Stealth Hiring Quotas Via AI

24 Monday Oct 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Discrimination, Diversity, Quotas, Uncategorized

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AI, AI Bill of Rights, Algorithmic Bias, Algorithms, American Data Privacy and Protection Act, Artificial Intelligence, DEI, Disparate impact, Diversity Equity Inclusion, EEOC, Hiring Quotas, Machine Learning, Neural Networks, Protected Classes, Stealth Quotas, Stewart Baker, Volokh Conspiracy

Hiring quotas are of questionable legal status, but for several years, some large companies have been adopting quota-like “targets” under the banner of Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives. Many of these so-called targets apply to the placement of minority candidates into “leadership positions”, and some targets may apply more broadly. Explicit quotas have long been viewed negatively by the public. Quotas have also been proscribed under most circumstances by the Supreme Court, and the EEOC’s Compliance Manual still includes rigid limits on when the setting of minority hiring “goals” is permissible.

Yet large employers seem to prefer the legal risks posed by aggressive DEI policies to the risk of lawsuits by minority interests, unrest among minority employees and “woke” activists, and “disparate impact” inquiries by the EEOC. Now, as Stewart Baker writes in a post over at the Volokh Conspiracy, employers have a new way of improving — or even eliminating — the tradeoff they face between these risks: “stealth quotas” delivered via artificial intelligence (AI) decisioning tools.

Skynet Smiles

A few years ago I discussed the extensive use of algorithms to guide a range of decisions in “Behold Our Algorithmic Overlords“. There, I wrote:

“Imagine a world in which all the information you see is selected by algorithm. In addition, your success in the labor market is determined by algorithm. Your college admission and financial aid decisions are determined by algorithm. Credit applications are decisioned by algorithm. The prioritization you are assigned for various health care treatments is determined by algorithm. The list could go on and on, but many of these ‘use-cases’ are already happening to one extent or another.”

That post dealt primarily with the use of algorithms by large tech companies to suppress information and censor certain viewpoints, a danger still of great concern. However, the use of AI to impose de facto quotas in hiring is a phenomenon that will unequivocally reduce the efficiency of the labor market. But exactly how does this mechanism work to the satisfaction of employers?

Machine Learning

As Baker explains, AI algorithms are “trained” to find optimal solutions to problems via machine learning techniques, such as neural networks, applied to large data sets. These techniques are are not as straightforward as more traditional modeling approaches such as linear regression, which more readily lend themselves to intuitive interpretation of model results. Baker uses the example of lung x-rays showing varying degrees of abnormalities, which range from the appearance of obvious masses in the lungs to apparently clear lungs. Machine learning algorithms sometimes accurately predict the development of lung cancer in individuals based on clues that are completely non-obvious to expert evaluators. This, I believe, is a great application of the technology. It’s too bad that the intuition behind many such algorithmic decisions are often impossible to discern. And the application of AI decisioning to social problems is troubling, not least because it necessarily reduces the richness of individual qualities to a set of data points, and in many cases, defines individuals based on group membership.

When it comes to hiring decisions, an AI algorithm can be trained to select the “best” candidate for a position based on all encodable information available to the employer, but the selection might not align with a hiring manager’s expectations, and it might be impossible to explain the reasons for the choice to the manager. Still, giving the AI algorithm the benefit of the doubt, it would tend to make optimal candidate selections across reasonably large sets of similar, open positions.

Algorithmic Bias

A major issue with respect to these algorithms has been called “algorithmic bias”. Here, I limit the discussion to hiring decisions. Ironically, “bias” in this context is a rather slanted description, but what’s meant is that the algorithms tend to select fewer candidates from “protected classes” than their proportionate shares of the general population. This is more along the lines of so-called “disparate impact”, as opposed to “bias” in the statistical sense. Baker discusses the attacks this has provoked against algorithmic decision techniques. In fact, a privacy bill is pending before Congress containing provisions to address “AI bias” called the American Data Privacy and Protection Act (ADPPA). Baker is highly skeptical of claims regarding AI bias both because he believes they have little substance and because “bias” probably means that AIs sometimes make decisions that don’t please DEI activists. Baker elaborates on these developments:

“The ADPPA was embraced almost unanimously by Republicans as well as Democrats on the House energy and commerce committee; it has stalled a bit, but still stands the best chance of enactment of any privacy bill in a decade (its supporters hope to push it through in a lame-duck session). The second is part of the AI Bill of Rights released last week by the Biden White House.”

What the hell are the Republicans thinking? Whether or not it becomes a matter of law, misplaced concern about AI bias can be addressed in a practical sense by introducing the “right” constraints to the algorithm, such as a set of aggregate targets for hiring across pools of minority and non-minority job candidates. Then, the algorithm still optimizes, but the constraints impinge on the selections. The results are still “optimal”, but in a more restricted sense.

Stealth Quotas

As Baker says, these constrains on algorithmic tools would constitute a way of imposing quotas on hiring that employers won’t really have to explain to anyone. That’s because: 1) the decisioning rationale is so obtuse that it can’t readily be explained; and 2) the decisions are perceived as “fair” in the aggregate due to the absence of disparate impacts. As to #1, however, the vendors who create hiring algorithms, and specific details regarding algorithm development, might well be subject to regulatory scrutiny. In the end, the chief concern of these regulators is the absence of disparate impacts, which is cinched by #2.

About a month ago I posted about the EEOC’s outrageous and illegal enforcement of disparate impact liability. Should I welcome AI interventions because they’ll probably limit the number of enforcement actions against employers by the EEOC? After all, there is great benefit in avoiding as much of the rigamarole of regulatory challenges as possible. Nonetheless, as a constraint on hiring, quotas necessarily reduce productivity. By adopting quotas, either explicitly or via AI, the employer foregoes the opportunity to select the best candidate from the full population for a certain share of open positions, and instead limits the pool to narrow demographics.

Demographics are dynamic, and therefore stealth quotas must be dynamic to continue to meet the demands of zero disparate impact. But what happens as an increasing share of the population is of mixed race? Do all mixed race individuals receive protected status indefinitely, gaining preferences via algorithm? Does one’s protected status depend solely upon self-identification of racial, ethnic, or gender identity?

For that matter, do Asians receive hiring preferences? Sometimes they are excluded from so-called protected status because, as a minority, they have been “too successful”. Then, for example, there are issues such as the classification of Hispanics of European origin, who are likely to help fill quotas that are really intended for Hispanics of non-European descent.

Because self-identity has become so critical, quotas present massive opportunities for fraud. Furthermore, quotas often put minority candidates into positions at which they are less likely to be successful, with damaging long-term consequences to both the employer and the minority candidate. And of course there should remain deep concern about the way quotas violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection to many job applicants.

The acceptance of AI hiring algorithms in the business community is likely to depend on the nature of the positions to be filled, especially when they require highly technical skills and/or the pool of candidates is limited. Of course, there can be tensions between hiring managers and human resources staff over issues like screening job candidates, but HR organizations are typically charged with spearheading DEI initiatives. They will be only too eager to adopt algorithmic selection and stealth quotas for many positions and will probably succeed, whether hiring departments like it or not.

The Death of Merit

Unfortunately, quotas are socially counter-productive, and they are not a good way around the dilemma posed by the EEOC’s aggressive enforcement of disparate impact liability. The latter can only be solved only when Congress acts to more precisely define the bounds of illegal discrimination in hiring. Meanwhile, stealth quotas cede control over important business decisions to external vendors selling algorithms that are often unfathomable. Quotas discard judgements as to relevant skills in favor of awarding jobs based on essentially superficial characteristics. This creates an unnecessary burden on producers, even if it goes unrecognized by those very firms and is self-inflicted. Even worse, once these algorithms and stealth quotas are in place, they are likely to become heavily regulated and manipulated in order to achieve political goals.

Baker sums up a most fundamental objection to quotas thusly:

“Most Americans recognize that there are large demographic disparities in our society, and they are willing to believe that discrimination has played a role in causing the differences. But addressing disparities with group remedies like quotas runs counter to a deep-seated belief that people are, and should be, judged as individuals. Put another way, given a choice between fairness to individuals and fairness on a group basis, Americans choose individual fairness. They condemn racism precisely for its refusal to treat people as individuals, and they resist remedies grounded in race or gender for the same reason.”

Quotas, and stealth quotas, substitute overt discrimination against individuals in non-protected classes, and sometimes against individuals in protected classes as well, for the imagined sin of a disparate impact that might occur when the best candidate is hired for a job. AI algorithms with protection against “algorithmic bias” don’t satisfy this objection. In fact, the lack of accountability inherent in this kind of hiring solution makes it far worse than the status quo.

