Category Archives: Immigration

Open Borders and Club Goods

13 Saturday Jan 2018

Posted by in Immigration, Liberty

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The question of open borders divides libertarians as much as any. The arguments for open borders made by the likes of Bryan Caplan, Alex Tabarrok, Don Boudreaux and Sheldon Richman are in many ways quite appealing. Fewer borders means greater opportunities for gainful trade among individuals. For the U.S., the economic gains from in-migration have been unquestionable. From a pure libertarian perspective, governments should never interfere with the non-violent actions of free individuals, including freedom of movement. These great economists contend, in effect, that there is no real moral distinction between government actions that confine individuals within borders and those that keep people out, though our conciences are less burdened by the latter because the world abroad seems so large.

There is a gnawing contradiction in this viewpoint, however. It relates to the appropriate scope of “ownership”. At the link above, Caplan says:

“The only principled libertarian objection to this is that the citizens of each country are its rightful owners, so they’re entitled to regulate migration as they see fit. … But if you believe this, there is no principled libertarian objection to any act of government. Fortunately, the belief that citizens are countries’ rightful owners is crazy. The social contract is an utter myth. Contracts require unanimous consent, and no country has ever had unanimous consent.“

The Character of a Good

I contest Caplan’s assertion that any one act of government is like all others. Yes, there is always a danger of a majoritarian tyranny in any democracy. But there is also the question of sovereignty, for which borders of some kind are necessary. If policies governing those borders are established legislatively, they should be subject to checks and balances: executive consent as well as judicial review of disputes.

I also contest Caplan’s statement that ownership implies unanimous consent. In fact, there are many forms of property over which decisions do not imply unanimous consent of joint owners. One such form is the subject of what follows, and I believe that form of “ownership” is applicable to one’s citizenship or residency status.

To keep things simple, I’ll frame this discussion only in terms of citizenship. I therefore abstract from issues like green cards, visiting worker programs, and the presence of resident aliens in general. For a nation, the essence of barriers to immigration can be addressed by considering the simpler case of citizens versus non-resident non-citizens. For purposes of this discussion, if you are allowed to arrive on a nation’s shores, you will be a citizen.

If a country’s citizenship can be considered a good worth acquiring, what is its real character? It is privately possessed and not tradable, but not all goods are tradable. An important taxonomy of goods in the public finance literature is based on two dimensions: exclusivity and rivalrousness. The former is the degree to which other parties can be excluded from enjoyment or use of the good or resource.

Most goods have at least some degree of exclusivity: you can be denied admission to a concert, the use of an appliance or furniture, and even parks and port facilities. Pure public goods like national defense and the air we breath are completely non-exclusive, however. Broadcast television is non-exclusive as well, as long as you have the equipment to watch it.

Rivalrousness is the degree to which the use or enjoyment of a good precludes another’s use or enjoyment. My friend can’t eat the steak if I eat the steak. That’s rivalrous. But my friend and I can both enjoy the concert. That’s non-rivalrous. A private good is both exclusionary and rivalrous. A public good is neither.

Citizenship as a Good

Citizenship can be viewed as a bundle of attributes much as any good, but it is an extremely complex bundle: it includes the individual rights enshrined in a nation’s constitution (if any), the personal and economic opportunities available by virtue of access to in-country markets and resources, the culture(s), and any personal risk reduction provided collectively, i.e., a safety net via public support. How, then, would one classify citizenship, or its component attributes, in terms of exclusivity and rivalrousness?

First, the entire citizenship bundle has a high degree of exclusivity. A nation can decide on closed borders, or partially open borders, if it chooses to do so, just as a theme park limits its gate. That is the political decision at hand. The degree of exclusivity of individual components of the bundle matters little if the bundle itself is highly exclusive.

At a high level, citizenship itself is non-rivalrous. My citizenship does not preclude citizenship for anyone else. Therefore, at the level of the bundle, citizenship is exclusive but non-rivalrous, so it has the character of what economists call a “club good“. Citizens are already part of the club; to that extent they are joint “owners”. Like many clubs, decisions about new membership need not be unanimous.

Classification of citizenship attributes as goods is trickier. The exclusivity of citizenship makes the non-rivalrous public goods available to citizens into club goods. Once admitted, for example, you are free to engage in speech, practice a religion of your choice, own a weapon, and receive due process and habeas corpus without interfering with any other citizen’s ability to exercise the same rights. You get national defense and a judicial system. You have equality of opportunity to the extent that your pursuit of economic gain does not interfere directly with anyone else’s opportunities. On the other hand, the freedom of assembly is rivalrous to at least some extent, as we learned last year from events in Charlottesville, VA. In fact, there may be congestion limits to some of the other freedoms mentioned above. 

