Tag Archives: Skin in the Game

On Bended Knee To the Intolerant Few of

01 Thursday Apr 2021

Posted by in Identity Politics, Politics, Propaganda

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The U.S. Constitution was intended, among other things, to avoid a hazard common to purely democratic systems: a tyranny of the majority. Now, however, we’re threatened by a phenomenon that might have sounded absurd to the founding fathers: a tyranny of the minority. Hassan Nicholas Taleb describes how small, intolerant minorities can dominate the terms under which the rest of a society plays. Taleb discusses a few cases in point from the historical record. Some of these are fairly benign, like the evolution of certain dietary conventions, but the larger implications for a free society are grim. His discussion appears here, but it is actually a chapter of his book, “Skin In the Game”.

In a way, these phenomena are often “squeaky-wheel-gets-oiled” situations, but there’s more to it. Much depends on the cost of allowing an uncompromising minority to have its way. So, for example, the food and beverages we consume are usually kosher, but not many people notice the circled “U” on the label, and they don’t know the difference. That’s relatively low cost. In other cases, people are cowed into believing they’ve been insufficiently sensitive to the grievances of small groups, but they do not fully appreciate the cost (and futility) of proving their compassion. From Taleb:

“How do books get banned? Certainly not because they offend the average person –most persons are passive and don’t really care, or don’t care enough to request the banning. It looks like, from past episodes, that all it takes is a few (motivated) activists for the banning of some books, or the black-listing of some people. The great philosopher and logician Bertrand Russell lost his job at the City University of New York owing to a letter by an angry –and stubborn –mother who did not wish to have her daughter in the same room as the fellow with dissolute lifestyle and unruly ideas.

The same seems to apply to prohibitions –at least the prohibition of alcohol in the United States which led to interesting Mafia stories.

Let us conjecture that the formation of moral values in society doesn’t come from the evolution of the consensus. No, it is the most intolerant person who imposes virtue on others precisely because of that intolerance. The same can apply to civil rights.”

Taleb’s point runs counter to the theory that most forms of governance, either legal or cultural, work best when they reflect broad, prior consensus. He insists, however, that people are often willing to placate the most uncompromising parties. In a tolerant, liberal society, there is a certain willingness to give ground when grievances have a whiff of legitimacy. That’s well and good, but a liberal society may be plagued by the existence of enough saps who just want to get along with more poisonous elements. And those poor saps will find a way to defend their position and become useful idiots.

The intolerant and intransigent minorities get the ball rolling with various grievances. Right or wrong, there are many disparate groups with perceived social or economic grievances. Their determination plays out in agitation of various kinds, sometimes rhetorical and sometimes violent. One way or another, and with the assistance of certain institutions, the grievances (and potential policies to deal with them) may be integrated into the political views of a larger set of sympathetic listeners. To the extent the aggrieved can find common ground with other aggrieved groups, the movement grows.

Some institutions are likely to be more naturally sympathetic to claims of victimhood, such as academia and the press. These institutions are, in a real sense, “grievance aggregators”, along with community organizers of various kinds, and they are capable of accelerating the fire. Then, grievances have a way of becoming enshrined as permanent talking points, all earnest efforts at mitigation aside. Appeasement seems only to invite more demands.

Today, there is a special intransigence on social media that is difficult for many if not most well-meaning individuals to stand up against. You must be “woke” or face social and economic repercussions. The intolerant minority can adopt a number of tactics to gain cooperation. These are often intimations of bad faith including racism, classism, xenophobia, homophobia, transphobia, misogyny, or “bad-think” and “denialism” of any sort. Apparently these are all ripe targets. This potential ostracization gives rise to fear on the part of those who might otherwise think and speak independently.

All this goes for businesses as well, which are only too eager to avoid litigation or offending any and all “stakeholders”, an ever-growing class increasingly unrelated to the firm’s trade. As institutions, many large corporations have fallen well into the fold of wokeness. They attempt to virtue signal to consumers, workers, government, and the “community” in a bid to stay out front. That sets the stage for repercussions in the lives and careers of workers who might fear doxing by an intransigent minority. Just go along with the demands and you’ll be fine. In a version of Stockholm Syndrome, some of the intimidated will convince themselves to adopt the cloak of woke righteousness and signal their virtue! Be a hero! More useful idiots.