Hiring Discrimination In the U.S., Canada, and Western Europe

10 Monday Oct 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Discrimination

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Alex Tabarrok, Anti-Discrimination Laws, Ban the Box, Disparate impact, European Union, Hiring Discrimination, Protected Groups, Racial Proxies, Segregation, Slavery

Some people have the impression that the U.S. is uniquely bad in terms of racial, ethnic, gender, and other forms of discrimination. This misapprehension is almost as grossly in error as the belief held in some circles that the history of slavery is uniquely American, when in fact the practice has been so common historically, and throughout the world, as to be the rule rather than the exception.

This week, Alex Tabarrok shared some research I’d never seen on one kind of discriminatory behavior. In his post, “The US has Relatively Low Rates of Hiring Discrimination”, he cites the findings of a 2019 meta-study of “… 97 Field Experiments of Racial Discrimination in Hiring”. The research focused on several Western European countries, Canada, and the U.S. The experiments involved the use of “faux applicants” for actual job openings. Some studies used applications only and were randomized across different racial or ethnic cues for otherwise similar applicants. Other studies paired similar individuals of different racial or ethnic background for separate in-person interviews.

The authors found that hiring discrimination is fairly ubiquitous against non-white groups across employers in these countries. The authors were careful to note that the study did not address levels of hiring discrimination in countries outside the area of the study. They also disclaimed any implication about other forms of discrimination within the covered countries, such as bias in lending or housing.

The study’s point estimates indicated “ubiquitous hiring discrimination”, though not all the estimates were statistically significant. My apologies if the chart below is difficult to read. If so, try zooming in, clicking on it, or following the link to the study above.

Some of the largest point estimates were highly imprecise due to less coverage by individual studies. The impacted groups and severity varied across countries. Blacks suffered significant discrimination in the U.S., Canada, France, and Great Britain. For Hispanics, the only coverage was in the U. S. and sparsely in Canada. The point estimates showed discrimination in both counties, but it was (barely) significant only in the U.S. For Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) applicants, discrimination was severe in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden. Asian applicants faced discrimination in France, Norway, Canada, and Great Britain.

Across all countries, the group suffering the least hiring discrimination was white immigrants, followed by Latin Americans / Hispanics (but only two countries were covered). Asians seemed to suffer the most discrimination, though not significantly more than Blacks (and less in the U.S. than in France, Norway, Canada, and Great Britain). Blacks and MENA applicants suffered a bit less than Asians from hiring discrimination, but again, not significantly less.

Comparing countries, the authors used U.S. hiring discrimination as a baseline, assigning a value of one. France had the most severe hiring discrimination and at a high level of significance. Sweden was next highest, but it was not significantly higher than in the U.S. Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands and Great Britain had higher point estimates of overall discrimination than the U. S., though none of those differences were significant. Employers in Norway were about as discriminatory as the U.S., and German employers were less discriminatory, though not significantly.

The upshot is that as a group, U.S. employers are generally at the low end of the spectrum in terms of discriminatory hiring. Again, the intent of this research was not to single out the selected countries. Rather, these countries were chosen because relevant studies were available. In fact, Tabarrok makes the following comment, which the authors probably wouldn’t endorse and is admittedly speculative, but I suspect it’s right:

“I would bet that discrimination rates would be much higher in Japan, China and Korea not to mention Indonesia, Iraq, Nigeria or the Congo. Understanding why discrimination is lower in Western capitalist democracies would reorient the literature in a very useful way.”

So the U.S. is not on the high-side of this set of Western countries in terms of discriminatory hiring practices. While discrimination against blacks and Hispanics in the U.S. appears to be a continuing phenomenon, overall hiring discrimination in the U.S. is, at worst, comparable to many European countries.

To anticipate one kind of response to this emphasis, the U.S. is not alone in its institutional efforts to reduce discrimination. In fact, the study’s authors say:

“A fairly similar set of antidiscrimination laws were adopted in North America and many Western European countries from the 1960s to the 1990s. In 2000, the European Union passed a series of race directives that mandated a range of antidiscrimination measures to be adopted by all member states, putting their legislative frameworks on racial discrimination on highly similar footing.”

Despite these similarities, there are a few institutional details that might have some bearing on the results. For example, France bans the recording and “formal discussion” of race and ethnicity during the hiring process. (However, photos are often included in job applications in European countries.) Does this indicate that reporting mandates and prohibiting certain questions reduce hiring discrimination? That might be suggestive, but the evidence is not as clear cut as the authors seem to believe. They cite one piece of conflicting literature on that point. Moreover, it does not explain why Great Britain had a greater (and highly significant) point estimate of discrimination against Asians, or why Canada and Norway were roughly equivalent to France on this basis. Nor does it explain why Sweden and Belgium did not differ from France significantly in terms of discrimination against MENA applicants. Or why Canada was not significantly different from France in terms of hiring discrimination against Blacks. Overall, discrimination in Sweden was not significantly less than in France. Still, at least based on the three applicant groups covered by studies of France, that country had the highest overall level of discrimination. France also had the most significant departure from the U.S., where recording the race and ethnicity of job applicants is institutionalized.

Germany had the lowest overall point estimates of hiring discrimination in the study. According to the authors, employers in German-speaking countries tend to collect a fairly thorough set of background information on job applications. This detail can actually work against discrimination in hiring. Tabarrok notes that so-called “ban the box” policies, or laws that prohibit employers from asking about an applicant’s criminal record, are known to result in greater racial disparities in hiring. The same is true of policies that threaten sanctions against the use of objective job qualifications which might have disparate impacts on “protected” groups. That’s because generalized proxies based on race are often adopted by hiring managers, consciously or subconsciously.

Discrimination in hiring based on race and ethnicity might actually be reasonable when a job entails sensitive interactions requiring high levels of trust with members of a minority community. This statement acknowledges that we do not live in a perfect world in which racial and ethnic differences are irrelevant. Still, aside from exceptions of that kind, overt hiring discrimination based on race or ethnicity is a negative social outcome. The conundrum we face is whether it is more or less negative than efforts to coerce nondiscrimination on those bases across a broad range of behaviors, most of which are nondiscriminatory to begin with, and when interventions often have perverse discriminatory effects. Policymakers and observers in the U.S. should maintain perspective. Discriminatory behavior persists in the U.S., especially against Blacks, but some of this discrimination is likely caused by prohibitions on objective tests of relevant job skills. And as the research discussed above shows, employers here appear to be a bit less discriminatory than those in most other Western democracies.

Ubiquitous Guilt: EEOC Disparate Impact Liability

22 Thursday Sep 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Discrimination, Regulation

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Antonin Scalia, Automation, Bias, Business Necessity, Chevron Deference, Christopher Rufo, Civil Rights Act, Credit Checks, Criminal Background Checks, DEI, discrimination, Disparate impact, Due Process, EEOC, Employment Practices, Equal Protection, Four-Fifths Rule, Gail Heriot, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., Major Questions Doctrine, Non-Delegation Doctrine, Protected Groups, Separation of Powers, Stakeholder Capitalism, Strength Tests, Title VII, Warren Burger, Written Job Tests

A key part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was Title VII, which dealt with employment discrimination. Title VII applied only to intentional discrimination, but it didn’t take long for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with administering Title VII, to find ways to expand the scope of its enforcement mandate under the law. The EEOC eventually managed to convince virtually all parties, including employers, employees, job applicants, attorneys, and even the courts, that the law prohibited employment practices having disparate impacts on groups protected from actual discrimination under the law. Predictably, this warped reinterpretation created severe distortions to the efficiency and fairness of labor market outcomes .

Another Rogue Agency

On the EEOC’s complete and erroneous reimagining of Title VII, Gail Heriot’s “Title VII Disparate Impact Liability Makes Almost Everything Presumptively Illegal” is a must read. Heriot is a Professor at the University of San Diego School of Law and is a member of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. This post attempts to summarize most of the important points in Heriot’s paper, so if you don’t have time for Heriot’s paper, read on. All errors are mine, of course!

Heriot provides an incredible case study on the dangers of regulatory overreach. She first discusses the EEOC’s blatant usurpation of Congressional power:

“It is hardly surprising that EEOC officials would undertake to publish answers to the questions they were hearing repeatedly…. But publishing such ‘guidances’ also had the potential to spin out of control. The temptation would always be to use them to establish what the EEOC staff wanted the law to be rather than what it was. Instead of interpreting Title VII in good faith, guidances would soon become quasi-legislation—disguised as interpretation, but in reality imposing new duties on employers not found in Title VII itself.

None of this should be surprising. It is in the nature of bureaucracy. It naturally seeks to expand its powers, often beginning by occupying niches that are otherwise unoccupied. Over time, a little power often becomes a lot of power. What is surprising is how upfront EEOC officials were about their tactics in accumulating that power.”

