Monthly Archives: February 2018

School Shootings, Distorted Trends, and Hysteria

28 Wednesday Feb 2018

Posted by in Gun Control

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It’s not possible to exaggerate the tragic nature of a school shooting, but the frequency and trend in such events is often overstated. A wave of misinformation about mass shootings in schools is circulating in the wake of the massacre at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida. That awful day notwithstanding, the so-called epidemic of mass shootings underway in American schools is a fiction. Criminology professor James Alan Fox provides an illuminating discussion of statistics on school shootings since 1990:

“Since 1990, there have been 22 shootings at elementary and secondary schools in which two or more people were killed, not counting those perpetrators who committed suicide. … Whereas five of these incidents have occurred over the past five-plus years since 2013, claiming the lives of 27 victims (17 at Parkland), the latter half of the 1990s witnessed seven multiple-fatality shootings with a total of 33 killed (13 at Columbine).“

But what about reports that there have been 290 school shootings over the past five years? Fox addresses that claim:

“Nearly half of the 290 were completed or attempted suicides, accidental discharges of a gun, or shootings with not a single individual being injured. Of the remainder, the vast majority involved either one fatality or none at all.“

Some of the gun fatalities in schools are drug- and/or gang-related. I have written about the destructive effects of drug prohibition before, and school shootings are a dimension of that problem. The drug war has done much to keep the overall homicide rate elevated in the U.S. Suicides, in-school or not, are relatively insensitive to the availability of guns, as international data show.

Any shooting of an innocent should be mourned, particularly when it is a child. But there are many dangers in the modern world that loom larger than school shootings, once they are reported accurately. Fox notes the following:

“Over the past quarter-century, on average [of] about 10 students are slain in school shootings annually. ... Compare the school fatality rate with the more than 100 school-age children accidentally killed each year riding their bikes or walking to school. Congress might be too timid to pass gun legislation to protect children, but how about a national bicycle helmet law for minors? Half of the states do not require them.“

Anyone close to a victim can be forgiven for calls to action they might make in the midst of their grief. However, it’s wise to keep a proper perspective on events before rushing to legislate policy changes. The frequency and trend in mass shootings at schools has been greatly exaggerated, and largely in service to a political agenda. The news media does a disservice to the public by propagating this lie (and it is not the only falsehood in circulation). It would be appropriate to call it “fake news” and dispense with the false sense of urgency it creates in the debate. Reducing the risk of school shootings is an important objective, but let’s not distort the magnitude of the risk.

Gays and Bakers: Expression or Repression?

26 Monday Feb 2018

Posted by in Discrimination, Free Speech

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A lot rides on the legal interpretation of “expression” in the gay-wedding-cake dispute. Eugene Volokh discusses a recent ruling in California in which a trial court judge ruled that the baker’s right to free expression, buttressed by her right to free exercise of religion, protected her from demands that she participate in a form of expression to which she objected. Specifically, she had no legal obligation to create a cake for the celebration of a gay couple’s wedding, according to the ruling.

The facts in the case, CA Dept. of Fair Employment and Housing v. Cathy’s Creations, are that the baker refused to bake the couple a wedding cake but expressed a willingness to sell them anything that was already available in the shop. Thus, she did not discriminate against the couple by denying them access to her “public accommodations”. She also gave the couple a referral to another baker whom she believed would be willing to produce the cake. So there were probable alternatives available to the couple, and the baker’s assistance in locating one mitigated against any harm suffered by the gay couple. That sort of mitigation is an important factor to consider in weighing the rights of conflicting parties. Courts have tended to view “dignitary harm” as less compelling than forced expression.

Volokh argues that the baker’s role in the episode did not demand expression on her part. He says the proposed cake was a pre-existing design and did not involve writing of any kind. Otherwise, Volokh would have supported the ruling. He and a coauthor discuss the distinctions between an artist (who expresses) and an artisan (who merely executes), and an expressive and a non-expressive cake, in an amicus brief, as noted in the article linked above. Here is Volokh’s summary of his view:

“While creating photographs, videos, and text would be constitutionally protected speech (so we support the right of, for instance, photographers not to photograph same-sex weddings), creating wedding cakes with no text or symbolic design on them is not.“

The Volokh article is a little confusing because the amicus brief seems to have been filed in a different but similar case, Masterpiece Bakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which is now before the U.S. Supreme Court. A ruling is expected this summer. Here is a transcript of the oral arguments in that case, which were heard late last year. It’s a fascinating discussion.

