Tag Archives: Corporatism

Evil HR: Organizational Fetters, Social Fabians

27 Wednesday Feb 2019

Posted by in Identity Politics, Progressivism, Social Justice

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It is with deepest apologies to my friends in Human Resources (HR) that I admit to a long-standing bias: HR can exert a corrosive influence on a company’s ability to serve customers well and profit at it. I’m sure there are exceptions, but HR often pursues missions that are incompatible with the firm’s primary objectives. I’ve had my own difficulties with HR at employers for whom I’ve worked, and those have been of a mere bureaucratic variety. Today, the dysfunction goes much deeper. Many HR departments are engaged in a sort of Fabian gradualism, subverting free enterprise from within and promoting the doctrine of social justice.

Here are a few reasons for casting a skeptical eye on the contributions of HR:

  • It adds little value in screening applicants for certain kinds of jobs, helping to explain why so many job matches occur via professional networks and external recruiters.
  • I have witnessed HR scuttle simple plans to add interns, paid or unpaid, asserting that our department had no authority to institute such a program.
  • HR dreams up ridiculously ambiguous and complex performance assessment methods, which in the end make very little difference in the structure of rewards.
  • HR insists that “promoting diversity” is a key component of every job assessment, forcing staff to engage in written exercises of creative fluffery.
  • It creates incentives that distort hiring and firing decisions based on demographic characteristics rather than actual job qualifications and performance.
  • HR requires staff time for “diversity training”, an effort that is often resented as an insulting and patronizing intrusion on the time employees have to do their jobs.
  • HR emphasizes rewards to “stakeholders”, with little deference to the primacy of shareholders. It’s one thing for a company to maximize its value proposition to customers and prospects and to provide employees with handsome incentives. Those are fully consistent with maximizing the value of the firm. But “stakeholders” includes … just about everyone. Come and get it!
  • And HR relentlessly promotes the creed of “corporate social responsibility“, which ultimately involves a high order of virtue signaling on environmental and other social issues having little to do with the firm’s business.

It is true that HR is tasked with responsibilities that include minimizing a company’s exposure to various legal and regulatory risks. For example, one objective is to avoid any appearance of “disparate impact”. Even policies having a legitimate business purpose might be challenged if results have a statistical association with demographic characteristics. It’s an unfortunate fact that through efforts to manage that risk, HR serves as a spearhead of government intrusion into the affairs of private companies.

HR has thus become a tool through which collectivist ideals infiltrate business practices, to the detriment of the firm’s performance. These are exactly the kinds of things meant by Fast Company when they say HR isn’t working for you.  

Kyle Smith makes no bones about it: companies should simply fire their HR departments. And many can do just that by outsourcing HR functions. Smith’s arguments are couched in the most practical of terms:

“They speak gibberish.” Yes they do. Nowhere is corporate-speak more pervasive than in HR, where they’ll tell you that the organization’s “core competences” must be “leveraged” via “best practices” by “empowered contributors” within “centers of excellence”.

“They revel in red tape.” To paraphrase Smith, HR could rightfully be renamed “Compliance Resources”. These “paper pushing” functions are drivers of bloat and cost escalation, a manifestation of the familiar cost disease endemic to all bureaucracies.

“They live in a bubble.” HR managers have an inflated view of their role in the organization. Smith quotes an HR executive: ”The organization reports to us. It must meet our demands for information, documents, numbers.” Sounds like a classic central planner. Unfortunately, many companies acquiesce to the tyranny of HR bureaucrats, much to their detriment. But Smith’s point here is that HR executives are often out of touch with the way employees truly feel about the company for whom they work, with an exaggerated view of employee enthusiasm. Yet those executives are given responsibilities for which they should know better.

“They aren’t really in your business.” The skill emphasized as most important for success in HR is communications skills, according to Smith (“… what you and I call talking.“) Knowledge of finance, engineering or technology is noncritical. Fair enough, you might say: their role is different, but this goes a long way toward explaining why HR generally fails so miserably in evaluating job candidates. Can you really expect them to craft policies designed to optimize a business’ use of professional talent?

Jordan Peterson takes an extremely dim view of HR. I share his concern that HR, and HR policies, have a tendency to become heavily politicized. Ultimately, this cannot be of value to a competitive firm. As Glenn Reynolds likes to say, “Get woke, go broke“. Peterson’s perspective is societal, however, and he goes so far as to say HR departments are “dangerous”:

“I see that the social justice etiology that’s destroyed a huge swath of academia is on the march in a major way through corporate America. …

… they’ve become ethics departments. And people who take to themselves the right to determine the propriety of ethical conduct end up with a lot more power — especially if you cede it to them — than you think. And that’s happening at a very rapid rate.

The doctrines that are driving hiring decisions, for example — any emphasis, for example, on equity, or equality of outcome — it’s unbelievably dangerous. You don’t just pull that in and signal to society that you’re now acting virtuously without bringing in the whole pathological ideology.”

The value extracted from firms in the service of achieving “social justice” is essentially stolen from its rightful owners. The penalties don’t end with shareholders; employees and suppliers lose a measure of security from a weakened firm, and customers may suffer a loss in the quality of the product. It is as if reparations must be made to parties who are completely external to, and completely unharmed by, the success of the business.

It’s little wonder that companies are outsourcing their HR functions. A classic case is the use of recruiting firms that specialize in identifying talent in particular professions. Another is the outsourcing of benefits management, and there are other functions that can be farmed out. Eliminating bureaucratic bloat is often a focus of firms seeking to rationalize HR. Ultimately, a leaner HR department improves cost control, and keeping it lean reduces its latitude to divert company resources toward endeavors that promote the philosophy of collectivism.

Socialism and Authoritarianism: Perfectly Complementary

19 Wednesday Sep 2018

Posted by in Socialism, Tyranny

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The socialist left and the Marxist hard left both deny their authoritarian progenitors. Leftists are collectivists, many of whom subscribe to an explicit form of corporatism with the state having supreme power, whether as a permanent or transitional arrangement on the path to full state ownership of the means of production. Collectivism necessarily requires force and the abrogation of individual rights. At this link, corporatism, with its powerful and interventionist state, is aptly described as “de facto nationalization without being de jure nationalization” of industry. To the extent that private ownership is maintained (for the right people), it is separated from private control and is thus a taking. But the word corporatism itself is confusing to some: it is not capitalism by any means. It essentially means “to group”, and it is a form of social control by the state. (And by the way, it has nothing to do with the legal business definition of a corporation.)