Having gone this far, one might be tempted to ask the EEOC what limiting principle they actually apply to determine whether various employment and hiring practices are permissible. Are level of education, industry experience, and tests of physical and cognitive faculties verboten? The answer that is there is no consistent, limiting principle. Instead, Heriot says the EEOC “picks its battles” (see below). She also describes the EEOC’s adoption of a so-called “four-fifths rule”, which is about as arbitrary as it gets. It means the EEOC will challenge an employment practice only if it leads to a selection of any protected group at a rate less than 80% of the most-selected group. That is, the “disparate impact” must be less than 20% to rule out a challenge. This rule appears nowhere in Title VII.

Job Qualifications? You’re Guilty!

Unfortunately, as Heriot takes pains to demonstrate, it’s virtually impossible to identify a hiring guideline or method of employee assessment that does not have a disparate impact. The examples she provides on pp. 34 – 37 of her paper, and on p. 40, are convincing. Furthermore, the EEOC’s “four-fifths” rule hardly narrows the potential for challenge at all.

“Selection rates of less than four-fifths relative to the group with the highest rate are extremely common. Just as everything or nearly everything has a disparate impact, everything or nearly everything has a selection rate that fails the ‘four fifths rule’ for some race, color, religion, sex, or national origin group.”

So the EEOC is allowed to operate with tremendous discretion. Again, Heriot says the agency “picks its battles”, focusing on challenges to screening tools like “written tests, physical strength and endurance tests, criminal background tests [sic], high school diploma requirements, personal credit histories, residency requirements, and a few others.”

This regulatory environment encourages employers to keep job requirements vague, sometimes to the point at which potential applicants might not be sure what the job qualifications really are, or exactly what the job function entails. One upshot is that this makes it harder to detect and prove actual discrimination, and it often leads to more arbitrary decisions by hiring managers, which may, in fact, involve real discrimination, including nepotism and/or cronyism.

Unbiased Intent Doesn’t Matter

Heriot points to a disastrous decision by the Supreme Court that, perhaps unintentionally, helped legitimize the concept of disparate impact as legal doctrine, and as a valid cause of action by plaintiffs against employers. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), the Court rejected the premise that an employer’s innocence with respect to their intent to discriminate was an inadequate defense of an employment practice that had adverse consequences to a protected group. Heriot quotes the opinion of Chief Justice Warren Burger:

“… good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem…. Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.”

It’s as if the Court convinced itself that adverse consequences prove actual discrimination, even when there is no intent to discriminate. The Court also emphasized that it’s decision was based on “general deference” to the EEOC! And this was years before the unfortunate Chevron Doctrine (judicial deference to administrative agencies on interpretation of law) was formally established by the Court. Heriot and others assert that the decision in Griggs would have astonished the authors of Title VII.

Heriot also discusses changes in the treatment of “business necessity” as a defense against complaints of disparate impact. It is generally the employer’s burden to show the “necessity” of a challenged hiring practice. “Necessity” was the subject of several Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s and 1980s, but the Court stopped short of requiring an employer to show that a practice was “essential”. In one case, the court shifted some of the burden back onto the plaintiff to show that a practiced lacked necessity. In 1990, there was concern in the Bush Administration and Congress that the difficulty of proving business necessity would eventually lead to the adoption of racial quotas by employers in order to prevent EEOC challenges, though the authors of Title VII had staunchly opposed quotas. While the original hope was that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would resolve questions about “business necessity” and the burden of proof, it did not. Instead, it can be said that it legitimized disparate impact liability, with conditions. The standard for proving necessity, based on Court decisions, evolved to become more strict with time. There are cases in which courts seem to have left the EEOC to define “business necessity”, as if the EEOC would be in a better position to do that than the business itself!

Inviting Discrimination

Heriot devotes part of her paper to the perverse effects of disparate impact. When employers are faced with prohibitions or the threat of action against a certain practice, whether it be tests of aptitude, strength, or screening on criminal or credit records, they may abandon those devices and opt instead for “informal” proxies. The use of proxies, however, often leads to instances of actual discrimination, whether born of conscious or unconscious bias on the part of hiring managers.

Heriot provides a number of examples of the proxy phenomenon, some of which have been confirmed by empirical research. For example, an employer interviewing candidates for a job that requires math proficiency might reasonably use a test of math skill as a key criterion. If such a test is prohibited, the hiring manager might be tempted to hire an Asian candidate, since Asians have a reputation for good math skills. Similarly, an applicant of West European ancestry might be favored for a position requiring excellent grammar skills, absent the ability to explicitly test grammatical skill. Candidates for a job requiring a certain level of physical strength could be evaluated by various tests of strength, but barring that, a hiring manager might be inclined to hire based on gender.

When criminal background checks are prohibited, employers might be tempted to use proxies such as gender and race as a substitute. Likewise, if it’s forbidden to check a candidate’s credit record to gauge reliability, other proxies might lead to discrimination against members of protected classes. Needless to say, these kinds of outcomes are precisely the opposite of what the EEOC hopes to achieve.

As Heriot further notes, the outcomes can be much systematic and destructive than a bit of one-off discrimination in hiring, promotion, pay raises, or task assignment. These may inflict damage reaching well beyond having the wrong people gaining favorable labor market outcomes. For example, an employer might choose to relocate operations to a “safer” or more affluent community, barring an ability to perform criminal background or credit checks. Or businesses might decide to substitute capital for labor, given the interference in their attempts to identify the best job candidates. The difficulty in screening also creates an incentive to automate, just as premature automation is becoming more common with rising wage floors imposed by government.

Killing Jobs and Competition

Like many forms of regulation, however, large firms in less competitive industries are usually better positioned to survive EEOC scrutiny than smaller firms in competitive markets. Indeed, we often see large market players embrace regulation because it gives them a competitive advantage over smaller rivals. In this case, we see large firms adopting their own diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) goals. This is not solely related to the threat of EEOC challenges, however. Private lawsuits alleging discrimination or disparate impact are also a concern, as is pleasing activists inside and outside the company. Nevertheless, as Christopher Rufo reveals, there is growing push-back against the corporate DEI regime. Let’s hope it continues to gain traction.

Unconstitutional Executive Discretion

Heriot also dedicates part of her paper to constitutional issues related to the EEOC’s broad discretion in the application of disparate impact to employment practices. For one thing, disparate impact is a direct source of discrimination: when members of “protected groups” are awarded opportunities based on the possibility of disparate statistical outcomes, it means the majority candidates are denied those opportunities, no matter their qualifications. This is outright discrimination, and it’s instigation by a federal agency constitutes an explicit denial of equal protection under the law.

It should be no surprise that many consider disparate impact actions against employers to be denials of due process. Furthermore, when a federal agency like the EEOC exercises broad discretion, the so-called non-delegation doctrine should come into play. That is, the EEOC makes judgements on matters that are not necessarily authorized Congress. Thus, there are legitimate questions as to whether the EEOC’s discretion is a violation of the separation of powers. Granted, the courts have long deferred to administrative agencies in the interpretation of enabling statutes, but the Supreme Court has taken a new tack under Chief Justice Roberts. In some recent decisions, the Court has relied on a new “major questions” doctrine to place certain limits on executive discretion.

Conclusion

Hiring? Creating jobs? Better not get picky about checking your applicants’ skills and backgrounds or you risk liability for contributing to the statistical malaise of one, or of many, protected groups. That’s how it is under “disparate impact” rules imposed by the EEOC. The success of your business be damned!

Gail Heriot’s excellent paper details the way in which the EEOC transformed the meaning of its enabling legislation, expanding its reign over employment practices across the nation. She demonstrates the breadth of disparate impact rules with examples showing that virtually any attempt at systematic screening of job applicants can be held to be illegal. Your intent to hire the most qualified candidate without bias doesn’t matter, under an insane Supreme Court decision that buttressed the EEOC’s authority. As Heriot says, “… everything is presumptively illegal”. She also describes how disparate impact liability leads to employment decisions based on proxy criteria, which often lead to actual (even if unintended) discrimination. Further unintended consequences are the possibility of larger job losses in minority communities and less competition in product and labor markets. Finally, Heriot delineates several constitutional violations inherent in broad EEOC discretion and the enforcement of disparate impact.

One day a court challenge to the EEOC and disparate impact liability might rise to the level of the Supreme Court. Justice Antonin Scalia expected it, but it still hasn’t come before the Court. It should! Another way to do battle against the EEOC’s scourge is to challenge corporations who cow-tow to activists and to the EEOC with their own DEI initiatives. This manifestation of stakeholder capitalism is a cancer on the wealth and productivity of the U.S. economy, resting side-by-side with disparate impact liability.

