Category Archives: Taxes

Joe Biden’s Fat Cooked-Goose Tax Plan

03 Saturday Apr 2021

Posted by in Fiscal policy, Taxes

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I recently wrote on this blog about the damaging impact of corporate taxes on workers, consumers, and U.S. competitiveness. Phil Kerpen tweeted the chart above showing the dramatic reduction in the distribution of corporate tax rates across the world from 1980 through 2020. Yes, yes, Joe Biden’s posture as a fair and sensible leader aside, most countries place great emphasis on their treatment of business income and their standing relative to trading partners.

Kerpen’s tweet was a response to this tweet by economist Justin Wolfers:

Apparently, Wolfers wishes to emphasize that Biden’s plan, which raises the statutory corporate rate from 21% to 28%, does not take the rate up to the level of the pre-Trump era. Fair enough, but compare Wolfers’ chart with Kerpen’s (from the Tax Foundation) and note that it would still put the U.S. in the upper part of the international distribution without even considering the increment from state corporate tax rates. Also note that the U.S. was near the top of the distribution in 1980, 2000, and 2010. In fact, the U.S. had the fourth highest corporate tax rate in the world in 2017, before Trump’s tax package took effect. Perhaps Biden’s proposed rate won’t be the fourth highest in the world, but it will certainly worsen incentives for domestic U.S. investment, the outlook for wage growth, and consumer prices.

And in the same thread, Wolfers said this:

That’s certainly true, but let’s talk about those “loopholes”. First, much of U.S. corporate income is “passed though” to the returns of individual owners, so corporate taxes understate the true rate of tax paid on corporate income. Let’s also remember that the corporate tax represents a double taxation of income, and as a matter of tax efficiency it would be beneficial to consolidate these taxes on individual returns.

Beyond those consideration, the repeal of any corporate tax deduction or credit would have its own set of pros and cons. As long as there is a separate tax on corporate income, there is an economic rationale for most so-called “loopholes”. Does Wolfers refer to research and development tax credits? Maybe he means deductions on certain forms of compensation, though it’s hard to rationalize treating any form of employee compensation as income taxable to the business. Then there are the massive tax subsidies extended for investments in renewable energy. Well, good for Wolfers if that last one is his gripe! The CARES Act of 2020 allowed publicly-traded companies to use losses in 2020( presumably induced by the pandemic) to offset income in prior years, rather than carrying them forward. Did Wolfers believe that to be inappropriate? I might object to that too, to the extent that the measure allows declining firms to use COVID to cloak inefficiencies. Does he mean the offshoring of income to avoid U.S. corporate taxes? Might that be related to relative tax rates?

In any case, Wolfers can’t possibly imagine that the U.S. is the only country allowing a variety of expenses to be deducted against corporate income, or credits against tax bills for various activities. So, a comparison of statutory tax rates is probably a good place to start in assessing the competitive thrust of tax policy. But effective tax rates can reveal much more about the full impact of tax policy. In 2011, a study showed that the U.S. had the second highest effective corporate tax rate in the world. Today, among developed countries, the OECD puts the U.S. roughly in the middle of the pack, close to Germany but higher than Canada, Mexico and Japan, and lower than the UK. This article from 2019 reaches the same conclusion, though the rankings and rates differ from the OECD’s calculations. So it’s not as if the U.S. is the only country to offer tax incentives, or “loopholes” in Wolfers’ preferred terminology.

The corporate tax hikes proposed by the Biden Administration are intended to fund the massive outlays in the so-called infrastucture bill, which of course has very little to do with real infrastructure. Both the tax and spending proposals are bad policy. So far, however, passage of the bill is not a given. Let’s hope all of the Republicans and at least one Democrat senator have the sense to vote it down, but I’m not optimistic. The best hope for resistance among Democrats is Joe Manchin of West Virginia, but even he has signaled his support. Biden’s appointment of Gayle Manchin to a key administration post couldn’t have hurt.

Trump’s Payroll Tax Ploy

15 Tuesday Sep 2020

Posted by in Fiscal policy, Taxes

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President Trump’s memorandum to Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin on payroll tax deferral is bad economic policy, but it might ultimately prove useful as a political weapon. The memo, released in August, instructed the Treasury to allow employers to suspend withholding of the employee’s share of FICA taxes (6.2%) until the end of the year, but it does not forgive the taxes. Only Congress (with the President’s signature) can eliminate the tax obligation. There are several reasons I don’t like it:

  1. Assuming the tax obligation is forgiven, it would provide some relief to those who are already employed (and earning less than $4,000 every two weeks), but not to the unemployed. Thus, as relief from coronavirus-induced job losses, this doesn’t cut it.
  2. It does not reduce the cost of hiring, as would a permanent reduction in the employer’s share, so it does not improve hiring incentives.
  3. The deferral creates uncertainty: will the tax bill be forgiven? If not, will the employee be on the hook? Or the employer? What if an employee leaves the company having received a deferral?
  4. The measure will not be an effective stimulus to spending. It is not an addition to workers’ permanent income since it is a temporary “holiday”. Income perceived as temporary adds little to consumer spending. And it doesn’t constitute a temporary tax break unless employers participate (see below), and even then only if Trump is re-elected and if Congress agrees to forgive the tax.
  5. Trump suggested that the tax will be forgiven if he is re-elected. It’s a rather unsavory proposition: create an immediate tax benefit paired with a matching future obligation with forgiveness contingent upon re-election!
  6. Long-term funding of Social Security is already problematic. Adding a payroll tax holiday on top of that, assuming the taxes are forgiven, only aggravates the situation. Yes, I can imagine various “long-game” reform proposals that might attempt to leverage such a break, but I consider that highly unlikely.

It’s no surprise that a number of large employers are not participating in the tax deferral. such as CVS, JP Morgan Chase, UPS, Home Depot, and Wells Fargo.

Small employers have an even bigger problem to the extent that they lack sophisticated accounting systems to handle such deferrals. Here’s Warren Meyers’ take on the payroll tax suspension:

“We have 400 employees today, but since we are a summer seasonal business we will have fewer than 100 in January. If there is a catch-up repayment in January (meaning Congress chooses not to forgive the taxes altogether), most of my employees who would need to repay the tax will be gone. Do you think the government is just going to say, ‘oh well, I guess we lost that money’? Hah! You don’t know how the government works with tax liens. My guess is that for every employee no longer on the payroll for whom back employment taxes need to be collected, the government is going to say our company is responsible for those payments instead. We could be out hundreds of thousands of extra dollars. President Biden will just say, ‘well I guess you should not have participated in a Trump program.’