And so the intolerant minority wins. Or, a coalition of intolerant minorities and their sympathizers win. Taleb again:

“Clearly can democracy –by definition the majority — tolerate enemies? The question is as follows: ‘Would you agree to deny the freedom of speech to every political party that has in its charter the banning the freedom of speech?’ Let’s go one step further, ‘Should a society that has elected to be tolerant be intolerant about intolerance?’

We can answer these points using the minority rule. Yes, an intolerant minority can control and destroy democracy. Actually, as we saw, it will eventually destroy our world.

So, we need to be more than intolerant with some intolerant minorities. It is not permissible to use ‘American values’ or ‘Western principles’ in treating intolerant Salafism (which denies other peoples’ right to have their own religion). The West is currently in the process of committing suicide.”

This article by Steve McCann struck a chord with me because it describes a culmination of the forces of intolerance: McCann draws a tight comparison between the tactics of the Left, who attempt to represent themselves as champions of the aggrieved, and German National Socialists in the 1920s and 30s. Here is the shared playbook:

  • Exploit racial division;
  • Censor your enemies;
  • Unleash a flood of propaganda and fake news;
  • Exploit class envy;
  • Incite street riots;
  • Exploit events (the Reichstag fire vs. the Capitol “riot”) to legislate one-party rule (the Enabling Act of 1934 vs. HR 1).

This has very much to do with the acceptance of pseudo-realities and outright lies about the state of social affairs, some of which become institutionalized (e.g., “systemic racism”, “follow the science”, “sustainability”, “fair trade”, “disparate impact”, “infrastructure plan”, Modern Monetary Theory, and the meaning of “liberalism”). Individuals frame their lot in relation to a “perfect” society, a utopianism that can’t ever be fully satisfied. “Failure” will always be blamed on elements of the status quo, like capitalism and anyone perceived to benefit from it (except perhaps for those “privileged” agitating against it).

Taleb’s observation that intolerant minorities tend to “win” might be easier to swallow now than it might have been a few years ago. It’s certainly a warning to anyone who might take comfort in thinking our present dysfunction will be fixed when a sensible majority gets good and fed up. They might be unhappy, but most tend to lack sufficient determination to avoid getting cowed by intolerant minorities. Suicide of the West indeed!

Bankers, Risk and the Rents of Slippery Skin

12 Monday Mar 2018

Posted by in Banking, rent seeking

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Risk taking is important to the economic success of a nation. Creative energy demands it, and it is critical to achieving economic growth and wealth creation. But it’s obviously possible to take too much risk or risks that are ill-considered, and that is all the more likely when risk-takers are absolved of the consequences of their actions. That is, healthy risk-taking and responsibility are inextricably linked. One can’t truly be said to take a risk if the cost of failure is borne by another party. It’s easy to understand why risk-taking becomes excessive or misdirected when that is the case.

Risk Shifting

There are various ways in which a party can parlay risky undertakings into easy gains by shifting the risks to others. For example, any piece of merchandise comes with the risk that it will not perform as advertised. Some traders might be tempted to sell unreliable merchandise and shift risk to the buyer without recourse. This is an area in which we must rely on a bulwark of private governance: caveat emptor. On the other hand, government tends to subsidize risk-taking in various ways: limited liability under the corporate form of business organization, bank deposit insurance, bankruptcy laws, the implicit government guarantee on mortgage assets, and the “too-big-to-fail” mentality of government bailouts.

Whose Skin In the Game?