Defang the Administrative State

14 Wednesday Apr 2021

Posted by Nuetzel in Administrative State, Discrimination, Free Speech

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Administrative Law, Administrative State, discrimination, Human Subjects, Institutional Review Boards, Internal Revenue Code, Ku Klux Klan, Philip Hamburger, Religious Speech, rent seeking, Section (501)(c)(3), Tuskegee, Woodrow Wilson

The American administrative state (AS) was borne out of frustration by statist reformers with expanded voting rights. It continues to be an effective force of exclusion and discrimination today, according to Philip Hamburger of Columbia Law School. I’ve discussed Hamburger’s commentary in the past on the extra-legal power often wielded by administrative agencies, and I will quote him liberally in what follows. At the first link above, he provides some historical context on the origins of the AS and discusses the inherently discriminatory nature of administrative law and jurisprudence.

An Abrogation of Voting Rights

Hamburger quotes Woodrow Wilson from 1887 on the difficulty of appealing to a broad electorate, a view that was nothing short of elitist and bigoted:

“‘… the reformer is bewildered’ by the need to persuade ‘a voting majority of several million heads.’ He worried about the diversity of the nation, which meant that the reformer needed to influence ‘the mind, not of Americans of the older stocks only, but also of Irishmen, of Germans, of Negroes.’ Put another way, ‘the bulk of mankind is rigidly unphilosophical, and nowadays the bulk of mankind votes.’”

Wow! Far better, thought Wilson, to leave the administration of public policy to a class of educated technocrats and thinkers whose actions would be largely independent of the voting public. But Wilson spoke out of both sides of his mouth: On one hand, he said that administration “lies outside the proper sphere of politics“, but he also insisted in the same publication (“The Study of Administration“) that public administration “must be at all points sensitive to public opinion“! Unfortunately, the views of largely independent public administrators seldom align with the views of the broader public.

Administration and Prejudice

Wilson was elected President 25 years later, and his administration did much to expand the administrative powers of the federal executive. Over the years, the scope of these powers would expand to include far more than mere administrative duties. Administrative rule-making would come to form a deep body of administrative law. And while traditional legislation would nominally serve to “enable” this activity, it has expanded in ways that are not straightforwardly connected to statute, and its impact on the lives of ordinary Americans has been massive. Furthermore, a separate legal system exists for adjudicating disputes between the public and administrative agencies, with entirely separate rules and guarantees than our traditional legal system:

“It is bad enough that administrative proceedings deny defendants many of the Constitution’s guaranteed civil procedures. … In addition, all administrative proceedings that penalize or correct are criminal in nature, and they deny defendants their procedural rights, such as their right to a jury and their right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Of course, these administrative proceedings deny procedural rights to all Americans, but they are especially burdensome on some, such as the poor.“

The AS has truly become a fourth, and in many ways dominant, branch of government. Checks and balances on its actions are woefully inadequate, and indeed, Wilson considered that a feature! It represents a usurpation of voting rights, but one that is routinely overlooked by defenders of universal suffrage. It is also highly prejudiced and discriminatory in its impact, which is routinely overlooked by those purporting to fight discrimination.

Bio-Medical Discrimination

Hamburger devotes some of his discussion to Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), which are mandated by federal law to conduct prior reviews of research in various disciplines. These boards are generally under the authority of the Department of Health and Human Services. One major objective of IRBs is to prevent research involving human subjects, but this prohibition can be very misguided, and the reviews impose costly burdens and delays of studies, often stopping them altogether on trivial grounds:

“This prior review inevitably delays and prevents a vast array of much entirely innocent bio-medical research. And because the review candidly focuses on speech in both the research and its publication, it also delays and prevents much bio-medical publication.

The consequences, particularly for minorities, are devastating. Although supposedly imposed by the federal government in response to scientific mistreatment of black individuals, such as at Tuskegee, the very solicitousness of IRBs for minorities stymies research on their distinctive medical problems. …

When government interferes with medical research and its publication—especially when it places administrative burdens on research and publication concerning minorities—the vast costs in human life are entirely predictable and, of course, discriminatory.”

Stifling Political Speach

Hamburger tells the story of Hiram Evans, a 1930s crusader against religious influence on voters and legislators. Evans also happened to be the Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan. Hamburger classifies Evans’ agitation as an important force behind nativist demands to outlaw religious speech in politics. Ultimately, Congress acquiesced, imposing limits on certain speech by non-profits. Individuals are effectively prohibited from fully participating in the political process through religious and other non-profit organizations by Section (501)(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Of course, tax-exempt status is critical to the survival and growth of many of these institutions. More traditionally religious individuals are often heavily reliant upon their faith-based organizations not just for practicing their faith, but as centers of intellectual and social life. Needless to say, politics intersects with these spheres, and to prohibit political speech by these organizations has an out-sized discriminatory impact on their members.

The insulation of the AS from the democratic process, and the effective limits on religious speech, often mean there is little leeway or tolerance within the AS for individuals whose religious beliefs run counter to policy:

“The difference between representative and administrative policymaking is painfully clear. When a legislature makes laws, the policies that bear down on religion are made by persons who feel responsive to religious constituents and who are therefore usually open to considering exemptions or generally less severe laws.”

But there are other fundamental biases against religious faith and practices within the AS:

“… when policies come from administrative agencies, they are made by persons who are chosen or fired by the executive, not the public, and so are less responsive than legislators to the distinctive needs of a diverse people. They are expected, moreover, to maintain an ethos of scientism and rationality, which—however valuable for some purposes—is indifferent and sometimes even antagonistic to relatively orthodox or traditional religion, let alone the particular needs of local religious communities.“

Sucking Life From the Republic

The administrative state imposes a variety of economic burdens on the private sector. This is not just costly to economic growth. It also creates innumerable opportunities for rent-seeking by interest groups of all kinds, including private corporations whose competitive interests often lead them to seek advantage outside of traditional participation in markets.

Hamburger’s arguments are even more fundamental to the proper functioning of a republic, but they are probably difficult for many journalists and politicians to fully grasp. He identifies some core structural defects of the administrative state, and he does so with great passion. He sums things up well in his closing:

“… was founded on racial and class prejudice, it is still supported by class prejudice. Moreover, by displacing laws made by elected lawmakers, it continues to discriminate against minorities of all sorts. Along the way, it stifles much scientific inquiry and publication with devastating costs, particularly for minorities. It is especially discriminatory against many religious Americans. And it eviscerates the Constitution’s procedural rights, not least in cases criminal in nature.

So, if you are inclined to defund oppression, defund the administrative state. If you want to tear down disgraceful monuments, demolish the prejudiced and discriminatory power that is Woodrow Wilson’s most abysmal legacy. If you are worried about stolen votes, do not merely protest retail impediments to voting, but broadly reject the wholesale removal of legislative power out of the hands of elected legislators. And if you are concerned about the injustice of the criminal justice system, speak up against the loss of juries, due process, and other rights when criminal proceedings get transmuted into administrative proceedings.

Little in America is as historically prejudiced or systematically discriminatory as administrative power. It is a disgrace, and it is time to take it down.“

Behold Our Algorithmic Overlords

18 Thursday Jul 2019

Posted by Nuetzel in Automation, Censorship, Discrimination, Marketplace of Ideas

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Algorithmic Governance, American Affairs, Antitrust, Behavioral Economics, Bryan Caplan, Claremont Institute, David French, Deplatforming, Facebook, Gleichschaltung, Google, Jonah Goldberg, Joseph Goebbels, Mark Zuckerberg, Matthew D. Crawford, nudge, Peeter Theil, Political Legitimacy, Populism, Private Governance, Twitter, Viewpoint Diversity

A willingness to question authority is healthy, both in private matters and in the public sphere, but having the freedom to do so is even healthier. It facilitates free inquiry, the application of the scientific method, and it lies at the heart of our constitutional system. Voluntary acceptance of authority, and trust in its legitimacy, hinges on our ability to identify its source, the rationale for its actions, and its accountability. Unaccountable authority, on the other hand, cannot be tolerated. It’s the stuff of which tyranny is made.

That’s one linchpin of a great essay by Matthew D. Crawford in American Affairs entitled “Algorithmic Governance and Political Legitimacy“. It’s a lengthy piece that covers lots of ground, and very much worth reading. Or you can read my slightly shorter take on it!

Imagine a world in which all the information you see is selected by algorithm. In addition, your success in the labor market is determined by algorithm. Your college admission and financial aid decisions are determined by algorithm. Credit applications are decisioned by algorithm. The prioritization you are assigned for various health care treatments is determined by algorithm. The list could go on and on, but many of these “use-cases” are already happening to one extent or another.