Access to a nation’s markets permits mutually beneficial trade to take place. An individual’s participation usually does not rule out participation by others, so it is essentially non-rivalrous. (In some markets the entry of new sellers may be limited and exclusionary.) Of course, a nation’s resources are scarce; exploiting them for gain or enjoyment necessarily prevents others from using the same resources. From the point of view of existing citizens, these resources are non-exclusive and rivalrous, and are therefore classified as “common resources”, subject to congestion effects, but they are still exclusive to those citizens. The key here is not whether there are gains from trade, but that there is some rivalrousness embedded in this citizenship attribute.

In addition to the basic rights mentioned earlier, the entire legal structure, regulatory apparatus, and the political process are complex attributes of citizenship. These bear on the limits of legal conduct: Can you buy or sell liquor on Sundays? Do businesses require licensure? Is abortion legal? And on and on. In a democracy, the ability to participate in the political process is non-rivalrous: it does not prevent others from participating. However, the range of possible outcomes of the process can also be viewed as an attribute, and these outcomes, as they are promulgated, are certainly rivalrous. If the “other” side gets extra votes, then the power of my vote is diminished. So the limits of legal conduct are exposed to political rivalry. In the case of open borders, a large number of citizens may not favor existing rules, regulations, and the allocation of public spending.

So the attributes of citizenship are mixed in terms of rivalrousness: Some are rivalrous but many are not. The citizenship bundle, at a more detailed level, is therefore a mix of club goods (exclusive but non-rvalrous) and some goods that are rivalrous. This is important, because under the classical description club goods are public goods provided privately; they are therefore under-provided from the perspective of social welfare and the Pareto criterion that a new citizens can be made better off without making any existing citizen worse off. That might not be the case in the presence of congestion effects.

Should a Club Good Be Unrestricted?

Citizenship has value at the margin to both existing citizens, who should be regarded as established club members, and non-citizens. The foregoing establishes that there are some private (exclusive and rivalrous) attributes attached to citizenship. Sometimes this is due to the impact of congestion on the provision of public goods. Patrick McNutt, in his survey of literature on “Public Goods and Club Goods“, summarizes some basic conditions under which public goods are provided by clubs:

“The public good is not a pure public good, but rather there is an element of congestion as individuals consume the good up to its capacity constraint. What arises then is some exclusion mechanism in order to charge consumers a price for the provision and use of the good. Brown and Jackson (1990, p. 80) had commented that the purpose of a club ‘is to exploit economies of scale, to share the costs of providing an indivisible commodity, to satisfy a taste for association with other individuals who have similar preference orderings’. For Buchanan and Ng the main club characteristic is membership or numbers of consumers and it is this variable that has to be optimised.“

Citizenship (or residency) is generally not price rationed, though there are certainly costs to the immigrant. I make no pretense here as to the determination of an optimal membership from a club or larger social perspective. My point is that rationing membership is a rational choice by club members, or citizens in this case.

Okay, I Like My Club

Tribal affiliations, and ultimately nation states, were a natural outgrowth of early competition for resources, especially when identifying threats from outsiders was a constant preoccupation. Territorialism was a byproduct, and with the establishment of agriculture, the peoples of these early societies probably identified strongly with their homelands.

Modern nation-states have evolved from those early patterns, and nations continue to differ in terms of language, culture, and governance. Successful nations are undoubtedly more liberal (in the classical sense) and open to trade and cross-border movement. Maybe one day all nations will be united under the principles of libertarianism… don’t count on it! For now, to one degree or another, a nation’s inhabitants have an interest in minimizing economic and political risks and retaining access to resources within their borders. I don’t believe that desire is irrational or immoral. If the inhabitants of a nation have a moral obligation to share their rights, wealth, and political process with all comers, then they must accept the possibility that their rights will be compromised, and possibly even complete upheaval. They suffer a loss of sovereignty and a loss in the expected value of their citizenship.

There is obviously no limiting principle to the open borders policy, as Tyler Cowen says. Existing citizens would be obligated to accommodate all those who land upon their shores, granting them the full rights and opportunities accorded to all other residents. Perhaps there would be economic gains in the short or long run, as most libertarians would predict. But perhaps there would be some losses along the way. Perhaps there would be political stability after a large influx of new residents, but perhaps not. And ultimately, perhaps changes in the political climate would feed back to the detriment of economic performance. One simply cannot say, a priori, how things would go. There are risks to the existing citizenry, and if they are obliged to accept those risks, those might well include having to feed, clothe and house new residents. There should be no absolute obligation to accept those risks. If the debate is about individual liberty, then surely imposing those risks via open borders would  abrogate the rights of existing citizens.

Addendum: A Note on the Goods Taxonomy

Given the two dimensions of goods discussed above, exclusivity and rivalrousness, goods are classified as follows:

  • Private goods: exclusive and rivalrous;
  • Public goods: non-exclusive and non-rivalrous;
  • Club goods: exclusive but non-rivalrous: e.g., a concert;
  • Common resources: non-exclusive but rivalrous: the air we breath; an aquifer;

Another category is sometimes defined: contestable goods, which have the character of public goods or even club goods when under light use, and are common resources when under heavy use. There is a difference between an empty park and a crowded park; or an empty road and a crowded road.