These are examples of what Nassim Taleb bemoans as the failure to have “skin in the game”. The quoted expression happens to be the title of his new book. I have both praised and castigated Taleb’s work in the past. He made an interesting contribution about the nature and risk of extreme events in his book “Black Swan”, such as his application of so-called “fat tails” in probability distributions, though some have claimed the ideas were anything but original. I was highly critical of Taleb’s alarmist hyperbole on the effects of GMOs. In the present case, however, he considers “the asymmetry of risk bearing” to be a major social problem, and I’m generally in agreement with the point. The most interesting part of the brief discussion at the link is the following:

“In Taleb’s universe, the fieriest circle of hell is reserved for bankers and neoconservatives. ‘The best thing that could happen to society is the bankruptcy of Goldman Sachs,’ he tells me. ‘Banking is rent-seeking of industrial proportions.’ Taleb, who became rich as a derivatives trader, is not a foe of capitalism but of ‘cronyism’. ‘If you’re taking risks, God bless you. This is why I accept inequality. I’ve seen people go from trader to cab driver and back again.’“

Banks are a prominent example of the risk-shifting phenomenon. First of all, banking institutions are not required to hold much capital against their assets. In fact, recently banks have had average equity of less than 6% of assets. That’s much higher than during the financial crisis of ten years ago, but it is still rather thin and hardly represents much “skin in the game”.

Fractional Reserves

It should come as no surprise that a bank’s assets are funded largely by account balances held by depositors (liabilities), and not by equity capital. But your bank balance is not kept as cash in the vault. Instead, it is loaned out to the bank’s credit clients or used to purchase securities. This is facilitated by “fractional reserve banking”, whereby banks need only keep a fraction of their depositors’ money on hand as cash (or in their own reserve deposit accounts with the Federal Reserve). This generally works well on a day-to-day basis because depositors seldom ask to redeem more than a small fraction of their money on a given day.

Reserve requirements are set by the Federal Reserve and range from 0-10%, depending on the size of a banks’ deposit account balances. At the upper figure, a dollar of new cash deposits would allow a bank to extend new loans of up to $0.90. This legal practice divides many in the economics profession. Some believe it represents fraud rather than sound banking. This article by Frank Hollenbeck at the Mises Canada web site states that it is improper for a bank to lend a depositor’s money to others:

“Suppose you lived in the 18th century and had 100 ounces of gold. It’s heavy and you do not live in a safe neighborhood, so you decide to bring it to a goldsmith for safekeeping. In exchange for this gold, the goldsmith gives you ten tickets where eachis clearly marked as claims against 10 ounces. …

… Quickly the goldsmith realizes there is an easy, fraudulent, way to get rich: just lend out the gold to someone else by creating another 10 tickets. Since the tickets are rarelyredeemed, the goldsmith figures he can run this scam for a very long time. Of course, it is not his gold, but since it is in his vault, he can act as though it is his money to use. This is fractional reserve banking with a voluntary reserve requirement of 50%. Today, modern US banks have a reserve requirement of between 0% and 10%. This is also how the banking systemcan create money out of thin air, or basically counterfeit money, and steal the purchasing power from others without actually having to produce real goods and services.”

Another aspect of the argument against fractional reserves is that it creates economic instability, fueling booms and busts as the quantity of money in circulation sometimes exceeds or falls short of the needs of the public. Many authorities have taken a negative view of fractional reserve banking through the years: Irving Fisher, Milton Friedman, John Cochrane, Ralph Musgrave, and Laurence Kotlikoff, to name a few prominent economists (see this recent paper by Musgrave).

In Defense of Fractional Reserves

Others have defended fractional reserves as a practice that has and would again arise in a free market environment. According to this view, depositors would accept the logic of allowing banks to lend a portion of the funds in their accounts in order to generate income, rather than charging larger fees for “storage” and administration. If the depositing public is aware of the risk and has competing choices among banks, then the argument that banks expose depositors to excessive risk via fractional reserves is moot. Fractional reserves can exist in a private money economy in which competitive pressures reward banks (and their privately circulating notes) having sound lending practices. In fact, some would say that the very idea of a 100% reserve requirement is an unacceptable government intrusion into the private relationship between banks and their customers. All of that is true.

Some have compared fractional reserve banking to the sale of insurance. Consumers buy insurance to take advantage of pooled risk, but they have no expectation of a refund unless they incur the kind of insured loss in question. Bank depositors, on the other hand, expect a return of their funds in-full. Yes, low risk is an attribute they desire, and pooling across the withdrawal needs of many depositors is one reason why banks can invest and pass a part of the return on to depositors, both in interest and reduced fees. So, despite the differing needs and expectations of their customers, there is some validity to the comparison of insurers to fractional-reserve bankers.