Blurring Private and Public Governance

Much of what Crawford describes has to do with the way we conduct private transactions and/or private governance. Most governance in free societies, of the kind that touches us day-to-day, is private or self-government, as Crawford calls it. With the advent of giant on-line platforms, algorithms are increasingly an aspect of that governance. Crawford notes the rising concentration of private governmental power within these organizations. While the platforms lack complete monopoly power, they are performing functions that we’d ordinarily be reluctant to grant any public form of government: they curate the information we see, conduct surveillance, exercise control over speech, and even indulge in the “deplatforming” of individuals and organizations when it suits them. Crawford quotes Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg:

“In a lot of ways Facebook is more like a government than a traditional company. . . . We have this large community of people, and more than other technology companies we’re really setting policies.”

At the same time, the public sector is increasingly dominated by a large administrative apparatus that is outside of the normal reach of legislative, judicial and even executive checks. Crawford worries about “… the affinities between administrative governance and algorithmic governance“. He emphasizes that neither algorithmic governance on technology platforms nor an algorithmic administrative state are what one could call representative democracy. But whether these powers have been seized or we’ve granted them voluntarily, there are already challenges to their legitimacy. And no wonder! As Crawford says, algorithms are faceless pathways of neural connections that are usually difficult to explain, and their decisions often strike those affected as arbitrary or even nonsensical.

Ministry of Wokeness

Political correctness plays a central part in this story. There is no question that the platforms are setting policies that discriminate against certain viewpoints. But Crawford goes further, asserting that algorithms have a certain bureaucratic logic to elites desiring “cutting edge enforcement of social norms“, i.e., political correctness, or “wokeness”, the term of current fashion.

“First, in the spirit of Václav Havel we might entertain the idea that the institutional workings of political correctness need to be shrouded in peremptory and opaque administrative mechanisms because its power lies precisely in the gap between what people actually think and what one is expected to say. It is in this gap that one has the experience of humiliation, of staying silent, and that is how power is exercised.

But if we put it this way, what we are really saying is not that PC needs administrative enforcement but rather the reverse: the expanding empire of bureaucrats needs PC. The conflicts created by identity politics become occasions to extend administrative authority into previously autonomous domains of activity. …

The incentive to technologize the whole drama enters thus: managers are answerable (sometimes legally) for the conflict that they also feed on. In a corporate setting, especially, some kind of ass‑covering becomes necessary. Judgments made by an algorithm (ideally one supplied by a third-party vendor) are ones that nobody has to take responsibility for. The more contentious the social and political landscape, the bigger the institutional taste for automated decision-making is likely to be.

Political correctness is a regime of institutionalized insecurity, both moral and material. Seemingly solid careers are subject to sudden reversal, along with one’s status as a decent person.”

The Tyranny of Deliberative Democracy

Crawford takes aim at several other trends in intellectual fashion that seem to complement algorithmic governance. One is “deliberative democracy”, an ironically-named theory which holds that with the proper framing conditions, people will ultimately support the “correct” set of policies. Joseph Goebbels couldn’t have put it better. As Crawford explains, the idea is to formalize those conditions so that action can be taken if people do not support the “correct” policies. And if that doesn’t sound like Gleichschaltung (enforcement of conformity), nothing does! This sort of enterprise would require:

“… a cadre of subtle dialecticians working at a meta-level on the formal conditions of thought, nudging the populace through a cognitive framing operation to be conducted beneath the threshold of explicit argument.

… the theory has proved immensely successful. By that I mean the basic assumptions and aspirations it expressed have been institutionalized in elite culture, perhaps nowhere more than at Google, in its capacity as directorate of information. The firm sees itself as ‘definer and defender of the public interest’ …“

Don’t Nudge Me

Another of Crawford’s targets is the growing field of work related to the irrationality of human behavior. This work resulted from the revolutionary development of experimental or behavioral economics, in which various hypotheses are tested regarding choice, risk aversion, an related issues. Crawford offers the following interpretation, which rings true:

“… the more psychologically informed school of behavioral economics … teaches that we need all the help we can get in the form of external ‘nudges’ and cognitive scaffolding if we are to do the rational thing. But the glee and sheer repetition with which this (needed) revision to our understanding of the human person has been trumpeted by journalists and popularizers indicates that it has some moral appeal, quite apart from its intellectual merits. Perhaps it is the old Enlightenment thrill at disabusing human beings of their pretensions to specialness, whether as made in the image of God or as ‘the rational animal.’ The effect of this anti-humanism is to make us more receptive to the work of the nudgers.”

While changes in the framing of certain decisions, such as opt-in versus opt-out rules, can often benefit individuals, most of us would rather not have nudgers cum central planners interfere with too many of our decisions, no matter how poorly they think those decisions approximate rationality. Nudge engineers cannot replicate your personal objectives or know your preference map. Indeed, externally applied nudges might well be intended to serve interests other than your own. If the political equilibrium involves widespread nudging, it is not even clear that the result will be desirable for society: the history of central planning is one of unintended consequences and abject failure. But it’s plausible that this is where the elitist technocrats in Silicon Vally and within the administrative state would like to go with algorithmic governance.

Crawford’s larger thesis is summarized fairly well by the following statements about Google’s plans for the future:

“The ideal being articulated in Mountain View is that we will integrate Google’s services into our lives so effortlessly, and the guiding presence of this beneficent entity in our lives will be so pervasive and unobtrusive, that the boundary between self and Google will blur. The firm will provide a kind of mental scaffold for us, guiding our intentions by shaping our informational context. This is to take the idea of trusteeship and install it in the infrastructure of thought.

Populism is the rejection of this.”

He closes with reflections on the attitudes of the technocratic elite toward those who reject their vision as untrustworthy. The dominance of algorithmic governance is unlikely to help them gain that trust.

What’s to be done?

Crawford seems resigned to the idea that the only way forward is an ongoing struggle for political dominance “to be won and held onto by whatever means necessary“. Like Bryan Caplan, I have always argued that we should eschew anti-trust action against the big tech platforms, largely because we still have a modicum of choice in all of the services they provide. Caplan rejects the populist arguments against the tech “monopolies” and insists that the data collection so widely feared represents a benign phenomenon. And after all, consumers continue to receive a huge surplus from the many free services offered on-line.

But the reality elucidated by Crawford is that the tech firms are much more than private companies. They are political and quasi-governmental entities. Their tentacles reach deeply into our lives and into our institutions, public and private. They are capable of great social influence, and putting their tools in the hands of government (with a monopoly on force), they are capable of exerting social control. They span international boundaries, bringing their technical skills to bear in service to foreign governments. This week Peter Theil stated that Google’s work with the Chinese military was “treasonous”. It was only a matter of time before someone prominent made that charge.

The are no real safeguards against abusive governance by the tech behemoths short of breaking them up or subjecting them to tight regulation, and neither of those is likely to turn out well for users. I would, however, support safeguards on the privacy of customer data from scrutiny by government security agencies for which the platforms might work. Firewalls between their consumer and commercial businesses and government military and intelligence interests would be perfectly fine by me.

The best safeguard of viewpoint diversity and against manipulation is competition. Of course, the seriousness of threats these companies actually face from competitors is open to question. One paradox among many is that the effectiveness of the algorithms used by these companies in delivering services might enhance their appeal to some, even as those algorithms can undermine public trust.

There is an ostensible conflict in the perspective Crawford offers with respect to the social media giants: despite the increasing sophistication of their algorithms, the complaint is really about the motives of human beings who wish to control political debate through those algorithms, or end it once and for all. Jonah Goldberg puts it thusly:

“The recent effort by Google to deny the Claremont Institute the ability to advertise its gala was ridiculous. Facebook’s blocking of Prager University videos was absurd. And I’m glad Facebook apologized.

But the fact that they apologized points to the fact that while many of these platforms clearly have biases — often encoded in bad algorithms — points to the possibility that these behemoths aren’t actually conspiring to ‘silence’ all conservatives. They’re just making boneheaded mistakes based in groupthink, bias, and ignorance.”

David French notes that the best antidote for hypocrisy in the management of user content on social media is to expose it loud and clear, which sets the stage for a “market correction“. And after all, the best competition for any social media platform is real life. Indeed, many users are dropping out of various forms of on-line interaction. Social media companies might be able to retain users and appeal to a broader population if they could demonstrate complete impartiality. French proposes that these companies adopt free speech policies fashioned on the First Amendment itself:

“…rules and regulations restricting speech must be viewpoint-neutral. Harassment, incitement, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are speech limitations with viewpoint-neutral definitions…”

In other words, the companies must demonstrate that both moderators and algorithms governing user content and interaction are neutral. That is one way for them to regain broad trust. The other crucial ingredient is a government that is steadfast in defending free speech rights and the rights of the platforms to be neutral. Among other things, that means the platforms must retain protection under Section 230 of the Telecommunications Decency Act, which assures their immunity against lawsuits for user content. However, the platforms have had that immunity since quite early in internet history, yet they have developed an aggressive preference for promoting certain viewpoints and suppressing others. The platforms should be content to ensure that their policies and algorithms provide useful tools for users without compromising the free exchange of ideas. Good governance, political legitimacy, and ultimately freedom demand it.

