Tag Archives: Price Ceilings

Texas Cold Snap Scarcity: Don’t Blame Markets!

18 Thursday Mar 2021

Posted by in Electric Power, Price Mechanism, Renewable Energy, Shortage

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People say the darnedest things about markets, even people who seem to think markets are good, as I do. For example, when is a market “too efficient”? In the real world we tend to see markets that lack perfect efficiency for a variety of reasons: natural frictions, imperfect information, taxes, subsidies, regulations, and too few sellers or buyers. In such cases, we know that market prices don’t properly reflect the true scarcity of a good, as they would under the competitive ideal. Nevertheless, we are usually best-off allowing market forces to approximate true conditions in guiding the allocation of resources. But what does it mean when someone asserts that a market is “too efficient”.

Not long ago I posted about the failure of Texas utility planners to maintain surge capacity. Instead, they plowed resources into renewable energy, which is intermittent and unable to provide for reliable baseline power loads. That spelled disaster when temperatures plunged in February. Wind and solar output plunged while demand spiked. Even gas- and coal-fired power generation hit a pause due to a lack of adequate winterization of generators. The result was blackouts and a huge jump in wholesale power prices, which are typically passed on to customers. The price to some consumers rose to the ceiling of $9/kwh for a time, compared to an average winter rate of 12c/kwh. A bill in the Texas Senate would reverse those charges retroactively.

I cross-linked my post on a few platforms, and a friendly commenter opined that the jump in prices occurred because “markets were too efficient”. For a moment I’ll set aside the fact that what we have here is a monopoly grid operator: “market efficiency” is not a real possibility, despite elements of competition at the retail level. There is, however, a price mechanism in play at the wholesale level and for retail customers on variable rate plans. Prices are supposed to respond to scarcity, and there is no question that power became scarce during the Texas cold snap. Higher prices are both an incentive to curtail consumption and to increase production or attract product from elsewhere. So, rather than saying the “market was too efficient”, the commenter should have said “power was too scarce”! Well duh…

If anything, the episode underscores how un-market-like were the conditions created by the Texas grid operator, the ironically-named Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT): it allowed massive resources to be diverted to unreliable power sources; it skimped on winterization; it failed to arrange interconnection agreements with power grids outside of Texas; and it charged customers on fixed-rate plans too little to provide for adequate surge capacity, while giving them no incentive to conserve under a stress scenario. ERCOT can be said to have created a situation in which power supply was highly inelastic, which means that a normal market force was short-circuited at a time when it was most needed.

ERCOT‘s mismanagement of power resources is partly a result of incentives created by the federal government. The installation of wind and solar power generation came with huge federal subsidies, which distort the cost of the energy they produce. Thus, not only were incentives in place to invest in unreliable power sources, but ERCOT forced electricity produced by fossil fuels to compete at unrealistically low prices. This predatory pricing forced several power producers into bankruptcy, compromising the state’s baseline and surge capacity.

There are plenty of distortions plaguing the “market” for electric power in Texas, all of which worsened the consequences of the cold snap. This was far from a case of “market efficiency”, as the comment on my original post asserted.

The very idea that markets and the price mechanism are “ruthlessly efficient” is a concession to those who say high prices are always “unfair” in times of crises and shortages. We hear about “price-gougers”, and the media and politicians are almost always willing to join in this narrative. Higher prices help to ease shortages, and they do so far more quickly and effectively than governments or charities can provide emergency supplies (unless, of course, a monopoly grid operator leaves the state more vulnerable to stress conditions than necessary). Conversely, price ceilings only serve to exacerbate shortages and the suffering they cause. So let’s not blame markets, which are never “too efficient”; sometimes the things we trade are just too scarce, and sometimes they are made more scarce by inept planners.

