Tag Archives: TANF

How We Hinder Mobility

06 Monday Feb 2017

Posted by in Labor Markets, Mobility

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A plethora of regulations and subsidies established by governments at all levels is making it more difficult for Americans to move, especially from one state to another. Yale Law Professor David Schleicher identifies these barriers to mobility and writes that they compromise the nation’s ability to match jobs with workers. Thus, these laws beget economic immobility as well. His paper, “Stuck in Place: Law and the Economic Consequences of Residential Stability“, describes a number of the barriers:

“Land-use laws and occupational licensing regimes limit entry into local and state labor markets; differing eligibility standards for public benefits, public employee pension policies, homeownership subsidies, state and local tax regimes, and even basic property law rules reduce exit from states and cities with less opportunity; and building codes, mobile home bans, federal location-based subsidies, legal constraints on knocking down houses and the problematic structure of Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy all limit the capacity of failing cities to ‘shrink’ gracefully, directly reducing exit among some populations and increasing the economic and social costs of entry limits elsewhere.“

To get a sense of the magnitude of declines in mobility over the past three decades, see Figure 3 in this discussion about mobility by Richard Florida at CityLab. The percentage of homeowners who move declined from almost 10% annually in the late 1980s to about 5% in 2016. The biggest declines occurred during the periods of economic weakness in 2001 and 2008. For renters, the percentage of movers declined from just above 35% in 1988 to less than 24% in 2016.

Workers who might otherwise migrate to jurisdictions with better economic opportunities often cannot do so. Schleicher notes that low-income workers suffer the most from these obstacles, which he divides into entry and exit barriers. Most of the obstacles he cites are compelling, though at times his emphasis veers toward enabling more effective government management of the macroeconomy, which is very unappealing to my libertarian instincts.

Entry Barriers

Schleicher emphasizes two major ways in which entry barriers are created. One is the spread and severity of land use restrictions such as zoning and construction laws, which have become so severe in some areas of the country that they have led to drastic inflation in housing prices. In a review of Schliecher’s paper, Ronald Bailey at Reason.com illustrates the disparities created by this process:

“According to the Trulia real estate market analysis, the median house price in San Francisco is $1.2 million, with a median rent of $4,100 a month; in Youngstown it’s $93,000, with a median rent of $650. In other words, a Youngstown worker who sold his home for full price would receive enough money to rent a place in San Francisco for 22 months.“

The contrast in the economies of these two cities is stark. The San Francisco Bay Area has experienced vibrant job growth over the past several years, while Youngstown has been struggling for decades. Given the difference in housing prices and rents, it would be almost impossible for a worker from Youngstown to pursue an opportunity in the Bay Area without a accepting a severe decline in their standard of living. Joel Kotkin makes a similar point in discussing the high cost of housing in some areas, but his focus is on the difficult prospects for economic mobility and homeownership among Millennials.

The second major entry barrier discussed by Schleicher takes the form of occupational licensing laws. They differ across states but have multiplied since the 1950s. According to Richard Florida (linked above), the share of American workers subject to some form of licensing requirement rose from just 5% in the 1950s to 25% by 2008. Schleicher cites low rates of interstate mobility among professions that typically require a license to practice. Veterans of those occupations tend to have an established book of business, however, so it’s reasonable to expect fewer distant moves. Nevertheless, the cost of obtaining a license in a new state and differing licensure requirements are likely to inhibit the mobility of licensed professionals.

Exit Barriers

One of the most interesting sections in Schleicher’s paper is on exit barriers. Locations are always “sticky” to the extent that local ties exist or develop over time, both between people and between people and local institutions. But some institutions create ties that are severely binding. For example, state and local government employees are often enrolled in defined benefit plans with lengthy vesting periods. Remaining in one system throughout a career can be a huge advantage. Other exit barriers involve differences in eligibility and levels of aid under federal programs managed by states such as Medicaid, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP — food stamps). Beyond the actual benefits at stake, administrative costs and delays in re-enrollment might hinder a needy family’s attempt to make an interstate move.

Local and state law on property transfers can also impinge on mobility. Real estate transfer taxes in some states certainly create an incentive to stay put. Also, while tax reassessments occur with regularity in most jurisdictions, some impose limits on the amount of the annual change in valuation, requiring a full tax revaluation on resale, so a seller must forego such a tax discount. Rent controls reward renters who stay in place, creating another exit barrier. And rent controls prevent entry as well, as they invariably reduce the supply of quality housing, thereby inflating the rents of vacated apartments available to new residents.

