Tag Archives: Freedom of Speech

Parents and Taxpayers Confront Rogue Educrats

14 Thursday Oct 2021

Posted by in Critical Race Theory, Education, Propaganda, Uncategorized

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This Norman Rockwell painting is called “Freedom of Speech”. It depicts a Vermont dairy farmer speaking his mind at a school board meeting, and no, he is not a “domestic terrorist”! (A recent piece by Selina Zito reminded me of this painting.) Today, parents of schoolchildren have a very special reason to be upset: the teaching of critical race theory (CRT) as part of the regular curriculum. A better name for this vapid “theory” might be “critical race theology”, because it is no “theory” at all: it is a set of “woke” accusations leveled against “out groups” designated by leftists: whites, straights, men, and sometimes groups like Jews and Asians. Many people of color are just as dismayed as those among CRT’s targets because its wrongheaded and corrosive nature is so plain. CRT is itself straightforwardly racist.

Taxpayers have a place in this debate as well, at both the K-12 and public university levels. However, their role in funding the indoctrination taking place in public schools has been neglected in the story of the revolt against CRT.

The Parent Trap

Many parents have taken strong action in response to the CRT onslaught. Some have quietly removed their children from public schools, while others have chosen to register their objections with school officials, often at school board meetings. Also, there has been some success at the ballot box by dissident school board candidates. This is grass roots participatory democracy in action, local and vocal. Certainly parents have a greater stake in their childrens’ education than anyone (except the kids themselves). They have a right to know what’s being taught and to provide critical feedback to schools.

School officials, teachers unions, and CRT teacher-enthusiasts are not likely to be straightforward about whether CRT is actually taught, however. This link might help you see through the gaslighting to which we’ve all been subjected. This article discusses various political avenues for fighting CRT in the schools. And here’s a “tool kit” that might be helpful.

Garland’s Effrontery

To top it all off, recently we’ve witnessed an act of fascist authoritarianism by the U.S. Attorney General that, by all appearances, involves a conspiracy between the Biden Administration, top officials at the Department of Justice, and the National School Boards Association (NSBA). AG Merrick Garland’s memorandum of October 4 announced a “partnership among federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement to address threats against school administrators, board members, teachers, and staff.“ He did not provide actual evidence of threats against school boards or personnel, however. Yet Garland is willing to treat interested parents as if they are domestic terrorists! His memorandum is a thinly veiled warning to anyone having the temerity to confront school authorities on issues like CRT, as well as school mask mandates (which are ineffective, unnecessary, and detrimental to learning, socialization, and the psychological well being of children). Furthermore, we now know of an obvious conflict of interest: Garland’s daughter is married to the cofounder of Panorama Education, which sells training materials for teachers of CRT.

While Garland’s attempt to undercut free speech might chill the willingness of some parents to speak out against CRT in the schools, many refuse to back down. The following is an excerpt from a letter to the NSBA written on behalf of 427,000 parent-members of 21 organizations:

“Our organizations unequivocally oppose violence and find it deeply troubling that you imply otherwise about concerned citizens who care deeply about their community’s children – and who are concerned by the direction that America’s schools have taken.

  • Citizens are angry that school boards and school officials around the country are restricting access to public meetings, limiting public comment, and in some cases conducting business via text messages in violation of state open meetings laws.
  • They are angry that schools are charging them thousands of dollars in public records requests to view curriculum and training materials that impact their children and that should be open to the public by default.
  • They are angry that pandemic-related learning losses have compounded the already-low reading, writing, and math proficiency rates in America’s schools.
  • They are angry that rather than focusing on declining student achievement, large numbers of districts have chosen to fund, often with hundreds of thousands of dollars in taxpayer money, “social justice” and “diversity, equity, and inclusion” programs with finite resources.”

Insularity At the Board

I’ll be surprised if Garland’s memorandum doesn’t inspire many parents to push harder against CRT in their local schools. However, getting in front of school boards is not always easy, thanks to restricted access for public comment. Here’s an example of the draconian reaction by school authorities in their effort to silence parents, from Orange County, CA. In my own local school district in Missouri, making a short comment at a board meeting first requires submission of a request detailing the subject or question you wish to address to the board. Not only can they simply ignore your request, but it also gives them an opportunity to “circle the wagons” in advance, as it were, even calling upon various “friends of the board” to attend en masse.