So this is the vise we are in: Either we participate in the program, and risk paying a fortune in extra taxes at some future date, or we don’t participate, and have every employee screaming at us for deducting payroll taxes when President Trump told them they did not have to pay it anymore. And what happens if Congress does come along later and forgive the taxes, what kind of jerk am I for not allowing my employees to benefit from the tax break?

A payroll tax rollback was considered for the Republican stimulus packages that failed in Congress this summer, but that provision was said to be “negotiable”. In any case, nothing passed. Surely Trump’s economic advisors know that the economics of the payroll tax memo are lousy, even if Trump doesn’t get it.

I can’t decide whether the whole thing is Machiavellian or just a goof. Perhaps Trump is so eager to be seen as a tax cutter that he is willing to gloss over the distinction between a tax cut and a deferral. If the taxes owed are not forgiven, it won’t be on his watch. And Trump might believe he can weaponize the payroll tax deferral against obstinate Democrats in Congress as well as Joe Biden. Maybe he can.

Tax Returns, Politics and Privacy

12 Sunday May 2019

Posted by in Privacy, Taxes

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It’s a constitutional crisis! Or so claim congressional Democrats, but at this point it looks more like a one-party panic attack. They keep sniffing the trailing fumes of the Mueller investigation, which turned up nothing on the President, or at least nothing worth prosecuting. There is also an ongoing dispute over the President’s tax returns, which he has chosen not to make public. Last week, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Richard Neal subpoenaed the IRS for six years of Trump’s tax returns, but that is likely to be ignored. There is no law or requirement that Trump release the returns, and the IRS would be under no obligation to comply with the subpoena if it has “no legislative purpose”, as Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin said of an earlier request by Neal. For his part, Trump has falsely claimed to the public that an ongoing audit prevents him from releasing his tax documents, but he is fully within his legal rights to withhold his returns, at least for now. His decision is, no doubt, political and it may be wise to that extent. Nevertheless, the suspicion that Trump is a tax cheat is fueled by his very reluctance to make the returns public.

Constitutional Protection

The legality of Trump’s refusals to make the returns public is established in the Constitution, according to law professor Adam Grewal of the University of Iowa:

“Though a federal statute seemingly compels the IRS to furnish, on request, anyone’s tax returns to some congressional committees, a statute cannot transcend the constitutional limits on Congress’s investigative authority. Congress enjoys a near-automatic right to review a President’s tax returns only in the impeachment context.”

If explicit action is taken to impeach the President, justifiably or not, then presumably he or the IRS would be forced to turn over his tax returns to Congress. Even then, however, it would probably become the subject of a protracted court fight.

Partisan Charges

It’s not surprising that Trump has engaged expensive tax experts for the Trump organization and his personal taxes. Of course he has! Anyone in his position would be crazy not to. Minimizing taxes is a complex undertaking even for those having far less wealth and business complexity than a Donald Trump. There is no reason why he should have foregone any tax advantages for which he or his business was entitled. And in fact, he was entitled to use losses on a number of failed enterprises over the years to offset other income for tax purposes. Under these circumstances, a tax liability of zero is not terribly surprising.

Specific claims that Trump is a tax cheat are as yet unfounded. As Jeffrey Carter explains, there is an array of tax provisions intended to provide incentives to businesses precisely because tax law has been crafted to encourage business activity; real estate development is no exception. The idea is that businesses encourage employment, income, incremental tax revenue, and eventually more development. While I generally oppose tax provisions that impinge on specific kinds of human activity, there is nothing illegal or even immoral about taking advantage of tax rules that exist. In fact, there are legal tax maneuvers that can allow a successful real estate development business to generate continuing tax losses.

There are allegations that the Trump organization used fraudulent appraisals to understate values of buildings as a means of minimizing taxes. A variety of appraisal techniques are used in commercial real estate, each involving a series of assumptions and possible adjustments. Appraisals might be especially difficult for complex properties such as large, high-end gambling developments. Perhaps reviews of appraisals are part of the ongoing IRS audit to which Trump referred. There’s little doubt that Trump’s tax advisors would have sought to use the most advantageous techniques and assumptions that would pass scrutiny by the IRS and other tax authorities. However, it is unlikely that he was intimately involved in the appraisal process himself. The audit should determine whether their methods were excessive, not a swarm of politicians and leftist journalists. The penalties for any past understatement of taxes might be financially significant, but his presidency would almost certainly survive such a finding.

Again, Trump may be wise to withhold his tax returns. In today’s political environment, every deduction, credit, and loss carry-forward would be characterized by Democrats and the media as an affront to the American people. In fact, most American taxpayers attempt to minimize their taxes, as well they should. In a world with a simple, sane tax code, a simple definition of taxable income, and a competent IRS, there would be little reason for the clamor over public disclosure of tax data by public officials or candidates for office.

Universal Tax Disclosure? No

That brings me to the subject of a rather striking proposal: Robin Hanson believes that all tax returns should be made publicly available: yours, mine and Donald Trump’s. That change was made in the U.S. in 1924, but soon reversed, according to Hanson. It is done today in Norway, though the identity of anyone seeking that information on a taxpayer is made available to the taxpayer. Without the latter condition, the idea seems like an invitation to voyeurism, or worse. The several rationales offered by Hanson all tend to fall under the rubric that “transparency is good”. He includes critical remarks from Tyler Cowan on the proposal, dismissing them all on various grounds. But I happen to agree with Cowan that not all transparency is good. In fact, my first reaction is that the proposal would be an unnecessary extension of the intrusion into private affairs made by government taxation of income.

Universal tax disclosure might have some value in discouraging tax evasion, and perhaps the IRS could create a schedule of buy-off rates by income level at which tax information would be kept private. However, I’m skeptical of the other benefits cited by Hanson. For one thing, if the identity of the inquirer is revealed, many of the purported benefits would be nullified by discouraging the queries. To the extent that transparency has value, many credit transactions or credit payment mechanisms already require verification of income. Insurance underwriting is also sometimes dependent on proof of income. I am skeptical that the ability of workers to collect information from the tax returns of other individuals would greatly improve the efficiency of labor markets. The value of income data to counter-parties in other kinds of relationships, such as prospective marriage, would seem to be balanced by the value of privacy. Hanson says that people don’t place a high value on privacy, but it clearly has value, and I’m not sure his Twitter poll with a single price point is a valid test of the proposition. And again, with the simple tax code we should have, the benefits of acquiring the tax returns of politicians would boil down to an opportunity for shaming the rich and “tax pinchfists” (successful tax minimizers), which is what some of this is about anyway.

