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The Twitter Files and Political Exploitation of Social Media

07 Wednesday Dec 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Censorship, Regulation, Social Media

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Bari Weiss, Censorship, Common Carrier, Communications Decency Act, Content Moderation, Disinformation Governance Board, Elon Musk, Eugene Volokh, Fighting Words, First Amendment, Hunter Biden, In-Kind Campaign Contribution, James Baker, Mark Zuckerberg, Matt Taibbi, Michael Munger, Munger Test, Public Accompdation, Public Square, Section 230 Immunity, Social Media, Telecommunications Act, Trump-Russia Investigation, Twitter Files, Your Worst Enemy Test

I’ve been cheering for Elon Musk in his effort to remake Twitter into the kind of “public square” it always held the promise to be. He’s standing up for free expression, against one-party control of speech on social media, and especially against government efforts to control speech. That’s a great and significant thing, yet as Duke economist Michael Munger notes, we hear calls from the Biden Administration and congressional Democrats to “keep an eye on Twitter”, a not-so-veiled threat of future investigative actions or worse.

Your Worst Enemy Test, Public or Private

As a disclaimer, I submit that I’m not an unadulterated fan of Musk’s business ventures. His business models too often leverage wrong-headed government policy for profitability. It reeks of rent seeking behavior, whatever Musk’s ideals, and the availability of those rents, primarily subsidies, violates the test for good governance I discussed in my last post. That’s the Munger Test (the “Your Worst Enemy” Test), formally:

“You can only give the State power that you favor giving to your worst enemy.”

On the other hand, Musk’s release of the “Twitter Files” last weekend, with more to come, is certainly a refreshing development. Censorship at the behest of political organizations, foreign governments, or our own government are all controversial and possibly illegal. While we’d ordinarily hope to transact privately at arms length with free exchange being strictly an economic proposition, one might even apply the Munger Test to the perspective of a user of a social media platform: would you trust your worst enemy to exercise censorship on that platform on the basis of politics? Like Donald Trump? Or Chuck Schumer? If not, then you probably won’t be happy there! Now, add to that your worst enemy’s immunity to prosecution for any content they deem favorable!

Cloaked Government Censorship?

Censorship runs afoul of the First Amendment if government actors are involved. In an interesting twist in the case of the Twitter Files, the two independent journalists working with the files, Matt Taibbi and Bari Weiss, learned that some of the information had been redacted by one James Baker, Twitter’s Deputy General Counsel. Perhaps not coincidentally, Baker was also formerly General Counsel of the FBI and a key figure in the Trump-Russia investigation. Musk promptly fired Baker from Twitter over the weekend. We might see, very soon, just how coincidental Baker’s redactions were.

Mark Zuckerberg himself recently admitted that Facebook was pressured by the FBI to censor the Hunter Biden laptop story, which is a key part of the controversy underlying the Twitter Files. The Biden Administration had ambitious plans for working alongside social media on content moderation, but the Orwellian-sounding “Disinformation Governance Board” has been shelved, at least for now. Furthermore, activity performed for a political campaign may represent an impermissible in-kind campaign donation, and Twitter falsely denied to the FEC that it had worked with the Biden campaign.

Solutions?

What remedies exist for potential social media abuses of constitutionally-protected rights, or even politically-driven censorship? Elon Musk’s remaking of Twitter is a big win, of course, and market solutions now seem more realistic. Court challenges to social media firms are also possible, but there are statutory obstacles. Court challenges to the federal government are more likely to succeed (if its involvement can be proven).

The big social media firms have all adopted a fairly definitive political stance and have acted on it ruthlessly, contrary to their professed role in the provision of an open “public square”. For that reason, I have in the past supported eliminating social media’s immunity from prosecution for content posted on their networks. A cryptic jest by Musk might just refer to that very prospect:

“Anything anyone says will be used against me in a court of law.”

Or maybe not … even with the sort of immunity granted to social media platforms, the Twitter Files might implicate his own company in potential violations of law, and he seems to be okay with that.

Immunity was granted to social media platforms under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (DCA). It was something many thought “the state should do” in the 1990s in order to foster growth in the internet. And it would seem that a platform’s immunity for content shared broadly should be consistent with promoting free speech. So the issue of revoking immunity is thorny for free speech advocates.

Section 230 And Content Moderation

There have always been legal restrictions on speech related to libel and “fighting words”. In addition, the CDA, which is a part of the Telecommunications Act, restricts “obscene” or “offensive” speech and content in various ways. The problem is that social media firms seem to have used the CDA as a pretext for censoring content more generally. It’s also possible they felt as if immunity from liability made them legally impervious to objections of any sort, including aggressive political censorship and user bans on behalf of government.

The social value of granting immunity depends on the context. There are two different kinds of immunity under Section 230: subsection (c)(1) grants immunity to so-called common carriers (e.g. telephone companies) for the content of private messages or calls on their networks; subsection (c)(2) grants immunity to social media companies for content posted on their platforms as long as those companies engage in content moderation consistent with the provisions of the CDA.

Common carrier immunity is comparatively noncontroversial, but with respect to 230(c)(2), I go back to the question: would I want my worst enemy to have the power to grant this kind of immunity? Not if it meant the power to forgive political manipulation of social media content with the heavy involvement of one political party! The right to ban users is completely unlike the “must serve” legal treatment of “public accommodations” provided by most private businesses. And immunity is inconsistent with other policies. For example, if social media acts to systematically host and to amplify some viewpoints and suppress others, it suggests that they are behaving more like publishers, who are liable for material they might publish, whether produced on their own or by third-party contributors.

Still, social media firms are private companies and their user agreements generally allow them to take down content for any reason. And if content moderation decisions are colored by input from one side of the political aisle, that is within the rights of a private firm (unless its actions are held to be illegal in-kind contributions to a political campaign). Likewise, it is every consumer’s right not to join such a platform, and today there are a number of alternatives to Twitter and Facebook.

Again, political censorship exercised privately is not the worst of it. There are indications that government actors have been complicit in censorship decisions made by social media. That would be a clear violation of the First Amendment for which immunity should be out of the question. I’d probably cut a platform considerable slack, however, if they acted under threat of retaliation by government actors, if that could be proven.

Volokh’s Quid Pro Quo

Rather than simply stripping away Section 230 protection for social media firms, another solution has been suggested by Eugene Volokh in “Common Carrier Status as Quid Pro Quo for § 230(c)(1) Immunity”. He proposes the following choice for these companies:

“(1) Be common carriers like phone companies, immune from liability but also required to host all viewpoints, or

(2) be distributors like bookstores, free to pick and choose what to host but subject to liability (at least on a notice-and-takedown basis).”

Option 2 is the very solution discussed in the last section (revoke immunity). Option 1, however, would impinge on a private company’s right to moderate content in exchange for continued immunity. Said differently, the quid pro quo offers continued rents created by immunity in exchange for status as a public utility of sorts, along with limits on the private right to moderate content. Common carriers often face other regulatory rules that bear on pricing and profits, but since basic service on social media is usually free, this is probably not at issue for the time being.

Does Volokh’s quid pro quo pass the Munger Test? Well, at least it’s a choice! For social media firms to host all viewpoints isn’t nearly as draconian as the universal service obligation imposed on local phone companies and other utilities, because the marginal cost of hosting an extra social media user is negligible.

Would I give my worst enemy the power to impose this choice? The CDA would still obligate social media firms selecting Option 1 to censor obscene or offensive content. Option 2 carries greater legal risks to firms, who might respond by exercising more aggressive content moderation. The coexistence of common carriers and more content-selective hosts might create competitive pressures for restrained content moderation (within the limits of the CDA) and a better balance for users. Therefore, Volokh’s quid pro quo option seems reasonable. The only downside is whether government might interfere with social media common carriers’ future profitability or plans to price user services. Then again, if a firm could reverse its choice at some point, that might address the concern. The CDA itself might not have passed the “Worst Enemy” Munger Test, but at least within the context of established law, I think Volokh’s quid pro quo probably does.

