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Central Planning With AI Will Still Suck

23 Sunday Feb 2020

Posted by pnoetx in Artificial Intelligence, Central Planning, Free markets

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Artificial Intelligence, central planning, Common Law, Data Science, Digital Socialism, Friedrich Hayek, Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Machine Learning, Marginal Revolution, Property Rights, Robert Lucas, Roman Law, Scientism, The Invisible Hand, The Knowledge Problem, The Lucas Critique, Tyler Cowen

 

Artificial intelligence (AI) or machine learning (ML) will never make central economic planning a successful reality. Jesús Fernández-Villaverde of the University of Pennsylvania has written a strong disavowal of AI’s promise in central planning, and on the general difficulty of using ML to design social and economic policies. His paper, “Simple Rules for a Complex World with Artificial Intelligence“, was linked last week by Tyler Cowen at Marginal Revolution. Note that the author isn’t saying “digital socialism” won’t be attempted. Judging by the attention it’s getting, and given the widespread acceptance of the scientism of central planning, there is no question that future efforts to collectivize will involve “data science” to one degree or another. But Fernández-Villaverde, who is otherwise an expert and proponent of ML in certain applications, is simply saying it won’t work as a curative for the failings of central economic planning — that the “simple rules” of the market will aways produce superior social outcomes.

The connection between central planning and socialism should be obvious. Central planning implies control over the use of resources, and therefore ownership by a central authority, whether or not certain rents are paid as a buy-off to the erstwhile owners of those resources. By “digital socialism”, Fernández-Villaverde means the use of ML to perform the complex tasks of central planning. The hope among its cheerleaders is that adaptive algorithms can discern the optimal allocation of resources within some “big data” representation of resource availability and demands, and that this is possible on an ongoing, dynamic basis.

Fernández-Villaverde makes the case against this fantasy on three fronts or barriers to the use of AI in policy applications: data requirements; the endogeneity of expectations and behavior; and the knowledge problem.

The Data Problem: ML requires large data sets to do anything. And impossibly large data sets are required for ML to perform the task of planning economic activity, even for a small portion of the economy. Today, those data sets do not exist except in certain lines of business. Can they exist more generally, capturing the details of all economic transactions? Can the data remain current? Only at great expense, and ML must be trained to recognize whether data should be discarded as it becomes stale over time due to shifting demographics, tastes, technologies, and other changes in the social and physical environment. 

Policy Change Often Makes the Past Irrelevant: Planning algorithms are subject to the so-called Lucas Critique, a well known principle in macroeconomics named after Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas. The idea is that policy decisions based on observed behavior will change expectations, prompting responses that differ from the earlier observations under the former policy regime. A classic case involves the historical tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. Can this tradeoff be exploited by policy? That is, can unemployment be reduced by a policy that increases the rate of inflation (by printing money at a faster rate)? In this case, the Lucas Critique is that once agents expect a higher rate of inflation, they are unlikely to confuse higher prices with a more profitable business environment, so higher employment will not be sustained. If ML is used to “plan” certain outcomes desired by some authority, based on past relationships and transactions, the Lucas Critique implies that things are unlikely to go as planned.  

The Knowledge Problem: Not only are impossibly large data sets required for economic planning with ML, as noted above. To achieve the success of markets in satisfying unlimited wants given scarce resources, the required information is impossible to collect or even to know. This is what Friedrich Hayek called the “knowledge problem”. Just imagine the difficulty of arranging a data feed on the shifting preferences of many different individuals across a huge number of products,  services and they way preference orderings will change across the range of possible prices. The data must have immediacy, not simply a historical record. Add to this the required information on shifting supplies and opportunity costs of resources needed to produce those things. And the detailed technological relationships between production inputs and outputs, including time requirements, and the dynamics of investment in future productive capacity. And don’t forget to consider the variety of risks agents face, their degree of risk aversion, and the ways in which risks can be mitigated or hedged. Many of these things are simply unknowable to a central authority. The information is hopelessly dispersed. The task of collecting even the knowable pieces is massive beyond comprehension.

The market system, however, is able to process all of this information in real time, the knowable and the unknowable, in ways that balance preferences with the true scarcity of resources. No one actor or authority need know it all. It is the invisible hand. Among many other things, it ensures the deployment of ML only where it makes economic sense. Here is Fernández-Villaverde:

“The only reliable method we have found to aggregate those preferences, abilities, and efforts is the market because it aligns, through the price system, incentives with information revelation. The method is not perfect, and the outcomes that come from it are often unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, like democracy, all the other alternatives, including ‘digital socialism,’ are worse.”

Later, he says:

“… markets work when we implement simple rules, such as first possession, voluntary exchange, and pacta sunt servanda. This result is not a surprise. We did not come up with these simple rules thanks to an enlightened legislator (or nowadays, a blue-ribbon committee of academics ‘with a plan’). … The simple rules were the product of an evolutionary process. Roman law, the Common law, and Lex mercatoria were bodies of norms that appeared over centuries thanks to the decisions of thousands and thousands of agents.” 

These simple rules represent good private governance. Beyond reputational enforcement, the rules require only trust in the system of property rights and a private or public judicial authority. Successfully replacing private arrangements in favor of a central plan, however intricately calculated via ML, will remain a pipe dream. At best, it would suspend many economic relationships in amber, foregoing the rational adjustments private agents would make as conditions change. And ultimately, the relationships and activities that planning would sanction would be shaped by political whim. It’s a monstrous thing to contemplate — both fruitless and authoritarian.

You’re Welcome: Charitable Gifts Prompt Statist Ire

14 Friday Dec 2018

Posted by pnoetx in Central Planning, Charity, Uncategorized

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Amazon, American Institute for Economic Research, central planning, Charity, Cloe Anagnos, Day 1 Fund, Doug Bandow, Forced Charity, Gaby Del Valle, Homelessness, Jeff Bezos, Redistribution, Russ Roberts, Scientism, Seattle Employment Tax, War on Charity

Charitable acts are sometimes motivated by a desire to cultivate a favorable reputation, or even to project intelligence. Perhaps certain charitable acts are motivated by guilt of one kind or another. Tax deduction are nice, too. But sometimes a charitable gift is prompted by no more than a desire to help others less fortunate. It’s likely a combination of motives in many cases, but to gainsay the purity of anyone’s charitable motives is rather unseemly. Yet Gaby Del Valle does just that in Vox, casting a skeptical eye at Jeff Bezos’ efforts to help the homeless through his Day 1 Fund.

“Last week, Amazon founder and CEO Jeff Bezos announced that he and his wife, MacKenzie Bezos, were donating $97.5 million to 24 organizations that provide homeless services across the country. The donation is part of Bezos’s $2 billion ‘Day 1 Fund, a philanthropic endeavor … that, according to Bezos, focuses on establishing ‘a network of new, non-profit, tier-one preschools in low-income communities’ and funding existing nonprofits that provide homeless services.”

Del Valle says Bezos deserves little credit for his big gift for several reasons. First, Amazon very publicly opposed a recent initiative for a $275 per employee tax on large employers in Seattle. The proceeds would have been used to fund public programs for the homeless. This allegation suggests that Bezos feels guilty, or that the gift is a cynical attempt to buy-off critics. That might have an element of truth, but the tax was well worthy of opposition on economic grounds — almost as if it was designed to stunt employment and economic growth in the city.

