Note: I’m moving for the first time in many years. We have a lot to do quickly because we’ll close on our new home in early September. It’s in a place with palm trees, but no basements! The clean-up and winnowing of our accumulated papers, possessions, and … junk — not to mention attending to all the details of the move — is taking up all of my time. Anyway, I started the post below a week ago and had to put it aside. Not sure how frequently I’ll be posting till we’re fully settled in the fall, but we’ll see how it goes.
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The inflation news was great last week, with both the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Producer Price Index (PPI) reported below expectations. Month-over-month, the increase in the overall CPI was just 0.2%. Year-over-year, CPI inflation was 3%, down from 9% a year ago. Of course, contrary to Joe Biden’s ridiculous claims, this inflation news came despite, and not because of, the pernicious effects of “Bidenomics”. But that aside, just like that, we heard proclamations that the Federal Reserve had finally succeeded in bringing real short-term interest rates into positive territory. Finally, some said, Fed policy had moved into more restrictive territory. But in fact, real rates moved above zero months ago.
The popular rate narrative is based on the fact that the effective Fed Funds rate is now 5.08% while “headline” CPI inflation fell to 2.97%. That would give us a real Fed Funds rate of 3.11%… if that sort of calculation made sense. Here’s an appropriate reaction from Kevin Erdman:
“The short term rate minus trailing 12 month inflation is not a thing. It’s an irrelevant number. Nothing about June 2022 inflation has anything to do with the real fed funds rate in July 2023.”
His statement generalizes to interest rates at any maturity less a corresponding measure of trailing inflation. They are all irrelevant. A proper real rate of interest must incorporate a measure of inflation expectations. Survey data is often used for this purpose, but a better measure can be taken from market expectations by comparing a nominal Treasury rate with a rate on an inflation-indexed Treasury (TIPS) of the same maturity. This is a fairly convenient approach.
Below, we can see that the real one-year Treasury rate has been positive since last November.
And here is the real one-month Treasury rate:
Again, these charts suggest that real short-term rates have been positive much longer than some believe. Whether that represents a “restrictive policy stance” by the Federal Reserve is another matter. We know the Fed has tightened policy, but that began after the notably loose policy conducted throughout the pandemic. Have we truly crossed the threshold into “tightness”?
Here’s the effective (nominal) federal funds rate over the past year.
This rate is under fairly direct control by the Fed, and it is the primary focus of most Fed watchers. It’s an overnight lending rate on loans of reserves between banks, so to adjust it precisely for expected inflation requires an annualized, overnight inflation rate. That’s pretty tricky!
Finding a published measure of expected inflation over durations of less than a year forward is difficult. One can derive one or use a longer-term rate of expected inflation as a proxy, with the proviso that near-term expectations might be more extreme than the proxy, especially if inflation is expected to change from its current pace. Here are one-year inflation expectations over the past year from a Cleveland Fed model that utilizes TIPS returns and other data.
So inflation expectations have declined substantially. If we compare them with short-term interest rates or the effective fed funds rate over the past year, it’s likely the real fed funds rate climbed above zero before the end of the first quarter of 2023. It might even have exceeded the so called “neutral” real Fed funds rate (R*), which was estimated by the Fed to be 1.14% in the first quarter of 2023. A real Fed funds rate above that level would have been deemed restrictive in the first quarter.
My own view is that changes in the Fed funds rate are not at the heart of the transmission mechanism from monetary policy to the real economy. The monetary aggregates are more reliable guides. The broad money stock M2 has been edging lower for well over a year now. That certainly qualifies as a restrictive move, but there is still a lot of excess liquidity out there, left over from the pandemic deluge engineered by the Fed.
The good reports last week might not mark the end of the inflation problem. There are still price pressures fromboth the demand and supply-sides. Furthermore, to put things in context, the month-to-month increases in May and June of last year were large, which helped to hold down the 12-month increases this May and June. But the CPI was flat during the second half of last year. That means month-to-month inflation over the next six months may well translate into an escalation of year-over-year inflation. That might or might not be turn out to be meaningful, but it would provide a pretext for additional Fed tightening.
The main point of this post is that real interest rates cannot be calculated on the basis of reported inflation over prior months. Doing so at this juncture understates the degree of monetary tightening in terms of short-term rates. Real interest rates can only be determined by nominal rates relative to expectations of future inflation. This gives a more accurate picture of actual credit market conditions and the Fed’s rate policy stance.
We’re told again and again that government must take action to correct “market failures”. Economists are largely responsible for this widespread view. Our standard textbook treatments of external costs and benefits are constructed to demonstrate departures from the ideal of perfectly competitive market equilibria. This posits an absurdly unrealistic standard and diminishes the power and dramatic success of real-world markets in processing highly dispersed information, allocating resources based on voluntary behavior, and raising human living standards. It also takes for granted the underlying institutional foundations that lead to well-functioning markets and presumes that government possesses the knowledge and ability to rectify various departures from an ideal. Finally, “corrective” interventions are usually exposited in economics classes as if they are costless!
