Tag Archives: Electoral College

State Compact Aims To Subvert Electoral College

09 Tuesday Apr 2019

Posted by in Constitution, Voting Rights

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The map shows the number of electoral votes by state, one vote per square. The states colored green are participants in a gambit that would, if successful, vitiate the Electoral College (EC). They hope to execute an end-run around Article V of the Constitution, which otherwise would require an amendment to replace the EC with the national popular vote. Such an amendment is highly unlikely to win approval, as I noted last week. The green states are members of the so-called National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVC). This group of 13 states plus the District of Columbia would pledge their electors to the winner of the national popular vote, but only if and when enough states join the Compact to enable it to carry an election.

The big question is whether an electoral action by the NPVC would be constitutional. Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution prohibits states from entering treaties or compacts with other states without the approval of Congress. However, supporters of the NPV such as Justin Yang focus on an 1893 Supreme Court decision (Virginia v. Tennessee) that found congressional approval is unnecessary as long as a compact does not infringe on federal powers. NPVC advocates go on to assert that elsewhere, in Article II, Section 1, state legislatures are empowered to allocate electoral votes “in any way they want“, as Yang puts it.

There are strong reasons to doubt the NPVC’s interpretation, however. Carroll Andrew Morse raises a basic constitutional issue: the NPVC amounts to a denial of voting rights to the citizens of a Compact member-state. It is obviously true that a member-state’s voters would contribute to the national vote totals. Nevertheless, awarding state electors to the winner of the national vote, regardless of the in-state outcome, certainly could deprive state residents of their preference. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state’s denial of voting rights to any citizen or group of citizens would require the state to relinquish its representation in the legislature by a proportionate amount. That is a harsh remedy that the voters of any state should consider when weighing the benefits of membership in the NPVC.

This BYU Law Review article by Norman R. Williams covers some other areas of contention. It provides a review of some constitutional provisions bearing on the legality of interstate compacts as well as excellent background on the EC and its history. Some brief thoughts on the issue from Williams also appear in the Harvard Law Review here. According to Williams:

“… the states’ power to regulate the manner of presidential elections is far more limited than the proponents of the NPVC contend. In fact, just as the U.S. Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the states’ power to regulate congressional elections to prevent states from destabilizing the constitutional structure, so too should it deny states the power to undermine the stability of the presidential election process.”

Williams cites a 1995 Supreme Court decision (U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton) limiting state power over questions such as congressional term limits. The ruling stated that state-regulated limits create additional qualifications for holding office that are not authorized under the Elections Clause in Article I, Section 4. Williams contends that the process of choosing electors is analogous to other provisions regarding state powers, so it should be subject to the same limitations. He also says that if the Court followed the same method of reasoning as in Thornton, which focused on the founders intent as well as subsequent developments, it would reject the actions of the NPVC as unconstitutional.

Williams also argues that the NPVC may interfere with the rights of voters in other, non-Compact states. He says the history of Article II is inconsistent with an interpretation that the founders would have intended to allow states to exercise such broad, extra-state powers in electing a president:

“If a group of states can agree to pledge their presidential electors on the basis of the national vote, then they must likewise be able to agree to pledge their electors to a candidate only from those states, only from one political party, or only in accordance with the wishes of a designated committee of ‘presidential experts.’ In short, any interstate compact regarding the manner in which presidential electors are selected threatens to exclude the wishes of voters in nonsignatory states, and, therefore, it seems inconceivable that a Constitution that specifies how the President is to be elected and that lays out a process for amending its requirements would permit a group of states to alter so fundamental a part of our constitutional structure.”

Williams concludes with a quote from the Court’s decision in the Thornton case:

“As the Court admonished in Thornton, change, if it is to be undertaken, ‘must come not by legislation adopted either by Congress or by an individual State, but rather—as have other important changes in the electoral process—through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V.'”

