Behold Our Algorithmic Overlords

18 Thursday Jul 2019

Posted by pnuetz in Automation, Censorship, Discrimination, Marketplace of Ideas

Tags

Algorithmic Governance, American Affairs, Antitrust, Behavioral Economics, Bryan Caplan, Claremont Institute, David French, Deplatforming, Facebook, Gleichschaltung, Google, Jonah Goldberg, Joseph Goebbels, Mark Zuckerberg, Matthew D. Crawford, nudge, Peeter Theil, Political Legitimacy, Populism, Private Governance, Twitter, Viewpoint Diversity

A willingness to question authority is healthy, both in private matters and in the public sphere, but having the freedom to do so is even healthier. It facilitates free inquiry, the application of the scientific method, and it lies at the heart of our constitutional system. Voluntary acceptance of authority, and trust in its legitimacy, hinges on our ability to identify its source, the rationale for its actions, and its accountability. Unaccountable authority, on the other hand, cannot be tolerated. It’s the stuff of which tyranny is made.

That’s one linchpin of a great essay by Matthew D. Crawford in American Affairs entitled “Algorithmic Governance and Political Legitimacy“. It’s a lengthy piece that covers lots of ground, and very much worth reading. Or you can read my slightly shorter take on it!

Imagine a world in which all the information you see is selected by algorithm. In addition, your success in the labor market is determined by algorithm. Your college admission and financial aid decisions are determined by algorithm. Credit applications are decisioned by algorithm. The prioritization you are assigned for various health care treatments is determined by algorithm. The list could go on and on, but many of these “use-cases” are already happening to one extent or another.

Blurring Private and Public Governance

Much of what Crawford describes has to do with the way we conduct private transactions and/or private governance. Most governance in free societies, of the kind that touches us day-to-day, is private or self-government, as Crawford calls it. With the advent of giant on-line platforms, algorithms are increasingly an aspect of that governance. Crawford notes the rising concentration of private governmental power within these organizations. While the platforms lack complete monopoly power, they are performing functions that we’d ordinarily be reluctant to grant any public form of government: they curate the information we see, conduct surveillance, exercise control over speech, and even indulge in the “deplatforming” of individuals and organizations when it suits them. Crawford quotes Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg:

“In a lot of ways Facebook is more like a government than a traditional company. . . . We have this large community of people, and more than other technology companies we’re really setting policies.”

At the same time, the public sector is increasingly dominated by a large administrative apparatus that is outside of the normal reach of legislative, judicial and even executive checks. Crawford worries about “… the affinities between administrative governance and algorithmic governance“. He emphasizes that neither algorithmic governance on technology platforms nor an algorithmic administrative state are what one could call representative democracy. But whether these powers have been seized or we’ve granted them voluntarily, there are already challenges to their legitimacy. And no wonder! As Crawford says, algorithms are faceless pathways of neural connections that are usually difficult to explain, and their decisions often strike those affected as arbitrary or even nonsensical.

Ministry of Wokeness

Political correctness plays a central part in this story. There is no question that the platforms are setting policies that discriminate against certain viewpoints. But Crawford goes further, asserting that algorithms have a certain bureaucratic logic to elites desiring “cutting edge enforcement of social norms“, i.e., political correctness, or “wokeness”, the term of current fashion.

“First, in the spirit of Václav Havel we might entertain the idea that the institutional workings of political correctness need to be shrouded in peremptory and opaque administrative mechanisms because its power lies precisely in the gap between what people actually think and what one is expected to say. It is in this gap that one has the experience of humiliation, of staying silent, and that is how power is exercised.

But if we put it this way, what we are really saying is not that PC needs administrative enforcement but rather the reverse: the expanding empire of bureaucrats needs PC. The conflicts created by identity politics become occasions to extend administrative authority into previously autonomous domains of activity. …

The incentive to technologize the whole drama enters thus: managers are answerable (sometimes legally) for the conflict that they also feed on. In a corporate setting, especially, some kind of ass‑covering becomes necessary. Judgments made by an algorithm (ideally one supplied by a third-party vendor) are ones that nobody has to take responsibility for. The more contentious the social and political landscape, the bigger the institutional taste for automated decision-making is likely to be.

Political correctness is a regime of institutionalized insecurity, both moral and material. Seemingly solid careers are subject to sudden reversal, along with one’s status as a decent person.”

The Tyranny of Deliberative Democracy

Crawford takes aim at several other trends in intellectual fashion that seem to complement algorithmic governance. One is “deliberative democracy”, an ironically-named theory which holds that with the proper framing conditions, people will ultimately support the “correct” set of policies. Joseph Goebbels couldn’t have put it better. As Crawford explains, the idea is to formalize those conditions so that action can be taken if people do not support the “correct” policies. And if that doesn’t sound like Gleichschaltung (enforcement of conformity), nothing does! This sort of enterprise would require:

“… a cadre of subtle dialecticians working at a meta-level on the formal conditions of thought, nudging the populace through a cognitive framing operation to be conducted beneath the threshold of explicit argument.

… the theory has proved immensely successful. By that I mean the basic assumptions and aspirations it expressed have been institutionalized in elite culture, perhaps nowhere more than at Google, in its capacity as directorate of information. The firm sees itself as ‘definer and defender of the public interest’ …“

Don’t Nudge Me

Another of Crawford’s targets is the growing field of work related to the irrationality of human behavior. This work resulted from the revolutionary development of experimental or behavioral economics, in which various hypotheses are tested regarding choice, risk aversion, an related issues. Crawford offers the following interpretation, which rings true:

“… the more psychologically informed school of behavioral economics … teaches that we need all the help we can get in the form of external ‘nudges’ and cognitive scaffolding if we are to do the rational thing. But the glee and sheer repetition with which this (needed) revision to our understanding of the human person has been trumpeted by journalists and popularizers indicates that it has some moral appeal, quite apart from its intellectual merits. Perhaps it is the old Enlightenment thrill at disabusing human beings of their pretensions to specialness, whether as made in the image of God or as ‘the rational animal.’ The effect of this anti-humanism is to make us more receptive to the work of the nudgers.”

While changes in the framing of certain decisions, such as opt-in versus opt-out rules, can often benefit individuals, most of us would rather not have nudgers cum central planners interfere with too many of our decisions, no matter how poorly they think those decisions approximate rationality. Nudge engineers cannot replicate your personal objectives or know your preference map. Indeed, externally applied nudges might well be intended to serve interests other than your own. If the political equilibrium involves widespread nudging, it is not even clear that the result will be desirable for society: the history of central planning is one of unintended consequences and abject failure. But it’s plausible that this is where the elitist technocrats in Silicon Vally and within the administrative state would like to go with algorithmic governance.

Crawford’s larger thesis is summarized fairly well by the following statements about Google’s plans for the future:

“The ideal being articulated in Mountain View is that we will integrate Google’s services into our lives so effortlessly, and the guiding presence of this beneficent entity in our lives will be so pervasive and unobtrusive, that the boundary between self and Google will blur. The firm will provide a kind of mental scaffold for us, guiding our intentions by shaping our informational context. This is to take the idea of trusteeship and install it in the infrastructure of thought.

Populism is the rejection of this.”

He closes with reflections on the attitudes of the technocratic elite toward those who reject their vision as untrustworthy. The dominance of algorithmic governance is unlikely to help them gain that trust.

What’s to be done?

Crawford seems resigned to the idea that the only way forward is an ongoing struggle for political dominance “to be won and held onto by whatever means necessary“. Like Bryan Caplan, I have always argued that we should eschew anti-trust action against the big tech platforms, largely because we still have a modicum of choice in all of the services they provide. Caplan rejects the populist arguments against the tech “monopolies” and insists that the data collection so widely feared represents a benign phenomenon. And after all, consumers continue to receive a huge surplus from the many free services offered on-line.

But the reality elucidated by Crawford is that the tech firms are much more than private companies. They are political and quasi-governmental entities. Their tentacles reach deeply into our lives and into our institutions, public and private. They are capable of great social influence, and putting their tools in the hands of government (with a monopoly on force), they are capable of exerting social control. They span international boundaries, bringing their technical skills to bear in service to foreign governments. This week Peter Theil stated that Google’s work with the Chinese military was “treasonous”. It was only a matter of time before someone prominent made that charge.

