Category Archives: Markets

Homeownership, Pensions, and the Wealth Distribution

13 Monday Dec 2021

Posted by in Markets, Wealth Distribution

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , ,

My theme in “What’s To Like About Income Inequality?” was the existence of natural drivers of an unequal distribution of income, as where institutions reward merit and legal systems assign strong property rights. I also discussed trends in income and wealth inequality and how standard measures of inequality are distorted by income taxes and transfer payments, including differences in unrealized and realized capital gains. Furthermore, income mobility makes “snapshots” of inequality less compelling, as individuals are not “stuck” for all time at a point in the income distribution, but are typically moving across the distribution and usually upward as they age through their working years.

Wealth inequality is another matter, but a new paper by Daniel Waldenström entitled “Wealth and History: An Update” shows that wealth concentration, which he defines as the share of wealth held by the top 1%, declined markedly between 1920 and 1970 in Europe and the U.S. After 1970, however, the share remained flat in Europe and was flat in the U.S. as well if unfunded pensions and Social Security benefits are valued as wealth. However, the near-entirety of the earlier decline in U.S. wealth concentration occurred by about 1950.

So a great thinning in the fat right tail of the wealth distribution occurred during the middle years of the 20th century. Waldenström attributes this transition to growth of homeownership and pension assets. These are so-called “popular assets” because they are held more broadly than the legacy wealth of the 1800s and early twentieth century:

“… the structure of private wealth has changed over the twentieth century, from being dominated by elite fortunes in agriculture or businesses to consisting mainly of widely dispersed assets in housing and funded pensions.”

Waldenström concludes that the facts run contrary to claims that wealth inequality has worsened in Western, capitalist economies over the years:

“These new findings have implications for the historiography of Western wealth accumulation and wealth concentration. They cast doubt over the view that an unfettered capitalism, such as in pre-democratic and pre-taxation nineteenth-century Europe, generates extreme levels of capital accumulation. The new findings also question the pivotal role of wars, crises and progressive taxation as the sole important factors behind the wealth equalization of the twentieth century.

Waldenström considers the role of progressive taxation in equalizing wealth, but he acknowledges that taxes undermined wealth accumulation at all levels, so the effect was ambiguous. A point on which I’d take issue with Waldenström is the role of regulation, which he believes “curbed the growth of large fortunes”. That might be true in some cases, but this effect is also subject to ambiguity. Regulation is often welcomed by powerful market players as a way of consolidating market position and hindering new competition. The regulatory state has long been considered a primary channel for rent seeking, so the impact on the wealth distribution is likely to be mixed.

Market institutions, together with rising education levels, labor reforms, and gains in productivity enabled this broadening in the accumulation and distribution of wealth. Social Security certainly played a part as well, though we don’t know how private pensions might have evolved in its absence. Of course, Social Security has a terrible record as an “investment” of payroll taxes. Private control over the investment direction of those funds would have done far better, and still could, which would be a further boon to wealth for the lower 99%.

It is true that inequality in both income and wealth is to be expected under merit-based systems of rewards. However, Daniel Waldenström’s paper offers evidence that markets do not merely concentrate wealth at the expense of workers. Rather, they deliver gains to all participants, who are in turn free to accumulate wealth in the kinds of “popular assets” discussed by Waldenström.

Do You Chronically Feel Cheated?

24 Tuesday Aug 2021

Posted by in Markets

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Economists are rightfully astonished when people act as if they’ve come up losers in almost every transaction they make. It’s often when they’re on the buying end, but here’s the paradox: almost all transactions are voluntary, a major exception being the coerced payment of taxes. There are few private transactions in which free choice is absent. A truly voluntary choice is an absolute proof of gain. In those trades, buyers reveal that they assign less value to choices not made, and foregone choices almost always exist, including the possibility of doing nothing. By their very nature, voluntary transactions are mutually beneficial. So why do people feel cheated so often?

Free To Lose?

Yes, we are free to choose and free to lose! But this isn’t about cases in which a product proves defective or quickly becomes obsolete. Nor is it about making a purchase only to learn of a discount later. Those are ex post events that might have been impossible to foresee. Here, I refer only to the decision made on the day and hour of the purchase, including any assessment of risk. 

A recent study confirmed a pervasive “loser’s” mentality in transactions: “Win–win denial: The psychological underpinnings of zero-sum thinking”, by Samuel B.G. Johnson, Jiewen Zhang, and Frank C. Keil. They also found that people judge the seller as the “winner” in most transactions. The authors considered a few explanations for these findings discussed in psychological literature, such as socially-ingrained mercantilist attitudes and a tendency to zero-sum thinking.

Roots of “Never-a-Buyer-Be” Phobia

Mercantilism was borne of zero-sum thinking — a belief in a hard limit to total wealth. Under those circumstances, accumulating gold or other hard assets was seen as preferable to spending on imports of goods from other nations. Imports meant gold had to be shipped out, but exports of goods brought it in. 

That uncompromising view led to efforts by government on behalf of domestic industries to stanch imports, and it ultimately led to decline. One nation cannot buy another’s goods indefinitely without corresponding flows of goods in the other direction. Nations gain from trade only by producing things in which they have a comparative advantage and selling them to others. In turn, they must purchase goods from others in which they do NOT have a comparative advantage. It’s cheaper that way! And it’s a win-win prescription for building worldwide wealth.

If You Gotta Have It…

People do have a tendency to regret money spent on things they reluctantly feel they must have. They suffer a kind of advance buyer’s remorse, but it stems from having to part with money, which represents all those other nice things one might have had, covering an infinite range of possibilities. This is the same fallacy inherent in mercantilism. The fact is, we purchase things we must have because they represent greater value than doing without. The phantom satisfaction of opportunities foregone are simply not large enough to keep us from doing the “right” thing in these situations.

The Contest For Surplus

There’s a more basic reason why people feel swindled after having engaged in mutually beneficial trade. The seller collects more revenue than marginal cost, and the buyer pays less than the item’s full “use value”. The latter is the buyer’s reservation price: the most they’d be willing to pay under the circumstances. The seller’s gain (over cost) plus the buyer’s gain (under reservation price) is the total “surplus” earned in the exchange. It’s the surplus that’s up for grabs, and both buyer and seller might view the exchange as a contest over its division. Competitive instincts and thrift being what they are, both sides want a larger share of the spoils!