Any legal challenge to the NPVC will have to wait until it is effective, that is, when and if it ever exercises 270 electoral votes. It now has a total of 189 electoral votes. The most recent addition was New Mexico, and a proposed ballot measure in Ohio could bring total Compact electors to 207. Fans of the NPVC hope that Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin might join as well, though none of those is imminent. But if they did it would bring another 46 electoral votes to the Compact. Apparently Pennsylvania has rejected membership for now.

Almost all of the states already in the NPVC are solidly “blue”, having voted for the Democrat in presidential elections, at least over recent cycles. Of course, that means the Compact might quickly disintegrate if a Republican is expected to win the popular vote. Right now, however, Colorado and New Mexico are the only states that might qualify as swing states, and even those are a stretch. Some of the other states in which the NPVC is under debate are legitimate swing states, and legislation enabling the change will be risky for many lawmakers in those states. Ballot measures might be more preferable to the NPVC due to the possibility of limited turnout. We’ll see how it goes.

If states with 270 or more electors vote as a block, it diminishes the importance of each state’s voters, who might well disagree with the national popular vote in the future if not already. For example, members of the NPVC, including California, would have had to cast their electoral votes for George W. Bush in 2004, despite the desires expressed by their citizens at the polls. Voters at-large in any non-Compact state have more leverage over the outcome of a presidential election than if they follow the national popular vote. Alexander Hamilton would not have approved of the NPVC; he wrote that a state’s electors should not be influenced by parties outside the state. That was the intent of the founders.

Court challenges would undoubtedly follow any exercise of votes through the NPVC. Presumably that would occur only in the event of another conflict between the national popular vote and the EC, as constituted prior to the adoption of the NPVC. That would occur only if at least one Compact state had an in-state popular vote conflicting with the national vote. There is almost no doubt that such a dispute would make its way to the Supreme Court. Thus, a presidential election might someday be undecided until a final ruling is passed down by the high court. I strongly suspect that the NPVC would be found unconstitutional.

 

The Excellent Electoral College

05 Friday Apr 2019

Posted by in Constitution, Democracy

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , ,

So lacking is the average American’s knowledge of civics that they often react in shock to the suggestion that the United States was never intended to be a pure democracy. But unchecked democracy is not a system that can be counted upon to maintain stability, something the founders knew when they fashioned the country as a constitutional republic. This point bears emphasis given the recent calls to abolish the Electoral College (EC) by such Democrat luminaries as Elizabeth Warren and Beto O’Rourke. Others, like Socialist-cum-Democrat Bernie Sanders, say they want to “assess” the EC.

Jon Gabriel describes the EC as one of a series of stabilizing checks and balances embedded in our system of government. It served the purpose of balancing interests across diverse regional economies and sub-cultures:

“By distributing our presidential choice among 51 individual elections, nominees must appeal to a wide variety of voters with a wide variety of interests. Farmers in Wisconsin are important, as are retirees in Florida, factory workers in Pennsylvania, and shopkeepers in Arizona. White Evangelicals need to be courted in Charlotte, as do Latino Catholics in Mesa.

If the Electoral College were abandoned, party frontrunners would camp out exclusively in urban areas. The pancake breakfasts in Des Moines and Denver would be replaced with mammoth rallies in Los Angeles and New York City.”

So diverse were these interests in the late 1700s that it’s reasonable to assume that the Constitutional Convention would have failed without the creation of the EC. Today, no less, our country would be unlikely to survive the EC’s elimination. Why, for example, would voters in Missouri wish to allow the preferences of east and west coast voters to dominate federal policy-making?

Gabriel provides some interesting history giving emphasis to the notion of a tyranny of the majority under pure democracy:

“The world’s first democracy was ancient Athens, which allowed around 30,000 free adult male citizens to choose their leaders. They made up less than 15 percent of the population, but it was the most egalitarian political innovation to date.

