Tag Archives: Avik Roy

Medicare For All … and Tax Hikes, Long Waits, Inferior Care

23 Thursday Jun 2022

Posted by in Health Care, Health Insurance

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Political humorist P.J. O’Rourke once quipped that if you think health care is expensive now, wait till it’s free! A Stephen Green post reminded me of the source of that wisdom. But there are many who say they don’t understand why we simply don’t offer the Medicare program to everyone … free! Well, the reasons are quite simple: we can’t afford it, and it would be bad policy. In fact, it’s too costly and bad policy even if it isn’t free! Medicare is technically insolvent as it is — broke, in plain language. According to the Medicare Trustees 2022 Report linked above, the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund will be depleted by 2028. That only means the Medicare system has authority to take funds the Treasury borrows to pay ongoing benefits through 2028, so the remaining trust fund balance is little consolation. The long-term actuarial deficit is $700 billion, but it’s possibly as high as $1.5 trillion under an alternative, high-cost scenario shown in the Trustee’s report.

Single Payer Medicare?

Extending free Medicare to the entire population would cost over $30 trillion in the first 10 years, and that’s a conservative estimate. And be forewarned: single-payer health care is government health care, which invariably leads to rationed access and protracted waiting times, poor quality, and escalating costs. For a detailed look at many of the quality problems suffered by Medicare patients, see this paper by Michael Cannon and Jacqueline Pohida. Don’t be deceived by claims that Medicare’s administrative costs are lower than private insurance: The real cost of Medicare is largely hidden through the imposition of low reimbursement rates to providers, while taxpayers get stuck with a significant bill.

Avik Roy has discussed variations on “Medicare For All” (M4A), most of which share very little with today’s Medicare. Not only would they fail to address its shortcomings; they would be much worse. Some do not include the range of private plans currently offered through Medicare Advantage. In fact, under the plans offered by Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, Medicare Advantage would be terminated, as would all other private insurance for the working-age population. Medicaid would also be eliminated. “Medicare”, in its surviving form, would be the single-payer system, “free” at the point of care and without premiums. Again, a free health care buffet would unleash gluttonous demand, so certain restrictions must be in place to limit pricing and access to care. Think rationing, which should sound ominous to those whose health is failing.

Physician reimbursement rates under traditional Medicare are now only about 60% of private reimbursements, and that filters down to the wages earned by other workers in the health care sector. Naturally, broadening Medicare’s reach will cause providers and their employees to drop-out or cut back. And again, services will be subject to various other forms of rationing. These are unavoidable failings of free or heavily-subsidized health care systems, not to mention the massive burden on taxpayers. And by the way, the “rich” are nowhere near rich enough to pay for all of it.

As to the overall effects, here’s what CBO Director Phillip L. Swagel told the Senate Budget Committee recently, as quoted in Reason by JD Tuccille:

“The increase in demand for personal health care would exceed the increase in supply, resulting in greater unmet demand than the amount under current law. The increase in unmet demand would correspond to increased congestion in the health care system, including delays and forgone care.”

The “increase in supply” mentioned by Swagel is something of a pipe dream.

Buy-Ins and Public Option

There are less drastic proposals than full-blown M4A, such as so-called Medicare buy-ins. For example, those age 50 – 64 might be given the option to “buy-in” to Medicare coverage. It’s not clear whether that would include a choice of Medicare Advantage plans. Many would find the coverage available through traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage to be inadequate. It is often inferior to private plans, including the lack of dependent coverage and no out-of-pocket maximum for traditional Medicare. Supplemental coverage would be necessary for many individuals choosing the latter.

Another question is how employers would adjust to a segment of their work force in the 50-64 age group opting-out of sponsored coverage. Would the company be required to pick-up the Medicare tab? Would there be compensatory adjustments in wages? Fully compensatory changes are unlikely. Even with partial adjustments, how would an employer adjust company-wide wage scales for younger workers who perform the same or similar duties as those opting into Medicare. And what of the tax-free benefit for workers on employer-paid premiums? Medicare premiums are not tax deductible… at least not yet!

All of the other concerns about low provider reimbursement rates would apply to a Medicare buy-in. The supply of medical care, particularly to the segment buying in, might prove thin. The buy-in option would have very little impact on the number of uninsured individuals. However, several studies have found that the buy-in option would increase premiums for private plans on the individual market (see the last link). That’s largely because providers will try to stick private insurers and patients with the burden of cross-subsidizing Medicare buy-ins.

Another proposal is for a Medicare plan or similar public option to be made available to all in the exchange marketplace. This would take a more massive toll on taxpayers and health care access and quality than the buy-in approach. Moreover, because of pressure for cross-subsidies, private plans will struggle to stay in business. The destruction would be gradual, but the public option would slowly eliminate choice from the marketplace. Cannon and Pohida believe that offering a public option could lead to improvements if the private and public plans are allowed to compete on a level playing field, largely in terms of subsidies and regulatory hurdles, but that is highly unlikely.

Cuts Ahead?

A lesser known issue is the impact of spending caps put in place under the Affordable Care Act. These apply to Medicare and Medicaid as well as federal subsidies on policies purchased on the Obamacare exchanges. When those caps are exceeded, access becomes temporarily restricted, with some practices actually closing their doors for a period of days or weeks. Health economist John Goodman notes that seniors tend to eat into the allowable spending amounts much faster than younger cohorts. That means seniors might be denied costlier forms of care. To the extent that any variation on M4A covers a broader age range, there might be more pressure to curtail certain forms of care for seniors, which would be a most unfortunate case of policy-induced age discrimination.

As for Medicare as it stands now, Goodman describes the potential cuts that are coming. These include the possibility of reduced amenities (e.g., hospital wards with more patients per room and lower-cost meals), and as already mentioned, longer waits and restricted availability of costlier treatments. Goodman states that the necessary cuts to make Medicare whole would be equivalent to the loss of three years of coverage for a 65-year old, and the cuts will affect both traditional Medicare and privately-issued (but publicly subsidized) Advantage plans.

Conclusion

There’s no chance any form of M4A would reduce the cost of care or improve access to care. An expanded Medicare would bear the hallmarks of central planning that have accelerated the monopolization of health care under Obamacare. And like Obamacare, the final form of any M4A plan will be the product of negotiations between self-interested politicians, corporatists and regulators. Big pharmaceutical companies, insurers, large hospital systems, and other interest groups will wrangle for the rents that “reform” legislation might bring. Costs will rise and access to care will be restricted. Taxpayers will be saddled with a large chunk of the cost.

In the end it’s likely to be a mess. Far better to adopt reforms that would bring more innovation, choice, and competition to the markets for health insurance and health care. That includes expanding the range of options available under private Medicare (Advantage). At the same time, Obamacare should be scrapped in favor of a range of a greater range of private options with income-dependent subsidies, including catastrophic coverage only, as well as reduced regulation of insurers and providers.

Hospital Price Insanity

15 Sunday Dec 2019

Posted by in Health Care, Health Insurance

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Almost nothing is less transparent than hospital pricing. If you’re shopping for a procedure, you probably won’t hear about the negotiated prices worked out with large insurers…. you’re likely to be quoted something much higher. A high price is billed to an insurer, but the excess above their negotiated prices is “disallowed” via contractual adjustment. You and/or your small insurer might not get the same deal. As Robert Laszewski says:

“The chargemaster is complete nonsense that really doesn’t matter — unless you are an uninsured person and you’re getting these huge bills driving you toward bankruptcy. The biggest irony of the U.S. healthcare system is that only the uninsured — often people who don’t have a lot of money — are the only ones the hospital expects to pay these incredibly inflated prices!”