So there truly is a sort of zero-sum game in play. You can try to bargain to capture more of the surplus, but not every seller will do so, often as a matter of policy or reputation. Or you can spend more time and incur greater personal cost by shopping around. Ultimately, if the offer you face is less than your “reservation price”, you’ll extract an absolute benefit from the exchange. Both you and the seller are better off than without it. You both do it voluntarily, and it’s mutually beneficial. Whatever the division of the surplus, you haven’t really lost anything, even if you have the gnawing feeling you might have been able to find a better bargain and captured more surplus.

Exceptions?

You might think the parties to a stock trade cannot both win. However, buyers and sellers have different reasons for making stock trades, which usually involve other needs and differing expectations. Ex ante, both sides of these trades earn a surplus, unless either the seller or buyer is at the losing end of a previous option trade now forcing them to buy or sell the stock.

There are other cases worthy of debate: buyers in monopolized or captive markets are unlikely to collect much of the surplus. Buyers at an informational disadvantage will gain less surplus as well, and they might incur greater risk to any gain whatsoever. Excise taxes allow government to capture some of the surplus, while government subsidies deliver “fake” surplus to the buyer and seller that comes at the expense of taxpayers. Now I feel cheated!

Beware Marxist Sympathies

Buyers and sellers both benefit by virtue of voluntary exchange. The gains might not be divided equally, but the false perception that buyers always get the “short end of the bargain” is a fundamental misunderstanding about how markets work. It also undermines support for basic freedoms allowing autonomous economic decisions and activity, and it strengthens the hand of statists who would fetter the operation of free markets. Like short-sighted mercantilists, those who would intervene in markets create obstacles to human cooperation and the creation of wealth. In fact, the idea that buyers are always cheated is a classist, Marxist notion. Policies acting upon that bias are rife with unintended consequences: small and large market interventions often strike at property rights, which ultimately inhibits the supply of goods and harms consumers. 

Supply-Gouging Laws Keep Goods Off Shelf

23 Monday Mar 2020

Posted by in Markets, Pandemic, Price Controls

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , ,

“Low prices say, ‘Take all you want, there’s plenty more.‘”

— Duke economist Michael Munger

See the prices marked on those shelves above? They say infinity!

Nothing drives economists crazy like anti-price “gouging” sentiment, and especially politicians who play on it. Hoarders hoard under such laws precisely because prices are too low given demand and supply conditions. Scarcity is defined by demand relative to supply, and freely adjusting prices register the degree of scarcity quite well. To what purpose? First, to ration available supplies; second, to encourage conservation; third, to incentivize producers to bring more product to market.

But when hoarders hoard, does that not create artificial scarcity? Not really, because the scarcity itself was already a condition, or else the hoarder would not have acted. And the hoarder would not have acted if developing conditions of scarcity had not been contradicted by the low price.

But what if the hoarders are mere speculators? Doesn’t that prove their actions create artificial scarcity? No, again, scarce conditions existed. Speculators don’t speculate to lose money, and they would certainly lose money if they buy when a product is not truly in short supply relative to demand. Speculators operate on the principle of arbitrage: transacting in response to profit opportunities created by gaps between prices and real value. Markets tend to eliminate such opportunities. Anti-“gouging” laws create them in times of crisis.

Should we demand that respiratory therapists not accept higher offers to practice in areas hit hard by the coronavirus? That bears a certain equivalence to laws preventing retailers from raising prices sufficiently to discourage hoarding. After all, retailers know that their dwindling inventory has gained value in a crisis situation, just as the respiratory therapist knows that her services have gained value in a world ravaged by a lung-damaging viral disease. Should we arrest her?

In a functioning market, the respiratory therapist, the retailer, and producers who supply the retailer would all earn more based on the true value of their skills, inventories, or ability to produce. These parties get to keep any premium they earn when conditions create more scarcity. Speculators however, generally don’t share their gains with the producer, which some find regrettable. (In fact, commodity speculators often provide valuable hedging opportunities for suppliers, so my last statement is not quite true.) Nevertheless, speculators serve a valuable function because they often provide the first source of information about changes in scarcity. That information, the price signal, has social value because it embeds incentives for conservation and added production.

Yes, retailers should be able to restock with some time. But it can fairly be said they did not react quickly enough to the “demand shock” caused by the range of precautions taken in response to the coronavirus pandemic. Perhaps retailers placed additional orders with suppliers in an effort to deal with the crisis, and some might have hiked certain prices marginally. I don’t know. However, it’s certain they were chastened in their price response by fears of damaging their public image, and even cowed by short-sighted laws and regulations in some cases. It doesn’t take much imagination, however, to think of ways they might have be able to deal with crisis conditions via pricing policy, such as charging quantity premiums: first package of TP at regular price, second at 2x regular price, three-plus at 10x regular price.

As J.D. Tucille says, people think of price “gouging” as a matter of degree. But at what threshold does price flexibility become inappropriate as conditions of scarcity change? No price controller can tell you exactly. That’s a good reason to eschew shortage-inducing pricing laws. Is it fair when prices rise drastically? Well, the price is infinite when the shelf is empty. Is that fair? Better let markets do their job.

In Defense of College Admission for Pay

20 Wednesday Mar 2019

Posted by in competition, Education, Markets, School Choice, Uncategorized

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , ,

The college admissions scandal revealed by the FBI last week exposed the willingness of some very wealthy people to lie and cheat to enhance the status of their children. It also resulted in charges against several employees of testing services and prestigious universities, who sold-out their institutions for pure financial gain. These actions may have harmed more deserving applicants to the defrauded academic institutions. Perhaps as sad, the children whose parents cheated are bound to suffer life-long consequences.

Strong prosecution of these crimes will deter other parents entertaining similarly crooked avenues in pursuit of ambitions for their kids. The schools and testing organizations should be motivated to tighten their internal governance processes. My hope, however, is that legislative bodies will refrain from passing new laws in an effort to regulate college admissions. Many schools accept a small percentage of students, legacy or otherwise, who do not meet their academic standards but whose wealthy families make substantial, above-board donations that benefit other students. Putting an abrupt end to these transactions might not be helpful to anyone.

With certain conditions, I do not object to wealthy parents wishing to pay an above-board premium to get their kids into the college of their choice, nor do I object to schools that are free to name their price. First, the school should always receive consideration in an amount adequate to benefit other students or deserving applicants. Second, the acceptance of a privileged but academically inferior student should represent an increment to the school’s freshman class, never taking a coveted slot otherwise filled by a better student. Third, an institution should never guarantee successful completion of a degree program in exchange for such an offer. Fourth, I’d like to see schools make public the number of students falling short of academic qualification whom they accept in exchange for such offers, as well as the aggregate remuneration they receive in all those cases. Fifth and finally, I see no reason why these practices should be limited to private schools. However, a public school’s remuneration must be more than sufficient to make unnecessary any taxpayer subsidies attributable to a new matriculant.