Volokh’s analysis is fine as far as it goes. However, a wedding cake is likely to be considered expressive to both the baker and the cake’s buyers. The baker’s effort in executing even a pre-existing design may involve meaning for her beyond mere execution, since the usual intent of a wedding cake is to celebrate a sacred union. Likewise, the baker knows that the buyers consider the cake to be expressive of their union. The baker doesn’t want any involvement in that expression, asserting that it is not for the government to intercede, forcing them to participate by producing the cake.

Does the baker’s offer to supply an existing cake (or any other bakery good) undermine their case? Does the necessity of baking a new cake for a gay wedding differ from offering a cake already on the shelf for the same purpose? That may be irrelevant to the cases at hand, because no other wedding cakes were available at the time, and freshness might demand the preparation of a new cake for such an occasion. Nevertheless, that sort of line between an acceptable sale for the baker and unacceptable expression strikes me as thin.

As for the matter of the baker’s religious beliefs and their importance to her expressive rights, Volokh derides some of the language of the ruling. Those beliefs, Volokh says, are irrelevant to the question of whether a particular kind of expression is protected or compelled:

“By the way, I take it that it’s clear that the Free Speech Clause issue can’t turn on whether Miller’s belief ‘is part of the orthodox doctrines’ of many religions, or whether it’s instead ‘trivial, arbitrary, nonsensical, or outrageous’ — the Free Speech Clause protects views regardless of whether they express views that are seen as orthodox, outrageous, or nonsensical.“

Bravo! However, when the rights of two parties are in conflict, it is appropriate to weigh any impingement upon other, secondary rights of both parties.

A disturbing aspect of these cases is that they do not turn in any way on freedom of association, a freedom that encompasses a right not to associate (since any association must be voluntary for both parties). The presumption is that the baker’s right to freely associate or not associate with whomever they please is superseded by their obligations under public accommodation laws, despite the fact that freedom of association is an enumerated right in the U.S. Constitution. While public accommodation laws have generally been found to be constitutional, those laws do not apply in all circumstances, such as when a particular product or service involves expression. But on its own, a violation of the baker’s freedom of association seems to matter less, in today’s legal environment, than abridgment of her free expression, and perhaps less than any obligation she has to provide public accommodation.

Richard Epstein gives a general treatment of the balance between freedom of association and anti-discrimination law. David Henderson has bemoaned the dilution of the freedom of association suffered in the name of non-discrimination. He does not defend discrimination on the basis of race, gender or sexual preference. Quite the contrary. However, as a matter of individual liberty, he prefers that we retain our right to associate on any basis of our choosing and pay the price imposed by the market for discrimination. For example, if you hang a sign outside your restaurant saying that you won’t serve African Americans, you are likely to suffer a loss of business from all who find your preference offensive, as many will. That solution is obviously unappealing to those who believe that participation in civil society requires public standards of equal access in private transactions. Still, there is some truth to a quote Henderson provides from an anonymous individual comparing the idea of non-discrimination in public accommodations to the “common carrier” designation:

“‘Either way, the theory boils down to “you brought forth a good or service and abracadabra you now have fewer rights”‘”.

The legal actions against the bakers in the cases discussed above rely on anti-discrimination law (in CA, the Unruh Act, and in CO, the Anti-Discrimination Act). Those laws must face limits in their application, as may be necessary in the case of compelled expression, especially expression against one’s most deeply-held convictions, religious or otherwise. The most basic question in this regard is whether the creation of the proposed wedding (or union) cakes can be described as expression. Whether the bakers are acting as mere fabricators or as artists, there is no doubt that the wedding parties desired the cakes as part of the celebration of their unions. That use of a cake constitutes expression on their part, and it is a kind of expression and an association from which the bakers would prefer to demure.

