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Coerced Fairness: Wronging Every Right

14 Thursday Apr 2016

Posted by Nuetzel in Discrimination, Liberty, Tyranny

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Andrew Bernstein, Constitutional rights, Dan Sanchez, discrimination, Economics of Discrimination, Freedom of Association, Freedom of Expression, Jeffrey Tucker, Jim Crow Laws, Ludwig von Mises, Property Rights, Public Accomodations, Right to Privacy, Unintended Consequences

 

image

A nurse says, “If I can bring myself to treat a patient tattooed with a swastika, then a baker can bake a cake for a gay wedding.” Of course, the statement ignores any differences in the values held by these individuals, their right to hold different values, or at least their right to act peacefully on those values. It makes an arbitrary presumption about what is “fair” and what is “unfair”, which is seldom well-defined when two parties hold sincere but conflicting beliefs. Yes, the baker can bake the cake, but should he be forced to do so under state compulsion? Coerced behavior is the product of aggression, but declining business for personal reasons is not an act of aggression, though the “safe-space” crowd would do its best to convince us otherwise. Sorry, hurt feelings don’t count!

Imposing the machinery of the state on private decisions about how and for whom one’s art must be practiced invites even more coercive action by the state going forward. Jeffrey Tucker addresses this in “Must a Jewish Baker Make a Nazi Cake?“, using the teachings of Ludwig von Mises on the implications of voluntary and coerced behavior.

Discrimination occurs in markets in many forms. Consumers discriminate between sellers and products based on quality, price, convenience and trust. In turn,  producers or sellers discriminate between workers based on skill, effort, wages and trust. They discriminate between local markets or areas of specialization based on profitability. They discriminate between buyers based upon ability and willingness to pay. All of these forms of discrimination are rational because they result in better value for the discriminating consumer or better profitability for the discriminating producer. In other words, these forms of discrimination align with economic self-interest.

Other forms of discrimination do not align strictly with economic self-interest, but they may be preferred by the individual based on other criteria. It’s probably not possible to justify these forms of discrimination from all perspectives. Some may be abhorrent to most observers, including me. Certainly more consensus exists on some than on others. Nevertheless, these non-economically motivated forms of discrimination are always costly to the discriminator. For example, a consumer who refuses to frequent certain establishments owned by members of an out-group will forego opportunities for more varied experiences. Also, she will tend to pay higher prices due to her lack of interest in the competitive effort made by the out-group. An employer who refuses to hire certain minorities faces a more limited labor pool. He is likely to face a higher wage bill and will get a less efficient mix of skills in his workers. A seller who discriminates against certain groups by turning them away foregoes revenue, and the action may have negative reputational consequences. Obviously, other competitors can profit from another seller’s discriminatory behavior. Almost by definition, markets impose penalties on discrimination not borne out of economic self-interest.

Anyone with doubts about the effectiveness of markets and capitalism to overcome this latter type of discrimination should look no further than the broadly integrated activity that occurs within markets every day, and at the extent to which markets have become more diverse over time. Here is a choice quote of Tucker:

“Commerce has a tendency to break down barriers, not create them. In fact, this is why Jim Crow laws came into existence, to interrupt the integrationist tendencies of the marketplace. Here is the hidden history of a range of government interventions, from zoning to labor laws to even the welfare state itself. The ruling class has always resented and resisted the market’s tendency to break down entrenched status and gradually erode tribal bias.

Indeed, commerce is the greatest fighter against bigotry and hate that humankind has ever seen. And it is precisely for this reason that a movement rooted in hate must necessarily turn to politics to get its way.“

The hypertext within the quote links to an excellent piece by Andrew Berstein on “Black Innovators and Entrepreneurs Under Capitalism”, which covers the sad history of efforts to use government to undermine black commercial success.