Amplification of Shifted Risks

Do fractional reserves allow banks to take risks without having skin in the game? Absolutely! With as little as 6% equity at risk, banks have relatively little to lose relative to depositors. Yes, banks pay the FDIC to insure deposits, and premiums are higher for riskier banks. However, not all deposits are insured by the FDIC. More importantly, at the end of 2017, the entire FDIC deposit insurance fund was about 0.7% of commercial bank assets. One big bank failure would wipe it out, or a few hundred small ones. That’s well within the realm of possibility and historical experience. So, where does that leave depositors? Their skin is very much in the game, and the game is about the risks taken by banks in investing depositors’ funds.

We now live in the era of “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF), whereby large banks (and sometimes industrial firms) are viewed as so “systemically important” that they cannot be allowed to fail. Taxpayers must bail them out in the event they become insolvent. Thus, taxpayers have skin in the game. Banks collect rents to the extent that their returns exceed those commensurate with the risks for which they are actually “on the hook”.

Another avenue through which banks off-load risk is the extent to which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are still presumed to have the federal government’s implicit guarantee against default on the mortgage debt they purchase from banks. That is beyond the scope of the present discussion, however. And I have not discussed the role of large investment banks in the capital markets. That’s a whole other dimension of the story. This article by Guatam Mukunda in the Harvard Business Review provides a perspective on rent seeking in investment banking.

Conclusion

The combination of deposit insurance, TBTF and other risk-insulating subsidies, layered on top of a fractional reserve banking system, places banks into Taleb’s “fieriest circle of hell”. These factors blunt bank incentives to manage risk effectively as well as consumer incentives to conduct adequate due diligence in their banking relationships. It means that risk is not priced properly, because banks are likely to ignore risks from which they are shielded. Therefore, banks may allocate resources into excessively risky uses. The consequences for depositors and taxpayers can be dramatic.

Fractional reserves are not “fraud” in the sense that the system has unsuspecting victims. Anyone who has watched “It’s a Wonderful Life” knows that banks lend your deposits to others. But fractional reserves magnify the risk-mitigating privileges conferred upon the banking industry by government through various mechanisms. This “risk-cleansing” is converted to rents and collected by banks for their shareholders, but the risks are still borne by society. To the extent that fractional reserves create instability, deposit insurance is viewed as a necessity, but banks should pay a market premium to an insurer to cover the actual risk inherent in the system. Too-big-to-fail should end, as should the implicit subsidy collected by banks through the government-sponsored enterprises.

Carried Interest and Your Private Sweat Equity

30 Saturday Dec 2017

Posted by in Central Planning, Taxes

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Suppose your rich uncle buys an old house to do some fix-ups and hopes to resell it at a gain. He has the cash and is willing to split the profit 50-50 if you’re willing to handle a few restorations over the next year. Even better, under the partnership he’ll form with you, your profit will be taxed as a pass-through capital gain. You’ll be taxed at only 15% (or 20% if your income is already very high). You’ll provide the labor, but your cut won’t be taxed at ordinary income tax rates.

That’s Just Like Carried Interest

A similar example is provided by Greg Mankiw, along with several others, to illustrate the ambiguity of “capital gains” under our tax law. What might surprise you is that the tax treatment of the deal with your uncle is exactly the same as the tax benefit received by the general partner (GP) in a private equity fund. The GP is the “worker”, as it were, who manages the capital paid-in by the fund’s investors (or limited partners). The GP attempts to build the fund’s value in various ways. The investors, on the other hand, take the same role as your uncle. The GP earns fees as a cut of the investment gains; those fees are essentially treated as capital gains for tax purposes. In the case of the private equity GP, however, the income is called “carried interest”, but there is no real difference.

The tax treatment of carried interest has been a target of progressives and populist critics for many years. This article in The Hill derides the GOP’s failure to close the carried interest “loophole” in the Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA) recently signed into law by President Trump. Of course, wealthy private-equity players have sought to protect the rule with generous campaign contributions to key politicians. However, as illustrated by the partnership with your uncle, pass-through business taxation combined with the treatment of capital gains provides the same benefits to any business-person who invests “sweat equity” into the improvement of an asset for ultimate resale, including the business itself.