The leftists who support CRT fight dirty, as this article notes:

“Nicole Solas, a mother who has complained about her school board, has been harassed and even sued by the authorities. Go ahead, ‘arrest me,’ she said on Twitter. ‘They wanted to publicly humiliate me,’ she said. ‘They paid a PR firm to call me a racist in the national media. So they really wanted to ostracize me from my community.’”

The anger of parents toward this bankrupt philosophy in our schools, and its belligerent proponents, is well justified. Parents obviously have the biggest stake in this controversy. My kids are grown, but I’m angry too, in part because the once-fine education offered by our school district has digressed to brutish proselytization about victimhood, its supposed perpetrators, and the emphasis on the Left’s version of “social justice”. I’m also angry as a taxpayer. While the student population might shrink as decent families abandon the brainwashing camps in favor of private schools or home schooling, does anyone expect the tax bill to decline commensurately? At all? School taxes should be a ripe area for activism, because lots of people don’t want to pay for this shit!

Our Taxes, Our Schools?

Opponents of CRT won a victory of sorts this summer when the U.S. Department of Education amended a proposal that would have prioritized CRT initiatives in awarding grant money.

“The Department of Education withdrew ‘the requirement that grantees incorporate curriculum and instruction based on or similar to the 1619 Project or the works of Ibram X. Kendi.’”

Hooray for that. And in August, the U.S. Senate passed a “STOP CRT” amendment to the otherwise misbegotten $3.5 trillion “social infrastructure” bill. The amendment would ban the use of federal funds for teaching CRT in schools. Of course, that the federal government has any role in funding local schools, and in shaping their curricula, is itself regrettable.

At the state level, many Republican office-holders seem unaware of the use of state resources for CRT in schools, as this piece about Indiana demonstrates. Perhaps they’ve been cowed, and are reluctant to comment for fear of being called racists by CRT proponents. Registering strong displeasure with state legislators regarding the onslaught of CRT is something all within our opposition should be doing.

Local taxes still account for most school funding. There’s obviously no way to get around school district bond servicing. Most ballot initiatives on school taxes appear at the behest of the school districts themselves, and generally those go in only one direction: up! General funding may be subject to reduction via ballot initiative, but petitions are usually necessary, and apparently those have been few and far between. A more promising avenue for wresting control over school funding are school voucher programs, whereby school funds (either state or local dollars) follow the student rather than remaining under the control of monopoly school districts. School choice is expanding across a number of states, having been given a boost by the pandemic. CRT might prove to be an additional impetus in some states. But parents should be careful: some private schools are just as brazen as public schools when it comes to peddling CRT. And there is the danger that vouchers, one day, will bring unwelcome government curriculum mandates.

Joining Arms

The widespread adoption of critical theology in public schools (and universities) is not only a corruption of education: it is institutional roguery and a misappropriation of taxpayer funds for political indoctrination. This is aggravated by the unresponsiveness of many school boards, administrators, and teachers. Parents have good cause to be infuriated, and so do taxpayers. They are natural allies in this struggle to win back our educational institutions.

Right-To-Work Prop A: Freedom of Speech, Association and Contract

30 Monday Jul 2018

Posted by in Labor Markets, Right to Work, Unions

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I’d be angry if my employer forced me to contribute to the company’s Political Action Committee (PAC), and that view is shared by many of my colleagues. It would be illegal, of course, at least as a condition of employment. I love my job, but I give nothing to the PAC because I do not trust it to properly represent my political preferences. That goes for political contributions and lobbying activity that might benefit the company and, by extension, my own economic interests. I simply do not believe the company will refrain from corporatist practices, and I do not under any circumstances want my contributions lavished on politicians with whom I have policy differences.

In my home state of Missouri, unions and their political allies insist that union dues payments should be a condition of employment in unionized workplaces. Like PACs, unions are major political contributors, and I’d be surprised if there weren’t a large number of union members who object to the use of their dues for political contributions and activism. Of course, most of that activism is broadly anti-capitalist. This, quite simply, constitutes compelled speech and is a violation of employees’ First Amendment free-speech rights. Forced membership is a violation of the worker’s freedom of association under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Unions are also presumed to represent the interests of workers in negotiating with management, but not everyone wants that representation, especially given the corruption that has often plagued unions over the years and the poor economic performance of unionized industries in general. That last statement applies to public employee unions no less than private sector unions. Prohibiting non-union workers from employment at a unionized firm violates their freedom of contract under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. I agree, however, that an employee refusing to join a union should not automatically be entitled to the wages and benefits negotiated by the union in collective bargaining with the employer. That should be strictly between the non-union employee and the firm.

