Monthly Archives: June 2025

Juneteenth Marred By An Economic Fallacy

28 Saturday Jun 2025

Posted by in Economic Development, Slavery

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The Juneteenth holiday (June 19th) marks the anniversary of the abolition of slavery in the U.S. It should be viewed as a celebration of basic human rights. However, in purely economic terms, slavery was (and still is in many parts of the world) a complete revocation of property rights (self-ownership). But not only was slave-holding the worst sort of theft, it represented a total suspension of the labor market mechanism and had dire consequences for long-term economic development, especially in the south.

Government sanction of slaveholding in the southern U.S. and an extremely low effective wage for slaves promoted an excessive and inefficient dependence on, and utilization of, the low-cost input: slave labor. As a result, slavery created an obstacle to economic development, innovation, and capital deepening. The overall impact on the U.S. was to reduce economic welfare and development, and the dysfunction was obviously concentrated in the south.

That hasn’t stopped some activists from making the claim that slavery enabled the success of American capitalism. For example, this book contends that:

“… the expansion of slavery in the first eight decades after American independence drove the evolution and modernization of the United States.“

The so-called 1619 Project has promoted this narrative as well. Interestingly, this is similar to claims made prior to emancipation by defenders of slavery.

Of course, one can’t overemphasize the injustices suffered by American slaves, like those of other enslaved peoples throughout history. But it is foolhardy to attribute the long-term economic success of the American economy to slavery. Even today, 160 years after emancipation, it’s a safe bet that most Americans would be better off without its legacy.

To be clear I’ll outline several assertions I’m making here. First, if slaves had been free workers, they would have enjoyed freedoms and captured the value of their labors from the start. (Though it is not clear how many Africans would have come to America voluntarily as free workers, had they been given the opportunity. Some, however, were already enslaved.)

Under this counterfactual, more efficient pricing of labor would have led to deeper capital. At the same time, while many black non-slaves would still have worked in agriculture, blacks would have been more dispersed occupationally, working at tasks that best suited individual skills. The resulting efficiency gains would have been magnified by virtue of working in combination with more capital assets, enhancing productivity. And these workers would have been free to build their own human capital through education and work experience. Meanwhile, government would not have wasted resources enforcing slave ownership, and plantation owners (and other slave holders) would have made more rational resource allocation decisions. All these factors would have produced a net gain in welfare and improved economic development from at least the time of the nation’s founding.

There is no question that enslavement and the welfare losses suffered by slaves (and many of their descendants) far outweighed the gains captured by those who employed slave labor, as well as those who consumed or otherwise made use of the product of slave labor. A proper economic accounting of these losses acknowledges that slaves were denied their worker surplus and their ability to earn an opportunity cost, and they were often punished or tortured as a means of coercing greater effort. This serves to emphasize the implausibility of the argument that the America reaped net economic benefits from slavery.

Slavery was so powerful an institution that it permeated southern culture and perceptions of status. Wealth was tied-up in slave-chattel, and the free labor made for a handsome return on investment. Thus, both economic and cultural factors acted to lock producers into an unending series of short-run input decisions.

Furthermore, as Phil Magness explains in a letter to the Editor in the Wall Street Journal:

“… slavery’s economics … largely depended on government support. Fugitive slave patrols, military expenditures to fend off the threat of slave revolts and censorship of abolitionist materials by the post office were necessary to secure the institution’s economic position. These policies transferred the burden of enforcing the slave system from the plantation masters on to the taxpaying public.“

Meanwhile, the distortions to the cost of labor slowed the adoption of a variety of production techniques, including horse-drawn cultivators and harrows, steel plows, and steam-powered machinery. In other words, planters had little incentive to modernize production. Other technologies commonly used in the north during that era could have been applied in the south, but only to its much smaller share of acreage dedicated to grain crops.