Athen’s unbridled democracy, however, led to the very extremes that sowed its decline and defeat at the hands of enemies. This note from Edward Conway on Quora is instructive (his is the third commentary at the link; most of the others are helpful, but his is most succinct):

“… ancient Athenian democracy was purely a matter of votes: if you wanted to win a court case, or pass a law, or tax a group, or go to war, or massacre a large number of people, the only check was whether you could convince a majority of the citizens to vote in your favor. While there were means of checking individual people (see: Ostracon), this did nothing to check the power of the crowds, as it only removed one focus of this power.

Thus Athenian democracy never moved beyond the initial ‘UNLIMITED POWER!’ stage. Anyone who could convince the crowd to follow them had unchecked authority until they lost control of the crowd.

This led, predictably, to excesses: ‘Let’s attack Sparta!’, ‘Let’s invade Sicily!’, ‘Let’s ostracize our best general!’, etc.“

It’s interesting that the Athenian military was staffed by plebeians who found imperialistic actions to be profitable. Naturally, they voted to devote more resources to military incursions… until they were defeated. Allowing a large faction to vote on their own pay, and the taxes on others necessary to pay for it, can be a glaring defect of democracy. We see manifestations of the same phenomenon today in congressional pay raises and expansion of federal benefits for large segments of the population who pay no taxes.

Back to Gabriel:

As the saying goes, democracy is four wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch. The Founders looked to Athens less as a political model than an object lesson in what not to do.

James Madison said that democracies are ‘incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.’

The EC was a stroke of political genius: It allowed the delegates at the Constitutional Convention to reach a consensus, something that would probably be just as difficult to accomplish today as it was then. The EC transforms one federal election into 51 local elections, reducing the feasibility of tampering by the party in power at the federal level. It also reduces the incentive for electoral fraud in a national race because a greater margin of victory within a state cannot gain the votes of additional electors.

The noise regarding the EC is coming from just one side of the political aisle: Donald Trump’s electoral victory in 2016, and his reasonably good prospects for reelection in 2020, have inflamed the passions of Democrats, who are now grasping at any and all ways in which they might tilt the playing field their way. Relative to electoral votes, popular votes are heavily concentrated in the coastal “blue” states. Such a change in the rules of the game would certainly stand to benefit Democrats. Therefore, the debate looks suspiciously like it has nothing to do with “good governance” and electoral integrity, and everything to do with raw politics.

It’s useful to remember that the EC was an essential incentive for gaining the buy-in of smaller states to join the Union. It remains vitally important to states whose interests would likely be neglected if presidential politics was dominated by the coastal states. Fortunately, the founders invested the EC with durability: rescinding it would require a constitutional amendment. That could happen if two-thirds of the state legislatures agree to convene a constitutional convention. Or, it could be proposed by a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress, then ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures. Ain’t gonna happen.

 

Fraud-Free Voting Fallacy

26 Thursday Jan 2017

Posted by in Democracy, Voter Fraud

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , ,

acorn-voter-fraud

I posted the following on December 1, 2016. It seems timely today. The bottom line: voter fraud is very unlikely to have swung the popular vote in favor of Hillary Clinton, but it is all too common.

Democrats have long asserted that voter fraud is rare. Recently, we heard from them that questioning the results of an election would “undermine democracy”. In fact, voter fraud is routinely characterized by the left as “fake news“, and even worse, as a racist narrative! How convenient. But in the wake of the Donald Trump victory, we’ve been hearing about electronic voter fraud from the same crowd that’s been imagining Ruskiis under their beds for months (to steal a phrase from Glenn Reynolds). Fear not: voting machines are not connected to the internet!

This week, however, Donald Trump stirred the pot once again by tweeting that he would have won the popular vote if not for the “millions” of illegal votes for Hillary Clinton. Hilarity ensued, and not only on the left. All the pundits say that Trump has no data to support his claim. He probably never looked for it, and he probably doesn’t care. As Ed Driscoll notes at Instapundit, perhaps “stray voltage” is simply part of his plan.