Finally, federal policies designed to encourage homeownership create exit barriers across the country. Ownership of a residence increases the “stickiness” of any locale, but the loss of a mortgage interest income-tax deduction adds to the sacrifice of a move to a rental unit in a more expensive location. So does the interest rate subsidy inherent in the implicit federal guarantee against default on mortgages securitized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Finally, when local economies are in a state of decline, home prices usually follow. Consequently, owners are likely to suffer reduced or negative equity in their homes and may be “locked in”, unable to pay off their mortgage on a sale, and therefore unable to leave their current residence.

Rent Seeking and Good Intentions

Some of the policies discussed above are the handiwork of those powerful enough to enlist government power in their own self-interest. That includes zoning laws, by which property owners can prevent land uses they deem undesirable. It also includes occupational licensing, a political avenue through which established business interests limit competition by new entrants. Of course, licensure is typically sold to voters as consumer protection, a claim that is often dubious.

Other policies that hinder mobility can be characterized as well-intentioned, like the old-style, defined benefit plans still in use by many state and local governments, or federal subsidies for homeownership. Many such policies are, or have been, promoted on the basis of the obvious gains they create for individuals, with little thought given to the “unseen” but damaging economic consequences. Rent controls fall into this category as well, but are very damaging in the long-term.

The Labor Market Ossified

All of the mobility-limiting policies discussed by Schleicher have a detrimental effect on the performance of labor markets. Workers tend to get stuck in depressed areas, where their value as human resources is diminished even while employers in other markets face limited supplies of qualified labor. This leads to higher structural unemployment, lower growth in output, and more difficulty for the private sector in meeting the needs of consumers than otherwise be possible.

I haven’t dealt with one other national policy dealing explicitly with geographic mobility: immigration. Restrictions on legal immigration and the issuance of green cards are often sought by interests hoping to protect Americans from competition for jobs. Suspending competition is never a good idea, however, as it leads to higher prices and undermines consumer interests. To the extent that businesses face a shortage of qualified talent to fill particular jobs, as is often the case, such restrictive policies are unequivocally damaging to the economy for the same reasons as barriers to interstate migration. Liberalized immigration allows more foreigners with peaceful, productive and often entrepreneurial intent to contribute to the country’s ability to create wealth.

Prescriptions

What can be done to promote interstate mobility? Here is a list that is undoubtedly incomplete: encourage state and local governments to end rent controls; liberalize zoning laws; reevaluate construction restrictions; liberalize occupational licensing; reduce real estate transfer taxes and smooth the timing of tax revaluations. Governments should also transition from defined benefit to defined contribution benefit plans, a step that would also allow them to avoid persistent overoptimism about their ability to meet future pension obligations. As long as states manage federal aid programs and have leeway in setting eligibility requirements and their share of benefits, there will be exit barriers to low-income recipients. Perhaps states should be required to coordinate benefits, with strict time limits, when recipients move interstate to pursue employment opportunities. Finally, subsidies encouraging homeownership should be phased out, including the federal tax deduction for mortgage interest and full privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. A neutral stance with respect to homeownership would allow the market to seek an optimal balance in residential property ownership without creating excessive locational anchors.

Schleicher devotes a large part of his paper to the implications of reduced mobility for macroeconomic stabilization policy. In particular, he contends that measures intended to stimulate the economy cannot be as effective when labor supplies are inflexible. That might be true, but I’m loath to endorse Keynesian activism. Still, there is no doubt that geographic stasis of the kind described by Schleicher contributes to immobility in incomes as well. The main conclusion I draw from his paper is that governments ought to be very cautious about interfering in market transactions, even when convinced that their cause is noble. The law of unintended consequences has a way of foiling the best laid plans of social engineers.

The Progressive Underclass

09 Friday Sep 2016

Posted by in Poverty, Welfare State

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The underclass has not fared well under government policies enacted in explicit efforts to improve its members’ well being. If there is any one point on which I agree with Donald Trump, it is his recent assertion that “progressive” policies have been disastrous for minorities. Indeed, there is evidence that many public programs have been abject failures, even in terms of achieving basic goals. Some programs have managed to improve the immediate lot of the impoverished, but they have done so without freeing the beneficiaries of long-term dependency,  and perhaps have encouraged it. An underlying question is whether there is something endemic to these public initiatives that guarantees failure.