Second, because Amazon has been an engine of growth for Seattle, Del Valle intimates that the company and other large employers are responsible for the city’s high cost of housing and therefore homelessness. Of course, growth in a region’s economy is likely to lead to higher housing prices if the supply of housing does not keep pace, but forsaking economic growth is not a solution. Furthermore, every large city in the country suffers from some degree of homelessness. And not all of those homeless individuals have been “displaced”, as Del Valle would have it. Some have relocated voluntarily without any guarantee or even desire for employment. As for the housing stock, government environmental regulations, zoning policies and rent control (in some markets) restrains expansion, leading to higher costs.

Finally, Del Valle implies that private efforts to help the homeless are somehow inferior to “leadership by elected officials”. Further, she seems to regard these charitable acts as threatening to “public” objectives and government control. At least she doesn’t disguise her authoritarian impulses. Del Valle also quotes a vague allegation that one of the charities beholden to Amazon is less than a paragon of charitable virtue. Well, I have heard similar allegations that government isn’t celebrated for rectitude in fulfilling its duties. Like all statists, Del Valle imagines that government technocrats possess the best vision of how to design aid programs. That attitude is an extension of the scientism and delusions of efficacy typical of central planners. Anyone with the slightest awareness of the government’s poor track record in low-income housing would approach such a question with trepidation. In contrast, private efforts often serve as laboratories in which to test innovative programs that can later be adopted on a broader scale.

While selfishness might motivate private acts of charity in some cases, only voluntary, private charity can ever qualify as real charity. Government benefits for the homeless are funded by taxes, which are compulsory. Such public programs might be justifiable as an extension of social insurance, but it is not charity in any pure sense; neither are it advocates engaged in promoting real charity, despite their conveniently moralistic positioning. And unlike private charity, government redistribution programs can be restrained only through a political process in which substantial payers are a distinct minority of the voting population.

Public aid and private charity have worked alongside each other for many years in the U.S. According to Russ Roberts, private giving to the poor began to be “crowded-out” during the Great Depression by a dramatic increase in public assistance programs. (Also see Doug Bandow’s “War On Charity“.) It’s certainly more difficult to make a case for gifts to the poor when donors are taxed by the government in order to redistribute income.

The statist war on private charity can take other forms. The regulatory apparatus can crowd-out private efforts to extend a helping hand. Chloe Anagnos of the American Institute for Economic Research (AIER) writes of a charity in Kansas City that wanted to provide home-cooked soup to the homeless, but health officials intervened, pouring bleach into the soup. I am aware of similar but less drastic actions in St. Louis, where organizations attempting to hand-out sandwiches to the poor were recently prohibited by health authorities.

Private charity has drawn criticism because its source has driven economic growth, its source has opposed policies that stunt comic growth, and because it might interfere with the remote possibility that government would do it better. But private charity plays a critical role in meeting the needs of the disadvantaged, whether as a substitute for public aid where it falls short, or as a supplement. It can also play a productive role in identifying the most effective designs for aid programs. Of course, there are corrupt organizations and individuals purporting to do charitable work, which argues for a degree of public supervision over private charities. But unfortunately, common sense is too often lost to overzealous enforcement. In general, the public sector should not stand in the way of private charities and charitable acts, but real generosity has little value to those who press for domination by the state.

Human Potential Exceeds the Human Burden

30 Friday Nov 2018

Posted by pnoetx in Abortion, Mobility, Redistribution

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Abortion, Border Control, central planning, dependency, Economic Burden, Economic Freedom, Eugenics, Human Footprint, Human Ingenuity, Immigration, Left Tail, Margaret Sanger, Open Borders, Planned Parenthood, Population Control, Private charity, Public Safety Net

Are human beings a burden, and in what way? Between two camps of opinion on this question are many shades of thought, and some inconsistencies. But whether the discussion is centered on the macro-societal level or the family level, the view of people and population growth as burdensome promotes centralized social control and authoritarian rule, with an attendant imposition of burdens on human freedom and productive effort.

Naysaying Greens

The environmental Left views people as a net burden on resources while failing to recognize their resource value, without which our world would yield little in the way of food and other comforts. It is mankind’s ability to process and transform raw materials that makes the planet so hospitable.

The world’s human population has increased by a factor of 18 times in the last 400 years, but food supplies have grown even faster. Each person has potential as a resource capable of a net positive contribution to societal and global well being. If we wrongly conclude that people are burdensome, however, it offers a rationale to statists for regulating the lives of individuals, preventing them from producing and consuming as they would otherwise choose.

Sirens of Dependency

There will always be individuals who cannot provide for themselves, sometimes due to temporary circumstances and sometimes as a permanent condition. If the latter, these individuals find themselves in the lower tail of the distribution of human productive capacity. The undeniable burden of this lower tail for humanity can be dealt with through various social support structures, including family, religious organizations, private social organizations, and the public safety net.

People of true compassion have always helped to fill this need privately and voluntarily, but “compassionate” motives can be a false and corrupting when the public sector becomes the tool of choice. Actual and potential beneficiaries of public largess can vote for their alms at the expense of others, along with those well-meaning partisans who confuse forced redistribution with compassion. And benefits and taxes often create disincentives that undermine a society’s productive dynamic. Under such circumstances, the lower tail and its burden of dependency grows larger than necessary, and society’s ability to carry that burden is diminished.

Burdensome Children

Children are unable to provide for themselves up to varying ages, so they do create an economic burden for their parents. That burden might loom large in the event of an unexpected pregnancy, but most parents find the burden well worth bearing, whether planned or unplanned, ex ante and ex post, and for reasons that often have little to do with material concerns. But many individuals and families in the lower tail simply cannot bear the economic burden on their own; others not in the lower tail might simply find the prospective burden of an unexpected pregnancy a bit too heavy or inconvenient for non-economic reasons.

Solutions are available, of course. They range from sexual abstinence and prophylactics to adoption services, as well as hard sacrifice by new parents. And then there is abortion. The pro-choice Left makes the argument that children are so burdensome as to justify the termination of pregnancies at almost any stage. The ease with which they make that argument and traffic in the imposition of that burden upon the innocent is horrific. Furthermore, regimes dominated by the Left have often instituted formal population control measures, and Western leftists such as the late Margaret Sanger, founder of Planned Parenthood, have advocated strenuously for eugenics.

Burdens at the Border

Are migrants a burden or a blessing? In general, the latter, because mobility allows individuals to exploit economic opportunities, with consequent gains to themselves and to those who demand their services. This is generally true from the perspective of nations; it is the basis of the traditional economic argument in favor of liberalized, legal immigration to which I subscribe. But some partisans on both sides of the immigration debate accept the idea that immigrants impose a burden. That may be correct under some circumstances.