Trump’s claim really does sound outrageous, but a review of the recent history of actual and potential election fraud shows that it might not be as radically far-fetched as we’ve been told. DiscovertheNetworks.org (DTN) provides a three-part compilation of voter fraud research and cases spanning the last 30 years. Pertinent detail on each case or finding is provided, and each item is sourced. The cases span the country and include fraudulent voter registration efforts, dead and ineligible voters (including pets) on the rolls, multiple registrations across jurisdictions, homeless voters casting multiple votes, fraudulent absentee ballots, vote buying, voter impersonation, and failure to provide absentee ballots to deployed military personnel. ACORN, by the way, is well-represented on the list.

Many of the cases on DTN’s list involve anywhere from a handful of fraudulent votes to several hundred. Of course, it’s likely that only a small percentage of fraudulent votes are ever detected. But there are cases on the list of fraudulent registrations numbering in the thousands, and counts of ineligible voters appearing on voter rolls numbering in the hundreds of thousands and even millions.

One of the studies cited by DTN was commissioned by The Pew Center on the States, published in 2012. It found that there were 24 million invalid or “significantly inaccurate” voter registrations in the U.S. And just before every election, said the report, election officials are inundated with a flood of new and often questionable registrations.

Another study cited by DTN appeared in the journal Electoral Studies in 2014. It said “… based upon extrapolations from the portion of the sample with a verified vote … 6.4 percent of non-citizens voted in 2008 ….” The authors admit that there are reasons to think 6.4% is an under-estimate. That’s especially true given the focus on immigration policy in this year’s presidential campaign. But if that percentage was repeated in this year’s election, and given 24 million non-citizen residents in the U.S. (legal and illegal), then roughly 1.4 million non-citizen votes would be included to the 2016 popular vote total. The researchers acknowledge that this group tends to vote heavily for democrats. The overlap between these votes and those arising from the other kinds of voter fraud by Pew is certainly not complete, so the fraudulent vote total is likely to be well north of 1.4 million.

The electoral college was designed to discourage voter fraud in states dominated by a single party. Vote margins beyond a simple majority provide no incremental reward in the electoral college, the reasoning goes. That doesn’t mean election fraud doesn’t occur in those states or that it isn’t motivated in part by presidential politics. Moreover, state and local races can still be contested in so-called “one-party” states and may be subject to manipulative efforts. In such cases, presidential votes might well ride on the coattails of candidates for state and local offices.

The recent tide of republican success in congressional races and at the state level does not suggest that election fraud is benefitting democrats in more highly contested states. Perhaps it goes the other way or is roughly balanced between the parties in those states. But most people who believe Trump’s tweet would probably say that fraud must be concentrated in heavily “blue” states like California and New York. If so, it would be unbalanced fraud.

The magnitude of voter fraud in the presidential election is plausibly in the range of 1 – 2 million and it could be even higher based on the research and other information cited above. That total, however, is split between the parties. For the sake of argument, if 2 million fraudulent ballots are cast and republicans garner 30%, or 600,000 fraudulent votes, then the contribution to the democrat vote margin is just 800,000 (1,400,000 – 600,000). Hillary Clinton’s popular vote margin was 2.9 million (less than the margin in California alone). Given that total, Trump’s claim is a real stretch, but his “guess” at the number of fraudulent votes is probably well within an order of magnitude. That might be surprising to some detractors.

What should be obvious is that voter fraud is a major problem in the U.S., and it undoubtedly swings some races at state and local levels. I have been lukewarm with respect to voter ID laws, but I am persuaded that they are a necessary step in the quest for electoral integrity. (Whether IDs must be government-issued is a separate matter.) The argument that these laws are discriminatory is true to the extent that we wish to prevent ineligible individuals from voting. That’s a good thing. The argument that it is racist is sheer stupidity: citizenship should bring privileges. That is not a position on immigration policy. Voter ID laws place a simple burden on citizens to prove that they are legitimately entitled to full participation in the democratic process. If you can’t be troubled to identify yourself, you should expect multiple obstacles to sharing in the fruits of modern society.

Postscript: I just ran across this post, which makes some of the same points I’ve discussed above, but it says that there are roughly 20 million adult non-citizens in the U.S. today.