Should “sweat equity” earned by a worker be taxed more lightly than the direct receipt of “sweat wages”? The worker does not “own” the asset in question prior to the work effort, a fundamental distinction from what we normally consider to be a capital gain. On the other hand, the worker shoulders risk that the asset’s value will fail to meet expectations. My view is that it is not appropriate for the tradeoff between private risk and return to be managed via the income tax code or by government generally. Nevertheless, the sweat-equity conversion of labor value into asset appreciation is treated by tax law as a capital gain and is taxed at a lower rate than wages (except at low levels of taxable income).

Equal Protection Under the Tax Law

The carried interest rule and relatively “light” taxation of returns on capital are not at the root of the problem here. Rather, it is the disparate treatment of different kinds of income for tax purposes and the high taxation of ordinary income, even in the wake of the the TCJA’s passage. Diane Furchtgott-Roth argues that the low carried-interest tax rate is necessary to encourage productive investment. Peter Wayrich agrees, but again, that is not a good rationale for disparate (and high) taxation of labor income. This note in the Economic Policy Journal contains a quote on Senator Ron Johnson’s proposal to tax all productive entities at the 20% carried-interest tax rate. The potential loss of revenue might require a higher rate, but the proposition that rates should be equal across all forms of business organizations is more sensible than the complex changes promulgated for pass-throughs under the TCJA. Moreover, the progressive premise that tax rates on capital income should be high is a prescription for low rates of saving, a diminished pool of investment capital, and ultimately low growth in labor productivity and wages.

Demonizing Private Equity

The private equity business is criticized for reasons other than carried interest, but mainly due to superstition that these firms routinely engage in plundering healthy enterprises to extract value and victimize helpless employees by reducing wages or leaving them without work. Simple economics reveals the shallow thinking underlying such claims. As a first approximation, private equity can be profitable only when target firms are under-performing or undervalued. A healthy market for business ownership is necessary to ensure that firms with untapped value survive. Weak performance might stem from any number of circumstances but must be addressable under new management. That includes a management shakeup itself, and it could include a capital infusion to upgrade facilities, elimination of unprofitable product lines, a spin-off from a neglectful parent company, or wage renegotiation to improve competitiveness (but never ask a leftist if wages are too high, even as the employer fails).

Interest Deductibility

The tax benefits of carried interest enhance private equity deals relative to traditional merger and acquisition activity. Again, that illustrates the oddity of having different tax rules for different firms. In the past, the gains from carried interest have been magnified by another unfortunate aspect of the tax code: the interest-deductibility of business debt. The TCJA doesn’t completely eliminate this economic peculiarity, but it places a severe restriction on its use (see #6 on the list at the link).

In general, interest deductibility has favored the use of debt in the capital structures of all businesses. That leverage increases financial risk and bids up the level of interest rates faced by all borrowers. Private equity firms have made liberal use of debt in structuring buyouts. Their borrowing capacity combined with carried interest and the debt subsidy has undoubtedly made deals more attractive at the margin.

The new restriction on interest deductibility is likely to reinforce an existing trend in private equity: gradually, GPs have been putting more “skin in the game“. That is, they are risking a bit more of their own capital. That is generally a good thing for investors. The article at the last link was written in March 2017, so the data shown for 2017 is almost meaningless. In 2016, however, the average GP commitment as a percentage of fund size was still less than 8% and the median was just 4%. These percentages should continue to increase with competition for deals and more restricted deductibility of interest expense.

Taxes and Value

If you want to encourage value-maximizing behavior, then don’t tax its makers (or its markers) heavily. Carried interest extends the tax treatment of “sweat equity” to those who “police” the private sector for unexploited value: private equity firms. By eliminating waste, resuscitating formerly productive enterprises, and exploiting new profit opportunities, their efforts are socially accretive. The popular narrative of an “evil” and “vulturous” private equity industry is both misleading and destructive. Beyond that, there is no reason to tax different forms of productive activity at different rates, but we do. The TCJA has lessened the tax disparities to some extent, but more equalization should be a priority. At least the business interest deduction has been restricted, which should lessen the artificial reliance on borrowed capital.