I don’t believe any of these conditions should be a matter of law. Private and public educational institutions are market participants, even if they do engage in non-price rationing. Market incentives should guide institutions to protect the integrity of their brands by awarding degrees only for real academic achievement. This bears on my third and fourth conditions above: no school can guarantee to parents that a degree will be awarded to their child without compromising its integrity. Also, a school’s academic reputation should reflect the extent to which it accepts applicants lacking the school’s minimum standards.

One of the thorniest problems with my conditions has to do with the poor academic standards that actually exist in certain degree programs. These make it possible for bad students to earn diplomas. Grade inflation is all too pervasive, and grade-point averages are notoriously high in some fields, such as education. It may be exceptionally difficult to monitor and prevent instructors from allowing poor students to skate through classes with decent grades. And too obviously and sadly, it’s often the diploma itself that matters to people as a status symbol, rather than real educational achievement. If employers are content to rely on mere signals of that kind, so much the worse.

There’s nothing to be done if that’s all that is demanded of a college education. I think that, more than anything else, is what inflames the passions of Bryan Caplan, who calls the entire system of higher education wasteful. More demanding disciplines have some immunity to this form of decay. Competitive markets might punish schools and employers having weak standards. But wherever the importance of real merit is discounted due to classist loyalties, legal impediments, professions lacking in academic rigor, or any other form of compromise, the diploma signal is paramount, and that is lamentable.

The admissions scandal has prompted howls of indignation directed not only at the cheaters ensnared by the FBI’s “Varsity Blues” operation, but more broadly at the perceived injustices of college admissions in general. The process is said to be unfair because it tolerates admissions for scions of wealthy families and even those who can pay for multiple rounds of standardized tests, multiple application fees, interview “coaches” and the like. These advantages are not unlike those endemic to any market in which ability-to-pay impinges on demand. Yet generally markets do an excellent job of facilitating the development of affordable substitutes. College education is no different, and longstanding mechanisms are in place offering means of payment for academically-qualified applicants who lack adequate resources. The conditions I listed above would enhance that support.

Nevertheless, critics say that the disadvantaged do not get adequate preparation in primary and secondary education to be competitive in college admissions. They are largely correct, but the solutions have more to do with fixing public K-12 education than the college admissions process. Primary and secondary education are almost devoid of competition and real parental choice in disadvantaged communities. There are many other social problems that aggravate the poor performance of public education in preparing students who might otherwise be candidates for higher learning. Realistically, however, the college admissions process cannot be blamed for those problems.

Climbing Up: Economic Mobility In the U.S.

29 Monday Oct 2018

Posted by in Inequality, Markets, Redistribution

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , ,

One of the great sacred cows of current economic discourse is that U.S. living standards have been stagnant for decades, coincident with a severe lack of economic mobility (I know, those are goats!). These assertions have been made by people with the training to know better, and by members of the commentariat who certainly would not know better. But Russ Roberts has a great article on the proper measurement of these trends and how poorly that case stacks up. I have made some of the same points in the past (and here), but Roberts’ synthesis is excellent.

Those who insist that income growth has languished or even declined in real terms over the past 40 years have erred in several ways. They usually ignore non-wage benefits (for which workers often receive favorable tax treatment) and other forms of income. Roberts notes that income tax returns leave about 40% of income unreported, and a lot of it goes to individuals in lower income strata. In addition, the studies often use flawed inflation gauges, fail to adjust correctly for various demographic trends in the identification of “households”, and most importantly, fail to follow the same individuals over time. The practice of taking “snapshots” of the income distribution at two different points in time, and then comparing the same percentiles from those snapshots, is inappropriate for addressing the question of income mobility. Instead, the question is how specific individuals or cohorts have migrated across time. Generally incomes grow as people age through their working lives.

Roberts discusses some studies that follow individuals over time, rather than percentiles, to see how they have fared:

From a study comparing the 1960s and the early 2000s:

“… 84% earned more than their parents, corrected for inflation. But 93% of the children in the poorest households, the bottom 20% surpassed their parents. Only 70% of those raised in the top quintile exceeded their parent’s income.”

 In another study compared children born in 1980:

“… 70% of children born in 1980 into the bottom decile exceed their parents’ income in 2014. For those born in the top 10%, only 33% exceed their parents’ income.”

Another study finds:

“The children from the poorest families ended up twice as well-off as their parents when they became adults. The children from the poorest families had the largest absolute gains as well. Children raised in the top quintile did no better or worse than their parents once those children became adults.”

The next study cited by Roberts compares adults at two stages of life:

“The study looks at people who were 35–40 in 1987 and then looks at how they were doing 20 years later, when they are 55–60. The median income of the people in the top 20% in 1987 ended up 5% lower twenty years later. The people in the middle 20% ended up with median income that was 27% higher. And if you started in the bottom 20%, your income doubled. If you were in the top 1% in 1987, 20 years later, median income was 29% lower.”

And here’s one more:

“… when you follow the same people, the biggest gains go to the poorest people. The richest people in 1980 actually ended up poorer, on average, in 2014. Like the top 20%, the top 1% in 1980 were also poorer on average 34 years later in 2014.”

These studies show impressive mobility across the income distribution, but is it still true that overall incomes have been flat? No, for reasons mentioned earlier: growth in benefits and unreported income have been dramatic, and inflation measures used to “deflate” nominal income income gains are notoriously poor. When the prices of many goods are expressed in terms of labor hours, there is no doubt that living standards have advanced tremendously. It is all the more impressive in view of the quality improvements that have occurred over the years.

The purported income stagnation and lack of mobility are also said to be associated with an increasingly unequal distribution of income. The OECD reports that the distribution of income in the U.S. is relatively unequal compared to other large, developed countries, but the definitions and accuracy of these comparisons are not without controversy. A more accurate accounting for incomes after redistribution via taxes and transfer payments would place the U.S. in the middle of the pack. And while measures of income inequality have trended upward, consumption inequality has not, which suggests that the income comparisons may be distorted.