Fraud-Free Voting Fallacy

01 Thursday Dec 2016

Posted by in Democracy

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , ,

acorn-voter-fraud

Democrats have long asserted that voter fraud is rare. Recently, we heard from them that questioning the results of an election would “undermine democracy”. In fact, voter fraud is routinely characterized by the left as “fake news“, and even worse, as a racist narrative! How convenient. But in the wake of the Donald Trump victory, we’ve been hearing about electronic voter fraud from the same crowd that’s been imagining Ruskiis under their beds for months (to steal a phrase from Glenn Reynolds). Fear not: voting machines are not connected to the internet!

This week, however, Donald Trump stirred the pot once again by tweeting that he would have won the popular vote if not for the “millions” of illegal votes for Hillary Clinton. Hilarity ensued, and not only on the left. All the pundits say that Trump has no data to support his claim. He probably never looked for it, and he probably doesn’t care. As Ed Driscoll notes at Instapundit, perhaps “stray voltage” is simply part of his plan.

Trump’s claim really does sound outrageous, but a review of the recent history of actual and potential election fraud shows that it might not be as radically far-fetched as we’ve been told. DiscovertheNetworks.org (DTN) provides a three-part compilation of voter fraud research and cases spanning the last 30 years. Pertinent detail on each case or finding is provided, and each item is sourced. The cases span the country and include fraudulent voter registration efforts, dead and ineligible voters (including pets) on the rolls, multiple registrations across jurisdictions, homeless voters casting multiple votes, fraudulent absentee ballots, vote buying, voter impersonation, and failure to provide absentee ballots to deployed military personnel. ACORN, by the way, is well-represented on the list.

Many of the cases on DTN’s list involve anywhere from a handful of fraudulent votes to several hundred. Of course, it’s likely that only a small percentage of fraudulent votes are ever detected. But there are cases on the list of fraudulent registrations numbering in the thousands, and counts of ineligible voters appearing on voter rolls numbering in the hundreds of thousands and even millions.

One of the studies cited by DTN was commissioned by The Pew Center on the States, published in 2012. It found that there were 24 million invalid or “significantly inaccurate” voter registrations in the U.S. And just before every election, said the report, election officials are inundated with a flood of new and often questionable registrations.

Another study cited by DTN appeared in the journal Electoral Studies in 2014. It said “… based upon extrapolations from the portion of the sample with a verified vote … 6.4 percent of non-citizens voted in 2008 ….” The authors admit that there are reasons to think 6.4% is an under-estimate. That’s especially true given the focus on immigration policy in this year’s presidential campaign. But if that percentage was repeated in this year’s election, and given 24 million non-citizen residents in the U.S. (legal and illegal), then roughly 1.4 million non-citizen votes would be included to the 2016 popular vote total. The researchers acknowledge that this group tends to vote heavily for democrats. The overlap between these votes and those arising from the other kinds of voter fraud by Pew is certainly not complete, so the fraudulent vote total is likely to be well north of 1.4 million.

The electoral college was designed to discourage voter fraud in states dominated by a single party. Vote margins beyond a simple majority provide no incremental reward in the electoral college, the reasoning goes. That doesn’t mean election fraud doesn’t occur in those states or that it isn’t motivated in part by presidential politics. Moreover, state and local races can still be contested in so-called “one-party” states and may be subject to manipulative efforts. In such cases, presidential votes might well ride on the coattails of candidates for state and local offices.

The recent tide of republican success in congressional races and at the state level does not suggest that election fraud is benefitting democrats in more highly contested states. Perhaps it goes the other way or is roughly balanced between the parties in those states. But most people who believe Trump’s tweet would probably say that fraud must be concentrated in heavily “blue” states like California and New York. If so, it would be unbalanced fraud.

