It’s a Big Government Mess

22 Tuesday Nov 2022

Posted by pnoetx in Big Government, Uncategorized

Tags

Campaign Spending, Carbon Footprint, central planning, Climate Risk, Compliance Costs, Cronyism, Debt Monetization, dependency, Diversity, Do-Somethingism, External Costs, Fiscal Illusion, Limited government, Malinvestment, monopoly, Price Controls, Public goods, Redistribution, Regulatory Capture, rent seeking, Wetlands, Willingness To Pay

I’m really grateful to have the midterm elections behind us. Well, except for the runoff Senate race in Georgia, the cockeyed ranked-choice Senate race in Alaska, and a few stray House races that remain unsettled after almost two weeks. I’m tired of campaign ads, including the junk mail and pestering “unknown” callers — undoubtedly campaign reps or polling organizations.

It’s astonishing how much money is donated and spent by political campaigns. This year’s elections saw total campaign spending (all levels) hit $16.7 billion, a record for a mid-term. The recent growth in campaign spending for federal offices has been dramatic, as the chart below shows:

Do you think spending of a few hundred million dollars on a Senate campaign is crazy? Me too, though I don’t advocate for legal limits on campaign spending because, for better or worse, that issue is entangled with free speech rights. Campaigns are zero-sum events, but presumably a big donor thinks a success carries some asymmetric reward…. A success rate of better than 50% across several campaigns probably buys much more…. And donors can throw money at sure political bets that are probably worth a great deal…. Many donors spread their largess across both parties, perhaps as a form of “protection”. But it all seems so distasteful, and it’s surely a source of waste in the aggregate.

My reservations about profligate campaign spending include the fact that it is a symptom of big government. Donors obviously believe they are buying something that government, in one way or another, makes possible for them. The greater the scope of government activity, the more numerous are opportunities for rent seeking — private gains through manipulation of public actors. This is the playground of fascists!

There are people who believe that placing things in the hands of government is an obvious solution to the excesses of “greed”. However, politicians and government employees are every bit as self-interested and “greedy” as actors in the private sector. And they can do much more damage: government actors legally exercise coercive power, they are not subject in any way to external market discipline, and they often lack any form of accountability. They are not compelled to respect consumer sovereignty, and they make correspondingly little contribution to the nation’s productivity and welfare.

Actors in the private sector, on the other hand, face strong incentives to engage in optimizing behavior: they must please customers and strive to improve performance to stay ahead of their competition. That is, unless they are seduced by what power they might have to seek rents through public sector activism.

A people who grant a wide scope of government will always suffer consequences they should expect, but they often proceed in abject ignorance. So here is my rant, a brief rundown on some of the things naive statists should expect to get for their votes. Of course, this is a short list — it could be much longer:

Opportunities for graft as bureaucrats administer the spending of others’ money and manipulate economic activity via central planning.
A ballooning and increasingly complex tax code seemingly designed to benefit attorneys, the accounting profession, and certainly some taxpayers, but at the expense of most taxpayers.
Subsidies granted to producers and technologies that are often either unnecessary or uneconomic (and see here), leading to malinvestment of capital. This is often a consequence of the rent seeking and cronyism that goes hand-in-hand with government dominance and ham-handed central planning.
Redistribution of existing wealth, a zero- or even negative-sum activity from an economic perspective, is prioritized over growth.
Redistribution beyond a reasonable safety net for those unable to work and without resources is a prescription for unnecessary dependency, and it very often constitutes a surreptitious political buy-off.
Budgetary language under which “budget cuts” mean reductions in the growth of spending.
Large categories of spending, known in the U.S. as non-discretionary entitlements, that are essentially off limits to lawmakers within the normal budget appropriations process.
“Fiscal illusion” is exploited by politicians and statists to hide the cost of government expansion.
The strained refrain that too many private activities impose external costs is stretched to the point at which government authorities externalize internalities via coercive taxes, regulation, or legal actions.
Massive growth in regulation (see chart at top) extending to puddles classified as wetlands (EPA), the ”disparate impacts” of private hiring practices (EEOC), carbon footprints of your company and its suppliers (EPA, Fed, SEC), outrageous energy efficiency standards (DOE), and a multiplicity of other intrusions.
Growth in the costs of regulatory compliance.
A nearly complete lack of responsiveness to market prices, leading to misallocation of resources — waste.
Lack of value metrics for government activities to gauge the public’s “willingness to pay”.
Monopoly encouraged by regulatory capture and legal / compliance cost barriers to competition. Again, cronyism.
Monopoly granted by other mechanisms such as import restrictions and licensure requirements. Again, cronyism.
Ruination of key industries as government control takes it’s grip.
Shortages induced by price controls.
Inflation and diminished buying power stoked by monetized deficits, which is a long tradition in financing excessive government.
Malinvestment of private capital created by monetary excess and surplus liquidity.
That malinvestment of private capital creates macroeconomic instability. The poorly deployed capital must be written off and/or reallocated to productive uses at great cost.
Funding for bizarre activities folded into larger budget appropriations, like holograms of dead comedians, hamster fighting experiments, and an IHOP for a DC neighborhood.
A gigantic public sector workforce in whose interest is a large and growing government sector, and who believe that government shutdowns are the end of the world.
Attempts to achieve central control of information available to the public, and the quashing of dissent, even in a world with advanced private information technology. See the story of Hunter Biden’s laptop. This extends to control of scientific narratives to ensure support for certain government programs.
Central funding brings central pursestrings and control. This phenomenon is evident today in local governance, education, and science. This is another way in which big government fosters dependency.
Mission creep as increasing areas of economic activity are redefined as “public” in nature.
Law and tax enforcement, security, and investigative agencies pressed into service to defend established government interests and to compromise opposition.

I’ve barely scratched the surface! Many of the items above occur under big government precisely because various factions of the public demand responses to perceived problems or “injustices”, despite the broader harms interventions may bring. The press is partly responsible for this tendency, being largely ignorant and lacking the patience for private solutions and market processes. And obviously, those kinds of demands are a reason government gets big to begin with. In the past, I’ve referred to these knee-jerk demands as “do somethingism”, and politicians are usually too eager to play along. The squeaky wheel gets the oil.

I mentioned cronyism several times in the list. The very existence of broad public administration and spending invites the clamoring of obsequious cronies. They come forward to offer their services, do large and small “favors”, make policy suggestions, contribute to lawmakers, and to offer handsomely remunerative post-government employment opportunities. Of course, certaIn private parties also recognize the potential opportunities for market dominance when regulators come calling. We have here a perversion of the healthy economic incentives normally faced by private actors, and these are dynamics that gives rise to a fascist state.

It’s true, of course, that there are areas in which government action is justified, if not necessary. These include pure public goods such as national defense, as well as public safety, law enforcement, and a legal system for prosecuting crimes and adjudicating disputes. So a certain level of state capacity is a good thing. Nevertheless, as the list suggests, even these traditional roles for government are ripe for unhealthy mission creep and ultimately abuse by cronies.

The overriding issue motivating my voting patterns is the belief in limited government. Both major political parties in the U.S. violate this criterion, or at least carve out exceptions when it suits them. I usually identify the Democrat Party with statism, and there is no question that democrats rely far too heavily on government solutions and intervention in private markets. The GOP, on the other hand, often fails to recognize the statism inherent in it’s own public boondoggles, cronyism, and legislated morality. In the end, the best guide for voting would be a political candidate’s adherence to the constitutional principles of limited government and individual liberty, and whether they seem to understand those principles. Unfortunately, that is often too difficult to discern.

Markets Deal With Scarcity, Left Screams “Price Gouging”

11 Monday Apr 2022

Posted by pnoetx in Antitrust, Environmental Fascism, Oil Prices

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Antitrust, Barack Obama, central planning, ESG Scores, FDR, Fossil fuels, Gas Prices, Green New Deal, Intermittancy, Joe Biden, Keystone Pipeline, Lawrence Summers, Oil Prices, Oil Profits, OPEC, Power Grid, Price Gouging, Profit Margins, Profiteering, Renewable energy, Strategic Petroleum Reserve, Ukraine Invasion, Vladimir Putin, West Texas Intermediate

Democrats claim profiteering by oil companies is responsible for the sustained rise in oil prices since Joe Biden’s inauguration (really, his election). That’s among the more laughable attempts at gaslighting in recent memory, right up there with blaming market concentration for the sustained increase in inflation since Biden’s inauguration. At a hearing this week, congressional Democrats, frightened by the prospect of a beat-down just ahead in the mid-term elections, couldn’t resist making “price-gouging” accusations against oil producers. These pols stumble over their own contradictory talking points, insisting on more oil production only when they aren’t hastily sabotaging oil and gas output. Their dishonestly is galling, but so is the foolishness of voters who blindly accept the economic illiteracy issuing from that side of the aisle.