See ThoughtCo. for a good exposition on the taxonomy.

American Homicide Rates: Which America?

12 Thursday Oct 2017

Posted by in Discrimination, Gun Control, Immigration

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A heterogenious society and the successful assimilation of minorities are two very different things, as much as we might wish otherwise. Two populations within a region will come into contact, but conditions promoting real assimilation are complex. (I’m avoiding use of the term “diversity” because it has come to imply the successful assimilation of distinct groups.) While cultural differences can enrich the lives of both populations, sharp economic gaps between minority and majority populations (and even some cultural differences) will tend to slow the process of assimilation. This is often associated with social dysfunction, such as high crime and homicide rates, especially among the minority group. This is a fairly common phenomenon in countries with racial and ethnic minority or immigrant populations, as Ryan McMaken writes in a recent piece on international differences in heterogeneity and homicide rates.

Heterogeneity In the West

Countries in the Western Hemisphere tend to have relatively high immigrant and minority populations, as McMaken describes:

“… when considering the Americas, … nation-states are in most cases frontier states with populations heavily affected by immigration, a history of conflict with indigenous populations, and institutionalized chattel slavery that lasted until the 19th century. The factors are significant through the region, and the United States cannot be held apart in this regard from the Caribbean, Brazil, Colombia, and other states impacted by all these factors. 

Importantly, these factors also make the Americas significantly different from Western Europe and other areas — Japan and Korea, for example — where the present situation is marked by much higher levels of cultural uniformity and quite different recent histories and current demographic trends.“

Homicides

McMaken questions popular theories of cross-country differences in homicide rates based on the degree of gun control and gun ownership rates. Homicides and violent victimization have been declining in the U.S. for many years even as gun ownership has soared. Furthermore, international comparisons are traditionally plagued by arbitrary country classifications and exclusions, as well as inconsistent definitions of homocide and gun ownership. However, McMaken points to other explanations for violent crime found to be fairly robust in the academic literature: poverty and population heterogeneity:

“… these factors contribute to lower levels of social cohesion, and thus higher levels of criminality and other socially-undesirable behaviors.“

McMaken cites research involving ethnic minority populations of Slavs in Germany, Italians in Argentina and the U.S., and Arabs in Europe, all of whom had crime rates far exceeding those in their countries of origin. The connection between heterogeneity and crime might have nothing to do with particular ethnic groups, though it seems all too easy for observers within individual countries to blame specific “others” for crime. It is a symptom of alienation from the majority as well as economic desperation and vulnerability to opportunities and threats arising from the underground economy. Illegal activities might truly provide the best alternatives available to low-skilled, minority job seekers. Needless to say, underground economic activity, such as the drug trade, involves high risk and often violence among users and between competing factions. This is an important source of the high crime and victimization that typifies many minority communities.

Despite declines since the 1970s, the U.S. still has a higher homicide rate than many other industrialized countries. Beyond the weakness cited above, such comparisons fail to control for other confounding effects, including the degree of heterogeneity across countries.

Policies

Heterogeneity poses a problem in the context of involuntary and often voluntary segregation of sub-cultures. If you don’t believe the “voluntary” part, take a close look at the different clusters of individuals in the cafeteria at almost any “diverse” university or corporate office. Judge for yourself. Differences in language, fertility, demographics, religion and cultural traditions may be noteworthy, but where crime is associated with effectively segregated minorities, there is usually a gap in economic status and mobility relative to society at large.

What policies can mitigate these conditions and their impact on crime? It would be nice to approach this question strictly from the perspective that heterogeneity is a given, but the degree of heterogeneity is, to some extent, an endogenous outcome. Restrictive immigration policies might leap to mind as a way of restraining heterogeneity, and there is little doubt that illegal immigrants are less likely to assimilate (many contend that their crime rate is low). Policies allowing less restricted flows of legal immigrants tend to be salutary if they are based on domestic economic need, economic potential, or compassion for those seeking asylum or a haven from political oppression. A legal immigrant receiving a welcome on new shores is more likely to assimilate successfully than an illegal immigrant, all else equal. Citizenship and language education are avenues through which assimilation might be encouraged. And there could be ways to improve sponsorships and even temporary visa programs so as to encourage assimilation.

What can be done to encourage more effective assimilation of all minorities? And what can be done to reduce the crime associated with unassimilated populations? One major corrective is a strong economy. Policies that encourage economic growth will lead to greater participation in markets and society, with consequent interaction and mixing of sub-cultures. Growth policies include low and non-distortionary taxes and light regulation.

The war on drugs also accounts for a major share of homicides, and that war interacts with non-assimilation in perverse ways. It is crippling to disadvantaged communities precisely because it creates risky “opportunities” in the underground economy. It also produces high levels of incarceration and dangerous forms of “cut” contraband. As I’ll discuss in my next post, ending the war on drugs would reduce violent crime and lead to safer drugs in relatively short order.