The magnitude of voter fraud in the presidential election is plausibly in the range of 1 – 2 million and it could be even higher based on the research and other information cited above. That total, however, is split between the parties. For the sake of argument, if 2 million fraudulent ballots are cast and republicans garner 30%, or 600,000 fraudulent votes, then the contribution to the democrat vote margin is just 800,000. Hillary Clinton’s popular vote margin was 2.1 million (less than the margin in California alone). Given that total, Trump’s claim is a real stretch, but his “guess” at the number of fraudulent votes is probably well within an order of magnitude. That might be surprising to some detractors.

What should be obvious is that voter fraud is a major problem in the U.S., and it undoubtedly swings some races at state and local levels. I have been lukewarm with respect to voter ID laws, but I am persuaded that they are a necessary step in the quest for electoral integrity. (Whether IDs must be government-issued is a separate matter.) The argument that these laws are discriminatory is true to the extent that we wish to prevent ineligible individuals from voting. That’s a good thing. The argument that it is racist is sheer stupidity: citizenship should bring privileges. That is not a position on immigration policy. Voter ID laws place a simple burden on citizens to prove that they are legitimately entitled to full participation in the democratic process. If you can’t be troubled to identify yourself, you should expect multiple obstacles to sharing in the fruits of modern society.

Postscript: I just ran across this post, which makes some of the same points I’ve discussed above, but it says that there are roughly 20 million adult non-citizens in the U.S. today.

Futile Hope for Faithless Electors

16 Wednesday Nov 2016

Posted by in Federalism

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , ,

trump-go-round

Just who are these electors, anyway? Might they elect Hillary Clinton after all? Or switch en masse to someone else? The answer: slim to no chance. After my post on the Electoral College, it occurred to me that I should have addressed those questions. After all, every leftist clinging to hope of political redemption seems to think it could happen. But here’s the thing: if a Republican wins a state’s popular vote, then a slate of Republican electors is appointed. Electors at the state level are not appointed randomly or in proportion to the vote, as some apparently imagine. Only the Maine and Nebraska electoral slates bear any semblance of proportionality, since congressional districts in those states get one elector each, while two others go with the state vote. Here is a U.S. government web page on the Electoral College describing the selection process for electors.

It appears likely that Donald Trump will win Michigan’s 16 electoral votes, though the results probably won’t be certified until the end of the month. That would give him 36 more electors than the 270 required to win the presidency. The likelihood that 36 Republican electors will refuse to back Trump, or even 20 electors if he loses Michigan, is infinitesimal. Such “faithless electors” can be penalized in 29 states, but those laws have never been enforced due to the rarity of faithless electors. In some states, the vote of a faithless elector is voided, so it would reduce Trump’s total but not add to Clinton’s. And Clinton might have two faithless electors of her own in Washington state, who have said they will vote for Bernie Sanders and pay a $1,000 fine.

Broken-hearted leftists will almost certainly have to satisfy themselves with marching, or rioting, and simply demonizing Trump, his appointees, and his supporters.

Post-Election Thoughts: The Electoral College

15 Tuesday Nov 2016

Posted by in Constitution, Populism

≈ 3 Comments

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , ,

tyranny-of-the-majority-cartoon

Among the targets of disillusioned Hillary Clinton voters is the much-maligned electoral college. The EC is misunderstood by most voters, from what can be judged on social media. Few seem to have any idea why it exists. Donald Trump condemned the EC during the recent campaign, echoing a typically populist attitude, yet it actually worked in his favor. And most are happy to accept the EC’s results when it works in their favor, but otherwise the EC strikes them as nonsensical.

Here’s how it works: a state’s electoral votes are equal to the total number of seats it has in Congress: two senators plus the number of congressional districts in the state. Therefore, a state’s relative influence in the college is larger with fewer congressional districts (which are a function of population and land area). For example, suppose that each congressional district has a population of 1,000,000 (The actual average is closer to 750,000). A state with one congressional district gets three electors for its one million inhabitants. A state with two congressional districts gets four electors, or two votes per million inhabitants. A state with a ten congressional districts gets 12 electors, or 1.2 per million inhabitants. Therefore, voters in small states have more leverage on the outcome of presidential elections than voters in large states. Does that make sense as a mechanism for selecting the nation’s chief executive?