Break It Then Blame It

Those who level “price gouging” charges at oil companies are often the same people seeking to eliminate fossil fuel consumption by making those energy choices unaffordable. The latter is a bad look this close to mid-term elections, so they follow the playbook I described recently in “Break the Market, Blame It, Then Break It Some More“. And this post is instructive: “House Dem: Big Oil is profiteering by, er … doing what we demanded”.

Not only have the Democrats’ policies caused oil prices to soar; for many years they’ve been undermining the stability of the power grid via forced conversion into intermittent renewable energy sources like wind and solar, all while preventing the expansion of safe and carbon-free nuclear power generation. It’s ironic that these would-be industrial planners seem so eager to botch the job, though failure is all too typical of central planning. Just ask the Germans about their own hapless efforts at energy planning.

As economist Lawrence Summers, former Treasury Secretary under Barack Obama, said recently:

“Look, the net effect of the things the administration talks about in terms of micro policies to reduce inflation, this gouging talk is frivolous, nonserious, and utterly ineffectual. A gas price holiday would, ultimately, push up prices by raising demand. … The student loan relief … is injecting resources into the economy at a hundred billion dollar a year annual rate when the economy needs to be cooled off, not heated up. … The administration could be much more constructive than it has been with respect to energy supply.”

The market functions to allocate scarce resources. When conditions of scarcity become more acute, the market mechanism responds by pricing available supplies to both curtail use and incentivize delivery of additional quantities. That involves the processing of vast amounts of information, and it is a balancing at which the market performs extremely well relative to bumbling politicians and central planners, whose actions are too often at the root of acute scarcities.

Antitrust Nonsense

Of course, the Democrats have seized upon the inescapable fact that soaring oil prices cause profits to soar for anyone producing oil or holding stocks of oil. But oil company profits are notoriously volatile. Margins were negative for most of 2020, when demand weakened in the initial stages of the pandemic. And now, some companies are bracing for massive write-downs on abandoned drilling projects in Russia. The oil and gas business is certainly not known for high profit margins. Short-term profits, while they last, must be used to meet the physical or financial needs of the business.

The threats of antitrust action by the Biden Administration are an extension of the price-gouging narrative, even if the threat reflects an injudicious grasp of what it takes to prove collusion. It takes a fertile imagination to think western oil companies could successfully collude on pricing in a market dominated by the following players:

Fat chance. In any case, it’s a global market, and it’s impossible for western oil producers to dictate pricing. Even the OPEC cartel has been unable to dictate prices, not to mention keeping it’s members from violating production quotas. But if a successful conspiracy among oil companies to raise prices was possible, one would guess they’d have done it a lot sooner!

Nor is it possible for the oil majors to dictate prices at the pump, because retail prices are set independently. While the cost of crude oil is only about 54% of the cost of refined gas at retail, fluctuations in prices at the pump correlate strongly with crude oil prices. Here is a ten-year chart of daily price data, where the blue line is the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil and the orange line is the average price of regular gas in the U.S.:

Here are the same two series for 2022 year-to-date:

Coerced Scarcity

Again, oil prices have been under upward pressure for over a year until a break in early March, following the steep run-up in the immediate wake of the Ukraine invasion. First there was Biden’s stultifying rhetoric, before and after the 2020 election, assisted by radical members of Congress. Then there were executive orders halting drilling on federal lands, killing the Keystone pipeline, efforts to shut down several other existing pipelines, and the imposition of regulatory penalties on drillers. In addition, unrest in certain parts of the Middle East curtailed production, compounded this year by the boycott on Russian oil (which, as a foreign policy matter, was far too late in coming).

However, existing facilities have been capable of squeezing out more oil and gas. Lo and behold, supply curves slope upward, even in the short-run! Despite all of Biden’s efforts to cripple domestic oil production, higher crude prices have brought forth some additional supplies. Biden’s raid on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve has also boosted supply for now, but its magnitude won’t help much, and it must be replaced for use during real U.S. national emergencies, which the war in Ukraine is not, as awful as it is.

That said, investing in new drilling capacity is not wise given the political climate created by Biden and the Democrats: they have been quite clear that they mean to crush the fossil fuel industry. For some time, the oil companies have been busy investing cash flows in “green” initiatives in an effort to bolster their ESG scores, a dubious exercise to say the least. Arguably, in this policy environment, the most responsible thing to do is to return some of the capital over which these firms are stewards to its rightful owners, many of whom are middle-class savers who hold oil stocks in their 401(k) funds. That approach is manifest in the recent stock buybacks and dividend payments oil companies have announced and defended before Congress.

Conclusion

A forced shutdown of fossil fuel energy was much ballyhooed by the Left as a part of Joe Biden’s agenda. Biden himself bought into the “Green New Deal”, imagining it might win him a vaunted place alongside FDR’s legacy in American history. The effort was unwise, but Biden is trying to hang onto the narrative and maintain his punitive measures against American oil companies. All the while, he begs OPEC producers to step up production, bending a knee to despots in countries such as Iran and Venezuela. Why, it’s as if their fossil fuels are somehow cleaner than those extracted in the U.S! The feeble Biden and congressional Democrats are proving just how mendacious they are. They can rightfully blame Vladimir Putin for the recent escalation in oil prices, but they bear much responsibility themselves for the burden of high gas prices, energy bills, and the unnecessary, ongoing scarcity victimizing the American public.

The SEC’s Absurd Climate Overreach

04 Monday Apr 2022

Posted by pnoetx in Central Planning, Global Warming

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

capital costs, Carbon Emissions, Carbon Forcing Models, carbon Sensitivity, central planning, Corporatism, Disclosure Requirements, ESG Risk, ESG Scores, Green Energy, Greenhouse Gas, Hester Peirce, John Cochrane, Litigation Risk, Paris Agreement, Regulatory Risk, Renewable energy, Scope 1, Scope 2, Scope 3, SEC Climate Mandate, Securities and Exchange Commission

The Securities and Exchange Commission recently issued a proposed rule for reporting on climate change risk, and it is fairly outrageous. It asks that corporations report on their own direct greenhouse gas emissions (GHG – Scope 1), the emissions caused by their purchases of energy inputs (Scope 2), and the emissions caused by their “downstream” customers and “upstream” suppliers (Scope 3). This is another front in the Biden Administration’s efforts to bankrupt producers of fossil fuels and to force the private sector to radically alter its mix of energy inputs. The SEC’s proposed “disclosures” are sheer lunacy on several levels.

The SEC Mandate

If implemented, the rule would allow the SEC to stray well outside the bounds of its regulatory authority. The SEC’s role is not to regulate emissions or the environment. Rather, as its web site makes clear, the agency is charged with:

“… protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitating capital formation.”

Given this mission, the SEC requires management to disclose material financial risks. Are a firm’s GHG emissions really material risks? The first problem here is quite practical: John Cochrane notes the outrageous costs that would be associated with compliance:

“‘Disclosure’ usually means revealing something you know. A perfectly honest answer to ‘disclose what you know about your carbon emissions’ is, ‘we have no idea what our carbon emissions are.’ Back that up with every document the company has ever produced, and you have perfectly ‘disclosed.’ There is no asymmetric information, fraud, etc.

The SEC has already required the production of new information, and as Hester Peirce makes perfectly clear, the climate rules again make a huge dinner out of that appetizer: essentially telling companies to hire a huge number of climate consultants to generate new information, and also how to run businesses.”

In a separate post, Cochrane quotes SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce’s response to the proposed rule. She emphasizes that companies are already required to disclose all material risks. Perhaps they have properly declined to disclose climate risks because those risks are not material.