Missouri Proposition A, which is on the state’s August 7 ballot, is a referendum on a right-to-work (RtW) law already passed by the general assembly and signed by the governor last year. I’ve discussed reasons why some libertarians have expressed disagreement with this kind of legislation—primarily because it denies an employer the right to hire workers exclusively from a unionized pool of labor. As Daniel J. Mitchell has noted, right-to-work laws are a second-best, compensatory solution to other forms of government intervention in labor markets that essentially grant unions monopsony privileges. Furthermore, giving primacy to an employer’s right to deal exclusively with a union ignores the rights of non-union workers and the rights of union members who do not wish to contribute to a union’s political activities. Trampling on the latter stands in contrast to the established protection of my rights against coerced contributions to my employer’s PAC.

The standard economic argument in favor of RtW laws hinges on the favorability of a state’s business environment and its competitiveness with other states. Andrew Wilson explains how and why Prop A will create jobs in Missouri. He notes that over the ten years ending in 2014:

“…average job growth in the 22 states with RTW laws in place for most or all of that time was more than twice as fast (at 9.1 percent) as in the 28 forced-union states. The RTW states also had considerably faster growth in personal income (at 54.7 percent compared to 43.5 percent) and a much stronger economic growth (50.7 percent compared to 38.0 percent).”

Wilson also remarks on a historical phenomenon which pro-union forces refuse to acknowledge: unions have undermined the competitive position of the industries upon which their members rely. It’s a classic principal-agent problem. Workers appoint an agent for representation, but the agent acts independently to maximize its own gains, often at the expense of the workers. RtW applies discipline to the process, reinforcing the union’s incentive to put members’ interests above of its own. After all, nearly all employers have to compete for workers, and private employers have to compete in product markets. Union workers have been exempt from competition only to the extent that their wage demands have not undermined the business’ competitive position, but they frequently have.

The real rub, according to RtW opponents, is that business interests will simply “crush” unions under RtW and impose lower wages and poor work conditions on workers. But as I alluded above, there are employers that prefer to work with a union for a variety of reasons. Second, suppose that new employees of a unionized firm refuse to join the union, or that some union members opt out. That’s a pretty strong indication that union membership is an unattractive proposition. Whose fault is that?

I favor Proposition A because workers should not be forced to accept representation by any third party, firms should not be forced to hire exclusively from those willing to do so, and because workers should not be required to contribute to union political initiatives. But as Steve Spellman writes, unions could do much to enhance their value to both workers and firms, attracting membership and gaining advantages in bargaining with employers:

“If unions focused on providing helpful, outsourced H.R. functions to companies, such as worker recruitment, drug screening and taking care of all that labor-law-compliance paperwork, it would sure change their reputation. As would standing up for its members, while also taking necessary (and fair) disciplinary actions instead of covering up for the occasional bad apple (even if that is only one worker out of 1,000). … If we can dream a little here, unions could also be best positioned to stand up for workers who are discriminated against, for whatever reason, rather than waiting on the law to catch up with our evolving society.”

Gays and Bakers: Expression or Repression?

26 Monday Feb 2018

Posted by in Discrimination, Free Speech

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A lot rides on the legal interpretation of “expression” in the gay-wedding-cake dispute. Eugene Volokh discusses a recent ruling in California in which a trial court judge ruled that the baker’s right to free expression, buttressed by her right to free exercise of religion, protected her from demands that she participate in a form of expression to which she objected. Specifically, she had no legal obligation to create a cake for the celebration of a gay couple’s wedding, according to the ruling.

The facts in the case, CA Dept. of Fair Employment and Housing v. Cathy’s Creations, are that the baker refused to bake the couple a wedding cake but expressed a willingness to sell them anything that was already available in the shop. Thus, she did not discriminate against the couple by denying them access to her “public accommodations”. She also gave the couple a referral to another baker whom she believed would be willing to produce the cake. So there were probable alternatives available to the couple, and the baker’s assistance in locating one mitigated against any harm suffered by the gay couple. That sort of mitigation is an important factor to consider in weighing the rights of conflicting parties. Courts have tended to view “dignitary harm” as less compelling than forced expression.