Arguments that public programs have such weaknesses are often based on the negative incentives they create, either for the intended beneficiaries (certain anti-poverty programs) or for employers who might otherwise work with them (absent minimum or “living” wages or regulatory obstacles). Then, of course, there are public services that are effectively monopolized (public schools) because they are “too important” to leave in the hands of private enterprise, with little recognition of the shoddy performance that is typical of institutions operating free of competitive pressure. And government action such as environmental policy often has a regressive impact, costing the poor a far greater share of income than the rich, and causing direct job losses in certain targeted industries.

A post from The Federalist Papers on “The Top 5 Ways Liberal Policies Hurt The Poor” is instructive. In addition to the welfare incentive trap, it highlights the failure of public schools to serve the educational needs of the poor, the minimum wage as a system of marginalization, urban gun control as a sacrifice of defenseless victims, and the extension of rights to illegal immigrants at the expense of U.S. citizens, especially low-skilled workers.

A fine essay by Kurt Williamsen entitled “Do Progressive Policies Hurt Black Americans?” focuses on three general areas of failure: public education, the workplace and welfare. He notes that certain educational innovations have met with success, yet are ridiculed by the progressive left because they promote competition.  He cites the dismal consequences for blacks of various labor and employment laws: “prevailing wage rates, the minimum wage, union bargaining power, occupational and business licensing laws, and affirmative action laws to comply with federal and state contracting requirements“. Even more astonishing is that the original motive for some of these policies, such as minimum wages and prevailing wage laws, was to keep unskilled blacks from competing with white union labor. They still work that way. Williamsen also discusses the fact that the welfare state has essentially left low-income blacks running in place, rather than lifting them out of dependency. Unfortunately, those programs have also inflicted large social costs, such as the disintegration of family in the black community:

“Welfare programs had an insidious effect on black culture — more so than white culture — because of the way they were designed. With dramatically more blacks than whites being in poverty and with less future prospects when the War on Poverty got started, young black women often had children out of wedlock, beginning a cycle of enduring poverty and welfare wherein they relied on welfare as a main source of income, as did their children. Welfare provided more money for young women with fatherless children, on average, than the same young women could have made if they were employed. If a woman became married, she would lose benefits, making it beneficial for her to either just hook up with men or cohabitate, rather than marry.“

Redistributionist policies have long been criticized for creating incentive problems among recipients of aid. Some of those problems have been corrected with the Earned Income Tax Credit, which operates as something of a negative income tax, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which incorporates work requirements. However, as Vanessa Brown Colder at the CATO Institute points out, there is a need for further reforms to the many underperforming programs.

Like any large government program, redistribution also damages incentives for those who must pay the tab, generally those at higher income levels. High taxes ultimately discourage investment in capital and in new businesses that could improve the employment and income prospects of low-income segments. Here is Andrew Lundeen at The Tax Foundation:

“When fewer people are willing to invest, two things happen. First, the capital stock (i.e. the amount of computers, factories, equipment) shrinks over time, which makes workers less productive and decreases future wages.“

Redistributionists do their intended beneficiaries no favor by advocating for steeply progressive tax structures, which simply discourage investment in productive risk capital, impairing growth in labor income. This chart from Dan Mitchell shows a cross-country comparison of capital per worker and labor compensation. Not surprisingly, the relationship is quite strong. The lesson is that we should do everything we can to improve investment incentives. Punitive taxes on those who earn capital income is counterproductive.

Mitchell emphasizes a few other statist obstacles to empowering the disadvantaged here, including a brief discussion of how land-use regulations harm the poor. He quotes Leigh Franke of The Urban Institute:

“Restrictive land-use regulations, including zoning laws, are partially to blame for the stagnant growth… Land-use regulations may be intended to protect the environment or people’s health and safety, and even to enhance the supply of affordable housing, but in excess, they restrict housing supply, drive up home prices, and limit mobility. …More and more zoning restrictions meant less construction, fewer permits, and a restricted housing supply that drove up prices even further. …cities often have stringent zoning laws, a restricted housing supply, and high prices, making it nearly impossible for lower-income residents and newcomers, who would likely benefit most from the opportunities available, to find affordable housing.“

On the topics of local housing, labor laws, services, and regulatory burdens, Scott Beyer covers the maladies of that most progressive of cities, San Francisco. The city’s policies have helped create one of the nation’s most expensive housing markets  and have made the city’s distribution of income highly unequal. It is no coincidence that the politics of most of our declining cities are dominated by the progressive left.