Opponents of immigration reform certainly identify immigrants as a burden to productive citizens and taxpayers. Critics of border control, on the other hand, are motivated by compassion for political refugees or economically disadvantaged immigrants, whether employment opportunities exist for them or not. In fact, would-be immigrants are often attracted by generous public benefits in the receiving country, and so they are likely to add to a country’s lower-tail burden, as I’ve described it. But the no-borders crowd insists that society must shoulder any burden created by the combined effect of an open border with generous public benefits, and even immediate voting rights.

The Burdens of Overbearance

The Left imagines that people create many burdens, but the Left is happy to impose many burdens in pursuit of their “ideal” society: planned by experts, egalitarian, highly regulated, profit-free, and green. They wish to “save the planet” by imposing burdens, regulating and restricting economic growth and sparing no expense to minimize the human “footprint”. They wish to fund redistributive social programs by burdening productive resources with taxes, while crowding-out private efforts to provide charitable relief. They wish to prevent the perceived burden of children by offering, and even funding publicly, the “choice” to impose an ultimate burden on those too weak to register a protest. And they wish to burden taxpayers by availing all potential migrants, without question, of generous public benefits.

Burdens are a fact of life, but people with the freedom to exploit their own effort and ingenuity for gain have increasingly shouldered their own burdens and much more. Over the last few centuries, human ingenuity has expanded the effective quantity of all resources by many orders of magnitude. In so doing, the scale and scope of real poverty have been reduced dramatically. But those who would deign to manage our burdens for us, under the authority of the state, are more threatening to our well being than beneficent.

Central Planning Fails to Scale, Unlike Spontaneous Order

05 Tuesday Jun 2018

Posted by pnoetx in Central Planning, Markets, Price Controls

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Bronze Age, central planning, Client-Server Network, Decentralized Decision-Making, Economies of Scale, Federalism, Francis Turner, Industrial Policy, Liberty.me, Markets, Peer-to-Peer Network, Price mechanism, Property Rights, Scalability, Spontaneous Order

The proposition that mankind is capable of creating a successful “planned” society is at least as old as the Bronze Age. Of course it’s been tried. The effort necessarily involves a realignment of the economic and political landscape and always requires a high degree of coercion. But putting that aside, such planning can never be successful relative to spontaneous order of the kind that dominates private affairs in a free society. The task of advancing human well-being given available resources has never been achieved under central planning. It always fails miserably in this regard, and it always will fail to match the success of decentralized decision-making and private markets.

There are various ways to explain this fact, but I recently came across an interesting take on the subject having to do with the notion of scalability. Francis Turner offers this note on the topic at the Liberty.me blog. To begin, he gives a lengthy quote from a software developer who relates the problems of social and economic planning to the complexity of managing a network. On the topic of scale, the developer notes that the number of relationships in a network increases with the square of the number of its “nodes”, or members:

“2 nodes have 1 potential relationship. 4 nodes (twice as many) has 6 potential relationships (6 times as many). 8 nodes (twice again) has 28 potential relationships. 100 nodes => [4,950] relationships; 1,000 nodes => 499,500 relationships—nearly half a million.“

Actually, the formula for the number of potential relationships or connections in a network is n*(n-1)/2, where n is the number of network nodes. The developer Turner  quotes discusses this in the context of two competing network management structures: client-server and peer-to-peer. Under the former, the network is managed centrally by a server, which communicates with all nodes, makes various decisions, and routes communications traffic between nodes. In a peer-to-peer network, the work of network management is distributed — each computer manages its own relationships. The developer says, at first, “the idea of hooking together thousands of computers was science fiction.” But as larger networks were built-out in the 1990s, the client-server framework was more or less rejected by the industry because it required such massive resources to manage large networks. In fact, as new nodes are added to a peer-to-peer network, its capacity to manage itself actually increases! In other words, client-server networks are not as scalable as peer-to-peer networks:

“Even if it were perfectly designed and never broke down, there was some number of nodes that would crash the server. It was mathematically unavoidable. You HAVE TO distribute the management as close as possible to the nodes, or the system fails.

… in an instant, I realized that the same is true of governments. … And suddenly my coworker’s small government rantings weren’t crazy…”

This developer’s epiphany captures a few truths about the relative efficacy of decentralized decision-making. It’s not just for computer networks! But in fact, when it comes to network management, the task is comparatively simple: meet the computing and communication needs of users. A central server faces dynamic capacity demands and the need to route changing flows of traffic between nodes. Software requirements change as well, which may necessitate discrete alterations in capacity and rules from time-to-time.

But consider the management of a network of individual economic units. Let’s start with individuals who produce something… like widgets. There are likely to be real economies achieved when a few individual widgeteers band together to produce as a team. Some specialization into different functions can take place, like purchasing materials, fabrication, and distribution. Perhaps administrative tasks can be centralized for greater efficiency. Economies of scale may dictate an even larger organization, and at some point the firm might find additional economies in producing widget-complementary products and services. But eventually, if the decision-making is centralized and hierarchical, the sheer weight of organizational complexity will begin to take a toll, driving up costs and/or diminishing the firm’s ability to deal with changes in technology or the market environment. In other words, centralized control becomes difficult to scale in an efficient way, and there may be some “optimal” size for a firm beyond which it struggles.

Now consider individual consumers, each of whom faces an income constraint and has a set of tastes spanning innumerable goods. These tastes vary across time scales like hour-of-day, day-of-week, seasons, life-stage, and technology cycles. The volume of information is even more daunting when you consider that preferences vary across possible price vectors and potential income levels as well.

Can the interactions between all of these consumer and producer “nodes” be coordinated by a central economic authority so as to optimize their well-being dynamically, subject to resource constraints? As we’ve seen, the job requires massive amounts of information and a crushing number of continually evolving decisions. It is really impossible for any central authority or computer to “know” all of the information needed. Secondly, to the software developer’s point, the number of potential relationships increases with the square of the number of consumers and producers, as does the required volume of information and number of decisions. The scalability problem should be obvious.

This kind of planning is a task with which no central authority can keep up. Will the central authority always get milk, eggs and produce to the store when people need it, at a price they are willing to pay, and with minimal spoilage? Will fuel be available such that a light always turns on whenever they flip the switch? Will adequate supplies of medicines always be available for the sick? Will the central authority be able to guarantee a range of good-quality clothing from which to choose?

There has never been a central authority that successfully performed the job just described. Yet that job gets done every day in free, capitalistic societies, and we tend to take it for granted. The massive process of information transmission and coordination takes place spontaneously with spectacularly good results via private discovery and decision-making, secure property rights, markets, and a functioning price mechanism. Individual economic units are endowed with decision-making power and the authority to manage their own relationships. And the spontaneous order that takes shape remains effective even as networks of economic units expand. In other words, markets are highly scalable at solving the eternal problem of allocating scarce resources.

But thus far I’ve set up something of a straw man by presuming that the central authority must monitor all individual economic units to know and translate their demands and supplies of goods into the ongoing, myriad decisions about production, distribution and consumption. Suppose the central authority takes a less ambitious approach. For example, it might attempt to enforce a set of prices that its experts believe to be fair to both consumers and producers. This is a much simpler task of central management. What could go wrong?