I support the right of homosexuals to enter into legal marriage, but I also support the bakers’ right to refuse the business. To invoke a phrase used by Richard Epstein in the article linked above, the world would be a better place if all agreed to simply “live and let live”.

Deficits Are a Symptom of Statist Excess

12 Monday Feb 2018

Posted by in Big Government, Taxes

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One thing’s clear with respect to President Trump’s budget proposal and the ongoing debate over appropriations: federal spending will increase and add to future budget deficits. This follows the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) enacted late last year, which many expect to add upwards of $1 trillion to deficits over the next 10 years. I have offered mixed praise of some of the reforms and rate cuts in the TCJA, though it does not accomplish much in the way of tax simplification and it will almost certainly require a large increase in federal borrowing. Ultimately, however, dollar for dollar, a tax cut giving rise to a deficit inflicts lower (or even negative) costs on the private sector than an unfunded spending binge, which is costly in the most basic terms: resources devoured by government.

Cost of Spending

The cost of an extra dollar of government spending at the most basic level is the value of lost opportunities to which the resources absorbed by government otherwise could have been put. When the government spends an extra dollar, and if the government pays a competitive market price, the goods and services exchanged for that dollar by private party “A” would be valued at more than one dollar by other private parties who lost the opportunity to trade with “A” for those same goods and services.

There might be a strong case for incremental spending in any particular instance, of course. Can we benefit from more national defense? Infrastructure? Grants of foreign aid? Subsidies for this industry or that? This technology or that? This cultural program or that? Public aid? Primary research? Regulatory budgets? I’d favor very few of those as general spending priorities. However, there are many subcategories and so many special interests that it is difficult to control spending as long as compromise is needed to accomplish anything.

The Trump budget is a mix of cuts in non-defense spending and large increases in defense, infrastructure outlays, and border security. On balance, it would lead to substantially higher budget deficits over the next ten years. He won’t get all of what he wants, but it would be astonishing if larger deficits are not an outcome.

Unfortunately, government is typically inefficient in the execution of its tasks and it is less responsive to price incentives than private buyers, who are fully vested in “ownership” of the dollars they spend. Government agents, no matter how honorable, simply do not have the same kind of stake in the outcome as a private owner. Obviously, spending by federal agencies is influenced by the political process, which creates opportunities for side rewards for those who direct or influence spending and those who receive the payments. These side rewards are pure private rents arising from public largess. For a private party, the profitability of transacting with government may well exceed the normal return to capital or entrepreneurship. The efficiency of government spending is compromised by its political nature and the uneconomic behavior of government agents. I therefore have strong doubts about the cost-benefit comparison of almost any public initiative.

Un-Taxing

The government ultimately acquires its funds from taxes enforced via coercive power. After all, tax collection requires a considerable enforcement effort. A tax payment of one dollar requires the sacrifice of things that would have been acquired, now or in the future, in voluntary, private transactions valued more highly than one dollar by the taxpayer. That is the nature of gains from voluntary trade foregone. The result is that one dollar of taxation extracts more than one dollar of value from the private sector. Conversely, a reduced tax liability of one dollar means that private parties can engage in an extra dollar of voluntary trade and benefit from the surplus.

There are few forms of taxes that don’t distort incentives in the private market. Taxes may blunt incentives for work, saving, and deployment of capital in productive uses. To the extent that these private decisions are twisted by taxes in ways that differ from fully voluntary decisions, there is a further loss of value and resource waste. Eliminating these distortions is always a worthy goal.

Funding Deficits

Government has ways other than immediate taxation of paying for excess spending. One is to borrow from the public, domestic or foreign. Those who purchase the government’s debt, loaning their money to the government, do so voluntarily. That debt carries an interest obligation by the government, and it must repay the principle some day. That will require new taxes and their attendant distortions, even more borrowing, and/or some other method of extracting value from the private sector. A principle known as Ricardian equivalence holds that the effects of government outlays are the same whether financed by taxes or borrowing, because taxpayers know that future taxes will be owed to pay off government debt, and so they discount that liability into their behavioral calculus.