The are no real safeguards against abusive governance by the tech behemoths short of breaking them up or subjecting them to tight regulation, and neither of those is likely to turn out well for users. I would, however, support safeguards on the privacy of customer data from scrutiny by government security agencies for which the platforms might work. Firewalls between their consumer and commercial businesses and government military and intelligence interests would be perfectly fine by me.

The best safeguard of viewpoint diversity and against manipulation is competition. Of course, the seriousness of threats these companies actually face from competitors is open to question. One paradox among many is that the effectiveness of the algorithms used by these companies in delivering services might enhance their appeal to some, even as those algorithms can undermine public trust.

There is an ostensible conflict in the perspective Crawford offers with respect to the social media giants: despite the increasing sophistication of their algorithms, the complaint is really about the motives of human beings who wish to control political debate through those algorithms, or end it once and for all. Jonah Goldberg puts it thusly:

“The recent effort by Google to deny the Claremont Institute the ability to advertise its gala was ridiculous. Facebook’s blocking of Prager University videos was absurd. And I’m glad Facebook apologized.

But the fact that they apologized points to the fact that while many of these platforms clearly have biases — often encoded in bad algorithms — points to the possibility that these behemoths aren’t actually conspiring to ‘silence’ all conservatives. They’re just making boneheaded mistakes based in groupthink, bias, and ignorance.”

David French notes that the best antidote for hypocrisy in the management of user content on social media is to expose it loud and clear, which sets the stage for a “market correction“. And after all, the best competition for any social media platform is real life. Indeed, many users are dropping out of various forms of on-line interaction. Social media companies might be able to retain users and appeal to a broader population if they could demonstrate complete impartiality. French proposes that these companies adopt free speech policies fashioned on the First Amendment itself:

“…rules and regulations restricting speech must be viewpoint-neutral. Harassment, incitement, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are speech limitations with viewpoint-neutral definitions…”

In other words, the companies must demonstrate that both moderators and algorithms governing user content and interaction are neutral. That is one way for them to regain broad trust. The other crucial ingredient is a government that is steadfast in defending free speech rights and the rights of the platforms to be neutral. Among other things, that means the platforms must retain protection under Section 230 of the Telecommunications Decency Act, which assures their immunity against lawsuits for user content. However, the platforms have had that immunity since quite early in internet history, yet they have developed an aggressive preference for promoting certain viewpoints and suppressing others. The platforms should be content to ensure that their policies and algorithms provide useful tools for users without compromising the free exchange of ideas. Good governance, political legitimacy, and ultimately freedom demand it.

School Discipline, Disparate Impact, and Disparate Justice

05 Friday Oct 2018

Posted by pnuetz in Discrimination, Education, Uncategorized

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

Alison Somin, Civil Rights Act, Department of Education, discrimination, Disparate impact, Disparate Justice, Disparate Treatment, Education Week, Gail Herriot, Office of Civil Rights, Title VI, Walter Williams

Sad to say, there are racial disparities in victimization by misbehavior in schools, and African American children are the most victimized in terms of their safety and academic environment. Yet since 2014, the Department of Education (DOE) has been enforcing rules against “disparate impact” in school disciplinary policies, often aggravating that victimization. In a paper entitled “The Department of Education’s Obama-Era Initiative on Racial Disparities in School Discipline: Wrong For Students and Teachers, Wrong on the Law“, authors Gail Heriot and Alison Somin expose these unfortunate policies and the distortion of actual law they represent. These policies and actions are presumed by the DOE and the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) to be authorized under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but Heriot and Somin show that Title VI is not a disparate impact law and that enforcement of strictures against disparate impacts exceed the authority of the OCR.

When are disciplinary policies discriminatory? Disparate treatment occurs when a student from a “protected class” is punished more severely than other students for an identical misdeed. That is obviously discriminatory and unfair. A disparate impact, however, is a statistical difference in the punishments meted out to a protected class relative to others, which is not prima facie evidence of discrimination. Given consistent application of disciplinary policies — identical treatment for all classes under those policies — disparate impact is possible only when there are differences in the actual behavior of students across classes. Of course, such a difference does not mean that the protected class is “less worthy” in any absolute sense; instead, it probably indicates that those students face disadvantages that manifest in misbehavior in greater proportion within a school environment. The consequences of refusing to punish that behavior are bad for everyone, including and perhaps especially the miscreants themselves.

Disparate impact enforcement rules are fundamentally flawed, as Heriot and Somin explain. Almost any decision rule applied in business or other social interaction has a disparate impact on some parties. Defining qualifications for many jobs will almost always involve a disparate impact when protected classes lack those skills in greater proportion than unprotected classes. In schools, such rules lead to more lenient disciplinary policies or a lack of enforcement, either of which are likely to bring even greater disciplinary problems.

In schools with large minority populations, these perverse effects penalize the very minority students that the DOE hopes to protect. And they often have harsh consequences for minority teachers as well. Walter Williams bemoans the difficulties faced by many teachers:

“For example, after the public school district in Oklahoma City was investigated by the OCR, there was a 42.5 percent decrease in the number of suspensions. According to an article in The Oklahoman, one teacher said, ‘Students are yelling, cursing, hitting and screaming at teachers, and nothing is being done, but teachers are being told to teach and ignore the behaviors.’ According to Chalkbeat, new high school teachers left one school because they didn’t feel safe. There have been cases in which students have assaulted teachers and returned to school the next day. …

An article in Education Week earlier this year, titled ‘When Students Assault Teachers, Effects Can Be Lasting,’ discusses the widespread assaults of teachers across the country: ‘In the 2015-16 school year, 5.8 percent of the nation’s 3.8 million teachers were physically attacked by a student. Almost 10 percent were threatened with injury, according to federal education data.'”

To state the obvious, this undermines the ability of teachers do their jobs, let alone enjoy teaching. For many, quitting is an increasingly tempting option. And Williams, an African American, goes on to say “… when black students are not held accountable for misbehaving, they are set up for failure in life.”

When it comes to misbehavior, equalizing discipline by subgroup is almost certain to be unjust. And disparate impacts are almost certain to be a byproduct of a just disciplinary system when other social forces lead to differences in preparation for schooling. When the focus is placed on a by-product of Justice, rather than justice itself, as when disparate impacts are penalized or prohibited, everyone loses. It obviously harms unprotected classes, but ultimately it harms protected classes even more harshly by subjecting them to degraded school environments, less educational opportunity, and fewer rewards in life.

Gays and Bakers: Expression or Repression?

26 Monday Feb 2018

Posted by pnuetz in Discrimination, Free Speech

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Anti-discrimination law, CO Anti-Discrimination Act, Common Carrier, David Henderson, Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Association, Freedom of Speech, Gay Wedding Cake, Masterpiece Bakeshop, Public Accommodations, Richard Epstein, Unruh Act

A lot rides on the legal interpretation of “expression” in the gay-wedding-cake dispute. Eugene Volokh discusses a recent ruling in California in which a trial court judge ruled that the baker’s right to free expression, buttressed by her right to free exercise of religion, protected her from demands that she participate in a form of expression to which she objected. Specifically, she had no legal obligation to create a cake for the celebration of a gay couple’s wedding, according to the ruling.

The facts in the case, CA Dept. of Fair Employment and Housing v. Cathy’s Creations, are that the baker refused to bake the couple a wedding cake but expressed a willingness to sell them anything that was already available in the shop. Thus, she did not discriminate against the couple by denying them access to her “public accommodations”. She also gave the couple a referral to another baker whom she believed would be willing to produce the cake. So there were probable alternatives available to the couple, and the baker’s assistance in locating one mitigated against any harm suffered by the gay couple. That sort of mitigation is an important factor to consider in weighing the rights of conflicting parties. Courts have tended to view “dignitary harm” as less compelling than forced expression.

