Are The Native-Born Idle By Choice?

21 Wednesday Sep 2016

Posted by pnoetx in Immigration, Labor Markets, Minimum Wage

Tags

Cash Compensation, Donald Trump, Erik Hurst, High-School Dropouts, Idle Time, Illegal Employment, Immigration, James Pethokoukis, Low-skilled labor, Minimum Wage, Native-born Americans, Reservation Wage, Robert Verbruggen, Underground Economy, Undocumented Workers, Video Games and Young Men, work incentives, Work-Leisure Tradeoff

Native-born Americans don’t seem to want low-skilled work, even when they have no skills. Immigrants, on the other hand, seem more than happy to take those jobs. The fact is that hours worked by native high-school dropouts have declined relative to the hours of immigrant dropouts, as noted by Robert Verbruggen in “When Young Men Don’t Work“.

Of course, American men in general are working less, with fewer jobs in occupations and sectors traditionally dominated by men, such as manufacturing. The total demand for manual labor may be decreasing due to automation. Among the youngest cohort, hours spent in educational activities have increased. However, another contributing factor may be that the supply of labor is held down by negative work incentives created by government policy. In any case, the changing composition of the low-skilled work force is a curiosity. Many of the native-born appear to be opting out of work, but not the foreign-born:

“Native high-school dropouts of ‘prime age’ (25–54) work only about 35 weeks per year, on average; comparable immigrant dropouts work 49 weeks. Native dropouts are the outliers. Immigrant dropouts work roughly as much as both native and immigrant men with higher levels of education—and they do 60 percent of the work performed by dropouts in America, despite being less than half of the dropout population.“

Clearly low-skilled work exists , and immigrants are doing a disproportionate share of it. Are some of these low-wage jobs simply inaccessible to the native-born? I doubt it. The argument that immigrants are taking low-wage jobs from Americans implies that immigrants have lower reservation wages. But if that’s so, it confirms the hypothesis that natives are less willing to take low-skilled jobs.

In fact, the native-born might have better leisure alternatives than many of the foreign-born. Verbruggen reviews the work of Erik Hurst of the University of Chicago, who argues that technology such as video games and the internet have increased the value of leisure relative to work. Perhaps natives are better situated than immigrants to draw on other resources to finance an idle, gaming existence. Whatever they do to occupy their time, those resources might include relationships with family having the means to support them, and even a familial tolerance for idleness.

It’s also possible that natives have better access to the bounty of the welfare state. Undocumented foreign workers are at a disadvantage in this regard, but that handicap is eroding. Whatever the reason, it appears that native-born Americans are spared the need to bid aggressively on work they consider undesirable. That decision will often be costly in the longer-run, given the lost opportunity to develop skills on the job.

Another possible explanation for the disparity in average working hours is that more immigrants are willing to work (illegally) in sub-minimum wage jobs. That might well be true for undocumented foreign workers, even in occupations that would otherwise be legal. One could argue that this is unlikely to reduce opportunities for work at or above the minimum wage because wage offers tend to align with skill level. However, sub-minimum wage offers to illegals are probably driven by the risk faced by the employer in making such hires. Just the same, illegal opportunities to work below minimum wage are not the exclusive domain of immigrants. Cash compensation can allow an employer to pay sub-minimum wages to anyone willing to work. Moreover, many natives work in the underground economy in areas such as illicit drug distribution, which might or might not involve sub-minimum wages.

Of course, an individual working at a lower wage must work more hours to earn the same income as one earning a higher wage. Subsistence for the immigrants might require the extra hours. That would explain the disparity in average hours if natives and immigrants truly can be sorted by wage rate, but if that is the case, then the natives must have less interest in low-wage jobs, as postulated, and the natives are content to live at the same subsistence level as the low-wage immigrants by working fewer hours.

Thus, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that native-born Americans are less willing to work in low-wage jobs than the foreign-born. Further increases in the minimum wage would have a tendency to create more idle time among the low-skilled, both native and immigrant. The total legal demand for low-skilled labor would decline. More natives might be willing to supply labor at the higher minimum, but incumbents have an advantage in holding onto jobs that remain after the increase. A higher minimum would certainly convert some formerly legal opportunities into illegal opportunities (at wages below the new minimum), attenuating the total increase in idleness.