Southern agricultural practices were “frozen in place”, as Rod D. Martin puts it. Ultimately, had southern planters adopted labor-saving technologies, and had southern governments shifted resources away from protecting slavery as an institution toward more diversified economic development, the antebellum economy would have experienced more rapid growth.

Growth in demand for cotton exports was certainly a boon to the south during the years preceding the Civil War, but the reliance on cotton was such that the southern economy was heavily exposed to risks of draught and other shocks. Furthermore, the lack of industrialization meant that southern states captured little of the final value of the textiles produced with cotton. The inadequacy of transportation infrastructure in the south was another serious detriment to long-term growth.

The work of Nathan Nunn, which is cited by Martin, generally supports the hypothesis that slavery retards economic growth. Nunn found a strong negative correlation between slave use and later economic development across different “New World” economies, as well as U.S. states and counties.

Martin goes so far as to say that the Union’s victory over the Confederacy was due in large part to economic under-development attributable to slavery in the south. That narrative has been challenged by a few scholars who claimed that the south was actually wealthier than the north. The owners of large southern plantations were quite well off, of course, but estimates of their wealth are unreliable, and in any case slaves themselves were highly illiquid “assets”. That meant planters would have been hard pressed to raise the capital needed for investment in labor-saving technologies, even if they’d had proper incentives to do so.

On the whole, there is no question the north was far more industrialized, diversified, and prosperous than the south. It was also much larger in terms of population and total output. Thus, Martin’s assertion that slavery explains why the south lost the Civil War is probably a bit too sweeping.

Nevertheless, the slavery “ecosystem” helps explain the south’s historic under-development. It was characterized by artificially cheap labor, illiquidity, a lack of diversification, a rigid social hierarchy based on the aberrant ownership of human chattel, and state subsidization of slave owners. These conditions restricted the supply of investment capital in the south. This was a drag on economic development before the Civil War. Those characteristics, along with the direct costs of the war itself, go a long way toward explaining the south’s lengthy period of depressed conditions after the Civil War as well.

It’s certainly not a knock on the slave population prior to emancipation to say that they were not responsible for the success of American capitalism. It’s a knock on the institution of slavery itself. Our wealth and the bounties produced by today’s economy are not supercharged by the efforts of slave labor in the distant past. If anything, our prosperity would be far greater had slavery never been practiced on U.S. soil.

I oppose reparations as a form of redistribution partly because most prospective payers today have absolutely no connection to slave-holding in antebellum America. It’s ironic that certain activists now argue for reparations based on imagined economic benefits once used to defend slavery itself.

Indecorously Jaw-Boning an Unhurried Fed

21 Saturday Jun 2025

Posted by in Inflation, Monetary Policy

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President Trump engaged in one of his favorite pastimes on June 18 while the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) was concluding its meeting on the direction of monetary policy. He publicly called Fed Chairman Jerome Powell “stupid” for not having cut rates already, and later said the Fed’s board was “complicit”.

“”I don’t know why the Board doesn’t override this Total and Complete Moron!“

Trump also tagged Powell with one of his trademark appellations: “Too Late”. Yep, that’s how Trump says he refers to Powell.

Later that day, the Fed once again announced that it had decided to leave unchanged its target range for the interest rate on federal funds. Powell described the overall tenor of current Fed policy as mildly restrictive, but FOMC members still “expect” (loosely speaking) two quarter-point cuts in the funds rate by year end.

Of course, Powell and the FOMC really were far too late in recognizing that inflation was more than transitory in 2021-22. Now, with inflation measures tapering but still higher than the Fed’s 2% target, Trump says “Too Late” Powell and the Fed are again behind the curve. Of course, because the central bank is outside the President’s direct control, it makes a convenient scapegoat for whatever might ail the Trump economy, and Trump frets that unnecessarily high rates will cost the U.S. Treasury hundreds of billions in interest on new and refinanced federal debt.