Volokh argues that the baker’s role in the episode did not demand expression on her part. He says the proposed cake was a pre-existing design and did not involve writing of any kind. Otherwise, Volokh would have supported the ruling. He and a coauthor discuss the distinctions between an artist (who expresses) and an artisan (who merely executes), and an expressive and a non-expressive cake, in an amicus brief, as noted in the article linked above. Here is Volokh’s summary of his view:

“While creating photographs, videos, and text would be constitutionally protected speech (so we support the right of, for instance, photographers not to photograph same-sex weddings), creating wedding cakes with no text or symbolic design on them is not.“

The Volokh article is a little confusing because the amicus brief seems to have been filed in a different but similar case, Masterpiece Bakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which is now before the U.S. Supreme Court. A ruling is expected this summer. Here is a transcript of the oral arguments in that case, which were heard late last year. It’s a fascinating discussion.

Volokh’s analysis is fine as far as it goes. However, a wedding cake is likely to be considered expressive to both the baker and the cake’s buyers. The baker’s effort in executing even a pre-existing design may involve meaning for her beyond mere execution, since the usual intent of a wedding cake is to celebrate a sacred union. Likewise, the baker knows that the buyers consider the cake to be expressive of their union. The baker doesn’t want any involvement in that expression, asserting that it is not for the government to intercede, forcing them to participate by producing the cake.

Does the baker’s offer to supply an existing cake (or any other bakery good) undermine their case? Does the necessity of baking a new cake for a gay wedding differ from offering a cake already on the shelf for the same purpose? That may be irrelevant to the cases at hand, because no other wedding cakes were available at the time, and freshness might demand the preparation of a new cake for such an occasion. Nevertheless, that sort of line between an acceptable sale for the baker and unacceptable expression strikes me as thin.

As for the matter of the baker’s religious beliefs and their importance to her expressive rights, Volokh derides some of the language of the ruling. Those beliefs, Volokh says, are irrelevant to the question of whether a particular kind of expression is protected or compelled:

“By the way, I take it that it’s clear that the Free Speech Clause issue can’t turn on whether Miller’s belief ‘is part of the orthodox doctrines’ of many religions, or whether it’s instead ‘trivial, arbitrary, nonsensical, or outrageous’ — the Free Speech Clause protects views regardless of whether they express views that are seen as orthodox, outrageous, or nonsensical.“

Bravo! However, when the rights of two parties are in conflict, it is appropriate to weigh any impingement upon other, secondary rights of both parties.

A disturbing aspect of these cases is that they do not turn in any way on freedom of association, a freedom that encompasses a right not to associate (since any association must be voluntary for both parties). The presumption is that the baker’s right to freely associate or not associate with whomever they please is superseded by their obligations under public accommodation laws, despite the fact that freedom of association is an enumerated right in the U.S. Constitution. While public accommodation laws have generally been found to be constitutional, those laws do not apply in all circumstances, such as when a particular product or service involves expression. But on its own, a violation of the baker’s freedom of association seems to matter less, in today’s legal environment, than abridgment of her free expression, and perhaps less than any obligation she has to provide public accommodation.

Richard Epstein gives a general treatment of the balance between freedom of association and anti-discrimination law. David Henderson has bemoaned the dilution of the f reedom of association suffered in the name of non-discrimination. He does not defend discrimination on the basis of race, gender or sexual preference. Quite the contrary. However, as a matter of individual liberty, he prefers that we retain our right to associate on any basis of our choosing and pay the price imposed by the market for discrimination. For example, if you hang a sign outside your restaurant saying that you won’t serve African Americans, you are likely to suffer a loss of business from all who find your preference offensive, as many will. That solution is obviously unappealing to those who believe that participation in civil society requires public standards of equal access in private transactions. Still, there is some truth to a quote Henderson provides from an anonymous individual comparing the idea of non-discrimination in public accommodations to the “common carrier” designation:

“‘Either way, the theory boils down to “you brought forth a good or service and abracadabra you now have fewer rights”‘”.

The legal actions against the bakers in the cases discussed above rely on anti-discrimination law (in CA, the Unruh Act, and in CO, the Anti-Discrimination Act). Those laws must face limits in their application, as may be necessary in the case of compelled expression, especially expression against one’s most deeply-held convictions, religious or otherwise. The most basic question in this regard is whether the creation of the proposed wedding (or union) cakes can be described as expression. Whether the bakers are acting as mere fabricators or as artists, there is no doubt that the wedding parties desired the cakes as part of the celebration of their unions. That use of a cake constitutes expression on their part, and it is a kind of expression and an association from which the bakers would prefer to demure.

I support the right of homosexuals to enter into legal marriage, but I also support the bakers’ right to refuse the business. To invoke a phrase used by Richard Epstein in the article linked above, the world would be a better place if all agreed to simply “live and let live”.

American Homicide Rates: Which America?

12 Thursday Oct 2017

Posted by pnuetz in Discrimination, Gun Control, Immigration

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Affirmative Action, Assimilation, Bretigne Shaffer, Diversity, Economic Mobility, Heterogeneity, Illegal Immigration, On the Banks, Rent Controls, Ryan McMaken, School Choice, Segregation, Sponsorship, Violent Victimization, War on Drugs

A heterogenious society and the successful assimilation of minorities are two very different things, as much as we might wish otherwise. Two populations within a region will come into contact, but conditions promoting real assimilation are complex. (I’m avoiding use of the term “diversity” because it has come to imply the successful assimilation of distinct groups.) While cultural differences can enrich the lives of both populations, sharp economic gaps between minority and majority populations (and even some cultural differences) will tend to slow the process of assimilation. This is often associated with social dysfunction, such as high crime and homicide rates, especially among the minority group. This is a fairly common phenomenon in countries with racial and ethnic minority or immigrant populations, as Ryan McMaken writes in a recent piece on international differences in heterogeneity and homicide rates.

Heterogeneity In the West

Countries in the Western Hemisphere tend to have relatively high immigrant and minority populations, as McMaken describes:

“… when considering the Americas, … nation-states are in most cases frontier states with populations heavily affected by immigration, a history of conflict with indigenous populations, and institutionalized chattel slavery that lasted until the 19th century. The factors are significant through the region, and the United States cannot be held apart in this regard from the Caribbean, Brazil, Colombia, and other states impacted by all these factors.

Importantly, these factors also make the Americas significantly different from Western Europe and other areas — Japan and Korea, for example — where the present situation is marked by much higher levels of cultural uniformity and quite different recent histories and current demographic trends.“

Homicides

McMaken questions popular theories of cross-country differences in homicide rates based on the degree of gun control and gun ownership rates. Homicides and violent victimization have been declining in the U.S. for many years even as gun ownership has soared. Furthermore, international comparisons are traditionally plagued by arbitrary country classifications and exclusions, as well as inconsistent definitions of homocide and gun ownership. However, McMaken points to other explanations for violent crime found to be fairly robust in the academic literature: poverty and population heterogeneity:

“… these factors contribute to lower levels of social cohesion, and thus higher levels of criminality and other socially-undesirable behaviors.“

McMaken cites research involving ethnic minority populations of Slavs in Germany, Italians in Argentina and the U.S., and Arabs in Europe, all of whom had crime rates far exceeding those in their countries of origin. The connection between heterogeneity and crime might have nothing to do with particular ethnic groups, though it seems all too easy for observers within individual countries to blame specific “others” for crime. It is a symptom of alienation from the majority as well as economic desperation and vulnerability to opportunities and threats arising from the underground economy. Illegal activities might truly provide the best alternatives available to low-skilled, minority job seekers. Needless to say, underground economic activity, such as the drug trade, involves high risk and often violence among users and between competing factions. This is an important source of the high crime and victimization that typifies many minority communities.

Despite declines since the 1970s, the U.S. still has a higher homicide rate than many other industrialized countries. Beyond the weakness cited above, such comparisons fail to control for other confounding effects, including the degree of heterogeneity across countries.

Policies

Heterogeneity poses a problem in the context of involuntary and often voluntary segregation of sub-cultures. If you don’t believe the “voluntary” part, take a close look at the different clusters of individuals in the cafeteria at almost any “diverse” university or corporate office. Judge for yourself. Differences in language, fertility, demographics, religion and cultural traditions may be noteworthy, but where crime is associated with effectively segregated minorities, there is usually a gap in economic status and mobility relative to society at large.