Social justice activists argue that the state has a compelling interest in ending all discrimination, but the courts have followed a circuitous path in thrashing out whether (and what parts of) the U.S. Constitution might protect individuals or groups against private discrimination. But my interest is in what happens when the state endeavors to end discrimination in markets that are otherwise self-regulating: the state infringes on other rights that are clearly and definitively enshrined in the Constitution, and it arrigates power to itself that far exceeds the limits defined there. It may compromise the freedom of association, the freedom of religion, the right to private property, and the right to privacy. I believe the government has a compelling interest in protecting those rights, which apply to all individuals. It is also worth noting the absence of a limiting principle in defining what counts as fairness or discrimination. The Left finds it easy to denigrate and dismiss these as selfish concerns, proving how little regard they have for individual liberty. Establishing government control over the extent of those rights represents the end of our Constitutional Republic and is a prescription for tyranny.

Consider the ways in which government often attempts or is asked to create accommodations for marginalized groups, through laws on hate speech, compulsory service, hiring quotas, admission quotas, lending fairness, pricing equity, wage laws, work rules, mandatory facilities and the forced transfer of income. Tucker argues that this complex web of resource manipulation and mandatory and proscribed behaviors has several “unintended” consequences. I already mentioned the obvious abridgment of freedoms. Another negative consequence is that this approach does not promote unity; it breeds resentment and is likely to end in greater disunity. Furthermore, self-sufficiency is undermined by policies that hamper economic growth, and all of the general measures just mentioned redound to the detriment of that objective. Finally, many of these “fairness” policies run directly counter to the interests of the marginalized, such as wage floors that eliminate employment opportunities for the least-skilled, and means testing that discourages labor market effort through income “cliff” incentives.

The most menacing aspect of the effort to stamp out all forms of discrimination is a state with power to impose its own rules of legal “fair” treatment. Tucker appeals to Mises’ views on this point:

“[Mises] said that a policy that forces people against their will creates the very conditions that lead to legal discrimination. In his view, even speaking as someone victimized by invidious discrimination, it is better to retain freedom than build a bureaucracy that overrides human choice. …

Sacrificing principle for the sake of marginalized groups is short-sighted. If you accept the infringement of human rights as an acceptable political weapon, that weapon will eventually be turned on the very people you want to help. As Dan Sanchez has written, ‘Authoritarian restriction is a game much better suited for the mighty than for the marginalized.’“

Proponents of legal, compensatory  handicapping by the state in favor of those pressing any and all grievances ask us to compromise basic constitutional rights, including the rights of association, free expression, privacy and private property. A corresponding effect is to grant the state more complete coercive power in almost every aspect of life. The unavoidable focus of such policies is not unity, but group identity, a divisive result that should give us pause. The power granted to the state in this context is as arbitrary as the currently fashionable definition of “fairness”, and it cannot be rolled back easily. Furthermore, economic vitality is not easy to restore once basic institutions and freedoms have been destroyed. This is evident from the sad history of socialism throughout the world. Ultimately, the coercive power granted to the state can be used in ways that should horrify today’s proponents of social and economic redress for every real or imagined inequity.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Addendum: Just over a year ago, I made a qualified defense of the right of a business to refuse service based on religious principles in my post “Suit Me, Or Face a Lawsuit: Adventures In Litigationland“. There, I made a distinction between “public accommodations” versus work for which a business-person must use her art, which is a form of expression, to provide customized service to a potential customer. I had the baker in mind, or the photographer asked to work a gay wedding. As I have in this post, I maintained that if a business-person finds some aspect of a request objectionable for any reason, she has the right to discriminate by refusing the business as a matter of freedom of expression.

I left a huge loose end in the argument I made in the earlier post. It had to do with the presumed requirement to serve all potential customers through the “public accommodations” of a private business. However, if the baker creates a beautiful “love cake” for sale to the general public, why can’t he refuse to sell it to a gay couple for their wedding as a matter of freedom of expression? After all, it involves the baker’s art. If a stationer has created an artful collection of cards for sale to the public, why can’t she refuse to sell them to a gay couple for their wedding invitations on account of her religious convictions? And what about the nurse? If he is in private practice, can’t he refuse to practice his art of healing on the “swastikaner” as a matter of free expression? I believe that’s a constitutional absolute, though professional oaths may dictate that care be delivered. An emergency room nurse would not have any choice but to deliver care under federal law, but it is not clear whether the law would withstand a constitutional challenge by a private hospital on these grounds. As things stand, the nurse can only refuse employment or resign if the rules are not to his liking.