Horizons Lost To Coercive Intervention

27 Wednesday Jan 2016

Posted by in Human Welfare, Price Controls, Regulation

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ceiling prices

Every action has a cost. When you’re on the hook, major decisions are obviously worth pondering. But major societal decisions are often made by agents who are not on the hook, with little if any accountability for long-term consequences. They have every incentive to discount potential downside effects, especially in the distant future. Following Frederic Bastiat, Don Boudreaux writes of three levels of “What Is Not Seen” as a consequence of human decisions, which I summarize here:

  1. Immediate foregone alternatives: Possession, use and enjoyment of X is not seen if you buy Y.
  2. Resources not directed to foregone alternatives: The reduction in X inventory is not seen, compensating production of X is not seen, and extra worker hours, capital use and flow of raw materials needed for X production are not seen.
  3. The future implied by foregone alternatives: Future impacts can take many forms. X might have been a safer or healthier alternative, but those benefits are unseen. X might have been lower quality, so the potential frustration and repairs are unseen. X might have been less expensive, but the future benefits of the money saved are unseen. All of these “unseens” have implications for the future world experienced by the decision-maker and others.

These effects take on much more significance in multiples, but (2) and (3) constitute extended unseen implications for society at large. In multiples, the lost (unseen) X production and X labor-hours, capital and raw materials are more obvious to the losers in the X industry than the winners in the Y industry, but they matter. In the future, no vibrant X industry will not be seen; the resources diverted to meet Y demand won’t be seen at new or even old X factories. X might well vanish, leaving only nontransformable detritus as a token of its existence.

Changes in private preferences or in production technologies create waves in the course of the “seen” reality and the “unseen” world foregone. Those differences are caused by voluntary, private choice, so gains are expected to outweigh losses relative to the “road not traveled”. That’s not a given, however, when decisions are imposed by external authorities with incentives unaligned with those in their thrall. For that reason, awareness of the unseen is of great importance in policy analysis, which is really Boudreaux’s point. Here is an extreme example he offers in addressing the far-reaching implications of government intrusions:

“Suppose that Uncle Sam in the early 20th century had, with a hypothetical Ludd Act, effectively prohibited the electrification of American farms, businesses, and homes. That such a policy would have had a large not-seen element is evident even to fans of Bernie Sanders. But the details of this not-seen element would have been impossible today even to guess at with any reliability. Attempting to quantify it econometrically would be an exercise in utter futility. No one in a 2015 America that had never been electrified could guess with any sense what the Ludd Act had cost Americans (and non-Americans as well). The not-seen would, in such a case, loom so large and be so disconnected to any known reality that it would be completely mysterious.“

Price regulation provides more familiar examples. Rent controls intended to “protect” the public from landlords have enormous “unintended” consequences. Like any price regulation, rent controls stifle exchange, reducing the supply and quality of housing. Renters are given an incentive to remain in their units, and property owners have little incentive to maintain or upgrade their properties. Deterioration is inevitable, and ultimately displacement of renters. The unseen, lost world would have included more housing, better housing, more stable neighborhoods and probably less crime.

A price floor covered by Boudreaux is the minimum wage. The fully predictable but unintended consequences include immediate losses in some combination of jobs, hours, benefits, and working conditions by the least-skilled class of workers. Higher paid workers feel the impact too, as they are asked to perform more (and less complex) tasks or are victimized by more widespread substitution of capital for labor. Consumers also feel some of the pain in higher prices. The net effect is a reduction in mutually beneficial trade that continues and may compound with time:

“As the time span over which obstructions to certain economic exchanges lengthens, the exchanges that would have, but didn’t, take place accumulate. The businesses that would have been created absent a minimum wage – but which, because of the minimum wage, are never created – grow in number and variety. The instances of on-the-job worker training that would have occurred – but, because of the minimum wage, didn’t occur – stack up increasingly over time.“

Regulation and taxation of all forms have such destructive consequences, but policy makers seldom place a heavy weight on the unobserved counterfactual. Boudreaux emphasizes the futility of quantifying the “unseen” effects these policies:

“… those who insist that only that which can be measured and quantified with numerical data is real must deny, as a matter of their crabbed and blinding scientism, that such long-term effects … are not only not-seen but also, because they are not-seen, not real.“

The trade and welfare losses of coercive interventions of all types are not hypothetical. They are as real as the losses caused by destruction of property by vandals. Never again can the owners enjoy the property as they once had. Future pleasures are lost and cannot be observed or measured objectively. Even worse, when government disrupts economic activity, the cumulative losses condemn the public to a backward world that they will find difficult to recognize as such.