What policies can mitigate these conditions and their impact on crime? It would be nice to approach this question strictly from the perspective that heterogeneity is a given, but the degree of heterogeneity is, to some extent, an endogenous outcome. Restrictive immigration policies might leap to mind as a way of restraining heterogeneity, and there is little doubt that illegal immigrants are less likely to assimilate (many contend that their crime rate is low). Policies allowing less restricted flows of legal immigrants tend to be salutary if they are based on domestic economic need, economic potential, or compassion for those seeking asylum or a haven from political oppression. A legal immigrant receiving a welcome on new shores is more likely to assimilate successfully than an illegal immigrant, all else equal. Citizenship and language education are avenues through which assimilation might be encouraged. And there could be ways to improve sponsorships and even temporary visa programs so as to encourage assimilation.

What can be done to encourage more effective assimilation of all minorities? And what can be done to reduce the crime associated with unassimilated populations? One major corrective is a strong economy. Policies that encourage economic growth will lead to greater participation in markets and society, with consequent interaction and mixing of sub-cultures. Growth policies include low and non-distortionary taxes and light regulation.

The war on drugs also accounts for a major share of homicides, and that war interacts with non-assimilation in perverse ways. It is crippling to disadvantaged communities precisely because it creates risky “opportunities” in the underground economy. It also produces high levels of incarceration and dangerous forms of “cut” contraband. As I’ll discuss in my next post, ending the war on drugs would reduce violent crime and lead to safer drugs in relatively short order.

A short list of other policies that would foster assimilation and economic mobility would include: improved education: school choice and apprenticeship programs; better labor market outcomes: reduce the minimum wage or create sub-minimum wage categories to enhance opportunities to gain experience and skills; better housing: eliminate rent controls.

Assimilation is always more effective when it occurs “organically”. Affirmative action and forced diversity initiatives often fail to achieve effective assimilation. Beyond the obvious infringement on liberty, these policies may sow resentment among those who suffer reverse discrimination, and among those who witness it, to the probable detriment of efforts to eliminate bias. Even worse, these policies often put their intended beneficiaries into vulnerable, un-winnable situations: jobs or programs for which their skills are not adequate. There are undoubtedly excellent candidates among those placed in positions under quotas, but there is a likelihood that many will be unsuccessful in their roles.

Conclusion

The anti-gun left is eager to attribute differences in homicide rates to the impact of gun control policies, but a close examination of the facts reveals better explanations. A prominent factor contributing to differences in homicide rates is the degree of heterogeneity across countries. Those with more homogeneous populations tend to have lower homicide rates and vice versa. But the problem is not merely heterogeneity, but the difficulty of economic and cultural assimilation of minority populations. These factors appear to lead to greater crime within many minority populations. The U.S. is not unique in its experience with high minority crime rates, but it is a relatively heterogenous nation. This is an important factor in explaining why the homicide rate tends to be higher in the U.S. than in other industrialized countries. To close, I’ll offer something cogent from Bretigne Shaffer’s On the Banks blog, in which she offers this quote from an individual named Michael Owen (the soccer player?):

“... we don’t really have a single America with a moderately high rate of gun deaths. Instead, we have two Americas, one of which has very high rates of gun ownership but very low murder rates, very comparable to the rest of the First World democracies such as those in western & northern Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, South Korea. The other America has much lower rates of gun ownership but much, much higher murder rates, akin to violent third world countries.“

Race and Crime, Cops and Race

09 Saturday Jul 2016

Posted by pnuetz in Discrimination, racism

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Black Homicides, Black Lives Matter, Fatal Police Shootings, Greg Ridgeway, Heather Mac Donald, Minimum Wage, Prohibition, racism, War on Drugs

Good Cop Bad Cop

Blacks are arrested in the U.S. at a disproportionately high rate relative to their share of the population, and they are killed by police at a disproportionately high rate as well. Does that prove that police target blacks unfairly? No, it depends on additional considerations not revealed by a simple comparison of police actions against blacks to their representation in the overall population.

This matter was put into perspective earlier this year by Heather Mac Donald in the Wall Street Journal (the link is to a Google search that should get around the WSJ paywall). Her analysis relies in part on a data base of fatal police shootings in 2015-16 maintained by the Washington Post, available here. Some of the most telling points noted by Mac Donald were the following:

“… in 2015 officers killed 662 whites and Hispanics, and 258 blacks. (The overwhelming majority of all those police-shooting victims were attacking the officer, often with a gun.)” The most recent data for 2016 are incomplete, but of the 509 police shootings recorded so far this year, the proportion involving blacks appears to be roughly consistent with the 2015 figures.
“There were 6,095 black homicide deaths in 2014—the most recent year for which such data are available—compared with 5,397 homicide deaths for whites and Hispanics combined. Almost all of those black homicide victims had black killers.“
“Over the past decade, according to FBI data, 40% of cop killers have been black. Officers are killed by blacks at a rate 2.5 times higher than the rate at which blacks are killed by police.“
“According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, blacks were charged with 62% of all robberies, 57% of murders and 45% of assaults in the 75 largest U.S. counties in 2009, though they made up roughly 15% of the population there.“
“Such a concentration of criminal violence in minority communities means that officers will be disproportionately confronting armed and often resisting suspects in those communities, raising officers’ own risk of using lethal force.“
“A March 2015 Justice Department report on the Philadelphia Police Department found that black and Hispanic officers were much more likely than white officers to shoot blacks based on “threat misperception”—that is, the mistaken belief that a civilian is armed.“
“A 2015 study by University of Pennsylvania criminologist Greg Ridgeway … found that, at a crime scene where gunfire is involved, black officers in the New York City Police Department were 3.3 times more likely to discharge their weapons than other officers at the scene.“

It is a tragic fact that the black community is plagued disproportionately by crime and violence. However, that has nothing to do with the manner in which police perform their duties when confronted with danger. Rather, it has to do with historical inequities, poor educational institutions, dismal economic opportunities, and a number of misguided government policies. The latter include minimum wages that diminish opportunities for black workers to gain job experience, anti-poverty initiatives that destroy work incentives and undermine family structure, a failed public school system, and the misguided war on drugs. Drug prohibition ensnares those who face insidious alternatives to legal market activity, which is often unavailable. Unfortunately, all of these policies have a disproportionate effect on the black community.

Any assessment of police conduct must acknowledge the circumstances under which officers work. If a particular demographic is disproportionately involved in crime, and affected by crime, then it is reasonable to expect that police action will be disproportionately focused on that group. This is not prima facie evidence of racism in police work. Quite the contrary: it is evidence that the police are fulfilling their obligation to protect innocents within that demographic, even if other institutions are aggravating the social dysfunction.

Back To The Restroom

29 Friday Apr 2016

Posted by pnuetz in Discrimination, Federalism, Privacy, Property Rights

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Anti-Discrimination, Arbitrary Discrimination, Charlotte, Gender Registration, Gender-Specific Restrooms, Hormone Replacement Therapy, LGBT Discrimination, Market Self-Regulation, Mises Institute, NC, North Carolina, Property Rights, Restroom Federalism, Roy Cardato, Separation of Bathroom and State, Transgender, Tyler Cowan

I’m following-up on “I’m a Restroom Federalist” by sharing “We Need Separation of Bathroom and State” by Roy Cordato at the Mises Institute. He makes a clean defense of the libertarian view that restrooms choices on private property must not be controlled by government. Any attempt to do so is a violation of private property rights, according to this view. I did not adequately treat the question of property rights in my first “restroom” post. Strong property rights in this context mean that you, a private businessperson, can set the rules for restroom use on your premises, or no rules at all. If you or your customers prefer gender-neutral restrooms in your place of business, so be it. If you believe your customers prefer separate restrooms based on a definition of gender, you can post appropriate signs and face any complaints privately without interference from government.