These prices will be wrong immediately, to one degree or another, without tailoring them to detailed knowledge of the individual tastes, preferences, talents, productivities, price sensitivities, and resource endowments of individual economic units. It would be sheer luck to hit on the correct prices at the start, but even then they would not be correct for long. Conditions change continuously, and the new information is simply not available to the central authority. Various shortages and surpluses will appear without the corrective mechanism usually provided by markets. Queues will form here and inventories will accumulate there without any self-correcting mechanism. Consumers will be angry, producers will quit, goods will rot, and stocks of physical capital will sit idle and go to waste.

Other forms of planning attempt to set quantities of goods produced and are subject to errors similar to those arising from price controls. Even worse is an attempt to plan both price and quantity. Perhaps more subtle is the case of industrial policy, in which planners attempt to encourage the development of certain industries and discourage activity in those deemed “undesirable”. While often borne out of good intentions, these planners do not know enough about the future of technology, resource supplies, and consumer preferences to arrogate these kinds of decisions to themselves. They will invariably commit resources to inferior technologies, misjudge future conditions, and abridge the freedoms of those whose work or consumption is out-of-favor and those who are taxed to pay for the artificial incentives. To the extent that industrial policies become more pervasive, scalability will become an obstacle to the planners because they simply lack the information required to perform their jobs of steering investment wisely.

Here is Turner’s verdict on central planning:

“No central planner, or even a board of them, can accurately set prices across any nation larger than, maybe, Liechtenstein and quite likely even at the level of Liechtenstein it won’t work well. After all how can a central planner tell that Farmer X’s vegetables taste better and are less rotten than Farmer Y’s and that people therefore are prepared to pay more for a tomato from Farmer X than they are one from Farmer Y.”

I will go further than Turner: planning can only work well in small settings and only when the affected units do the planning. For example, the determination of contract terms between two parties requires planning, as does the coordination of activities within a firm. But then these plans are not really “central” and the planners are not “public”. These activities are actually parts of a larger market process. Otherwise, the paradigm of central planning is not merely unscalable, it is unworkable without negative consequences.

Finally, the notion of scalability applies broadly to governance, not merely economic planning. The following quote from Turner, for example, is a ringing endorsement for federalism:

“It is worth noting that almost all successful nations have different levels of government. You have the local town council, the state/province/county government, possibly a regional government and then finally the national one. Moreover richer countries tend to do better when they push more down to the lower levels. This is a classic way to solve a scalability problem – instead of having a single central power you devolve powers and responsibilities with some framework such that they follow the general desires of the higher levels of government but have freedom to implement their own solutions and adapt policies to local conditions.” 

Corporate Lapdogs of the Left

04 Wednesday Apr 2018

Posted by pnoetx in Central Planning, Identity Politics, Progressivism, rent seeking

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central planning, Corporate Socialism, Corporatism, David Cay Johnston, Identity Politics, Interstate Commerce Commission, Kevin Williamson, Orbiting the Giant Hairball, Political Action Committees, Political Correctness, rent seeking, Technocratic elite, William H. Whyte

ceo

Now don’t get me wrong, I definitely prefer to see private goods and services produced privately, not publicly. Private ownership of the means of production makes the world a better place because ownership and self-interest drive performance and value, to put it all too briefly. But corporate America is now so thoroughly encumbered by ideological distractions that it compromises the mission of creating value, risking shareholder returns and invested capital as well. Having spent the past 31 years employed successively by three gigantic corporate hairballs (with a 2-year stint at the central bank), the following thesis about corporate CEOs, and corporate America by extension, strikes me as wholly accurate:

“CEOs … mostly [reject] the ethos of rugged individualism in favor of a more collectivist view of the world. The capitalists [are] not much interested in defending the culture of capitalism. … the psychological and operational mechanics of large corporations [are] much like those of other large organizations, including government agencies … American CEOs [believe] that expertise deployed through bureaucracy [can] impose rationality on such unruly social entities as free markets, culture, family, and sexuality. The supplanting of spontaneous order with political discipline is the essence of progressivism….“

I changed the tenses used above by Kevin Williamson, who attempts to explain why American corporations became such progressive activists. The beginning of the quote describes interviews conducted by William H. Whyte in the 1950s, but it’s as true now as it was then, and probably much more so. The technocratic view of organizational efficacy may be true up to a point. In fact, there is undoubtedly an optimal size for any organization that is dependent upon it’s mission, the technologies at its disposal, and the range of prices it is likely to face in input and output markets. It’s all too easy for a successful firm to expand beyond that point, however, as many now-defunct businesses have learned the hard way. However, the quote merely highlights the sympathetic view often held by corporate managements toward the notion of a planned society, guided by a class of technocrats. They share this scientistic line of thinking with the statist left, though the corporatist vision is a world in which their private organizations play a critical role, with risks mitigated by “partners” in government.

Private incentives can produce wonderful results, but they are corrupted by the scent of private advantage that can be gained via government intervention in markets. The corporate practice of seeking rents through legislative and administrative action has been going on since at least the 1880s, when railroads sought protection from competition and other shipping interests via federal regulatory action.The symbiosis between government and corporate interests, or corporatism, has been growing ever since. Whether it is lucrative contract awards, subsidies, or favorable regulation, government has lots of goodies at its disposal by virtue of its exclusive ability to exert coercive power. This quote of David Cay Johnston describes the end-product of corporate rent-seeking behavior:

“Corporate socialism is where we socialize losses and privatize gains. Companies that have failed in the marketplace stick the taxpayers with their losses, but when they make money they get to keep it, and secondly, huge amounts of capital are given to companies by taxpayers.”

Risk mitigation is at the heart of a second variety of corporate leftism, and Williamson notes the asymmetry in the political risks faced by most corporations:

“Conservatives may roll their eyes a little bit at promises to build windmills so efficient that we’ll cease needing coal and oil, but progressives (at least a fair portion of them) believe that using fossil fuels may very well end human civilization. The nation’s F-150 drivers are not going to organize a march on Chevron’s headquarters if it puts a billion bucks into biofuels, but the nation’s Subaru drivers might very well do so if it doesn’t. … The same asymmetry characterizes the so-called social issues.“

At this point, Williamson goes on to describe a few social issues on which corporate leaders are frequently harangued by the left. Those leaders may view conservative positions on those issues as aberrant, according to Williamson, because the leaders inhabit an insulated world of elitist, media-driven, politically-correct opinion. They wish to be seen as “progressive” and discount the risk of offending conservatives. While I do not take Williamson’s side on all of the social issues he mentions, I concede that there is some truth to the asymmetry he describes.

An avenue through which corporate America is strongly influenced by the left is identity politics. This is partly an unfortunate side-effect of civil rights legislation and other anti-discrimination law, but in today’s litigious environment, there are excessive legal risks against which corporations must take precautions. This is embedded in human resource policies to the point at which hiring the best individual to fill a role is subject to a series of costly, time-consuming hurdles, and is sometimes impossible. Then, there are the mandatory “Diversity and Inclusion” courses that all employees are required to complete. These overbearing attempts to “educate” the work force consume valuable staff time and are of questionable value in light of the aggravation and resentment they inspire in employees. Finally, I can’t keep count of all the corporate-sponsored activities devoted to celebrating one identity group after another. Can we please get back to work?