 

ZIRP’s Over, But Fed Zombies Linger Over Seed Corn

24 Thursday Dec 2015

Posted by in Central Planning, Monetary Policy, Price Controls

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Fed Rate Cuts

The Federal Reserve plans a few more increases in short-term interest rates in 2016, which should be welcome to savers who are not overexposed to market risk. The Fed took its first step away from the seven-year zero-interest-rate policy (ZIRP) last week, increasing its target rate on overnight loans between banks (“federal” funds) for the first time in almost ten years. ZIRP was grounded in the Fed’s desire to stimulate the economy after the last financial crisis, an objective that met with limited success. ZIRP’s most profound “success” was to distort prices, with negative consequences for conservative savers, those dependent on retirement assets, and the long-term growth of the economy.

ZIRP necessarily constitutes a price ceiling when expected inflation is positive. It implies negative real rates of return, but real rates of time preference are not and cannot be negative. Given the choice, no one intends to forego present pleasure to purposefully suffer a loss later. The imperative to earn positive real returns does not end simply because the Fed and ZIRP make it more difficult. 

Anyone with funds parked in near zero-return assets, such as money market funds and certificates of deposit, earned a negative real return during the ZIRP regime, as inflation remained positive despite misplaced fears to the contrary. Those kinds of savings vehicles earn relatively low returns and should carry little risk to savers.

What are savers and retirees to do under a ZIRP regime? If they absolutely must defer consumption, they can accept the predicament and leave funds to decay in real value. They can dis-save in response to the disincentive, consuming their accumulated wealth. Some, for whom retirement is near, might even put more aside with the full knowledge that it will erode in real terms. But many will seek out yield in other ways, investing in assets bearing greater risk than they would otherwise prefer. All of these alternatives are likely to be less-preferred by the public than rates of saving and portfolios constructed in the absence of the Fed’s rate distortions.

The Fed’s policies and zero rates have contributed to inflated equity prices over the past six years as savers sought enhanced returns, and those valuations are certainly vulnerable. Over the past week, market jitters have shown the extent to which traders and investors feel threatened by the Fed’s tightening move.

The impact of ZIRP on the well-being of savers is only part of the story, however. Such a regime compromises the fundamental process of aligning preferences with the physical transformation of present resources into future consumption. Like any price distortion, ZIRP misallocates resources, but it misallocates across time and across sectors of the economy. When discounted at ultra-low rates, the values of future financial flows are grossly inflated, diminishing the need to set additional amounts aside today. At the same time, zero or near-zero rate borrowing confuses the evaluation of alternative capital investment projects. Resources may be committed to projects that would be rejected given accurate price signals. The artificially-enabled bidding for resources prompted by ZIRP, and the distortion of the risk-return trade off, might even cause more worthy projects to be rejected. And there is every reason to expect that saving by some individuals will be channeled into immediate consumption by others.

Who would do such wasteful things, undertaking projects with low or nonexistent future returns? Those facing distorted price signals, most prominently government technocrats for whom meaningful price signals are seldom a concern. And that also goes for the subsidy-hungry private beneficiaries of the state’s tax-extracted and borrowed largess. The ultimate consequence of this behavior is a deterioration in the economy’s growth potential.

Ronald-Peter Stoferle provides a short catalogue of ZIRP’s destructive impacts in the “Unseen Consequences of ZIRP“. One of his more interesting statements is the following, with reference to “zombie” banks:

“Low interest rates prevent the healthy process of creative destruction. Banks are enabled to roll over potentially non-performing loans practically indefinitely and can thus lower their write-off requirements.“

Thus, ZIRP promotes economic rot in several ways. Last week’s rate move by the Fed is a step in the right direction, away from zero rates and drastic overvaluation of consumption flows now and in the future. However, the monetary excesses of the past six years will not be reversed by this one move. The Fed is still imposing an artificial ceiling on rates. Even if that restriction is eased in further steps during 2016, the Fed is committed for the long-term to the manipulation of interest rates in the execution of policy. That sort of activist market manipulation is likely to continue; like all forms of central planning, it will be based on woefully incomplete information, a poor understanding of individual and market behavior, and bad timing. It will degrade economic conditions and have the classic boom-and-bust repercussions typical of central bank intervention.