A short list of other policies that would foster assimilation and economic mobility would include: improved education: school choice and apprenticeship programs; better labor market outcomes: reduce the minimum wage or create sub-minimum wage categories to enhance opportunities to gain experience and skills; better housing: eliminate rent controls.

Assimilation is always more effective when it occurs “organically”. Affirmative action and forced diversity initiatives often fail to achieve effective assimilation. Beyond the obvious infringement on liberty, these policies may sow resentment among those who suffer reverse discrimination, and among those who witness it, to the probable detriment of efforts to eliminate bias. Even worse, these policies often put their intended beneficiaries into vulnerable, un-winnable situations: jobs or programs for which their skills are not adequate. There are undoubtedly excellent candidates among those placed in positions under quotas, but there is a likelihood that many will be unsuccessful in their roles.

Conclusion

The anti-gun left is eager to attribute differences in homicide rates to the impact of gun control policies, but a close examination of the facts reveals better explanations. A prominent factor contributing to differences in homicide rates is the degree of heterogeneity across countries. Those with more homogeneous populations tend to have lower homicide rates and vice versa. But the problem is not merely heterogeneity, but the difficulty of economic and cultural assimilation of minority populations. These factors appear to lead to greater crime within many minority populations. The U.S. is not unique in its experience with high minority crime rates, but it is a relatively heterogenous nation. This is an important factor in explaining why the homicide rate tends to be higher in the U.S. than in other industrialized countries. To close, I’ll offer something cogent from Bretigne Shaffer’s On the Banks blog, in which she offers this quote from an individual named Michael Owen (the soccer player?):

“... we don’t really have a single America with a moderately high rate of gun deaths. Instead, we have two Americas, one of which has very high rates of gun ownership but very low murder rates, very comparable to the rest of the First World democracies such as those in western & northern Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, South Korea. The other America has much lower rates of gun ownership but much, much higher murder rates, akin to violent third world countries.“

An Immigration Reform Dream: What’s Trump’s Price?

08 Friday Sep 2017

Posted by in Executive Authority, Immigration

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Two major issues weigh on critics and supporters of President Trump’s rescission of DACA, President Obama’s 2012 executive order establishing the Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals program. First is the treatment of individuals who entered the U.S. illegally prior to mid-2007 at less than 16 years of age (and who were 30 or younger in 2012). Under Trump’s new order, these individuals would be subject to deportation in March 2018 or later, depending on their remaining DACA eligibility and the status of any renewal application already filed by then.

As an isolated question, draconian treatment of so-called “Dreamers” (taken from the “Dream Act”, which never made it through Congress) is difficult to justify. These individuals did not arrive here by choice or through any fault of their own, and the vast majority are now productive members of society. The problem, however, is the usual argument against amnesty: it creates an incentive for would-be immigrants to circumvent the legal immigration process in the hope of later forgiveness. If children of illegals are subject to lenient treatment once in the U.S., it probably magnifies that incentive. While some take a hard line with respect to deporting today’s Dreamers, many critics of DACA are strongly sympathetic to their plight.

The second issue defines another basis for opposition to DACA: the questionable legality of Obama’s original order. Obama issued another executive order in 2014 that essentially expanded DACA. That later order, already rescinded by Trump in June, was likely to be overturned by the Supreme Court. This article quotes from the majority opinion of the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:

“The administration’s interpretation of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, [5th Circuit Judge] Smith wrote, would effectively vest the Secretary of Homeland Security with the power ‘to grant lawful presence and work authorization to any illegal alien in the United States—an untenable position in light of the INA’s intricate system of immigration classifications and employment eligibility.’ In other words, Smith wrote, ‘the INA flatly does not permit the reclassification of millions of illegal aliens as lawfully present and thereby make them newly eligible for a host of federal and state benefits, including work authorization.’“

The key here is the clause “making them newly eligible for a host of federal and state benefits” without proper legislative authorization. In other words, Obama exceeded his authority. The original DACA order suffers from the same defect as the extension, and it was likely to be challenged as well. However, Ilya Somin has defended DACA as a matter of “prosecutorial discretion”, which was Obama’s original rationale for not enforcing immigration law for Dreamers. (But there is suspicion that the likelihood of adding to Democrat voter rolls appealed to Obama.) Enforcement against the children of illegal immigrants, Somin contends, is simply bad policy of the sort routinely avoided by prosecutors. In 2013, Zachary Price addressed this defense of DACA, including the application of earlier statutes specifically allowing discretion in immigration enforcement (also see this post by Michael Ramsey):

“The immigration [DACA] policy, in contrast, provides a more definite and specific guarantee of non-enforcement to a broad category of undocumented immigrants who fall squarely within the scope of removal statutes. … It’s worth noting (as some folks have helpfully pointed out to me) that the Obama Administration has maintained vigorous enforcement with respect to other groups of undocumented immigrants. But DACA goes beyond simply turning a blind eye to their unlawful presence in the country. It effectively grants a form of lawful status not contemplated by the applicable statutes through an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