Failed Disgnoses
This brings into focus the worst presumption of all: that government solutions to social and economic problems never fail to achieve their intended aims. Of course that’s nonsense. If defined on an equivalent basis, government failure is vastly more endemic and destructive than market failure.
“According to ancient legend, a Roman emperor was asked to judge a singing contest between two participants. After hearing the first contestant, the emperor gave the prize to the second on the assumption that the second could be no worse than the first. Of course, this assumption could have been wrong; the second singer might have been worse. The theory of market failure committed the same mistake as the emperor. Demonstrating that the market economy failed to live up to the ideals of general competitive equilibrium was one thing, but to gleefully assert that public action could costlessly correct the failure was quite another matter. Unfortunately, much analytical work proceeded in such a manner. Many scholars burst the bubble of this romantic vision of the political sector during the 1960s. But it was [James] Buchanan and Gordon Tullock who deserve the credit for shifting scholarly focus.”
John Cochrane sums up the whole case succinctly in the “punchline” of a recent post:
“The case for free markets never was their perfection. The case for free markets always was centuries of experience with the failures of the only alternative, state control. Free markets are, as the saying goes, the worst system; except for all the others.”
Tracing Failures
We can view the relation between market failure and government failure in two ways. First, we can try to identify market failures and root causes. For example, external costs like pollution cause harm to innocent third parties. This failure might be solely attributable to transactions between private parties, but there are cases in which government engages as one of those parties, such as defense contracting. In other cases government effectively subsidizes toxic waste, like the eventual disposal of solar panels. Another kind of market failure occurs when firms wield monopoly power, but that is often abetted by costly regulations that deliver fatal blows to small competitors.
The second way to analyze the nexus between government and market failures is to first examine the taxonomy of government failure and identify the various damages inflicted upon the operation of private markets. That’s the course I’ll follow below, though by no means is the discussion here exhaustive.
Failures In and Out of Scope
An extensive treatment of government failure was offered eight years ago by William R. Keech and Michael Munger. To start, they point out what everyone knows: governments occasionally perpetrate monstrous acts like genocide and the instigation of war. That helps illustrate a basic dichotomy in government failures:
“… government may fail to do things it should do, or government may do things it should not do.’
Both parts of that statement have numerous dimensions. Failures at what government should do run the gamut from poor service at the DMV, to failure to enforce rights, to corrupt bureaucrats and politicians skimming off the public purse in the execution of their duties. These failures of government are all too common.
What government should and should not do, however, is usually a matter of political opinion. Thomas Jefferson’s axioms appear in a single sentence at the beginning of the Declaration of Independence; they are a tremendous guide to the first principles of a benevolent state. However, those axioms don’t go far in determining the range of specific legal protections and services that should and shouldn’t be provided by government.
Pareto Superiority
Keech and Munger engage in an analytical exercise in which the “should and shouldn’t” question is determined under the standard of Pareto superiority. A state of the world is Pareto superior if at least one person prefers it to the current state (and no one else is averse to it). Coincidentally, voluntary trades in private markets always exploit Pareto superior opportunities, absent legitimate external costs and benefits.
The set of Pareto superior states available to government can be expanded by allowing for side payments or compensation to those who would have preferred the current state. Still, those side payments are limited by the magnitude of the gains flowing to those who prefer the alternative (and if those gains can be redistributed monetarily).
Keech and Munger define government failure as the unexploited existence of Pareto superior states. Of course, by this definition, only a benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent dictator could hope to avoid government failure. But this is no more unrealistic than the assumptions underlying perfectly competitive market equilibrium from which departure are deemed “market failures” that government should correct. Thus, Keech and Munger say:
“The concept of government failure has been trapped in the cocoon of the theory of perfect markets. … Government failure in the contemporary context means failing to resolve a classic market failure.”
But markets must operate within a setting defined by culture and institutions. The establishment of a social order under which individuals have enforceable rights must come prior to well-functioning markets, and that requires a certain level of state capacity. Keech and Munger are correct that market failure is often a manifestation of government failure in setting and/or enforcing these “rules of the game”.
“The real question is … how the rules of the game should be structured in terms of incentives, property rights, and constraints.”
The Regulatory State and Market Failures
Government can do too little in defining and enforcing rights, and that’s undoubtedly a cause of failure in markets in even the most advanced economies. At the same time there is an undeniable tendency for mission creep: governments often try to do too much. Overregulation in the U.S. and other developed nations creates a variety of market failures. This includes the waste inherent in compliance costs that far exceed benefits; welfare losses from price controls, licensing, and quotas; diversion of otherwise productive resources into rent seeking activity, anti-competitive effects from “regulatory capture”; Chevron-like distortions endemic to the administrative judicial process; unnecessary interference in almost any aspect of private business; and outright corruption and bribe-taking.