An uninsured patient might be billed at the higher rate, but of course few end up paying. But there is harm in this arrangement, and it extends well beyond the uninsured. You might not be surprised to learn that the government is right in the middle of it. Read on…

What a Racket!

There’s some slight of hand going on in hospital pricing that creates perverse incentives. Who has something to gain from a huge gap between the full price and the hospital’s allowable charge? The answer is both the hospital and insurers, and that’s true whether the hospital is for-profit or nonprofit. When the list price and the size of the discount increase, the insurer gets to brag to employer-plan sponsors about the great savings it negotiates. In an episode on EconTalk, Dr. Keith Smith, a partner in the ultra-competitive and cash-only Surgery Center of Oklahoma, says (only partly in jest) that the conversation between the insurer and hospital might go something like this:

“Now, what the insurers actually do is ask the hospital administrators, ‘Can you do a brother a favor and actually charge $200,000 for that, so that our percentage savings actually looks larger?‘”

This does two things for the insurer: it impresses employers as prospective plan sponsors, and it might also earn the insurer a bonus known as Claims Repricing, whereby the employer pays a commission on the discounts the insurer “negotiates”.

What about the hospitals? How do they benefit from this kind of arrangement? By inflating the “list price” of procedures, the hospital creates the appearance of a write-down or loss on a substantial share of the care it provides, despite the fact that its real costs are far below list prices and usually below the discounted “allowable amounts” negotiated with insurers as well. The appearance of loss serves to benefit the hospitals because they are compensated by the government on that basis through so-called Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments. These are, ostensibly, reimbursements for so-called uncompensated care.

This would not be such a travesty if the prices approximated real costs, but they don’t, and the arrangement creates incentives to inflate. The DSH payments to hospitals are used in a variety of ways, as Smith notes:

“Yeah; and before we get to feeling too sorry for the hospitals, all of the ones I know of claiming to go broke have a crane in front of them building onto their Emergency Room. …

So, I don’t know: again, the hospitals that are complaining about this, they are buying out physician practices, they’re buying out competitors. They seem to have a whole lot of money. They’re not suffering. Now, what they have done is used the situation you described–the legitimate non-payer–they’ve used that as a propaganda tool, I would argue, to develop a justification for cost shifting where they charge us all a whole lot more to make up for all the money that they’re losing. But they really need a lot of this red ink to maintain the fiction of their not-for-profit status.”

Non-profit hospitals are also entirely tax-exempt (income and property taxes), despite the fact that many use their “free cash flows” in ways similar to for-profit hospitals. The following describes a 2015 court ruling in New Jersey:

“The judge stated ‘If it is true that all non-profit hospitals operate like the hospital in this case… then for purposes of the property tax exemption, modern non-profit hospitals are essentially legal fictions.’ Judge Bianco found that the hospital ‘operated and used the property for a profit-making purpose’ by, in part, providing substantial loans, capital, and subsidies to for-profit entities, including physician groups.“

The bad incentives go beyond all this. Smith adds the following:

“Waste in a big hospital system is actually encouraged, many times because hospitals are paid based on what they use…. So, to the extent that the hospital uses a lot of supplies, that typically raises and increases the amount of revenue that they receive.”

Hospitals have been shielded from competition for years by the government. As Chris Pope explains, hospital pricing is designed “to accommodate rather than to constrain the growth of hospital costs“. This encourages hospitals that are inefficient in terms of costs, quality of care, and over-investment in equipment. Conversely, duplicated facilities and equipment simply add costs and don’t encourage competition given the cost-plus nature of hospital pricing and government efforts to prevent entry by more efficient operators. These restrictions include “Certificates of Need” for new entrants, and the ban on physician-owned hospitals in the Affordable Care Act (ACA). At the same time, the ACA encouraged hospital consolidation by rewarding the formation of so-called Accountable Care Organizations, which are basically exempt from anti-trust review. In the end, any reductions in administrative costs that consolidation might offer are swamped by the anti-consumer force of monopoly power.

Mandated Transparency?

The lack of price transparency really isn’t the root problem, in my view, but it is undesirable. Can government action to create transparency foster a more competitive market for the services hospitals offer? A recent Trump Administration Executive Order would require that hospitals publicly post prices for 300 “shoppable” services or procedures. The effective date of this order was recently delayed by a year, to January 2021. Hospital trade groups have challenged the order in court on the grounds that the First Amendment protects private businesses from being compelled to reveal details of privately-negotiated deals for complex services. While I try to be a faithful defender of constitutional rights, I find this defense rather cynicical. I’m not sure the First Amendment was intended to aid in concealing dishonest schemes for private benefit at the expense of taxpayers and consumers.

Avik Roy likes the price transparency rule. It would require the posting of gross charges for procedures as well as specific negotiated prices. The executive order would also require Medicare to pay no more to hospital-owned clinics than to independent clinics for the same procedure, which is laudable. Roy is sanguine about the ability of these rules to bring more competition to the market. He predicts a more level playing field for small insurers in negotiating discounts, and he thinks the order would spur development of on-line tools to assist consumers.

John C. Goodman is mildly skeptical of the benefits of a transparency mandate (also see here). Consumers with decent levels of coverage aren’t terribly motivated to make hospital price comparisons, especially if it means a delay in treatment. Also, Goodman points out a few ways in which hospitals try to “game” transparency requirements that already exist. John Cochrane worries about gaming of the rules as well. Competition and price discipline are better prescriptions for price transparency and might be better addressed by eliminating the incentives for third-party payment arrangements, like the unbalanced tax deductibility of health insurance premiums, but that kind of reform isn’t on the horizon. Goodman concedes that many procedures are “shoppable”, and he does not minimize the extent to which pricing varies within local hospital markets.

Conclusion

The most insane thing about hospital revenue generation is its reliance on fictitious losses. And hospitals, profit and non-profit, have a tendency to spend excess cash in ways that fuel additional growth in cost and prices. Sadly, beyond their opacity, hospital prices do not reflect the true value of the resources used by those institutions.

In my view, the value of price transparency does not hinge on whether the average health care consumer is sensitive to hospital prices, but on whether the marginal consumer is sensitive. That includes those willing to pay for services out-of-pocket, such as those who seek care at the Surgery Center of Oklahoma. Third-party payers lacking significant market power would undoubtedly prefer to have more information on pricing as well. Mandated price transparency won’t fix all of the dysfunctions in the delivery and payment for health care. That would require more substantial free-market reforms to the insurance and health care industries, which ideally would involve replacing price subsidies with direct payments to the uninsured. The transparency mandate itself might or might not intrude on domains over which privacy is protected by the Constitution, a question that has already been brought before the courts. Nonetheless, transparency would lead to better market information for all participants, which might help rationalize pricing and encourage competitive forces.

 

Choice, Federal Exchange Failure, and a Path to Health Insurance Reform

25 Wednesday Oct 2017

Posted by in Health Insurance, Markets, Obamacare

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“… a government program that is ruined by permitting more choice is not sustainable.“

That’s Jeffrey Tucker on Obamacare. Conversely, coercive force is incompatible with a free society. Tucker, no fan of President Donald Trump, writes that the two recent executive orders on health coverage are properly framed as liberalization. The orders in question: 1a) eliminate federal restrictions on the sale of so-called association health insurance plans, including their availability across state lines; 1b) remove the three-month limitation on coverage offered under temporary policies; and 2) end insurer cost-sharing subsidies for policies sold to low-income (non-Medicaid) segments of the individual market.