Many sincere observers hope for a way to fairly accommodate transgender individuals without unduly compromising the rights of others. In my mind, discrimination (or differences in accommodations) should not be tolerated in society if based on arbitrary distinctions. By that I mean the victim differs from the discriminator only in nonessential ways for the purposes at hand. For example, discriminating on the basis of race is wholly arbitrary in almost context. (A director casting the part of an individual of a specific race is a possible exception.) No real harm comes from tolerance and equal treatment in these contexts. I have argued that the market is self-regulating in punishing discrimination. And one can argue that certain freedoms may be violated (association, religion, expression and even property) when even arbitrary forms of discrimination are outlawed, as they are. In these situations, however, laws can work because there is little ambiguity in defining victims of discrimination and the legitimacy of their victimhood.

Is discrimination against transgenders in their restroom options just as arbitrary as it would be against other minorities? That depends upon whether “transgender” can be defined objectively. If it cannot, then denying the bearded lady’s transgender claim in the restroom is not so arbitrary, given the privacy rights of others.

Tyler Cowen discusses some of the complexities of determining whether there should be a legal definition of transgender, or a more “nuanced” definition of gender with three or more categories. That would eliminate any legitimate objections to gender-specific restrooms. However, a legal standard cannot be based solely on “inner feelings”. Aside from genitalia, are there objective facts that can be brought to bear in defining gender? A personal physician’s assessment of “gender intent” is one possibility. An active regimen of hormone replacement therapy is another. However, transgenders themselves might object to any specific definition of gender imposed by government. Many transgenders would prefer to have it remain a matter of self-identity, but it is impossible to clearly define rights on that basis. As Cowen notes, the “most libertarian view is to refuse to offer a legal definition of transgender.” He also adds:

“If we stick with no legal definition of transgender, let’s tackle the remaining problems directly. For instance we could significantly increase the penalties for men who abuse women or young girls in or near women’s rooms, if indeed that is an ongoing problem.“

As I intimated in my earlier post, I am unconvinced that gender-neutral restrooms won’t encourage voyeurism by posers. That implies a conflict between the rights of transgenders and the fundamental right to privacy. Given that fact, Cowen’s suggestion is sensible under any restroom regime. He also cites the existence of voluntary gender registration systems in other countries. Given a clear definition, transgenders choosing to register could use the restroom consistent with their gender identity and would have documented proof if any question arose as to their right to use a particular facility.

Cordato provides a good explanation of the Charlotte anti-discrimination ordinance and North Carolina’s new law striking it down. The Charlotte ordinance stripped owners of business property of their right to set rules for their own restrooms. The state law does several things: It restores the rights of business owners to provide separate restrooms for males and females, which is fine as far as it goes. It also mandates gender separation of multi-occupancy restrooms and locker rooms in government facilities. Truly, it is hard to imagine any good coming of mixing middle-school girls and boys in the same restrooms and locker rooms. However, the state law also prohibits the promulgation of any anti-discrimination law by lower jurisdictions. That seems a bit too sweeping.

Cowan says the North Carolina law is a solution in search of a problem, or worse:

“North Carolina made a mistake in signing the new law. Not just a practical mistake, because of the backlash, but a mistake outright. I’m not aware there was a problem needing to be solved, and yet new problems have been created.“

Maybe so, but the city of Charlotte clearly took a step in violation of private property rights, and one that threatened privacy rights. I stated in my first restroom post that alternative arrangements will be tested socially, at the ballot box, and by the courts. Some object to the strong privacy ethic that exists in the U.S. as prudish, but it is a cultural given, and privacy rights are protected by the Constitution. Given a conflict over rights between two parties, the courts must decide how to balance those interests.That’s as it should be. And so we’re back to the beauty of federalism!

Coerced Fairness: Wronging Every Right

14 Thursday Apr 2016

Posted by pnuetz in Discrimination, Liberty, Tyranny

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Andrew Bernstein, Constitutional rights, Dan Sanchez, discrimination, Economics of Discrimination, Freedom of Association, Freedom of Expression, Jeffrey Tucker, Jim Crow Laws, Ludwig von Mises, Property Rights, Public Accomodations, Right to Privacy, Unintended Consequences

A nurse says, “If I can bring myself to treat a patient tattooed with a swastika, then a baker can bake a cake for a gay wedding.” Of course, the statement ignores any differences in the values held by these individuals, their right to hold different values, or at least their right to act peacefully on those values. It makes an arbitrary presumption about what is “fair” and what is “unfair”, which is seldom well-defined when two parties hold sincere but conflicting beliefs. Yes, the baker can bake the cake, but should he be forced to do so under state compulsion? Coerced behavior is the product of aggression, but declining business for personal reasons is not an act of aggression, though the “safe-space” crowd would do its best to convince us otherwise. Sorry, hurt feelings don’t count!

Imposing the machinery of the state on private decisions about how and for whom one’s art must be practiced invites even more coercive action by the state going forward. Jeffrey Tucker addresses this in “Must a Jewish Baker Make a Nazi Cake?“, using the teachings of Ludwig von Mises on the implications of voluntary and coerced behavior.

Discrimination occurs in markets in many forms. Consumers discriminate between sellers and products based on quality, price, convenience and trust. In turn, producers or sellers discriminate between workers based on skill, effort, wages and trust. They discriminate between local markets or areas of specialization based on profitability. They discriminate between buyers based upon ability and willingness to pay. All of these forms of discrimination are rational because they result in better value for the discriminating consumer or better profitability for the discriminating producer. In other words, these forms of discrimination align with economic self-interest.

Other forms of discrimination do not align strictly with economic self-interest, but they may be preferred by the individual based on other criteria. It’s probably not possible to justify these forms of discrimination from all perspectives. Some may be abhorrent to most observers, including me. Certainly more consensus exists on some than on others. Nevertheless, these non-economically motivated forms of discrimination are always costly to the discriminator. For example, a consumer who refuses to frequent certain establishments owned by members of an out-group will forego opportunities for more varied experiences. Also, she will tend to pay higher prices due to her lack of interest in the competitive effort made by the out-group. An employer who refuses to hire certain minorities faces a more limited labor pool. He is likely to face a higher wage bill and will get a less efficient mix of skills in his workers. A seller who discriminates against certain groups by turning them away foregoes revenue, and the action may have negative reputational consequences. Obviously, other competitors can profit from another seller’s discriminatory behavior. Almost by definition, markets impose penalties on discrimination not borne out of economic self-interest.

Anyone with doubts about the effectiveness of markets and capitalism to overcome this latter type of discrimination should look no further than the broadly integrated activity that occurs within markets every day, and at the extent to which markets have become more diverse over time. Here is a choice quote of Tucker:

“Commerce has a tendency to break down barriers, not create them. In fact, this is why Jim Crow laws came into existence, to interrupt the integrationist tendencies of the marketplace. Here is the hidden history of a range of government interventions, from zoning to labor laws to even the welfare state itself. The ruling class has always resented and resisted the market’s tendency to break down entrenched status and gradually erode tribal bias.

Indeed, commerce is the greatest fighter against bigotry and hate that humankind has ever seen. And it is precisely for this reason that a movement rooted in hate must necessarily turn to politics to get its way.“

The hypertext within the quote links to an excellent piece by Andrew Berstein on “Black Innovators and Entrepreneurs Under Capitalism”, which covers the sad history of efforts to use government to undermine black commercial success.

Social justice activists argue that the state has a compelling interest in ending all discrimination, but the courts have followed a circuitous path in thrashing out whether (and what parts of) the U.S. Constitution might protect individuals or groups against private discrimination. But my interest is in what happens when the state endeavors to end discrimination in markets that are otherwise self-regulating: the state infringes on other rights that are clearly and definitively enshrined in the Constitution, and it arrigates power to itself that far exceeds the limits defined there. It may compromise the freedom of association, the freedom of religion, the right to private property, and the right to privacy. I believe the government has a compelling interest in protecting those rights, which apply to all individuals. It is also worth noting the absence of a limiting principle in defining what counts as fairness or discrimination. The Left finds it easy to denigrate and dismiss these as selfish concerns, proving how little regard they have for individual liberty. Establishing government control over the extent of those rights represents the end of our Constitutional Republic and is a prescription for tyranny.