Contrary to the oft-repeated narrative, U.S. living standards have not stagnated since the 1970s, nor have U.S. households been plagued by a lack of economic mobility. It’s easy to understand the confusion suffered by journalists on these points, but it’s horrifying to realize that such mistaken interpretations of data are actually issued by economists. Even more disappointing is that these misguided narratives are favorite talking points of class warriors and redistributionists, whose policy recommendations would bring-on real stagnation and immobility. That’s the subject of a future post, or posts. For now, I’ll let it suffice to say that it is the best guarantee of mobility is the preservation of economic freedom and opportunity by limiting the size and scope of government, creating a more neutral tax code, and encouraging markets to flourish.

Central Planning Fails to Scale, Unlike Spontaneous Order

05 Tuesday Jun 2018

Posted by in Central Planning, Markets, Price Controls

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The proposition that mankind is capable of creating a successful “planned” society is at least as old as the Bronze Age. Of course it’s been tried. The effort necessarily involves a realignment of the economic and political landscape and always requires a high degree of coercion. But putting that aside, such planning can never be successful relative to spontaneous order of the kind that dominates private affairs in a free society. The task of advancing human well-being given available resources has never been achieved under central planning. It always fails miserably in this regard, and it always will fail to match the success of decentralized decision-making and private markets.

There are various ways to explain this fact, but I recently came across an interesting take on the subject having to do with the notion of scalability. Francis Turner offers this note on the topic at the Liberty.me blog. To begin, he gives a lengthy quote from a software developer who relates the problems of social and economic planning to the complexity of managing a network. On the topic of scale, the developer notes that the number of relationships in a network increases with the square of the number of its “nodes”, or members:

“2 nodes have 1 potential relationship. 4 nodes (twice as many) has 6 potential relationships (6 times as many). 8 nodes (twice again) has 28 potential relationships. 100 nodes => [4,950] relationships; 1,000 nodes => 499,500 relationships—nearly half a million.“

Actually, the formula for the number of potential relationships or connections in a network is n*(n-1)/2, where n is the number of network nodes. The developer Turner  quotes discusses this in the context of two competing network management structures: client-server and peer-to-peer. Under the former, the network is managed centrally by a server, which communicates with all nodes, makes various decisions, and routes communications traffic between nodes. In a peer-to-peer network, the work of network management is distributed — each computer manages its own relationships. The developer says, at first, “the idea of hooking together thousands of computers was science fiction.” But as larger networks were built-out in the 1990s, the client-server framework was more or less rejected by the industry because it required such massive resources to manage large networks. In fact, as new nodes are added to a peer-to-peer network, its capacity to manage itself actually increases! In other words, client-server networks are not as scalable as peer-to-peer networks:

“Even if it were perfectly designed and never broke down, there was some number of nodes that would crash the server. It was mathematically unavoidable. You HAVE TO distribute the management as close as possible to the nodes, or the system fails.

… in an instant, I realized that the same is true of governments. … And suddenly my coworker’s small government rantings weren’t crazy…”

This developer’s epiphany captures a few truths about the relative efficacy of decentralized decision-making. It’s not just for computer networks! But in fact, when it comes to network management, the task is comparatively simple: meet the computing and communication needs of users. A central server faces dynamic capacity demands and the need to route changing flows of traffic between nodes. Software requirements change as well, which may necessitate discrete alterations in capacity and rules from time-to-time.

But consider the management of a network of individual economic units. Let’s start with individuals who produce something… like widgets. There are likely to be real economies achieved when a few individual widgeteers band together to produce as a team. Some specialization into different functions can take place, like purchasing materials, fabrication, and distribution. Perhaps administrative tasks can be centralized for greater efficiency. Economies of scale may dictate an even larger organization, and at some point the firm might find additional economies in producing widget-complementary products and services. But eventually, if the decision-making is centralized and hierarchical, the sheer weight of organizational complexity will begin to take a toll, driving up costs and/or diminishing the firm’s ability to deal with changes in technology or the market environment. In other words, centralized control becomes difficult to scale in an efficient way, and there may be some “optimal” size for a firm beyond which it struggles.

Now consider individual consumers, each of whom faces an income constraint and has a set of tastes spanning innumerable goods. These tastes vary across time scales like hour-of-day, day-of-week, seasons, life-stage, and technology cycles. The volume of information is even more daunting when you consider that preferences vary across possible price vectors and potential income levels as well.

Can the interactions between all of these consumer and producer “nodes” be coordinated by a central economic authority so as to optimize their well-being dynamically, subject to resource constraints? As we’ve seen, the job requires massive amounts of information and a crushing number of continually evolving decisions. It is really impossible for any central authority or computer to “know” all of the information needed. Secondly, to the software developer’s point, the number of potential relationships increases with the square of the number of consumers and producers, as does the required volume of information and number of decisions. The scalability problem should be obvious.

This kind of planning is a task with which no central authority can keep up. Will the central authority always get milk, eggs and produce to the store when people need it, at a price they are willing to pay, and with minimal spoilage? Will fuel be available such that a light always turns on whenever they flip the switch? Will adequate supplies of medicines always be available for the sick? Will the central authority be able to guarantee a range of good-quality clothing from which to choose?

There has never been a central authority that successfully performed the job just described. Yet that job gets done every day in free, capitalistic societies, and we tend to take it for granted. The massive process of information transmission and coordination takes place spontaneously with spectacularly good results via private discovery and decision-making, secure property rights, markets, and a functioning price mechanism. Individual economic units are endowed with decision-making power and the authority to manage their own relationships. And the spontaneous order that takes shape remains effective even as networks of economic units expand. In other words, markets are highly scalable at solving the eternal problem of allocating scarce resources.

But thus far I’ve set up something of a straw man by presuming that the central authority must monitor all individual economic units to know and translate their demands and supplies of goods into the ongoing, myriad decisions about production, distribution and consumption. Suppose the central authority takes a less ambitious approach. For example, it might attempt to enforce a set of prices that its experts believe to be fair to both consumers and producers. This is a much simpler task of central management. What could go wrong?

These prices will be wrong immediately, to one degree or another, without tailoring them to detailed knowledge of the individual tastes, preferences, talents, productivities, price sensitivities, and resource endowments of individual economic units. It would be sheer luck to hit on the correct prices at the start, but even then they would not be correct for long. Conditions change continuously, and the new information is simply not available to the central authority. Various shortages and surpluses will appear without the corrective mechanism usually provided by markets. Queues will form here and inventories will accumulate there without any self-correcting mechanism. Consumers will be angry, producers will quit, goods will rot, and stocks of physical capital will sit idle and go to waste.