“Current SEC disclosure mandates are intended to provide investors with an accurate picture of the company’s present and prospective performance through managers’ own eyes. How are they thinking about the company? What opportunities and risks do the board and managers see? What are the material determinants of the company’s financial value?”

Identifying the Risk Causers

Regardless of the actual risks to a firm caused by climate change, the SEC’s proposed GHG disclosures put a more subtle issue into play. Peirce describes what amounts to a fundamental shift in the SEC’s philosophy regarding the motivation and purpose of disclosure:

The proposal, by contrast, tells corporate managers how regulators, doing the bidding of an array of non-investor stakeholders, expect them to run their companies. It identifies a set of risks and opportunities—some perhaps real, others clearly theoretical—that managers should be considering and even suggests specific ways to mitigate those risks. It forces investors to view companies through the eyes of a vocal set of stakeholders, for whom a company’s climate reputation is of equal or greater importance than a company’s financial performance.”

In other words, a major risk faced by these firms has nothing to do with climate change itself, but with perceptions of “climate-related” risks by other parties. That transforms the question of climate risk into something that is, in fact, regulatory and political. Is this the true nature of the SEC’s concern, all dressed up in the scientism typically relied upon by climate change activists?

The reaction of government bureaucrats to the risks they perceive is a palpable threat to investor well-being. For example, GHG emissions might lead to future regulatory sanctions from various government agencies, including fines, taxes, various sanctions, and mitigation mandates. In addition, with the growth of investment management based on what are essentially shambolic and ad hoc ESG scores, GHG or carbon emissions might lead to constraints on a firm’s access to capital. Just ask the oil and gas industry! That penalty is imposed by activist investors and fund managers who wish to force an unwise and premature end to the use of fossil fuels. There is also a threat that GHG disclosures themselves, based (as they will be) on flimsy estimates, could create litigation risk for many companies.

Much Ado About Nothing

While there are major regulatory and political risks to investors, let’s ask, for the sake of argument: how would one degree celcius of warming by the end of this century affect corporate results? Generally not at all. (The bounds described in the Paris Agreement are 1.5 to 2 degrees, but these are based on unrealistic scenarios — see links below.) It would happen gradually in any case, with ample opportunity to adapt to the operating environment. To think otherwise requires great leaps of imagination. For example, climate alarmists probably fancy that violent weather or wildfires will wipe out facilities, yet there is no reliable evidence that the mild warming experienced to-date has been associated with more violent weather or an increased incidence of wildfires (and see here). There are a great many “sacred cows” worshiped by climate-change neurotics, and the SEC undoubtedly harbors many of those shibboleths.

What probabilities can be attached to each incremental degree of warming that might occur over several decades. The evidence we’ve seen comes from so-called carbon-forcing models parameterized for unrealistically high carbon sensitivities and subjected to unrealistic carbon-concentration scenarios. Estimates of these probabilities are not reliable.

Furthermore, climate change risks, even if they could be measured reliably in the aggregate, cannot reasonably be allocated to individual firms. The magnitude of the firm’s own contribution to that risk is equivalent to the marginal reduction in risk if the firm implemented a realistic zero-carbon operating rule. For virtually any firm, we’re talking about something infinitesimal. It involves tremendous guesswork given that various parties around the globe take a flexible approach to emissions, and will continue to do so. The very suggestion of such an exercise is an act of hubris.

Back To The SEC’s Mandated Role

Let’s return to the practical problems associated with these kinds of disclosure requirements. Cochrane also points out that the onerous nature of the SEC proposal, and the regulatory and political threats it embodies, will hasten the transition away from public ownership in many industries.

“The fixed costs alone are huge. The trend to going private and abandoning public markets, at least in the U.S. will continue. The trend to large oligopolized politically compliant static businesses in the U.S. will continue.

I would bet these rules wind up in court, and that these are important issues. They should be.”

Unfortunately, private companies will still have to to deal with certain investors who would shackle their use of energy inputs and demand forms of diligence (… not to say “due”) of their own.

The SEC’s proposed climate risk disclosures are stunningly authoritarian, and they are designed to coalesce with other demands by the regulatory state to kill carbon-based energy and promote renewables. These alternative energy sources are, as yet, unable to offer an economical and stable supply of power. The fraudulent nature of the alleged risks make this all the more appalling. The SEC has effectively undertaken an effort to engage in corporatist industrial policy benefitting a certain class of “green” energy investors, exposing the proposal as yet another step on the road to fascism. Let’s hope Cochrane is right: already, 16 state attorneys general are preparing a legal challenge. May the courts ultimately see through the SEC’s sham!

Price Controls: Political Gut Reaction, Gut Punch To Public

06 Thursday Jan 2022

Posted by pnoetx in Price Controls, Shortage

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Artificial Tradeoffs, Big Meat, Big Oil, Black Markets, central planning, Excess Demand, Federal Reserve, Inflation, Isabella Weber, Joe Biden, Money Supply, Paul Krugman, Price Controls, Relative Prices, Scientism, Shortage, Unintended Consequences

In a gross failure of education or perhaps memory, politicians, policymakers, and certain academics seem blithely ignorant of things we’ve learned repeatedly. And of all the dumb ideas floated regarding our current bout with inflation, the notion of invoking price controls is near the top. But watch out, because the Biden Administration has already shifted from “inflation is transitory” to “it only hurts the rich” to “it’s fine because people just want to buy things”, and now “greedy businessmen are the culprits”. The latter falsehood is indeed the rationale for price controls put forward by a very confused economist at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst named Isabella Weber. (See this for an excerpt and a few immediate reactions.) She makes me grieve for my profession… even the frequently ditzy Paul Krugman called her out, though he softened his words after realizing he might have offended some of his partisan allies. Of course, the idea of price controls is just bad enough to gain favor with the lefty goofballs pulling Biden’s strings.

To understand the inflation process, it’s helpful to distinguish between two different dynamics:

1. When prices change we usually look for explanations in supply and demand conditions. We have supply constraints across a range of markets at the moment. There’s also a great deal to say about the ways in which government policy is hampering supplies of labor and energy, which are key inputs for just about everything. It’s fair to note here that, rather than price controls, we just might do better to ask government to get out of the way! In addition, however, consumer demand rebounded as the pandemic waned and waxed, and the federal government has been spending hand over fist, with generous distributions of cash with no strings attached. Thus, supply shortfalls and strong demand have combined to create price pressures across many markets.

2. Economy-wide, all dollar prices cannot rise continuously without an excess supply of a monetary asset. The Federal Reserve has discussed tapering its bond purchases in 2022 and its intention to raise overnight interest rates starting in the spring. It’s about time! The U.S. money supply ballooned during 2020 and its growth remains at a gallop. This has enabled the inflation we are experiencing today, and only recently have the markets begun to react as if the Fed means business.

Weber, our would-be price controller, exhibits a marked ignorance with respect to both aspects of price pressure: how markets work in the first instance, and how monetary profligacy lies at the root of broader inflation. Instead, she insists that prices are rising today because industrialists have simply decided to extract more profit! Poof! It’s as simple as that! Well what was holding those greedy bastards back all this time?

Everyone competes for scarce resources, so prices are bid upward when supplies are short, inputs more costly, or demand is outpacing supply for other reasons. Sure, sellers may earn a greater margin on sales under these circumstances. But the higher price accomplishes two important social objectives: efficient rationing of available quantities, and greater incentives to bring additional supplies to market.

So consider the outcome when government takes the advice of a Weber: producers are prohibited from adjusting price in response to excess demand. Shortages develop. Consumers might want more, but that’s either impossible or it simply costs more. Yet producers are prohibited from pricing commensurate with that cost. Other adjustments soon follow, such as changes in discounts, seller credit arrangements, and product quality. Furthermore, absent price adjustment, transaction costs become much more significant. Other resources are consumed in the mere process of allocating available quantities: time spent in queues, administering quotas, lotteries or other schemes, costly barter, and ultimately unsatisfied needs and wants, not to mention lots of anger and frustration. Lest anyone think this process is “fair”, keep in mind that it’s natural for these allocations to take a character that is worse than arbitrary. “Important people” will always have an advantage under these circumstances.

Regulatory and financial burdens are imposed on those who play by the rules, but not everyone does. Black market mechanisms come into play, including opportunities for illegal side payments, rewards for underworld activity, along with a general degradation in the rule of law.