 

 

Suit Me, Or Face a Lawsuit: Adventures In Litigationland

06 Monday Apr 2015

Posted by Nuetzel in Discrimination, Presumptive rights

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

14th Amendment, 1st Amendment, Anti-discrimination law, Constitutional rights, Economics of Discrimination, Eugene Volokh, Free exercise, Free expression, Freedom of Association, Gary Becker, Gay rights, Indiana, New Mexico, Presumptive rights, Private discrimination, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, SCOTUS, Taste for discrimination, Tolerance and profit

Racism-cartoon

Suppose that Jim and Bob, who are life partners, own and operate a company that produces signage. A church group requests a banner to read “Only one man and one woman make a marriage”. Jim and Bob are likely to be offended by the suggestion that they use their art to express such a sentiment, and I think they are entitled to refuse the business. The freedom of expression granted by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects individuals against compulsion to express things they find objectionable. Will Jim and Bob engage in discrimination if they refuse the business? You bet, but I do not think the government has a “compelling interest” to intervene on behalf of the religious group, especially if there are other businesses capable of producing the banner or if the group can produce it themselves.

Has the exercise of free expression been tested as a defense against charges of illegal discrimination? The example above dealt with discrimination by a private company against a religious group. A similar case involved New Mexico photographers who refused to shoot photos at a same-sex wedding. The plaintiffs alleged discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, but the photographers claimed that compulsion to accept that work constituted a violation of their freedom of expression. The New Mexico Supreme Court ruled against the photographers. They appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court (SCotUS), which refused to hear the case without additional comment. While this case established a precedent in New Mexico for the compelling interest of government to enforce anti-discrimination law, the refusal of SCotUS to get involved did not create a wider precedent in favor of anti-discrimation law over free speech. There are a number of reasons why the Court might have refused to hear the case, including the fact that the suit was brought under state law, not federal law; simple prioritization across many competing cases for an always full docket; or the lack of any conflict with other court decisions.

At the link above, which was written just after the New Mexico court’s ruling, Eugene Volokh offered his views on the case:

“Is it permissible for the law to require freelance writers, composers, artists, editors, and the like to create speech that they don’t want to create? Might it even be permissible for the law to require other conduits, such as bookstores and movie theaters, to distribute speech that they don’t want to distribute? (I use ‘speech’ here in the standard First Amendment sense, which includes music, pictures, video, and the like.) … It seems to me that having to create speech, using your own creative abilities and judgments as an artist, musician, writer, or what have you, is an even deeper ‘foster[ing]’ of ‘an idea [you might] find morally objectionable’ — an even deeper intrusion on ‘individual freedom of mind’”

We often couch discussions like this in terms of “rights”, which is easily understood. However, there is a strong distinction between this framing and the actual structure of the Constitution. Rather than granting specific rights to individuals, that document presumes the existence of those rights and instead enumerates powers held by the federal government and restrictions on its exercise of those powers. For example, here is the First Amendment:

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

And below is a key excerpt from the Fourteenth Amendment, upon which much anti-discrimination law is based. Note that its prohibitions apply only to government action, not private action:

“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

One right that should be presumptive is that of individuals to form a union in marriage. It is not addressed explicitly in the Constitution, and perhaps that would be less important if the government were not so intricately involved in the marriage business. Property rights, estate law, taxes, and legal benefits to employees and significant others can all be dependent on the legal status of a marriage. Still, it is not obvious why the government should be anything but neutral with respect to who can be married. Even if we concede a government interest in certifying marriages (it is a source of license fee revenue), are there other reasons for government authority in this area? Call me a skeptic. In any case, the legal recognition of marriage has been left up to the states.