Other forms of planning attempt to set quantities of goods produced and are subject to errors similar to those arising from price controls. Even worse is an attempt to plan both price and quantity. Perhaps more subtle is the case of industrial policy, in which planners attempt to encourage the development of certain industries and discourage activity in those deemed “undesirable”. While often borne out of good intentions, these planners do not know enough about the future of technology, resource supplies, and consumer preferences to arrogate these kinds of decisions to themselves. They will invariably commit resources to inferior technologies, misjudge future conditions, and abridge the freedoms of those whose work or consumption is out-of-favor and those who are taxed to pay for the artificial incentives. To the extent that industrial policies become more pervasive, scalability will become an obstacle to the planners because they simply lack the information required to perform their jobs of steering investment wisely.

Here is Turner’s verdict on central planning:

“No central planner, or even a board of them, can accurately set prices across any nation larger than, maybe, Liechtenstein and quite likely even at the level of Liechtenstein it won’t work well. After all how can a central planner tell that Farmer X’s vegetables taste better and are less rotten than Farmer Y’s and that people therefore are prepared to pay more for a tomato from Farmer X than they are one from Farmer Y.”

I will go further than Turner: planning can only work well in small settings and only when the affected units do the planning. For example, the determination of contract terms between two parties requires planning, as does the coordination of activities within a firm. But then these plans are not really “central” and the planners are not “public”. These activities are actually parts of a larger market process. Otherwise, the paradigm of central planning is not merely unscalable, it is unworkable without negative consequences.

Finally, the notion of scalability applies broadly to governance, not merely economic planning. The following quote from Turner, for example, is a ringing endorsement for federalism:

“It is worth noting that almost all successful nations have different levels of government. You have the local town council, the state/province/county government, possibly a regional government and then finally the national one. Moreover richer countries tend to do better when they push more down to the lower levels. This is a classic way to solve a scalability problem – instead of having a single central power you devolve powers and responsibilities with some framework such that they follow the general desires of the higher levels of government but have freedom to implement their own solutions and adapt policies to local conditions.” 

Francis, Papal Perónista, Courts Redistributional Mirage

15 Thursday Mar 2018

Posted by in Markets, Marxism, Redistribution, statism, Welfare State

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Is world poverty really increasing? Actually, no, quite the opposite, and you can blame economic liberalism, capitalism, and free markets for that. Yet we hear exactly the contrary from Pope Francis who, despite his evident compassion, has an amazingly poor understanding of economics. He misstates basic facts, offers dimly reasoned analyses of human rights, and promotes ill-considered policies. Now that the Vatican is set to release the Pope’s first feature film, no doubt a stirring piece of social justice propaganda, it seems as good a time as any to review the confounded state of Francis’ economic reasoning. This is not the first time I’ve discussed the Pope’s policy views: this link contains three previous posts from SacredCowChips on which Francis was tagged.

The False Narrative

My inspiration for this post comes from Robert P. Murphy, whose recent commentary on Francis’ pronouncements is trenchant. Murphy covers this speech written by Francis for the World Economic Forum, but delivered by a Vatican proxy, in which the Pope asserts the following:

“… governments must confront … the growth of unemployment, the increase in various forms of poverty, the widening of the socio-economic gap and new forms of slavery, often rooted in situations of conflict, migration and various social problems.“

Francis refers to increasing unemployment and poverty, and I could let that phrase pass if he was referring to certain nations or locales that have experienced chronically depressed economic growth. But Francis’ description is rather general, as evidenced by his diagnosis of causes. More on that below. Regarding his statement about trends in poverty, he is flatly incorrect. Here is Murphy:

“As the World Bank reports, the global “extreme poverty” rate in 1990 was cut in half by 2010. Back in 1990, 1.85 billion people lived on less than $1.90 per day, but by 2013, the figure had dropped to 767 million such people—meaning that more than a billion people had been lifted out of crushing poverty.“

After the Great Recession, world unemployment decreased from 2009-2015, according to the World Bank, though it is estimated to have crept up slightly in 2016-17. Again, the Pope’s woeful tale of growing unemployment and increasing poverty is nonsense.

But the world is a difficult place. In the underdeveloped world, the range and quality of goods available is extremely limited, and $1.90 represents bare subsistence, yet it’s a condition that exceeds the historical norm in many places. Movement above that threshold can represent a meaningful improvement in economic well-being.

Francis may lack an appreciation for the general enrichment in material conditions that has been taking place over the last two centuries, which is ongoing, or perhaps he believes that even greater achievements are easily within reach but for certain injustices, though he offers no qualifications. Perhaps he is mistakenly generalizing specific instances of exploitation in the underdeveloped world, which often occur with the explicit blessing of the state apparatus in exchange for kickbacks.

Rights and Markets

Even more egregious is the Pope’s presumption that private markets are at fault for any stagnation that he has identified. A notable difference between countries with successful, growing economies and those mired in stagnation is the degree to which their citizens enjoy freedoms, especially economic freedom. That is a well-established empirical fact, as Murphy explains. But the Pontiff goes further with preposterous dogma on the meaning of human rights. Again, from Murphy:

“Although inspired by concern for the poor and the marginalized, the Vatican’s message is seriously flawed…. On a conceptual level, Pope Francis posits a false dichotomy between economic freedom and human rights. … ‘Economic freedom must not prevail over the practical freedom of man and over his rights, and the market must not be absolute, but honour the exigencies of justice.’ 

What does the concept of “economic freedom” entail? It means freedom to work in any occupation of one’s choice, without permission from the government, and certainly without being conscripted into service against one’s will. It means the freedom to start a business. It means the freedom to keep what you have produced, without having your assets seized by a rapacious regime. It means the freedom to trade with people who live in another country. It means the rule of law, where contracts are interpreted fairly and government officials can’t exercise arbitrary power.“

Economic freedom, more than anything else, means that individuals are endowed with property rights. To deny such rights is to banish any reward for work and differential rewards for work well done. If free individuals are rewarded, it is a matter of their own discretion as to whether they immediately consume the reward or save it in order to accumulate wealth. Yet Francis takes the misanthropic and childish view that economic freedom, private property and markets imply exploitation. He lacks a basic understanding of the revolutionary power of markets as a form of social organization.

Within just a few hundred years, a small fraction of the many millennia during which mankind was mired in poverty and pestilence, markets have dramatically transformed the existence of most human populations. Peaceful, arms length transactions made in mutual self-interest exploit only one thing: gains from trade that would otherwise be wasted. And only a form of social organization that enables those gains can dovetail with the human rights and justice that Francis so strongly desires. The denial of economic freedom, property rights, and self-interest prohibits those gains, however, denying humanity of the wealth necessary to achieve anything like justice.