Of course, leftists distance themselves from the brutality of many statist regimes by asserting that authoritarianism is exclusively a right-wing phenomenon, conveniently ignoring Stalin, Castro, Mao, Pol Pot, and other hard lefties too numerous to mention. In fact, leftists assert that fascism must be right-wing because it is corporatist and relies on the force of authority. But again, both corporatism and fascism are collectivist philosophies and historically have been promoted as such by their practitioners. Furthermore, these leftist denials fly in the face of the systemic tendency of large governments to stanch dissent. I made several of these points four years ago in “Labels For the Authoritarian Left“.

I find this link from The Federalist fascinating because the author, Paul Jossey, provides quotes of Hitler and others offering pretty conclusive proof that the Nazi high command was collectivist in the same vein as the leftists of today. Here are a few of Jossey’s observations:

“Hitler’s first ‘National Workers’ Party’ meeting while he was still an Army corporal featured the speech ‘How and by What Means is Capitalism to be Eliminated?’

The Nazi charter published a year later and coauthored by Hitler is socialist in almost every aspect. It calls for ‘equality of rights for the German people’; the subjugation of the individual to the state; breaking of ‘rent slavery’; ‘confiscation of war profits’; the nationalization of industry; profit-sharing in heavy industry; large-scale social security; the ‘communalization of the great warehouses and their being leased at low costs to small firms’; the ‘free expropriation of land for the purpose of public utility’; the abolition of ‘materialistic’ Roman Law; nationalizing education; nationalizing the army; state regulation of the press; and strong central power in the Reich.”

Are you feeling the Bern? Does any of this remind you of the “Nasty Woman”, Liz Warren? Here is more from Jossey:

“Hitler repeatedly praised Marx privately, stating he had ‘learned a great deal from Marxism.’ The trouble with the Weimar Republic, he said, was that its politicians ‘had never even read Marx.’ He also stated his differences with communists were that they were intellectual types passing out pamphlets, whereas ‘I have put into practice what these peddlers and pen pushers have timidly begun.’

It wasn’t just privately that Hitler’s fealty for Marx surfaced. In ‘Mein Kampf,’ he states that without his racial insights National Socialism ‘would really do nothing more than compete with Marxism on its own ground.’ Nor did Hitler eschew this sentiment once reaching power. As late as 1941, with the war in bloom, he stated ‘basically National Socialism and Marxism are the same’ in a speech published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Nazi propaganda minister and resident intellectual Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary that the Nazis would install ‘real socialism’ after Russia’s defeat in the East. And Hitler favorite Albert Speer, the Nazi armaments minister whose memoir became an international bestseller, wrote that Hitler viewed Joseph Stalin as a kindred spirit, ensuring his prisoner of war son received good treatment, and even talked of keeping Stalin in power in a puppet government after Germany’s eventual triumph.”

Some contend that the Nazis used the term “socialist” in a purely cynical way, and that they hoped to undermine support for “real socialists” by promising a particular (and perverse) vision of social justice to those loyal to the Reich and the German nation. After all, the Bolsheviks were political rivals who lacked Hitler’s nationalistic fervor. Hitler must have thought that his brand of “socialism” was better suited to his political aspirations, not to mention his expansionist visions. Those not loyal to the Reich, including Jews and other scapegoats, would become free slave labor to the regime and its loyal corporate cronies. (It’s striking that much of today’s Left, obviously excepting Bernie Sanders, seems to share the Nazis’ antipathy for Jews.)

Socialism, corporatism and fascism are close cousins and are overlapping forms of statism, and they are all authoritarian by their practical nature. It’s incredible to behold leftists as they deny that the National Socialists Workers Party practiced a brand of socialism. Perhaps the identification of the Nazis as a fascist regime has led to confusion regarding their true place along the ideological spectrum, but that too is puzzling. In their case, a supreme corporatist state enabled its most privileged advocates to exploit government power for private gain, and that’s the essence of fascism and the archetypical outcome of socialism.

Corporate Lapdogs of the Left

04 Wednesday Apr 2018

Posted by in Central Planning, Identity Politics, Progressivism, rent seeking

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ceo

Now don’t get me wrong, I definitely prefer to see private goods and services produced privately, not publicly. Private ownership of the means of production makes the world a better place because ownership and self-interest drive performance and value, to put it all too briefly. But corporate America is now so thoroughly encumbered by ideological distractions that it compromises the mission of creating value, risking shareholder returns and invested capital as well. Having spent the past 31 years employed successively by three gigantic corporate hairballs (with a 2-year stint at the central bank), the following thesis about corporate CEOs, and corporate America by extension, strikes me as wholly accurate:

“CEOs … mostly [reject] the ethos of rugged individualism in favor of a more collectivist view of the world. The capitalists [are] not much interested in defending the culture of capitalism. … the psychological and operational mechanics of large corporations [are] much like those of other large organizations, including government agencies … American CEOs [believe] that expertise deployed through bureaucracy [can] impose rationality on such unruly social entities as free markets, culture, family, and sexuality. The supplanting of spontaneous order with political discipline is the essence of progressivism….“

I changed the tenses used above by Kevin Williamson, who attempts to explain why American corporations became such progressive activists. The beginning of the quote describes interviews conducted by William H. Whyte in the 1950s, but it’s as true now as it was then, and probably much more so. The technocratic view of organizational efficacy may be true up to a point. In fact, there is undoubtedly an optimal size for any organization that is dependent upon it’s mission, the technologies at its disposal, and the range of prices it is likely to face in input and output markets. It’s all too easy for a successful firm to expand beyond that point, however, as many now-defunct businesses have learned the hard way. However, the quote merely highlights the sympathetic view often held by corporate managements toward the notion of a planned society, guided by a class of technocrats. They share this scientistic line of thinking with the statist left, though the corporatist vision is a world in which their private organizations play a critical role, with risks mitigated by “partners” in government.

Private incentives can produce wonderful results, but they are corrupted by the scent of private advantage that can be gained via government intervention in markets. The corporate practice of seeking rents through legislative and administrative action has been going on since at least the 1880s, when railroads sought protection from competition and other shipping interests via federal regulatory action.The symbiosis between government and corporate interests, or corporatism, has been growing ever since. Whether it is lucrative contract awards, subsidies, or favorable regulation, government has lots of goodies at its disposal by virtue of its exclusive ability to exert coercive power. This quote of David Cay Johnston describes the end-product of corporate rent-seeking behavior:

“Corporate socialism is where we socialize losses and privatize gains. Companies that have failed in the marketplace stick the taxpayers with their losses, but when they make money they get to keep it, and secondly, huge amounts of capital are given to companies by taxpayers.”