Laws against private discrimination are thought to derive their authority from an enumerated power in the commerce clause, in Article 1 of the Constitution. This allows Congress to “regulate commerce among the several states“. This power was traditionally held to relate only to interstate commerce, consistent with the preservation of federalist principles and states’ rights. The courts have interpreted the power more broadly at times, but it is certainly not unlimited. In the traditional context of interstate commerce, and in view of the presumptive nature of individual rights under the Constitution, this seems to be a strikingly thin rationale for regulating many kinds of private behavior, or for compelling certain activities that burden the exercise of other rights.

Returning to the example above, defending Jim and Bob for turning away the church group’s business is similar in most respects to defending the photographer in the New Mexico case, or the baker who refuses, on religious grounds, to decorate a cake with a gay wedding theme. The cases all involve a form of private discrimination and a conflict between anti-discrimination law and forms of free expression. Whether presumptive rights to free speech, religious practice, or even freedom of association can trump statutory prohibitions against discrimination, or vice versa, is unlikely to be resolved once and for all, at least not any time soon. The individual circumstances surrounding a dispute of this nature will always be helpful, if not determinative. But what sort of test can be applied in order to achieve a resolution?

When sufficient tension exists, it is up to the courts to consider the specific nature of the discrimination in question, its rationale under any presumptive rights, and whether the claimant has “protected” status under a relevant anti-discrimination law. In terms of anti-discrimination law, a line is often drawn by insisting on the universal, non-discriminatory provision of “public accommodations”. The exact meaning of this term can differ by jurisdiction, but it generally implies a sales channel for which the “doors are open”. The presence of competition and alternative providers would argue against the state’s contravention of the presumptive rights of individual sellers in order to satisfy a statuary requirement. The competitive landscape and presence of viable alternatives should be an important consideration in balancing interests in these kinds of conflicts.

Choosing to discriminate against a specific group is not costless, even when legally sanctioned. It is obvious to most business people that tolerance is more profitable than intolerance. The acceptance of this disparity was clearly articulated as a “taste” for discrimination by Gary Becker in his 1957 book, “The Economics of Discrimination“. Becker’s analysis of discrimination in the labor market noted that employers with such a “taste” are willing to pay higher wages in order to avoid hiring certain minorities. In the examples above, Bob and Jim are willing to turn away otherwise profitable business, as are the baker and the photographer. However, their tastes for discrimination do not imply economic irrationality. In all three cases, the business people hold the maintenance of certain principles to be of greater value than the foregone profits.

These issues are relevant to the recent controversy surrounding Indiana’s new Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The context for RFRAs is narrower, as they relate to religious expression as opposed to expression generally. The first RFRA was a federal law supported by liberals in response to a conservative SCotUS decision in a dispute over the use of peyote for religious purposes. Generally, RFRAs require that the government have a compelling interest in burdening religious exercise and then must do so using the least restrictive means available. A number of individual states have passed their own RFRAs in order to carve out religious exemptions to various rules. In a recent post, Eugene Volokh discusses the history that gave rise to RFRAs, and the irony that many liberals now decry their existence, while conservatives tend to support them. The principles underlying these laws were once championed by prominent liberal members of SCotUS.

The version of the Indiana RFRA originally signed by Governor Pence would have allowed religious expression to be used as a defense in a discrimination lawsuit. Subsequently, the Indiana state legislature amended the bill with a provision stating that the law does not authorize a “provider” to refuse business from a range of protected groups, including gays and lesbians (ministers, churches and non-profits are exempted). Does this nullify the impact of the bill on free exercise of religion? Many believe so. However, the absence of positive “authorization” may not mean the courts will decide that the state of Indiana has a compelling interest in preventing a particular case of discrimination.

[An aside: One interesting approach has been suggested for businesses in the wedding industry whose owners believe that accepting work at same-sex weddings would violate their religious principles. These businesses should continue to accept business through their “public accommodations” except for customized wedding goods and services. According to this approach, they should offer the latter exclusively through binding contracts with specific churches or places of worship, thereby operating  exemptions granted to those institutions.]