Conclusion

Donald Trump’s tax returns are a prize that his detractors hope will reveal an abundance of classist political fodder and perhaps even evidence of misdeeds. They can only hope. Unless Articles of Impeachment are drafted in the House of Representatives, the Constitution protects President Trump’s tax returns from congressional scrutiny. Trump is probably wise to resist disclosure of his taxes, since the returns would be picked over by the Left and criticized for any whiff of tax management, legal or otherwise. Trump’s businesses hired experts to aggressively minimize tax liabilities, but there is no evidence that they engineered any illegal maneuvers.

Finally, to suggest that all tax returns be made publicly accessible is to support a massive invasion of privacy. Then again, the very imposition of our complex income tax code is a massive invasion of privacy, and one that creates a substantial compliance burden on all income earners.

Progs Give New Meaning To “Tax Distortions”

16 Tuesday Apr 2019

Posted by in Taxes

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Tax day has come and gone, but I’m struck by 1) the incredible misconceptions people express about the change in their tax liabilities caused by the 2018 income tax legislation; and 2) the confusion about how our progressive income tax system actually works! Some of these misapprehensions are encouraged by progressives who would rather misinform the public than evaluate policy on its own terms. I am not a fan of our income tax system, nor all aspects of the 2018 tax law, but let’s at least discuss it honestly.

First, a substantial majority of taxpayers paid lower taxes on their 2018 income than they would have under prior tax rules (also see here). However, as I’ve observed before, many people conflate the change in the amount of their tax refund with the change in their taxes paid. And again, the progressive media hasn’t helped to allay this misconception, as noted by Vox cofounder Matthew Yglesias when he tweeted this:

“Nobody likes to give themselves credit for this kind of messaging success, but progressive groups did a really good job of convincing people that Trump raised their taxes when the facts say a clear majority got a tax cut.”

Even worse, members of Congress misrepresent the facts with little media backlash. For example, Andrew Wilford of the National Taxpayers Union Foundation reports the following:

“… the tax cut actually made the tax code more progressive, not less.  … Of course, none of this stopped Democrats such as Sen. Kamala Harris (D-Calif.) from claiming that the TCJA was a “middle-class tax hike.” Nor did it prevent three separate Democratic senators from claiming that the average family making up to $86,000 would see a tax hike of $794, despite the fact that the source for this claim clarified that this tax hike would apply to only 6.5 percent of households in this income bracket.”

It’s amazing just how drastically our income tax system is misunderstood or often misrepresented by the media. Apparently, it’s considered politically advantageous to do so. Chris Edwards offers the following quote from Christine Elba in the Washington Post:

“Meanwhile, the wealthier among us (remember: corporations are people, too!) are able to hire tax lawyers, consultants and accountants to clue them in on lightly advertised but heavily lobbied for loopholes that allow them to pay a lower tax rate or even no taxes at all.”

That is simply not a fair characterization of our income tax system. Edwards goes on to demonstrate the progressive nature of U.S. income taxes based on information from the Tax Policy Center. Not only do statutory federal income tax rates rise with income, but so do average effective tax rates, which account for the effects of deductions, credits and exclusions. In fact, average effective rates are negative in the lowest income groups and are zero on balance for the lowest 50% of earners. And average effective rates keep rising in the top quintile, moving up through the top 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1%. Ms. Elba is clearly confused. And if she is aware of the pernicious double-taxation of corporate income, she probably would never admit it.

Apparently the current state of income tax progressivity is not enough to satisfy statists and redistributionists, who take license to lie about it in order to make their case for higher taxes on the rich, and even the not-so-rich. But here’s some advice for Bernie Sanders, Kamala Harris, and others who insist that, while they are rich, they desperately want to pay more taxes: you are free to do so without penalty. Better yet, give it to a good charity instead!

A Carbon Tax Would Be Fine, If Only …

01 Friday Mar 2019

Posted by in Environment, Global Warming, Taxes

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I’ve opposed carbon taxes on several grounds, but I admit that it might well be less costly as a substitute for the present mess that is U.S. climate policy. Today, we incur enormous costs from a morass of energy regulations and mandates, prohibitions on development of zero-carbon nuclear power, and subsidies to politically-connected industrialists investing in corn ethanol, electric cars, and land- and wildlife-devouring wind and solar farms. (For more on these costly and ineffective efforts, see Michael Shellenberger’s “Why Renewables Can’t Save the Planet” in Quillette.) Incidentally, the so-called Green New Deal calls for a complete conversion to renewables in unrealistically short order, but with very little emphasis on a carbon tax.

The Carbon Tax

Many economists support the carbon tax precisely because it’s viewed as an attractive substitute for many other costly policies. Some support using revenue from the tax to pay a flat rebate or “carbon dividend” to everyone each year (essentially a universal basic income). Others have pitched the tax as a revenue-neutral replacement for other taxes that are damaging to economic growth, such as payroll taxes or taxes on capital. Economic growth would improve under the carbon tax, or so the story goes, because the carbon tax is a tax on a “bad”, as opposed to taxes on “good” factors of production. I view these ideas as politically naive. If we ever get the tax, we’ll be lucky to get much regulatory relief in the bargain, and the revenue is not likely to be offset by reductions in other taxes.

But let’s look a little closer at the concept of the carbon tax, and I beg my climate-skeptic friends to stick with me for a few moments and keep a straight face. The tax is a way to attach an explicit price to the use of fuels that create carbon emissions. The emissions are said to inflict social or external costs on other parties, costs which are otherwise ignored by consumers and businesses in their many decisions involving energy use. The carbon tax is a so-called Pigouvian tax: a way to “internalize the externality” by making fossil fuels more expensive to burn. The tax itself involves no prohibitions on behavior of any kind. Certain behaviors are taxed to encourage more “desirable” behavior.

Setting the Tax

But what is the appropriate level of the tax? At what level will it approximate the true “social cost of carbon”? Any departure from that cost would be sub-optimal. Robert P. Murphy contrasts William D. Nordhaus’ optimal carbon tax with more radical levels, which Nordhaus believes would be needed to meet the goals of the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Nordhaus won the 2018 Nobel Prize in economics for his work on climate change. Whatever one might think of the real risks of climate change, Nordhaus’ clearly recognizes the economic downsides to mitigating against those risks.