The most immediately impactful of the three points above might be 1b. These temporary policies became quite popular after Obamacare took effect, at least until the Obama Administration placed severe restrictions on their duration and renewal in 2016 (see Avik Roy’s post in Forbes on this point). Trump’s first order rescinds that late-term Obama order. The short-term policies are likely to become popular once again, as things stand. Small employers can avoid many of the Obamacare rules and save significantly on premiums using temporary policies.

Association plans are already sold to small businesses having a “commonality of interest”, but Trump’s order would expand the allowable common interests and permit association plans to be sold across state lines. Avik Roy doubts that this will have a large impact, but to the extent that association plans avoid both state and federal benefit mandates, they could prove to be another important source of more affordable coverage for employees than the Obamacare exchanges. In any case, as Tucker says:

“In the words of USA Today: the executive order permits a greater range of choice ‘by allowing more consumers to buy health insurance through association health plans across state lines.’  … The key word here is ‘allowing’– not forcing, not compelling, not coercing. Allowing.

Why would this be a problem? Because allowing choice defeats the core feature of Obamacare, which is about forcing risk pools to exist that the market would otherwise never have chosen. … The tenor of the critics’ comments on this move is that it is some sort of despotic act. But let’s be clear: no one is coerced by this executive order. It is exactly the reverse: it removes one source of coercion. It liberalizes, just slightly, the market for insurance carriers.“

The elimination of insurer cost-sharing subsidies might sound like the most draconian aspect of the orders. Those subsidies were designed to keep the cost of coverage low for consumers with low incomes, but the subsidies are illegal because the allocation of funds was never authorized by Congress. And contrary to what has been alleged, eliminating the insurer subsidies will have virtually no impact on low-income consumers. First, a large percentage of them are on Medicaid to begin with, not the exchanges. Second, tax-credit subsidies for low-income consumers are still in place for exchange plans, and they will scale based on the premium charged for the “silver” plan (also see Avik Roy’s link above). Taxpayers will be on the hook for those increased subsidies, as they were for the insurer cost-sharing payments.

The exchange market will be weakened by the executive orders, but it has been in a prolonged decline since its inception. Relatively healthy consumers will have opportunities to buy more competitive coverage through short-term policies or association plans, so they are now more likely to exit the risk pool. Higher-income, unsubsidized consumers are likely to pay more for coverage on the exchanges, particularly those with pre-existing conditions. As premiums rise, some of the healthy will simply forego coverage, paying the penalty instead (if it is enforced). Of course, the exchange risk pool was already risky, coverage options have thinned, and premiums have been rising, but the deterioration of conditions on the exchanges will likely be hastened under Trump’s executive orders.

Dismantling some of the restrictions on health insurance choice, which were imposed by executive order under President Obama, could prove to have been a stroke of genius on Trump’s part. As a negotiating ploy, Trump just might have maneuvered Republicans and Democrats into a position from which they can agree … on something. The new orders certainly give emphasis to the deterioration of the exchange markets. The insurers probably viewed the cost-sharing subsidies as a better deal for themselves than having to recoup costs via risky and controversial rate increases, so they are likely to pressure Congress for relief. And higher-income consumers with pre-existing conditions will face higher premiums but won’t have new choices. They will be a vocal constituency.

Democrats just don’t have any ideas with legs, however: single-payer and Medicare-for-all are increasingly viewed as politically unacceptable alternatives by most observers. As John C. Goodman notes at the last link, Medicare is already an actuarial and financial nightmare. Another program of the like to replace existing coverage that most voters would like to keep is not a position likely to win elections. Here is Goodman:

“So, the Democrats’ dilemma is: (1) they are not getting any electoral advantage from Obamacare, (2) they can’t afford to criticize it for fear of upsetting their base and (3) they don’t have an acceptable solution in any event.“

So perhaps we have conditions that might foster a compromise, at least one that could win enough votes to fix the insurance markets. Goodman contends that a plan originally attributable to John McCain, and now in the form of the Pete Sessions/Bill Cassidy-sponsored Patient Freedom Act, could be the answer. It would create something like a Universal Basic Health Allowance, in the form of a tax credit, funded by eliminating all current federal spending on health care (excluding Medicare and Medicaid). Those with pre-existing conditions would purchase coverage the same way as others, but the plan would give insurers a strong incentive to retain them. According to Goodman, a “health status risk adjustment” would assure actuarially-fair pricing by forcing an existing insurer to pay the adjustment to a new insurer when sick individuals change their insurance plans.

The Sessions/Cassidy plan (and Goodman) describes a particular implementation of a more general concept called health status insurance, a good explanation of which is offered by John Cochrane:

“Market-based lifetime health insurance has two components: medical insurance and health-status insurance. Medical insurance covers your medical expenses in the current year, minus deductibles and copayments. Health-status insurance covers the risk that your medical insurance premiums will rise. If you get a long-term condition that moves you into a more expensive medical insurance premium category, health-status insurance pays you a lump sum large enough to cover your higher medical insurance premiums, with no change in out-of-pocket expenses.“

It would be a miracle if Congress can successfully grapple with the complexities of health care reform in the current legislative session. However, Trump’s executive orders have improved the odds that some kind of agreement can be negotiated to address the dilemma of the failing exchanges and coverage for pre-existing conditions. Let’s hope whatever they negotiate will leverage consumer choice and free markets. Trump’s orders are a step, but only one step, in reestablishing the patient/insured as a key decision maker in the allocation of health care resources.

Can Health Care Bill Get GOP Off the Schneid?

29 Thursday Jun 2017

Posted by in Health Insurance, Obamacare

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health insurer bailout

For those who are “woke” to Obamacare’s failures, the Senate GOP’s health insurance reform bill has plenty to hate and maybe some things to love. There are likely to be some changes in the bill before it goes to a vote, which now has been delayed until sometime after Congress’ July 4th recess. Known as the Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017 (BCRA), the bill is another mixed bag of GOP health care reforms and non-reforms. It is the Senate Republicans’ effort to improve upon the bill passed by the House of Representatives in May. The non-reforms are tied to an inability to repeal all aspects of Obamacare (the Affordable Care Act, or ACA) within the context of budget reconciliation, a process which permits a simple majority for approval of changes linked in some way to the budget (the so-called Byrd rule). Yuval Levin offers an excellent discussion of the bill and the general motivations for the form it has taken:

“They are choosing to address discrete problems with Obamacare within the framework it created and to pursue some significant structural reforms to Medicaid beyond that, and they should want the merits of their proposal judged accordingly. Their premise is politically defensible — it is probably more so than my premise — and the proposal they have developed makes some sense in light of it.“

It’s necessary to get one thing out of the way at the outset: the CBO’s scoring of the Senate bill is flawed in a massive way, like the earlier score of the House bill. The estimate of lost coverage for 22 million individuals is based on the CBO’s errant predictions of Obamacare coverage levels. (See here and here, and see Avik Roy’s latest entry on this topic.) Does anyone believe that enrollment on the exchanges will decline by 15 million in 2018 due to the elimination of the individual mandate? That’s over 40% more than total enrollment in 2017, by the way. Even if we attribute the CBO’s prediction to the elimination of both the individual and employer mandates, it would be an incredible plunge, especially given the means-tested tax credits in the BCRA. Does anyone believe that coverage levels under Obamacare would increase by 18 – 19 million by 2026 (mostly on account of the individual mandate)? That is the baseline assumed by the CBO in its scoring of the BCRA, which is laughable. A more realistic estimate of lost coverage under the BCRA might be 2 to 3 million, but remember that many of those coverage losses would not be “forced” in any sense. Rather, they would be purposeful refusals to take coverage with the demise of the individual mandate. But they would tend to be the healthiest of the current, coerced enrollees.