Price controls also impose rigidity in relative prices that can be very costly for society. “Freezing” the value of one good in terms of others distorts the signals upon which efficient resource allocation depends. Tastes, circumstances, and production technology change, and flexible relative prices enable a smoother transitions between these states. And even while demand and/or input scarcity might increase in all markets, these dynamics are never uniform. Over time, imbalances always become much larger in some markets than others. Frozen relative prices allow these imbalances to persist.

For example, the true value of good A at the imposition of price controls might be two units of good B. Over time, the true value of A might grow to four units of good B, but the government insists that A must be traded for no more than the original two units of B. Good B thus becomes overvalued on account of government intervention. The market for good A, which should attract disproportionate investment and jobs, will instead languish under a freeze of relative prices. Good B will continue to absorb resources under the artificial tradeoff imposed by price controls. Society must then sacrifice the gains otherwise afforded by market dynamism.

The history of price controls is dismal (also see here). They artificially suppress measured inflation and impose great efficiency costs on the public. Meanwhile, price controls fail to address the underlying monetary excess.

Price controls are destructive when applied economy-wide, but also when governments attempt to apply them to markets selectively. Posturing about “strategic” use of price controls reveals the naïveté of those who believe government planners can resolve market dislocations better than market participants themselves. Indeed, the planners would do better to discover, and undo, the damage caused by so many ongoing regulatory interventions.

So beware Joe Biden’s bluster about “greedy producers” in certain markets, whether they be in “Big Meat”, or “Big Oil”. Price interventions in these markets are sure to bring you less meat, less oil, and quite possibly less of everything else. The unintended consequences of such government interventions aren’t difficult to foresee unless one is blinded with the scientism of central planning.

Break the Market, Blame It, Then Break It Some More

28 Sunday Nov 2021

Posted by pnoetx in Energy, Environmental Fascism, Free markets, Uncategorized

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

Antitrust, Asymmetric Information, Build Back Better, Capital Controls, central planning, Endangered Species Act, Energy Policy, Externalities, Fossil fuels, Fracking, FTC, Government Failure, Green New Deal, Greenbook, Hart Energy, Industrial Policy, Industry Concentration, Joe Biden, Keystone XL Pipeline, Knowledge Problem, Line 5 Pipeline, Mark Theisen, Market Failure, Monetary policy, OPEC, Price Gouging, Principles of Economics, Quotas, Regulatory Overreach, Stephen Green, Strategic Petroleum Reserve, Subsidies, Tariffs, Taxes, The Fatal Conceit

Much of what is labeled market failure is a consequence of government failure, or rather, failure caused by misguided public intervention, not just in individual markets but in the economy more generally. Misguided efforts to correct perceived excesses in pricing are often the problem, but there are myriad cases of regulatory overreach, ham-handed application of taxes and subsidies for various enterprises, and widespread cronyism. But it is often convenient for politicians to appear as if they are doing something, which makes activism and active blame of private enterprise a tempting path. The Biden Administration’s energy crisis offers a case in point. First, a digression on the efficiency of free markets. Skip the next two sections to get straight to Biden’s mess.

Behold the Bounty

I always spent part of the first class session teaching Principles of Economics on some incredible things that happen each and every day. Most college freshmen seem to take them for granted: the endless variety of goods that arrive on shelves each day; the ongoing flow of services, many appearing like magic at the flick of a switch; the high degree of coincidence between specific wants and all these fresh supplies; the variety and flow of raw materials and skills that are brought to bear; the fantastic array of sophisticated equipment deployed to assist in these efforts; and the massive social coordination necessary to accomplish all this. How does it all happen? Who collects all the information on what is wanted, and by whom? On the feasibility of actually producing and distributing various things? What miracle computer processes the vast set of information guiding these decisions and actions? Does some superior intelligence within an agency plan all this stuff?

The answer is simple. The seemingly infinite set of knowledge is marshaled, and all these tasks are performed, by the greatest institution of social cooperation to ever emerge: decentralized, free markets! Buying decisions are guided by individual needs and wants. Production and selling decisions are guided by resource availability and technology. And all sides react to evolving prices. Preferences, resources, and technology are in a constant state of flux, but prices react, signaling producers and consumers to make individual adjustments that correct larger imbalances. It is tempting to describe the process as the evolving solution to a gigantic set of dynamic equations.

The Impossible Conceit

No human planner or government agency is capable of solving this problem as seamlessly and efficiently as markets, nor can they hope to achieve the surplus welfare that redound to buyers and sellers in markets. Central planners or intervening authorities cannot possess the knowledge and coordinating power of the market mechanism. That doesn’t mean markets are “perfect”, of course. Things like external costs and benefits, dominant sellers, and asymmetric information can cause market outcomes to deviate from the competitive “ideal”. Inequities can arise from some of these imperfections as well.

What can be much worse is the damage to market performance caused by government policy. Usually the intent is to “correct” imperfections, and the rationale might be defensible. The knowledge to do it very well is often lacking, however. Taxes, subsidies, regulations, tariffs, quotas, capital controls, and manipulation of interest rates (and monetary and credit aggregates) are very general categories of distortion caused by the public sector. Then there is competition for resources via government procurement, which is frequently graft-ridden or price-insensitive.

Many public interventions create advantages for large sellers, leading to greater market concentration. This might best serve the private political power of the wealthy or might convey advantages to investments that happen to be in vogue among the political class. These are the true roots of fascism, which leverages coercive state power for the benefit of private interests.

Energy Vampires

Now we have the curious case of the Biden Administration and it’s purposeful disruption of energy markets in an effort to incentivize a hurried transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. As I described in a recent post on stagflation,

“… Biden took several steps to hamstring the domestic fossil fuel industry at a time when the economy was still recovering from the pandemic. This included revoking permits for the Keystone pipeline, a ban on drilling on federal lands and federally-controlled waters in the Gulf, shutting down production on some private lands on the pretext of enforcing the Endangered Species Act, and capping methane emissions by oil and gas producers. And all that was apparently just a start.

As Mark Theisen notes, when you promise to destroy a particular industry, as Joe Biden has, by taxing and regulating it to death, who wants to invest in or even maintain production facilities? Some leftists with apparent influence on the administration are threatening penalties against the industry up to and including prosecution for ‘crimes against humanity’!”

In addition to killing Keystone, there remains a strong possibility that Biden will shut down the Line 5 pipeline in Michigan, and there are other pipelines currently under federal review. Biden’s EPA also conducted a purge of science advisors considered “too friendly” to oil and gas industry. This was intertwined with a “review” of new methane rules, which harm smaller, independent oil and gas drillers disproportionately.

Joe Biden’s “Build Back Better” (BBB) legislation, as clumsy in policy as it is in name, introduces a number of “Green New Deal” provisions that would further disadvantage the production and use of fossil fuels. Hart Energy provides descriptions of various tax changes that appeared in the Treasury’s so-called “Greenbook”, a collection of revenue proposals, many of which appear in the BBB legislation that recently passed in the House. These include rollbacks of various deductions for drilling costs, depletion allowances, and recovery rules, as well as hikes in certain excise taxes as well as taxes on foreign oil income. And all this while granting generous subsidies to intermittent and otherwise uneconomic technologies that happen to be in political favor. This is a fine payoff for cronies having invested significantly in these rent seeking opportunities. While the bill still faces an uphill fight in the Senate, apparently Biden has executive orders, held in abeyance, that would inflict more pain on consumers and producers of fossil fuels.

Biden’s energy policies are obviously intended to reduce supplies of oil, gas, and other fossil fuels. Prices have responded, as Green notes:

“Gas is up an average of 57% this year, with corresponding increases of 44% for diesel and a whopping 60% for fuel oil.”

The upward price pressure is not limited to petroleum: electricity rates are jumping as well. Consumers and shippers have noticed. In fact, while Biden crows about wanting “the rich” to pay for BBB, his energy policies are steeply regressive in their impact, as energy absorbs a much larger share of budgets among the poor than the rich. This is politically suicidal, but Biden’s advisors have chosen a most cynical tact as the reality has dawned on them.