School Discipline, Disparate Impact, and Disparate Justice

05 Friday Oct 2018

Posted by Nuetzel in Discrimination, Education, Uncategorized

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

Alison Somin, Civil Rights Act, Department of Education, discrimination, Disparate impact, Disparate Justice, Disparate Treatment, Education Week, Gail Herriot, Office of Civil Rights, Title VI, Walter Williams

Sad to say, there are racial disparities in victimization by misbehavior in schools, and African American children are the most victimized in terms of their safety and academic environment. Yet since 2014, the Department of Education (DOE) has been enforcing rules against “disparate impact” in school disciplinary policies, often aggravating that victimization. In a paper entitled “The Department of Education’s Obama-Era Initiative on Racial Disparities in School Discipline: Wrong For Students and Teachers, Wrong on the Law“, authors Gail Heriot and Alison Somin expose these unfortunate policies and the distortion of actual law they represent. These policies and actions are presumed by the DOE and the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) to be authorized under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but Heriot and Somin show that Title VI is not a disparate impact law and that enforcement of strictures against disparate impacts exceed the authority of the OCR.

When are disciplinary policies discriminatory? Disparate treatment occurs when a student from a “protected class” is punished more severely than other students for an identical misdeed. That is obviously discriminatory and unfair. A disparate impact, however, is a statistical difference in the punishments meted out to a protected class relative to others, which is not prima facie evidence of discrimination. Given consistent application of disciplinary policies — identical treatment for all classes under those policies — disparate impact is possible only when there are differences in the actual behavior of students across classes. Of course, such a difference does not mean that the protected class is “less worthy” in any absolute sense; instead, it probably indicates that those students face disadvantages that manifest in misbehavior in greater proportion within a school environment. The consequences of refusing to punish that behavior are bad for everyone, including and perhaps especially the miscreants themselves.

Disparate impact enforcement rules are fundamentally flawed, as Heriot and Somin explain. Almost any decision rule applied in business or other social interaction has a disparate impact on some parties. Defining qualifications for many jobs will almost always involve a disparate impact when protected classes lack those skills in greater proportion than unprotected classes. In schools, such rules lead to more lenient disciplinary policies or a lack of enforcement, either of which are likely to bring even greater disciplinary problems.

In schools with large minority populations, these perverse effects penalize the very minority students that the DOE hopes to protect. And they often have harsh consequences for minority teachers as well. Walter Williams bemoans the difficulties faced by many teachers:

“For example, after the public school district in Oklahoma City was investigated by the OCR, there was a 42.5 percent decrease in the number of suspensions. According to an article in The Oklahoman, one teacher said, ‘Students are yelling, cursing, hitting and screaming at teachers, and nothing is being done, but teachers are being told to teach and ignore the behaviors.’ According to Chalkbeat, new high school teachers left one school because they didn’t feel safe. There have been cases in which students have assaulted teachers and returned to school the next day. …

An article in Education Week earlier this year, titled ‘When Students Assault Teachers, Effects Can Be Lasting,’ discusses the widespread assaults of teachers across the country: ‘In the 2015-16 school year, 5.8 percent of the nation’s 3.8 million teachers were physically attacked by a student. Almost 10 percent were threatened with injury, according to federal education data.'”

To state the obvious, this undermines the ability of teachers do their jobs, let alone enjoy teaching. For many, quitting is an increasingly tempting option. And Williams, an African American, goes on to say “… when black students are not held accountable for misbehaving, they are set up for failure in life.”

When it comes to misbehavior, equalizing discipline by subgroup is almost certain to be unjust. And disparate impacts are almost certain to be a byproduct of a just disciplinary system when other social forces lead to differences in preparation for schooling. When the focus is placed on a by-product of Justice, rather than justice itself, as when disparate impacts are penalized or prohibited, everyone loses. It obviously harms unprotected classes, but ultimately it harms protected classes even more harshly by subjecting them to degraded school environments, less educational opportunity, and fewer rewards in life.

Gays and Bakers: Expression or Repression?

26 Monday Feb 2018

Posted by Nuetzel in Discrimination, Free Speech

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Anti-discrimination law, CO Anti-Discrimination Act, Common Carrier, David Henderson, Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Association, Freedom of Speech, Gay Wedding Cake, Masterpiece Bakeshop, Public Accommodations, Richard Epstein, Unruh Act

A lot rides on the legal interpretation of “expression” in the gay-wedding-cake dispute. Eugene Volokh discusses a recent ruling in California in which a trial court judge ruled that the baker’s right to free expression, buttressed by her right to free exercise of religion, protected her from demands that she participate in a form of expression to which she objected. Specifically, she had no legal obligation to create a cake for the celebration of a gay couple’s wedding, according to the ruling.

The facts in the case, CA Dept. of Fair Employment and Housing v. Cathy’s Creations, are that the baker refused to bake the couple a wedding cake but expressed a willingness to sell them anything that was already available in the shop. Thus, she did not discriminate against the couple by denying them access to her “public accommodations”. She also gave the couple a referral to another baker whom she believed would be willing to produce the cake. So there were probable alternatives available to the couple, and the baker’s assistance in locating one mitigated against any harm suffered by the gay couple. That sort of mitigation is an important factor to consider in weighing the rights of conflicting parties. Courts have tended to view “dignitary harm” as less compelling than forced expression.

Volokh argues that the baker’s role in the episode did not demand expression on her part. He says the proposed cake was a pre-existing design and did not involve writing of any kind. Otherwise, Volokh would have supported the ruling. He and a coauthor discuss the distinctions between an artist (who expresses) and an artisan (who merely executes), and an expressive and a non-expressive cake, in an amicus brief, as noted in the article linked above. Here is Volokh’s summary of his view:

“While creating photographs, videos, and text would be constitutionally protected speech (so we support the right of, for instance, photographers not to photograph same-sex weddings), creating wedding cakes with no text or symbolic design on them is not.“

The Volokh article is a little confusing because the amicus brief seems to have been filed in a different but similar case, Masterpiece Bakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which is now before the U.S. Supreme Court. A ruling is expected this summer. Here is a transcript of the oral arguments in that case, which were heard late last year. It’s a fascinating discussion.

Volokh’s analysis is fine as far as it goes. However, a wedding cake is likely to be considered expressive to both the baker and the cake’s buyers. The baker’s effort in executing even a pre-existing design may involve meaning for her beyond mere execution, since the usual intent of a wedding cake is to celebrate a sacred union. Likewise, the baker knows that the buyers consider the cake to be expressive of their union. The baker doesn’t want any involvement in that expression, asserting that it is not for the government to intercede, forcing them to participate by producing the cake.

Does the baker’s offer to supply an existing cake (or any other bakery good) undermine their case? Does the necessity of baking a new cake for a gay wedding differ from offering a cake already on the shelf for the same purpose? That may be irrelevant to the cases at hand, because no other wedding cakes were available at the time, and freshness might demand the preparation of a new cake for such an occasion. Nevertheless, that sort of line between an acceptable sale for the baker and unacceptable expression strikes me as thin.

As for the matter of the baker’s religious beliefs and their importance to her expressive rights, Volokh derides some of the language of the ruling. Those beliefs, Volokh says, are irrelevant to the question of whether a particular kind of expression is protected or compelled:

“By the way, I take it that it’s clear that the Free Speech Clause issue can’t turn on whether Miller’s belief ‘is part of the orthodox doctrines’ of many religions, or whether it’s instead ‘trivial, arbitrary, nonsensical, or outrageous’ — the Free Speech Clause protects views regardless of whether they express views that are seen as orthodox, outrageous, or nonsensical.“

Bravo! However, when the rights of two parties are in conflict, it is appropriate to weigh any impingement upon other, secondary rights of both parties.

A disturbing aspect of these cases is that they do not turn in any way on freedom of association, a freedom that encompasses a right not to associate (since any association must be voluntary for both parties). The presumption is that the baker’s right to freely associate or not associate with whomever they please is superseded by their obligations under public accommodation laws, despite the fact that freedom of association is an enumerated right in the U.S. Constitution. While public accommodation laws have generally been found to be constitutional, those laws do not apply in all circumstances, such as when a particular product or service involves expression. But on its own, a violation of the baker’s freedom of association seems to matter less, in today’s legal environment, than abridgment of her free expression, and perhaps less than any obligation she has to provide public accommodation.

