Tag Archives: TCJA

Deficits Are a Symptom of Statist Excess

12 Monday Feb 2018

Posted by in Big Government, Taxes

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One thing’s clear with respect to President Trump’s budget proposal and the ongoing debate over appropriations: federal spending will increase and add to future budget deficits. This follows the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) enacted late last year, which many expect to add upwards of $1 trillion to deficits over the next 10 years. I have offered mixed praise of some of the reforms and rate cuts in the TCJA, though it does not accomplish much in the way of tax simplification and it will almost certainly require a large increase in federal borrowing. Ultimately, however, dollar for dollar, a tax cut giving rise to a deficit inflicts lower (or even negative) costs on the private sector than an unfunded spending binge, which is costly in the most basic terms: resources devoured by government.

Cost of Spending

The cost of an extra dollar of government spending at the most basic level is the value of lost opportunities to which the resources absorbed by government otherwise could have been put. When the government spends an extra dollar, and if the government pays a competitive market price, the goods and services exchanged for that dollar by private party “A” would be valued at more than one dollar by other private parties who lost the opportunity to trade with “A” for those same goods and services.

There might be a strong case for incremental spending in any particular instance, of course. Can we benefit from more national defense? Infrastructure? Grants of foreign aid? Subsidies for this industry or that? This technology or that? This cultural program or that? Public aid? Primary research? Regulatory budgets? I’d favor very few of those as general spending priorities. However, there are many subcategories and so many special interests that it is difficult to control spending as long as compromise is needed to accomplish anything.

The Trump budget is a mix of cuts in non-defense spending and large increases in defense, infrastructure outlays, and border security. On balance, it would lead to substantially higher budget deficits over the next ten years. He won’t get all of what he wants, but it would be astonishing if larger deficits are not an outcome.

Unfortunately, government is typically inefficient in the execution of its tasks and it is less responsive to price incentives than private buyers, who are fully vested in “ownership” of the dollars they spend. Government agents, no matter how honorable, simply do not have the same kind of stake in the outcome as a private owner. Obviously, spending by federal agencies is influenced by the political process, which creates opportunities for side rewards for those who direct or influence spending and those who receive the payments. These side rewards are pure private rents arising from public largess. For a private party, the profitability of transacting with government may well exceed the normal return to capital or entrepreneurship. The efficiency of government spending is compromised by its political nature and the uneconomic behavior of government agents. I therefore have strong doubts about the cost-benefit comparison of almost any public initiative.

Un-Taxing

The government ultimately acquires its funds from taxes enforced via coercive power. After all, tax collection requires a considerable enforcement effort. A tax payment of one dollar requires the sacrifice of things that would have been acquired, now or in the future, in voluntary, private transactions valued more highly than one dollar by the taxpayer. That is the nature of gains from voluntary trade foregone. The result is that one dollar of taxation extracts more than one dollar of value from the private sector. Conversely, a reduced tax liability of one dollar means that private parties can engage in an extra dollar of voluntary trade and benefit from the surplus.

There are few forms of taxes that don’t distort incentives in the private market. Taxes may blunt incentives for work, saving, and deployment of capital in productive uses. To the extent that these private decisions are twisted by taxes in ways that differ from fully voluntary decisions, there is a further loss of value and resource waste. Eliminating these distortions is always a worthy goal.

Funding Deficits

Government has ways other than immediate taxation of paying for excess spending. One is to borrow from the public, domestic or foreign. Those who purchase the government’s debt, loaning their money to the government, do so voluntarily. That debt carries an interest obligation by the government, and it must repay the principle some day. That will require new taxes and their attendant distortions, even more borrowing, and/or some other method of extracting value from the private sector. A principle known as Ricardian equivalence holds that the effects of government outlays are the same whether financed by taxes or borrowing, because taxpayers know that future taxes will be owed to pay off government debt, and so they discount that liability into their behavioral calculus.

Additional borrowing can create an unstable financial environment if borrowing occurs at interest rates higher than the economy’s rate of growth. Borrowing might also “crowd out” private borrowers, absorbing saving that would otherwise be used to finance investment in the economy’s productive capacity. In other words, the resources acquired with that extra dollar of government spending will lead to less private investment and a sacrifice of future production.

Sneaky Inflation Tax

Another way that government can pay for spending is by imposing an inflation tax. This amounts to a devaluation of privately-held assets accomplished by inducing unexpected inflation. It allows government debt to be extinguished in the future with dollars having reduced purchasing power. Essentially, more currency (or its electronic equivalent) is placed into circulation: money printing, if you like. That sets up the “too-much-money-chasing-too-few-goods” inflation cycle. But like any other tax, the inflation tax is involuntary and creates waste by inducing the public to respond to distorted incentives.