We’ll Know More Soon

More will be revealed as new “episodes” of the Twitter Files are released. We may well hear direct evidence of government involvement in censorship decisions. If so, it will be interesting to see the fallout in terms of legal actions against government censorship, and whether support coalesces around changes in the social media regulatory environment.

Ubiquitous Guilt: EEOC Disparate Impact Liability

22 Thursday Sep 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Discrimination, Regulation

≈ 3 Comments

Tags

Antonin Scalia, Automation, Bias, Business Necessity, Chevron Deference, Christopher Rufo, Civil Rights Act, Credit Checks, Criminal Background Checks, DEI, discrimination, Disparate impact, Due Process, EEOC, Employment Practices, Equal Protection, Four-Fifths Rule, Gail Heriot, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., Major Questions Doctrine, Non-Delegation Doctrine, Protected Groups, Separation of Powers, Stakeholder Capitalism, Strength Tests, Title VII, Warren Burger, Written Job Tests

A key part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was Title VII, which dealt with employment discrimination. Title VII applied only to intentional discrimination, but it didn’t take long for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with administering Title VII, to find ways to expand the scope of its enforcement mandate under the law. The EEOC eventually managed to convince virtually all parties, including employers, employees, job applicants, attorneys, and even the courts, that the law prohibited employment practices having disparate impacts on groups protected from actual discrimination under the law. Predictably, this warped reinterpretation created severe distortions to the efficiency and fairness of labor market outcomes .

Another Rogue Agency

On the EEOC’s complete and erroneous reimagining of Title VII, Gail Heriot’s “Title VII Disparate Impact Liability Makes Almost Everything Presumptively Illegal” is a must read. Heriot is a Professor at the University of San Diego School of Law and is a member of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. This post attempts to summarize most of the important points in Heriot’s paper, so if you don’t have time for Heriot’s paper, read on. All errors are mine, of course!

Heriot provides an incredible case study on the dangers of regulatory overreach. She first discusses the EEOC’s blatant usurpation of Congressional power:

“It is hardly surprising that EEOC officials would undertake to publish answers to the questions they were hearing repeatedly…. But publishing such ‘guidances’ also had the potential to spin out of control. The temptation would always be to use them to establish what the EEOC staff wanted the law to be rather than what it was. Instead of interpreting Title VII in good faith, guidances would soon become quasi-legislation—disguised as interpretation, but in reality imposing new duties on employers not found in Title VII itself.

None of this should be surprising. It is in the nature of bureaucracy. It naturally seeks to expand its powers, often beginning by occupying niches that are otherwise unoccupied. Over time, a little power often becomes a lot of power. What is surprising is how upfront EEOC officials were about their tactics in accumulating that power.”

Having gone this far, one might be tempted to ask the EEOC what limiting principle they actually apply to determine whether various employment and hiring practices are permissible. Are level of education, industry experience, and tests of physical and cognitive faculties verboten? The answer that is there is no consistent, limiting principle. Instead, Heriot says the EEOC “picks its battles” (see below). She also describes the EEOC’s adoption of a so-called “four-fifths rule”, which is about as arbitrary as it gets. It means the EEOC will challenge an employment practice only if it leads to a selection of any protected group at a rate less than 80% of the most-selected group. That is, the “disparate impact” must be less than 20% to rule out a challenge. This rule appears nowhere in Title VII.

Job Qualifications? You’re Guilty!

Unfortunately, as Heriot takes pains to demonstrate, it’s virtually impossible to identify a hiring guideline or method of employee assessment that does not have a disparate impact. The examples she provides on pp. 34 – 37 of her paper, and on p. 40, are convincing. Furthermore, the EEOC’s “four-fifths” rule hardly narrows the potential for challenge at all.

“Selection rates of less than four-fifths relative to the group with the highest rate are extremely common. Just as everything or nearly everything has a disparate impact, everything or nearly everything has a selection rate that fails the ‘four fifths rule’ for some race, color, religion, sex, or national origin group.”

So the EEOC is allowed to operate with tremendous discretion. Again, Heriot says the agency “picks its battles”, focusing on challenges to screening tools like “written tests, physical strength and endurance tests, criminal background tests [sic], high school diploma requirements, personal credit histories, residency requirements, and a few others.”

This regulatory environment encourages employers to keep job requirements vague, sometimes to the point at which potential applicants might not be sure what the job qualifications really are, or exactly what the job function entails. One upshot is that this makes it harder to detect and prove actual discrimination, and it often leads to more arbitrary decisions by hiring managers, which may, in fact, involve real discrimination, including nepotism and/or cronyism.

Unbiased Intent Doesn’t Matter

Heriot points to a disastrous decision by the Supreme Court that, perhaps unintentionally, helped legitimize the concept of disparate impact as legal doctrine, and as a valid cause of action by plaintiffs against employers. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), the Court rejected the premise that an employer’s innocence with respect to their intent to discriminate was an inadequate defense of an employment practice that had adverse consequences to a protected group. Heriot quotes the opinion of Chief Justice Warren Burger:

“… good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem…. Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.”

It’s as if the Court convinced itself that adverse consequences prove actual discrimination, even when there is no intent to discriminate. The Court also emphasized that it’s decision was based on “general deference” to the EEOC! And this was years before the unfortunate Chevron Doctrine (judicial deference to administrative agencies on interpretation of law) was formally established by the Court. Heriot and others assert that the decision in Griggs would have astonished the authors of Title VII.

Heriot also discusses changes in the treatment of “business necessity” as a defense against complaints of disparate impact. It is generally the employer’s burden to show the “necessity” of a challenged hiring practice. “Necessity” was the subject of several Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s and 1980s, but the Court stopped short of requiring an employer to show that a practice was “essential”. In one case, the court shifted some of the burden back onto the plaintiff to show that a practiced lacked necessity. In 1990, there was concern in the Bush Administration and Congress that the difficulty of proving business necessity would eventually lead to the adoption of racial quotas by employers in order to prevent EEOC challenges, though the authors of Title VII had staunchly opposed quotas. While the original hope was that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would resolve questions about “business necessity” and the burden of proof, it did not. Instead, it can be said that it legitimized disparate impact liability, with conditions. The standard for proving necessity, based on Court decisions, evolved to become more strict with time. There are cases in which courts seem to have left the EEOC to define “business necessity”, as if the EEOC would be in a better position to do that than the business itself!

Inviting Discrimination

Heriot devotes part of her paper to the perverse effects of disparate impact. When employers are faced with prohibitions or the threat of action against a certain practice, whether it be tests of aptitude, strength, or screening on criminal or credit records, they may abandon those devices and opt instead for “informal” proxies. The use of proxies, however, often leads to instances of actual discrimination, whether born of conscious or unconscious bias on the part of hiring managers.

Heriot provides a number of examples of the proxy phenomenon, some of which have been confirmed by empirical research. For example, an employer interviewing candidates for a job that requires math proficiency might reasonably use a test of math skill as a key criterion. If such a test is prohibited, the hiring manager might be tempted to hire an Asian candidate, since Asians have a reputation for good math skills. Similarly, an applicant of West European ancestry might be favored for a position requiring excellent grammar skills, absent the ability to explicitly test grammatical skill. Candidates for a job requiring a certain level of physical strength could be evaluated by various tests of strength, but barring that, a hiring manager might be inclined to hire based on gender.

When criminal background checks are prohibited, employers might be tempted to use proxies such as gender and race as a substitute. Likewise, if it’s forbidden to check a candidate’s credit record to gauge reliability, other proxies might lead to discrimination against members of protected classes. Needless to say, these kinds of outcomes are precisely the opposite of what the EEOC hopes to achieve.