The Constitutional Convention

The purpose of the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787 was to forge an agreement between the individual states regarding a system of governance. This 1986 article by Shlomo Slomin in The Journal of American History provides an excellent account of the lengthy discussions that took place at the convention over how to select the chief executive. It was perhaps the lengthiest debate at the convention, as documented by Slomin. In the effort to create a durable union, a major concern was that a majority of voters were concentrated in states with interests, both economic and social, that differed from the interests of small states. One fear was that the executive would always be selected from one of the large states.

The first proposals involved selection of the president by legislative bodies (a position which endured until late in the summer):

“Whereas the Virginia Plan provided for a popularly elected legislature with the representation of each state proportional to the size of its population, the New Jersey Plan proposed that the legislature remain …the representative body of the states, with each state entitled to one vote…. In effect, therefore, at the very outset of the convention, the large and small states were at loggerheads over the method of selecting an executive no less than they were over the composition of the legislature.“

Obviously, the New Jersey Plan was much more extreme in its departure from proportional representation than the final, agreed-upon EC. (Note that New Jersey was relatively small at the time.) The problem was finally referred to a committee late in the summer, which presented its plan a few days later. Each state legislature would choose electors, who would in turn elect the president. States would have the option of turning over the choice of electors to their voters. To paraphrase Slomin slightly, it removed the decision from Congress for selection of a president in favor of an independent, ad hoc body. The EC had a single purpose, would not meet at one central location, and would immediately disband, so there was little chance of corruption or “cabal” influences. In terms of votes, it was an exact replica of Congress. Originally, each elector was to vote for two individuals, but could vote for only one from their own state.

“The delegates, it appears, were pleased with the Electoral College scheme, which so successfully blended all the necessary elements to ensure a safe and equitable process for electing a president and which reserved considerable influence for the states.“

The Constitution embodies other provisions that ensured a balance of power, all of which helped to bring disparate interests together into one federalist union. This includes the fact that we have two senators in Congress from each state. Alexander Hamilton wrote favorably of the EC in the Federalist Papers. The method of electing a president was subject to the same balancing of interests.

The founders had other reasons to think the EC was advisable. One was that it was impossible for many citizens, especially those in less populous regions, to truly “know” the presidential candidates. State electors, it was hoped, would relieve the citizenry of an impossible duty to perform a final vetting process. That rationale, however,  might not be very compelling in the era of modern communication and social media.

Another concern that arose was the appeasement of the southern, slave states. The issue of slavery was a lightning rod, but the northern states offered another “sweetener” to the south: the so called “three-fifths rule”, whereby three-fifths of the slave population would be counted in the total for allocating legislative representation. Even with that rather ugly adjustment, the southern states were generally less “populous”, but not as a rule. After all, Virginia was by far the largest state at the time of the convention. Certainly, the EC was an extra inducement to those states to approve the Constitution, but slavery had less to do with it than some have asserted, as the popular vote was never a serious contender for passage at the convention.

Fragile Democracy

It’s long been known that unrestrained democracy and majority rule can have negative consequences, including severe instability, without safeguards. The EC represents one such safeguard, functioning as a protection against a tyranny of the majority. If you’ve ever dealt with so much as a neighborhood association, you know that it’s a real phenomenon. Slomin found little evidence that the tarnished history of absolute majoritarianism was of any influence at the convention, but the founders were aware of it. The fact that legislative solutions to the electoral problem were widely accepted from the start of the convention probably reflected their awareness. Here is John Adams on the subject:

“Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide.“

In any case, the possibility of a union in which large states were dominant was obviously an issue for small states, and delegates from large states recognized the potential imbalance and the threat it presented to the success of the convention.