Critics of the original Indiana RFRA were generally silent regarding RFRAs in 19 other states, as well as a federal RFRA signed by President Clinton. Moreover, it is clear that there has been some contrived activity from partisans on both sides (see here, here and here). At least the contrived activity demonstrates a greater depth of understanding than some of the hateful speech that I have witnessed on social media. Some would claim my example of Jim and Bob is contrived as well, but it is a plausible scenario and it shows that the tension between rights can cut both ways. A call for the legal supremacy of anti-discrimination law over presumptive rights means that the freedoms of protected groups can be abrogated as well when in conflict with another protected group.

Persecution is well known to both gays and people of faith. Both groups are certainly aware that there will always be others who do not share their views, strictures and practices, and some who may well disapprove. Both groups should be sympathetic to the notion of “live and let live”, and they should have the forbearance to avoid insisting on everyone’s direct participation in their celebrations. Some might even call this good manners. Participation (even for profit) cannot be compelled any more than approval. Regardless of what one might think of the values of outsiders who do not wish to participate, the “discriminatory” actions (or failures to act) in question are not prima facie evidence of hatred.

Jim and Bob, as well as the baker and the photographer, have broad presumptive rights under the constitution, whether they involve free speech or religious exercise. No one should be compelled to engage in expression they find objectionable without the ability to challenge it in court. Protections against discrimination are important, but they certainly do not confer the power to force others to participate in your celebrations. And why bother? Live and let live.

Postscript: Why bother, indeed! And here is Jonathan Turley on the key issue of defining an “expressive act”.

Court Strength In The Constitution

30 Friday Jan 2015

Posted by Nuetzel in Judicial Branch

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Boston Globe, Constitutional rights, Damon Root, Judicial Activism, Judicial Restraint, Original Intent, Rand Paul, Randy Barnett, Reason Magazine

santorumandi

An important function of the judicial branch of government is to defend the U.S. Constitution and the constitutional rights of individuals. In my view, deference on the part of courts to legislative decisions or to court precedent should be viewed with skepticism. The plain text of the Constitution should always come first. Beyond that, however, judges should not interject their personal opinions into decisions. Does this position support so-called “judicial activism”, or “judicial restraint”? Many legal thinkers reject that dichotomy because it embodies contradictions, failing to reliably categorize my position combining constitutional precedence with a rejection of political preference in jurisprudence. The pairing seems natural enough to me.

“Judicial activism” is often used as a pejorative, as Randy Barnett says at the link above, quoting a Boston Globe article that quotes him:

” ‘Most people who use the term don’t provide a coherent definition of it. It typically means judicial opinions with which they disagree,’ says Randy E. Barnett, a law professor at Boston University who considers himself a libertarian and a defender of ‘original intent’ in Constitutional matters. [He should have written ‘original meaning’ not “original intent” –RB.]”

According to Reason‘s Damon Root, Rand Paul calls himself a judicial activist. It would be interesting to hear exactly how he defines it, but he also purports to be something of a strict constitutionalist. In “Why Rand Paul’s Case for ‘Judicial Activism’ Scares Both Liberals and Conservatives“, Root discusses the interesting coincidence that contrary to Paul, both traditional conservatives and progressives seem to believe in judicial restraint. His explanation:

“What these two views share in common is that they each support what amounts to virtually unchecked majoritarian rule over certain aspects of American life. For conservatives, judicial deference means that lawmakers get the last word when it comes to banning birth control and prohibiting ‘homosexual conduct.’ For liberals, judicial deference means that lawmakers get the last word when it comes to bulldozing private property in the name of eminent domain. Each approach demands judicial passivity in the face of its preferred forms of government action.”

Of course, there are lovers of government power on both the left and the right. Rand Paul wants to distance himself from their kind, but many libertarians do not believe he will stick to principles of limited government as he campaigns for the GOP nomination.

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