Nordhaus has estimated that the social cost of carbon will be $44/ton in 2025 (about $0.39 per gallon of gas). He claims that a carbon tax at that level would limit increases in global temperature to 3.5º Celsius by 2100. He purports to show that the costs of a $44 carbon tax in terms of reduced economic output would be balanced by the gains from limiting climate warming. Less warming would require a higher tax with fewer incremental rewards, and even more incremental lost output. The costs of the tax would then outweigh benefits. For perspective, according to Nordhaus, a stricter limit of 2.5º C implies a carbon tax equivalent to $2.50 per gallon of gas. The IPCC, however, prescribes an even more radical limit of 1.5º C. That would inflict a huge cost on humanity far outweighing the potential benefits of less warming.

A Carbon Tax, If…

Many economists have come down in favor of a carbon tax under certain qualifications: revenue-neutrality, a “carbon dividend”, or as a pre-condition to deregulation of carbon sources and de-subsidization of alternatives. John Cochrane discusses a carbon tax in the context of the “Economists’ Statement on Carbon Dividends” (Cochrane’s more recent thoughts are here):

“It’s short, sweet, and signed by, as far as I can tell, every living CEA chair, every living Fed Chair, both Democrat and Republican, and most of the living Nobel Prize winners. … It offers four principles 1. A carbon tax, initially $40 per ton. 2. The carbon tax substitutes for regulations and subsidies and (my words) the vast crony-capitalist green boondoggle swamp, which is chewing up money and not saving carbon. 3. Border adjustment like VAT have [sic] 4. ‘All the revenue should be returned directly to U.S. citizens through equal lump-sum rebates.'”

Rather than a carbon dividend, Warren Meyer proposes that a carbon tax be accompanied by a reduction in the payroll tax, an elimination of all subsidies, mandates, and prohibitions, development of more nuclear power-generating capacity, and contributions to a cleanup of Chinese and Asian coal-power generation. That’s a lot of stuff, and I think it exceeds Meyer’s normal realism with respect to policy issues.

My Opposition

Again, I oppose the adoption of a carbon tax for several reasons, despite my sympathy for the logic of Pigouvian taxation of externalities. At the risk of repeating myself, here I elaborate on my reasons for opposition:

Government Guesswork: First, Nordhaus’ estimates notwithstanding, we do not and cannot know the climate/economic tradeoffs with any precision. We can barely measure global climate, and the history of what measures we have are short and heavily manipulated. Models purporting to show the relationship between carbon forcing and global climate climate change are notoriously unreliable. So even if we can agree on the goal (1.5º, 2.5º, 3.5º), and we won’t, the government will get the tradeoffs wrong. I took the following from a comment on Cochrane’s blog, a quote from A.C. Pigou himself:

“It is not sufficient to contrast the imperfect adjustments of unfettered enterprise with the best adjustment that economists in their studies can imagine. For we cannot expect that any State authority will attain, or even wholeheartedly seek, that ideal. Such authorities are liable alike to ignorance, to sectional pressure, and to personal corruption by private interest. A loud-voiced part of their constituents, if organized for votes, may easily outweigh the whole.”

Political Hazards: Second, we won’t get the hoped-for political horse trade made explicit in the “Economists’ Statement …” discussed above. As a political matter, the setting of the carbon tax rate will almost assuredly get us a rate that’s too high. Experiences with carbon taxes in Australia, British Columbia, and France have been terrible thus far, sowing widespread dissatisfaction with the resultant escalation of energy prices.

Economic Growth: Neither is it a foregone conclusion that a revenue-neutral carbon tax will stimulate economic growth, and it might actually reduce output. As Robert P. Murphy explains in another post, the outcome depends on the structure of taxes prior to the change. The substitution of the carbon tax will increase output only if it replaces taxes on a factor of production (labor or capital) that is overtaxed prior to the change. That undermines a key selling point: that the carbon tax would necessarily produce a “double dividend”: a reduction in carbon emissions and higher economic growth. Nevertheless, I’d allow that revenue neutrality combined with elimination of carbon regulation and “green” subsidies would be a good bet from an economic growth perspective.

Overstated Risks: Finally, I oppose carbon taxes because I’m unconvinced that the risk and danger of global warming are as great as even Nordhaus would have it. In other words, the external costs of carbon don’t amount to much. Our recorded temperature history is extremely short and is therefore not a reliable guide to the long-term nature of the systemic relationships at issue. Even worse, temperature records are manipulated to exaggerate the trend in temperatures (also see here, here and here). There is no evidence of an uptrend in severe weather events, and the dangers of sea level rise associated with increasing carbon concentrations also have been greatly exaggerated. Really, at some point one must take notice of the number of alarming predictions and doomsday headlines from the past that have not been borne out even remotely. Furthermore, higher carbon concentrations and even warming itself would be of some benefit to humanity. In addition to a greener environment, the benefits include more rapid economic growth, improved agricultural yields, and a reduction in the salient danger of cold-weather deaths.

Economic Development: The use of fossil fuels has helped to enable strong growth in incomes in developed economies. It has also given us energy alternatives such as nuclear power as well as research into other alternatives, albeit with very mixed success thus far. And while a carbon tax would create an additional incentive to develop such alternatives, a U.S. tax would not accomplish much if any global temperature reduction. Such a tax would have to be applied on a global scale. Talk about a political long-shot! Increasing the price of carbon emissions also has enormous downsides for the less developed world. These fragile economies would benefit greatly from development of fossil fuel energy, enabling reductions in poverty and the income growth necessary to someday join in the prosperity of the developed economies. This, along with liberalization of markets, is the affordable way to bring economic success to these countries, which in turn will enable them to consider the energy alternatives that might come to fruition by that time. Fighting the war on fossil fuels in the underdeveloped world is nothing if not cruel.

 

The Oddly Cherished Tax Refund

13 Wednesday Feb 2019

Posted by in Taxes, Uncategorized

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Lately I’ve heard people complain bitterly that their federal tax refunds will be smaller this year. It’s as if they expected the 2017 tax package to lead to a larger refund on taxes paid in 2018, rather than a lower tax liability. Yes, those are two different things. About 80% of U.S. taxpayers are expected to see a net reduction in their federal taxes for 2018, but they might or might not receive refunds. Was your withholding reduced by the new tax law? Then you might receive a smaller refund even if your taxes are lower. Likewise, if you reduced your withholding too much, you will receive a smaller refund. Did your income rise? Then maybe you’ll pay more taxes and see a smaller refund.