Risk mitigation is at the heart of a second variety of corporate leftism, and Williamson notes the asymmetry in the political risks faced by most corporations:

“Conservatives may roll their eyes a little bit at promises to build windmills so efficient that we’ll cease needing coal and oil, but progressives (at least a fair portion of them) believe that using fossil fuels may very well end human civilization. The nation’s F-150 drivers are not going to organize a march on Chevron’s headquarters if it puts a billion bucks into biofuels, but the nation’s Subaru drivers might very well do so if it doesn’t. … The same asymmetry characterizes the so-called social issues.“

At this point, Williamson goes on to describe a few social issues on which corporate leaders are frequently harangued by the left. Those leaders may view conservative positions on those issues as aberrant, according to Williamson, because the leaders inhabit an insulated world of elitist, media-driven, politically-correct opinion. They wish to be seen as “progressive” and discount the risk of offending conservatives. While I do not take Williamson’s side on all of the social issues he mentions, I concede that there is some truth to the asymmetry he describes.

An avenue through which corporate America is strongly influenced by the left is identity politics. This is partly an unfortunate side-effect of civil rights legislation and other anti-discrimination law, but in today’s litigious environment, there are excessive legal risks against which corporations must take precautions. This is embedded in human resource policies to the point at which hiring the best individual to fill a role is subject to a series of costly, time-consuming hurdles, and is sometimes impossible. Then, there are the mandatory “Diversity and Inclusion” courses that all employees are required to complete. These overbearing attempts to “educate” the work force consume valuable staff time and are of questionable value in light of the aggravation and resentment they inspire in employees. Finally, I can’t keep count of all the corporate-sponsored activities devoted to celebrating one identity group after another. Can we please get back to work?

Today, as a consumer, it is becoming more difficult to engage in commerce without exposure to a seller’s political positioning. For example, I buy about 90% of my clothing from a particular clothier, but last weekend I learned that the company had taken an objectionable position (to me) in the debate over gun legislation. I am certain that activists badgered the company, and it succumbed, and so I will change my shopping habits. People often find that it’s easier to engage in arms-length transactions when the other party stays off the soapbox. But it goes further than that. Here is Williamson:

“Whereas the ancient corporate practice was to decline to take a public position on anything not related to their businesses, contemporary CEOs feel obliged to act as public intellectuals as well as business managers.“

Well, “ancient” might take it a bit too far, but as a customer, employee, and especially as a shareholder, I would urge any company to steer clear of political posturing. Do not dilute your mission of delivering value to customers, which dovetails with serving the interests of shareholders. You must pursue that mission in a way that you consider responsible and ethical, which just might narrow the scope of the mission. And that’s okay. Just be as neutral as possible on extraneous issues as you reach out to potential customers, and do not respond to politically-motivated threats except in the most diplomatic terms.

Should I bother to say that corporations should eschew public subsidies? That they should respond to competition by improving value, rather than lobbying for advantages and protection from lawmakers or regulators? That they should not badger their employees to give to their company’s Political Action Committee (PAC)?

I must be fantasizing! Corporations would never follow that advice, not as long as they can capture rents through the seductive expedient of big government. If that were the only reason for the hate reserved by leftists for corporate America, I’d be right with them. But in fact, leftist rhetoric condemns the profit motive generally, both in principle and as a method of scapegoating for any social ill. Williamson marvels at the incredible irony of the corporate enterprise-cum-lapdog of the Left, which is especially palpable as the Left beats the dog so unrelentingly.

Ridley’s Case For Free Market Capitalism

05 Saturday Aug 2017

Posted by in Free markets

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Matt Ridley delivered an excellent lecture in July addressing a generally unappreciated distinction: markets and free enterprise vs. corporatism. Many don’t seem to know the difference. Ridley offers an insightful discussion of the very radical and liberating nature of free markets. The success of the free market system in alleviating poverty and increasing human well-being is glaringly obvious in historical perspective, but it’s become too easy for people to take market processes for granted. It’s also too easy to misinterpret outcomes in a complex society in which producers must navigate markets as well as a plethora of regulatory obstacles and incentives distorted by government.

I agree with almost everything Ridley has to say in this speech, but I think he does the language of economics no favors. I do not like his title: “The Case For Free Market Anti-Capitalism”. Free Markets are great, of course, and they are fundamental to the successful workings of a capitalistic system. Not a corporatist system, but capitalism! Ridley seems to think the latter is a dirty word. As if to anticipate objections like mine, Ridley says:

“‘Capitalism’ and ‘markets’ mean the same thing to most people. And that is very misleading. Commerce, enterprise and markets are – to me – the very opposite of corporatism and even of ‘capitalism’, if by that word you mean capital-intensive organisations with monopolistic ambitions.“

No, that is not what I mean by capitalism. Commerce, free enterprise, markets, capitalism and true liberalism all imply that you are free to make your own production and consumption decisions without interference by the state. Karl Marx coined the word “capitalism” as a derogation, but the word was co-opted long ago to describe a legitimate and highly successful form of social organization. I prefer to go on using “capitalism” as synonymous with free markets and liberalism, though the left is unlikely to abandon the oafish habit of equating liberalism with state domination.

Capital is man-made wealth, like machines and buildings. It can be used more intensively or less in production and commerce. But capitalism is underpinned by the concept of private property. You might own capital as a means of production, or you might operate an enterprise with very little capital, but the rewards of doing so belong to you. Saving those rewards by reinvesting in your business or investing in other assets allows you to accumulate capital. That’s a good way to build or expand a business that is successful in meeting the needs of its customers, and it’s a good way to provide for oneself later in life.

Capitalism does not imply monopolistic ambitions unless you incorrectly equate market success with monopoly power. Market success might mean that you are an innovator or just better at what you do than many of your competitors. It usually means that your customers are pleased. The effort to innovate or do your job well speaks to an ambition rooted in discovery, service and pride. In contrast, the businessperson with monopolistic ambitions is willing to achieve those ends by subverting normal market forces, including attempts to enlist the government in protecting their position. That’s known as corporatism, rent-seeking, and crony capitalism. It is not real capitalism, and Ridley should not confuse these terms. But he also says this:

“Free-market ideas are often the very opposite of business and corporate interests. “

Most fundamental to business interests is to earn a profit, and the profit motive is an essential feature of markets and the operation of the invisible hand that is so beneficial to society. Why Ridley would claim that business interests are inimical to free market ideals is baffling.