Volokh argues that the baker’s role in the episode did not demand expression on her part. He says the proposed cake was a pre-existing design and did not involve writing of any kind. Otherwise, Volokh would have supported the ruling. He and a coauthor discuss the distinctions between an artist (who expresses) and an artisan (who merely executes), and an expressive and a non-expressive cake, in an amicus brief, as noted in the article linked above. Here is Volokh’s summary of his view:

“While creating photographs, videos, and text would be constitutionally protected speech (so we support the right of, for instance, photographers not to photograph same-sex weddings), creating wedding cakes with no text or symbolic design on them is not.“

The Volokh article is a little confusing because the amicus brief seems to have been filed in a different but similar case, Masterpiece Bakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which is now before the U.S. Supreme Court. A ruling is expected this summer. Here is a transcript of the oral arguments in that case, which were heard late last year. It’s a fascinating discussion.

Volokh’s analysis is fine as far as it goes. However, a wedding cake is likely to be considered expressive to both the baker and the cake’s buyers. The baker’s effort in executing even a pre-existing design may involve meaning for her beyond mere execution, since the usual intent of a wedding cake is to celebrate a sacred union. Likewise, the baker knows that the buyers consider the cake to be expressive of their union. The baker doesn’t want any involvement in that expression, asserting that it is not for the government to intercede, forcing them to participate by producing the cake.

Does the baker’s offer to supply an existing cake (or any other bakery good) undermine their case? Does the necessity of baking a new cake for a gay wedding differ from offering a cake already on the shelf for the same purpose? That may be irrelevant to the cases at hand, because no other wedding cakes were available at the time, and freshness might demand the preparation of a new cake for such an occasion. Nevertheless, that sort of line between an acceptable sale for the baker and unacceptable expression strikes me as thin.

As for the matter of the baker’s religious beliefs and their importance to her expressive rights, Volokh derides some of the language of the ruling. Those beliefs, Volokh says, are irrelevant to the question of whether a particular kind of expression is protected or compelled:

“By the way, I take it that it’s clear that the Free Speech Clause issue can’t turn on whether Miller’s belief ‘is part of the orthodox doctrines’ of many religions, or whether it’s instead ‘trivial, arbitrary, nonsensical, or outrageous’ — the Free Speech Clause protects views regardless of whether they express views that are seen as orthodox, outrageous, or nonsensical.“

Bravo! However, when the rights of two parties are in conflict, it is appropriate to weigh any impingement upon other, secondary rights of both parties.

A disturbing aspect of these cases is that they do not turn in any way on freedom of association, a freedom that encompasses a right not to associate (since any association must be voluntary for both parties). The presumption is that the baker’s right to freely associate or not associate with whomever they please is superseded by their obligations under public accommodation laws, despite the fact that freedom of association is an enumerated right in the U.S. Constitution. While public accommodation laws have generally been found to be constitutional, those laws do not apply in all circumstances, such as when a particular product or service involves expression. But on its own, a violation of the baker’s freedom of association seems to matter less, in today’s legal environment, than abridgment of her free expression, and perhaps less than any obligation she has to provide public accommodation.

Richard Epstein gives a general treatment of the balance between freedom of association and anti-discrimination law. David Henderson has bemoaned the dilution of the freedom of association suffered in the name of non-discrimination. He does not defend discrimination on the basis of race, gender or sexual preference. Quite the contrary. However, as a matter of individual liberty, he prefers that we retain our right to associate on any basis of our choosing and pay the price imposed by the market for discrimination. For example, if you hang a sign outside your restaurant saying that you won’t serve African Americans, you are likely to suffer a loss of business from all who find your preference offensive, as many will. That solution is obviously unappealing to those who believe that participation in civil society requires public standards of equal access in private transactions. Still, there is some truth to a quote Henderson provides from an anonymous individual comparing the idea of non-discrimination in public accommodations to the “common carrier” designation:

“‘Either way, the theory boils down to “you brought forth a good or service and abracadabra you now have fewer rights”‘”.

The legal actions against the bakers in the cases discussed above rely on anti-discrimination law (in CA, the Unruh Act, and in CO, the Anti-Discrimination Act). Those laws must face limits in their application, as may be necessary in the case of compelled expression, especially expression against one’s most deeply-held convictions, religious or otherwise. The most basic question in this regard is whether the creation of the proposed wedding (or union) cakes can be described as expression. Whether the bakers are acting as mere fabricators or as artists, there is no doubt that the wedding parties desired the cakes as part of the celebration of their unions. That use of a cake constitutes expression on their part, and it is a kind of expression and an association from which the bakers would prefer to demure.

I support the right of homosexuals to enter into legal marriage, but I also support the bakers’ right to refuse the business. To invoke a phrase used by Richard Epstein in the article linked above, the world would be a better place if all agreed to simply “live and let live”.