The President has no appreciation for the value of an independent central bank, as opposed to one captive to the fiscal whims of Presidents and Congress. Despite his frequent criticism of inflationary sins of the past, Trump doesn’t understand the dangers of a central bank that could be bullied into inflating away government debt.

The day after the Fed’s meeting, Trump said rates should be cut immediately by a huge 2.5%! As the Donald might say, no one’s ever seen anything like it!

Trump, however, is delusional to think the Fed can engineer reductions in the spectrum of interest rates by aggressively slashing its fed funds target. The Fed does not control long-term interest rates, nor is that part of the Fed’s formal mandate. In fact, an aggressively large reduction in the fed funds rate is likely to backfire, feeding expectations of higher inflation and a selloff in credit markets.

Let me reiterate: the Fed does not control long-term interest rates. Short-term rates are more heavily influenced by the Fed’s rate actions, and by expectations of Fed policy, but the Fed is likewise influenced by those very expectations. In fact, the Fed often follows market rates rather than leading them. In any case, a general truth is that long-term interest rates go where market forces direct them, not where the Fed might try to push them.

Today the Fed is attempting to walk a line between precipitating divergent and potentially negative outcomes. It wants to see clear evidence that inflation is settling down at roughly the 2% target. Also, the Fed is wary that Trump’s tariffs might generate a near-term spike in prices. Under those circumstances, prematurely easing policy could rekindle more permanent inflationary pressures. It seems clear that the Fed currently judges inflation as the dominant risk.

At the same time, the real economy shows mixed signals. Clear signs of a downturn would likely prompt the Fed to cut its fed funds target sooner. After the latest meeting, the Fed announced that it had reduced its own forecast for real GDP growth in 2025 to just 1.4%. Recent employment gains have been moderate, but jobless claims are trending up. The unemployment rate is low, but the labor force has declined over the past few months, which incidentally might be putting upward pressure on wages.

Policy uncertainty was a major theme in the Fed’s June rate decision. Tariffs loom large and would be a threat to continued growth if producers, facing weak demand, were unable to pass the cost of tariffs through to customers, undermining their profit margins. Prospects for passage of the budget reconciliation bill create more uncertainty, providing another rationale to stand pat without cutting the funds rate.

Again, Jerome Powell says that Fed policy is “modestly restrictive” at present. In fact, estimates of the “policy neutral” Fed funds rate are in the vicinity of 2.75%, well below the current target range of 4.25-4.50. However, the money supply (M2) has drifted up over the past year and by May was up 4.4% from a year earlier. That would be consistent with 2% inflation and better than 2% real growth, the latter being higher than the FOMC’s expectation.

Another consideration is that the Fed has nearly ended its quantitative tightening (QT) program, having recently trimmed the passive runoff of maturing securities in its portfolio to just $5 billion per month. This leads to less downward pressure on bank reserves and less upward pressure on the fed funds rate. In other words, policy has already shifted toward greater support for money growth. But out of caution, the Fed wants to defer reductions in the funds rate to avoid undermining the central bank’s inflation-fighting credibility.

Jerome Powell and the FOMC probably could not care less about Trump’s exhortations to reduce interest rates. For one thing, it is beyond the Fed’s power to force down rates that could spur housing and other economic activity. And Trump should be grateful: such a reckless attempt would risk great harm to markets and the economy, not to mention Trump’s economic agenda. Better to wait until near-term inflation risks and policy uncertainty clear up.

Trump can jawbone as aggressively as he wants. He cannot fire Powell, though he keeps saying he “should”. However, no matter what actions the Fed takes, he will almost certainly not reappoint Powell to lead the Fed when Powell’s term expires next May. Sadly, Trump will try to appoint a replacement he can rely upon to do his bidding. Let’s hope the Senate stands in his way to preserve Fed independence.