Growth in the labor force is a fundamental driver of economic growth, and immigration has always been an important source of labor for the U.S. economy. Low-skilled, native-born Americans seem less willing to offer their services at wages matching their skill levels, but immigrants help to fill that gap and are usually happy for the opportunity. A higher minimum wage will not make their lives easier in the U.S. It should also be noted that greater tolerance for immigration at the low-end of the socioeconomic spectrum need not imply a sacrifice in border security or careful vetting, but it would provide a supply of able and willing workers eager to improve their standard of living.

On a related note, I add the following: James Pethokoukis points to an interesting irony with respect to Donald Trump’s policy positions: “Trump wants 4% (or higher) US growth. Easy. Just massively increase immigration“.

Costco Labor Productivity Drives Its Wages

26 Thursday May 2016

Posted by pnoetx in Minimum Wage, Uncategorized

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Bloomberg, Caveat Emptorium, Costco Productivity, Costco Wages, Glassdoor.com, Gone With The Wind, Living Wage, Low-skilled labor, Margaret Mitchell, MarketWatch, Megan McArdle, Minimum Wage, Price floors, Productivity and Costs, Wage floor, Wage Mandates, WalMart, Warehouse Stores

Buyer beware: various memes promoting a higher minimum wage, or a mandated “living wage” of $15, cite Costco as “proof” that a higher wage floor does not imply that product prices must rise. In fact, Costco pays relatively high wages to its hourly workers and it is a discount retailer, but it is highly misleading to treat these facts in isolation or to suggest that they imply anything about cost-price causality and the consequences of changes in costs. A higher wage floor would add cost pressure to any business employing low-skilled labor and even some employing more skilled workers like Costco. Many of these firms would have to raise prices to remain viable.

Costco says that it pays an average wage of $17 plus benefits. A quick glance at Glassdoor.com shows starting pay rates well below that average, which is no surprise. Costco recently increased its lowest pay rates for the first time in eight years, to $13 and $13.50 an hour from $11.50 and $12. However, there may be some slight-of-hand used to support other quotes of Costco’s average wage. It’s been claimed elsewhere that the company pays an average wage of $20, and President Obama asserted that Costco’s average wage is $21. Typically, quotes of hourly wages do not include the value of benefits. One blogger suggests that these higher figures may have been calculated by averaging across job classifications, rather than dividing the company’s total hourly wage bill by the number of worker-hours. One other qualification is that roughly 10% of the workers in a typical Costco warehouse store dispense free samples but are not employed by Costco. The average hourly wage of “workers at Costco” would likely be lower than $17 if they were included.

Nevertheless, it’s true that Costco pays a relatively high wage rate to its hourly workers. How can they afford to do so? As it happens, Costco has relatively few workers relative to other retail operations, and its average revenue per transaction is high. According to Megan McArdle at Bloomberg, in 2013, Costco’s average square-feet of floor space per employee was almost twice WalMart’s; according to MarketWatch, Costco’s average revenue per employee is now nearly three times the comparable figure for WalMart (enter COST and WMT). Obviously, Costco employees are highly productive in terms of revenue, and that is closely associated with higher wages.

The high productivity at Costco is not an accident. While a good wage is certainly a motivating factor, the productivity of Costco’s work force starts with screening during the hiring process, where the company is known to prefer significant retail experience. They also emphasize the demanding physical requirements of certain jobs, and given their thin staffing, a relatively high level of responsibility for a retail worker. Newcomers are said to be under a watchful eye, and effective performers are rewarded. It takes four to five years to reach the top of the wage scale in a job category. Many of those categories involve specialized skills, such as licensed opticians, butchers, cake decorators, forklift drivers, licensed hearing aid dispensers, and registered pharmacists (these categories drive up the average wage). The company provides training opportunities in various areas, and average employee turnover is low, which reduces costs. The Costco warehouse stores are without typical retail amenities; they are bare-bones with goods sitting on pallets rather than displayed on shelves. This also lowers costs, giving the company additional leeway in shaping its generous wage policy.