As Heriot further notes, the outcomes can be much systematic and destructive than a bit of one-off discrimination in hiring, promotion, pay raises, or task assignment. These may inflict damage reaching well beyond having the wrong people gaining favorable labor market outcomes. For example, an employer might choose to relocate operations to a “safer” or more affluent community, barring an ability to perform criminal background or credit checks. Or businesses might decide to substitute capital for labor, given the interference in their attempts to identify the best job candidates. The difficulty in screening also creates an incentive to automate, just as premature automation is becoming more common with rising wage floors imposed by government.

Killing Jobs and Competition

Like many forms of regulation, however, large firms in less competitive industries are usually better positioned to survive EEOC scrutiny than smaller firms in competitive markets. Indeed, we often see large market players embrace regulation because it gives them a competitive advantage over smaller rivals. In this case, we see large firms adopting their own diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) goals. This is not solely related to the threat of EEOC challenges, however. Private lawsuits alleging discrimination or disparate impact are also a concern, as is pleasing activists inside and outside the company. Nevertheless, as Christopher Rufo reveals, there is growing push-back against the corporate DEI regime. Let’s hope it continues to gain traction.

Unconstitutional Executive Discretion

Heriot also dedicates part of her paper to constitutional issues related to the EEOC’s broad discretion in the application of disparate impact to employment practices. For one thing, disparate impact is a direct source of discrimination: when members of “protected groups” are awarded opportunities based on the possibility of disparate statistical outcomes, it means the majority candidates are denied those opportunities, no matter their qualifications. This is outright discrimination, and it’s instigation by a federal agency constitutes an explicit denial of equal protection under the law.

It should be no surprise that many consider disparate impact actions against employers to be denials of due process. Furthermore, when a federal agency like the EEOC exercises broad discretion, the so-called non-delegation doctrine should come into play. That is, the EEOC makes judgements on matters that are not necessarily authorized Congress. Thus, there are legitimate questions as to whether the EEOC’s discretion is a violation of the separation of powers. Granted, the courts have long deferred to administrative agencies in the interpretation of enabling statutes, but the Supreme Court has taken a new tack under Chief Justice Roberts. In some recent decisions, the Court has relied on a new “major questions” doctrine to place certain limits on executive discretion.

Conclusion

Hiring? Creating jobs? Better not get picky about checking your applicants’ skills and backgrounds or you risk liability for contributing to the statistical malaise of one, or of many, protected groups. That’s how it is under “disparate impact” rules imposed by the EEOC. The success of your business be damned!

Gail Heriot’s excellent paper details the way in which the EEOC transformed the meaning of its enabling legislation, expanding its reign over employment practices across the nation. She demonstrates the breadth of disparate impact rules with examples showing that virtually any attempt at systematic screening of job applicants can be held to be illegal. Your intent to hire the most qualified candidate without bias doesn’t matter, under an insane Supreme Court decision that buttressed the EEOC’s authority. As Heriot says, “… everything is presumptively illegal”. She also describes how disparate impact liability leads to employment decisions based on proxy criteria, which often lead to actual (even if unintended) discrimination. Further unintended consequences are the possibility of larger job losses in minority communities and less competition in product and labor markets. Finally, Heriot delineates several constitutional violations inherent in broad EEOC discretion and the enforcement of disparate impact.

One day a court challenge to the EEOC and disparate impact liability might rise to the level of the Supreme Court. Justice Antonin Scalia expected it, but it still hasn’t come before the Court. It should! Another way to do battle against the EEOC’s scourge is to challenge corporations who cow-tow to activists and to the EEOC with their own DEI initiatives. This manifestation of stakeholder capitalism is a cancer on the wealth and productivity of the U.S. economy, resting side-by-side with disparate impact liability.

TikTok Tax: The Heavy Wants a Cut

05 Wednesday Aug 2020

Posted by Nuetzel in Industrial Policy, Regulation, Trump Administration

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Tags

AOC, Barack Obama, CCP, Chinese Communist Party, Coyote Blog, Cronyism, Donald Trump, Hong Kong, Larry Kudlow, Likee, Microsoft, Muslim Uighurs, Peter Navarro, Regulatory State, statism, Steve Bannon, Taiwan, TikTok, Varney & Co, Video Sharing, Warren Meyer

I have a certain ambivalence toward Donald Trump, and I could go on and on about why it’s so “complicated” for me. One thing for which I’ve credited the Trump Administration is its effort to “deconstruct the administrative state”, as Steve Bannon so aptly put it shortly after the 2016 election. Of course, the progress thus far hasn’t always lived up to my hopes, but the effort to deregulate continues. And after all, the regulatory state is deeply entrenched and difficult to uproot.

Then my eyes glazed over as Trump floated an idea so bad, an intervention so awful, that I can hardly gather it in! It has to do with TikTok, the Chinese video sharing service that has gained popularity worldwide. Crazy as this might sound, it’s not so much Trump’s threat to shut down TikTok’s U.S. operations. Like most libertarians, I’d find that appalling in and of itself, except for the legitimate data security issues at stake. The company’s ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are a national security concern and an ethical blot on the company, given the CCP’s brutal treatment of Muslim Uighurs, its roughshod treatment of Hong Kong, and its threats to Taiwan. In any case, at least Trump said he’s amenable to a sale of the company’s U.S. operations to a domestic firm. Several large tech firms have expressed strong interest, including Microsoft. So, while any government imposed shutdown or forced sale makes me squirm, it’s not my main issue here.

What really stunned me was to hear Trump say the U.S. Treasury must get a cut of the deal! This is “Hall-of-Fame” statism. Where in the hell does the U.S. government get a legitimate financial claim to the value of any private business that changes hands? Well, Trump seems to think the federal government is adding value as the heavy:

“But if you buy [TicTok], the United States, which is making it possible to buy, because without us they can’t do anything, should be compensated.”

Yes, the buyer would be the beneficiary of a shakedown, and the demand is another poke in the eye to the Chinese. Of course, it might well threaten the transaction, and I’m not even sure it’s in Trump’s interest politically. But that’s not even the worst of it: as Warren Meyer explains, it would be hard to think of a better way to weaponize financial regulation than having the Treasury at the bargaining table in private negotiations for corporate control:

“Already there are too many regulatory hurdles to doing about anything, and Trump wants agencies to use regulatory approvals to hold up corporations for payments. And you can be sure this is a precedent the Democrats will be only too happy to latch onto — want a pipeline built, where’s our vig? Who wants [this to be] the first Trump decision AOC comes out in support of? The Republican Party sure has come a long way in my lifetime.”

The Left would certainly love to exercise this kind of coercion as a revenue source, as a cudgel of industrial policy to wield against disfavored firms and industries, and as a way to favor cronies. It’s a ready extension of Barack Obama’s deranged “You-didn’t-build-that” theme.

Is this one of trade advisor Peter Navarro‘s brainstorms? I was relieved to see Trump economic advisor Larry Kudlow cast some doubt on whether the government would follow through on Trump’s idea:

“‘I don’t know if that’s a key stipulation. …. A lot of options here,’ Kudlow told ‘Varney & Co.’ on Tuesday. ‘Not sure it’s a specific concept that will be followed through.’“

I think Trump would really like to kill TikTok. Maybe his grudge is driven in part by the presumptive role that TikTok played in his under-attended Tulsa rally. But there are domestic competitors to TikTok, so consumers will have alternatives. The most popular of those seems to be another Chinese app called Likee. In any case, downloads of other video sharing apps have spiked over the past few weeks. If Trump’s real aim is simply to shut down TikTok in the U.S., I’d almost rather see him do that than start making a practice of horse trading with cronies over shares of corporate booty.