I hope and believe that Ridley is merely guilty of imprecision, and that he intended to convey that certain paths to profit are inconsistent with free market ideals. And in fact, he follows that last sentence with the following, which is quite right: capitalism is subverted by corporatism:

“We need to call out not just the worst examples of crony capitalism, but an awful lot of what passes for capitalism today — a creature of subsidy that lobbies governments for regulatory barriers to entry.“

And, of course, crony capitalism is not capitalism!

Now I’ll get off my soapbox and briefly return to the topic of an otherwise beautiful lecture by Ridley. He makes a number of fascinating points, including the following, which is one of the most unfortunate and paradoxical results in the history of economic and social thought:

“Somewhere along the line, we have let the market, that most egalitarian, liberal, disruptive, distributed and co-operative of phenomena, become known as a reactionary thing. It’s not. It is the most radical and liberating idea ever conceived: that people should be free to exchange goods and services with each other as they please, and thereby work for each other to improve each other’s lives.

In the first half of the 19th century this was well understood. To be a follower of Adam Smith was to be radical left-winger, against imperialism, militarism, slavery, autocracy, the established church, corruption and the patriarchy.

Political liberation and economic liberation went hand in hand. Small government was a progressive proposition. Insofar as there was a revolution during the Industrial Revolution, it was the weakening of the power of the aristocracy and the landed interests, and the liberation of the bulk of the people.“

Do read the whole thing!

Can Health Care Bill Get GOP Off the Schneid?

29 Thursday Jun 2017

Posted by in Health Insurance, Obamacare

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health insurer bailout

For those who are “woke” to Obamacare’s failures, the Senate GOP’s health insurance reform bill has plenty to hate and maybe some things to love. There are likely to be some changes in the bill before it goes to a vote, which now has been delayed until sometime after Congress’ July 4th recess. Known as the Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017 (BCRA), the bill is another mixed bag of GOP health care reforms and non-reforms. It is the Senate Republicans’ effort to improve upon the bill passed by the House of Representatives in May. The non-reforms are tied to an inability to repeal all aspects of Obamacare (the Affordable Care Act, or ACA) within the context of budget reconciliation, a process which permits a simple majority for approval of changes linked in some way to the budget (the so-called Byrd rule). Yuval Levin offers an excellent discussion of the bill and the general motivations for the form it has taken:

“They are choosing to address discrete problems with Obamacare within the framework it created and to pursue some significant structural reforms to Medicaid beyond that, and they should want the merits of their proposal judged accordingly. Their premise is politically defensible — it is probably more so than my premise — and the proposal they have developed makes some sense in light of it.“

It’s necessary to get one thing out of the way at the outset: the CBO’s scoring of the Senate bill is flawed in a massive way, like the earlier score of the House bill. The estimate of lost coverage for 22 million individuals is based on the CBO’s errant predictions of Obamacare coverage levels. (See here and here, and see Avik Roy’s latest entry on this topic.) Does anyone believe that enrollment on the exchanges will decline by 15 million in 2018 due to the elimination of the individual mandate? That’s over 40% more than total enrollment in 2017, by the way. Even if we attribute the CBO’s prediction to the elimination of both the individual and employer mandates, it would be an incredible plunge, especially given the means-tested tax credits in the BCRA. Does anyone believe that coverage levels under Obamacare would increase by 18 – 19 million by 2026 (mostly on account of the individual mandate)? That is the baseline assumed by the CBO in its scoring of the BCRA, which is laughable. A more realistic estimate of lost coverage under the BCRA might be 2 to 3 million, but remember that many of those coverage losses would not be “forced” in any sense. Rather, they would be purposeful refusals to take coverage with the demise of the individual mandate. But they would tend to be the healthiest of the current, coerced enrollees.

A related point has to do with hysterical claims that the BCRA will “kill thousands of people”. Someone cooked-up this talking (screaming?) point to rally the ignorant left and perhaps frighten the ignorant right (including a few GOP Senators). As Ira Stoll explains, there are several reasons to dismiss these assertions, not least of which is its tradeoff-free conceit. More ugly detail on the basis of these claims can be found here.

Will the BCRA “gut” Medicaid, as Charles Schumer, Nancy Pelosi and other have claimed? Program spending would not decline by any means, only its growth rate. Enrollment would decline with tougher eligibility rules, but as noted above, tax credits more generous than the Medicaid savings (relative to Obamacare) would help replace lost Medicaid coverage with private insurance. Steve Chapman has contributed one of the most nitwitted commentaries on Medicaid reform that I have seen. Not only do critics consistently ignore the proposed tax credits for coverage at low incomes, but they never address the monumental waste in the program., something that would likely improve under the budgeting requirements and additional discretion given to states by the BCRA.

An even crazier scare story going around is that the Senate bill will cut Medicare benefits. That is not the case, though the bill repeals an Obamacare Medicare tax increase on the self-employed.

Getting back to the broader BCRA, here are some of the major provisions:

  • Medicaid reform to replace the budgetary disaster of federal matching with per capita caps or block grants, and state program control.
  • Means-tested tax credits for insurance purchases would extend to low-income individuals who might otherwise lose their expanded Medicaid eligibility. According to Levin, this group is heavily weighted toward the unmarried and childless.
  • Greater state authority over regulation of the individual insurance market. This is accomplished through the availability of state waivers from many Obamacare regulations, including essential health benefits.
  • Almost all Obamacare tax provisions would be repealed. One exception is the “Cadillac” tax on high-cost employer plans starting in 2026 (after a temporary hiatus). Many of these repeals would benefit individuals broadly as taxpayers, employees, business people, and patients.
  • Expanded allowable age rating to 5/1 from 3/1. This helps limit adverse selection by pricing more risk where it exists, and the means-tested credits would help offset higher premiums for older individuals with low incomes.
  • Provides about $130 billion in “stabilization” funds for insurers over a three-year period. This is an attempt to keep premiums down during a transition over which the GOP probably hopes to enact additional deregulatory measures. Is this a practical maneuver? Yes, but it also reflects a bit of “corporatism-when-it’s-convenient” hypocrisy.
  • Eliminates funding for Planned Parenthood. Presumably funding could be restored later were the organization to split off its abortion services into a financially distinct division, which the Hyde Amendment would seem to require.
  • Retains coverage for pre-existing conditions.
  • Elimination of the individual and employer mandates, including the tax penalty. However, individuals who go without coverage for two months would face a six-month waiting period before they could re-qualify for coverage.