Consider the ways in which government often attempts or is asked to create accommodations for marginalized groups, through laws on hate speech, compulsory service, hiring quotas, admission quotas, lending fairness, pricing equity, wage laws, work rules, mandatory facilities and the forced transfer of income. Tucker argues that this complex web of resource manipulation and mandatory and proscribed behaviors has several “unintended” consequences. I already mentioned the obvious abridgment of freedoms. Another negative consequence is that this approach does not promote unity; it breeds resentment and is likely to end in greater disunity. Furthermore, self-sufficiency is undermined by policies that hamper economic growth, and all of the general measures just mentioned redound to the detriment of that objective. Finally, many of these “fairness” policies run directly counter to the interests of the marginalized, such as wage floors that eliminate employment opportunities for the least-skilled, and means testing that discourages labor market effort through income “cliff” incentives.

The most menacing aspect of the effort to stamp out all forms of discrimination is a state with power to impose its own rules of legal “fair” treatment. Tucker appeals to Mises’ views on this point:

“[Mises] said that a policy that forces people against their will creates the very conditions that lead to legal discrimination. In his view, even speaking as someone victimized by invidious discrimination, it is better to retain freedom than build a bureaucracy that overrides human choice. …

Sacrificing principle for the sake of marginalized groups is short-sighted. If you accept the infringement of human rights as an acceptable political weapon, that weapon will eventually be turned on the very people you want to help. As Dan Sanchez has written, ‘Authoritarian restriction is a game much better suited for the mighty than for the marginalized.’“

Proponents of legal, compensatory handicapping by the state in favor of those pressing any and all grievances ask us to compromise basic constitutional rights, including the rights of association, free expression, privacy and private property. A corresponding effect is to grant the state more complete coercive power in almost every aspect of life. The unavoidable focus of such policies is not unity, but group identity, a divisive result that should give us pause. The power granted to the state in this context is as arbitrary as the currently fashionable definition of “fairness”, and it cannot be rolled back easily. Furthermore, economic vitality is not easy to restore once basic institutions and freedoms have been destroyed. This is evident from the sad history of socialism throughout the world. Ultimately, the coercive power granted to the state can be used in ways that should horrify today’s proponents of social and economic redress for every real or imagined inequity.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Addendum: Just over a year ago, I made a qualified defense of the right of a business to refuse service based on religious principles in my post “Suit Me, Or Face a Lawsuit: Adventures In Litigationland“. There, I made a distinction between “public accommodations” versus work for which a business-person must use her art, which is a form of expression, to provide customized service to a potential customer. I had the baker in mind, or the photographer asked to work a gay wedding. As I have in this post, I maintained that if a business-person finds some aspect of a request objectionable for any reason, she has the right to discriminate by refusing the business as a matter of freedom of expression.

I left a huge loose end in the argument I made in the earlier post. It had to do with the presumed requirement to serve all potential customers through the “public accommodations” of a private business. However, if the baker creates a beautiful “love cake” for sale to the general public, why can’t he refuse to sell it to a gay couple for their wedding as a matter of freedom of expression? After all, it involves the baker’s art. If a stationer has created an artful collection of cards for sale to the public, why can’t she refuse to sell them to a gay couple for their wedding invitations on account of her religious convictions? And what about the nurse? If he is in private practice, can’t he refuse to practice his art of healing on the “swastikaner” as a matter of free expression? I believe that’s a constitutional absolute, though professional oaths may dictate that care be delivered. An emergency room nurse would not have any choice but to deliver care under federal law, but it is not clear whether the law would withstand a constitutional challenge by a private hospital on these grounds. As things stand, the nurse can only refuse employment or resign if the rules are not to his liking.

I’m a Restroom Federalist

10 Sunday Apr 2016

Posted by pnuetz in Discrimination, Privacy

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

Expectation of Privacy, Federalism, Privacy Rights, Restroom Rights, Sexual Reassignment Surgery, Transgender, Transsexual, Transsexual Prevalence, Voyeurism, Voyeurism Prevalence, Wikipedia

A joke I once heard: “What two words does a guy least want to hear at the urinal? … Nice d*ck!” The truth is that privacy matters. While most men don’t wish to be “admired” by other men, mens’ public restrooms would seem to provide adequate privacy for those having a particular sensitivity. I presume that womens’ restrooms do too.

Still, voyeurism is more common than we’d like, and strong privacy advocates believe that’s an adequate rationale for prohibiting transgender women (M to F) from using womens’ restrooms. It’s not legitimate trans-women who are of concern, whether they’ve undergone full sexual reassignment or not. Rather, it’s men who would falsely claim to be trans-women. Put another way, does the state have any compelling interest in protecting privacy by discriminating against transgender women, barring their use of womens’ restrooms?

Laws against voyeurism are grounded in the presumed right to privacy under the U.S. Constitution. The expectation of privacy is well-established as a condition under which voyeurism can be prosecuted, and bathrooms meet that test. In fact, the prevalence of voyeurism is estimated to be quite high, especially among males. The Wikipedia entry on this subject states that:

“…research found voyeurism to be the most common sexual law-breaking behavior in both clinical and general populations. … In a national study of Sweden it was found that 7.7% of the population (both men and women) had engaged in voyeurism at some point. It is also believed that voyeurism occurs up to 150 times more frequently than police reports indicate.“

The estimate from Sweden is conservative for male voyeurs. However, only a portion of that voyeurism occurs in or around public restrooms. For the sake of argument, let’s suppose that 5% of the estimate above relates to males likely to commit some form of voyeurism in or around womens’ restrooms, or 0.38% of the adult male population. Each of those males may commit voyeurism against multiple females on any given bathroom escapade, so this value may underestimate the risk to the privacy of women.

On the other hand, the prevalence of transgender, or gender identification different from that assigned at birth, is very low. Again according to Wikipedia, the most commonly cited figure is that 1 in 10,000 assigned males is transgender (and far fewer birth-assigned females). Some argue that this is too low to account for even the cases of sexual reassignment surgery (SRS) that have occurred in the U.S. I would argue, however, that trans-women (M to F) having undergone SRS would be welcome in womens’ restrooms. After all, they’d even pass a genital check at the door! That leaves transgender men who have not yet, or will not, undergo SRS. So, for the sake of argument, I will go with the incidence rate of 0.01% implied by the figure above. That is, 0.01% of the adult male population is an assigned-male trans woman having male genitals.

Assuming that all womens’ restrooms are thrown open to any male claiming to be a trans-woman, the conservative estimate of the incidence of voyeurism would be 38 times the incidence of legitimate trans-women disallowed from entering womens’ restrooms under traditional gender restrictions. Note that neither of these estimates has a time dimension. Repeat voyeurism is a likelihood, just as legitimate trans-women, pre-SRS, would be denied their rights on every trip to a public restroom.

Now we ask again which case is more compelling: protecting the right to privacy against the potential for voyeurism, or protecting the restroom rights of trans-women who are pre- or non-SRS? One possible solution is to acknowledge restrictions on restroom use as an incentive for transsexuals to undergo SRS. However, that is not practical in important respects: full gender transition can take a number of years; SRS is not and cannot be an immediate procedure for walk-ins at the doctor’s office for various reasons; and some transsexuals are never able to make a full transition.

Another consideration is the extent to which bathroom regulation makes any difference at all. While “throwing the doors open” might create some additional incentive to male voyeurs, they are already active, and most of them would be just as easy to prosecute if the rules on restroom use for trans-women were relaxed. However, to the extent that creates additional risk, it is borne by all women availing themselves of public restrooms. At the same time, it is certain that trans-women already make use of womens’ restrooms. If non-SRS, they must do so surreptitiously and at some legal risk, Again, their total number is limited.

The balance between the threat to privacy rights and the desire for equitable treatment of transsexuals is not as clear-cut as some on either side would have us believe. However, given the need to determine that balance, the classic federalist approach seems ideal. That is, states or more limited political jurisdictions should decide how best to handle the issue. That is more or less our current approach, as the issue is otherwise beyond our ability to find a consensus. Full conversion to unisex restrooms might even be acceptable in some parts of the U.S. Fortunately, individuals can “vote with their feet”, rewarding those jurisdictions having laws they find best-protect their rights as individuals. It’s another great experiment in the determination of social preferences. That’s what federalism is all about.

Leftist Ad Hominid Species Screams “White Racists!”