The withholding tables were adjusted by the IRS in early 2018 based on the changes dictated by the tax package. Lower withholding was applied to many taxpayers, but it is often possible to manage one’s withholding rate within certain limits. How many of those pining for a refund took action to preserve a higher level of withholding? Let’s hope it was zero, for their sake.

Don’t get me wrong: if you’re not sure whether you’ll owe taxes when you file, it’s always nice to hear that a refund is coming. Moreover, the withholding allowance calculation is a very imprecise guide to one’s tax liability. Clearly the tax package did not benefit every taxpayer, especially high earners and small business people. Those in high-tax states lost a chunk of their state and local tax deduction. And another thing was somewhat irritating: continuing high compliance costs. Even under this so-called tax simplification, it remains necessary for many taxpayers to collect information related to potential deductions. After all, how else would you know whether it makes more sense to itemize rather than take the larger standard deductions now available? Small business people have some other compelling reasons to complain about this “simplification”.

Jazz Shaw at Hot Air observed that this Washington Post article about reduced tax refunds was crafted as if to inflame resentment among taxpayers:

“This is certainly a clever bit of ‘coverage’ of a story based primarily on people bitching on Twitter. Notice how the WaPo manages to promote a hashtag denigrating the tax cuts in the second paragraph. [#GOPTaxScam] The premise here is clearly that the tax cuts reduced some people’s refunds, only Republicans voted for the tax cuts, therefore the tax cuts must be bad and so are the Republicans.”

I don’t have the link now, but yesterday Alex Tabarrok had this sarcastic reaction to the WaPo article:

“Voters irate because the government didn’t force them to give it an interest-free loan…”

Perhaps no explanation is required, but the government has free use of your funds whenever too much is withheld from your regular paycheck — it pays you no interest on the “loan” as part of your ultimate refund. If getting that refund is the only way you can save, you’re doing it wrong.

 

 

The Abolition of Wealth

12 Tuesday Feb 2019

Posted by in Free markets, Redistribution, Taxes

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Few weep for the wealthy when they are attacked by redistributionists, but perhaps we should. Recent expressions of hatred for the so-called super-rich extend to the merely affluent, of course, but billionaires are much less likely to find sympathy. Those proposing to “abolish billionaires” by laying public claim to their assets and incomes have little reason to expect a popular backlash. Nevertheless, there are strong reasons to defend the wealthy and their right to control the riches they accumulate. Don Boudreaux has some words we should all take to heart:

“While exceptions no doubt exist, the people who get rich in our economy are overwhelmingly people who have made the rest of us richer.”

Boudreaux is correct in noting that “anti-billionaire” sentiment is marked in people who know little of the complexities of actually producing things. Wealth creation is a two-way street. On one end is a cadre of innovators and risk-takers whose rewards are often concentrated. On the other end are the many beneficiaries of those innovations: eager buyers of value-enhanced products whose rewards are relatively diffuse but very meaningful nonetheless. The same dynamic takes place in generating lower levels of wealth, among hard-working small entrepreneurs and savers. Eliminate one set of rewards and the other will vanish.

Redistributionists are aware of scarcity at a basic level, but it’s as if they take for granted that a certain quantity of product will be on the shelves irrespective of the policy environment, incentives, and basic guarantees of economic liberty. As Boudreaux says:

“If food, clothing, medical care, automobiles, houses, diamond rings, airplane seats, rolls of paper towels, and all other good and services were randomly rained down onto earth by some heavenly being, it would then be true that the more of these goodies that I manage to grab, the fewer are the goodies available for you to grab, and vice versa. … And so if through simple luck or sinister cunning I grab more than you grab, then the resulting inequality in our wealth has no good justification. If the government seizes from me a chunk of ‘my’ stuff and gives it to you, no ethical offense is committed.”

That’s not how it works in a world in which effort and resourcefulness are required to satisfy wants. Under a truly liberal order, such efforts are voluntary, motivated by the promise and prospect of secure rewards. And so, as consumers, we can possess the riches made possible through the efforts of innovators and risk-takers. If successful, their rewards are earned by producing value that not only exceeds their own costs, but exceeds the prices buyers are asked to pay. Today’s most prominent billionaires have brought to market products, services, and ways of transacting that we’d never have imagined even a few years prior to their introduction. Computer operating systems, smart phones, on-line retailing, and room- and ride-sharing are just a few examples.

Nick Gillespie makes much the same point in quoting Joseph Schumpeter:

“The capitalist engine is first and last an engine of mass production which unavoidably also means production for the masses. . . . It is the cheap cloth, the cheap cotton and rayon fabric, boots, motorcars and so on that are the typical achievements of capitalist production, and not as a rule improvements that would mean much to the rich man. Queen Elizabeth owned silk stockings. The capitalist achievement does not typically consist in providing more silk stockings for queens but in bringing them within reach of factory girls.”

Then there are the highly popular musicians and actors of the day, with wealth approaching (and in a few cases exceeding) $1 billion. Gillespie uses Paul McCartney as a case in point. Rather than “cheating” his way to wealth, McCartney’s fans would heartily agree that his talents are well worth the wealth he’s managed to accumulate. Would advocates of “abolishing” billionaires deny all this? They contend, in their own arbitrary judgment, that the market’s objective assessment cannot justify wealth of this magnitude.

Redistributionists also resent that anyone of wealth might have the gall to hold it or invest it rather than give it away. First, as noted above, secure rights provide the necessary incentives to create, produce, and take risks ex ante, which help enrich us all ex post. But those rights also must be secure ex post, and not subject to the whims of the next generation of socialist nitwits. In addition, as Gillespie says:

“Would there be less suffering in the world if [McCartney’s] money is expropriated and transferred to the wretched of the earth via higher taxes rather than through his own charitable donations and investments? Probably not, especially when you think about how much suffering, especially in the developing world, is the direct result of government action.”

Gillespie also marshals statistics on changes in measures of inequality that do not support the claims of redistributionists. In a separate post, Boudreaux makes that case here. Furthermore, the U.S. already has arguably the most progressive tax system in the developed world, even if transfers to the poor are not as generous as in some countries.

The sheer ignorance of many progressives is well illustrated by the “war against billionaires“. These critics of wealth demonstrate all the economic sophistication of preening high-school social studies students. Unfortunately, they are now coddled by certain established officeholders too eager to seek approval from the fringe left than to bother with responsible policy analysis.