A related point has to do with hysterical claims that the BCRA will “kill thousands of people”. Someone cooked-up this talking (screaming?) point to rally the ignorant left and perhaps frighten the ignorant right (including a few GOP Senators). As Ira Stoll explains, there are several reasons to dismiss these assertions, not least of which is its tradeoff-free conceit. More ugly detail on the basis of these claims can be found here.

Will the BCRA “gut” Medicaid, as Charles Schumer, Nancy Pelosi and other have claimed? Program spending would not decline by any means, only its growth rate. Enrollment would decline with tougher eligibility rules, but as noted above, tax credits more generous than the Medicaid savings (relative to Obamacare) would help replace lost Medicaid coverage with private insurance. Steve Chapman has contributed one of the most nitwitted commentaries on Medicaid reform that I have seen. Not only do critics consistently ignore the proposed tax credits for coverage at low incomes, but they never address the monumental waste in the program., something that would likely improve under the budgeting requirements and additional discretion given to states by the BCRA.

An even crazier scare story going around is that the Senate bill will cut Medicare benefits. That is not the case, though the bill repeals an Obamacare Medicare tax increase on the self-employed.

Getting back to the broader BCRA, here are some of the major provisions:

  • Medicaid reform to replace the budgetary disaster of federal matching with per capita caps or block grants, and state program control.
  • Means-tested tax credits for insurance purchases would extend to low-income individuals who might otherwise lose their expanded Medicaid eligibility. According to Levin, this group is heavily weighted toward the unmarried and childless.
  • Greater state authority over regulation of the individual insurance market. This is accomplished through the availability of state waivers from many Obamacare regulations, including essential health benefits.
  • Almost all Obamacare tax provisions would be repealed. One exception is the “Cadillac” tax on high-cost employer plans starting in 2026 (after a temporary hiatus). Many of these repeals would benefit individuals broadly as taxpayers, employees, business people, and patients.
  • Expanded allowable age rating to 5/1 from 3/1. This helps limit adverse selection by pricing more risk where it exists, and the means-tested credits would help offset higher premiums for older individuals with low incomes.
  • Provides about $130 billion in “stabilization” funds for insurers over a three-year period. This is an attempt to keep premiums down during a transition over which the GOP probably hopes to enact additional deregulatory measures. Is this a practical maneuver? Yes, but it also reflects a bit of “corporatism-when-it’s-convenient” hypocrisy.
  • Eliminates funding for Planned Parenthood. Presumably funding could be restored later were the organization to split off its abortion services into a financially distinct division, which the Hyde Amendment would seem to require.
  • Retains coverage for pre-existing conditions.
  • Elimination of the individual and employer mandates, including the tax penalty. However, individuals who go without coverage for two months would face a six-month waiting period before they could re-qualify for coverage.

Eliminating the mandates is great from a libertarian and an economic perspective. The coercion inherent in those requirements is bad enough. In practice, the individual mandate has proven less effective in encouraging enrollment than Obamacare’s architects had hoped, which makes the CBO’s conclusions all the more puzzling. The employer mandate gives firms an incentive to reduce hours and employment, so it has extremely undesirable labor-market implications.

Most criticism of the BCRA from the right has centered on its failure to fully repeal Obamacare insurance and health care regulations. The continuation of Obamacare community rating is a major shortcoming of the bill, as it distributes the financial risks of medical needs in ways that do not correspond to the actual distribution of health risks. The result is the very same adverse selection problem we have witnessed on the Obamacare exchanges. Unfortunately, this raises the specter that we’ll be stuck with some form of community rating in the long-term, along with employer-provided coverage and the ill-advised premium tax deductions, which tend to inflate premium levels.

Michael F. Cannon of the CATO Institute calls the BCRA an Obamacare rescue package. John C. Goodman is largely in agreement with Cannon, stating that Republicans have no real desire to repeal Obamacare. Peter Suderman at Reason has many of the same concerns. In addition to community rating, Cannan (and Senator Rand Paul) are unhappy that Medicaid spending continues to grow under the bill with a new program of subsidies (tax credits) to boot! They also condemn the so-called “stabilization” or “cost-sharing” subsidies that would be paid to insurers under the bill. While a broader range of plans would become available, there is little confidence that insurers will be able to  bring down premiums and/or deductibles substantially without the added subsidies.

Avik Roy has defended the Senate bill for its proposed reforms to Medicaid, replacement of Obama’s Medicaid expansion with tax credits for private coverage, and transitional tax credits to smooth jumps in premium levels as income rises from low levels. This is an improvement over the House bill. However, marginal tax rates would be high under the BCRA for individuals in the range of income over which the credits phase out, which is a legitimate “welfare trap” criticism.

David Harsanyi also believes the bill is a good start:

“If Republican leadership had told conservatives in 2013 that they could pass a bill that would eliminate the individual and employer mandates, phase out Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion, cut an array of taxes, and lay out the conditions for full repeal later, I imagine most would have said ‘Sign me up!’“

Naturally, most critics of Obamacare have strong misgivings about a bill that would leave major components of the ACA’s structure in place. That includes Obamacare’s regulation of health care delivery itself, not just health insurance coverage. The BCRA might incorporate signifiant changes before it goes to a vote, however. One can only hope! Rand Paul has suggested breaking the bill into two parts: repeal of the ACA and other spending provisions, though it’s not clear how a repeal bill would qualify under the Byrd rule. Either way, the GOP intends to follow-up with additional health care legislation and administrative changes. Were a bill enacted soon, there is some chance that additional legislation could garner limited bi-partisan support. Long-term stability of the health insurance and health care markets would be better-served by a stronger semblance of political equilibrium than we have seen in the years since Obama was elected.

 

 

Musings II: Avik Roy on Health Insurance Reform

12 Friday May 2017

Posted by in Health Care, Obamacare

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IMG_4209

Vox carried an excellent Dylan Scott interview with Avik Roy this week. Roy is a health care policy expert for whom I have great respect. Among other health care issues, I have quoted him in the recent past on the faulty Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections for Obamacare enrollment, which have consistently overshot actual enrollment. In this interview, Roy explains his current views on the health care insurance reform process and, in particular, the American Health Care Act (AHCA), the bill passed by the House of Representatives last month. The interview provides a good follow-up to my “musings” post on Sacred Cow Chips earlier this week.

Roy provides good explanations of some of the AHCA’s regulatory changes that have merit. These include:

  1. relaxation of Obamacare’s community rating standards, meaning that insurers have more flexibility to charge premia based on age and other risk factors, thus mitigating the pricing distortions caused by cross-subsidies on the individual market;
  2. a rollback in the required minimum actuarial value (AV) of an insurance plan (the ratio of plan-paid medical expenses to total medical expenses);
  3. elimination of federal essential benefits requirements.

Roy provides context for these proposed changes relative to Obamacare. For example, regarding AV, he says:

“[In] the old individual market, prior to Obamacare, the typical actuarial value of a plan was about 40 percent. Obamacare drives that up effectively to 70 percent. That has a corresponding effect on premiums; it makes premiums a lot more expensive. In the AHCA, those actuarial value mandates are repealed. Which should provide a lot more opportunity for plans to design more affordable insurance policies for individuals.“

Even with Obamacare’s high AV requirements, an insurer could make money by virtue of the law’s “risk corridors”, which were intended to cover losses for insurers as they adjusted to the new regulations and as the exchange market matured, but those bailouts were temporary, and development of the exchanges did not go exactly as hoped. Insurers have been ending their participation in the exchange market, leaving even less than the limited choices available under Obamacare and little competition to restrain pricing.