Left’s Pandemic Response: Politics As Usual

17 Tuesday Mar 2020

Posted by Nuetzel in Health Care, Pandemic, Regulation

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

Biodefense, Breitbart.com, CDC, Centers for Disease Control, Coronavirus, ebola, FDA, Glenn Reynolds, Infectious Diseases, John Bolton, Legal Insurrection, Leslie Eastman, Nancy Pelosi, National Biodefense Strategy, National Security Council, NSC, Pandemic Response Team, Richard Goldberg, Ronald Bailey, Ronna McDaniel, Tim Morrison

The Left asserts that President Trump dismissed and dismantled the nation’s Pandemic Response Team. That’s bullshit. So is the claim that the CDC was defunded. The news media and certain pundits have helped to feed this narrative. Or, as Glenn Reynolds calls those pundits, “Democrat operatives with bylines”.

First of all, the team in question was not at the CDC, a fact that hasn’t always been clear from the commentary on this issue. It was a team of White House overseers at the National Security Council’s “Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense”. What happened was this: the senior director of that team resigned after John Bolton was appointed to head the NSC. Bolton might have wanted him out, but what we know is the director resigned. Subsequently, that team was folded into another directorate as part of an long-overdue consolidation. Health experts from the team remain on the NSC staff today. Yet Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-OH)—and many others since—had the temerity to charge that Trump had fired “the entire Whilte House pandemic team”. Well, at least he didn’t imply that it was the CDC.

Tim Morrison wrote the following in the Washington Post yesterday:

“Because I led the very directorate assigned that mission, the counterproliferation and biodefense office, for a year and then handed it off to another official who still holds the post, I know the charge is specious. …

When I joined the National Security Council staff in 2018, I inherited a strong and skilled staff in the counterproliferation and biodefense directorate. This team of national experts together drafted the National Biodefense Strategy of 2018 and an accompanying national security presidential memorandum to implement it; an executive order to modernize influenza vaccines; and coordinated the United States’ response to the Ebola epidemic in Congo, which was ultimately defeated in 2020.”

This assessment at Brietbart.com quotes former senior NSC official Richard Goldberg:

“Weird. A year later I was inside the NSC working with talented global health/biodefense professionals who coordinated an incredibly effective response to Ebola. They’re still there. Working hard. On #Covid_19.”

It’s true that Bolton sought to eliminate red tape, duplication, and bureaucracy within the NSC, and that was wholly justified. According to Morrison, the NSC staff quadrupled from the 1990s through the second Obama term. Pandemics are supposed to be the CDC’s purview, but the proliferation of administrative layers is what happens as government grows uncontrollably. Leslie Eastman at Legal Insurrection questions whether the U.S. needs a permanent “Pandemic Response Team” in the White House. She quotes GOP Chairwoman Ronna McDaniel:

“JAN 7: CDC established a coronavirus incident management system, two days before China announced the outbreak. … Pelosi began Week 3 of withholding her sham impeachment articles. 

JAN 21: The CDC activated its emergency operations center to provide ongoing support to confront coronavirus. …What were Congressional Democrats focused on? Writing their opening arguments for their bogus impeachment trial.”

Well, bully for the CDC. As for “defunding the CDC”, the facts are this: the proposed budget submitted to Congress by the Trump Administration in February, but never passed, did indeed include cuts to the CDC’s budget, which has grown over the years as it expanded its mission from fighting infectious diseases to matters like obesity, racism, and questions of social justice. The cuts proposed by Trump, however, were primarily to state grants. Actually, the proposal called for increased CDC staffing, and it funded all programs related to infectious diseases. But no matter, because that proposal is unlikely to become part of any appropriations bill that would pass Congress.

True to form, the Left plays politics in the middle of a national crisis. When the Trump Administration told airlines that it was considering banning flights from China in late January, it was called racist. Now, of course, he hasn’t done enough. A huge irony, however, is that Trump’s biggest mistake was in trusting the FDA and the CDC’s authority to develop and regulate testing for the coronavirus. They botched it. In a classic case of over-regulation, they prohibited hospitals and labs from conducting tests developed privately or by academic researchers, insisting that everyone wait for the “approved” test to be distributed. Then, the test they released in early February was flawed, costing additional weeks before testing was available.

 

EPA Concedes Puddles, Ditches to Owners

30 Thursday Jan 2020

Posted by Nuetzel in Environment, Federalism, Regulation

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Tags

Anthony K Francois, Christian Britschgi, Clean Water Act, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, Federalism, Interstate Waters, Jonathan Adler, Navigable Waters Protection Rule, Obama administration, Property and Environment Research Center, Reason.com, Trump Administration, Waters of the United States, WOTUS

Those who like their government served-up intrusive are reacting hysterically to the Environmental Protection Agency’s new Navigable Waters Protection Rule, which forbids the federal government from regulating waters that are not interstate waters or waters that aren’t or cannot be used in any way related to interstate commerce. The federal government will no longer have jurisdiction over normally dry, “ephemeral”  creek beds, private lakes and ponds unconnected to interstate waters, and most ground areas where rainwater pools, such as ditches on private property. This is a very good thing!

The emphasis of the new rule on interstate waters hews more closely to the constitutional limits of federal power than did the rescinded rule that had been imposed by the Obama Administration in 2015, which some called the Waters of the United States (WOTUS) rule (really an interpretation of “navigable waters”, or WOTUS as defined by the 1972 Clean Water Act). Christian Britschgi writes at Reason.com:

“The Obama-era rule was controversial from the get-go, with multiple Red states filing legal challenges claiming it exceeded the federal government’s authority to regulate water pollution. A slew of federal court rulings stayed the implementation of the rule in over half the states.”

Some of the straightforward differences between the new rule and WOTUS were mentioned above, but Anthony K. Francois of the Property and Environment Research Center gets into a bit more detail in his nice summary of these changes in federal authority.

In many cases, state and local governments already have regulatory authority over waters placed off-limits to the EPA. In fact, as Jonathan Adler wrote last summer, some of those state regulations are more stringent than the federal oversight now rescinded. That flies in the face of assertions by activists that states will be patsies in their dealings with property owners (the activists would call them “polluters”). So those who claim that the new rule will cause damage to the environment are really saying they only trust the EPA’s authority in these matters. They are also saying that no private citizen who owns property should be presumed to have rights over the industrial, commercial, or residential use of that property without review by the federal government. Under WOTUS, this represented such a severe abrogation of rights that it interfered with both productive activity and private enjoyment, not to mention the considerable confusion and costly litigation it prompted.

Weighing the costs and benefits of regulatory actions is a difficult undertaking. However, it is far too easy for regulators, with an imbalance of coercive power in their favor, to impose costly standards in locales where there may be little or no net benefit, and where individual property owners have no recourse. Regulators get no reward for protecting individual liberty and property rights, which skews their view of the tradeoff against potential environmental damage. Federal regulatory power is best kept within strict limits. The same goes for state and local regulatory power, but authority at those levels is at least more accountable to local interests on behalf of consumer, business and environmental concerns.

Regulation, Crowding Out, and Malformed Capital

19 Saturday Oct 2019

Posted by Nuetzel in Big Government, Regulation

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Bentley Coffey, Compliance Costs, Congressional Budget Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Conversable Economist, crowding out, Gold Plating, James Whitford, Kieth Carlson, Mandated Investment, Mercatus Center, Patrick A. McLaughlin, Pietro Peretto, Real Clear Markets, Regulatory Burden, Regulatory State, Return on Capital, Robert Higgs, Roger Spencer, Susan E. Dudley, Timothy Taylor, Tyler Richards, Wayne Brough, Zero-Sum Economics

Expanding regulation of the private sector is perhaps the most pernicious manifestation of “crowding out”, a euphemism for the displacement of private activity by government activity. The idea that government “crowds out” private action, or that government budget deficits “crowd out” private investment, has been debated for many years: government borrowing competes with private demand to fund investment projects, bidding interest rates and the cost of capital upward, thus reducing business investment, capital intensity, and the economy’s productive capacity. Taxes certainly discourage capital investment as well. That is the traditional fiscal analysis of the problem.

The more fundamental point is that as government competes for resources and absorbs more resources, whether financed by borrowing or taxation, fewer resources remain available for private activity, particularly if government is less price-sensitive than private-sector buyers.