Abusive Victim Blaming

Who to blame? After the predictable results of cramping domestic production and attacking fossil fuel producers, the Biden team naturally blames them for rising prices! “Price gouging” is a charge made by political opportunists and those who lack an understanding of how markets allocate scarce resources. More severe scarcity means that prices must rise to ration available quantities and to incentivize those capable of bringing forth additional product under difficult circumstances. That is how a market is supposed to function, and it mitigates scarcity!

But here comes the mendacious and Bumbling Buster Biden. He wants antitrust authorities at the FTC to investigate oil pricing. Again from Stephen Green:

“… the Biden Administration has decided to launch a vindictive legal campaign against oil producers in order to deflect blame for the results of Biden’s policies: Biden’s Solution to Rising Gas Prices Appears to Be Accusing Oil Companies of Price Gouging.”

There’s nothing quite like a threat to market participants to prevent the price mechanism from performing its proper social function. But a failure to price rationally is a prescription for more severe shortages.

Biden has also ordered the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to release 50 million barrels of oil, a move that replaces a total of 2.75 days of monthly consumption in the U.S. The SPR is supposed to be drawn upon only in the case of emergencies like natural disasters, so this draw-down is as irresponsible as it is impotent. In fact, OPEC is prepared to offset the SPR release with a production cut. Biden has resorted to begging OPEC to increase production, which is pathetic because the U.S. was a net exporter of oil not long ago … until Biden took charge.

Conclusion

Properly stated, the challenge mounted against markets as an institution is not that they fall short of “perfection”. It is that some other system would lead to superior results in terms of efficiency and/or equity. Central planning, including the kind exercised by the Biden Administration in it’s hurried and foolish effort to tear down and remake the energy economy, is not even a serious candidate on either count.

Granted, there is a long history of subsidies to the oil and gas sector. I cannot defend those, but the development of the technology (even fracking) largely preceded the fruits of the industry’s rent seeking. At this point, green fuels receive far more subsidies (despite some claims to the contrary). Furthermore, the primacy of fossil fuels was not achieved by tearing down competing technologies and infrastructure. In contrast, the current round of central planning requires destruction of entire sectors of the economy that could otherwise produce efficiently for the foreseeable future, if left unmolested.

The Biden Administration has adopted the radical green agenda. Their playbook calls for a severe tilting of price incentives in favor uneconomic, renewable energy sources, despite the economy’s heretofore sensible reliance on plentiful fossil fuels. It’s no surprise that Biden’s policy is unpopular across the economic spectrum. His natural inclination is to blame a competitive industry victimized by his policy. It’s a futile attempt to avoid accountability, as if he thinks doubling down on the fascism will help convince the electorate that oil and gas producers dreamt up this new, nefarious strategy of overcharging customers. People aren’t that dumb, but it’s typical for the elitist Left presume otherwise.

Central Planning With AI Will Still Suck

23 Sunday Feb 2020

Posted by pnoetx in Artificial Intelligence, Central Planning, Free markets

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Artificial Intelligence, central planning, Common Law, Data Science, Digital Socialism, Friedrich Hayek, Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Machine Learning, Marginal Revolution, Property Rights, Robert Lucas, Roman Law, Scientism, The Invisible Hand, The Knowledge Problem, The Lucas Critique, Tyler Cowen

Artificial intelligence (AI) or machine learning (ML) will never make central economic planning a successful reality. Jesús Fernández-Villaverde of the University of Pennsylvania has written a strong disavowal of AI’s promise in central planning, and on the general difficulty of using ML to design social and economic policies. His paper, “Simple Rules for a Complex World with Artificial Intelligence“, was linked last week by Tyler Cowen at Marginal Revolution. Note that the author isn’t saying “digital socialism” won’t be attempted. Judging by the attention it’s getting, and given the widespread acceptance of the scientism of central planning, there is no question that future efforts to collectivize will involve “data science” to one degree or another. But Fernández-Villaverde, who is otherwise an expert and proponent of ML in certain applications, is simply saying it won’t work as a curative for the failings of central economic planning — that the “simple rules” of the market will aways produce superior social outcomes.

The connection between central planning and socialism should be obvious. Central planning implies control over the use of resources, and therefore ownership by a central authority, whether or not certain rents are paid as a buy-off to the erstwhile owners of those resources. By “digital socialism”, Fernández-Villaverde means the use of ML to perform the complex tasks of central planning. The hope among its cheerleaders is that adaptive algorithms can discern the optimal allocation of resources within some “big data” representation of resource availability and demands, and that this is possible on an ongoing, dynamic basis.

Fernández-Villaverde makes the case against this fantasy on three fronts or barriers to the use of AI in policy applications: data requirements; the endogeneity of expectations and behavior; and the knowledge problem.

The Data Problem: ML requires large data sets to do anything. And impossibly large data sets are required for ML to perform the task of planning economic activity, even for a small portion of the economy. Today, those data sets do not exist except in certain lines of business. Can they exist more generally, capturing the details of all economic transactions? Can the data remain current? Only at great expense, and ML must be trained to recognize whether data should be discarded as it becomes stale over time due to shifting demographics, tastes, technologies, and other changes in the social and physical environment.

Policy Change Often Makes the Past Irrelevant: Planning algorithms are subject to the so-called Lucas Critique, a well known principle in macroeconomics named after Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas. The idea is that policy decisions based on observed behavior will change expectations, prompting responses that differ from the earlier observations under the former policy regime. A classic case involves the historical tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. Can this tradeoff be exploited by policy? That is, can unemployment be reduced by a policy that increases the rate of inflation (by printing money at a faster rate)? In this case, the Lucas Critique is that once agents expect a higher rate of inflation, they are unlikely to confuse higher prices with a more profitable business environment, so higher employment will not be sustained. If ML is used to “plan” certain outcomes desired by some authority, based on past relationships and transactions, the Lucas Critique implies that things are unlikely to go as planned.

The Knowledge Problem: Not only are impossibly large data sets required for economic planning with ML, as noted above. To achieve the success of markets in satisfying unlimited wants given scarce resources, the required information is impossible to collect or even to know. This is what Friedrich Hayek called the “knowledge problem”. Just imagine the difficulty of arranging a data feed on the shifting preferences of many different individuals across a huge number of products, services and they way preference orderings will change across the range of possible prices. The data must have immediacy, not simply a historical record. Add to this the required information on shifting supplies and opportunity costs of resources needed to produce those things. And the detailed technological relationships between production inputs and outputs, including time requirements, and the dynamics of investment in future productive capacity. And don’t forget to consider the variety of risks agents face, their degree of risk aversion, and the ways in which risks can be mitigated or hedged. Many of these things are simply unknowable to a central authority. The information is hopelessly dispersed. The task of collecting even the knowable pieces is massive beyond comprehension.

The market system, however, is able to process all of this information in real time, the knowable and the unknowable, in ways that balance preferences with the true scarcity of resources. No one actor or authority need know it all. It is the invisible hand. Among many other things, it ensures the deployment of ML only where it makes economic sense. Here is Fernández-Villaverde:

“The only reliable method we have found to aggregate those preferences, abilities, and efforts is the market because it aligns, through the price system, incentives with information revelation. The method is not perfect, and the outcomes that come from it are often unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, like democracy, all the other alternatives, including ‘digital socialism,’ are worse.”

Later, he says:

“… markets work when we implement simple rules, such as first possession, voluntary exchange, and pacta sunt servanda. This result is not a surprise. We did not come up with these simple rules thanks to an enlightened legislator (or nowadays, a blue-ribbon committee of academics ‘with a plan’). … The simple rules were the product of an evolutionary process. Roman law, the Common law, and Lex mercatoria were bodies of norms that appeared over centuries thanks to the decisions of thousands and thousands of agents.”

These simple rules represent good private governance. Beyond reputational enforcement, the rules require only trust in the system of property rights and a private or public judicial authority. Successfully replacing private arrangements in favor of a central plan, however intricately calculated via ML, will remain a pipe dream. At best, it would suspend many economic relationships in amber, foregoing the rational adjustments private agents would make as conditions change. And ultimately, the relationships and activities that planning would sanction would be shaped by political whim. It’s a monstrous thing to contemplate — both fruitless and authoritarian.