Eliminating the mandates is great from a libertarian and an economic perspective. The coercion inherent in those requirements is bad enough. In practice, the individual mandate has proven less effective in encouraging enrollment than Obamacare’s architects had hoped, which makes the CBO’s conclusions all the more puzzling. The employer mandate gives firms an incentive to reduce hours and employment, so it has extremely undesirable labor-market implications.

Most criticism of the BCRA from the right has centered on its failure to fully repeal Obamacare insurance and health care regulations. The continuation of Obamacare community rating is a major shortcoming of the bill, as it distributes the financial risks of medical needs in ways that do not correspond to the actual distribution of health risks. The result is the very same adverse selection problem we have witnessed on the Obamacare exchanges. Unfortunately, this raises the specter that we’ll be stuck with some form of community rating in the long-term, along with employer-provided coverage and the ill-advised premium tax deductions, which tend to inflate premium levels.

Michael F. Cannon of the CATO Institute calls the BCRA an Obamacare rescue package. John C. Goodman is largely in agreement with Cannon, stating that Republicans have no real desire to repeal Obamacare. Peter Suderman at Reason has many of the same concerns. In addition to community rating, Cannan (and Senator Rand Paul) are unhappy that Medicaid spending continues to grow under the bill with a new program of subsidies (tax credits) to boot! They also condemn the so-called “stabilization” or “cost-sharing” subsidies that would be paid to insurers under the bill. While a broader range of plans would become available, there is little confidence that insurers will be able to  bring down premiums and/or deductibles substantially without the added subsidies.

Avik Roy has defended the Senate bill for its proposed reforms to Medicaid, replacement of Obama’s Medicaid expansion with tax credits for private coverage, and transitional tax credits to smooth jumps in premium levels as income rises from low levels. This is an improvement over the House bill. However, marginal tax rates would be high under the BCRA for individuals in the range of income over which the credits phase out, which is a legitimate “welfare trap” criticism.

David Harsanyi also believes the bill is a good start:

“If Republican leadership had told conservatives in 2013 that they could pass a bill that would eliminate the individual and employer mandates, phase out Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion, cut an array of taxes, and lay out the conditions for full repeal later, I imagine most would have said ‘Sign me up!’“

Naturally, most critics of Obamacare have strong misgivings about a bill that would leave major components of the ACA’s structure in place. That includes Obamacare’s regulation of health care delivery itself, not just health insurance coverage. The BCRA might incorporate signifiant changes before it goes to a vote, however. One can only hope! Rand Paul has suggested breaking the bill into two parts: repeal of the ACA and other spending provisions, though it’s not clear how a repeal bill would qualify under the Byrd rule. Either way, the GOP intends to follow-up with additional health care legislation and administrative changes. Were a bill enacted soon, there is some chance that additional legislation could garner limited bi-partisan support. Long-term stability of the health insurance and health care markets would be better-served by a stronger semblance of political equilibrium than we have seen in the years since Obama was elected.

 

 

Good Profits and Bad Profits

18 Thursday May 2017

Posted by in Health Care, Profit Motive

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Toles-on-Regulatory-Capture

There are two faces of profit. It’s always the fashion on the left to denigrate profits and the profit motive generally, as if it serves no positive social function. This stems partly from a failure to examine the circumstances under which profits are earned: is it through competitive performance, innovation, hard-won customer loyalty, and the skill or even luck to spot an underpriced asset? Such a “good” profit might even exceed what economists call a “normal profit”, or one that just covers the opportunity cost of the owners’ capital. On the other hand, profit can be derived from what economists call “rent seeking”. That’s the dark side, but the unrecognized spirit of rent seeking seems to lurk within many discussions, as if the word profit was exclusively descriptive of evil. The “rent” in rent seeking derives from “economic rent”, which traditionally meant profit in excess of opportunity cost, or a “supra-normal” profit. But it’s impossible to know exactly how much of any given profit is extracted by rent seeking; a high profit in and of itself is not prima facie evidence of rent seeking, even though we might argue the social merits of a firm’s dominant market position.

Rent seeking takes many forms. Collusion between ostensible competitors is one, as is any predatory attempt to monopolize a market, but the term is most often associated with cronyism in government. For example, lobbying efforts might involve favors to individuals in hopes of swaying votes on regulatory matters or lucrative government contracts. Sometimes, a rent seeker wants lighter regulation. At others, a rent seeker might work the political system for more regulation in the knowledge that smaller competitors will be incapable of surviving the heavy compliance costs. Government administrators also have the authority to change fortunes with their rulings, and they are subject to the same temptations as elected officials. In fact, in the aggregate, administrative rule-making and even enforcement might outweigh prospective legislation as attractors of intense rent-seeking.

Rent seeking is big-time and it is small-time. It takes place at all levels of government, from attempts to influence zoning decisions, traffic patterns, contract awards, and even protection from law enforcement. When it’s big time, rent seeking is the very essence of what some call corporatism and more generally fascism: the enlistment of coercive government power for private gain. A pretty reliable rule is that where there’s government, there is rent-seeking behavior.

Otherwise, the profit motive serves a valuable and massive social function: resources are attracted to profitable uses because they signal the desires of potential buyers. In this way, profits assure that resources are drawn into the most-valued uses. The market interactions between new competitors, drawn by the prospect of profits, and willing buyers leads to a self-correction: supra-normal profits get competed away over time. In this way, the spontaneous actions of voluntary market participants lead to a great achievement: all mutually beneficial trades are exhausted. Profit makes this possible in the short-run and it assures that trades evolve optimally with changes in tastes, technology and resource availability. By comparison, government fares poorly when it attempts to plan outcomes in the short- or the long-run. Rent seeking is an attempt to influence and even encourage such planning, and the profits it enables impose costs on society.

Good and Bad Profits In Health Insurance

I’ve written a few posts about health insurance reform recently (see the left margin). Health care is scarce. If relying on government is the preferred alternative to private insurance, don’t count on better access to care: you won’t get it unless you’re connected. Profits earned by health insurance carriers are roundly condemned by the left. It is as if private capital utilized in arranging coverage and carrying the risk on pools of customers deserves zero compensation, that only public capital raised by coercive taxation is morally acceptable for this purpose. But aside from this obvious hogwash, is there a reason to question the insurers’ route to profitability based upon rent seeking?