It’s true that there is a history to the practice of deferred action. Although this form of relief originated in executive practice, it’s now mentioned in several statutes, so to some degree at least Congress may have ratified it. … Yet the practice (as I understand it) originated as a form of case-by-case humanitarian relief. While immigration officials have used it categorically a few times in the past (for instance, to grant relief to immigrant students affected by Hurricane Katrina), I’m not aware of it ever being used for as broad and significant a group of immigrants as in the DACA program. So I think it’s hard to claim that there’s been even an implicit ratification of the practice sufficient to support the DACA program.“

Legislative action — a new attempt at some kind of Dream Act — could resolve the dilemma faced by Dreamers and their defenders while avoiding the legal objections to unrestrained executive authority. It’s likely that Trump is willing to exchange a continuation of the DACA regime, or even complete amnesty for Dreamers, to achieve other priorities, such as funding for his ballyhooed border wall. One could accuse Trump of using the Dreamers as pawns — why else would he have agreed to a grace period of six months? And why did he say, subsequently, that he would “revisit DACA” if Congress failed to act? That might give him some leverage with those who oppose DACA on the legal grounds discussed above, but it might undermine his ability to cut a deal for the wall or any other priority with Democrats.

David Harsanyi writes in The Federalist that “Rescinding DACA Is the Right Thing To Do“:

“If there’s one thing that exemplified Obama’s administration, it was its embrace of executive unilateralism. No administration in memory was stopped more often by courts on this front—often by unanimous Supreme Court decisions. … The Constitution makes no allowance for the president to write law ‘if Congress doesn’t act.’“

Somin notes that rescinding DACA, and even passing a law in this case, will do nothing to prevent this and future presidents from exercising excessive authority. That’s certainly true, but rectifying a case in which that authority was exceeded, along with recognition of the constitutional limits on executive authority, is worthwhile.

Congress should pass legislation offering relief to the Dreamers. In a best case scenario, new legislation would provide them with a clear path to citizenship, and it would also reform existing immigration law to allow for greater flows of immigrants through the legal process. Those provisions might come at the cost of building a wall, as well as funds for tougher immigration enforcement. And Trump has made merit-based criteria for issuing green cards and accepting immigrants a priority. That’s fine as long as: 1) “merit” is defined partly by economic needs, such as low-skilled farm labor; and 2) there is some sort of navigable process for refugees.

While the prospect of allowing Dreamers to be used as political pawns might be repugnant, the end result could be worthwhile. And we shouldn’t forget that some of those Dreamers, as children, were probably used as pawns by the very parents who brought them here.

 

Are The Native-Born Idle By Choice?

21 Wednesday Sep 2016

Posted by in Immigration, Labor Markets, Minimum Wage

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idle-hands

Native-born Americans don’t seem to want low-skilled work, even when they have no skills. Immigrants, on the other hand, seem more than happy to take those jobs. The fact is that hours worked by native high-school dropouts have declined relative to the hours of immigrant dropouts, as noted by Robert Verbruggen in “When Young Men Don’t Work“.

Of course, American men in general are working less, with fewer jobs in occupations and sectors traditionally dominated by men, such as manufacturing. The total demand for manual labor may be decreasing due to automation. Among the youngest cohort, hours spent in educational activities have increased. However, another contributing factor may be that the supply of labor is held down by negative work incentives created by government policy. In any case, the changing composition of the low-skilled work force is a curiosity. Many of the native-born appear to be opting out of work, but not the foreign-born:

“Native high-school dropouts of ‘prime age’ (25–54) work only about 35 weeks per year, on average; comparable immigrant dropouts work 49 weeks. Native dropouts are the outliers. Immigrant dropouts work roughly as much as both native and immigrant men with higher levels of education—and they do 60 percent of the work performed by dropouts in America, despite being less than half of the dropout population.“

Clearly low-skilled work exists , and immigrants are doing a disproportionate share of it. Are some of these low-wage jobs simply inaccessible to the native-born? I doubt it. The argument that immigrants are taking low-wage jobs from Americans implies that immigrants have lower reservation wages. But if that’s so, it confirms the hypothesis that natives are less willing to take low-skilled jobs.

In fact, the native-born might have better leisure alternatives than many of the foreign-born. Verbruggen reviews the work of Erik Hurst of the University of Chicago, who argues that technology such as video games and the internet have increased the value of leisure relative to work. Perhaps natives are better situated than immigrants to draw on other resources to finance an idle, gaming existence. Whatever they do to occupy their time, those resources might include relationships with family having the means to support them, and even a familial tolerance for idleness.

It’s also possible that natives have better access to the bounty of the welfare state. Undocumented foreign workers are at a disadvantage in this regard, but that handicap is eroding. Whatever the reason, it appears that native-born Americans are spared the need to bid aggressively on work they consider undesirable. That decision will often be costly in the longer-run, given the lost opportunity to develop skills on the job.