Pope Francis is a redistributionist, and that goes well beyond the charitable giving, good works and service performed voluntarily by individuals. In fact, he is a statist, advocating an economic system in which property rights are abrogated, wholly or in part, and wages above a politically determined threshold are confiscated.

The Pope and Perón

Francis is often described as a “Perónist”, after Juan Perón of Argentina, the so-called “right-wing socialist” (and sometime associate of the murderous Che Guevara). Anyone familiar with the economic history of Argentina should know that’s not praise. Here is Maureen Mullarkey from the last link:

“Both Juan and Eva understood the enchantments of populism. A charismatic pair, they ruled more by dint of personality—personalismo—than democratic procedure. Ushers of an ‘option for the poor,’ they glorified the lower classes and denigrated the wealthy. (This, while they amassed a huge personal fortune from the Eva Perón Welfare Foundation.) …

When Francis speaks of ‘the people’ as a revolutionary vanguard that ‘overflows the logical procedures of formal democracy,’ he is lapsing toward that ecstatic Peronist vision of a Third Way—justicialismo. That the disposition and design of it ended in economic collapse and misery is nothing against the splendor of the mystique.

In his youth, Francis absorbed the myth but not its lessons. Chief among them is how much Argentina’s fiscal catastrophe owed to an extravagant welfare system that favored enforced wealth redistribution over development. Among the many factors of Argentina’s historic economic crisis, one cries for attention: Perón’s increasing reliance on redistributing income, not only between industries and occupations but between skilled and unskilled workers.“

For further perspective on Francis, Perónism, and the disastrous Argentine “experiment”, see this piece by Daniel J. Mitchell.

For many years, naive Marxists have accepted the myth that central economic planners could and would direct productive and distributional activities with foresight, efficiency, and integrity. None of those is possible. The only form of social organization capable of registering and processing the myriad and dynamic signals on preferences and scarcity is free market capitalism. It is the only system capable of spontaneously harnessing appropriate responses based on the complex incentives faced by consumers and producers, and all at a minimal administrative cost for society, free of the government intervention that typifies the Peronist welfare state and corporatism.

Conclusion

Pope Francis should know better than to make claims having no empirical support. He should also have the wisdom to understand and advocate for the empowering nature of private property rights and markets. Elevating the human condition is possible only by allowing people to be free — economically free — and endowed with opportunities to earn private rewards and build wealth. Francis should realize that the massive private gains afforded by the market mechanism enable rewards which spill over, inuring to the benefit of parties external to a given exchange. On the other hand, state domination and control of economic activity gives over decision-making to selfish and ill-informed public commandants, who are all too pleased to grant special advantages to those in a position to return private favors. Such graft and mismanagement of resources comes at the expense of others. That way lies decay and a return to the much more brutal conditions of the past, unlike the mutually beneficial promise of market exchange.

Choice, Federal Exchange Failure, and a Path to Health Insurance Reform

25 Wednesday Oct 2017

Posted by in Health Insurance, Markets, Obamacare

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

“… a government program that is ruined by permitting more choice is not sustainable.“

That’s Jeffrey Tucker on Obamacare. Conversely, coercive force is incompatible with a free society. Tucker, no fan of President Donald Trump, writes that the two recent executive orders on health coverage are properly framed as liberalization. The orders in question: 1a) eliminate federal restrictions on the sale of so-called association health insurance plans, including their availability across state lines; 1b) remove the three-month limitation on coverage offered under temporary policies; and 2) end insurer cost-sharing subsidies for policies sold to low-income (non-Medicaid) segments of the individual market.

The most immediately impactful of the three points above might be 1b. These temporary policies became quite popular after Obamacare took effect, at least until the Obama Administration placed severe restrictions on their duration and renewal in 2016 (see Avik Roy’s post in Forbes on this point). Trump’s first order rescinds that late-term Obama order. The short-term policies are likely to become popular once again, as things stand. Small employers can avoid many of the Obamacare rules and save significantly on premiums using temporary policies.

Association plans are already sold to small businesses having a “commonality of interest”, but Trump’s order would expand the allowable common interests and permit association plans to be sold across state lines. Avik Roy doubts that this will have a large impact, but to the extent that association plans avoid both state and federal benefit mandates, they could prove to be another important source of more affordable coverage for employees than the Obamacare exchanges. In any case, as Tucker says:

“In the words of USA Today: the executive order permits a greater range of choice ‘by allowing more consumers to buy health insurance through association health plans across state lines.’  … The key word here is ‘allowing’– not forcing, not compelling, not coercing. Allowing.

Why would this be a problem? Because allowing choice defeats the core feature of Obamacare, which is about forcing risk pools to exist that the market would otherwise never have chosen. … The tenor of the critics’ comments on this move is that it is some sort of despotic act. But let’s be clear: no one is coerced by this executive order. It is exactly the reverse: it removes one source of coercion. It liberalizes, just slightly, the market for insurance carriers.“

The elimination of insurer cost-sharing subsidies might sound like the most draconian aspect of the orders. Those subsidies were designed to keep the cost of coverage low for consumers with low incomes, but the subsidies are illegal because the allocation of funds was never authorized by Congress. And contrary to what has been alleged, eliminating the insurer subsidies will have virtually no impact on low-income consumers. First, a large percentage of them are on Medicaid to begin with, not the exchanges. Second, tax-credit subsidies for low-income consumers are still in place for exchange plans, and they will scale based on the premium charged for the “silver” plan (also see Avik Roy’s link above). Taxpayers will be on the hook for those increased subsidies, as they were for the insurer cost-sharing payments.

The exchange market will be weakened by the executive orders, but it has been in a prolonged decline since its inception. Relatively healthy consumers will have opportunities to buy more competitive coverage through short-term policies or association plans, so they are now more likely to exit the risk pool. Higher-income, unsubsidized consumers are likely to pay more for coverage on the exchanges, particularly those with pre-existing conditions. As premiums rise, some of the healthy will simply forego coverage, paying the penalty instead (if it is enforced). Of course, the exchange risk pool was already risky, coverage options have thinned, and premiums have been rising, but the deterioration of conditions on the exchanges will likely be hastened under Trump’s executive orders.