You’re Welcome: Charitable Gifts Prompt Statist Ire

14 Friday Dec 2018

Posted by pnoetx in Central Planning, Charity, Uncategorized

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Amazon, American Institute for Economic Research, central planning, Charity, Cloe Anagnos, Day 1 Fund, Doug Bandow, Forced Charity, Gaby Del Valle, Homelessness, Jeff Bezos, Redistribution, Russ Roberts, Scientism, Seattle Employment Tax, War on Charity

Charitable acts are sometimes motivated by a desire to cultivate a favorable reputation, or even to project intelligence. Perhaps certain charitable acts are motivated by guilt of one kind or another. Tax deduction are nice, too. But sometimes a charitable gift is prompted by no more than a desire to help others less fortunate. It’s likely a combination of motives in many cases, but to gainsay the purity of anyone’s charitable motives is rather unseemly. Yet Gaby Del Valle does just that in Vox, casting a skeptical eye at Jeff Bezos’ efforts to help the homeless through his Day 1 Fund.

“Last week, Amazon founder and CEO Jeff Bezos announced that he and his wife, MacKenzie Bezos, were donating $97.5 million to 24 organizations that provide homeless services across the country. The donation is part of Bezos’s $2 billion ‘Day 1 Fund, a philanthropic endeavor … that, according to Bezos, focuses on establishing ‘a network of new, non-profit, tier-one preschools in low-income communities’ and funding existing nonprofits that provide homeless services.”

Del Valle says Bezos deserves little credit for his big gift for several reasons. First, Amazon very publicly opposed a recent initiative for a $275 per employee tax on large employers in Seattle. The proceeds would have been used to fund public programs for the homeless. This allegation suggests that Bezos feels guilty, or that the gift is a cynical attempt to buy-off critics. That might have an element of truth, but the tax was well worthy of opposition on economic grounds — almost as if it was designed to stunt employment and economic growth in the city.

Second, because Amazon has been an engine of growth for Seattle, Del Valle intimates that the company and other large employers are responsible for the city’s high cost of housing and therefore homelessness. Of course, growth in a region’s economy is likely to lead to higher housing prices if the supply of housing does not keep pace, but forsaking economic growth is not a solution. Furthermore, every large city in the country suffers from some degree of homelessness. And not all of those homeless individuals have been “displaced”, as Del Valle would have it. Some have relocated voluntarily without any guarantee or even desire for employment. As for the housing stock, government environmental regulations, zoning policies and rent control (in some markets) restrains expansion, leading to higher costs.

Finally, Del Valle implies that private efforts to help the homeless are somehow inferior to “leadership by elected officials”. Further, she seems to regard these charitable acts as threatening to “public” objectives and government control. At least she doesn’t disguise her authoritarian impulses. Del Valle also quotes a vague allegation that one of the charities beholden to Amazon is less than a paragon of charitable virtue. Well, I have heard similar allegations that government isn’t celebrated for rectitude in fulfilling its duties. Like all statists, Del Valle imagines that government technocrats possess the best vision of how to design aid programs. That attitude is an extension of the scientism and delusions of efficacy typical of central planners. Anyone with the slightest awareness of the government’s poor track record in low-income housing would approach such a question with trepidation. In contrast, private efforts often serve as laboratories in which to test innovative programs that can later be adopted on a broader scale.

While selfishness might motivate private acts of charity in some cases, only voluntary, private charity can ever qualify as real charity. Government benefits for the homeless are funded by taxes, which are compulsory. Such public programs might be justifiable as an extension of social insurance, but it is not charity in any pure sense; neither are it advocates engaged in promoting real charity, despite their conveniently moralistic positioning. And unlike private charity, government redistribution programs can be restrained only through a political process in which substantial payers are a distinct minority of the voting population.

Public aid and private charity have worked alongside each other for many years in the U.S. According to Russ Roberts, private giving to the poor began to be “crowded-out” during the Great Depression by a dramatic increase in public assistance programs. (Also see Doug Bandow’s “War On Charity“.) It’s certainly more difficult to make a case for gifts to the poor when donors are taxed by the government in order to redistribute income.

The statist war on private charity can take other forms. The regulatory apparatus can crowd-out private efforts to extend a helping hand. Chloe Anagnos of the American Institute for Economic Research (AIER) writes of a charity in Kansas City that wanted to provide home-cooked soup to the homeless, but health officials intervened, pouring bleach into the soup. I am aware of similar but less drastic actions in St. Louis, where organizations attempting to hand-out sandwiches to the poor were recently prohibited by health authorities.

Private charity has drawn criticism because its source has driven economic growth, its source has opposed policies that stunt comic growth, and because it might interfere with the remote possibility that government would do it better. But private charity plays a critical role in meeting the needs of the disadvantaged, whether as a substitute for public aid where it falls short, or as a supplement. It can also play a productive role in identifying the most effective designs for aid programs. Of course, there are corrupt organizations and individuals purporting to do charitable work, which argues for a degree of public supervision over private charities. But unfortunately, common sense is too often lost to overzealous enforcement. In general, the public sector should not stand in the way of private charities and charitable acts, but real generosity has little value to those who press for domination by the state.

Human Potential Exceeds the Human Burden

30 Friday Nov 2018

Posted by pnoetx in Abortion, Mobility, Redistribution

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Abortion, Border Control, central planning, dependency, Economic Burden, Economic Freedom, Eugenics, Human Footprint, Human Ingenuity, Immigration, Left Tail, Margaret Sanger, Open Borders, Planned Parenthood, Population Control, Private charity, Public Safety Net

Are human beings a burden, and in what way? Between two camps of opinion on this question are many shades of thought, and some inconsistencies. But whether the discussion is centered on the macro-societal level or the family level, the view of people and population growth as burdensome promotes centralized social control and authoritarian rule, with an attendant imposition of burdens on human freedom and productive effort.

Naysaying Greens

The environmental Left views people as a net burden on resources while failing to recognize their resource value, without which our world would yield little in the way of food and other comforts. It is mankind’s ability to process and transform raw materials that makes the planet so hospitable.

The world’s human population has increased by a factor of 18 times in the last 400 years, but food supplies have grown even faster. Each person has potential as a resource capable of a net positive contribution to societal and global well being. If we wrongly conclude that people are burdensome, however, it offers a rationale to statists for regulating the lives of individuals, preventing them from producing and consuming as they would otherwise choose.

Sirens of Dependency

There will always be individuals who cannot provide for themselves, sometimes due to temporary circumstances and sometimes as a permanent condition. If the latter, these individuals find themselves in the lower tail of the distribution of human productive capacity. The undeniable burden of this lower tail for humanity can be dealt with through various social support structures, including family, religious organizations, private social organizations, and the public safety net.

People of true compassion have always helped to fill this need privately and voluntarily, but “compassionate” motives can be a false and corrupting when the public sector becomes the tool of choice. Actual and potential beneficiaries of public largess can vote for their alms at the expense of others, along with those well-meaning partisans who confuse forced redistribution with compassion. And benefits and taxes often create disincentives that undermine a society’s productive dynamic. Under such circumstances, the lower tail and its burden of dependency grows larger than necessary, and society’s ability to carry that burden is diminished.

Burdensome Children

Children are unable to provide for themselves up to varying ages, so they do create an economic burden for their parents. That burden might loom large in the event of an unexpected pregnancy, but most parents find the burden well worth bearing, whether planned or unplanned, ex ante and ex post, and for reasons that often have little to do with material concerns. But many individuals and families in the lower tail simply cannot bear the economic burden on their own; others not in the lower tail might simply find the prospective burden of an unexpected pregnancy a bit too heavy or inconvenient for non-economic reasons.

Solutions are available, of course. They range from sexual abstinence and prophylactics to adoption services, as well as hard sacrifice by new parents. And then there is abortion. The pro-choice Left makes the argument that children are so burdensome as to justify the termination of pregnancies at almost any stage. The ease with which they make that argument and traffic in the imposition of that burden upon the innocent is horrific. Furthermore, regimes dominated by the Left have often instituted formal population control measures, and Western leftists such as the late Margaret Sanger, founder of Planned Parenthood, have advocated strenuously for eugenics.

Burdens at the Border

Are migrants a burden or a blessing? In general, the latter, because mobility allows individuals to exploit economic opportunities, with consequent gains to themselves and to those who demand their services. This is generally true from the perspective of nations; it is the basis of the traditional economic argument in favor of liberalized, legal immigration to which I subscribe. But some partisans on both sides of the immigration debate accept the idea that immigrants impose a burden. That may be correct under some circumstances.