Another possible explanation for the disparity in average working hours is that more immigrants are willing to work (illegally) in sub-minimum wage jobs. That might well be true for undocumented foreign workers, even in occupations that would otherwise be legal. One could argue that this is unlikely to reduce opportunities for work at or above the minimum wage because wage offers tend to align with skill level. However, sub-minimum wage offers to illegals are probably driven by the risk faced by the employer in making such hires. Just the same, illegal opportunities to work below minimum wage are not the exclusive domain of immigrants. Cash compensation can allow an employer to pay sub-minimum wages to anyone willing to work. Moreover, many natives work in the underground economy in areas such as illicit drug distribution, which might or might not involve sub-minimum wages.

Of course, an individual working at a lower wage must work more hours to earn the same income as one earning a higher wage. Subsistence for the immigrants might require the extra hours. That would explain the disparity in average hours if natives and immigrants truly can be sorted by wage rate, but if that is the case, then the natives must have less interest in low-wage jobs, as postulated, and the natives are content to live at the same subsistence level as the low-wage immigrants by working fewer hours.

Thus, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that native-born Americans are less willing to work in low-wage jobs than the foreign-born. Further increases in the minimum wage would have a tendency to create more idle time among the low-skilled, both native and immigrant. The total legal demand for low-skilled labor would decline. More natives might be willing to supply labor at the higher minimum, but incumbents have an advantage in holding onto jobs that remain after the increase. A higher minimum would certainly convert some formerly legal opportunities into illegal opportunities (at wages below the new minimum), attenuating the total increase in idleness.

Growth in the labor force is a fundamental driver of economic growth, and immigration has always been an important source of labor for the U.S. economy. Low-skilled, native-born Americans seem less willing to offer their services at wages matching their skill levels, but immigrants help to fill that gap and are usually happy for the opportunity. A higher minimum wage will not make their lives easier in the U.S. It should also be noted that greater tolerance for immigration at the low-end of the socioeconomic spectrum need not imply a sacrifice in border security or careful vetting, but it would provide a supply of able and willing workers eager to improve their standard of living.

On a related note, I add the following: James Pethokoukis points to an interesting irony with respect to Donald Trump’s policy positions: “Trump wants 4% (or higher) US growth. Easy. Just massively increase immigration“.

Bernie, Donald and Ignatius?

29 Friday Jan 2016

Posted by in Immigration, Socialism, Uncategorized

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BernieTrump

We have candidates vying for the nominations of both major U.S. political parties with tendencies toward nationalism: Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump. They both oppose liberalized immigration and they are both anti-trade, playing on economic fears in articulating their views. Sanders has attempted to soften his rhetoric on immigration since last summer, when he alleged that it harms U.S. workers.

There are differences between Sanders and Trump on the treatment of existing illegal immigrants. Despite Trump’s protests to the contrary, his nationalism has had ethnic overtones.

Trump’s positions on immigration and trade protectionism are not necessarily at odds with Republican tradition, which is a mixed bag, but they are consistent with a faith in big government and central planning. An anti-immigration and anti-trade platform is certainly no contradiction for Sanders, because central planning is integral to his avowed socialism.

Sanders has been called a “socialist with nationalistic tendencies”. He favors government provision of free health care and higher education, heavy redistribution, and severe restrictions on property rights via high taxation. Trump, on the other hand, has been called a “nationalist with socialist tendencies.” He too has called for nationalized health care, increasing certain transfer payments, as well as compromises to state rights. It would probably be more accurate to describe Trump as a corporatist, a system under which large business entities both serve and control government for their own benefit. For example, Trump has used and favors eminent domain to secure land for private projects, generous bankruptcy laws to eliminate business risks, and “deal-making” between government and private enterprise in order to “get things done.” Corporatism is a flavor of fascism, and it is perfectly consistent with a statist agenda.

Thus, each party has candidates who are by degrees both nationalist and socialist. In using these labels, however, I plead innocent to a violation of Godwin’s Law. Of course they are not Nazis, but they are nationalistic socialists. The distinction is explained nicely by B.K Marcus in The Freeman. Both candidates take positions that are consistent with the platform of the National Socialist German Workers Party, circa 1920.

As an aside, Marcus provides some fascinating etymology of the word “Nazi”, quoting Steve Horwitz:

“The standard butt of German jokes at the beginning of the twentieth century were stupid Bavarian peasants. And just as Irish jokes always involve a man called Paddy, so Bavarian jokes always involved a peasant called Nazi. That’s because Nazi was a shortening of the very common Bavarian name Ignatius. This meant that Hitler’s opponents had an open goal. He had a party filled with Bavarian hicks and the name of that party could be shortened to the standard joke name for hicks.“

Marcus also quotes Mark Forsyth on this topic:

“To this day, most of us happily go about believing that the Nazis called themselves Nazis, when, in fact, they would probably have beaten you up for saying the word.“

Back on point, I’ve written about both of these candidates before: Trump here and here; Sanders here. To keep things even, here is one more interesting take on Bernie.