The health insurers played a role in shaping the Affordable Care Act (ACA, i.e., Obamacare) and certainly had hoped to benefit from several of its provisions, even while sacrificing autonomy over product, price, coverage decisions, and payout ratios. The individual and employer mandates would force low-risk individuals to purchase extensive coverage, and essential benefits requirements would earn incremental margins. Sounds like a nice deal, but those policies were regarded by the ACA’s proponents as necessary for universal coverage, stabilizing risk, and promoting adequate coverage levels. There were other provisions, however, designed to safeguard the profitability of insurers. These included an industry risk adjustment mechanism, temporary reinsurance to help defray the cost of  covering high-risk patients, and so-called risk corridors (also temporary).

As it turned out, the ACA was not a great bet for insurers, as their risk pools deteriorated more than many expected. With the expiration of the temporary protections in Obamacare, it became evident that offering policies on the exchanges would not be profitable without large premium hikes. A number of carriers have stopped offering policies on the exchanges.

It should be no surprise that health insurance profitability has been anything but impressive over the past three years. The average industry return on equity was just 5.6% during that time frame, and it was a slightly better 6.2% in 2016, about 60% of the market-wide average. It’s difficult to conclude that insurers benefitted greatly from rent seeking activity with regard to the ACA’s passage, but perhaps that activity had a sufficient influence on policy to stabilize what otherwise might have been disastrous performance.

The critics of insurance profits are primarily interested in scapegoating as a means to promote a single-payer health care system. While some are aware of the favors granted to the industry in the design of the ACA, most are oblivious to the actual results. Even worse, they wish to throw-out the good with the bad.

The left is almost universally ignorant of the social function served by the profit motive. Profits stimulate supply, competition and innovation in virtually every area of economic life. To complain about profits in general is to wish for a primitive existence. Unfortunately, the potential for government to change the rules of the market makes it a ripe target for rent-seeking, and it creates a fog through which few discern the good from the bad.

Government As Hazard

10 Friday Feb 2017

Posted by in Big Government, Markets

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national-bird

Lots of people think government can do good things, even if its always in fashion to wink about the state’s legendary incompetence. It can do lots of things, but the only way it can do them is by exercising its power to coerce. It’s simply impossible to form an effective government without granting it that power. We must hope it will do only good things, and there is reasonable consensus that its basic functions are good, at least in kind: national defense, law enforcement and protection of basic rights, and a judicial system. The mere performance of those functions requires coercive power, and funding them requires the coercive power of taxation.

To make things simple, for now let’s stipulate that all agree on both the necessary functions of government, some minimal scale and scope of those functions, and the taxes necessary to pay for them. We may all feel that we are better off. Anything in excess of that minimal portfolio as might be desired by an individual or group would necessarily make some feel better off and some feel worse off. Additional taxes would have to be collected to pay for it, and the activities themselves might be seen in some quarters as inappropriate, wasteful, or intrusive. Now, the coercion of the state becomes more binding on some individuals and groups. We no longer have a win-win proposition, and that is what  distinguishes marginal government activity from marginal private exchange. The latter is always predicated on mutual benefits for the transacting parties. In the jargon of economics, these voluntary, private trades are Pareto-improving moves, meaning that some individuals are made better off and no one is made worse off. In general, if all mutually beneficial trades are exploited, the final result is Pareto optimal (after Vilfredo Pareto), because no further activity can make anyone better off without making someone else worse off.

The limited government described in the hypothetical sounds as if it might be Pareto optimal, but let’s add a little more realism. Are there additional government functions that would improve well being without doing harm to anyone? There is general agreement that government should provide for other “public goods”, which would otherwise be under-demanded in the market, and under-provided, due the nonexclusive nature of their benefits (think public parks). Once those are provisioned, the outcome may be Pareto optimal. There may be unanimous agreement, as well, that government should take actions to mitigate certain external costs arising from private activity. (If some of the costs of private activity are not internalized, then those market transactions fail the test of Pareto improvement). These additional government functions require coercive power, of course. Now we are into more complex issues of public choice. The provision of goods with at least some public benefits requires judgement as to degree, and judgement is necessary as to the appropriate degree of mitigation of external costs when they are an issue. In other words, Pareto-improving moves get scarce once government assumes responsibilities beyond those described in our original hypothetical.

As the scale and scope of government grow, its coercive force must advance as well. Therefore, unanimous consent for this growth, and even widespread consensus, will be impossible to achieve. Its size will reach a level at which a substantial share of the population will assume the roles of “public servants”, all having a vested interest in the state’s continued growth, if only to boost their own pay. The potential conflict of those personal interests with the public interest could not be clearer. That’s a good reason to support strict limits on the size and power of government, not to mention restrictions on the power of public employees to unionize.

Those who wish for government to play a dominant role in society might think it’s all for the good. They might support changes in the rules of governance that facilitate the dominance and coercive power it confers upon them. That might include, for example, pushing the use of executive authority to extreme levels based on interpretations of complex, but often vague, legislation. It might include changes in parliamentary rules that make it easier for thin majorities of legislators to work their will. No doubt these rule  changes will lead to Pareto-degrading actions, though the ruling faction will be quite happy with their new powers.

But what happens when a shift in the balance of public opinion brings new leaders to power? Those leaders will inherit rules that facilitate their agenda and authority to exercise coercive power. No one at any point along the ideological spectrum should dismiss this sort of risk. That’s the spirit of a recent Bryan Caplan post, “Limited Government as Insurance“. Stretching powers in the service of particular policy goals may well backfire when those powers become available to an opposing faction:

“Imagine going back in time to January 20, 2009. Obama’s Inauguration Day. You’re a cheering fan. On that day, an angel appears and makes you this offer: If you give up on Obama’s best ideas, none of Trump’s worst ideas will happen either. Obamacare will never happen – but neither will Trump’s immigration policies. Would you take that deal?

I know, it’s a galling hypothetical. You want the good stuff without the bad stuff.“

Caplan characterizes strict limits on government as a form of insurance against the risk of swings in the balance of power. He also considers plausible reasons for rejecting such a deal: “the arc of the moral universe”, or, you think your side will ultimately win, and will win for all time; and “asymmetric hyperbole”, or, the greatness of your policies outweighs any damage the other side can do with the same powers. If you really believe those things, it might seem reasonable to take your chances on an expansive state with expansive powers! A preference for limited government, however, does not require the contorted logic required to reject this insurance.