Dismantling some of the restrictions on health insurance choice, which were imposed by executive order under President Obama, could prove to have been a stroke of genius on Trump’s part. As a negotiating ploy, Trump just might have maneuvered Republicans and Democrats into a position from which they can agree … on something. The new orders certainly give emphasis to the deterioration of the exchange markets. The insurers probably viewed the cost-sharing subsidies as a better deal for themselves than having to recoup costs via risky and controversial rate increases, so they are likely to pressure Congress for relief. And higher-income consumers with pre-existing conditions will face higher premiums but won’t have new choices. They will be a vocal constituency.

Democrats just don’t have any ideas with legs, however: single-payer and Medicare-for-all are increasingly viewed as politically unacceptable alternatives by most observers. As John C. Goodman notes at the last link, Medicare is already an actuarial and financial nightmare. Another program of the like to replace existing coverage that most voters would like to keep is not a position likely to win elections. Here is Goodman:

“So, the Democrats’ dilemma is: (1) they are not getting any electoral advantage from Obamacare, (2) they can’t afford to criticize it for fear of upsetting their base and (3) they don’t have an acceptable solution in any event.“

So perhaps we have conditions that might foster a compromise, at least one that could win enough votes to fix the insurance markets. Goodman contends that a plan originally attributable to John McCain, and now in the form of the Pete Sessions/Bill Cassidy-sponsored Patient Freedom Act, could be the answer. It would create something like a Universal Basic Health Allowance, in the form of a tax credit, funded by eliminating all current federal spending on health care (excluding Medicare and Medicaid). Those with pre-existing conditions would purchase coverage the same way as others, but the plan would give insurers a strong incentive to retain them. According to Goodman, a “health status risk adjustment” would assure actuarially-fair pricing by forcing an existing insurer to pay the adjustment to a new insurer when sick individuals change their insurance plans.

The Sessions/Cassidy plan (and Goodman) describes a particular implementation of a more general concept called health status insurance, a good explanation of which is offered by John Cochrane:

“Market-based lifetime health insurance has two components: medical insurance and health-status insurance. Medical insurance covers your medical expenses in the current year, minus deductibles and copayments. Health-status insurance covers the risk that your medical insurance premiums will rise. If you get a long-term condition that moves you into a more expensive medical insurance premium category, health-status insurance pays you a lump sum large enough to cover your higher medical insurance premiums, with no change in out-of-pocket expenses.“

It would be a miracle if Congress can successfully grapple with the complexities of health care reform in the current legislative session. However, Trump’s executive orders have improved the odds that some kind of agreement can be negotiated to address the dilemma of the failing exchanges and coverage for pre-existing conditions. Let’s hope whatever they negotiate will leverage consumer choice and free markets. Trump’s orders are a step, but only one step, in reestablishing the patient/insured as a key decision maker in the allocation of health care resources.

Behold Our Riches! Quality, Prices, Income, and the Purchasing Power of Labor

12 Tuesday Sep 2017

Posted by in Human Welfare, Markets

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , ,

coffeemaker

A steady refrain among pundits is that the American middle class can’t get ahead. The standard of living of average Americans has stagnated over the past 30 years, according to this view. It’s bolstered by government measures of average wage growth relative to consumer prices. But Martin Feldstein describes the flaws in constructing these measures; he says they may have led to an understatement of real income growth of more than 2% per year! Here is a link to Feldstein’s piece in the Wall Street Journal: “We’re Richer Than We Realize“. (If the link doesn’t work, an ungated link can be found on the WSJ Facebook page, posted at 10:30 a.m. on Saturday, Sept. 9th.)

Here are some of Feldstein’s observations:

“If there is no increase in the cost of production, the government concludes that there has been no increase in quality. And if the manufacturer reports an increase in the cost of production, the government assumes that the value of the product to consumers has increased in the same proportion.

That’s a very narrow—and incorrect—way to measure quality change. In reality companies improve products in ways that don’t cost more to produce and may even cost less. That’s been true over the years for familiar products like television sets and audio speakers. The government therefore doesn’t really measure the value to consumers of the improved product, only the cost of the increased inputs. The same approach, based on measuring the cost of inputs rather than the value of output, is also used for services.

The official estimates of quality change are therefore mislabeled and misinterpreted. When it comes to quality change, what is called the growth of real output is really the growth of real inputs. The result is a major underestimation of the increase in real output and in the growth of real incomes that occurs through quality improvements.

The other source of underestimation of growth is the failure to capture the benefit of new goods and services. Here’s how the current procedure works: When a new product is developed and sold to the public, its market value enters into nominal gross domestic product. But there is no attempt to take into account the full value to consumers created by the new product per se.“

It goes well beyond that, however, as great swaths of consumer value are completely ignored by government statistics:

“A basic government rule of GDP measurement is to count only goods and services that are sold in the market. Services like Google and Facebook are therefore excluded from GDP even though they are of substantial value to households. The increasing importance of such free services implies a further understatement of real income growth.“

Some of these criticisms are unfair to the extent that income statistics correspond to what consumers can purchase in terms of market value. That is a fundamentally different concept than the total value consumers assign to goods and services (market value plus consumer surplus). Nevertheless, there are efforts to adjust for quality in these statistics, but they fall far short of their objective. Also, GDP and income statistics purport to be measures of economic welfare, though it’s well known that they fall short of that ideal. It might be more fair to say that that official income statistics are reliable in tracking short-term changes in well being, but not so much over long periods of time.

The graphic at the top of this post is taken from Marian L. Tupy’s “Cost of Living and Wage Stagnation in the United States, 1979-2015“, on the CATO Institute‘s web site:

“… many, perhaps most, big-ticket items used by a typical American family on a daily basis have decreased in price. Over at Human Progress, we have been comparing the prices of common household items as advertised in the 1979 Sears catalog and prices of common household items as sold by Walmart in 2015.

We have divided the 1979 nominal prices by 1979 average nominal hourly wages and 2015 nominal prices by 2015 average nominal hourly wages, to calculate the “time cost” of common household items in each year (i.e., the number of hours the average American would have to work to earn enough money to purchase various household items at the nominal prices). Thus, the ‘time cost’ of a 13 Cu. Ft. refrigerator fell by 52 percent in terms of the hours of work required at the average hourly nominal wage, etc.“

Tupy’s post also covers the huge increases in non-wage benefits enjoyed by many workers over the past several decades, which are not captured in average wage statistics.