“His family managed to send him to the University of Chicago. Despite a prestigious degree, however, Sanders failed to earn a living, even as an adult. It took him 40 years to collect his first steady paycheck — and it was a government check.”

Read the whole thing!

It’s difficult for me to take these two candidates seriously because they do not take individual liberty seriously, nor do they understand the power of private markets to promote human welfare. I also have strong reservations about their understanding of constitutional principles, and I suspect that either would have few qualms about taking Mr. Obama’s cue in stretching executive authority.

Instead of the headline above, it would have been more accurate to say “Bernie, Donald and Ignoramus!” Unfortunately, one of these guys could be our next president. Well, it won’t be Sanders.

In Praise of Refugee Aid and Precautions

23 Monday Nov 2015

Posted by in Immigration, Terrorism

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Libertarians differ from conservatives on the Syrian refugee issue and on immigration policy in general. I’m in favor of liberalized immigration because it confers powerful economic advantages. That does not imply, however, a willingness to sacrifice border security and control over the flow of immigrants. Border security is critical to the notion of U.S. sovereignty, and though I am loath to do so, I will credit Donald Trump for asking two pertinent questions: “Do we have a country? Or do we not have a country?” This is all the more important in an age when terror on the scale of a 9/11, Paris, or terrorist use of WMDs is a threat.

One of the few legitimate functions of government is national security, and the U.S. Constitution sought to assure that security would be provided without compromising the liberties of individual citizens. I’d like outsiders to feel welcome to join us and partake of those liberties, but only subject to precautions related to security. Given current threats, it is reasonable to insist on deliberation and caution in admitting new immigrants and refugees. That should include a careful vetting process and possibly post-entry safeguards such as mandatory touch-points with immigration and security officials.

Recent commentary on both sides of the Syrian refugee debate has featured conservatives waxing enthusiastic over police-state security measures and cavalier dismissal of security concerns by the Left, including a moment of apparent delusion from The Daily Kos when it weighed-in on refugees and certain principles of religious ethics, probably not that outlet’s strong suit. The Left’s usual approach to commentary on social media amounts to an exercise in “virtue signaling” (HT: Glenn Reynolds) without much critical thought, and this is no exception.

Refugees or asylum-seekers may need expedited initial handling for their own safety and protection. The tumultuous experience of fleeing a hostile regime without adequate planning, and possibly involving the loss of loved ones and possessions, suggests a need for greater assistance for refugees than for typical immigrants. The expense of a large influx of refugees is likely to be high. A solution used successfully by Canada involves private sponsorship of refugees, and there are apparently a large number of Americans willing to serve as sponsors. It is possible to vet the sponsors, of course, and might provide more reliable follow-up with the refugees themselves.

Certain classes of immigrants may be considered high-risk, though refugees have not been high-risk historically. This is one of several points made by Davis Bier at the Foundation for Economic Education in “Six Reasons To Welcome Refugees“. Bier provides a good perspective, but I don’t accept all of his assertions. He says (italicized):

  • The Paris attackers were not refugees: No, but at least one of them seems to have taken advantage of the European refugee process.
  • U.S. refugees don’t become terrorists: You can certainly vouch for this in the past tense, but it’s less certain going forward. The complete lack of documentation of many Syrian refugees complicates the vetting process.
  • Other migration channels are easier to exploit: Probably true, if the claimed thoroughness of the refugee vetting process is to be believed. Also, the resettlement from temporary camps can take two years or more, but that kind of delay is not required.
  • ISIS sees Syrian refugees as traitors: This reinforces the need to protect refugees, but it strikes me as irrelevant to the question of terrorist infiltration. A better question is whether ISIS is capable of passing-off one of their own as a refugee.
  • Turning away allies will make us less safe: It certainly won’t win us friends.
  • We should demonstrate moral courage: Helping legitimate refugees is certainly an honorable thing to do. The author points to American resistance to accepting Jewish refugees prior to World War II for fear they might be German spies. This is addressed in more detail below.

A different perspective is given in “There Are Serious, Unbigoted Reasons to Be Wary of a Flood of Syrian Refugees“, by Ian Tuttle in National Review. He asserts that the comparison of current Syrian refugees to Jewish refugees prior to WWII is inappropriate, and I largely agree. The infiltration of German spies into the Jewish refugee population was a perceived threat, but no one thought the Jews represented a risk of terror on our shores. There is nothing incompatible about feeling regret for the attitude many took toward the Jewish refugees of that era while exercising caution in the face of new risks.

Tuttle cites a recent Pew Research poll of Muslims in various countries finding that 4% to 14% of respondents approve of ISIS. Can you imagine a similar level of support for terrorism in the U.S.? This is an unfortunate social malignancy that should give us pause. Another Pew Research poll of Muslims in various countries found that the minority who believe that suicide bombing was justified ranges from 3% to 45%. It is therefore difficult to argue with Tuttle when he says:

“A non-trivial minority of refugees who support a murderous, metastatic caliphate is a reason for serious concern.“

Tuttle notes that Syrian refugees will not arrive on our shores directly from Syria.  Thus, the urgency of accepting those refugees comes into question. It is curious that such wealthy middle eastern countries as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have not accepted refugees from Syria.