Today, as a consumer, it is becoming more difficult to engage in commerce without exposure to a seller’s political positioning. For example, I buy about 90% of my clothing from a particular clothier, but last weekend I learned that the company had taken an objectionable position (to me) in the debate over gun legislation. I am certain that activists badgered the company, and it succumbed, and so I will change my shopping habits. People often find that it’s easier to engage in arms-length transactions when the other party stays off the soapbox. But it goes further than that. Here is Williamson:

“Whereas the ancient corporate practice was to decline to take a public position on anything not related to their businesses, contemporary CEOs feel obliged to act as public intellectuals as well as business managers.“

Well, “ancient” might take it a bit too far, but as a customer, employee, and especially as a shareholder, I would urge any company to steer clear of political posturing. Do not dilute your mission of delivering value to customers, which dovetails with serving the interests of shareholders. You must pursue that mission in a way that you consider responsible and ethical, which just might narrow the scope of the mission. And that’s okay. Just be as neutral as possible on extraneous issues as you reach out to potential customers, and do not respond to politically-motivated threats except in the most diplomatic terms.

Should I bother to say that corporations should eschew public subsidies? That they should respond to competition by improving value, rather than lobbying for advantages and protection from lawmakers or regulators? That they should not badger their employees to give to their company’s Political Action Committee (PAC)?

I must be fantasizing! Corporations would never follow that advice, not as long as they can capture rents through the seductive expedient of big government. If that were the only reason for the hate reserved by leftists for corporate America, I’d be right with them. But in fact, leftist rhetoric condemns the profit motive generally, both in principle and as a method of scapegoating for any social ill. Williamson marvels at the incredible irony of the corporate enterprise-cum-lapdog of the Left, which is especially palpable as the Left beats the dog so unrelentingly.

Trump Bumbles On Trade With Tariffs

02 Friday Mar 2018

Posted by pnoetx in Free Trade, Protectionism, Tariffs

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Carve-Outs, central planning, Fair Trade, Import Quotas, monopoly power, Protectionism, Tariffs, Trade Barriers, Trade War, Trading Partners, Trump Tariffs

You can get away with lousy policy by calling it a “negotiating tactic” for only so long. But that dubious ploy is one of the rationales offered last week by the Trump Administration for imposing a 25% tariff on imported steel and a 10% tariff on imported aluminum. Sure, the tariffs are like gifts rendered onto American steel and aluminum producers, their shareholders, and their unionized workers. The tariffs allow them to compete more effectively, without any effort, with foreign steel and aluminum in the domestic market, and the tariffs may also give them leeway to raise prices. The tariffs are also forgiving of degraded performance by domestic producers, since reduced competition relieves pressure for efficiency, a primary social cost of monopoly power.

So who pays for these gifts to the domestic steel and aluminum industries? A tariff, of course, is a tax, and a significant portion of it will be passed along into higher prices of both imported and domestically-produced steel and aluminum. Therefore, the burden of that tax will be borne to a large extent by domestics users, including every domestic industry that uses steel or aluminum as an input, and by consumers who purchase those products. That erodes the job security of many domestic workers outside of the steel and aluminum industries. In fact, the tariffs are unlikely to create more jobs even in the steel and aluminum industries given the negative impact of higher prices on the quantities of those metals demanded.

The desperate story line in support of tariffs also includes the assertion that the U.S. steel and aluminum industries are in such dire straits that they are in danger of vanishing. Statistics on U.S. production hardly suggest that is the case, however. Steel output in the U.S. has been reasonably steady since recovering from the last recession, though it has not achieved its pre-recession level. While aluminum output has been declining, it is hardly in a free fall. The stock prices of major steel and aluminum producers, which are forward-looking, have not demonstrated a particular need for government aid (as if that could ever justify a too-big or too-important-to-fail mentality).

Defenders of the tariffs claim that one effect will include additional direct investment in the U.S. by foreign producers of steel and aluminum, because they can avoid the tariffs by setting up production within our borders. Perhaps a few will, but capital is mobile in other sectors as well. Producers in other industries requiring intensive use of steel or aluminum inputs will now have an incentive to shift production overseas, where the tariffs won’t apply. Attempting to prevent such shifts via import tariffs on final products would quickly become a nightmare of central planning.

Apologists for the tariffs go even further, noting that our new regulatory and tax environment will bring foreign producers to the U.S., essentially making the tariffs irrelevant. If that’s the case, why bother imposing the tariffs at all? And why penalize consumers and industries requiring intensive use of steel or aluminum?

The argument that tariffs provide a stronger position from which to negotiate with foreign “trading partners” (or rather, their governments) is tenuous at best. More likely, the tariffs will prompt retaliation by foreign governments against a range of American products. The very notion that “trade wars are good”, tweeted by President Trump on Friday morning, is as nonsensical as a suggestion that voluntary exchange is destructive. Already, the EU has announced plans to retaliate by imposing tariffs  on bourbon and motorcycles produced in the U.S.

Negotiations are unlikely to be successful. Perhaps some foreign governments who subsidize their steel and aluminum producers could be persuaded to enter talks. Our own domestic producers are penalized by various tariffs and quotas in place abroad, and those might be used by foreign interests as a lever in negotiations. However, the most fundamental foreign trade advantages, when they exist, have to do with low wages, less regulation, more efficient production facilities, and sometimes a more favorable tax environment. Wage levels reflect labor productivity, but those wage levels are valued more highly in their home countries than in the U.S, and penalizing these countries with trade sanctions merely penalizes their workers. Not all dimensions of a cost advantage can be negotiated, and in any case, healthy competition in any industry is always in the interests of a nation’s consumers.

National security is another standard argument in favor of protectionist measures. We’re told, for example, that we cannot allow China to produce all of the steel, but China provides only a small fraction of U.S. steel imports. Canada, Brazil and Mexico provide far more. In fact, China was in 11th place on that list in 2017. So our sources of steel are fairly well diversified. A domestic shortage of steel or aluminum caused by a breakdown in relations with one or more steel-exporting countries would lead to higher prices, but it would bring forth greater supplies from other countries and even from high-cost domestic sources. That is not a national emergency.

It’s possible that the Trump Administration will create “carve-outs”, exempting goods from certain countries from the tariffs. Presumably, those would be based on an assessment of each country’s trade policies and whether they are consistent with “fair” trade, in the judgement of U.S. trade authorities. However, all nations play the protectionist game in one form or another, including the U.S. Any carve outs would be better than none at all, but the remaining tariffs imposed by the administration will be a net burden to the U.S. economy.

Up till now, I have been pleasantly surprised by the Trump Administration’s efforts to de-tax and deregulate the U.S. economy. However, the threat that Donald Trump would adopt protectionist trade policies was one of my major trepidations about his candidacy. And here it is, as he promised. The dilemma often expressed by protectionists is that foreign producers can put elements of the domestic economy out of business by selling below cost. That drain on a country’s resources cannot span all industries — the U.S. has a comparative advantage in many areas. Such an effort cannot last forever or else these nations would cannibalize their own industrial base. Foreign governments quite simply cannot afford it economically and politically. On our end, the best advice is to accept the gift of low-cost goods. With access to ultra-cheap goods, whether steel, sorghum, or some finished product, American consumers and producers who use those imports gain unambiguously, and the purchasing power released can be spent on other goods and services.