Opponents of immigration reform certainly identify immigrants as a burden to productive citizens and taxpayers. Critics of border control, on the other hand, are motivated by compassion for political refugees or economically disadvantaged immigrants, whether employment opportunities exist for them or not. In fact, would-be immigrants are often attracted by generous public benefits in the receiving country, and so they are likely to add to a country’s lower-tail burden, as I’ve described it. But the no-borders crowd insists that society must shoulder any burden created by the combined effect of an open border with generous public benefits, and even immediate voting rights.

The Burdens of Overbearance

The Left imagines that people create many burdens, but the Left is happy to impose many burdens in pursuit of their “ideal” society: planned by experts, egalitarian, highly regulated, profit-free, and green. They wish to “save the planet” by imposing burdens, regulating and restricting economic growth and sparing no expense to minimize the human “footprint”. They wish to fund redistributive social programs by burdening productive resources with taxes, while crowding-out private efforts to provide charitable relief. They wish to prevent the perceived burden of children by offering, and even funding publicly, the “choice” to impose an ultimate burden on those too weak to register a protest. And they wish to burden taxpayers by availing all potential migrants, without question, of generous public benefits.

Burdens are a fact of life, but people with the freedom to exploit their own effort and ingenuity for gain have increasingly shouldered their own burdens and much more. Over the last few centuries, human ingenuity has expanded the effective quantity of all resources by many orders of magnitude. In so doing, the scale and scope of real poverty have been reduced dramatically. But those who would deign to manage our burdens for us, under the authority of the state, are more threatening to our well being than beneficent.

Central Planning Fails to Scale, Unlike Spontaneous Order

05 Tuesday Jun 2018

Posted by pnoetx in Central Planning, Markets, Price Controls

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Bronze Age, central planning, Client-Server Network, Decentralized Decision-Making, Economies of Scale, Federalism, Francis Turner, Industrial Policy, Liberty.me, Markets, Peer-to-Peer Network, Price mechanism, Property Rights, Scalability, Spontaneous Order

The proposition that mankind is capable of creating a successful “planned” society is at least as old as the Bronze Age. Of course it’s been tried. The effort necessarily involves a realignment of the economic and political landscape and always requires a high degree of coercion. But putting that aside, such planning can never be successful relative to spontaneous order of the kind that dominates private affairs in a free society. The task of advancing human well-being given available resources has never been achieved under central planning. It always fails miserably in this regard, and it always will fail to match the success of decentralized decision-making and private markets.

There are various ways to explain this fact, but I recently came across an interesting take on the subject having to do with the notion of scalability. Francis Turner offer s this note on th e topic at the Liberty.me blog. To begin, he gives a lengthy quote from a software developer who relates the problems of social and economic planning to the complexity of managing a network. On the topic of scale, the developer notes that the number of relationships in a network increases with the square of the number of its “nodes”, or members:

“2 nodes have 1 potential relationship. 4 nodes (twice as many) has 6 potential relationships (6 times as many). 8 nodes (twice again) has 28 potential relationships. 100 nodes => [4,950] relationships; 1,000 nodes => 499,500 relationships—nearly half a million.“

Actually, the formula for the number of potential relationships or connections in a network is n*(n-1)/2, where n is the number of network nodes. The developer Turner quotes discusses this in the context of two competing network management structures: client-server and peer-to-peer. Under the former, the network is managed centrally by a server, which communicates with all nodes, makes various decisions, and routes communications traffic between nodes. In a peer-to-peer network, the work of network management is distributed — each computer manages its own relationships. The developer says, at first, “the idea of hooking together thousands of computers was science fiction.” But as larger networks were built-out in the 1990s, the client-server framework was more or less rejected by the industry because it required such massive resources to manage large networks. In fact, as new nodes are added to a peer-to-peer network, its capacity to manage itself actually increases! In other words, client-server networks are not as scalable as peer-to-peer networks:

“Even if it were perfectly designed and never broke down, there was some number of nodes that would crash the server. It was mathematically unavoidable. You HAVE TO distribute the management as close as possible to the nodes, or the system fails.

… in an instant, I realized that the same is true of governments. … And suddenly my coworker’s small government rantings weren’t crazy…”

This developer’s epiphany captures a few truths about the relative efficacy of decentralized decision-making. It’s not just for computer networks! But in fact, when it comes to network management, the task is comparatively simple: meet the computing and communication needs of users. A central server faces dynamic capacity demands and the need to route changing flows of traffic between nodes. Software requirements change as well, which may necessitate discrete alterations in capacity and rules from time-to-time.

But consider the management of a network of individual economic units. Let’s start with individuals who produce something… like widgets. There are likely to be real economies achieved when a few individual widgeteers band together to produce as a team. Some specialization into different functions can take place, like purchasing materials, fabrication, and distribution. Perhaps administrative tasks can be centralized for greater efficiency. Economies of scale may dictate an even larger organization, and at some point the firm might find additional economies in producing widget-complementary products and services. But eventually, if the decision-making is centralized and hierarchical, the sheer weight of organizational complexity will begin to take a toll, driving up costs and/or diminishing the firm’s ability to deal with changes in technology or the market environment. In other words, centralized control becomes difficult to scale in an efficient way, and there may be some “optimal” size for a firm beyond which it struggles.

Now consider individual consumers, each of whom faces an income constraint and has a set of tastes spanning innumerable goods. These tastes vary across time scales like hour-of-day, day-of-week, seasons, life-stage, and technology cycles. The volume of information is even more daunting when you consider that preferences vary across possible price vectors and potential income levels as well.

Can the interactions between all of these consumer and producer “nodes” be coordinated by a central economic authority so as to optimize their well-being dynamically, subject to resource constraints? As we’ve seen, the job requires massive amounts of information and a crushing number of continually evolving decisions. It is really impossible for any central authority or computer to “know” all of the information needed. Secondly, to the software developer’s point, the number of potential relationships increases with the square of the number of consumers and producers, as does the required volume of information and number of decisions. The scalability problem should be obvious.

This kind of planning is a task with which no central authority can keep up. Will the central authority always get milk, eggs and produce to the store when people need it, at a price they are willing to pay, and with minimal spoilage? Will fuel be available such that a light always turns on whenever they flip the switch? Will adequate supplies of medicines always be available for the sick? Will the central authority be able to guarantee a range of good-quality clothing from which to choose?

There has never been a central authority that successfully performed the job just described. Yet that job gets done every day in free, capitalistic societies, and we tend to take it for granted. The massive process of information transmission and coordination takes place spontaneously with spectacularly good results via private discovery and decision-making, secure property rights, markets, and a functioning price mechanism. Individual economic units are endowed with decision-making power and the authority to manage their own relationships. And the spontaneous order that takes shape remains effective even as networks of economic units expand. In other words, markets are highly scalable at solving the eternal problem of allocating scarce resources.

But thus far I’ve set up something of a straw man by presuming that the central authority must monitor all individual economic units to know and translate their demands and supplies of goods into the ongoing, myriad decisions about production, distribution and consumption. Suppose the central authority takes a less ambitious approach. For example, it might attempt to enforce a set of prices that its experts believe to be fair to both consumers and producers. This is a much simpler task of central management. What could go wrong?

These prices will be wrong immediately, to one degree or another, without tailoring them to detailed knowledge of the individual tastes, preferences, talents, productivities, price sensitivities, and resource endowments of individual economic units. It would be sheer luck to hit on the correct prices at the start, but even then they would not be correct for long. Conditions change continuously, and the new information is simply not available to the central authority. Various shortages and surpluses will appear without the corrective mechanism usually provided by markets. Queues will form here and inventories will accumulate there without any self-correcting mechanism. Consumers will be angry, producers will quit, goods will rot, and stocks of physical capital will sit idle and go to waste.

Other forms of planning attempt to set quantities of goods produced and are subject to errors similar to those arising from price controls. Even worse is an attempt to plan both price and quantity. Perhaps more subtle is the case of industrial policy, in which planners attempt to encourage the development of certain industries and discourage activity in those deemed “undesirable”. While often borne out of good intentions, these planners do not know enough about the future of technology, resource supplies, and consumer preferences to arrogate these kinds of decisions to themselves. They will invariably commit resources to inferior technologies, misjudge future conditions, and abridge the freedoms of those whose work or consumption is out-of-favor and those who are taxed to pay for the artificial incentives. To the extent that industrial policies become more pervasive, scalability will become an obstacle to the planners because they simply lack the information required to perform their jobs of steering investment wisely.