Pros and Cons of the “Big Beautiful Bill”

16 Monday Jun 2025

Posted by in Federal Budget, Fiscal policy

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The GOP’s “Big Beautiful Bill” (BBB) has generated its share of controversy, not least between President Trump and his erstwhile ally Elon Musk. It is a budget reconciliation bill that was passed by a single vote in the House of Representatives. It’s now up to the Senate, which is sure to alter some of the bill’s provisions. That will require another vote in the House before it can head to Trump’s desk for a signature.

Slim But “Reconciled” Majority

As a reconciliation bill, the BBB is not subject to filibuster in the Senate, and only a simple majority is required for approval, not a 60% supermajority. Obviously, that’s why the GOP used the reconciliation process.

I hate big bills, primarily because they tend to provide cover for all sorts of legislative mischief and pork. However, the reconciliation process imposes limits on what kinds of budgetary changes can be included in a bill. A reconciliation bill can alter only mandatory spending programs like Medicaid and other entitlements, but not discretionary or non-mandatory spending. Social Security is an entitlement, but it would be off limits in a typical reconciliation bill (owing to an arcane rule). Reconciliation bills can also address changes in revenue and the debt limit.

The BBB includes provisions to reduce Medicaid outlays such as work requirements, denial of benefits to illegal aliens, and controls on fraud. These are projected to cut spending by nearly $700 billion. Of course, this is a controversial area, but efforts to impose better controls on entitlements are laudable.

Elon Musk criticized the bill’s failure to aggressively rein-in deficit spending, prompting what was probably his first public feud with Trump. At the time, it wasn’t clear whether Musk really understood the limits of reconciliation. If he had, he might at least have been mollified by the effort to tackle Medicaid waste and fraud. Entitlement programs like Medicaid are, after all, at the very root of our fiscal imbalances.

Extending Trump’s Tax Cuts

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) says that BBB will reduce tax revenue by $3.8 trillion over the next ten years. The Trump tariffs are not addressed in the BBB, but those won’t come close to offsetting this projected revenue loss.

The CBO’s score compares spending and tax revenue to “current law”. Thus, the baseline assumes that the 2017 tax cuts under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) expire in 2026. With spending cuts under the BBB, primary federal deficits (non-interest) are projected to rise $2.4 billion over that time. With interest costs on the higher federal debt, the increase in deficits rises to about $3 trillion. I’ll briefly address some of the major provisions below, including their budget impacts.

Spending Cuts

In addition to Medicaid, other significant cuts in spending in the BBB include reductions in benefits under the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (food stamps, -$267b). This includes tighter work requirements, eligibility rules, and higher matching requirements for states. Also included in BBB are more stringent student loan repayment rules and changes in other education funding programs (-$350b).

Other spending categories would increase. The bill would authorize an additional $144 billion for Armed Services and $79 billion for Homeland Security, including $50 billion for the border wall. Senator Rand Paul has called the border security provisions excessive, though many of those favoring greater fiscal discipline also believe defense is underfunded, so they probably don’t oppose these particular items.

Voting Tax Incentives

In terms of revenue, the BBB would extend the provisions of the TCJA. The deduction for state and local taxes (SALT) would be extended and increased to $40,000 at incomes less than $500,000. This would have a combined revenue impact of -$787 billion. No wonder deficit hawks are upset! A larger SALT deduction creates an even greater subsidy for states imposing high tax burdens on their residents. There’s an expectation, however, that this provision will be dialed back to some extent in the Senate version of the BBB.

There are also provisions to eliminate taxes on overtime (-$124b) and tip income (-$40b), and to increase the standard deduction for seniors (-$66b). As I’ve written before, these are all terribly distortionary policies. They would treat different kinds of income differently, create incentives to reclassify income, and impose a highly complex administrative burden on the IRS. The senior deduction creates an incremental revenue hole as a function of Social Security benefit payments. This is the wrong way to address the needs of a system that is insolvent. These policies were selected primarily with vote buying in mind.

The timing of some of these provisions differs. Some would expire after 2028, while others would be permanent. Apparently, the Senate version of the bill is likely to include immediate and permanent expensing of business investment, which would encourage economic growth.