The U.S. Constitution includes many provisions originally intended to limit government and the exercise of coercive power. Those protections from the state have eroded over time, a process hastened by increasingly flexible judicial interpretations of the founding document. Caplan notes that there are a number of mechanisms by which limited government can be made durable:

“Supermajority rules require more than a majority to act. Division of powers makes it hard for government bodies to accomplish anything on their own. Judicial review allows judges to invalidate acts of government. Federalism greatly reduces the cost of “voting with your feet.” If you think these institutions aren’t working, the obvious solution is to strengthen them. Impose more supermajority requirements. Divide more powers. Overturn legislation that fails to get support from six, seven, eight, or all nine Supreme Court Justices. Make states pay for their own spending with their own taxes, not federal grants.“

Then comes the most insightful, but most disheartening, part of Caplan’s post: real steps to limit government will never be taken:

“Limited government helps everyone in the long-run, but immediately hurts the ruling party. They fought hard to win power; now that they have it, they yearn to flex their muscles.“

We might see a federal department abolished here or there, and we might see certain regulations rolled back, but those steps will be selective. The powers that put them there in the first place can be reapplied in the future. We might see more “business-friendly” actions, but those will be selective as well. In other words, corporatism will persist. And we might see tax cuts, but that won’t reduce the government’s absorption of resources, which is driven by the spending side. While this sounds discouraging, I nevertheless admire Caplan’s characterization of limited government as insurance against the other side’s bad policies. If only we could pull it off!

Seeding the Grapes of Graft

23 Saturday Apr 2016

Posted by in Big Government, rent seeking

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Government-Bounty-Hunter

Are you investing in graft and rent-seeking activity without knowing it? Is a significant share of your saving channeled into sectors that profit from political influence over politicians, regulators and government planners? Maybe it’s no surprise, and you knew all along that your capital backs firms who manipulate the political system to extract resources beyond what they can earn through honest production. You have an interest in the success of the rent seekers, and you might well get a tax benefit to go along with it!

All this is almost certainly true if your savings are in a 401k, an IRA, a public or private pension fund, or in publicly-traded stocks. These sources of investor funding are dominated by firms that rent seek…. an indication of just how far the cancer of corporatism has gone toward completely subverting free market capitalism. It can be turned back only by ending the symbiosis between industry and government and encouraging real competition in markets.

This question of investing in rent seekers is raised by Guy Rolnik at Pro-Market (the blog of the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business):

“Put another way, are we facing an economic model in which tens of millions of Americans’ pensions are relying on the ability of companies to extract rents from consumers and taxpayers?“

Rolnik’s emphasis is primarily on mergers and acquisitions, industrial concentration, diminished competition, and monopoly profits extracted by the surviving entities. As Alex Tabarrok at Marginal Revolution notes, “The Number of Publicy Traded Firms Has Halved” in the past 20 years. At the same time, the trend in business startups has been decidedly negative. While I strongly believe in the benefits of a healthy market for corporate control, these trends are a sign that the rent seekers and their enablers in government are gaining an upper hand.

Monopoly must be condoned if there are natural barriers to entry in a market, but such monopolists are generally subject to regulation of price and service levels (complex issues in their own right). If there are other legitimate economic barriers to entry such as differentiated products and strong brand reputations, there is no reason for concern, as those are signs of value creation. And given the private freedom to innovate and compete, there is little reason to suspect that above-normal profits can persist in the long run, as new risk-takers are ultimately drawn into the mix. That is how a healthy economy works and how prices direct resources to the highest-valued uses.

Rent seekers, on the other hand, always have one of the following objectives:

Government Protection: Increased concentration in an industry is a concern if there are artificial barriers to entry. One sure way to protect a market is to enlist the government’s help in locking it down. This happens in a variety of ways: tariffs and other restrictions on foreign goods, patent protection, restrictions on entry into geographic markets, implicit government guarantees against risk (too big to fail), union labor laws, and complex regulatory rules and compliance costs that small competitors can’t afford. The upshot is that if we want more competition in markets, we must reduce the size of the administrative state.

Subsidies: Another aspect of rent seeking is the quest for taxpayer subsidies. These are often channeled into politically-favored activities that can’t be sustained otherwise, and the recipients are always politically-favored firms with friends in high places. This is privilege! Look no further than the renewable energy industry to see that politically-favored, subsidized, and uneconomic activities tend to be dominated by firms with political connections. Naturally, good rent-seekers have an affinity for central planning and its plentiful opportunities for graft. With big-government control of resources you get big-time rent seeking.

Contracts: Government largess also means that big contracts are there to be won across a range of industries: construction, defense, transportation equipment, office supplies, computing, accounting and legal services and almost anything else. Because these purchases are made by an entity that uses other people’s money, incentives for efficiency are weak. And while private firms may compete for these contracts, there is no question that political connections play an important role. As government assumes control of more resources, more favorable rent-seeking opportunities always appear.

Influencing public policy is a game that is much easier for large firms to play. Moreover, the revolving door between government and industry is most active among strong players. This is not to say that large corporations don’t engage in many productive activities. They often excel in their areas of specialization and therefore earn profits that are economically legitimate. However, when government is involved as a buyer, subsidizer or regulator, the rewards are not as strongly related to productive effort. These rewards include above-normal profits, a more dominant market position, a long-term pipeline of taxpayer funding, the prestige of running a large operation with armies of highly-skilled employees engaged in compliance activities, and prestigious appointments for officers. Some of these gains from graft are shared by investors… and that’s probably you.

For society, the implications of channeling saving into rent-seeking activities are unambiguously negative. To say it differently, the private return to rent seeking exceeds the social return, and the latter is negative. Successful rent seekers artificially boost their equity returns and may simultaneously undermine returns to smaller competitors. The outcomes entail restraint of trade and misallocation of resources on a massive scale. The public-sector largess that makes it all possible gives us high rates of taxation, which retard incentives to work, save and invest. If taxes aren’t enough to cover the bloat, our central bank (the Fed) is not shy about monetizing government debt, which distorts interest rates, inflates asset prices and  inflates the prices of goods. In the aggregate, these things warp the usual tradeoff between risk and return and worsen society’s provision for the future.

How should you feel about all this? And your portfolio? As an investor, you might not have much choice. It’s not your fault, so take your private returns where you can find them. Some firms swear off rent seeking of any kind, like Koch Industries, but it is not publicly traded. You could invest in a business of your own, but know that you might compete at a disadvantage to rent seekers in the same industry. Most of all, you should vote for lower subsidies, less regulation and less government!

Bernie, Donald and Ignatius?