Is It In the Data?

Is crowding out really an issue? Private net fixed investment spending, which represents the dollar value of additions to the physical stock of private capital (and excludes investments that merely replace worn out capital), has declined relative to GDP over many decades, as the first chart below shows. The second chart shows that meanwhile, the share of GDP dedicated to government spending (at all levels) has grown, but with less consistency: it backtracked in the 1990s, rebounded during the early years of the Bush Administration, and jumped significantly during the Great Recession before settling at roughly the highs of the 1980s and early 1990s. The short term fluctuations in both of these series can be described as cyclical, but there is certainly an inverse association in both the short-term fluctuations and the long-term trends in the two charts. That is suggestive but far from dispositive.

Timothy Taylor noted several years ago that the magnitude of crowding out from budget deficits could be substantial, based on a report from the Congressional Budget Office. That is consistent with many of the short-term and long-term co-movements in the charts above, but the explanation may be incomplete.

Regulatory Crowding Out

Regulatory dislocation is not the mechanism traditionally discussed in the context of crowding out, but it probably exacerbates the phenomenon and changes its complexion. To the extent that growth in government is associated with increased regulation, this form of crowding out discourages private capital formation for wholly different reasons than in the traditional analysis. It also encourages malformation — either non-productive or misallocated capital deployment.

I acknowledge that regulation may be necessary in some areas, and it is reasonable to assert that voters demand regulation of certain activities. However, the regulatory state has assumed such huge proportions that it often seems beyond the reach of higher authorities within the executive branch, not to mention other branches of government. Regulations typically grow well beyond their original legislative mandates, and challenges by parties to regulatory actions are handled in a separate judicial system by administrative law judges employed by the very regulatory agencies under challenge!

Measures of regulation and the regulatory burden have generally increased over the years with few interruptions. As a budgetary matter, regulation itself is costly. Robert Higgs says that not only has regulation been expanding for many years, the growth of government spending and regulation have frequently had common drivers, such as major wars, the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the financial crisis and Great Recession of the 2000s. In all of these cases, the size of government ratcheted upward in tandem with major new regulatory programs, but the regulatory programs never seem to ratchet downward.

While government competes with the private sector for financial capital, its regulatory actions reduce the expected rewards associated with private investment projects. In other words, intrusive regulation may reduce the private demand for financial capital. Assuming there is no change in the taxation of suppliers of financing, we have a “coincidence” between an increase in the demand for capital by government and a decrease in the demand for capital by business owing to regulatory intrusions. The impact on interest rates is ambiguous, but the long-run impact on the economy’s growth is negative, as in the traditional case. In addition, there may be a reallocation of the capital remaining available from more regulated to less regulated firms.

The Costs of Regulation

Regulation imposes all sorts of compliance costs on consumers and businesses, infringing on many erstwhile private areas of decision-making. The Mercatus Center, a think tank on regulatory matters based at George Mason University, issued a 2016 report on “The Cumulative Cost of Regulations“, by Bentley Coffey, Patrick A. McLaughlin, and Pietro Peretto. It concluded in part:

“… the effect of government intervention on economic growth is not simply the sum of static costs associated with individual interventions. Instead, the deterrent effect that intervention can have on knowledge growth and accumulation can induce considerable deceleration to an economy’s growth rate. Our results suggest that regulation has been a considerable drag on economic growth in the United States, on the order of 0.8 percentage points per year. Our counterfactual simulation predicts that the economy would have been about 25 percent larger than it was in 2012 if regulations had been frozen at levels observed in 1980. The difference between observed and counterfactually simulated GDP in 2012 is about $4 trillion, or $13,000 per capita.”

In another Mercatus Center post, Tyler Richards discusses the link between declining “business dynamism” and growth in regulation and lobbying activity. Richards measures dynamism by the rate of entry into industries with relatively high profit potential. This is consistent with the notion that regulation diminishes the rewards and demand for private capital, thus crowding out productive investment.

Regulation, Rent Seeking, and Misallocation

Some forms of regulation entail mandates or incentives for more private investment in specific forms of physical capital. Of course, that’s no consolation if those investments happen to be less productive than projects that would have been chosen freely in the pursuit of profit. This often characterizes mandates for alternative energy sources, for example, and mandated investments in worker safety that deliver negligible reductions in workplace injuries. Some forms of regulation attempt to assure a particular rate of return to the regulated firm, but this may encourage non-productive investment by incenting managers to “gold plate” facilities to capture additional cash flows.

Regulations may, of course, benefit the regulated in certain ways, such as burdening weaker competitors. If this makes the economy less competitive by driving weak firms out of existence, surviving firms may have less incentive to invest in their physical capital. But far worse is the incentive created by the regulatory state to invest in political and administrative influence. That’s the thrust of an essay by Wayne Brough in Real Clear Markets: “Political Entrepreneurs Are Crowding Out the Entrepreneurs“. The possibility of garnering regulations favorable to a firm reinforces  the destructive focus on zero-sum outcomes, as I’ve gone to pains to point out on this blog.

Crowding out takes still other forms: the growth of the welfare state and regulatory burdens tend to displace private institutions traditionally seeking to improve the lives of the poor and disenfranchised. It also disrupts incentives to work and to seek help through those private aid organizations. That is a subject addressed by James Whitford in “Crowding Out Compassion“.

Just Stop It!

President Trump has made some progress in slowing the regulatory trend. One example of the Administration’s efforts is the two-year-old Trump executive order demanding that two regulatory rules be eliminated for each new rule. Thus far, many of the discarded regulations had become obsolete for one reason or another, so this is a clean-up long overdue. Other inventive efforts at reform include moving certain agency offices out of the Washington DC area to locales more central to their “constituencies”, which inevitably would mean attrition from the ranks of agency employees and with any luck, less rule-making. The judicial branch may also play a role in defanging the bureaucracy, like this case involving the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau now before the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, tariffs represent taxation of consumers and firms who use foreign goods as inputs, so Trump’s actions on the regulatory front aren’t all positive.

Conclusion

The traditional macroeconomic view of crowding out involves competition for funds between government and private borrowers, higher borrowing costs, and reduced private investment in productive capital. The phenomenon can be couched more broadly in terms of competition for a wide variety of goods and services, including labor, leaving less available for private production and consumption. The growth of the regulatory state provides another piece of the crowding-out puzzle. Regulation imposes significant costs on private parties, including small businesses that can ill-afford compliance. The web of rules and reporting requirements can destroy the return on private capital investment. To the extent that regulation reduces the demand for financing, interest rates might not come under much upward pressure, as the traditional view would hold. But either way, it’s bad news, especially when the regulatory state seems increasingly unaccountable to the normal checks and balances enshrined in our Constitution.

Amazon, Happy Users Face Lust for Antitrust

02 Thursday May 2019

Posted by Nuetzel in Antitrust, Capitalism, Regulation

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Amazon, Amazon Marketplace, Apple, e-Commerce, eBay, Elizabeth Warren, Home Depot, Jeff Bezos, Lina M. Kahn, Market Concentration, monopoly, Monopsony, Predatory Pricing, QVC, Was Mart, Wayfair

It’s almost always best to resist the temptation to “fix” perceived market failures, perceptions that are often incorrect to begin with. An equivalent truism is that government intervention in any market will almost always damage outcomes for consumers and producers alike. So it is with ill-advised calls to bring antitrust action against Amazon. Elizabeth Warren is a prominent voice among the would-be meddlers. She tells the story of a hypothetical pillow manufacturer reliant on sales through Amazon’s platform. But alas, the small company is squeezed out of its market because Amazon gives its own brand of pillows superior placement and pricing. Is this a clear case of anti-competitive behavior? And if so, what’s to be done?