Richard Epstein gives a general treatment of the balance between freedom of association and anti-discrimination law. David Henderson has bemoaned the dilution of the f reedom of association suffered in the name of non-discrimination. He does not defend discrimination on the basis of race, gender or sexual preference. Quite the contrary. However, as a matter of individual liberty, he prefers that we retain our right to associate on any basis of our choosing and pay the price imposed by the market for discrimination. For example, if you hang a sign outside your restaurant saying that you won’t serve African Americans, you are likely to suffer a loss of business from all who find your preference offensive, as many will. That solution is obviously unappealing to those who believe that participation in civil society requires public standards of equal access in private transactions. Still, there is some truth to a quote Henderson provides from an anonymous individual comparing the idea of non-discrimination in public accommodations to the “common carrier” designation:

“‘Either way, the theory boils down to “you brought forth a good or service and abracadabra you now have fewer rights”‘”.

The legal actions against the bakers in the cases discussed above rely on anti-discrimination law (in CA, the Unruh Act, and in CO, the Anti-Discrimination Act). Those laws must face limits in their application, as may be necessary in the case of compelled expression, especially expression against one’s most deeply-held convictions, religious or otherwise. The most basic question in this regard is whether the creation of the proposed wedding (or union) cakes can be described as expression. Whether the bakers are acting as mere fabricators or as artists, there is no doubt that the wedding parties desired the cakes as part of the celebration of their unions. That use of a cake constitutes expression on their part, and it is a kind of expression and an association from which the bakers would prefer to demure.

I support the right of homosexuals to enter into legal marriage, but I also support the bakers’ right to refuse the business. To invoke a phrase used by Richard Epstein in the article linked above, the world would be a better place if all agreed to simply “live and let live”.

American Homicide Rates: Which America?

12 Thursday Oct 2017

Posted by Nuetzel in Discrimination, Gun Control, Immigration

≈ 1 Comment

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Affirmative Action, Assimilation, Bretigne Shaffer, Diversity, Economic Mobility, Heterogeneity, Illegal Immigration, On the Banks, Rent Controls, Ryan McMaken, School Choice, Segregation, Sponsorship, Violent Victimization, War on Drugs

A heterogenious society and the successful assimilation of minorities are two very different things, as much as we might wish otherwise. Two populations within a region will come into contact, but conditions promoting real assimilation are complex. (I’m avoiding use of the term “diversity” because it has come to imply the successful assimilation of distinct groups.) While cultural differences can enrich the lives of both populations, sharp economic gaps between minority and majority populations (and even some cultural differences) will tend to slow the process of assimilation. This is often associated with social dysfunction, such as high crime and homicide rates, especially among the minority group. This is a fairly common phenomenon in countries with racial and ethnic minority or immigrant populations, as Ryan McMaken writes in a recent piece on international differences in heterogeneity and homicide rates.

Heterogeneity In the West

Countries in the Western Hemisphere tend to have relatively high immigrant and minority populations, as McMaken describes:

“… when considering the Americas, … nation-states are in most cases frontier states with populations heavily affected by immigration, a history of conflict with indigenous populations, and institutionalized chattel slavery that lasted until the 19th century. The factors are significant through the region, and the United States cannot be held apart in this regard from the Caribbean, Brazil, Colombia, and other states impacted by all these factors.

Importantly, these factors also make the Americas significantly different from Western Europe and other areas — Japan and Korea, for example — where the present situation is marked by much higher levels of cultural uniformity and quite different recent histories and current demographic trends.“

Homicides

McMaken questions popular theories of cross-country differences in homicide rates based on the degree of gun control and gun ownership rates. Homicides and violent victimization have been declining in the U.S. for many years even as gun ownership has soared. Furthermore, international comparisons are traditionally plagued by arbitrary country classifications and exclusions, as well as inconsistent definitions of homocide and gun ownership. However, McMaken points to other explanations for violent crime found to be fairly robust in the academic literature: poverty and population heterogeneity:

“… these factors contribute to lower levels of social cohesion, and thus higher levels of criminality and other socially-undesirable behaviors.“

McMaken cites research involving ethnic minority populations of Slavs in Germany, Italians in Argentina and the U.S., and Arabs in Europe, all of whom had crime rates far exceeding those in their countries of origin. The connection between heterogeneity and crime might have nothing to do with particular ethnic groups, though it seems all too easy for observers within individual countries to blame specific “others” for crime. It is a symptom of alienation from the majority as well as economic desperation and vulnerability to opportunities and threats arising from the underground economy. Illegal activities might truly provide the best alternatives available to low-skilled, minority job seekers. Needless to say, underground economic activity, such as the drug trade, involves high risk and often violence among users and between competing factions. This is an important source of the high crime and victimization that typifies many minority communities.

Despite declines since the 1970s, the U.S. still has a higher homicide rate than many other industrialized countries. Beyond the weakness cited above, such comparisons fail to control for other confounding effects, including the degree of heterogeneity across countries.

Policies

Heterogeneity poses a problem in the context of involuntary and often voluntary segregation of sub-cultures. If you don’t believe the “voluntary” part, take a close look at the different clusters of individuals in the cafeteria at almost any “diverse” university or corporate office. Judge for yourself. Differences in language, fertility, demographics, religion and cultural traditions may be noteworthy, but where crime is associated with effectively segregated minorities, there is usually a gap in economic status and mobility relative to society at large.

What policies can mitigate these conditions and their impact on crime? It would be nice to approach this question strictly from the perspective that heterogeneity is a given, but the degree of heterogeneity is, to some extent, an endogenous outcome. Restrictive immigration policies might leap to mind as a way of restraining heterogeneity, and there is little doubt that illegal immigrants are less likely to assimilate (many contend that their crime rate is low). Policies allowing less restricted flows of legal immigrants tend to be salutary if they are based on domestic economic need, economic potential, or compassion for those seeking asylum or a haven from political oppression. A legal immigrant receiving a welcome on new shores is more likely to assimilate successfully than an illegal immigrant, all else equal. Citizenship and language education are avenues through which assimilation might be encouraged. And there could be ways to improve sponsorships and even temporary visa programs so as to encourage assimilation.

What can be done to encourage more effective assimilation of all minorities? And what can be done to reduce the crime associated with unassimilated populations? One major corrective is a strong economy. Policies that encourage economic growth will lead to greater participation in markets and society, with consequent interaction and mixing of sub-cultures. Growth policies include low and non-distortionary taxes and light regulation.

The war on drugs also accounts for a major share of homicides, and that war interacts with non-assimilation in perverse ways. It is crippling to disadvantaged communities precisely because it creates risky “opportunities” in the underground economy. It also produces high levels of incarceration and dangerous forms of “cut” contraband. As I’ll discuss in my next post, ending the war on drugs would reduce violent crime and lead to safer drugs in relatively short order.

A short list of other policies that would foster assimilation and economic mobility would include: improved education: school choice and apprenticeship programs; better labor market outcomes: reduce the minimum wage or create sub-minimum wage categories to enhance opportunities to gain experience and skills; better housing: eliminate rent controls.

Assimilation is always more effective when it occurs “organically”. Affirmative action and forced diversity initiatives often fail to achieve effective assimilation. Beyond the obvious infringement on liberty, these policies may sow resentment among those who suffer reverse discrimination, and among those who witness it, to the probable detriment of efforts to eliminate bias. Even worse, these policies often put their intended beneficiaries into vulnerable, un-winnable situations: jobs or programs for which their skills are not adequate. There are undoubtedly excellent candidates among those placed in positions under quotas, but there is a likelihood that many will be unsuccessful in their roles.

Conclusion

The anti-gun left is eager to attribute differences in homicide rates to the impact of gun control policies, but a close examination of the facts reveals better explanations. A prominent factor contributing to differences in homicide rates is the degree of heterogeneity across countries. Those with more homogeneous populations tend to have lower homicide rates and vice versa. But the problem is not merely heterogeneity, but the difficulty of economic and cultural assimilation of minority populations. These factors appear to lead to greater crime within many minority populations. The U.S. is not unique in its experience with high minority crime rates, but it is a relatively heterogenous nation. This is an important factor in explaining why the homicide rate tends to be higher in the U.S. than in other industrialized countries. To close, I’ll offer something cogent from Bretigne Shaffer’s On the Banks blog, in which she offers this quote from an individual named Michael Owen (the soccer player?):

“... we don’t really have a single America with a moderately high rate of gun deaths. Instead, we have two Americas, one of which has very high rates of gun ownership but very low murder rates, very comparable to the rest of the First World democracies such as those in western & northern Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, South Korea. The other America has much lower rates of gun ownership but much, much higher murder rates, akin to violent third world countries.“

Race and Crime, Cops and Race

09 Saturday Jul 2016

Posted by Nuetzel in Discrimination, racism

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Tags

Black Homicides, Black Lives Matter, Fatal Police Shootings, Greg Ridgeway, Heather Mac Donald, Minimum Wage, Prohibition, racism, War on Drugs

Good Cop Bad Cop

Blacks are arrested in the U.S. at a disproportionately high rate relative to their share of the population, and they are killed by police at a disproportionately high rate as well. Does that prove that police target blacks unfairly? No, it depends on additional considerations not revealed by a simple comparison of police actions against blacks to their representation in the overall population.