Deficits Are a Symptom of Statist Excess

12 Monday Feb 2018

Posted by pnoetx in Big Government, Taxes

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central planning, crowding out, Dead Weight Loss, Debt Financing, Economic Rents, Government Waste, Inflation tax, Price Incentives, Ricardian Equivalence, Tax Cuts & Jobs Act, TCJA, Trump Budget Proposal

One thing’s clear with respect to President Trump’s budget proposal and the ongoing debate over appropriations: federal spending will increase and add to future budget deficits. This follows the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) enacted late last year, which many expect to add upwards of $1 trillion to deficits over the next 10 years. I have offered mixed praise of some of the reforms and rate cuts in the TCJA, though it does not accomplish much in the way of tax simplification and it will almost certainly require a large increase in federal borrowing. Ultimately, however, dollar for dollar, a tax cut giving rise to a deficit inflicts lower (or even negative) costs on the private sector than an unfunded spending binge, which is costly in the most basic terms: resources devoured by government.

Cost of Spending

The cost of an extra dollar of government spending at the most basic level is the value of lost opportunities to which the resources absorbed by government otherwise could have been put. When the government spends an extra dollar, and if the government pays a competitive market price, the goods and services exchanged for that dollar by private party “A” would be valued at more than one dollar by other private parties who lost the opportunity to trade with “A” for those same goods and services.

There might be a strong case for incremental spending in any particular instance, of course. Can we benefit from more national defense? Infrastructure? Grants of foreign aid? Subsidies for this industry or that? This technology or that? This cultural program or that? Public aid? Primary research? Regulatory budgets? I’d favor very few of those as general spending priorities. However, there are many subcategories and so many special interests that it is difficult to control spending as long as compromise is needed to accomplish anything.

The Trump budget is a mix of cuts in non-defense spending and large increases in defense, infrastructure outlays, and border security. On balance, it would lead to substantially higher budget deficits over the next ten years. He won’t get all of what he wants, but it would be astonishing if larger deficits are not an outcome.

Unfortunately, government is typically inefficient in the execution of its tasks and it is less responsive to price incentives than private buyers, who are fully vested in “ownership” of the dollars they spend. Government agents, no matter how honorable, simply do not have the same kind of stake in the outcome as a private owner. Obviously, spending by federal agencies is influenced by the political process, which creates opportunities for side rewards for those who direct or influence spending and those who receive the payments. These side rewards are pure private rents arising from public largess. For a private party, the profitability of transacting with government may well exceed the normal return to capital or entrepreneurship. The efficiency of government spending is compromised by its political nature and the uneconomic behavior of government agents. I therefore have strong doubts about the cost-benefit comparison of almost any public initiative.

Un-Taxing

The government ultimately acquires its funds from taxes enforced via coercive power. After all, tax collection requires a considerable enforcement effort. A tax payment of one dollar requires the sacrifice of things that would have been acquired, now or in the future, in voluntary, private transactions valued more highly than one dollar by the taxpayer. That is the nature of gains from voluntary trade foregone. The result is that one dollar of taxation extracts more than one dollar of value from the private sector. Conversely, a reduced tax liability of one dollar means that private parties can engage in an extra dollar of voluntary trade and benefit from the surplus.

There are few forms of taxes that don’t distort incentives in the private market. Taxes may blunt incentives for work, saving, and deployment of capital in productive uses. To the extent that these private decisions are twisted by taxes in ways that differ from fully voluntary decisions, there is a further loss of value and resource waste. Eliminating these distortions is always a worthy goal.

Funding Deficits

Government has ways other than immediate taxation of paying for excess spending. One is to borrow from the public, domestic or foreign. Those who purchase the government’s debt, loaning their money to the government, do so voluntarily. That debt carries an interest obligation by the government, and it must repay the principle some day. That will require new taxes and their attendant distortions, even more borrowing, and/or some other method of extracting value from the private sector. A principle known as Ricardian equivalence holds that the effects of government outlays are the same whether financed by taxes or borrowing, because taxpayers know that future taxes will be owed to pay off government debt, and so they discount that liability into their behavioral calculus.

Additional borrowing can create an unstable financial environment if borrowing occurs at interest rates higher than the economy’s rate of growth. Borrowing might also “crowd out” private borrowers, absorbing saving that would otherwise be used to finance investment in the economy’s productive capacity. In other words, the resources acquired with that extra dollar of government spending will lead to less private investment and a sacrifice of future production.

Sneaky Inflation Tax

Another way that government can pay for spending is by imposing an inflation tax. This amounts to a devaluation of privately-held assets accomplished by inducing unexpected inflation. It allows government debt to be extinguished in the future with dollars having reduced purchasing power. Essentially, more currency (or its electronic equivalent) is placed into circulation: money printing, if you like. That sets up the “too-much-money-chasing-too-few-goods” inflation cycle. But like any other tax, the inflation tax is involuntary and creates waste by inducing the public to respond to distorted incentives.

Summary

An additional dollar of government spending absorbs a dollar of resources, and destroys more value than that given lost surplus to those who would otherwise have benefited from those resources. Moreover, the spending often fails to return a full dollar in benefits, often lining the pockets of elite grifters in the process. Ultimately, the funding for incremental spending must be commandeered from private parties via taxes or an inflationary taking of assets. Public borrowing might conceal the reality of taxes for a time, but it may crowd out productive investment that would otherwise enhance economic growth. So a case against incrementally larger government can be made in terms of resource costs as well as the distortionary effects of taxes and dissipation of future private growth.

By the same token, an ostensible reduction in taxes might be illusory, to the extent that future taxes or an inflationary taking will be necessary to cover the debt one day. On the other hand, there is no direct resource cost involved, and a tax reduction unbinds constraints and distortions on private incentives, which is unambiguously beneficial. And that’s true as long as the tax reductions aren’t targeted to benefit particular sectors, parties or technologies in any new misadventures in government central planning.

Deficits, in and of themselves, are either irrelevant or possibly damaging to long-term economic growth. You’ll get them with either tax cuts or spending hikes. But spending hikes absorb real resources, whereas tax cuts release resources by transforming a dead weight loss in private markets into proper gains from trade. If deficits are a problem, and if eliminating them requires costly tax distortions, then the real problem is the expanse of the state.

5G Wireless: The NSA Wants You On Its Plan

30 Tuesday Jan 2018

Posted by pnoetx in infrastructure, National Security, Privacy, Uncategorized

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5G Wireless, Ajit Pai, central planning, FCC, incentives, Markets, National Security Council, Nationalized Wireless, Net Neutrality, NSA, Privacy, Scott Shackford, Wireless Infrastructure

Please no, Mr. President, do not even flirt with putting the federal government in charge of building and operating a new 5G wireless network! Sure, you’ll hate to disappoint the hawks on the National Security Council (NSC), but please let this remain outside the scope of your infrastructure plan!! For one thing, the private sector already has it underway, and the task is not straightforward. Excessive government involvement would almost surely botch the job. Let’s face it: while shrill calls for central planning of one form or another are constantly heard from leftists and populists, the government is really lousy at it. But then good central economic planning is impossible, given the impossibility of knowing and tracking the vast and dynamic information flows necessary to get it done, not to mention knowing and executing the appropriate responses to that information. There is a better tool for that called “markets”.