On essential benefits, Roy reminds us that every state has essential benefit regulations of its own. These mandates create an unfortunate obstacle to interstate competition, as I discussed in March in “Benefit Mandates Bar Interstate Competition“. Nevertheless, the federal mandates have created additional complexities and added costs to cover risks that a) are not common to the risk pool, or b) cover benefits that are not risk-related and therefore inappropriate as insurance.

Roy also defends the AHCA’s protection of individuals with pre-existing conditions. One fact often overlooked is that burdening the individual market with coverage of pre-existing conditions made Obamacare less workable from the start, simultaneously driving up premiums and sending insurers for the hills. These risks can and should be handled separately, and the AHCA offers subsidies that should be up to the task:

“… if you look at Obamacare, the mechanisms in Obamacare’s exchanges that served as a way to fund coverage for sick people, they were spending $8 billion a year on that program. If you look at it that way, if $8 billion was enough under Obamacare, then maybe $15 billion a year is enough. I really don’t think that’s the problem with this bill.“

Roy contends that the big weakness in the AHCA is inadequate assistance to the poor in arranging affordable coverage. While highly critical of the CBO’s wild estimate of lost coverage (24 million), he does believe that the AHCA, as it stands, would involve a loss. He favors means-tested subsidies as a way of closing the gap, but acknowledges the incentive problems inherent in means testing. With time and a growing economy, and if the final legislation (and the purported stages 2 and 3 of reform) is successful in reducing the growth of health care costs relative to income, the subsidies would constitute a smaller drain on taxpayers.

As for Medicaid reform, Roy defends the AHCA’s approach:

“You start with the fact that access to care under Medicaid and health outcomes under Medicaid are very poor, far underperforming other health insurance programs and certainly way underperforming private insurance. Why does that problem exist? It exists because states have very little flexibility in how they managed their Medicaid costs. They’re basically not able to do anything to keep Medicaid costs under control, except pay doctors and hospitals less money for the same amount of care. As a result of that, people have poor access. By moving to a system in which you put Medicaid on a clear budget and you give states more flexibility in how they manage their Medicaid costs, you actually can end up with much better access to care and much better coverage.“

One point that deserves reemphasis is that a final plan, should one actually pass in both houses of Congress, will be different from the AHCA. From my perspective, the changes could be more aggressive in terms of deregulation on both the insurance side and in health care delivery. The health care sector has been overwhelmed by compliance costs and incentives for consolidation under Obamacar. Nobody bends cost curves downward by creating monopolies.

I’ve hardly done justice to the points made by Roy in this interview, but do read the whole thing!

The CBO’s Obamacare Fantasy Forecast

28 Tuesday Mar 2017

Posted by in Health Care, Obamacare

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The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is still predicting strong future growth in the number of insured individuals under Obamacare, despite their past, drastic over-predictions for the exchange market and slim chances that the Affordable Care Act’s expansion of Medicaid will be adopted by additional states. Now that Republican leaders have backed away from an unpopular health care plan they’d hoped would pass the House and meet the Senate’s budget reconciliation rules, it will be interesting to see how the CBO’s predictions pan out. The “decremental” forecasts it made for the erstwhile American Health Care Act (AHCA) were based on its current Obamacare “baseline”. A figure cited often by critics of the GOP plan was that 24 million fewer individuals would be insured by 2026 than under the baseline.

It was fascinating to see many supporters of the AHCA accept this “forecast” uncritically. With the AHCA’s failure, however, we’ve been given an opportunity to witness the distortion in what would have been a CBO counterfactual. What a wonderful life! We’re stuck with Obamacare for the time being, but this glimpse into the CBO’s delusions will be one of several silver linings for me.

Again, the projected 24 million loss in the number of insured under the AHCA was based on an actual predicted loss of about 5 – 6 million and the absence of an Obamacare gain of 18 – 19 million. Those figures are from an excellent piece by Avik Roy in Forbes. I drew on that article extensively in my post on the AHCA prior to its demise. Here are some key points I raised then, which I’ve reworded slightly to put more emphasis on the Obamacare forecasts:

  1. The CBO has repeatedly erred by a large margin in its forecasts of Obamacare exchange enrollment, overestimating 2016 enrollment by over 100% as recently as 2014.
  2. The AHCA changes relative to Obamacare were taken from CBO’s 2016 forecast, which is likely to over-predict Obamacare enrollment on the exchanges by at least 7 million, according to Roy.
  3. The CBO also assumes that all states will opt to participate in expanded Medicaid under Obamacare going forward. That is highly unlikely, and Roy estimates its impact on the CBO’s forecast at about 3 million individuals.
  4. The CBO believes that the Obamacare individual mandate has encouraged millions to opt for insurance. Roy says that assumption accounts for as much as 9 million of total enrollment across the individual and employer markets, as well as Medicaid.

Thus, Roy believes the CBO’s estimate of the coverage loss of 24 million individuals under the AHCA was too high by about 19 million!

In truth, Obamacare will be watered down by regulatory and other changes instituted by the Trump Administration, which has said it will not enforce Obamacare’s individual mandate. Coverage under the “new” Obamacare will devolve quickly if the CBO is correct about the impact of the individual mandate.

The CBO’s job is to “score” proposed legislation relative to current law; traditionally, it made no attempt to account for dynamic effects that might arise from the changed incentives under a law. The results show it, and the Obamacare projections are no exception. In the case of Obamacare, however,  the CBO seems to have applied certain incentive effects selectively. The supporters of the AHCA might have helped their case by focusing on the flaws in the CBO’s baseline assumptions. We should keep that in mind in the future with respect to any future health care legislation, not to mention tax reform!

 

 

 

 

 

Cleaving the Health Care Knot… Or Not

18 Saturday Mar 2017

Posted by in Health Care, Obamacare

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Republican leadership has succeeded in making their health care reform plans in 2017 even more confusing than the ill-fated reforms enacted by Congress and signed by President Obama in 2010. A three-phase process has been outlined by Republican leaders in both houses after the initial rollout of the American Health Care Act (AHCA), now billed as “Phase 1”. The AHCA was greeted with little enthusiasm by the GOP faithful, however.

As a strictly political matter, there is a certain logic to the intent of “three-phase plan”: limiting the provisions of the AHCA to issues having an impact on the federal budget. That would allow the bill to be addressed under “budget reconciliation” rules requiring only 51 votes for passage in the Senate. Phase 2 would involve regulatory rule-making, or rule-rescinding, as the case may be. The putative Phase 3 would require additional legislation to address such unfinished business as allowing health insurance competition across state lines, eliminating anti-trust protection for insurers, and medical tort reform. How the sponsors will get 60 Senate votes for Phase 3 reforms is an unanswered question.

Legislative Priorities

Yuval Levin wrote a great analysis of the AHCA last week In which he described the structure of the House bill as a paranoid reaction to the demands of an “imaginary parliamentarian”. By that he means that the reforms in the bill conform to a rigid and potentially flawed interpretation of Senate budget reconciliation rules. Levin’s view is that the House should not twist itself up over what might be negotiated prior to a Senate vote. In other words, the House should concern itself at this stage with passing a bill that at least makes sense as reform, without bowing to any of the awful legacy provisions in Obamacare.

Medicaid reform is one piece of the proposed legislation and is reasonably straightforward. It imposes caps on federal funding to states after 2020, but it grants more flexibility to the states in managing the program. It also involves a tradeoff by allowing Medicaid funding to increase over the first few years, in line with the expansion under Obamacare, in exchange for capped growth later. The expectation is that long-term costs of the program will be reduced through a combination of the caps and better management at the state level.