03 Wednesday Feb 2016

Posted by pnuetz in Discrimination, Equality, racism

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Tags

A Taste For Discrimination, Assimilation, Celebrating Diversity, Cultural Sorting, Davis Bacon Act, discrimination, Economics of Discrimination, Jim Crow Laws, Minimum Wage, Racial Quotas, racism, Rent Controls, Social Mobility, Systemic Racism, Unintended Consequences, Virtue Signaling, Voluntary Sorting, War on Drugs

Lately I hear that all white people are racists, and I feel compelled to examine the intellectual grounding of such an inflamatory claim. Consciousness of race is not racism, as some would suggest. Indeed, solutions to racial division offered by activists usually require that we bear race in mind as a primary differentiator. Insofar as one must consider the worth of another person in any context, people of good faith simply do not care about a person’s race. Rather, they care about traits that count, such as honesty, skills, work ethic and perhaps affability. Should they somehow care more? What would vindicate them?

Inflammatory Claims

There are probably several motives for the charge of universal white racism. On one level, it represents political agitation. Posts carrying the charge on social media always involve a measure of “virtue signaling” to like-minded friends, or perhaps before the Gods. (I’m sure the posters will be forgiven.) Such posts might represent acts of social contrition to allay deep-seated feelings of guilt. The posters might fancy that they are raising the consciousness of others, proudly imagining the important lesson they are teaching. The bad news for them is that most people of good faith are rightly skeptical of proselytization like this. In fact, the agitation probably does more to breed skepticism than anything else.

Voluntary Sorting Behavior

What some view as racial division is often an innocent consequence of voluntary sorting based upon the shared subcultures most compelling to individuals at a given time. There are many subcultures into which a person might fit: work, school, profession, sports, music, religion, politics, hobbies, geography, ancestry, ethnicity and race. And there are micro-cultures within all of these categories. These cultural segments differ in many respects, and they may overlap in many cases. The extent of sub-cultural overlap may be viewed as a gauge of assimilation.

In any given context, people tend to voluntarily sort themselves into the sub-culture they find most compelling. This voluntary sorting does not yield a fixed social distribution of individuals across groups. Individuals can choose to associate with different sub-cultures to which they belong on a day-to-day basis.

There is a pronounced tendency for sorting to occur within larger “populations”, such as cafeteria-goers in a large office or in a large school. People from particular work groups might sit together: there is some sorting by age, by gender, and by race. African-Americans often sit together. There is mixing of members of these subgroups as well. People are brought together by work or school, but the shared work or school culture is frequently less compelling to individuals in their choice of a lunch table than other sub-cultures to which they belong.

Isolation or Assimilation

Assimilation does not mean that cultural differences must disappear, but it does mean that subcultures must at least be tolerant of others. A key question is whether one subgroup would welcome a member of another subgroup to join them. There might be reasons to refuse in some circumstances, such as a group of accountants who wish to avoid economists. Lol. However, a group of Caucasians who prefer to remain exclusive, making African Americans feel unwelcome, are guilty of racism, and vice-versa. As for the converse, an African American individual who prefers not to join a group of Caucasians, and vice versa, there is usually a good rationale for presuming the individual to be innocent of racism: they are simply choosing a more compelling sub-culture.

Certain sub-cultures may be especially amenable to selection from across sub-groups. For example, team sports often foster racial mixing, as do music and various professions. Religion and economic stratum can be powerful shared sub-cultures, drawing members across racial groups. In other words, mixing of sub-cultures will occur when a compelling sub-culture is shared. That is a form of successful assimilation.

When voluntary sorting takes place, the parties seek commonalities. That’s a form of discrimination that may be quite healthy and not racist in any way. On the other hand, accepting diversity implies respect for other cultures and subcultures. Voluntary sorting allows those cultures to function, but it does not necessarily imply exclusion of others who might be curious and wish to learn and take part in a culture’s traditions, or who might even wish to become a part of a different community.

Counterproductive Compulsion

The insistence that racism is widespread is often an expression of support for compelled remedies or paying reparations of some kind to alleged victims. In a free society, the kind of voluntary sorting discussed above will always be a reality; any attempt to prevent it would require extreme coercion. Reparations for historical injustices, legal or economic, raise ethical questions about the treatment of those who must bear the costs. They also carry high administrative costs and tend to breed resentment and division. There are well-known downsides to quotas in hiring and in school admissions. Not only do quotas lead to reverse discrimination, they also can place the intended beneficiaries into situations of vulnerability to failure.

Markets Are Not Racist

Then there is the allegation that private markets are a source of “systemic racism”, having “disparate impacts” on certain minorities. However, it should be noted that the market mechanism tends to penalize racism. A consumer who chooses to avoid sellers of a different race will tend to pay a higher price for the privilege. An employer with a “taste for discrimination” must choose from a smaller labor pool and may lose the opportunity to hire the best talent. In other words, racists must pay for their preference. They also forego the creative benefits that diverse organizations tend to enjoy.

Certain minorities have struggled to achieve success in the private economy, but there are much better explanations for that difficulty than market forces, which provide the best opportunity for growth and assimilation. There is no question that institutional obstacles have had extremely harsh effects on groups starting from lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder. A few examples: the failed public education has been especially burdensome for urban and rural minorities; various public policies have effectively excluded minorities from markets, including Jim Crow laws, the minimum wage and the Davis-Bacon Act; the so-called social safety net is rife with features that penalize work and reward fragmentation of families, making it as much a trap as a net; the drug war creates illicit market opportunities which present catastrophic but unappreciated risks for both the participants and their families; rent controls, zoning laws and restrictions on new construction limit the stock of affordable housing; heavy regulation makes starting a business difficult for those without the financial and legal resources to deal with it; and the ugly tradition of cronyism tends to reduce social mobility by entrenching privilege rather than rewarding economic value. The deck is stacked in many ways against economic mobility by public policy, and racial minirities have borne much of the burden.

Immigration Hotspot

Another controversy is whether racism is manifest in the negative views of many Americans toward immigrants. These claims allege ethnic and religious discrimination, including the hatred of Muslims. No doubt there are Americans who harbor racist attitudes toward immigrants. Some of this is grounded in unreasonable economic fears. There are also fears that terrorists may be among new immigrant populations, especially refugees, but that fear is hardly unreasonable given the recent experience of Europe and the difficulty of establishing reliable background information on some of these individuals.

Sharing Freedom

Racism still exists and it will never go away entirely. However, our dedication to freedom compels us to protect speech as long as it is not threatening. Racial discrimination by participants in markets can be difficult to detect, but racists must pay an economic price imposed by the market mechanism, and there are often legal remedies if racial discrimination in markets can be proven. Fortunately, racism today is not as widespread as the agitators would have you believe. The best policy for assimilation and acceptance is to promote a shared culture of freedom and economic opportunity.

Suit Me, Or Face a Lawsuit: Adventures In Litigationland

06 Monday Apr 2015

Posted by pnuetz in Discrimination, Presumptive rights

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

14th Amendment, 1st Amendment, Anti-discrimination law, Constitutional rights, Economics of Discrimination, Eugene Volokh, Free exercise, Free expression, Freedom of Association, Gary Becker, Gay rights, Indiana, New Mexico, Presumptive rights, Private discrimination, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, SCOTUS, Taste for discrimination, Tolerance and profit

Suppose that Jim and Bob, who are life partners, own and operate a company that produces signage. A church group requests a banner to read “Only one man and one woman make a marriage”. Jim and Bob are likely to be offended by the suggestion that they use their art to express such a sentiment, and I think they are entitled to refuse the business. The freedom of expression granted by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects individuals against compulsion to express things they find objectionable. Will Jim and Bob engage in discrimination if they refuse the business? You bet, but I do not think the government has a “compelling interest” to intervene on behalf of the religious group, especially if there are other businesses capable of producing the banner or if the group can produce it themselves.