Scott Shackford reports that the chairman of the FCC, Ajit Pai, reacted with swift condemnation to the 5G discussions taking place within the NSC. Do read the whole Shackford piece. Apparently, there are some in the NSC who imagine government being good at building, maintaining, and securing a wireless network. This despite the antiquated nature of the federal government’s information systems and, as Shackford notes, their poor security. There is also the potential threat that communications over such a network would be subject to monitoring by nosey law enforcement and other public officials. If national security always implies state control, I’ll take less, but I don’t believe that’s the case for a minute.

The government tends to be a poor custodian of infrastructure — really public assets in general, and there is a reason: incentives are lacking. Private communication networks keep improving thanks to private incentives, like the prices and profits that promote efficient behavior and the market pressures to offer data plans that private users value. The government, on the other hand, struggles even to maintain the interstate highway system, which is simple technology by comparison. But statists tend to view the lack of private incentives as a feature: it’s free! And as a consequence, it is over-utilized and under-maintained. Ultimately the taxpayer is on the hook for capital costs and any upkeep that can be mustered, not the user, but the user suffers the degraded quality of those assets. A nationalized wireless network and its users would suffer the same fate.

Private infrastructure like wireless networks is best encouraged by eliminating regulatory roadblocks to private construction and operation of those assets. That includes the welcome rollback of the stifling network neutrality rules. Low taxes also help, not to say special incentives for wireless carriers.

Private Incentives and Infrastructure

10 Tuesday Jan 2017

Posted by pnoetx in infrastructure, Markets

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central planning, Donald Trump, Exclusivity of Benefits, infrastructure, Infrastructure Tax Credit, Lawrence Summers, Material Infrastructure, Private Infrastructure, Public goods, Public-Private Partnership, Randall O'Toole, Trump Infrastructure Plan, Tyler Cowen, User Fees, Walter Buhr

motorway-to-hell

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Material infrastructure is fixed plant and equipment providing services considered basic to the functioning of society. That definition leaves plenty of room for interpretation, however. For example, it does not limit the meaning of “infrastructure” to facilities necessary for the provision of “public goods”, for which benefits are non-exclusive. And it encompasses facilities used by firms in certain competitive markets, such as some forms of telecommunication. The character of infrastructure tends to change over time, as new technologies lead to changes in our way of life (e.g., the cellular network). That’s even more evident when infrastructure is defined more broadly, as Walter Buhr does in “What Is Infrastructure?” His definition of material infrastructure encompasses all facilities enabling “the activation or mobilization of the economic agents’ potentialities.”

Infrastructure ≠ Government

There is a popular fallacy that infrastructure is the exclusive province of government. Infrastructure often does provide some public, non-exclusive benefits, but the willingness of users to pay is the key test of private benefits. As it happens, most infrastructure needs can be met privately and partly, if not fully, supported by user fees. That follows from the high degree of exclusivity of benefits yielded by the infrastructure. Today, privately-owned infrastructure includes communication networks, power generation and distribution, some water and sewer systems, toll roads, ports, and landfills. The presumed monopolistic nature of some infrastructural services probably encourages the notion that infrastructure must be public, but that view is largely unjustified: the services may be “monopolized” only to the extent that the relevant market is defined narrowly, such as road travel, rather than transportation. Indeed, certain kinds of infrastructure functions in markets that are fairly competitive (e.g., wireless networks).

The great thing about most private infrastructure is that owner-operators have an incentive to put it up and keep it up. So it kind of takes care of itself. I say “kind of” because there is always a degree of public involvement, from land use and environmental approval to construction permits, to licensing, to spectrum auctions, to rate regulation, and many other varieties of oversight. Aside from those considerations, if there is a need for infrastructure that is commercially-viable, the project is likely to be proposed by private interests. The funds necessary to pay for construction can be raised from private investors, rather than taxpayers. It’s not at all strange to say that private infrastructure is highly advantageous from a public finance perspective.

There are risks to private infrastructure developers, but those risks are too often borne publicly. A new facility, be it a water treatment plant or a road, might not prove to be profitable once a new revenue stream or reduction in operating costs is realized. Given those circumstances, private interests might seek additional incentives from public authorities to ensure profitbility. To the extent that the shortfall is due to an error in pricing administered by a public regulatory authority, it might be reasonable to make adjustments in the owner-operator’s favor. However, to the extent that demand falls short of the owner-operator’s expectations, it might be better to let the firm fail. That would allow the assets to be sold at a discount to a new operator who can make the cheaper investment profitable. No bailouts!

Trumpian Infrastructure Incentives

The coming Trump Administration is known to have certain steps in mind for encouraging infrastructure development. While the tax plan that has been discussed has a few questionable features, any policy that reduces corporate tax rates would increase the return to existing and prospective private infrastructure, and the profitability of private operation of public infrastructure. In addition, a proposal mentioned explicitly by Trump is a corporate tax credit for infrastructure development.

Here is where a more precise definition of infrastructure would be helpful. Would traditional categories of infrastructure investment by power, telecommunication, and water treatment companies qualify automatically? Moreover, the long timelines required in the planning and installation of most infrastructure might make it difficult to distinguish between new plans and those already in the works. Will the administration establish a bright line between infrastructure investment and run-of-the-mill corporate spending on new plant and equipment? Perhaps any form of corporate investment will qualify. These are questions that remain unanswered as we await Trump’s inauguration.

There is another public-finance dimension of the Trump infrastructure credit. Public infrastructure projects, such as roads, are frequently difficult for governments to fund because they face limits on the debt they can issue. This is emphasized by Randall O’Toole in a recent piece on the Trump credit. Instead of issuing its own debt, a government can take advantage of a large private road builder’s ability to raise funds in the capital market, agreeing to compensate the contractor over time. Thus, taxpayers will be obligated to pay-off the contractor’s debt. The term “Public-Private Partnership” has been invoked in this connection.

Private Incentives Or Central Planning?

I am never averse to reduced tax rates to the extent that taxation always distorts economic incentives. However, selective targeting of tax benefits at certain industries, specific forms of business organization (like corporations), or specific activities like capital investment is overt central planning. Overriding market incentives in this way is not desirable. (Neither are proposals to subsidize exporters and penalize importers. Tyler Cowen at the Marginal Revolution provides some salient quotes from Lawrence Summers on this point.) At this stage, Trump’s tax plan looks like central planning gone berserk.

Ideally, private investment and private infrastructure should be judged on its real merits, not on the prejudices of a central authority. To that end, I believe the Trump Administration’s intent to roll back regulatory distortions is commendable. A case in point is nuclear power generation. Despite the constant outcry against the burning of fossil fuels, there has been little emphasis on encouraging investment in new nuclear capacity. The lengthy approval process and costly regulatory requirements discourage this zero-carbon form of energy production relative to other forms of energy investment.