Summary

An additional dollar of government spending absorbs a dollar of resources, and destroys more value than that given lost surplus to those who would otherwise have benefited from those resources. Moreover, the spending often fails to return a full dollar in benefits, often lining the pockets of elite grifters in the process. Ultimately, the funding for incremental spending must be commandeered from private parties via taxes or an inflationary taking of assets. Public borrowing might conceal the reality of taxes for a time, but it may crowd out productive investment that would otherwise enhance economic growth. So a case against incrementally larger government can be made in terms of resource costs as well as the distortionary effects of taxes and dissipation of future private growth.

By the same token, an ostensible reduction in taxes might be illusory, to the extent that future taxes or an inflationary taking will be necessary to cover the debt one day. On the other hand, there is no direct resource cost involved, and a tax reduction unbinds constraints and distortions on private incentives, which is unambiguously beneficial. And that’s true as long as the tax reductions aren’t targeted to benefit particular sectors, parties or technologies in any new misadventures in government central planning.

Deficits, in and of themselves, are either irrelevant or possibly damaging to long-term economic growth. You’ll get them with either tax cuts or spending hikes. But spending hikes absorb real resources, whereas tax cuts release resources by transforming a dead weight loss in private markets into proper gains from trade. If deficits are a problem, and if eliminating them requires costly tax distortions, then the real problem is the expanse of the state.

Carried Interest and Your Private Sweat Equity

30 Saturday Dec 2017

Posted by in Central Planning, Taxes

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Suppose your rich uncle buys an old house to do some fix-ups and hopes to resell it at a gain. He has the cash and is willing to split the profit 50-50 if you’re willing to handle a few restorations over the next year. Even better, under the partnership he’ll form with you, your profit will be taxed as a pass-through capital gain. You’ll be taxed at only 15% (or 20% if your income is already very high). You’ll provide the labor, but your cut won’t be taxed at ordinary income tax rates.

That’s Just Like Carried Interest

A similar example is provided by Greg Mankiw, along with several others, to illustrate the ambiguity of “capital gains” under our tax law. What might surprise you is that the tax treatment of the deal with your uncle is exactly the same as the tax benefit received by the general partner (GP) in a private equity fund. The GP is the “worker”, as it were, who manages the capital paid-in by the fund’s investors (or limited partners). The GP attempts to build the fund’s value in various ways. The investors, on the other hand, take the same role as your uncle. The GP earns fees as a cut of the investment gains; those fees are essentially treated as capital gains for tax purposes. In the case of the private equity GP, however, the income is called “carried interest”, but there is no real difference.

The tax treatment of carried interest has been a target of progressives and populist critics for many years. This article in The Hill derides the GOP’s failure to close the carried interest “loophole” in the Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA) recently signed into law by President Trump. Of course, wealthy private-equity players have sought to protect the rule with generous campaign contributions to key politicians. However, as illustrated by the partnership with your uncle, pass-through business taxation combined with the treatment of capital gains provides the same benefits to any business-person who invests “sweat equity” into the improvement of an asset for ultimate resale, including the business itself.

Should “sweat equity” earned by a worker be taxed more lightly than the direct receipt of “sweat wages”? The worker does not “own” the asset in question prior to the work effort, a fundamental distinction from what we normally consider to be a capital gain. On the other hand, the worker shoulders risk that the asset’s value will fail to meet expectations. My view is that it is not appropriate for the tradeoff between private risk and return to be managed via the income tax code or by government generally. Nevertheless, the sweat-equity conversion of labor value into asset appreciation is treated by tax law as a capital gain and is taxed at a lower rate than wages (except at low levels of taxable income).

Equal Protection Under the Tax Law

The carried interest rule and relatively “light” taxation of returns on capital are not at the root of the problem here. Rather, it is the disparate treatment of different kinds of income for tax purposes and the high taxation of ordinary income, even in the wake of the the TCJA’s passage. Diane Furchtgott-Roth argues that the low carried-interest tax rate is necessary to encourage productive investment. Peter Wayrich agrees, but again, that is not a good rationale for disparate (and high) taxation of labor income. This note in the Economic Policy Journal contains a quote on Senator Ron Johnson’s proposal to tax all productive entities at the 20% carried-interest tax rate. The potential loss of revenue might require a higher rate, but the proposition that rates should be equal across all forms of business organizations is more sensible than the complex changes promulgated for pass-throughs under the TCJA. Moreover, the progressive premise that tax rates on capital income should be high is a prescription for low rates of saving, a diminished pool of investment capital, and ultimately low growth in labor productivity and wages.