29 Friday Jan 2016

Posted by in Immigration, Socialism, Uncategorized

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BernieTrump

We have candidates vying for the nominations of both major U.S. political parties with tendencies toward nationalism: Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump. They both oppose liberalized immigration and they are both anti-trade, playing on economic fears in articulating their views. Sanders has attempted to soften his rhetoric on immigration since last summer, when he alleged that it harms U.S. workers.

There are differences between Sanders and Trump on the treatment of existing illegal immigrants. Despite Trump’s protests to the contrary, his nationalism has had ethnic overtones.

Trump’s positions on immigration and trade protectionism are not necessarily at odds with Republican tradition, which is a mixed bag, but they are consistent with a faith in big government and central planning. An anti-immigration and anti-trade platform is certainly no contradiction for Sanders, because central planning is integral to his avowed socialism.

Sanders has been called a “socialist with nationalistic tendencies”. He favors government provision of free health care and higher education, heavy redistribution, and severe restrictions on property rights via high taxation. Trump, on the other hand, has been called a “nationalist with socialist tendencies.” He too has called for nationalized health care, increasing certain transfer payments, as well as compromises to state rights. It would probably be more accurate to describe Trump as a corporatist, a system under which large business entities both serve and control government for their own benefit. For example, Trump has used and favors eminent domain to secure land for private projects, generous bankruptcy laws to eliminate business risks, and “deal-making” between government and private enterprise in order to “get things done.” Corporatism is a flavor of fascism, and it is perfectly consistent with a statist agenda.

Thus, each party has candidates who are by degrees both nationalist and socialist. In using these labels, however, I plead innocent to a violation of Godwin’s Law. Of course they are not Nazis, but they are nationalistic socialists. The distinction is explained nicely by B.K Marcus in The Freeman. Both candidates take positions that are consistent with the platform of the National Socialist German Workers Party, circa 1920.

As an aside, Marcus provides some fascinating etymology of the word “Nazi”, quoting Steve Horwitz:

“The standard butt of German jokes at the beginning of the twentieth century were stupid Bavarian peasants. And just as Irish jokes always involve a man called Paddy, so Bavarian jokes always involved a peasant called Nazi. That’s because Nazi was a shortening of the very common Bavarian name Ignatius. This meant that Hitler’s opponents had an open goal. He had a party filled with Bavarian hicks and the name of that party could be shortened to the standard joke name for hicks.“

Marcus also quotes Mark Forsyth on this topic:

“To this day, most of us happily go about believing that the Nazis called themselves Nazis, when, in fact, they would probably have beaten you up for saying the word.“

Back on point, I’ve written about both of these candidates before: Trump here and here; Sanders here. To keep things even, here is one more interesting take on Bernie.

“His family managed to send him to the University of Chicago. Despite a prestigious degree, however, Sanders failed to earn a living, even as an adult. It took him 40 years to collect his first steady paycheck — and it was a government check.”

Read the whole thing!

It’s difficult for me to take these two candidates seriously because they do not take individual liberty seriously, nor do they understand the power of private markets to promote human welfare. I also have strong reservations about their understanding of constitutional principles, and I suspect that either would have few qualms about taking Mr. Obama’s cue in stretching executive authority.

Instead of the headline above, it would have been more accurate to say “Bernie, Donald and Ignoramus!” Unfortunately, one of these guys could be our next president. Well, it won’t be Sanders.

Pundits Get Played But Earn Rents From the Trade

04 Friday Dec 2015

Posted by in Big Government

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pundits-under-my-bed

Powerful officials often seek to influence “thinkers” and pundits by flattering them with access and requesting advice that ultimately is treated as superfluous. That is the upshot of this interesting post from Jeremy Shapiro at The Brookings Institution: “Who Influences Whom? Reflections on U.S. Government Outreach to Think Tanks“.

These relationships are of a different character than the symbioses often existing between government officials (elected and unelected) and private corporations and unions. The corporatist relationships that most often come to mind are infamous for bleeding taxpayers, distorting the economy and using the power of government to advance private interests. The nexus highlighted by Shapiro between officialdom and think-tank experts, as well as influencers in the media and academia, is a different corner of the rent-seeking world, but it is rent seeking nevertheless.

Shapiro, himself a former government official, describes a sequence of events that might be experienced by an outside expert leading up to an “important” meeting with a high government official. Such experts have a strong interest in their areas of study and naturally hope to promote their own views and analyses. An opportunity to provide input to a policymaker is obviously attractive to such a person. Interactions with officials also confer status on experts, who can then trade on the impressive access they’ve been granted. Invitations to meetings like these, in and of themselves, represent successful rent-seeking by policy experts, regardless of whether their policy advice is given serious consideration by public officials.

While outside experts are often called upon for real policy advice, the government official is frequently after something else; in all likelihood, the official already has a policy position:

“The government official desperately wants the thinkers to give him the benefit of the doubt when his inevitably flawed policy comes up for critical examination, as they are an important source of its ultimate evaluation by the Congress and the public. The briefings therefore tend to take place before important diplomatic meetings or foreign trips that will predictably occasion a round of media coverage on the policy in question.“

So the official hopes to engineer mutually beneficial trades with outside experts. Trades of this kind may have no real value to anyone outside of the direct parties. Shapiro’s example relates to foreign policy, but the same dynamic takes place in almost every area of government policymaking:

“The thinkers are the validators. They will write op-eds, give pithy quotes to important newspapers, and appear on network news programs.“

As Shapiro tells it, an intriguing aspect of this process is that the experts are often well aware of the circumstances. Usually, they can be counted upon to pay for their access and the esteem it bestows by offering at least subtle forms of support for the official’s policy initiative:

“The meetings, their grandeur and secrecy, are intended to foster a sense that the thinkers have been listened to and thus are somehow complicit in the policy—the illusion of inclusion. A meeting that seems to the thinker to be an opportunity to persuade is actually an opportunity to be persuaded. It doesn’t always work, of course. Fundamental positions are rarely altered and many of the supposed validators will remain fierce critics. But the biggest secret of all is that, even if the thinker does understand the real purpose, it often works at least at the margins.“

Large numbers of tremendously talented, well-compensated people are engaged in charades like this on a regular basis. We know there are beneficiaries and there are real costs, but who pays for the largess? Obviously taxpayers, but private parties pay in other ways: Media time devoted to pundits is often paid by advertisers and, ultimately, consumers. Private think tanks are supported by private contributors who expect their own views to be validated by analyses and promoted in policy debates. The activity described by Shapiro may subvert those intentions. The real cost to society, however, is the value of resources diverted from productive, private activity to support the circle of rent-jerking. The bigger the government, the bigger the circle.