Additional borrowing can create an unstable financial environment if borrowing occurs at interest rates higher than the economy’s rate of growth. Borrowing might also “crowd out” private borrowers, absorbing saving that would otherwise be used to finance investment in the economy’s productive capacity. In other words, the resources acquired with that extra dollar of government spending will lead to less private investment and a sacrifice of future production.

Sneaky Inflation Tax

Another way that government can pay for spending is by imposing an inflation tax. This amounts to a devaluation of privately-held assets accomplished by inducing unexpected inflation. It allows government debt to be extinguished in the future with dollars having reduced purchasing power. Essentially, more currency (or its electronic equivalent) is placed into circulation: money printing, if you like. That sets up the “too-much-money-chasing-too-few-goods” inflation cycle. But like any other tax, the inflation tax is involuntary and creates waste by inducing the public to respond to distorted incentives.

Summary

An additional dollar of government spending absorbs a dollar of resources, and destroys more value than that given lost surplus to those who would otherwise have benefited from those resources. Moreover, the spending often fails to return a full dollar in benefits, often lining the pockets of elite grifters in the process. Ultimately, the funding for incremental spending must be commandeered from private parties via taxes or an inflationary taking of assets. Public borrowing might conceal the reality of taxes for a time, but it may crowd out productive investment that would otherwise enhance economic growth. So a case against incrementally larger government can be made in terms of resource costs as well as the distortionary effects of taxes and dissipation of future private growth.

By the same token, an ostensible reduction in taxes might be illusory, to the extent that future taxes or an inflationary taking will be necessary to cover the debt one day. On the other hand, there is no direct resource cost involved, and a tax reduction unbinds constraints and distortions on private incentives, which is unambiguously beneficial. And that’s true as long as the tax reductions aren’t targeted to benefit particular sectors, parties or technologies in any new misadventures in government central planning.

Deficits, in and of themselves, are either irrelevant or possibly damaging to long-term economic growth. You’ll get them with either tax cuts or spending hikes. But spending hikes absorb real resources, whereas tax cuts release resources by transforming a dead weight loss in private markets into proper gains from trade. If deficits are a problem, and if eliminating them requires costly tax distortions, then the real problem is the expanse of the state.

Progressives: Paul Doesn’t Want Peter’s Money? What a Hypocrite!

08 Thursday Feb 2018

Posted by in Big Government, Federal Budget

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Red & Blue States

I’ve heard the following assertion over and over: blue states are “doners” of federal tax revenue and red states are donees. In other words, states dominated by Democrats contribute more than they take from the federal budget, while Republican states take more than they contribute. But the facts are somewhat ambiguous. And to the extent that it is true, policies that would improve the net position of blue states would be very unpopular with the progressive Left. Furthermore, progressives expose their confusion regarding the ethics of sound governance by calling the red state opposition to an expansive  federal government “hypocritical”.

The relative positions of red and blue states in terms of federal dollars is the topic of an excellent article by Megan McArdle, whom I haven’t featured on this blog for a while. Originally, the claim that blue states “gave” to red states via the federal budget was based on data from 2005, but a lot of fiscal water has passed under (and over) the bridge since then. Also, the original presentation used state totals of federal outlays minus revenues without accounting for differences in the size of state populations. Many blue states are relatively populous, so some the state rankings may shift when expressed on a per capita basis. McArdle reproduces a chart from a report by the New York State Comptroller using 2013 data:

“… deep-blue New Jersey is the biggest donor state. But red-blooded Wyoming is the next biggest, and North Dakota makes the list too. There is certainly a preponderance of blue states at that end of the spectrum, but it’s not a clear ‘Donor states are blue’ story. And if we match the 2013 data to the closest election (2012) we find that New Mexico, the biggest net recipient, went for Obama in 2012, as did Virginia, Maryland, Maine and Hawaii. What’s driving the net subsidies isn’t anything as simple as political identification.“

Wyoming and North Dakota contributed lots of federal revenue from taxes arising from the fracking boom.