This matter was put into perspective earlier this year by Heather Mac Donald in the Wall Street Journal (the link is to a Google search that should get around the WSJ paywall). Her analysis relies in part on a data base of fatal police shootings in 2015-16 maintained by the Washington Post, available here. Some of the most telling points noted by Mac Donald were the following:

“… in 2015 officers killed 662 whites and Hispanics, and 258 blacks. (The overwhelming majority of all those police-shooting victims were attacking the officer, often with a gun.)” The most recent data for 2016 are incomplete, but of the 509 police shootings recorded so far this year, the proportion involving blacks appears to be roughly consistent with the 2015 figures.
“There were 6,095 black homicide deaths in 2014—the most recent year for which such data are available—compared with 5,397 homicide deaths for whites and Hispanics combined. Almost all of those black homicide victims had black killers.“
“Over the past decade, according to FBI data, 40% of cop killers have been black. Officers are killed by blacks at a rate 2.5 times higher than the rate at which blacks are killed by police.“
“According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, blacks were charged with 62% of all robberies, 57% of murders and 45% of assaults in the 75 largest U.S. counties in 2009, though they made up roughly 15% of the population there.“
“Such a concentration of criminal violence in minority communities means that officers will be disproportionately confronting armed and often resisting suspects in those communities, raising officers’ own risk of using lethal force.“
“A March 2015 Justice Department report on the Philadelphia Police Department found that black and Hispanic officers were much more likely than white officers to shoot blacks based on “threat misperception”—that is, the mistaken belief that a civilian is armed.“
“A 2015 study by University of Pennsylvania criminologist Greg Ridgeway … found that, at a crime scene where gunfire is involved, black officers in the New York City Police Department were 3.3 times more likely to discharge their weapons than other officers at the scene.“

It is a tragic fact that the black community is plagued disproportionately by crime and violence. However, that has nothing to do with the manner in which police perform their duties when confronted with danger. Rather, it has to do with historical inequities, poor educational institutions, dismal economic opportunities, and a number of misguided government policies. The latter include minimum wages that diminish opportunities for black workers to gain job experience, anti-poverty initiatives that destroy work incentives and undermine family structure, a failed public school system, and the misguided war on drugs. Drug prohibition ensnares those who face insidious alternatives to legal market activity, which is often unavailable. Unfortunately, all of these policies have a disproportionate effect on the black community.

Any assessment of police conduct must acknowledge the circumstances under which officers work. If a particular demographic is disproportionately involved in crime, and affected by crime, then it is reasonable to expect that police action will be disproportionately focused on that group. This is not prima facie evidence of racism in police work. Quite the contrary: it is evidence that the police are fulfilling their obligation to protect innocents within that demographic, even if other institutions are aggravating the social dysfunction.

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29 Friday Apr 2016

Posted by Nuetzel in Discrimination, Federalism, Privacy, Property Rights

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Anti-Discrimination, Arbitrary Discrimination, Charlotte, Gender Registration, Gender-Specific Restrooms, Hormone Replacement Therapy, LGBT Discrimination, Market Self-Regulation, Mises Institute, NC, North Carolina, Property Rights, Restroom Federalism, Roy Cardato, Separation of Bathroom and State, Transgender, Tyler Cowan

I’m following-up on “I’m a Restroom Federalist” by sharing “We Need Separation of Bathroom and State” by Roy Cordato at the Mises Institute. He makes a clean defense of the libertarian view that restrooms choices on private property must not be controlled by government. Any attempt to do so is a violation of private property rights, according to this view. I did not adequately treat the question of property rights in my first “restroom” post. Strong property rights in this context mean that you, a private businessperson, can set the rules for restroom use on your premises, or no rules at all. If you or your customers prefer gender-neutral restrooms in your place of business, so be it. If you believe your customers prefer separate restrooms based on a definition of gender, you can post appropriate signs and face any complaints privately without interference from government.

Many sincere observers hope for a way to fairly accommodate transgender individuals without unduly compromising the rights of others. In my mind, discrimination (or differences in accommodations) should not be tolerated in society if based on arbitrary distinctions. By that I mean the victim differs from the discriminator only in nonessential ways for the purposes at hand. For example, discriminating on the basis of race is wholly arbitrary in almost context. (A director casting the part of an individual of a specific race is a possible exception.) No real harm comes from tolerance and equal treatment in these contexts. I have argued that the market is self-regulating in punishing discrimination. And one can argue that certain freedoms may be violated (association, religion, expression and even property) when even arbitrary forms of discrimination are outlawed, as they are. In these situations, however, laws can work because there is little ambiguity in defining victims of discrimination and the legitimacy of their victimhood.

Is discrimination against transgenders in their restroom options just as arbitrary as it would be against other minorities? That depends upon whether “transgender” can be defined objectively. If it cannot, then denying the bearded lady’s transgender claim in the restroom is not so arbitrary, given the privacy rights of others.

Tyler Cowen discusses some of the complexities of determining whether there should be a legal definition of transgender, or a more “nuanced” definition of gender with three or more categories. That would eliminate any legitimate objections to gender-specific restrooms. However, a legal standard cannot be based solely on “inner feelings”. Aside from genitalia, are there objective facts that can be brought to bear in defining gender? A personal physician’s assessment of “gender intent” is one possibility. An active regimen of hormone replacement therapy is another. However, transgenders themselves might object to any specific definition of gender imposed by government. Many transgenders would prefer to have it remain a matter of self-identity, but it is impossible to clearly define rights on that basis. As Cowen notes, the “most libertarian view is to refuse to offer a legal definition of transgender.” He also adds:

“If we stick with no legal definition of transgender, let’s tackle the remaining problems directly. For instance we could significantly increase the penalties for men who abuse women or young girls in or near women’s rooms, if indeed that is an ongoing problem.“

As I intimated in my earlier post, I am unconvinced that gender-neutral restrooms won’t encourage voyeurism by posers. That implies a conflict between the rights of transgenders and the fundamental right to privacy. Given that fact, Cowen’s suggestion is sensible under any restroom regime. He also cites the existence of voluntary gender registration systems in other countries. Given a clear definition, transgenders choosing to register could use the restroom consistent with their gender identity and would have documented proof if any question arose as to their right to use a particular facility.

Cordato provides a good explanation of the Charlotte anti-discrimination ordinance and North Carolina’s new law striking it down. The Charlotte ordinance stripped owners of business property of their right to set rules for their own restrooms. The state law does several things: It restores the rights of business owners to provide separate restrooms for males and females, which is fine as far as it goes. It also mandates gender separation of multi-occupancy restrooms and locker rooms in government facilities. Truly, it is hard to imagine any good coming of mixing middle-school girls and boys in the same restrooms and locker rooms. However, the state law also prohibits the promulgation of any anti-discrimination law by lower jurisdictions. That seems a bit too sweeping.

Cowan says the North Carolina law is a solution in search of a problem, or worse:

“North Carolina made a mistake in signing the new law. Not just a practical mistake, because of the backlash, but a mistake outright. I’m not aware there was a problem needing to be solved, and yet new problems have been created.“

Maybe so, but the city of Charlotte clearly took a step in violation of private property rights, and one that threatened privacy rights. I stated in my first restroom post that alternative arrangements will be tested socially, at the ballot box, and by the courts. Some object to the strong privacy ethic that exists in the U.S. as prudish, but it is a cultural given, and privacy rights are protected by the Constitution. Given a conflict over rights between two parties, the courts must decide how to balance those interests.That’s as it should be. And so we’re back to the beauty of federalism!

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Category Archives: Discrimination

Stealth Hiring Quotas Via AI

Hiring Discrimination In the U.S., Canada, and Western Europe

Ubiquitous Guilt: EEOC Disparate Impact Liability

Defang the Administrative State

Behold Our Algorithmic Overlords

School Discipline, Disparate Impact, and Disparate Justice

Gays and Bakers: Expression or Repression?

American Homicide Rates: Which America?

Race and Crime, Cops and Race

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