Returning to the question of pricing, Costco’s example cannot be generalized. First, it might not be such a good example of price restraint in the face of higher wages to begin with. To bolster earnings, Costco is expected to raise its membership fees by about 9% in 2017; undoubtedly there is also room for retail margins to increase. Time will tell. Second, again, Costco’s wage policy works fairly well because its business model rests largely on high labor productivity. Basic economics teaches us that higher productivity drives higher wages. Workers who earn less than Costco wages are, in general, less productive. This is a consequence of more limited skill sets, less experience, and sometimes weak desire. Those earning at the minimum wage are handicapped by an inability to contribute at high levels, or an inability to demonstrate that they can at their hiring date. Thus, they work in jobs that do not require developed skills. For their employers, higher wages are not a path to profitability.

Mandating an increase in the wage floor is not possible without other market adjustments. First, like anything else, the demand curve for low-skilled labor slopes downward, so a higher wage floor reduces the desired labor input. Job losses befall the least skilled in such a scenario. This consequence has greater breadth in a world in which opportunities for automation are plentiful. Another possible adjustment is an increase in the price charged to customers, which might be a reflexive response among business operators. However, they must compromise when confronted with the competitive effects of passing along an increase in costs. There could be other cost-reducing changes in job structure, benefits, break times, and any number of other conditions and circumstances of employment. Finally, some business owners might accept a lower level of profitability, depending on their disposition and the competitive tenor of the markets in which they operate. Some Costco shareholders believe that might be the case, as the company’s earnings have softened recently.

The final outcome is likely to be a combination of the adjustments described above. Unfortunately for proponents of a higher wage floor, the economy cannot and will not transform itself into a community of Costco clones. With limited skills, the motivational power of higher wages goes only so far. All price floors create excess supply, in this context unemployment. Excess supplies tend to consist of the most marginal units, in this case, the least productive workers. Perhaps sheer ignorance causes agitators for wage mandates to overlook this inevitable marginalization. The real minimum wage is zero.

A note on the cartoon above: It reminded me of an amusing passage in Margaret Mitchell’s “Gone With The Wind” when Rhett Butler, in a sardonic moment, suggests to Scarlett O’Hara that she change the name of Kennedy’s General Store in Atlanta to “Caveat Emptorium, assuring her that it would be a title most in keeping with the type of goods sold in the store. She thought it had an imposing sound and even went so far as to have the sign painted….” Later, Rhett learns that she actually had the sign made, but an embarrassed Ashley Wilkes clued her in to the meaning. She is furious, and Rhett laughs hysterically.

The Inhumane Minimum Wage Fantasy

22 Monday Feb 2016

Posted by pnoetx in Minimum Wage, Poverty

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

American Enterprise Institute, Angela Rachidi, Congressional Budget Office, David Neumark, Don Boudreaux, Economic Policy Institute, Living Wage, Low-skilled labor, Minimum Wage, OLena Nizalova, Public Assistance, Wefare Cliff

min-wage ball n chain

An analysis by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) is the basis for breathless claims by the Left that a substantial increase in the minimum wage would have “sweeping benefits for low-income families.” The EPI study purports to show that spending on public assistance will decline significantly with the increase in the minimum wage. Author David Cooper’s analysis is purely static, dressed up with a few linear regression equations relating participation in federal welfare programs to the wage distribution. However, his conclusion is preordained by the very design of the analysis, which relies on pooled data from public assistance programs across 2012 – 2014. This was a period over which wages were generally rising, but the federal minimum wage was constant (and only a few state minimum wages were increased).

It’s no surprise that higher wages are associated with a reduced likelihood of receiving needs-based public assistance in a cross section. That’s not quite the same as measuring the dynamic impact of an increase in the minimum wage. The adjustment to a higher wage floor involves more complex shifts in the structure of the economy, including higher prices, a higher incidence of small business failure and the substitution of automated systems for labor. And celebration would not be in order if the policy change prompted a deterioration in the employment prospects of the least-skilled workers, and it would.