It’s a short rhetorical step from condemning billionaires to condemning mere millionaires and sub-millionaires, and coveting their wealth. The victims here will ultimately include successful small business people and professionals who not only employ large segments of the population but also provide many of the services and wares we rely on in our day-to-day lives. Their success is not only well-earned: it is continuously exposed to risk from competitive forces. Rapacious politicians will never cease in their efforts to apply confiscatory taxes to the wealth of the very affluent. Soon enough, tax policy will reach farther down into the wealth distribution. These are games better suited to children or even vicious animals. Redistributionists think in zero-sum terms, with no appreciation for the positive-sum outcomes enabled by secure rights and free markets. Their failure to grasp the dynamics of free markets is at the root of their advocacy for disastrously negative-sum policies.

 

Deficits Are a Symptom of Statist Excess

12 Monday Feb 2018

Posted by in Big Government, Taxes

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One thing’s clear with respect to President Trump’s budget proposal and the ongoing debate over appropriations: federal spending will increase and add to future budget deficits. This follows the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) enacted late last year, which many expect to add upwards of $1 trillion to deficits over the next 10 years. I have offered mixed praise of some of the reforms and rate cuts in the TCJA, though it does not accomplish much in the way of tax simplification and it will almost certainly require a large increase in federal borrowing. Ultimately, however, dollar for dollar, a tax cut giving rise to a deficit inflicts lower (or even negative) costs on the private sector than an unfunded spending binge, which is costly in the most basic terms: resources devoured by government.

Cost of Spending

The cost of an extra dollar of government spending at the most basic level is the value of lost opportunities to which the resources absorbed by government otherwise could have been put. When the government spends an extra dollar, and if the government pays a competitive market price, the goods and services exchanged for that dollar by private party “A” would be valued at more than one dollar by other private parties who lost the opportunity to trade with “A” for those same goods and services.

There might be a strong case for incremental spending in any particular instance, of course. Can we benefit from more national defense? Infrastructure? Grants of foreign aid? Subsidies for this industry or that? This technology or that? This cultural program or that? Public aid? Primary research? Regulatory budgets? I’d favor very few of those as general spending priorities. However, there are many subcategories and so many special interests that it is difficult to control spending as long as compromise is needed to accomplish anything.

The Trump budget is a mix of cuts in non-defense spending and large increases in defense, infrastructure outlays, and border security. On balance, it would lead to substantially higher budget deficits over the next ten years. He won’t get all of what he wants, but it would be astonishing if larger deficits are not an outcome.

Unfortunately, government is typically inefficient in the execution of its tasks and it is less responsive to price incentives than private buyers, who are fully vested in “ownership” of the dollars they spend. Government agents, no matter how honorable, simply do not have the same kind of stake in the outcome as a private owner. Obviously, spending by federal agencies is influenced by the political process, which creates opportunities for side rewards for those who direct or influence spending and those who receive the payments. These side rewards are pure private rents arising from public largess. For a private party, the profitability of transacting with government may well exceed the normal return to capital or entrepreneurship. The efficiency of government spending is compromised by its political nature and the uneconomic behavior of government agents. I therefore have strong doubts about the cost-benefit comparison of almost any public initiative.

Un-Taxing

The government ultimately acquires its funds from taxes enforced via coercive power. After all, tax collection requires a considerable enforcement effort. A tax payment of one dollar requires the sacrifice of things that would have been acquired, now or in the future, in voluntary, private transactions valued more highly than one dollar by the taxpayer. That is the nature of gains from voluntary trade foregone. The result is that one dollar of taxation extracts more than one dollar of value from the private sector. Conversely, a reduced tax liability of one dollar means that private parties can engage in an extra dollar of voluntary trade and benefit from the surplus.

There are few forms of taxes that don’t distort incentives in the private market. Taxes may blunt incentives for work, saving, and deployment of capital in productive uses. To the extent that these private decisions are twisted by taxes in ways that differ from fully voluntary decisions, there is a further loss of value and resource waste. Eliminating these distortions is always a worthy goal.

Funding Deficits

Government has ways other than immediate taxation of paying for excess spending. One is to borrow from the public, domestic or foreign. Those who purchase the government’s debt, loaning their money to the government, do so voluntarily. That debt carries an interest obligation by the government, and it must repay the principle some day. That will require new taxes and their attendant distortions, even more borrowing, and/or some other method of extracting value from the private sector. A principle known as Ricardian equivalence holds that the effects of government outlays are the same whether financed by taxes or borrowing, because taxpayers know that future taxes will be owed to pay off government debt, and so they discount that liability into their behavioral calculus.

Additional borrowing can create an unstable financial environment if borrowing occurs at interest rates higher than the economy’s rate of growth. Borrowing might also “crowd out” private borrowers, absorbing saving that would otherwise be used to finance investment in the economy’s productive capacity. In other words, the resources acquired with that extra dollar of government spending will lead to less private investment and a sacrifice of future production.

Sneaky Inflation Tax

Another way that government can pay for spending is by imposing an inflation tax. This amounts to a devaluation of privately-held assets accomplished by inducing unexpected inflation. It allows government debt to be extinguished in the future with dollars having reduced purchasing power. Essentially, more currency (or its electronic equivalent) is placed into circulation: money printing, if you like. That sets up the “too-much-money-chasing-too-few-goods” inflation cycle. But like any other tax, the inflation tax is involuntary and creates waste by inducing the public to respond to distorted incentives.

Summary

An additional dollar of government spending absorbs a dollar of resources, and destroys more value than that given lost surplus to those who would otherwise have benefited from those resources. Moreover, the spending often fails to return a full dollar in benefits, often lining the pockets of elite grifters in the process. Ultimately, the funding for incremental spending must be commandeered from private parties via taxes or an inflationary taking of assets. Public borrowing might conceal the reality of taxes for a time, but it may crowd out productive investment that would otherwise enhance economic growth. So a case against incrementally larger government can be made in terms of resource costs as well as the distortionary effects of taxes and dissipation of future private growth.

By the same token, an ostensible reduction in taxes might be illusory, to the extent that future taxes or an inflationary taking will be necessary to cover the debt one day. On the other hand, there is no direct resource cost involved, and a tax reduction unbinds constraints and distortions on private incentives, which is unambiguously beneficial. And that’s true as long as the tax reductions aren’t targeted to benefit particular sectors, parties or technologies in any new misadventures in government central planning.