It’s clear that standard measures of income growth are distorted by the failure to properly account for changes in the quality of goods and services at our disposal. The narrative of middle class stagnation is flawed in that respect. As Don Boudreaux has said, most ordinary Americans are richer today than John D. Rockefeller was a century ago. The availability and quality of goods and many services today, affordable to ordinary Americans, are vastly superior to what Rockefeller had then or could even imagine. And many of those advancements occurred since the 1970s.

Sharing Apps and Market Benefits

24 Saturday Jun 2017

Posted by in Markets, Transaction Costs

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , ,

Transaction costs prevent lots of trades. So many that we often aren’t aware of their potentiality. Michael Munger asserts that transaction costs are so prohibitive that we tend to accumulate a lot of stuff that we could otherwise do without. That’s what he says in “Why we can’t break up with our stuff — yet“.

Transaction costs of all kinds have fallen dramatically over time. One of the greatest innovations in “transactions technology” was the avoidance of barter with the broad acceptance of a medium of exchange (money). Without a medium of exchange, trade requires a “double coincidence of wants”, which often makes the effort to engage in trade impractical. No less important was the establishment of secure property rights such that the integrity of a contract or transaction was protected, whether enforced by possible repercussions from other traders or through the police power of the state. Secure property rights and the use of money facilitated the development of markets and pricing that conveyed better information about scarcity. Other historical developments that reduced transaction costs include better transportation, communication, packaging, and more efficient distribution and supply chain management. In a variety of complex transactions, such as real estate, standardization of contracts has reduced transaction costs.

Those costs have been reduced dramatically of late by new communication and computing technologies. The size of these reductions is difficult to quantify in such prominent examples as Uber ride-sharing and Airbnb home-sharing, but there is no question that the new supplies of rides and accommodations would not have materialized absent the enabling on-line “apps”. The ease, low-cost and minimal risk of these transactions is incredible.

Suppose that hotels in Soho average $400 per night for a suite and that Airbnb rentals in Soho average $300. It’s fair to say that the average Airbnb host in Soho, without Airbnb, faced transaction costs in arranging for qualified occupants of at least $100 plus Airbnb’s fees. Probably much more. Now, it’s true that the hotel suites and the Airbnb rentals are fundamentally different “products”, but they are alternatives for meeting a particular need.

Similar reductions in transaction costs are occurring across a wide variety of sectors besides transportation and vacation rentals: trading in new and used goods, handymen, concierge services, snow plowing, home-sitting, food delivery, and hook-ups are but a few examples.

Munger’s twist on this story is that dramatically lower transaction costs will mean we’ll all need to own much less “stuff” on average, because we can “share”, or at least buy what we need at minimal transaction cost. Or, what we have will be used more intensively because we can share it profitably.

Munger mentions the high cost of owning an auto that he uses for about 5 out of 168 total hours in a week. The costs include dedicated “storage” space, both at home and at work, and sometimes the extra cost of “storing” it in airport parking. He could certainly afford to arrange alternative forms of transportation. Is owning the auto worthwhile because the transaction costs of the alternatives are too high? Well, Munger owns a nice car and he probably likes to drive it, so there is more to it than transaction costs. Still, if we mention the “convenience” of having a car at one’s disposal, that is really an expression of transaction costs avoided via ownership.

If the cost of arranging an acceptable and ready alternative is minimal, why own a car? This decision is very real in certain congested locales with costly real estate (e.g., parking New York City). In short, Munger believes even fewer individuals will bother to own personal autos, or that those cars will be less idle (rented to users), as technology reduces transaction costs:

“Why do I pay to store my car rather than let other people use it and collect rent? Transaction costs. …But we are living in the beginning of a pivotal era that will transform our relationship to ‘stuff’ (we’ll need less of it) and to each other (we’ll share more). For all of human history until about 1995, the desire to reduce transaction costs was tied to the desire to sell a particular product. Now, entrepreneurs are combining three things — mobile platforms, software apps, and internet connections — to sell reductions in transaction costs with no product attached. And that combination will change everything.“

Will that also mean fewer personally-owned kitchen appliances? Home furnishings? Clothing? Power tools? Stereo components? Probably not. Even if it’s easy to find a willing renter for my power tools or stereo components from time-to-time, I might not want to bother with the required exchanges (at pick-up and return). I use power tools from time-to-time, but I won’t want to shlep back and forth to rent them from someone when I could own them myself at relatively low cost. Perhaps I’ll rent a tiller or a power washer, but not a power drill. Maybe I could hire a gopher on the Air-gopher app to get the tools I need and return them when I’m done, but that adds back to my transaction costs. So there are certain limits to how far this can go in reducing our “stuff”.

Nevertheless, there is no question that there will be many new trades and competitive opportunities to exploit as transaction costs fall, and that implies more choice, lower prices, and less waste in the larger allocative sense. Those, I believe, are the major benefits of sharing technologies. For example, if you enjoy cooking but are the sole member of your household, imagine an app that allows you to sell your extra preparations to other individuals, or to give them away at a minimal transaction cost. Or, if you are able to perform odd jobs but prefer to take them at your convenience, you will likely be able to bid for projects of your choice. If you have a talent for teaching guitar, you could solicit business and even provide the lessons remotely through an on-line app. The major impediment to the development of such market innovations is potential interference by government or other entrenched interests who wish to prevent competition. Licensing laws and various forms of regulation and taxes could easily smother or eliminate the benefits of sharing technologies, and that would be a shame.

I’ll close with a digression on Munger’s hypothesis: why do I own or keep a lot of “stuff? It’s not all about transaction costs. Most people harbor nostalgic feelings for their “stuff”. I hate parting with my old shirts, old drivers licenses, theater programs, and ticket stubs. Most of those things have approximately zero market value. Some people believe it’s just plain wasteful to pitch something that can be put back into working order, like an old lawnmower. Transaction costs might be to blame, but the failure to junk the mower in the first place may be driven by a depression-era instinct for penny-pinching. The hoarder might simply underestimate the benefits of a new mower, or perhaps they deserve credit for undertaking a restoration project they enjoy.

I find myself hoarding all kinds of things that I think might be useful to me somehow, someday. Particularly things like miscellaneous nuts & bolts, sundry pieces of hardware, wire, old fixtures, pieces of lumber, and my late Dad’s old tools. I’m certain I won’t ever use 95%+ of these items, but it’s reassuring to have the inventory. Then again, every time I need an odd item, I find myself in my basement work room searching through all that stuff. Invariably, I end up on my way to the hardware store to get what I need. So much for minimizing transaction costs. What would it cost me to pitch all of it? An afternoon of painful evaluation… yet that too represents a transaction cost!