The more complex aspects of the AHCA attempt to effect changes in the individual market. Levin offers a good perspective on these measures. First, he describes the general character of earlier Republican reform proposals from which the AHCA descends:

“Those various proposals all involved bringing premium costs down by enabling insurers to sell catastrophic coverage plans (along with more comprehensive plans) and enabling everyone in the individual market to afford at least those catastrophic coverage plans. This would enable far greater competition and let anyone not otherwise covered by insurance enter the individual market as a consumer.  …

The House proposal bears a clear resemblance to this approach. It involves some deregulation from Obamacare, it includes a refundable tax credit for coverage, it gestures toward incentives for continuous coverage. But it is also fundamentally different from this approach, because it functions within the core insurance rules established by Obamacare, which means it can’t really achieve most of the key aims of the conservative reforms it is modeled on.”

The rules established by Obamacare to which Levin refers include the form of community rating, which is merely loosened somewhat by the AHCA. However, the AHCA would impose a 30% penalty for those who fail to enroll while still healthy. This is a poorly designed incentive meant to substitute for Obamacare’s individual mandate, and it is likely to backfire. Levin is clear that this feature could have been avoided by scrapping the old rules and introducing a new form of community rating available only to the continuously insured.

The AHCA also fails to cap the tax benefits of employer-provided coverage, which retains a potential imbalance between the incentives for employer versus individual coverage. Levin believes, however, that some of these shortcomings can be fixed through a negotiation process in either the House or the Senate, if and when the bill goes there.

The CBO’s Report

As it is, the bill was “scored” by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) with results that are widely viewed as unsatisfactory. The CBO’s report states that the AHCA would reduce the federal budget deficit, but the ugly headline is that relative to Obamacare, it woud cause 24 million people to lose their coverage by 2024. That number is drastically inflated, as Avik Roy demonstrated in his Forbes column this week. Here are the issues laid out by Roy:

  1. The CBO has repeatedly erred by a large margin in its forecasts of Obamacare exchange enrollment, overestimating 2016 enrollment by over 100% as recently as 2014.
  2. The AHCA changes relative to Obamacare are taken from CBO’s 2016 forecast, which still appears to over-predict Obamacare enrollment substantially. Roy estimates that this difference alone would shave at least 7 million off the 24 million loss of coverage quoted by the CBO.
  3. The CBO also assumes that all states will opt to participate in expanded Medicaid going forward. That is highly unlikely, and it inflates CBO’s estimate of the AHCA’s negative impact on coverage by another 3 million individuals, according to Roy.
  4. Going forward, the CBO expects the Obamacare individual mandate to encourage millions more to opt for insurance than would under the AHCA. Roy estimates that this assumptions adds as much as 9 million to the CBO’s estimate of lost coverage across the individual and employer markets, as well as Medicaid.

Thus, Roy believes the CBO’s estimate of lost coverage for 24 million individuals is too high by about 19 million! And remember, these hypothetical losses are voluntary to the extent that individuals refuse to avail themselves of AHCA tax credits to purchase catastrophic coverage, or to enroll in Medicaid. The latter will be no less generous under the AHCA than it is today. The tax credits are refundable, which means that you qualify regardless of your pre-credit tax liability.

Fixes

Despite Roy’s initial skepticism about the AHCA, he thinks it can be fixed, in part by means-testing the tax credits, rather than the flat credit in the bill. He also believes the transition away from the individual mandate should be more gradual, allowing more time for markets to being premiums down, but I find this position rather puzzling given Roy’s skepticism that the mandate has a strong impact on enrollment. Perhaps gradualism would convince the CBO to score the bill more favorably, but that’s a bad reason to make such a change.

It’s impossible to say how the bill will evolve, but certainly improvements can be made. It is also impossible to know whether Phases 2 and 3 will ultimately bring a more complete set of cost-reducing regulatory and competitive reforms. Phase 3, of course, is a political wild card.

Michael Tanner notes a few other advantages to the AHCA. Even the CBO says the cost of health insurance would fall, and the AHCA will bring greater choice to the individual market. It also promises over $1 trillion in tax cuts and lower federal deficits.

Alternatives

The GOP faced alternatives that should have received more consideration, but those alternatives might not be politically viable at this point. Some of them contain features that might be negotiated into the final legislation. Rand Paul’s plan has not attracted many advocates. Paul took the courageous position that there should be no entitlements in a reform plan (i.e., subsidies); instead, he insisted, with liberalized market forces, premium costs would decline sufficiently to allow affordable coverage to be purchased by a broad cross-section of Americans. Paul is obviously unhappy about the widespread support in the GOP for refundable tax credits as a replacement for existing Obamacare subsidies.

John C. Goodman has advocated a much simpler solution: take every federal penny now dedicated to health care and insurance subsidies, including every penny of taxes now avoided via tax deductions on employer-provided coverage, and pay it out to households as a tax credit contingent on the purchase of health insurance or health care expenses. This is essentially the plan put forward by Rep. Pete Sessions and Sen. Bill Cassidy in the Patient Freedom Act, described here. While I admire the simplicity of one program to replace the existing complexities in the federal funding of health care coverage, my objection is that a health care “dividend” of this nature resembles the flat tax credit in the AHCA. Neither is means-tested, amounting to a “Universal Basic Health Insurance Benefit”. Regular readers will recall my recent criticism of the Universal Basic Income, which is the sort of program that smacks of “universal state dependency”. But let’s face it: we’re already in a state of federal health care dependency. In this case, there is no incremental cost to taxpayers because the credit would replace existing outlays and tax expenditures. In that sense, it would eliminate many of the distortions currently embedded in federal health care policy.

A more drastic approach, at this point, is to simply repeal Obamacare, perhaps with a lengthy phase-out, and attempt to replace it later in the hope that support will coalesce around a reasonable set of measures leveraging market forces, and with accommodations for high-risk individuals and the economically disadvantaged. Michael Cannon writes that CBO estimated a simple repeal would increase the number of uninsured by 23 million over ten years, slightly less than the 24 million estimate for the AHCA! Of course, neither of these estimates is likely to be remotely accurate, as both are distorted by the CBO’s rosy assumptions about the future of Obamacare.

Where To Go?

Tanner reminds us that the real alternative to Republican legislation, whatever form it might take, is not a health care utopia. It is Obamacare, and it is collapsing. That plan cannot be effectively reformed with additional subsidies for insurers and consumers, or we’d find ourselves in a continuing premium spiral. The needed reforms to Obamacare would resemble changes contemplated in some of the GOP proposals. While I cannot endorse that AHCA legislation in its current form, or as a standalone reform, I believe it can be improved, and the later phases of reform we are told to anticipate might ultimately vindicate the approach taken by GOP leadership. I am most skeptical about the promise of subsequent legislation in Phase 3. I’ll have to keep my fingers crossed that by then, the path to additional reforms will be more attractive to democrats.

Death By Obamacare

18 Wednesday Jan 2017

Posted by in Health Care

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People will die if we don’t repeal and replace Obamacare! That right, and I’ll tell you why: First, the “Affordable” Care Act (ACA) creates terrible incentives for physicians. Among other provisions, it has chopped reimbursement rates on Medicare and Medicaid. As a result, physicians are declining patients under those plans, exposing the “access” myth under Obamacare as one of several cruel deceptions. Second, “physician feedback” reports and hospital “performance scores” reward providers who avoid the sickest and neediest patients. Third, provisions of the ACA encourage the monopolization of health care delivery and consequently inflate costs. That makes it less likely that needy individuals will insure or seek care, especially given the high deductibles they face. And greater market concentration in health care delivery often means patients have nowhere to go when they are denied care. Fourth, Obamacare has increased the regulatory burden on providers, which invariably reduces the quality of care. Other ACA regulatory burdens placed on employers have forced them to reduce employees’ hours and new hiring in order to control costs. This has limited the number insured under employer plans, leaving them to grapple with the exchanges, or on government plans from which physicians feel stiffed, or to be uninsured. All of these developments lead to undesirable health care outcomes. And there is more.