In this Yale Law Journal article Lina M. Kahn asserts that there is an antitrust case against Amazon. From the abstract:

“We cannot cognize the potential harms to competition posed by Amazon’s dominance if we measure competition primarily through price and output. Specifically, current doctrine underappreciates the risk of predatory pricing and how integration across distinct business lines may prove anticompetitive. These concerns are heightened in the context of online platforms for two reasons. First, the economics of platform markets create incentives for a company to pursue growth over profits, a strategy that investors have rewarded. Under these conditions, predatory pricing becomes highly rational—even as existing doctrine treats it as irrational and therefore implausible. Second, because online platforms serve as critical intermediaries, integrating across business lines positions these platforms to control the essential infrastructure on which their rivals depend. This dual role also enables a platform to exploit information collected on companies using its services to undermine them as competitors.”

A basic argument against anti-trust action is that the retail market and e-commerce market are not as concentrated as Kahn and Warren suggest. Amazon’s share of U.S. retail sales was an estimated 5% in 2018, but its share of e-commerce is the more worrisome to modern-day trust busters: Amazon is estimated to have controlled about 49% of U.S. online sales in 2018.

Obviously 49% is not close to monopolization, but the company is far ahead of other on-line rivals: eBay’s share was slightly less than 7%; Apple and Walmart each had less than 4%, and an assortment of sellers such as Home Depot, QVC and Wayfair, had shares of 1.5% share or less. The point is, however, that there are prominent rivals, some with aggressive plans to compete in the space. For example, apart from its traditional auction model, eBay is instituting a number of changes to its platform and offerings that it hopes will help it to compete with Amazon, some of which are very much like the practices for which Amazon is now criticized, such as preferential placement for big advertisers. Wal Mart is investing heavily in an effort to expand its online sales.

Companies like these rivals have the resources and access to capital to pose a legitimate threat to Amazon’s online dominance. That sort of competitive pressure, or even its mere possibility, imposes a far more effective form of market discipline than government regulators can hope to achieve, assuming they wouldn’t break the market. The governance imposed by the market itself keeps the focus squarely on bringing value to customers, which for Amazon means both buyers and third-party sellers. And while Amazon’s business model and platform are highly successful, no one, including Amazon management, can anticipate the shape of new technological developments that could lead to the next revolution in retail. Again, there are potent incentives for those who might be in a position to foment such a revolution.

But what about those sellers who rely so heavily on Amazon’s platform? Does Amazon exercise monopsony power to the detriment of these sellers, as Kahn and Warren contend? Again, sellers have alternatives. While it might be a burden for the smallest startups to compete on several different platforms, they do have choices. Therefore, the monopsony story just doesn’t hold up. Amazon has a large marketplace precisely because so many third-party sellers have chosen to compete there. But they can compete elsewhere.

If barriers to entry are created by Amazon’s platform management, it would involve a loss of revenue earned from hosting third-party sellers and create market opportunities for competitive platforms. The same can be said of “predatory placement” of Amazon’s own first-party product offerings. This practice bears a similarity to grocery stores giving preferred placement to certain brands in exchange for fees, which allow grocers to offer those products at lower prices. Indeed, few if any grocery stores carry all national brands, but those brands are usually available at competing stores. If anything, it would seem that getting a product listed on an online platform is relatively easy compared to getting space on grocery shelves, though like grocery brands, preferred placement is another matter. Building a brand has never been easy, and it may be necessary for less established products to be marketed on multiple platforms, including platforms based on auction models.

It would be very difficult to prove that Amazon engages in predatory pricing of their own offerings (also see here). That involves pricing below cost (including the loss of revenue from third-party sellers). Amazon might practice what has been described as loss leadership: offering products below cost from time-to-time in oder to spur sales of other products, which is a time-honored marketing tradition. The following quote, taken from the first link in this paragraph, is from a judge in a recent price fixing case involving Apple and Amazon:

“… the Complaint asserts that Amazon’s e-books business was ‘consistently profitable.’ Moreover, to hold a competitor liable for predatory pricing under the Sherman Act, one must prove more than simply pricing ‘below an appropriate measure of . . . costs.’ There must also be a ‘dangerous probability’ that the alleged predator will ‘recoup its investment in below-cost prices’ in the future. None of the comments demonstrate that either condition for predatory pricing by Amazon existed or will likely exist. Indeed, while the comments complain that Amazon’s $9.99 price for newly-released and bestselling e-books was ‘predatory,’ none of them attempts to show that Amazon’s e-book prices as a whole were below its marginal costs.” 

The basic considerations discussed above are couched in terms of traditional anti-trust thinking: monopoly, concentration, competitive threats, and predatory pricing. However, there is another, more fundamental point to be made: Amazon’s massive success is due precisely to the popularity of their platform as well as service to consumers and third-party sellers. That’s capitalism, baby! Does Amazon extract a price from users? Yes, it engages in mutually beneficial trade! If it tries to extract too much, it will suffer at its own hands by creating market opportunities for others. It is Amazon’s platform, asset, and private property. The Amazon Marketplace belongs to Amazon, and the company is free to manage it as shareholders allow. There is no social value in interfering with private property and voluntary arrangements that bring unambiguous benefits to customers on both sides of the transactions sponsored on the platform. Such interference would diminish those benefits and destroy private value belonging to Amazon shareholders.

Jeff Bezos’ recent letter to Amazon shareholders tells of third-party sellers “kicking our first-part butt.” Amazon’s total sales have grown fast over the past two decades, and while its sales in first-party transactions have grown at a robust 20% a year, third-party sales on the platform have grown at a rate of 52%! The last link provides this Bezos quote:

“Why did independent sellers do so much better selling on Amazon than they did on eBay? And why were independent sellers able to grow so much faster than Amazon’s own highly organized first-party sales organization? There isn’t one answer, but we do know one extremely important part of the answer: We helped independent sellers compete against our first-party business by investing in and offering them the very best selling tools we could imagine and build.”

Bezos also tells of the heavy investments Amazon makes in efforts to improve its platform, which have brought tremendous successes and a few noteworthy failures. His letter is obviously self-serving, both as an effort to engage shareholders and as an implicit appeal against anti-trust action. Nevertheless, it is hard to deny the company’s outstanding performance, the benefits it brings to the consuming public, and the opportunities it creates for enterprising sellers and entrepreneurs. The unfortunate fact is we must always be vigilant for the itchy fingers of leftists grasping for the value created by private effort.

Closing “Nonessential” Government

19 Saturday Jan 2019

Posted by Nuetzel in Big Government, Regulation, Uncategorized

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Adam Brandon, Border Wall, Council of Economic Advisors, Deep State, Federal Compensation, Government Output, Government Shutdown, John Tamny, Matthew Walther, Nonessential Functions, Reductions in Force

Contrary to the cartoon above, it’s not back up and running, though tax withholding and the impacts of regulatory rules continue unabated, and almost assuredly surveillance as well. After all (!), the federal government shutdown affects only “nonessential” activities of the federal government. Federal workers who are furloughed will receive back pay when the partial shutdown ends, but for now, federal spending is down roughly 25%.

The very real inconveniences for furloughed workers are regrettable. TSA employees continue to work while their paychecks are deferred indefinitely, though rates of absenteeism are high. So, we have slowdowns in security lines at airports, a lack of services at national parks (at least those not managed by private firms collecting revenue from visitors on-site), and a variety of other disruptions. For the time being, however, the lives of most Americans are largely unaffected. Except for the news coverage, my life hasn’t changed in any way, though I haven’t traveled during the shutdown.

Unfounded rumors about the shutdown have been rampant. For instance, I’ve heard that Social Security checks and weather forecasts would be suspended. Nancy Pelosi said the Secret Service would be unable to protect the President at the State of the Union address in the House chamber, a statement which the Department of Homeland Security promptly refuted. Many of the federal agencies with the highest shares of furloughed employees are regulators whose services are arguably counter-productive.