Demonizing Private Equity

The private equity business is criticized for reasons other than carried interest, but mainly due to superstition that these firms routinely engage in plundering healthy enterprises to extract value and victimize helpless employees by reducing wages or leaving them without work. Simple economics reveals the shallow thinking underlying such claims. As a first approximation, private equity can be profitable only when target firms are under-performing or undervalued. A healthy market for business ownership is necessary to ensure that firms with untapped value survive. Weak performance might stem from any number of circumstances but must be addressable under new management. That includes a management shakeup itself, and it could include a capital infusion to upgrade facilities, elimination of unprofitable product lines, a spin-off from a neglectful parent company, or wage renegotiation to improve competitiveness (but never ask a leftist if wages are too high, even as the employer fails).

Interest Deductibility

The tax benefits of carried interest enhance private equity deals relative to traditional merger and acquisition activity. Again, that illustrates the oddity of having different tax rules for different firms. In the past, the gains from carried interest have been magnified by another unfortunate aspect of the tax code: the interest-deductibility of business debt. The TCJA doesn’t completely eliminate this economic peculiarity, but it places a severe restriction on its use (see #6 on the list at the link).

In general, interest deductibility has favored the use of debt in the capital structures of all businesses. That leverage increases financial risk and bids up the level of interest rates faced by all borrowers. Private equity firms have made liberal use of debt in structuring buyouts. Their borrowing capacity combined with carried interest and the debt subsidy has undoubtedly made deals more attractive at the margin.

The new restriction on interest deductibility is likely to reinforce an existing trend in private equity: gradually, GPs have been putting more “skin in the game“. That is, they are risking a bit more of their own capital. That is generally a good thing for investors. The article at the last link was written in March 2017, so the data shown for 2017 is almost meaningless. In 2016, however, the average GP commitment as a percentage of fund size was still less than 8% and the median was just 4%. These percentages should continue to increase with competition for deals and more restricted deductibility of interest expense.

Taxes and Value

If you want to encourage value-maximizing behavior, then don’t tax its makers (or its markers) heavily. Carried interest extends the tax treatment of “sweat equity” to those who “police” the private sector for unexploited value: private equity firms. By eliminating waste, resuscitating formerly productive enterprises, and exploiting new profit opportunities, their efforts are socially accretive. The popular narrative of an “evil” and “vulturous” private equity industry is both misleading and destructive. Beyond that, there is no reason to tax different forms of productive activity at different rates, but we do. The TCJA has lessened the tax disparities to some extent, but more equalization should be a priority. At least the business interest deduction has been restricted, which should lessen the artificial reliance on borrowed capital.

Tax Cuts Yes, Simplification a Mixed Bag

18 Monday Dec 2017

Posted by in Taxes, Trump Administration

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President Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) this morning, the GOP tax bill with an acronym that simply won’t roll off my tongue. A useful summary of the Act produced by the House -Senate conference, and the full text of the Act, appear at this link. The TCJA hews more toward the earlier Senate bill than the House version. I’ve written about both (the House bill here and both here). Here is a good summary of the Act from Peter Suderman at Reason.com.

In my earlier assessments, I relied upon the principle of tax reform and real simplification as a justification for a tax cut without revenue neutrality. There are a few reforms and partial reforms, and the bill may simplify taxes for a number of individual taxpayers. However, on the whole I’m disappointed with the progress made by the GOP in those areas.

Notwithstanding my disappointment with the overall reform effort, the TCJA cuts taxes for most Americans and is likely to have salutary effects on economic growth and the job market. In fact, one of the most remarkable things about  the Act is the claim made by its adversaries on the Democrat side of the aisle. They apparently believe that the benefits of the TCJA flow primarily or even exclusively to the rich. This is a huge mistake for them. High-income taxpayers will receive greater benefits in absolute dollars, but not proportionally. This is shown by the table above, prepared by Chris Edwards from data produced by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT). In fact, the TCJA will extend tax reductions to a larger share of the middle class than either of its predecessor bills would have done. You cannot meaningfully reduce the taxes generated by a steeply progressive tax system without reducing the absolute dollars paid by high-income taxpayers. And you can’t lay the groundwork for sustainable economic growth without improving the investment incentives faced by high-income taxpayers and producers.

Here are some additional additional thoughts on the bill:

Yeah, I like me some tax cuts: The Act reduces taxes for many individuals and families by doubling the standard deduction and reducing tax rates. More importantly, perhaps, it will also reduce taxes for C-corporations, providing some relief from double taxation of corporate income, as will the switch to a territorial tax system on U.S. corporations doing business abroad. The latter is a real reform, while I consider the former a partial reform. Investment incentives are improved via the corporate rate cut and elimination of the corporate Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) — a real reform, as well as the ability to write-off spending on new equipment immediately. As I argued last month, lower corporate taxes are likely to benefit both workers and consumers. The actions of few companies (AT&T, Comcast, Wells Fargo, and Fifth-Third) seem to demonstrate that this is the case: they have announced bonuses and increases in their base wage rates in the immediate wake of the TCJA’s massage.