There are a few gaping holes in the EPI analysis. One involves a data limitation whereby the distribution of public assistance by wage decile is related to individual workers or their families. It is one thing to say that most recipients of public assistance work for a living. It is quite another to say “Most recipients of public assistance work or have a family member who works.” Obviously, the latter does not imply the former, yet the analysis asks you to accept that the wage rates of family members who perform work during a year are the determining factor in welfare program participation, rather than the employment status and hours of all members of the household.

The analysis includes cross-sectional regressions relating the receipt of public assistance (yes or no) to wages imputed at the individual level, controlling for a complex function of age (polynomial terms), other demographic factors and part-time work status during the previous year. As stated above, the data are plagued by measurement issues. Furthermore (and this is a technical critique), linear regression is not an appropriate statistical methodology with a binary dependent variable. The author should have known better, but we’ll leave that aside.

Controlling for part-time status is intended to create a more reliable estimate of the effect of wages on program participation, as part-timers are more likely to earn low wage rates. But if hours matter in that way, then the regression is all the more suspect because hours of work are otherwise ignored (except in the imputation of wage rates).

The truth is that poverty is not a wage problem as much as a jobs and hours problem. A recent post by Angela Rachidi of the American Enterprise Institute notes that “Only 11.7% of poor working-age adults worked full-time for the entire year in 2014.” Impoverished individuals who work full or part-time are concentrated in low-skilled occupations. Those are likely to be the same kinds of jobs for which impoverished non-workers might otherwise compete. Many of those jobs are at or near the minimum wage, but increasing the wage floor will only exacerbate the problem of unemployment or underemployment.

An increase in the minimum wage might help those workers who are able to keep their jobs. Unfortunately, if they remain employed, they are likely to suffer non-wage repercussions at their jobs. Therefore, the size of the net economic gain for those lucky enough to keep their jobs is open to question, though their measured income will rise. Still, keeping your job may be a big challenge.

The EPI analysis pays no heed to the negative employment effects of changes in the minimum wage. These stem from employers’ efforts to control costs, hiring only when the skills and expected productivity of a worker exceed the cost. Growth and job opportunities are thus quashed by the intervention, including the gain in skills that comes with experience. If a business hikes price to defray higher labor costs, the negative impact on customers will induce them to buy less, reducing the need for labor. Another possible impact may be caused by the so-called “welfare cliff“, or the tendency of many program benefits to decline as income rises, which imposes a marginal tax rate on beneficiaries’ labor income. A higher wage floor might induce a worker to reduce hours to avoid the cliff, if their employer allows it, or it might induce another employed member of the same household to reduce hours.

Here is the extent of EPI’s treatment of the negative employment effects of a higher minimum wage, quoting the Congressional Budget Office (CBO):

“CBO predicts that federal expenses would initially go down, but could later increase if the higher minimum wage has a significant negative effect on employment. On net, they conclude that ‘it is unclear whether the effect for the coming decade as a whole would be a small increase or a small decrease in budget deficits.’ It is important to note that the CBO’s ambiguity on this point is driven by their atypically high estimates of the probability of significant employment loss stemming from such an increase. If employment loss is insignificant (as most research on a minimum-wage increase of this magnitude indicates), the budget savings would surely dominate.” [Emphasis added]

The parenthetical, bolded statement is offered by Cooper without any support whatsoever, and it is incorrect. First, the evidence that the wage floor has negative employment effects “has been piling up” of late. “Living wage” advocates should not be encouraged by the recent experience of six large cities that have increased their minimum wages. Here is further information on the District of Columbia and WalMart’s reaction to a recent wage hike. The long-run effects of minimum wages are the most destructive, according to a recent paper authored by David Neumark and Olena Nizalova:

“The evidence indicates that even as individuals reach their late 20’s, they earn less and perhaps work less the longer they were exposed to a higher minimum wage at younger ages. The adverse longer-run effects of facing high minimum wages at young ages are stronger for blacks. From a policy perspective, these longer-run effects of minimum wages are likely more significant than the contemporaneous effects of minimum wages on youths that are the focus of most research and policy debate.“

Other recent work shows that minimum wage increases during the Great Recession increased unemployment among workers age 16 – 30 with less than a high-school education. Another paper finds that minimum wage hikes are bad anti-poverty measures, poorly targeted and regressive in their effects on the poor due to higher prices. A couple of previous posts on Sacred Cow Chips include many links to other work on minimum wages: “Major Mistake: The Minimum Opportunity Wage“, and “Unintended Consequences: Living (Without a) Wage“. Today, many jobs are at risk of automation, so the responsiveness of employers might be greater than ever.