Has the exercise of free expression been tested as a defense against charges of illegal discrimination? The example above dealt with discrimination by a private company against a religious group. A similar case involved New Mexico photographers who refused to shoot photos at a same-sex wedding. The plaintiffs alleged discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, but the photographers claimed that compulsion to accept that work constituted a violation of their freedom of expression. The New Mexico Supreme Court ruled against the photographers. They appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court (SCotUS), which refused to hear the case without additional comment. While this case established a precedent in New Mexico for the compelling interest of government to enforce anti-discrimination law, the refusal of SCotUS to get involved did not create a wider precedent in favor of anti-discrimation law over free speech. There are a number of reasons why the Court might have refused to hear the case, including the fact that the suit was brought under state law, not federal law; simple prioritization across many competing cases for an always full docket; or the lack of any conflict with other court decisions.

At the link above, which was written just after the New Mexico court’s ruling, Eugene Volokh offered his views on the case:

“Is it permissible for the law to require freelance writers, composers, artists, editors, and the like to create speech that they don’t want to create? Might it even be permissible for the law to require other conduits, such as bookstores and movie theaters, to distribute speech that they don’t want to distribute? (I use ‘speech’ here in the standard First Amendment sense, which includes music, pictures, video, and the like.) … It seems to me that having to create speech, using your own creative abilities and judgments as an artist, musician, writer, or what have you, is an even deeper ‘foster[ing]’ of ‘an idea [you might] find morally objectionable’ — an even deeper intrusion on ‘individual freedom of mind’”

We often couch discussions like this in terms of “rights”, which is easily understood. However, there is a strong distinction between this framing and the actual structure of the Constitution. Rather than granting specific rights to individuals, that document presumes the existence of those rights and instead enumerates powers held by the federal government and restrictions on its exercise of those powers. For example, here is the First Amendment:

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

And below is a key excerpt from the Fourteenth Amendment, upon which much anti-discrimination law is based. Note that its prohibitions apply only to government action, not private action:

“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

One right that should be presumptive is that of individuals to form a union in marriage. It is not addressed explicitly in the Constitution, and perhaps that would be less important if the government were not so intricately involved in the marriage business. Property rights, estate law, taxes, and legal benefits to employees and significant others can all be dependent on the legal status of a marriage. Still, it is not obvious why the government should be anything but neutral with respect to who can be married. Even if we concede a government interest in certifying marriages (it is a source of license fee revenue), are there other reasons for government authority in this area? Call me a skeptic. In any case, the legal recognition of marriage has been left up to the states.

Laws against private discrimination are thought to derive their authority from an enumerated power in the commerce clause, in Article 1 of the Constitution. This allows Congress to “regulate commerce among the several states“. This power was traditionally held to relate only to interstate commerce, consistent with the preservation of federalist principles and states’ rights. The courts have interpreted the power more broadly at times, but it is certainly not unlimited. In the traditional context of interstate commerce, and in view of the presumptive nature of individual rights under the Constitution, this seems to be a strikingly thin rationale for regulating many kinds of private behavior, or for compelling certain activities that burden the exercise of other rights.

Returning to the example above, defending Jim and Bob for turning away the church group’s business is similar in most respects to defending the photographer in the New Mexico case, or the baker who refuses, on religious grounds, to decorate a cake with a gay wedding theme. The cases all involve a form of private discrimination and a conflict between anti-discrimination law and forms of free expression. Whether presumptive rights to free speech, religious practice, or even freedom of association can trump statutory prohibitions against discrimination, or vice versa, is unlikely to be resolved once and for all, at least not any time soon. The individual circumstances surrounding a dispute of this nature will always be helpful, if not determinative. But what sort of test can be applied in order to achieve a resolution?

When sufficient tension exists, it is up to the courts to consider the specific nature of the discrimination in question, its rationale under any presumptive rights, and whether the claimant has “protected” status under a relevant anti-discrimination law. In terms of anti-discrimination law, a line is often drawn by insisting on the universal, non-discriminatory provision of “public accommodations”. The exact meaning of this term can differ by jurisdiction, but it generally implies a sales channel for which the “doors are open”. The presence of competition and alternative providers would argue against the state’s contravention of the presumptive rights of individual sellers in order to satisfy a statuary requirement. The competitive landscape and presence of viable alternatives should be an important consideration in balancing interests in these kinds of conflicts.

Choosing to discriminate against a specific group is not costless, even when legally sanctioned. It is obvious to most business people that tolerance is more profitable than intolerance. The acceptance of this disparity was clearly articulated as a “taste” for discrimination by Gary Becker in his 1957 book, “The Economics of Discrimination“. Becker’s analysis of discrimination in the labor market noted that employers with such a “taste” are willing to pay higher wages in order to avoid hiring certain minorities. In the examples above, Bob and Jim are willing to turn away otherwise profitable business, as are the baker and the photographer. However, their tastes for discrimination do not imply economic irrationality. In all three cases, the business people hold the maintenance of certain principles to be of greater value than the foregone profits.

These issues are relevant to the recent controversy surrounding Indiana’s new Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The context for RFRAs is narrower, as they relate to religious expression as opposed to expression generally. The first RFRA was a federal law supported by liberals in response to a conservative SCotUS decision in a dispute over the use of peyote for religious purposes. Generally, RFRAs require that the government have a compelling interest in burdening religious exercise and then must do so using the least restrictive means available. A number of individual states have passed their own RFRAs in order to carve out religious exemptions to various rules. In a recent post, Eugene Volokh discusses the history that gave rise to RFRAs, and the irony that many liberals now decry their existence, while conservatives tend to support them. The principles underlying these laws were once championed by prominent liberal members of SCotUS.

The version of the Indiana RFRA originally signed by Governor Pence would have allowed religious expression to be used as a defense in a discrimination lawsuit. Subsequently, the Indiana state legislature amended the bill with a provision stating that the law does not authorize a “provider” to refuse business from a range of protected groups, including gays and lesbians (ministers, churches and non-profits are exempted). Does this nullify the impact of the bill on free exercise of religion? Many believe so. However, the absence of positive “authorization” may not mean the courts will decide that the state of Indiana has a compelling interest in preventing a particular case of discrimination.

[An aside: One interesting approach has been suggested for businesses in the wedding industry whose owners believe that accepting work at same-sex weddings would violate their religious principles. These businesses should continue to accept business through their “public accommodations” except for customized wedding goods and services. According to this approach, they should offer the latter exclusively through binding contracts with specific churches or places of worship, thereby operating exemptions granted to those institutions.]

Critics of the original Indiana RFRA were generally silent regarding RFRAs in 19 other states, as well as a federal RFRA signed by President Clinton. Moreover, it is clear that there has been some contrived activity from partisans on both sides (see here, here and here). At least the contrived activity demonstrates a greater depth of understanding than some of the hateful speech that I have witnessed on social media. Some would claim my example of Jim and Bob is contrived as well, but it is a plausible scenario and it shows that the tension between rights can cut both ways. A call for the legal supremacy of anti-discrimination law over presumptive rights means that the freedoms of protected groups can be abrogated as well when in conflict with another protected group.

Persecution is well known to both gays and people of faith. Both groups are certainly aware that there will always be others who do not share their views, strictures and practices, and some who may well disapprove. Both groups should be sympathetic to the notion of “live and let live”, and they should have the forbearance to avoid insisting on everyone’s direct participation in their celebrations. Some might even call this good manners. Participation (even for profit) cannot be compelled any more than approval. Regardless of what one might think of the values of outsiders who do not wish to participate, the “discriminatory” actions (or failures to act) in question are not prima facie evidence of hatred.

Jim and Bob, as well as the baker and the photographer, have broad presumptive rights under the constitution, whether they involve free speech or religious exercise. No one should be compelled to engage in expression they find objectionable without the ability to challenge it in court. Protections against discrimination are important, but they certainly do not confer the power to force others to participate in your celebrations. And why bother? Live and let live.

Postscript: Why bother, indeed! And here is Jonathan Turley on the key issue of defining an “expressive act”.

Sacred Cow Chips

Category Archives: Discrimination

Behold Our Algorithmic Overlords

School Discipline, Disparate Impact, and Disparate Justice

Gays and Bakers: Expression or Repression?

American Homicide Rates: Which America?

Race and Crime, Cops and Race

Back To The Restroom

Coerced Fairness: Wronging Every Right

I’m a Restroom Federalist

Suit Me, Or Face a Lawsuit: Adventures In Litigationland