Central Planning and Market Failures
Another category of government attempting to “do too much” is the misallocation of resources that inevitably accompanies efforts to pick “winners and losers”. The massive subsidies flowing to investors in various technologies are often misdirected. Many of these expenditures end up as losses for taxpayers, and this is not the only form in which failed industrial planning takes place. A related evil occurs when steps are taken to penalize and destroy industries in political disfavor with thin economic justification.
Other clear examples of government “planning” failure are protectionist laws. These are a net drain on our wealth as a society, denying consumers of free choice and saddling the country with the necessity to produce restricted products at high cost relative to erstwhile trading partners.
There are, of course, failures lurking within many other large government spending programs in areas such as national defense, transportation, education, and agriculture. Many of these programs can be characterized as centrally planning. Not only are some of these expenditures ineffectual, but massive procurement spending seems to invite waste and graft. After all, it’s somebody else’s money.
Redistribution and Market Failures
One might regard redistribution programs as vehicles for the kinds of side payments described by Keech and Munger. Some might even say these are the side payments necessary to overcome resistance from those unable to thrive in a market economy. That reverses the historical sequence of events, however, since the dominant economic role of markets preceded the advent of massive redistribution schemes. Unfortunately, redistribution programs have been plagued by poor design, such as the actuarial nightmare inherent in Social Security and the destructive work incentives embedded in other parts of the social safety net. These are rightly viewed as government failures, and their distortionary effects spill variously into capital markets, labor markets and ultimately product markets.
Taxation and Market Failures
All these public initiatives under which government failures precipitate assorted market failures must be paid for by taxpayers. Therefore, we must also consider the additional effects of taxation on markets and market failures. The income tax system is rife with economic distortions. Not only does it inflict huge compliance costs, but it alters incentives in ways that inhibit capital formation and labor supply. That hampers the ability of input markets to efficiently meet the needs of producers, inhibiting the economy’s productive capacity. In turn, these effects spill into output market failures, with consequent losses in .social welfare. Distortionary taxes are a form of government failure that leads to broad market failures.
Deficits and Market Failure
More often than not, of course, tax revenue is inadequate to fund the entire government budget. Deficit spending and borrowing can make sense when public outlays truly produce long-term benefits. In fact, the mere existence of “risk-free” assets (Treasury debt) across the maturity spectrum might enhance social welfare if it enables improvements in portfolio diversification that outweigh the cost of the government’s interest obligations. (Treasury securities do bear interest-rate risk and, if unindexed, they bear inflation risk.)
Nevertheless, borrowing can reflect and magnify deleterious government efforts to “do too much”, ultimately leading to market failures. Government borrowing may “crowd out” private capital formation, harming economy-wide productivity. It might also inhibit the ability of households to borrow at affordable rates. Interest costs of the public debt may become explosive as they rise relative to GDP, limiting the ability of the public sector to perform tasks that it should *actually* do, with negative implications for market performance.
Inflation and Market Failure
Deficit spending promotes inflation as well. This is more readily enabled when government debt is monetized, but absent fiscal discipline, the escalation of goods prices is the only remaining force capable of controlling the real value of the debt. This is essentially the inflation tax.
Inflation is a destructive force. It distorts the meaning of prices, causes the market to misallocate resources due to uncertainty, and inflicts costs on those with fixed incomes or whose incomes cannot keep up with inflation. Sadly, the latter are usually in lower socioeconomic strata. These are symptoms of market failure prompted by government failure to control spending and maintain a stable medium of exchange.
Conclusion
Markets may fail, but when they do it’s very often rooted in one form of government failure or another. Sometimes it’s an inadequacy in the establishment or enforcement of property rights. It could be a case of overzealous regulation. Or government may encroach on, impede, or distort decisions regarding the provision of goods or services best left to the market. More broadly, redistribution and taxation, including the inflation tax, distort labor and capital markets. The variety of distortions created when government fails at what it should do, or does what it shouldn’t do, is truly daunting. Yet it’s difficult to find leaders willing to face up to all this. Statism has a powerful allure, and too many elites are in thrall to the technocratic scientism of government solutions to social problems and central planning in the allocation of resources.
In advanced civilizations the period loosely called Alexandrian is usually associated with flexible morals, perfunctory religion, populist standards and cosmopolitan tastes, feminism, exotic cults, and the rapid turnover of high and low fads---in short, a falling away (which is all that decadence means) from the strictness of traditional rules, embodied in character and inforced from within. -- Jacques Barzun