Another notable change would eliminate subsidies and tax credits for EVs (+$191b). Some claim this was at the heart of Musk’s diatribes against the BBB. However, Musk has supported elimination of both EV subsidies and mandates for many years. He stated as much to legislators on Capital Hill last December, so this theory regarding Musk’s opposition to BBB doesn’t wash.

Defining a Baseline

Advocates of extending the TCJA say the CBO’s baseline case is inappropriate, and that the proper baseline should incorporate the continued tax provisions of the TCJA. Again, the extension increases the ten-year deficit by $3.8 trillion, but that total includes the revenue effects of other provisions. Perhaps $3 trillion might be a more accurate upward adjustment to baseline deficits. In that case, the BBB would actually reduce ten-year deficits by $0.2 trillion.

Another criticism is that the CBO does not attempt to estimate dynamic changes in revenue induced by policy. Those in support of extending the TCJA believe that this static treatment unfairly discounts the revenue potential of pro-growth policies.

I don’t have a problem with the alternative baseline, but the fact is that deficits will still be problematic. Over the 2025-2034 time frame, a baseline incorporating an extension of TCJA would yield deficits in excess of $20 trillion. That includes mounting interest costs, which might overwhelm serious efforts at fiscal discipline in the unlucky event of an updraft in interest rates. Of course, these large, ongoing deficits raise the likelihood of inflationary pressure. The recent downgrade in the credit rating assigned to U.S. Treasuries by Moody’s is an acknowledgement that bondholder wealth could well be undermined by future attempts to “inflate away” the real value of the debt.

Debt Ceiling

In addition to its direct budgetary effects, the BBB calls for a $5 trillion increase of the federal debt limit. I admit to mixed feelings about this large increase in borrowing authority. Frequent debt limit negotiations tend to create lots of political theater and chew up scarce legislative time. Moreover, it’s easy to conclude that they usually accomplish little in terms of restraining deficit spending. Dominic Pino argues otherwise, citing historical examples in which the debt limit “was paired with” reforms and spending restraint. In other words, despite its apparent impotence, Pino asserts that deficits would have been much higher without it. I’m still skeptical, however, that frequent showdowns over the debt ceiling have much value given entitlements that are seemingly beyond legislative control. In the end, elected representatives must respect the judgement of credit markets and face consequences at the ballot box.

Final Thoughts on BBB

Superficially, the Big Beautiful Bill looks like an abomination to deficit hawks. The GOP decided to structure it as a reconciliation bill to strengthen its odds of passage. That decision sharply limited its potential for spending restraint. Other legislation will be required to make the kinds of rescissions necessary to eliminate wasteful spending identified by DOGE.

As for the bill itself, the effort to extend the 2017 Trump tax cuts was widely expected. That, in and of itself, is neutral with respect to a more reasonable baseline assumption. Elimination of EV tax subsidies is a big plus, as are the permanent incentives for business investment. Unfortunately, Trump and his congressional supporters also propose to create the additional fiscal burdens of no taxes on tips and overtime pay, as well as an increased standard deduction for seniors. The ill-advised increase in the SALT deduction was a compromise to ensure the support of certain blue-state republicans, but with any luck it will be curtailed by the Senate.

On the spending side, the big item is Medicaid. Reforms are long past due for a system so riddled with waste. In addition, there are new rules in the BBB that would reduce SNAP outlays and increase student loan repayments. Outlays for defense, Homeland Security, and border security would increase, but these were known to be Trump priorities. Too bad they’ve been paired with several wasteful tax policies.

But even with those flaws, the BBB would reduce deficits marginally relative to a baseline that incorporates extension of the TCJA. Yes, excessive ongoing deficits still have to be dealt with, but spending reductions on the discretionary side of the budget were out of the question this time due to reconciliation rules. They will have to come later, but that sort of legislation will face tough political headwinds, as will Social Security and Medicare reform. arever introduced.