Here is Turner’s verdict on central planning:

“No central planner, or even a board of them, can accurately set prices across any nation larger than, maybe, Liechtenstein and quite likely even at the level of Liechtenstein it won’t work well. After all how can a central planner tell that Farmer X’s vegetables taste better and are less rotten than Farmer Y’s and that people therefore are prepared to pay more for a tomato from Farmer X than they are one from Farmer Y.”

I will go further than Turner: planning can only work well in small settings and only when the affected units do the planning. For example, the determination of contract terms between two parties requires planning, as does the coordination of activities within a firm. But then these plans are not really “central” and the planners are not “public”. These activities are actually parts of a larger market process. Otherwise, the paradigm of central planning is not merely unscalable, it is unworkable without negative consequences.

Finally, the notion of scalability applies broadly to governance, not merely economic planning. The following quote from Turner, for example, is a ringing endorsement for federalism:

“It is worth noting that almost all successful nations have different levels of government. You have the local town council, the state/province/county government, possibly a regional government and then finally the national one. Moreover richer countries tend to do better when they push more down to the lower levels. This is a classic way to solve a scalability problem – instead of having a single central power you devolve powers and responsibilities with some framework such that they follow the general desires of the higher levels of government but have freedom to implement their own solutions and adapt policies to local conditions.”

Corporate Lapdogs of the Left

04 Wednesday Apr 2018

Posted by pnoetx in Central Planning, Identity Politics, Progressivism, rent seeking

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central planning, Corporate Socialism, Corporatism, David Cay Johnston, Identity Politics, Interstate Commerce Commission, Kevin Williamson, Orbiting the Giant Hairball, Political Action Committees, Political Correctness, rent seeking, Technocratic elite, William H. Whyte

ceo

Now don’t get me wrong, I definitely prefer to see private goods and services produced privately, not publicly. Private ownership of the means of production makes the world a better place because ownership and self-interest drive performance and value, to put it all too briefly. But corporate America is now so thoroughly encumbered by ideological distractions that it compromises the mission of creating value, risking shareholder returns and invested capital as well. Having spent the past 31 years employed successively by three gigantic corporate hairballs (with a 2-year stint at the central bank), the following thesis about corporate CEOs, and corporate America by extension, strikes me as wholly accurate:

“CEOs … mostly [reject] the ethos of rugged individualism in favor of a more collectivist view of the world. The capitalists [are] not much interested in defending the culture of capitalism. … the psychological and operational mechanics of large corporations [are] much like those of other large organizations, including government agencies … American CEOs [believe] that expertise deployed through bureaucracy [can] impose rationality on such unruly social entities as free markets, culture, family, and sexuality. The supplanting of spontaneous order with political discipline is the essence of progressivism….“

I changed the tenses used above by Kevin Williamson, who attempts to explain why American corporations became such progressive activists. The beginning of the quote describes interviews conducted by William H. Whyte in the 1950s, but it’s as true now as it was then, and probably much more so. The technocratic view of organizational efficacy may be true up to a point. In fact, there is undoubtedly an optimal size for any organization that is dependent upon it’s mission, the technologies at its disposal, and the range of prices it is likely to face in input and output markets. It’s all too easy for a successful firm to expand beyond that point, however, as many now-defunct businesses have learned the hard way. However, the quote merely highlights the sympathetic view often held by corporate managements toward the notion of a planned society, guided by a class of technocrats. They share this scientistic line of thinking with the statist left, though the corporatist vision is a world in which their private organizations play a critical role, with risks mitigated by “partners” in government.

Private incentives can produce wonderful results, but they are corrupted by the scent of private advantage that can be gained via government intervention in markets. The corporate practice of seeking rents through legislative and administrative action has been going on since at least the 1880s, when railroads sought protection from competition and other shipping interests via federal regulatory action.The symbiosis between government and corporate interests, or corporatism, has been growing ever since. Whether it is lucrative contract awards, subsidies, or favorable regulation, government has lots of goodies at its disposal by virtue of its exclusive ability to exert coercive power. This quote of David Cay Johnston describes the end-product of corporate rent-seeking behavior:

“Corporate socialism is where we socialize losses and privatize gains. Companies that have failed in the marketplace stick the taxpayers with their losses, but when they make money they get to keep it, and secondly, huge amounts of capital are given to companies by taxpayers.”

Risk mitigation is at the heart of a second variety of corporate leftism, and Williamson notes the asymmetry in the political risks faced by most corporations:

“Conservatives may roll their eyes a little bit at promises to build windmills so efficient that we’ll cease needing coal and oil, but progressives (at least a fair portion of them) believe that using fossil fuels may very well end human civilization. The nation’s F-150 drivers are not going to organize a march on Chevron’s headquarters if it puts a billion bucks into biofuels, but the nation’s Subaru drivers might very well do so if it doesn’t. … The same asymmetry characterizes the so-called social issues.“

At this point, Williamson goes on to describe a few social issues on which corporate leaders are frequently harangued by the left. Those leaders may view conservative positions on those issues as aberrant, according to Williamson, because the leaders inhabit an insulated world of elitist, media-driven, politically-correct opinion. They wish to be seen as “progressive” and discount the risk of offending conservatives. While I do not take Williamson’s side on all of the social issues he mentions, I concede that there is some truth to the asymmetry he describes.

An avenue through which corporate America is strongly influenced by the left is identity politics. This is partly an unfortunate side-effect of civil rights legislation and other anti-discrimination law, but in today’s litigious environment, there are excessive legal risks against which corporations must take precautions. This is embedded in human resource policies to the point at which hiring the best individual to fill a role is subject to a series of costly, time-consuming hurdles, and is sometimes impossible. Then, there are the mandatory “Diversity and Inclusion” courses that all employees are required to complete. These overbearing attempts to “educate” the work force consume valuable staff time and are of questionable value in light of the aggravation and resentment they inspire in employees. Finally, I can’t keep count of all the corporate-sponsored activities devoted to celebrating one identity group after another. Can we please get back to work?

Today, as a consumer, it is becoming more difficult to engage in commerce without exposure to a seller’s political positioning. For example, I buy about 90% of my clothing from a particular clothier, but last weekend I learned that the company had taken an objectionable position (to me) in the debate over gun legislation. I am certain that activists badgered the company, and it succumbed, and so I will change my shopping habits. People often find that it’s easier to engage in arms-length transactions when the other party stays off the soapbox. But it goes further than that. Here is Williamson:

“Whereas the ancient corporate practice was to decline to take a public position on anything not related to their businesses, contemporary CEOs feel obliged to act as public intellectuals as well as business managers.“

Well, “ancient” might take it a bit too far, but as a customer, employee, and especially as a shareholder, I would urge any company to steer clear of political posturing. Do not dilute your mission of delivering value to customers, which dovetails with serving the interests of shareholders. You must pursue that mission in a way that you consider responsible and ethical, which just might narrow the scope of the mission. And that’s okay. Just be as neutral as possible on extraneous issues as you reach out to potential customers, and do not respond to politically-motivated threats except in the most diplomatic terms.

Should I bother to say that corporations should eschew public subsidies? That they should respond to competition by improving value, rather than lobbying for advantages and protection from lawmakers or regulators? That they should not badger their employees to give to their company’s Political Action Committee (PAC)?

I must be fantasizing! Corporations would never follow that advice, not as long as they can capture rents through the seductive expedient of big government. If that were the only reason for the hate reserved by leftists for corporate America, I’d be right with them. But in fact, leftist rhetoric condemns the profit motive generally, both in principle and as a method of scapegoating for any social ill. Williamson marvels at the incredible irony of the corporate enterprise-cum-lapdog of the Left, which is especially palpable as the Left beats the dog so unrelentingly.

Sacred Cow Chips

Tag Archives: central planning

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Human Potential Exceeds the Human Burden

Central Planning Fails to Scale, Unlike Spontaneous Order

Corporate Lapdogs of the Left