In a strong sense, EPI’s findings and conclusion are beside the point for the many low-skilled workers whose jobs would be at risk, as well as those who might never be given legitimate employment opportunities under a higher wage floor. Those erstwhile workers and job seekers are generally the least skilled and most in need of experience. But EPI, and unthinking living wage advocates, are all too eager to signal the humanity and virtue of their favored policies, foolishly ignoring the negative and inhumane employment consequences.

Border Integrity or Lines In The Sand?

02 Tuesday Dec 2014

Posted by pnoetx in Uncategorized

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Amnesty Order, competition, Executive Orders, Heritage Foundation, Illegal immigrants, Joel Kotkin, Low-skilled labor, President Obama, Public Assistance, unemployment

The constitutionality of President Obama’s recent amnesty order is debatable, to say the least, Obama himself having admitted that he simply “changed the law”. If that’s what he thinks he did, the law professor should know that his action was out-of-bounds from a constitutional perspective. The executive branch cannot make or change laws!

In “Legal but Still Poor: The Economic Consequences of Amnesty“, Joel Kotkin puts aside the constitutional question to focus on difficulties that are likely to be aggravated by amnesty. Kotkin emphasizes the economic distress that now hampers the working class. Illegals already compete for certain jobs, of course, a point Kotkin doesn’t mention. Nevertheless, the amnesty order will create new competition among workers for some positions, many of whom already face difficult conditions:

“… the country suffers from rates of labor participation at a 36 year low. Many jobs that were once full-time are, in part due to the Affordable Care Act, now part-time, and thus unable to support families. Finally there are increasingly few well-paying positions—including in industry—that don’t require some sort of post-college accreditation.”

Furthermore, the order might create incentives for new illegal immigration, leading to further labor market stress. Politically, the order is seen as an act of betrayal by legal immigrants who have gone to considerable effort and expense to obtain their status. It is also likely to be viewed as betrayal by some minority workers, who tend to be more heavily represented in parts of the labor market most vulnerable to the new competition:

“African-American unemployment is now twice that of whites. The black middle class, understandably proud of Obama’s elevation, has been losing the economic gains made over the past thirty years. … Latino-Americans have made huge strides in previous decades, but now are also falling behind, with a gradual loss of income relative to whites. Poverty among Latino children in America has risen from 27.5 percent in 2007 to 33.7 percent in 2012, an increase of 1.7 million minors.”

Kotkin mentions several other administration policies that are likely to diminish prospects for new and existing workers.

“Ironically, the places where the cry for amnesty has been the loudest—New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Chicago—also tend to be those places that have created the least opportunity for the urban poor. … Whatever their noble intentions, these cities generally suffer the largest degree of income inequality, notes a recent Brookings study.”

The amnesty order will be expensive for taxpayers. Many newly legal immigrants will qualify for various forms of public assistance and benefits. The negative fiscal effects will be compounded if, as expected, those immigrants and the workers with whom they compete have greater difficulty finding jobs:

“Herein lies the great dilemma then for the advocates of amnesty. In much of the country, and particularly the blue regions, they will find very few decent jobs but often a host of programs designed to ease their poverty. The temptation to increase the rolls of the dependent—and perhaps boost Democratic turnouts—may prove irresistible for the local political class.”

Obama’s amnesty order attempts to deal head-on with the impossibility of deporting a large number of illegal immigrants. Unfortunately, many others will be made worse-off by the order: legal immigrants, relatively low-skilled workers and taxpayers are all likely to suffer negative consequences. And the order fails to deal adequately with the real economic need for more highly-skilled immigrants; it might well damage the prospects of achieving any near-term reform in this area. Instead of working with Congress to achieve more comprehensive reform, the President’s hasty action fuels suspicion that the real reason for his amnesty order is simply to build a larger constituency for a statist agenda.