The ACA Disaster

Obamacare was a complete sham and destined to fail from the start, but the law’s now certain demise is greeted with indignance by the economic illiterati of the left. There are many counts upon which the law has failed: almost 29 million remain uninsured; millions of others in the individual market lost the coverage and doctors they preferred; only a single insurance option is available on many exchanges; the individual mandate is widely-ignored; the exchanges are serving a sickly risk pool; insurance premia are skyrocketing; health care delivery has trended toward monopoly; low Medicaid reimbursement rates have reduced actual access to providers; negative employment effects have arisen as firms adjusted to the employer mandates; and the law has imposed stiff regulatory compliance costs on providers of health care. Obamacare is also a significant budget item, despite early claims to the contrary (also see here): according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the law’s contribution to the federal budget deficit is expected to be almost $2 trillion over the next ten years. What a law! It’s many invasive tendrils are destroying the vitality of the health care and insurance sectors, and it must be eliminated.

There are better ways to achieve the goals originally put forward under the aegis of the ACA. Those who fear repeal either believe that the law will not be replaced, which is unlikely, or that the replacement plan will lead to the loss of health care coverage for a large number of individuals. My contention is that the ACA can be replaced with a plan that would correct its massive deficiencies without creating other death traps.

The single truthful claim that supporters of Obamacare can make is a reduction in the number of uninsured since its implementation, but the numbers reported are exaggerated. A typical quote is that 20 million have gained coverage, an estimate, but we’ll go with that. The link gives a rough but meaningful accounting. Most of the increase in the number of insured, about 13 million, came from expanded Medicaid enrollment. That could have been accomplished without the ACA, and most of those enrollees were already eligible for Medicaid before the ACA’s expansion in eligibility. Perhaps the law had some beneficial effects on the awareness of individuals who were previously eligible but unenrolled.

The quoted gains in the insured population also include several million who were forced off their previous coverage in the individual market by the ACA. These do not represent net increases in the insured population. There have also been gains among young adults who remained on their parents policies. And yes, there have been gains in coverage among those with pre-existing conditions, but this totals less than half a million even counting those already covered under state “high-risk pools”. Needless to say, outright repeal of the ACA without replacement would not lead to a 20 million increase in the uninsured population, as many have argued. With replacement, it is conceivable that losses in coverage could be zero or negative.

Replacement Bills

What are the likely features of an ACA replacement bill? There are as many as nine different proposals or bills introduced by republicans, including one from Rep. Tom Price, who has been nominated to serve as President-Elect Trump’s Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). Rep. Pete Sessions and Sen. Bill Cassidy have introduced a bill endorsed by economist John C. Goodman. Rep. Phil Roe introduced a bill just last week. Sen. Orin Hatch and Sen. Richard Burr have proposed health care legislation. House Speaker Paul Ryan has also proposed a plan that received muted praise from noted health-care expert Avik Roy. These plans have some commonalities. In broad strokes, the proposed legislative actions call for less regulation, greater choice in the design of health insurance policies, more patient-centered care, a shift to market orientation, efforts to equalize the tax treatment of insurance premia for employer and individually-sponsored plans, retention of the ACA’s continuance of family coverage for young adults, and tax credits to support universal availability of insurance coverage.

There are several ways in which an ACA replacement plan can reduce the cost of health care delivery and the cost of health care insurance. The low-hanging fruit, as it were, involves steps to reduce the regulatory burden on health care providers, eliminating the ACA’s Minimum Essential Coverage and Essential Heath Benefits requirements (and allowing wider choice of coverage types and levels), and allowing competition among insurers across state lines.

The reduction in costs and subsidies that can achieved by allowing simple catastrophic-only policies in both the individual and employer markets is obvious. These policies would have low premia and correspondingly high deductibles. Regular checkups and routine health maintenance would not be covered under such basic policies. Those benefits would be optional, along with others like mental health coverage, maternity and reproductive health. The basic policies would represent real insurance, not paid-in-advance services. It’s more difficult, however, to anticipate the magnitude of cost savings and efficiency gains from eliminating regulatory requirements, encouraging competition among providers, and legalizing interstate insurance competition. That means the total gain from “low-hanging fruit” is hard to quantify, but it is real. Here are comments by David Brooks in The New York Times on the promise of market-oriented reforms.

Several of the GOP plans seek to provide universal availability of health insurance coverage by allowing refundable tax credits on insurance costs combined with expanded availability of Health Savings Accounts (HSAs). These steps would help to equalize the tax benefits of health insurance across the employer and individual markets. This is a crucial step due to the historically damaging effects of employer-provided coverage, as noted by A. Barton Hinkle here. Several of the GOP plans would allow non-employers like church groups, fraternal and professional associations to offer coverage.

Here is Avik Roy on the handling of high-risk individuals under the Ryan plan:

“Obamacare-style guaranteed issue and community rating would be gone and replaced by high risk pools, guaranteed issue for continuously held coverage, and a default requirement that insurers had to price their plans for older enrollees no higher than 5 times how they price them for younger enrollees (a significant improvement from Obamacare’s stricter 3:1 ratio).“

Other proposals in some of the GOP plans involve reform of the FDA, more support for private Medicare plans, and a change in the federal portion of Medicaid funding to block grants to states (who actually manage the program). The latter will be the subject of a future post.

Opportunities and Minefields

The kinds of steps described above can lead to greater reductions in the number of uninsured, and at a lower cost, than Obamacare. However, many partisans are agitating to convince republicans that this is impossible. Here is Roy’s opinion (he refers to his 2014 book, Transcending Obamacare):

“… many would-be reformers have convinced themselves that no Republican replacement for Obamacare can cover as many Americans as Obamacare will. Put simply, this is flat-out wrong. As Transcending Obamacare showed, you absolutely can achieve universal coverage with less spending and less government intervention, because we spend way too much subsidizing health coverage for the wealthy, and because our government-driven employer-based health care system inflates wasteful spending across the board.“

John C. Goodman discusses four “minefields” that republicans should avoid, the first of which seems obvious:

  1. Don’t repeal and delay: All indications are that congressional republicans have avoided this minefield, and Trump has stated that he won’t accept anything short of “simultaneous” repeal and replace.
  2. ACA revenue should not be “given away”: Goodman lists negotiated fee reductions from the AMA under the ACA, AARP’s agreement to Medicare cuts, and taxes on pharmaceutical companies, insurers, big labor and big business. Eliminating these sources of savings and tax revenue can be afforded only by reducing other costs. I’m dubious that the fee reductions and taxes haven’t had counterproductive effects, but point taken.
  3. Don’t impose a Cadillac tax: The Cadillac tax applies to expensive plans offered by employers. This point is an exception to #2 above, but Goodman says several GOP plans impose forms of Cadillac taxes despite widespread opposition.
  4. Don’t ignore employers: Here is Goodman on employers:

“Virtually all of the new government spending for private health insurance under Obamacare is going to what has become the most dysfunctional part of the healthcare system – the individual market. This is where premiums are spiraling and there is a race to the bottom on quality and access to care. Almost every Republican plan to replace Obamacare makes the same mistake. But why throw good money after bad?