Pass-through tax cuts are iffy: One of the most difficult parts of the TCJA to evaluate involves the implications for pass-through business entities like sole proprietorships, partnerships and S-corporations. Some might not receive significant cuts. The Act includes a maximum 25% rate on business income, but that is dependent on the proportion of the owner’s income deemed to be business income under the new rules. It also allows a flat deduction of 20% against business income. These provisions will be of benefit to very successful and very capital-intensive pass-throughs. Owners of smaller or less profitable firms will get the benefit of lower individual tax rates and the higher standard deduction, but might not have income high enough to benefit from the 25% rate cap.

Simpler for some, but it is not simplification: The doubled standard deduction will mean fewer taxpayers claiming itemized deductions. That sounds like simplification, but many will find it reassuring to calculate their taxes both ways, so a compliance burden remains. The Act retains or partially retains a number of deductions and credits slated for elimination in earlier versions, failing a simple principle held by reformers: eliminate deductions in exchange for lower rates. Along the same lines, the individual AMT is retained, but the exemption amount is increased, so fewer taxpayers will pay the AMT. Again, simpler for some, but not real simplification.

Elimination of the corporate AMT is simplification, as are immediate expensing of equipment purchases and territorial tax treatment. However, most of the complexities of corporate taxes remain, as do certain tax breaks targeted at specific industries. What a shame. And unfortunately, taxes for pass-through entities are anything but simplified under the Act. Complex new rules would govern the division of income into business income and the owners’ wage income.

Reducing deductions and bad incentives: The mortgage interest deduction encourages over-investment in housing and subsidizes the wealthiest homebuyers. The TCJA leaves it intact for existing mortgages, but allows the deduction to be claimed on new mortgage loans of up to $750,000. So the bad incentive largely remains, though the very worst of it will be eliminated. There have been complaints that this change could reduce home prices in states with the highest real estate prices. Good — they have been inflated by the subsidy at the expense of other taxpayers.

The tax write-off for state and local taxes (SALT) will be limited to $10,000 a year under the TCJA, though it adds some flexibility by allowing that sum to be met by any combination of state or local income, sales or property taxes. This change will reduce the subsidies from federal taxpayers residents of high-tax states, and should make leaders in those states more circumspect about the size of government.

The TCJA preserves and even expands a number of individual deductions and credits, subsidizing families with children, medical expenses, student loans, graduate students, educational saving, retirement saving, and the working poor. The interests benefiting from these breaks will be relieved, but this is not simplification.

Yet another case of “simpler for some” is the estate tax: it remains, but the exemption amounts are doubled. The estate tax does not produce much revenue, but it is fundamentally unjust: it ensnares the families of deceased property owners, farmers and small businesses; planning for it is costly; and it often forces survivors to sell assets quickly, sustaining losses, in order to meet a tax liability. The TCJA will significantly reduce this burden, but the tax framework will remain in place and will be an ongoing temptation to ravenous sponsors of future tax legislation.

Individual cuts are temporary: The corporate tax changes in the TCJA are permanent. They won’t have to be revisited (though they might be), and permanence is a desirable feature for sustaining the impact of positive incentives. The individual cuts and reforms, however, all expire within eight to ten years. The sun-setting of these provisions is, as some have said, a gimmick to reduce the revenue impact of the Act, but sunsetting means another politically fractious battle down the road. It is also a device to ensure compliance with the Byrd Act, which limits the deficit effects of legislation under Senate reconciliation rules. Eight years is a fairly long “temporary” tax cut, as those things go; for now, the impermanence of the cuts might not weaken the influence on spending. However, that influence is likely to wane as the cuts approach expiration.

Deficit Effects: The TCJA’s impact on the deficit and federal borrowing is likely to be somewhere north of $500 billion, possibly as much as $1.4 trillion. Deficits must be funded by government debt, which competes with private debt for the available pool of savings and must be serviced, repaid via future taxes or inflated away. In the latter sense, government borrowing is not really different from current taxes, a proposition known as Ricardian equivalence.

Nonetheless, the incentives, complexities and compliance costs of our current tax code are damaging, and the TCJA at least accomplishes some measure of reform. Moreover, the incremental debt is small relative to the impact of prior estimates of government borrowing over the next decade, with or without extension of the individual tax cuts. The most fundamental problem that remains is excessive government spending and its competing demands for, and absorption of, resources, with no market guidance as to the value of those uses.