Deficits, in and of themselves, are either irrelevant or possibly damaging to long-term economic growth. You’ll get them with either tax cuts or spending hikes. But spending hikes absorb real resources, whereas tax cuts release resources by transforming a dead weight loss in private markets into proper gains from trade. If deficits are a problem, and if eliminating them requires costly tax distortions, then the real problem is the expanse of the state.

Carried Interest and Your Private Sweat Equity

30 Saturday Dec 2017

Posted by in Central Planning, Taxes

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Suppose your rich uncle buys an old house to do some fix-ups and hopes to resell it at a gain. He has the cash and is willing to split the profit 50-50 if you’re willing to handle a few restorations over the next year. Even better, under the partnership he’ll form with you, your profit will be taxed as a pass-through capital gain. You’ll be taxed at only 15% (or 20% if your income is already very high). You’ll provide the labor, but your cut won’t be taxed at ordinary income tax rates.

That’s Just Like Carried Interest

A similar example is provided by Greg Mankiw, along with several others, to illustrate the ambiguity of “capital gains” under our tax law. What might surprise you is that the tax treatment of the deal with your uncle is exactly the same as the tax benefit received by the general partner (GP) in a private equity fund. The GP is the “worker”, as it were, who manages the capital paid-in by the fund’s investors (or limited partners). The GP attempts to build the fund’s value in various ways. The investors, on the other hand, take the same role as your uncle. The GP earns fees as a cut of the investment gains; those fees are essentially treated as capital gains for tax purposes. In the case of the private equity GP, however, the income is called “carried interest”, but there is no real difference.

The tax treatment of carried interest has been a target of progressives and populist critics for many years. This article in The Hill derides the GOP’s failure to close the carried interest “loophole” in the Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA) recently signed into law by President Trump. Of course, wealthy private-equity players have sought to protect the rule with generous campaign contributions to key politicians. However, as illustrated by the partnership with your uncle, pass-through business taxation combined with the treatment of capital gains provides the same benefits to any business-person who invests “sweat equity” into the improvement of an asset for ultimate resale, including the business itself.

Should “sweat equity” earned by a worker be taxed more lightly than the direct receipt of “sweat wages”? The worker does not “own” the asset in question prior to the work effort, a fundamental distinction from what we normally consider to be a capital gain. On the other hand, the worker shoulders risk that the asset’s value will fail to meet expectations. My view is that it is not appropriate for the tradeoff between private risk and return to be managed via the income tax code or by government generally. Nevertheless, the sweat-equity conversion of labor value into asset appreciation is treated by tax law as a capital gain and is taxed at a lower rate than wages (except at low levels of taxable income).

Equal Protection Under the Tax Law

The carried interest rule and relatively “light” taxation of returns on capital are not at the root of the problem here. Rather, it is the disparate treatment of different kinds of income for tax purposes and the high taxation of ordinary income, even in the wake of the the TCJA’s passage. Diane Furchtgott-Roth argues that the low carried-interest tax rate is necessary to encourage productive investment. Peter Wayrich agrees, but again, that is not a good rationale for disparate (and high) taxation of labor income. This note in the Economic Policy Journal contains a quote on Senator Ron Johnson’s proposal to tax all productive entities at the 20% carried-interest tax rate. The potential loss of revenue might require a higher rate, but the proposition that rates should be equal across all forms of business organizations is more sensible than the complex changes promulgated for pass-throughs under the TCJA. Moreover, the progressive premise that tax rates on capital income should be high is a prescription for low rates of saving, a diminished pool of investment capital, and ultimately low growth in labor productivity and wages.

Demonizing Private Equity

The private equity business is criticized for reasons other than carried interest, but mainly due to superstition that these firms routinely engage in plundering healthy enterprises to extract value and victimize helpless employees by reducing wages or leaving them without work. Simple economics reveals the shallow thinking underlying such claims. As a first approximation, private equity can be profitable only when target firms are under-performing or undervalued. A healthy market for business ownership is necessary to ensure that firms with untapped value survive. Weak performance might stem from any number of circumstances but must be addressable under new management. That includes a management shakeup itself, and it could include a capital infusion to upgrade facilities, elimination of unprofitable product lines, a spin-off from a neglectful parent company, or wage renegotiation to improve competitiveness (but never ask a leftist if wages are too high, even as the employer fails).

Interest Deductibility

The tax benefits of carried interest enhance private equity deals relative to traditional merger and acquisition activity. Again, that illustrates the oddity of having different tax rules for different firms. In the past, the gains from carried interest have been magnified by another unfortunate aspect of the tax code: the interest-deductibility of business debt. The TCJA doesn’t completely eliminate this economic peculiarity, but it places a severe restriction on its use (see #6 on the list at the link).

In general, interest deductibility has favored the use of debt in the capital structures of all businesses. That leverage increases financial risk and bids up the level of interest rates faced by all borrowers. Private equity firms have made liberal use of debt in structuring buyouts. Their borrowing capacity combined with carried interest and the debt subsidy has undoubtedly made deals more attractive at the margin.

The new restriction on interest deductibility is likely to reinforce an existing trend in private equity: gradually, GPs have been putting more “skin in the game“. That is, they are risking a bit more of their own capital. That is generally a good thing for investors. The article at the last link was written in March 2017, so the data shown for 2017 is almost meaningless. In 2016, however, the average GP commitment as a percentage of fund size was still less than 8% and the median was just 4%. These percentages should continue to increase with competition for deals and more restricted deductibility of interest expense.

Taxes and Value

If you want to encourage value-maximizing behavior, then don’t tax its makers (or its markers) heavily. Carried interest extends the tax treatment of “sweat equity” to those who “police” the private sector for unexploited value: private equity firms. By eliminating waste, resuscitating formerly productive enterprises, and exploiting new profit opportunities, their efforts are socially accretive. The popular narrative of an “evil” and “vulturous” private equity industry is both misleading and destructive. Beyond that, there is no reason to tax different forms of productive activity at different rates, but we do. The TCJA has lessened the tax disparities to some extent, but more equalization should be a priority. At least the business interest deduction has been restricted, which should lessen the artificial reliance on borrowed capital.

Tax Cuts Yes, Simplification a Mixed Bag

18 Monday Dec 2017

Posted by in Taxes, Trump Administration

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President Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) this morning, the GOP tax bill with an acronym that simply won’t roll off my tongue. A useful summary of the Act produced by the House -Senate conference, and the full text of the Act, appear at this link. The TCJA hews more toward the earlier Senate bill than the House version. I’ve written about both (the House bill here and both here). Here is a good summary of the Act from Peter Suderman at Reason.com.