Almost 30 million Americans are still uninsured (largely because the products in the Obamacare exchanges are so expensive and unattractive) and 85% of these live in a household with someone in the labor market. A tax credit that could be used by employers to help employees enroll in a group plan would give them access to lower premiums and better coverage.“

Goodman strongly endorses the replacement plan put forward by Rep. Pete Sessions and Sen. Bill Cassidy. It is the only GOP plan advanced thus far that avoids the four pitfalls identified by Goodman.

Markets Can Save Lives

My statement at the top of this piece might strike some as outrageous, but it is less outrageous than statements by Sen. Harry Reid and others that “people will die” if Obamacare is repealed. Of course, my assertion would be hard to defend unless conditioned on a replacement plan to improve access to quality care. But it is wrong to say that repeal will lead to incremental deaths without reference to a replacement plan. The claim that there is unlikely to be a replacement is disingenuous.

The usual defense of the ACA is grounded in the increased number of insureds it has achieved, combined with appeals to the expense of catastrophic health events. A weaker defense is the presumption that Obamacare codifies a “right” to health care. Even if we stipulate that such a right exists, there are better ways to accomplish the ends desired by the ACA’s proponents. The alternatives now under consideration are encouraging, as they are largely geared toward leveraging the efficiency of the market with less reliance on information-deficient government planners and rule-makers.

 

Hillary’s “Fix”: Obamacare Squared

26 Wednesday Oct 2016

Posted by in Obamacare

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One of Hillary Clinton’s “public positions” is that Obamacare needs a few “fixes”, a considerable understatement. Meanwhile, Wikileaks has revealed that she has “privately” rooted for the failure of Obamacare. For that reason, Bill Clinton’s recent slip-up, in which he portrayed Obamacare as a “crazy” system, had a certain Freudian quality. Indeed, Obamacare looks crazier every year, especially in the middle of premium-hike season.

One of Hillary’s so-called “fixes” is the creation of a “public option”, or health insurance offered by the government to compete on exchanges with private insurance. Private health insurers, with the expiration of the so-called “risk corridors”, do not have continuing access to the public purse to cover their losses; going forward, they must price coverage at rates covering the cost of their respective risk pools. The government, on the other hand, is likely to have pricing flexibility. If exercised, there will be little hope for private insurers to “compete” without bailout money. Health insurance coverage, then, is likely to devolve into a single-payer monopoly, and control over health care delivery will be increasingly monopolized as well.

Sally Pipes says the “public option” is a politically attractive way to make a single-payer system inevitable:

“But progressives face the same problem pushing single-payer they always have — the public won’t stand for it. So they’re dusting off an old idea that will get them to single-payer without using those words.“

So the path from Obamacare to a single-payer system is likely to involve a public option in one form or another. John C. Goodman points out that expanding Medicaid is one way to create a broad public option. Medicaid reimbursement rates are low, however, which is why many doctors refuse to accept patients with Medicaid coverage. Such might be the quality of future coverage under an “affordable” public option. And if Medicaid is enhanced so as to appeal to middle class families, it will be correspondingly more expensive. But for whom? More than likely, the tab will be paid by a combination of insureds and taxpayers. And more than likely, the number of competing Medicaid plans (most of which are now privately offered and managed (e.g., Centene Corporation)) will dwindle.

Christopher Jacobs says that when Obamacare became law, health insurers had every expectation that they’d be bailed out by the government indefinitely. Continuing reimbursement for losses was never guaranteed, however. The pressure to backstop the insurers’ profitability will be stronger as the debate over “fixing” Obamacare advances. But as Jacobs warns, ongoing bailouts mean that these insurers are essentially controlled by the government. The private insurers would essentially become heavily-regulated entities managing the operational details of a de facto single-payer system.

So, there are three distinct possibilities under a Hillary Clinton presidency, assuming she can get any of them though Congress: 1) a public option with no private bailouts; 2) a public option with ongoing bailouts; and 3) no public option with ongoing bailouts. Ultimately, all of these scenarios are likely to devolve toward a de facto single-payer system. So we will have monopoly, central control of health care, and/or bailouts. Who was it that said government is the way we wreck things together?

Hillary has some other “fixes” in mind. Some of these involve more regulation of coverage and pricing, such as mandatory provision of three free “sick” visits with a provider each year and in-network pricing for emergency procedures. These steps will add to the cost burden on private insurers.

Regulating drug companies more heavily is another favorite Hillary Clinton theme, but regulation is perhaps the primary reason why the drug development process is so lengthy and costly. The theory that government will be more effective at negotiating drug prices than insurers is suspect. Outright price regulation is likely to mean reduced availability of various medicines. Patent reform and an expedited drug approval process would be a more effective approach to reducing drug prices.

Clinton has also proposed a tax credit for out-of-pocket health care costs exceeding 5% of income. We’ll need higher tax rates, lower deductions and credits elsewhere, or higher deficits to pay for this one.

Finally, Hillary wants to expand eligibility for Medicare to anyone 55 and older, but as Goodman explains, the kind of Medicare Advantage plans that would be made available to “near seniors” under this proposal are similar to those already offered by private insurers, and at lower cost, and premia for these plans are often payable with pre-tax dollars, or the buyers may be eligible for tax subsidies. This proposal might sound appealing, but it is unlikely to accomplish anything except to create more administrative overhead, regulation and diminish existing offerings.

Obamacare has injected a high degree of central planning into the health care system with disastrous results. It has fallen far short of its own objectives for reducing the number of uninsured, “bending the cost curve” downward, and avoiding disruptions to existing coverage and patient-doctor relationships. Choices have narrowed in terms of coverage options and within networks. Obamacare has imposed unnecessary costs on providers and encouraged a monopolization of health care delivery, hardly a prescription for affordability. And Obamacare has proven to be a budget buster, contrary to the advance hype from its proponents.

I remember standing in a pharmacy shortly after Obamacare was enacted, and I heard a sharp-voiced leftist telling a clerk that Obamacare was just a bridge to single-payer health care. I tried to mind my own business, thinking it unproductive to engage such an individual in public. This fellow was quite pleased with the clever deception that was Obamacare. It was never a secret that the progressive left hoped single-payer would be the ultimate outcome, but it’s interesting to witness their discomfort with the way things are unfolding. Surely they must have known that if “fixes” were necessary, something would have to be broken. Perhaps they thought the politics would get simpler, but the shortcomings of the health care law have inflicted too much pain and shame.

I’m tempted to say that the health care system can be improved only by doing precisely the opposite of everything Clinton has proposed. There’s some truth in that, but it’s not quite that simple. The path to better and more affordable health care is to end the dominant role of third-party payers, placing responsibility on price-sensitive consumers, allowing a variety of choices in coverage, ending tax preferences, reducing regulation and encouraging real competition in the markets for coverage and medical care. Reform of the patent system could introduce more competition to markets for pharmaceuticals. The Medicaid system will have to be relied upon to cover those who otherwise can’t be insured at affordable rates. Proposals for federal funding of Medicaid through block grants to the states is an avenue for achieving greater efficiency and better health care outcomes.

Hillary Clinton’s “fixes” are all likely to exacerbate the worst failings of Obamacare for consumer-patients and taxpayers. More federal spending commitments will not solve the structural problems embedded in the health care law. It will magnify them. The hope among the progressive left remains that single-payer health care will evolve out of the Obamacare system once it is “fixed”. And what will we get? More complete monopolies in coverage and care, higher prices, central regulation, narrowed choice, waiting lists, denial of care, and some combination of higher taxes and deficits. In other words, a more radical version of Obamacare.