Given the immediacy of terrorist threats, the lack of even basic documents for many Syrian refugees, and the Obama Administration’s record of failure in the Middle East, it is reasonable to question their assurances as to the adequacy of the refugee vetting process. Indeed, as this article warns:

“The director of the National Counterterrorism Center admitted that terrorist groups are very interested in using refugee programs to slip operatives into Europe and the United States. … 

The director of Homeland Security had no answer when asked if the “vetting” process amounted to anything more than asking refugees to fill out an application, asking them a few questions in a verbal interview, and assuming they answer honestly….

FBI Director James Comey famously admitted last month that the U.S. government has no real way to conduct background checks on refugees.”

A substantial majority of American voters oppose the administration’s plan to accept Syrian refugees, at least under the current process. Last week, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill requiring that:

“… the heads of the FBI, Homeland Security Department and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence certify that each refugee being admitted would not pose a threat.“

It would be nice to have our security agencies accept some accountability for, well,  national security. The House bill would put the ball in their court with respect to high-risk refugees.

I concur with the general position of Libertarians who support a more open U.S. immigration policy and acceptance of refugees. I also believe that private sponsorship of refugees should be legalized in the U.S. to reduce their fiscal impact. And I believe we should welcome Syrian refugees provided that they can be thoroughly vetted. In the parlance of economics, transacting with refugees may involve severely asymmetric information. It is not advisable to make risky “trades” when due diligence is impossible. Short-cuts in the vetting process do not help to assure a mutually beneficial outcome. We must therefore temper our humanitarian impulse. Under the present circumstances, including an acceptance of terrorism by a “nontrivial minority” of Muslins, it is reasonable to proceed with caution, and only with caution.

Immigration and Reverse Discrimination

09 Thursday Apr 2015

Posted by in Immigration

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Affirmative Action

Conflicts between anti-discrimination law and presumptive constitutional rights were discussed Monday’s SCC post. Another avenue for such conflicts is when anti-discrimination efforts interact with other policies to foster a perverse spiral of encroachments upon presumed rights. In a post entitled “Immigration and Equality“, Nicholas Rosenkranz asserts that affirmative action programs not only discriminate unfairly against “unprotected classes”, but that their interplay with an open-borders immigration policy makes these reverse discriminatory effects far more pernicious.

I favor a liberalized immigration policy, provided that it is accompanied by security at entry to ensure health and public safety, and without subsidizing either potential employers or the immigrants themselves (except perhaps for short-term settlement assistance). Most critics of liberalized immigration focus on negative employment and wage impacts for established residents, but this piece in The New York Times Magazine debunks that notion. Alex Tabarroc adds some great points on the subject here. In essence, the evidence suggests that the short-run economic impact of immigration is not negative, and the long-run impact is unambiguously positive. The always passionate Don Boudreaux makes a case for liberalized immigration, and he is skeptical of the assertion that immigrants, once endowed with voting rights, will always support statist policies.

Yet as Rosencranz argues, affirmative action policies may attract flows of immigrants to the U.S. that are not supported by the labor market and general economic conditions. In this view, the contention that immigration is an always beneficial flow of productive resources is erroneous. Instead, the policy may attract an excess supply of immigrant labor that truly would undermine wages and employment for established workers. It could also give rise to other negative consequences such as skewed college admission decisions.

Federal anti-discrimination law has roots of varying depth in a few different parts of the Constitution, but the “protected status” conferred to specific classes or minorities is statutory, based on several federal laws, beginning with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Government and private affirmative action programs favor hiring or advancement of members of protected classes to eliminate discrimination against them, or as a form of reparation for past discrimination. Rosenkranz has this to say about these programs:

“American law and policy will discriminate in favor of most immigrants — those of favored races such as blacks and Hispanics — and their children, and their children’s children. Correspondingly, American law and policy will discriminate against Americans of disfavored races — Asian Americans, Indian Americans, Caucasian Americans — and their children, and their children’s children.”

Rosenkranz believes this creates a “natural bargain”, a political compromise involving immigration reform in exchange for an end to government affirmative action programs, which have institutionalized “discrimination on the basis of race“:

“Democrats believe that immigration is a winning political issue for them; they believe that it makes them look compassionate while it makes Republicans look churlish. Affirmative action, on the other hand, is a political winner for Republicans; polls overwhelmingly oppose it, and it allows Republicans to argue for the ringing principle of equality under law, while Democrats are left to defend the status quo of institutional discrimination and racial spoils.”

I seriously doubt that such a compromise can be reached, but it’s a nice idea.

On a related note, the federal judge who placed a hold on President Obama’s immigration order has denied the administration’s request to lift the hold, and in rather dramatic fashion.