Today’s Imbalance

Today, only nine states account for over half of the U.S. population. (Fifteen states account for over two-thirds.) Ten states accounted for more than half of the presidential vote count in 2012, which suggests that voter turnout in 2012 was slightly lower, on average, in the most heavily-populated states. Suppose we were to do it all over: if, for example, densely-populated states have interests that do not align with rural states, and if the latter are considered economically or culturally important, then the EC can be viewed as a worthwhile concession to offer in exchange for participation.

The Interstate Compact

The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact is a group of states that will pledge their electors to the winner of the national vote, but only when enough states join to total 270 electors. The compact now has ten member states plus DC, for a total of 165 electoral votes. These states are solidly “blue”, having voted for the Democrat in elections over many cycles. There are two states, with 36 electoral votes, in which legislation to join the compact is pending: Pennsylvania, which was carried by Donald Trump in last week’s election, and Michigan, which appears to have been carried by Trump. Something tells me the compact legislation will be risky for most legislators in those two states, but we’ll see. The voters of any state, under some circumstances, can have more leverage over the outcome of a presidential election when its electors are pledged to the winner of the in-state vote, rather than following the national popular vote. This can occur any time a majority of a state’s voters happen to disagree with a thin national majority.

If states with 270 or more electors vote as a block, it diminishes the importance of each state’s voters, who might well disagree with the national popular vote in the future, if not already. The members of the compact, including California, would have had to vote for George W. Bush in 2004, despite the desires expressed by their citizens at the polls. Hamilton would not have approved of the compact; he wrote that a state’s electors should not be influenced by parties outside the state. Unfortunately, that rule was not clearly set forth in the Constitution.

Accidental Genius

Sean Rosenthal just articulated a powerful defense of the EC appearing at FEE.org. He notes that the founding founders expected a fractured political landscape, with many parties vying for public office. They were wrong in that regard, he believes, because they agreed to two-year terms in the House of Representatives. Rosenthal cites Duvergers’s Law, combined with “first-past-the-post” voting for representatives, for the devolution to a two-party system in the U.S.: voters tend to avoid candidates who might help elect their least-favorite candidate.

Given the existence of a system dominated by two-parties, the EC ensures stability by working against a concentration of power. Rosenthal reminds us that the EC transforms one federal election into 51 local elections. That reduces the chance of tampering by the party in power at the federal level. It also reduces the incentive for electoral fraud at the local level, since a greater margin of victory cannot gain the votes of additional electors. Rosenthal believes that these benefits would be powerful even if the number of each state’s electors was reduced by two, which would then cause the EC to approximate the results of the popular vote. As I noted earlier, the founders seemed to think that the EC would promote stability, and that belief was not conditional on the number of major presidential contenders.

Other Notes On the EC

Another approach to the pledging of electors is used by Maine and Nebraska. They allow congressional districts to use their single vote independently, based upon the popular vote in the district. Certainly this is the most empowering approach for an individual district’s voters. I’m sure many voters in down-state Illinois would love it!

There are plausible criticisms of the EC, such as discouraging voter turnout in non-“swing” states, and of course the disadvantaging of third-party candidates. On the other hand, some have argued that the EC can help the interests of minority voters by encouraging candidates to focus on winning their votes. And relatively small states like Mississippi have a proportionately large minority population, so the EC should help to advance their interests.

Conclusion

The Electoral Collage is enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and was a crucial device in achieving an acceptance of the document by all the states. The delegates to the convention might have been able to overcome objections to proportional representation without the EC, but other, less desirable, concessions probably would have been necessary. Our country might look very different today without it. The EC certainly inures to the benefit of voters in smaller states who differ in their views from majority opinions. If we had to hold the convention all over again, some form of the EC would probably be necessary to achieve consensus, and obviously that has nothing to do with slavery. The EC is consistent with the federalist approach to governance, which is instrumental to maintaining the stability of the Republic. And voters can change their minds: even voters in large states might one day find themselves in a national minority. The Electoral College is undoubtedly a better way to protect the interests of those voters in the long-run than the Interstate Compact. It will probably survive the latest challenge, as it has survived many others in the past.