McArdle goes on to consider policies that would reduce the flow of budget dollars to donee states:

“Most of the transfers do not come from ‘red state welfare’ like agricultural subsidies. They derive from Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, unemployment insurance, food stamps, welfare, the maintenance of the national highway system, the purchase of goods and services for the federal government, and the operation of federal facilities and lands.

If blue state liberals consider this out of whack, what do they want to change?

  • Do they want to move toward a flatter, less progressive federal tax code?
  • Do they want to cut Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid?
  • Do they want to return unemployment insurance and similar entitlement programs entirely to the states?
  • Do they want to hand over the national parks to the states, or privatize them?
  • Would they like to downsize the federal workforce?
  • Should we redistribute military bases from red states to blue? (Those relocations might meaningfully alter the state electorate, making it easier for Republicans to get elected. …)“

Of course not! But like McArdle, I’m of the opinion that many of the policy changes on that list, or at least reforms of existing policies, are in order. Perhaps the allure of steeply progressive federal taxes has faded for blue state Democrats with the new reality of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. The law restricts deductions for mortgage interest, a hit on those borrowing against high-end homes. It also limits deductions for state and local taxes, eliminating a federal tax subsidy to high-earners living in states with high taxes. State and local politicians who support high taxes will no longer receive a “discount”, courtesy of taxpayers in  other states, on the natural political liability of high taxes.

The categorization of blue states and red states as federal donors and donees is not quite as unambiguous as most Leftists imagine. Be that as it may, the flows of revenue and spending between the federal government and states is a consequence of demographics, regional business environments, and many other factors, but most of all the set of policies promulgated over the years in Washington DC. An objective assessment of the federal government’s largess indicates that most of those policies are in need of drastic reform, yet statists resist, demand more, and act as if “red states rubes” should be grateful for the dysfunction and the federal cash it brings. To progressives, it is hypocritical to oppose an expansive federal government on this basis. The absurdity of that claim is self-evident, but such is the confused state of progressive discourse. Perhaps a better adjective for red state opposition to federal profligacy would be “principled”.

 

Rural Broadband and Federal Intrusion

06 Tuesday Feb 2018

Posted by in infrastructure, Technology

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Rural telecommunications service is often inferior in speed and quality to what is available in urban areas. This is one basis of the so-called “digital divide” in the U.S., the gaps that exist between various groups in terms of access to broadband telecom service. The urban rural “divide” is actually much smaller than the gaps that exist within urban areas, but much of the attention in public policy debates seems to focus on rural broadband availability. Telecom infrastructure is far more expensive to provide in the hinterlands due to the distances and occasional natural barriers that must be traversed. This was true before the revolution in wireless technology and still is, though wireless has reduced the severity of the tradeoff. Given the cost differential, it strikes me as unreasonable for rural users to expect the same levels of service at the same cost as urbanites. They can either pay the higher cost of provision to receive high-end service, make do with service levels that can be delivered at rates they are willing to pay, or go without. Or, if a high level of service is critical and the user is unwilling to pay the cost, they can move to a place at which it is available at lower cost.

For many years, however, public policy has been premised on the notion that rural telecom users deserve subsidies from the general user population, or from taxpayers, in order to promote equal access to basic telephony and, more recently, broadband access. The Universal Service Fund, to which telecom users pay a fee on their bills every month, is based on this premise. Its extension to broadband is a classic example of first-world luxury made necessity, now asserted to be an obligation owed by society to every individual. It is the philosophical underpinning for a huge allocation of federal funds for rural telecom spending that is now expected as part of President Trump’s infrastructure plan. 

Broadband Availability

The quality of telecom service includes speed and other factors (such as latency, which refers to data delays). Here, I’ll confine the discussion to the speed at which data can be downloaded (upload speeds are always a bit slower). Minimum speeds of 5 – 8 Mbps are required to stream HD video, according to the FCC. Higher speeds are necessary for heavy users with several devices or “running more than one high-demand application at the same time.”