The White House Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) estimates that each additional week of the shutdown will reduce first quarter GDP growth by 0.13%. That means the interruption would take about 0.5% off first quarter growth if it lasts through January (say, from an annual rate of 2.5% to 2.0%). To the extent that people view the shutdown as temporary, and most do, the so-called “multiplier effects” of the shutdown should be relatively minor.

GDP is intended to measure of the value of the economy’s physical output. It is calculated in two independent ways based on 1) all income earned, and 2) the total of all spending on final (not intermediate) goods and services. Most components of final spending are well defined by the values assigned to goods and services traded in markets. Likewise, most incomes are based on the value assigned by labor markets to a given productive effort. Government “output”, however, is rather suspect as a component of spending because it is generally not subject to a market test of value. On the income side of the ledger, do government workers produce actual outputs? Some do, of course, but those outputs cannot be measured except by assigning a value based on what the workers are paid, and the payer is spending other peoples’ money! It’s not too speculative to suggest that the government’s output is a fraction of its spending. If that’s the case, the actual reduction in output caused by the shutdown is much smaller than the measured reduction in GDP. Therefore, the CEA’s estimates are a fiction.

To put an even finer point on it, many nonessential functions absorb resources while contributing very little to the nation’s wealth. Adam Brandon and John Tamny assert that private economic growth gives us the luxury of a large government sector, not the other way around. Government absorbs resources when it spends, but only by virtue of the taxes it imposes on private activity that is otherwise more highly productive. In the long run, as Brandon and Tamny argue, a smaller government (given a permanent shutdown of certain functions) might well yield greater economic output, not less.

Read this interesting essay for a discussion of the wasted, even counterproductive, utilization of human resources in government:

“They do nothing that warrants punishment and nothing of external value. That is their workday: errands for the sake of errands — administering, refining, following and collaborating on process. ‘Process is your friend’ is what delusional civil servants tell themselves. Even senior officials must gain approval from every rank across their department, other agencies and work units for basic administrative chores.

Process is what we serve, process keeps us safe, process is our core value. It takes a lot of people to maintain the process. Process provides jobs. In fact, there are process experts and certified process managers who protect the process. Then there are the 5 percent with moxie (career managers).

Again, many and perhaps most Americans view the shutdown itself with a certain degree of cynicism. In “America’s shutdown indifference“, Matthew Walther recalls this entertaining aspect of the last shutdown under President Obama:

“…of barriers being erected around various D.C.-area landmarks, including open-air war memorials. To this day I cannot think of any good reason for this save sheer caprice. If the idea was that 550-foot obelisks made of granite simply could not be meaningfully serviced during those lean two weeks in 2013, then who was responsible for putting up the rent-a-fence barricades around them? Civic-minded volunteers? The U.S. Marine Corps? Barack Obama himself? It was beautifully cynical, and I congratulate whoever came up with it.”

Both sides of the aisle play politics at the expense of the federal workforce. I certainly don’t wish to denigrate all federal workers. They perform varied functions and many are hard-working individuals. But still, it’s hard to feel very sorry for them given that they out-earn their private sector counterparts at almost every education level. Again, here’s Walther:

“Government employees, at both the state and federal level, are among the only workers in the United States who continue to be represented by powerful unions, despite the fact that by definition they’re not bargaining against capital but against their fellow citizens.”

I haven’t even mentioned the debate over open borders and the proposed wall, but that’s not my purpose here. All parties to that debate seem to think the shutdown is unlikely to harm their side politically. That’s either because the shutdown isn’t perceived as very impactful, or the “other” side can be blamed. One theory making the rounds is that the shutdown is part of a larger plan to institute permanent Reductions in Force (RIFs) at federal agencies, which are permissible after a furlough of 30 days or more (by January 19th). The argument plausibly suggests that some federal agencies might operate more effectively once the bureaucracy is pruned back via furloughs and/or RIFs. That’s especially true if “deep-state” sabotage of efforts to roll-back regulations are as common as the author asserts. Is the shutdown therefore a trap for unsuspecting congressional Democrats? Who knows, but to my way of thinking, government RIFs might even be worth the trouble of building a wall!

Liz Warren Pitches Another Goofball

23 Thursday Aug 2018

Posted by Nuetzel in Central Planning, Property Rights, Regulation

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Accountable Capitalism Act, Board Activism, Don Boudreaux, Elizabeth Warren, Fifth Amendment, Kevin Williamson, Matt Yglesias, Richard Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions

Elizabeth Warren wants to nationalize all private businesses with more than $1 billion in annual revenue. She plans to introduce legislation called the “Accountable Capitalism Act” that would, if enacted, authorize an outright theft of private property from the owners of these companies. Among other things, her plan would require large companies to obtain a federal charter and set aside 40% of their board seats for members to be elected by employees. In addition, henceforth these businesses would be answerable not merely to shareholders, but to employees along with a limitless array of other “stakeholders”. That’s because under their federal charters, firms would have a duty to create a “general public benefit”. The operative assumption here is that merely creating a product or service does not produce adequate value for society, regardless of the benefits to buyers, income to employees and suppliers, taxes paid, and the returns earned by millions of working people who have invested in these companies via pension and 401(k) plans.

In the very first place, Warren’s bill is unconstitutional, as Richard Epstein points out. Owning a business is protected as a property right under several amendments to the U.S. Constitution, but particularly the Fifth Amendment. Warren would place unconstitutional conditions on this right via the requirements for a federal charter and the so-called public benefit. If enacted, her bill would quite likely be ruled unconstitutional by the courts. But if it stood, capital would quickly take flight from the U.S., depressing asset values.

Don Boudreaux notes that absent ownership, vaguely-defined “stakeholders” have risked nothing in the success of the company. Shareholders bear the financial risk that the company will fail to produce adequate earnings, lose value, or fail. Management has a fiduciary duty to protect the funds that shareholders invest in the firm, including a duty to protect the firm’s ability to acquire credit. Warren’s legislation would compromise these duties by elevating the objectives of non-owners to the same or greater status than those who have provided the equity capital. Again, this would happen in at least two ways: required representation of employee-elected board members, and the vague public-benefit mandate under the firm’s federal charter.

Significant employee representation on the board is likely to distort decisions about labor compensation and virtually any decision affecting employment. While 40% is short of a board majority, union pension funds already purchase shares in companies both as investments and as a way of driving labor issues before shareholders and into boardrooms. Those votes, along with the 40% board representation and oversight from federal bureaucrats, would give additional leverage to labor in influencing the firm’s decision-making. To take the simplest case, economic efficiency requires that the rate of labor compensation be the same as the marginal value of labor productivity. Warren’s proposal would surely result in wage payments exceeding this threshold, diminishing the economic value of the firm and its ability to raise capital. And by reducing the efficiency of the production process, it would raise costs to consumers and/or business customers.

There any number of other worker demands that would gain viability. For example, extended break times or extra paid-time-off would certainly raise costs, and such demands from a plurality of the board would be unrestrained by the need to negotiate other terms. Or how about a plant-closing decision? The upshot is that mandated board representation for labor would create instability and lead to a decline in the firm’s performance, competitiveness, and attractiveness to suppliers of capital. Ultimately, the very jobs on which labor depends would be threatened.

Further dilution of business objectives would arise from the requirement under the federal charter to produce a “public benefit”. Serving customers is not enough, but what will satisfy federal overseers that the firm has fulfilled its social obligations? And what are the limits of those social obligations? Again, these amorphous requirements would constitute a theft of resources from the business owners, requiring the payment of alms in order to produce something of value. There is already evidence that board activism in pursuit of non-business, social objectives destroys business value:

“Labor-affiliated pensions regularly file shareholder proposals, usually involving social and political concerns. Those social and political shareholder-proposal campaigns are associated with lower shareholder value. These labor investors also tend to attack companies facing ongoing union-organizing campaigns, as well as companies with political action committees that support Republicans.”