Users Are the Cost-Causers

I should note that O’Toole speaks favorably of “targeting” certain kinds of public infrastructure, but I think his point is that private operation of infrastructure, if not ownership, will allow markets to do the targeting more efficiently than government ever could. In particular, he notes that politicians tend to prefer new projects to the maintenance and repair of existing infrastructure, independent of the actual merit. Would relying on private operation and user fees encourage better maintenance?

“Unlike infrastructure paid for out of tax dollars, user-fee-funded projects tend to be well maintained because the agencies that manage them know they have to keep them in good shape to continue earning revenues.“

The cartoon above satirizes the consequences of providing free access to a costly facility. User fees encourage more rational patterns of use. For example, it is folly to think that projects like light rail can be financially viable when free alternatives exist. Specific highway routes under high demand must be priced in order for commuters to make rational decisions about the alternatives available to them, and for providers of transportation facilities, whether public or private, to rationally balance the resources dedicated to supporting various modes of travel.

Lower tax and regulatory burdens under the Trump infrastructure plan offer some encouragement for private development and operation of infrastructure projects. As a by-product, the plan might encourage greater reliance on user fees as a method of defraying the costs of infrastructure and promoting a more efficient allocation of resources toward infrastructure needs. However, there are unanswered questions about the details of the plan, and some of its heavy-handy features should be dispensed with.

Equality of Economic Freedom and the End of Poverty

30 Friday Dec 2016

Posted by pnoetx in Capitalism, Liberty, Redistribution

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central planning, Dependence, Dierdre McCloskey, Economic Freedom, economic growth, Ex Ante Equality, Ex Post Equality, Exchange-Tested Betterment, Poverty, Redistribution, Robert Sowell, Safety Net, Self-Sufficiency

poverty-econ-freedom

Should any form of equality be a central goal of society? Most certainly, but answers to this question often presume that government can set ground rules, ex ante, to ensure some form of ex post equality. Equality is a thing that can exist ex ante, as when rules are applied equally, and ex post, as when there are no differences in outcomes. The latter, however, always requires coercion and force of one form or another.

The great economist Deirdre McCloskey writes in the New York Times that forced equality will not save the poor; only growth can do it. Those who put their faith in the state to eliminate poverty lack an understanding of the underlying conditions and causes of the drastic improvements in the standard of living for even the world’s most impoverished inhabitants. It is all about economic freedom and capitalism. McCloskey explains:

“Eliminating poverty is obviously good. And, happily, it is already happening on a global scale. The World Bank reports that the basics of a dignified life are more available to the poorest among us than at any time in history, by a big margin. … Even in the rich countries, the poor are better off than they were in 1970, with better food and health care and, often, amenities like air-conditioning. …

… Free adults get what they need by working to make goods and services for other people, and then exchanging them voluntarily. They don’t get them by slicing up manna from Mother Nature in a zero-sum world. …

… We had better focus directly on the equality that we actually want and can achieve, which is equality of social dignity and equality before the law.“

Achievable equality has to do with ground rules, in the first instance. The rules must establish freedoms to which all participants are entitled. Many of these freedoms are enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, for example. With regard to strictly economic rules, we have: the right to private property, including the fruits of one’s own labor; the freedom to engage in exchange on terms of our choosing, and enter into contracts in pursuit of self-interest; and the freedom to take risks with real consequences.

Around the world, ex ante freedoms like these have been instrumental in lifting masses from the grips of poverty, not temporarily and artificially, but by encouraging self-sufficiency. That is the very ex post outcome that’s been so elusive for socialized economies and state-sponsored anti-poverty transfer schemes. By encouraging economic growth and an enhanced standard of living for those at the lowest end of the socioeconomic spectrum, ex ante freedoms achieve a crucial type of ex post equality: a life above penury.

McCloskey contrasts these kinds of equality with the utter failure of redistributive schemes to accomplish anything comparable:

“An all-wise central plan could force the right people into the right jobs. But such a solution, like much of the case for a compelled equality, is violent and magical. The magic has been tried, in Stalin’s Russia and Mao’s China. So has the violence.”

Not to mention the social and economic failures in Cuba, Venezuela, East Germany, Cambodia, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, Romania, North Vietnam, North Korea, and too many others. And the sluggish growth to which many “social democracies” consign themselves by ceding dominance to the state. McCloskey continues:

As a matter of arithmetic, expropriating the rich to give to the poor does not uplift the poor very much. If we took every dime from the top 20 percent of the income distribution and gave it to the bottom 80 percent, the bottom folk would be only 25 percent better off. If we took only from the superrich, the bottom would get less than that. And redistribution works only once. You can’t expect the expropriated rich to show up for a second cutting. In a free society, they can move to Ireland or the Cayman Islands. And the wretched millionaires can hardly re-earn their millions next year if the state has taken most of the money.“

The following quote about poverty in the U.S. seems appropriate in this context. It is from Robert Sowell’s final column (having just announced his retirement from regular syndication):

“Most people living in officially defined poverty in the 21st century have things like cable television, microwave ovens and air-conditioning. Most Americans did not have such things, as late as the 1980s. People whom the intelligentsia continue to call the ‘have-nots’ today have things that the ‘haves’ did not have, just a generation ago.“

A sound argument can be made for the public provision of a safety net to cushion the blow of job losses in a market economy, or from the effects of catastrophic events on individuals or families. However, permanent status as a state-dependent must be discouraged for those capable of readjustment and self-reliance. Some such losses can and should be self-insured, not least by a willingness to pursue new opportunities, even those offering lower immediate rewards or requiring new training. Voluntary saving is another obvious form of self-insurance, of course. Nevertheless, few would deny the need for some form of social insurance to enable more comfortable transitions for those in need following certain kinds of losses.

McCloskey’s most powerful message involves the matter of value. Individuals trade with one another voluntarily only when it is of mutual benefit, which is dependent on the ex ante freedoms discussed above. There are mistakes in which parties are left unsatisfied by certain exchanges, but no one is compelled to repeat those mistakes. And they have every reason to innovate and seek alternatives. Participants may be happy to adjust the terms on which they are willing to trade, and they have every reason to imitate and repeat successes. These are the ways in which economic growth occurs:

“It is growth from exchange-tested betterment, not compelled or voluntary charity, that solves the problem of poverty.“

Capitalism and the market system have, by far, the best record of eliminating poverty in the sense of self-reliance. The only success against poverty that can be claimed by redistributionists is the substitution of lasting dependence on the state. Capitalism and the market hold the only real promise for eliminating poverty entirely.

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A 93% peaceful blog

A Force for Good

How economics, morality, and markets combine

ARLIN REPORT...................walking this path together

PERSPECTIVE FROM AN AGING SENIOR CITIZEN

Notes On Liberty

Spontaneous thoughts on a humble creed

troymo

SUNDAY BLOG Stephanie Sievers

Escaping the everyday life with photographs from my travels

Miss Lou Acquiring Lore

Gallery of Life...

Your Well Wisher Program

Attempt to solve commonly known problems…

Objectivism In Depth

Exploring Ayn Rand's revolutionary philosophy.

RobotEnomics

(A)n (I)ntelligent Future

Orderstatistic

Economics, chess and anything else on my mind.

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