Here is another fascinating example of negative unintended consequences arising from intervention on behalf of a disadvantaged group: so-called “Ban the Box” (BTB) initiatives. These laws prevent employers from inquiring about a job applicant’s  crime record, at least until late in the hiring process. Mitchell recently cited a study finding that BTB laws are associated with a reduction in employment opportunities for minorities. This disparate impact might be the result of more subtle screening by employers, demonstrating a reluctance to interview individuals belonging to groups with high crime rates. Apparently, employers are willing to give minorities a better chance when information on crime history is disclosed up-front.

Deleterious forms of intervention may vary from one disadvantaged group to another. For example, Native Americans have long been handicapped by federal control of their lands and their natural resources. Regulation of activity taking place on reservations is particularly burdensome, including a rule under which title to land must:

“… be passed in equal shares to multiple heirs. After several generations, these lands have become so fractionated that there are often hundreds of owners per parcel. Managing these fractionated lands is nearly impossible, and much of the land remains idle.“

Progressives often vouch for interventionism on the belief that thpse policies are ethically beyond question, such as climate change regulation. Of course, the science of whether anthropomorphic climate change is serious enough to warrant drastic and costly action is far from settled. The existence of high costs is deemed virtually irrelevant by proponents of activist environmental laws. Those costs fall heavily on the poor by raising the cost of energy-intensive necessities and by raising business costs, in turn diminishing employment opportunities. This is more pronounced from a global perspective than it is for the U.S., as emphasized in “Protect the poor – from climate change policies“, at the Watts Up With That? blog.

The world’s poor secure massive benefits from trade, but progressive policies often seek to inhibit trade based on misguided notions of “fairness” to workers in low-wage countries. And trade restrictions tend to benefit relatively high-wage workers by shielding them from competitive pressure. Brian Doherty in Reason talks about the nationalism of the Bernie Sanders brand, and how it undermines the poor. Donald Trump’s trade agenda has roughly the same implications. Protectionism should be rejected by the under-privileged, as it increases the prices they pay and ultimately reduces employment opportunities.

Certainly progressives always hope to assist the disadvantaged, but their policies have created a permanent dependent class. The simple lessons are these: working, producing and hiring must be rewarded at the margin, not penalized; interfering with wages and prices is counterproductive; all forms of regulation are costly; programs must be neutral in their impact on personal decisions; and property rights must be secure. Historically, economic freedom has lifted humanity from the grips of poverty. In virtually every instance, government micro-management has done the opposite. Unfortunately, it is difficult for progressives to overcome their reflexive tendency to “do something” about the poor by invoking the ever-klutzy power of the state.

Poverty Maintenance Is Not A Win

01 Wednesday Apr 2015

Posted by in Poverty, Uncategorized

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Merely keeping a patient alive is inferior to curing the disease. Likewise, merely allowing the impoverished to live under tolerable conditions is inferior to eliminating the underlying causes of poverty. Evidence for the former is used by Harvard Professor Christopher Jencks to proclaim the war on poverty a success. That is the upshot of his recent article in The New York Review of Books. But does the maintenance of a permanent dependent class constitute success? I believe that our goals should be loftier, and President Johnson’s original goals for the War on Poverty went much farther than Jencks suggests.

Ostensibly a review of other work by Martha Bailey and Sheldon Danziger, Professor Jencks devotes most of his essay to arguing that the official poverty rate published by the Census Bureau is distorted, and that a “corrected” measure has declined since the “war” was initiated by Johnson in the 1960s. The official rate has fluctuated in a range of 11-15% since the mid-1960s. Jencks corrects the 2013 rate of 14.5% for 1) the value of non-cash benefits received by certain program recipients (-3%); 2) the omission of refundable tax credits from the official incomes of employed individuals below the poverty line (-3%); and 3) a change in the price index used to adjust the official poverty thresholds over time to one that does not overstate changes in the cost of living (-3.7%). These three adjustments would reduce the poverty rate in 2013 to just 4.8%.

Taken at face value, that reduction is impressive, but the third adjustment is not directly attributable to antipoverty programs. It could also be due to economic growth or other factors. Jencks notes the following:

“Both liberals and conservatives tend to resist the idea that poverty has fallen dramatically since 1964, although for different reasons. Conservatives’ resistance is easy to understand. They have argued since the 1960s that the federal government’s antipoverty programs were ineffective, counterproductive, or both. 