In time, the dilution of objectives undermines a firm’s viability, its health of its suppliers, and its ability to employ workers and hire other resources. Many of the suppliers hurt by Warren’s proposal would be smaller firms. It would ripple through the ranks of consultants, repair shops, electricians, plumbers, accounting firms, janitorial services, and any number of other businesses. But even before that, Warren’s proposal would send capital scrambling overseas.

I share Don Boudreaux’s astonishment that writers such as Matt Yglesias in Vox can assert that the Warren plan would have no costs. It might or might not have an impact on the federal budget, but the cost of destroyed economic value in the business sector would be massive, not to mention the jobs that ultimately would be lost in the process. It’s also astonishing that proponents can pretend that Warren’s bill would “save capitalism” when in fact it would do great harm.

Finally, here is Kevin Williamson expressing his disdain for Warren’s true intent in putting her bill forward:

“Warren’s proposal is dishonestly called the ‘Accountable Capitalism Act.’ Accountable to whom?  you might ask. That’s a reasonable question. The answer is — as it always is — accountable to politicians, who desire to put the assets and productivity of private businesses under political discipline for their own selfish ends. It is remarkable that people who are most keenly attuned to the self-interest of CEOs and shareholders and the ways in which that self-interest influences their decisions apparently believe that members of the House, senators, presidents, regulators, Cabinet secretaries, and agency chiefs somehow are liberated from self-interest when they take office through some kind of miracle of transcendence.”

Pruitt Out At EPA; So Is Eco-Absolutism

13 Friday Jul 2018

Posted by Nuetzel in Environment, Regulation

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Andrew Wheeler, Clean Air Act, Clean Power Plan, Clean Water Act, Compliance Costs, Endangerment Finding, Environmental Justice, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, Ledyard King, Navigable Waters, Paris Climate Accord, Scott Pruitt, Social Cost of Carbon, Sue and Settle, Superfund, Transparent Science

Green munchkins celebrated the fall of a house of cronyism earlier this month when it crashed right on top of EPA chief Scott Pruitt. Not that the Environmental Protection Agency has ever been free of cronyism and wicked warlocks, but Pruitt stumbled into an awkward appearance of coziness with industry representatives and was seemingly too fond of his expense account. The munchkins, however, will be sorely disappointed to learn that Andrew Wheeler, Pruitt’s replacement on at least an interim basis, will press forward with the same deregulatory agenda. They might imagine Wheeler as the surviving Warlock of the West, but the munchkins are incapable of understanding the deeper nature of wickedness at the EPA.

The agency took an expansive role during the Obama Administration (see this note on “environmental justice”, and this on the use of the “social cost of carbon” in rulemaking, and this on water regulation). Aggressive action was directed at emissions of carbon, a trace greenhouse gas (four parts per 10,000), but one that is necessary for life. In 2009, the EPA reached its “endangerment finding” that greenhouse gases, including carbon, pose a threat to humanity that must be addressed under the powers conferred upon the agency by the Clean Air Act. The Obama Administration viewed this finding as a regulatory carte blanche, ushering in a series of draconian, high-cost measures to reduce U.S. carbon emissions. Unfortunately, the environmental lobby is notorious for its inability to see beyond first-order effects. It cannot come to grips with the fact that green policies often waste more resources than they save, undermine the economy, infringe on liberty, and have their greatest negative impact on the poor.

President Obama also pushed for American participation in the Paris Climate Accord, which would have required transfers of billions of dollars of wealth to the often-corrupt governments of less developed countries for alternative energy projects. Beyond green energy objectives, this was presumably restitution for our past carbon sins. Whatever shortcomings Pruitt might have had, I valued his leadership in opposition to the Paris Accord and his role in dismantling the EPA’s overzealous regulatory model.

Pruitt might have earned praise from the green lobby in at least one area. He placed particular emphasis on streamlining Superfund site remediation, including a radioactive waste site in the St. Louis area. It is one of the so-called “top-10” sites that have been given high priority by the EPA. But there are 1,300 Superfund sites across the country, so Andrew Wheeler will have to be creative to succeed with more than just a few of these cleanups.

Ledyard King discusses the likely course of Scott Pruitt’s legacy under Wheeler, including continued opposition to the Paris Accord, reversing or deemphasizing renewable power mandates, reduced staffing and fewer enforcement actions. The Clean Power Plan is slated for replacement with rules that are not prohibitive to coal-fired power. Emissions from coal-burning are already heavily regulated, and CO2 and its unproven harms do not offer a valid pretext for a wholesale shutdown of the coal industry. Actions under the endangerment finding, if there are any, are likely to be more circumspect going forward. However, there are disconcerting reports that the Trump Administration may seek to subsidize or protect coal interests from more cost-effective alternatives, like natural gas.

According to King, Wheeler will continue Pruitt’s effort to balance representation on EPA advisory boards between academicians and business and state interests, include more geographic diversity on these boards, and end grant awards to members. Wheeler will continue to push for EPA rule-making based on fully-transparent science, rather than studies relying on private data. There are also likely to be efforts to stop “sue-and-settle” actions used by partisans to gain court-ordered consent decrees, which subvert public participation in the regulatory process.

The endangerment finding combined with the dubious and notoriously uncertain “social cost of carbon” gave EPA regulators almost unbridled power to control private activity. This ranged from questionable efficiency standards, uneconomic mandates on energy sources, and prohibitive emissions standards. The EPA also promulgated an expansive definition of “navigable waters” as an excuse to regulate virtually any puddle, or sometimes puddle, as wetland under the Clean Water Act. This overzealousness is a consequence of over-application of the precautionary principle, under which any prospective risk to humanity or the environment provides a rationale for regulation, taxation, or prohibition of an activity. It is also a consequence of refusing to recognize that government regulation, when it offers any benefit, has diminishing returns. The compliance costs of EPA regulations have been estimated to exceed $350 billion annually, a substantial impediment to economic growth that imposes cruel penalties on business, workers, and consumers. It is all the worse that these effects are strongly regressive in their impacts across income levels. Scott Pruitt may have been his own worst enemy, but his departure at this point might well advance the much-needed deregulatory agenda, as it is now that it is in the competent hands of Andrew Wheeler.

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Blog at WordPress.com.

Ominous The Spirit

Ominous The Spirit is an artist that makes music, paints, and creates photography. He donates 100% of profits to charity.

Passive Income Kickstart

OnlyFinance.net

TLC Cholesterol

Nintil

To estimate, compare, distinguish, discuss, and trace to its principal sources everything

kendunning.net

The Future is Ours to Create

DCWhispers.com

Hoong-Wai in the UK

A Commonwealth immigrant's perspective on the UK's public arena.

Marginal REVOLUTION

Small Steps Toward A Much Better World

Stlouis

Watts Up With That?

The world's most viewed site on global warming and climate change

Aussie Nationalist Blog

Commentary from a Paleoconservative and Nationalist perspective

American Elephants

Defending Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness

The View from Alexandria

In advanced civilizations the period loosely called Alexandrian is usually associated with flexible morals, perfunctory religion, populist standards and cosmopolitan tastes, feminism, exotic cults, and the rapid turnover of high and low fads---in short, a falling away (which is all that decadence means) from the strictness of traditional rules, embodied in character and inforced from within. -- Jacques Barzun

The Gymnasium

A place for reason, politics, economics, and faith steeped in the classical liberal tradition

A Force for Good

How economics, morality, and markets combine

Notes On Liberty

Spontaneous thoughts on a humble creed

troymo

SUNDAY BLOG Stephanie Sievers

Escaping the everyday life with photographs from my travels

Miss Lou Acquiring Lore

Gallery of Life...

Your Well Wisher Program

Attempt to solve commonly known problems…

Objectivism In Depth

Exploring Ayn Rand's revolutionary philosophy.

RobotEnomics

(A)n (I)ntelligent Future

Orderstatistic

Economics, chess and anything else on my mind.

Paradigm Library

OODA Looping

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