Broadband speeds vary tremendously across the U.S., but it’s important to remember that speeds are increasing dramatically over time. Small towns are undoubtedly concentrated at the lower end of the distribution of speed availability at any point in time. Today, the gap between the availability of speeds in urban and rural areas is minimal up to about 10 Mbps, but it widens above that level. In fact, the speeds available via certain wireline technologies can vary significantly even within one small town (to say nothing of the significant variation within urban areas). Away from town, the availability of wireline broadband is much more limited. Fixed wireless broadband service (point-to-point) can often be deployed at speeds comparable to wireline service, and those speeds and their availability will increase with the rollout of new (5G) wireless technology. Still, that might not be an option in many isolated communities and remote locales without additional facilities like relay stations. Satellite service is often available at speeds up to 25 Mbps, in-town or out, but like wireless, it has some reliability issues.

Nevertheless, to one degree or another, broadband service is often available in rural areas, or can be available if customers are open to a range of alternative technologies (and again, available speeds are increasing). Obviously, some technologies are better suited to reaching particular areas, depending on distances and terrain. Many rural communities are finding affordable solutions that combine technologies that best leverage existing infrastructure and the natural features of the landscape.

Alms or Unfettered Choice

A reality of life in a hard-to-serve location is that broadband service will be costly… for someone. Enter the interventionists, who view “rurals” with paternalistic sympathy. Rural customers, and certain solutions for broadband delivery discussed above, are already subsidized by the federal government in some instances. And again, the Trump Administration is ready to throw more federal money at rural telecom infrastructure. These subsidies are questionable from a public finance perspective because they presume that rural areas are “underserved” on a cost-benefit basis, a case that is often dubious.

The biggest rub is that most people who live in rural areas do so by choice, a point recently articulated by Nick Gillespie. He recounts the experiences of his ancestors, who came from poor European villages to America to seek a better life. By comparison, today’s American rural population is highly privileged. Few are mired in circumstances beyond their control, contrary to the popular view. Gillespie notes that rural median income is only about 3.5% less than urban income (including suburbs), while rural homeownership rates are higher and poverty rates are lower than in urban areas. Indeed, it’s no secret that many urban elites purchase rural property to escape congested city life. Those are some of the would-be recipients of federally-funded rural broadband infrastructure.

In the end, Americans tend to live where they do by choice. Alternatives not acted upon generally reveal a preference for staying put. Some people prefer the amenities of small town or country life for any number of reasons, including a generally low cost of living. They accept the disadvantages of a rural life such as the lack of proximity to advanced emergency treatment facilities and, at least historically, less connectedness to media. Obviously, city dwellers tend to prefer urban amenities and accept the disadvantages of city or suburban life, like congestion. Those who wish to move from country to city, or vice versa, are free to do so, but they must pay the cost of the move. Likewise, it’s reasonable to expect that those desiring to transform the amenities of a place to their liking should pay the cost. Bringing almost any form of broadband infrastructure to areas with low population density is a costly proposition, but today’s rural consumers have more choices than ever before, and the speed and quality of broadband will continue to improve there without federal intervention.

Rural vs. Urban Adoption Gaps

The rural population is older on average, and it is less educated on average, so rural adoption rates are always likely to be lower. This point has been emphasized by Brian Whitacre, who has stated that the urban-rural “digital divide” might always exist to some extent. But this phenomenon is not unique to rural areas. Adoption rates within urban areas are highly variable, and the intra-urban broadband gaps by race, age, and income dwarf the urban-rural gap. That too is unlikely to change any time soon.

Federal Cash for Cronies & Conferees 

Last year, FCC Commissioner Michael O’Reilly warned of the dangers of direct federal involvement in broadband infrastructure investment. These include the market distortions caused by picking winners and losers among providers based on non-market assessments, the graft that such a process invites, discrimination in favor of high-cost fiber technology, poor coordination across government bureaucracies, and insufficient oversight leading to chronic overpayments. Sadly, however, even Ajit Pai, Chairman of the FCC and a man whose opposition to network neutrality I have applauded, has proposed more federal spending on rural telecom infrastructure. The big telecom recipients of the buildout funds don’t mind the subsidies, of course. The rural recipients of new services at artificially low cost can’t mind too much. But federal taxpayers and broadband ratepayers should question this activity. I’m hopeful that there will be a silver lining: it is likely to be private infrastructure.