Liberals hear the claim that poverty has fallen quite differently, although they do not like it any better than conservatives do. Anyone, liberal or conservative, who wants the government to solve a problem soon discovers that it is easier to rally support for such an agenda by saying that the problem in question is getting worse than by saying that although the problem is diminishing, more still needs to be done.”

For my own part, I believe that many antipoverty programs succeed only as palliatives. They have not succeeded in breaking the cycle of poverty and dependence on the state. In other words, successful programs must foster self-sufficiency, which is a superior goal from a humanitarian and a Libertarian perspective. Jencks plans a follow-up on the “successes and failures specific anti-poverty programs”, but merely paying alms to the poor establishes a very low threshold for success.

In fairness to Jencks, anti-poverty programs serve a large number of individuals who are incapable of providing for themselves for a variety of reasons such as age, physical and mental disabilities. While it is beyond the scope of this post, some argue that private charities are more effective at providing for these individuals as well as the able poor. A greater role for charity could even be facilitated via public funding, but in any case, a larger role for private charity should always be on the menu of policy options.

A basic failing of many welfare programs is an incentive problem: able recipients perceive a penalty for work effort (additional hours or even kinds of employment) if rising earned income is associated with reduction or elimination of program benefits. This means that participants face a very high effective marginal tax rate on earned income.

This article from The CATO Institute contains a good overview of the federal welfare system, which consists of 126 separate programs. The article contains somewhat more detailed on the largest anti-poverty programs, such as Refundable Tax Credits (the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and Child Tax Credit (CTC)), Supplemental Security Income (SSI – for aged, blind and disabled), SNAP (food stamps), housing subsidies, child nutrition (WIC), Temporary Assistance For Needy Families (TANF) and unemployment insurance. Social Security is also included since it pays benefits to many low income seniors.

The CATO analysis shows that by one measure, refundable tax credits are by far the most cost efficient at lifting people out of poverty at a point in time, at least among the large programs, followed by SSI and using subsidies. In-kind programs such as SNAP and WIC tend to be less targeted and less effective by this measure. There is fairly widespread agreement that the tax credits have better incentives for work effort, but there are still high marginal tax rates in the phase-out range, a marriage penalty, and the credits are paid only once a year as tax refunds. Some contend that the phase-out of the EITC discourages labor supply even more than the credit increases labor supply at lower incomes. Still others believe that adding certain work requirements would make the EITC a more effective measure:

“The [EITC] clearly does reduce poverty, but it raises work levels far less than some of the statistical studies of the past decade claim, and it appears to do so by encouraging working people to keep working, rather than driving the non-working poor toward jobs. If we wish the credit to promote work as well as raise incomes, we … must add other suasions to promote and enforce work, such as those found in the more successful work-incentive experiments…. These include mandating participation in work programs and setting some threshold of working hours that claimants have to achieve to get benefits.”

The incentive effects of other programs are more negative than the tax credits. This paper found that the food stamp program reduces employment and hours worked. The TANF program, which was the successor to Aid To Families With Dependent Children (AFDC), also exposes recipients to high marginal tax rates. While CATO has been criticized for analyzing the combined impact on marginal tax rates of up to eight different programs, there is little question that the incentive problem is compounded for participants in multiple programs.

There are many different approaches that can be explored for eliminating poverty, supporting those who can’t work and ending dependency for those who can. Certainly, the work incentives of existing anti-poverty programs can be improved in a number of ways. More inventive approaches can be tested at the state level. However, programs such as guaranteed incomes should be eschewed, as they tend to aggravate the incentive problem and encourage dependency.

There are many other approaches to attacking poverty and its causes that do not strictly qualify as “welfare reform.” These include measures that would improve education and employment prospects, including apprenticeship and other training programs. School choice is a fundamental reform with enormous potential to improve the quality of education among poor children. Transitioning to market-based health care reform, including competition among health insurers, would reduce medical costs across the board. Eliminating costly regulation of business can encourage economic growth, which is basic to lifting the incomes of the working poor. Minimum wage legislation should be avoided as it simply eliminates opportunities for the least productive members of society and it is not well-targeted at the poor. Tax reform that encourages saving and investment, including corporate tax reform, will increase the economy’s long-term growth potential, as would a general reduction in the size of the public sector. An end to wasteful subsidies to “privileged” industries can minimize malinvestment and release resources to uses that pass a true market test, leading to a more general prosperity.