In my earlier assessments, I relied upon the principle of tax reform and real simplification as a justification for a tax cut without revenue neutrality. There are a few reforms and partial reforms, and the bill may simplify taxes for a number of individual taxpayers. However, on the whole I’m disappointed with the progress made by the GOP in those areas.

Notwithstanding my disappointment with the overall reform effort, the TCJA cuts taxes for most Americans and is likely to have salutary effects on economic growth and the job market. In fact, one of the most remarkable things about  the Act is the claim made by its adversaries on the Democrat side of the aisle. They apparently believe that the benefits of the TCJA flow primarily or even exclusively to the rich. This is a huge mistake for them. High-income taxpayers will receive greater benefits in absolute dollars, but not proportionally. This is shown by the table above, prepared by Chris Edwards from data produced by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT). In fact, the TCJA will extend tax reductions to a larger share of the middle class than either of its predecessor bills would have done. You cannot meaningfully reduce the taxes generated by a steeply progressive tax system without reducing the absolute dollars paid by high-income taxpayers. And you can’t lay the groundwork for sustainable economic growth without improving the investment incentives faced by high-income taxpayers and producers.

Here are some additional additional thoughts on the bill:

Yeah, I like me some tax cuts: The Act reduces taxes for many individuals and families by doubling the standard deduction and reducing tax rates. More importantly, perhaps, it will also reduce taxes for C-corporations, providing some relief from double taxation of corporate income, as will the switch to a territorial tax system on U.S. corporations doing business abroad. The latter is a real reform, while I consider the former a partial reform. Investment incentives are improved via the corporate rate cut and elimination of the corporate Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) — a real reform, as well as the ability to write-off spending on new equipment immediately. As I argued last month, lower corporate taxes are likely to benefit both workers and consumers. The actions of few companies (AT&T, Comcast, Wells Fargo, and Fifth-Third) seem to demonstrate that this is the case: they have announced bonuses and increases in their base wage rates in the immediate wake of the TCJA’s massage.

Pass-through tax cuts are iffy: One of the most difficult parts of the TCJA to evaluate involves the implications for pass-through business entities like sole proprietorships, partnerships and S-corporations. Some might not receive significant cuts. The Act includes a maximum 25% rate on business income, but that is dependent on the proportion of the owner’s income deemed to be business income under the new rules. It also allows a flat deduction of 20% against business income. These provisions will be of benefit to very successful and very capital-intensive pass-throughs. Owners of smaller or less profitable firms will get the benefit of lower individual tax rates and the higher standard deduction, but might not have income high enough to benefit from the 25% rate cap.

Simpler for some, but it is not simplification: The doubled standard deduction will mean fewer taxpayers claiming itemized deductions. That sounds like simplification, but many will find it reassuring to calculate their taxes both ways, so a compliance burden remains. The Act retains or partially retains a number of deductions and credits slated for elimination in earlier versions, failing a simple principle held by reformers: eliminate deductions in exchange for lower rates. Along the same lines, the individual AMT is retained, but the exemption amount is increased, so fewer taxpayers will pay the AMT. Again, simpler for some, but not real simplification.

Elimination of the corporate AMT is simplification, as are immediate expensing of equipment purchases and territorial tax treatment. However, most of the complexities of corporate taxes remain, as do certain tax breaks targeted at specific industries. What a shame. And unfortunately, taxes for pass-through entities are anything but simplified under the Act. Complex new rules would govern the division of income into business income and the owners’ wage income.

Reducing deductions and bad incentives: The mortgage interest deduction encourages over-investment in housing and subsidizes the wealthiest homebuyers. The TCJA leaves it intact for existing mortgages, but allows the deduction to be claimed on new mortgage loans of up to $750,000. So the bad incentive largely remains, though the very worst of it will be eliminated. There have been complaints that this change could reduce home prices in states with the highest real estate prices. Good — they have been inflated by the subsidy at the expense of other taxpayers.

The tax write-off for state and local taxes (SALT) will be limited to $10,000 a year under the TCJA, though it adds some flexibility by allowing that sum to be met by any combination of state or local income, sales or property taxes. This change will reduce the subsidies from federal taxpayers residents of high-tax states, and should make leaders in those states more circumspect about the size of government.

The TCJA preserves and even expands a number of individual deductions and credits, subsidizing families with children, medical expenses, student loans, graduate students, educational saving, retirement saving, and the working poor. The interests benefiting from these breaks will be relieved, but this is not simplification.

Yet another case of “simpler for some” is the estate tax: it remains, but the exemption amounts are doubled. The estate tax does not produce much revenue, but it is fundamentally unjust: it ensnares the families of deceased property owners, farmers and small businesses; planning for it is costly; and it often forces survivors to sell assets quickly, sustaining losses, in order to meet a tax liability. The TCJA will significantly reduce this burden, but the tax framework will remain in place and will be an ongoing temptation to ravenous sponsors of future tax legislation.

Individual cuts are temporary: The corporate tax changes in the TCJA are permanent. They won’t have to be revisited (though they might be), and permanence is a desirable feature for sustaining the impact of positive incentives. The individual cuts and reforms, however, all expire within eight to ten years. The sun-setting of these provisions is, as some have said, a gimmick to reduce the revenue impact of the Act, but sunsetting means another politically fractious battle down the road. It is also a device to ensure compliance with the Byrd Act, which limits the deficit effects of legislation under Senate reconciliation rules. Eight years is a fairly long “temporary” tax cut, as those things go; for now, the impermanence of the cuts might not weaken the influence on spending. However, that influence is likely to wane as the cuts approach expiration.

Deficit Effects: The TCJA’s impact on the deficit and federal borrowing is likely to be somewhere north of $500 billion, possibly as much as $1.4 trillion. Deficits must be funded by government debt, which competes with private debt for the available pool of savings and must be serviced, repaid via future taxes or inflated away. In the latter sense, government borrowing is not really different from current taxes, a proposition known as Ricardian equivalence.

Nonetheless, the incentives, complexities and compliance costs of our current tax code are damaging, and the TCJA at least accomplishes some measure of reform. Moreover, the incremental debt is small relative to the impact of prior estimates of government borrowing over the next decade, with or without extension of the individual tax cuts. The most fundamental problem that remains is excessive government spending and its competing demands for, and absorption of, resources, with no market guidance as to the value of those uses.