Tag Archives: Right to Work

Union Control, Shuttered Schools, COVID Risk

07 Monday Sep 2020

Posted by in Coronavirus, Education, Unions

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Public schools are closed in favor of virtual classrooms in some areas. Elsewhere, however, schools have physically reopened to the children of willing parents. It should be no surprise that the varying strength of teachers’ unions has a lot to do with these decisions. One cannot claim that the pattern of closures is a response to varying levels of COVID risk, as there is no geographic association between the closures and COVID cases or deaths. The shame of it is that closures compromise learning and also have destructive effects on local labor markets and the ability of parents to earn incomes.

That unions play this role, often decisively, is shown in a new paper entitled “Are School Reopening Decisions Related to Union Influence?“, by Corey DeAngelis and Christos Makridis (HT: Tyler Cowen). The authors examine the fall reopening decisions of 835 school districts and find that “… districts in locations with stronger teachers’ unions are less likely to reopen in person…“. The authors test four different measures of union strength with similar findings. They also rule out potential confounding influences like voting patterns.

Shall we defend the unions for protecting their members from excessive risk? Well, another important finding reported by the authors won’t surprise anyone having the least familiarity with data on C19 risks:

“We also do not find evidence to suggest that measures of COVID-19 risk are correlated with school reopening decisions.”

Few children catch the virus and children are not effective at transmitting C19 to their peers, teachers, and parents. Furthermore, schools closed to in-person learning are not located in areas at elevated risk relative to those remaining open.

The role of teachers’ unions in school reopening decisions is a textbook case of the inadvisability of unionized public employees. Most obviously, it is in their interests to encourage greater funding and taxes. This is but one of many dimensions of the political agendas that teachers’ unions may advance, and to which member dues are put. These are not always representative of members’ views, which is especially problematic in states without right-to-work laws.

The very nature of public service means that the work of public employees (or its absence) has profound external influences on the community at large. The unions are not shy about using this power as leverage in negotiations. Thus, teachers’ unions often act as adversaries not only to taxpayers, but to parents, children, and the business community.

Do public school administrators and elected school board members belong on the list of union adversaries as well? Perhaps: the unions have bullied school districts and have made them less attractive as educational institutions in a cost-benefit sense. In the present case, the unions have successfully lobbied for ongoing payments of income and benefits to their members despite the degraded effectiveness of on-line instruction for many K-12 students. Meanwhile, many parents are learning to exercise choice in the matter by abandoning public schools in favor of private alternatives.

Right-to-Work Promotes Employment, Wage Growth

06 Monday Aug 2018

Posted by in Labor Markets, Right to Work

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The economic evidence is quite clear that state right-to-work (RtW) laws do not reduce wages, though a few seem desperate to convince us otherwise. In fact, RtW has proven to be an unambiguous economic tonic for states that have enacted such laws (though perhaps not for union lobbyists). Note that this has nothing to do with comparisons of nominal wage levels in RtW vs. non-RtW states, as organizations like the left-wing Economic Policy Institute (EPI) are wont to make. Adjusting for the cost of living often shows a different result. Either way, the recency of RTW laws in many states means that those differences tend to be legacy effects and are not useful as a gauge of the incremental impact of RtW laws.

It’s no coincidence that RtW laws have gained favor as a mechanism for encouraging economic growth in historically low-wage states. The efforts have been largely successful. Jeffrey Eisenach reported the following findings in 2015:

  • “RTW laws directly affect economic performance through their impact on business location decisions, especially in heavily unionized industries such as manufacturing. Other things being equal, businesses are more likely to locate in states with RTW laws. There is also evidence that RTW laws have a direct, positive effect on employment, output, and personal income.
  • RTW laws do not lead to lower average wages in either unionized or non-unionized industries. There is some evidence that the long-run effect of RTW laws is to raise wage rates as a result of increased productivity.
  • RTW laws also affect economic performance indirectly through lower rates of union density. The weight of the evidence indicates that lower union density is associated with higher levels of employment, increased investment and R&D spending, and increased innovation.”

Mark Mix reports similar evidence, including more rapid employment growth and larger wage gains in RtW states. And James Sherk addresses some of the myths surrounding RtW, including the misleading narrative that RtW reduces wages and that RtW is unpopular among the American public. Indeed, Sherk quotes a Gallup poll finding that Americans support right-to-work laws by more than a 3 to 1 margin, though it’s not clear how well the average American understands the issue.

A disturbing aspect of the opposition to RtW is an effort to disparage the business community by characterizing private enterprise as exploitative. I leave you with some wisdom from Bran Caplan on that point (HT: Don Boudreaux):

“Businesses produce and deliver virtually all of the wonderful, affordable products that we enjoy. Contrary to millennia of economic illiterates, businesses rarely do so by ‘exploiting’ their workers. Instead, businesses provide gentle but much-needed leadership. Left to our own economic devices, most of us are virtually useless; we don’t know how to produce much, and we don’t know how to find customers.  Businesspeople solve these problems: They recruit workers, organize them to vastly raise their productivity, then put these products in the hands of customers all over the world. Yes, they’re largely in it for the money; but – unlike every government on Earth – business rarely puts a gun to your head. Businesses assemble teams of volunteers to meet the needs of willing consumers – and succeed wildly.” (emphasis Caplan’s)

Right-To-Work Prop A: Freedom of Speech, Association and Contract

30 Monday Jul 2018

Posted by in Labor Markets, Right to Work, Unions

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I’d be angry if my employer forced me to contribute to the company’s Political Action Committee (PAC), and that view is shared by many of my colleagues. It would be illegal, of course, at least as a condition of employment. I love my job, but I give nothing to the PAC because I do not trust it to properly represent my political preferences. That goes for political contributions and lobbying activity that might benefit the company and, by extension, my own economic interests. I simply do not believe the company will refrain from corporatist practices, and I do not under any circumstances want my contributions lavished on politicians with whom I have policy differences.

In my home state of Missouri, unions and their political allies insist that union dues payments should be a condition of employment in unionized workplaces. Like PACs, unions are major political contributors, and I’d be surprised if there weren’t a large number of union members who object to the use of their dues for political contributions and activism. Of course, most of that activism is broadly anti-capitalist. This, quite simply, constitutes compelled speech and is a violation of employees’ First Amendment free-speech rights. Forced membership is a violation of the worker’s freedom of association under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Unions are also presumed to represent the interests of workers in negotiating with management, but not everyone wants that representation, especially given the corruption that has often plagued unions over the years and the poor economic performance of unionized industries in general. That last statement applies to public employee unions no less than private sector unions. Prohibiting non-union workers from employment at a unionized firm violates their freedom of contract under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. I agree, however, that an employee refusing to join a union should not automatically be entitled to the wages and benefits negotiated by the union in collective bargaining with the employer. That should be strictly between the non-union employee and the firm.

Missouri Proposition A, which is on the state’s August 7 ballot, is a referendum on a right-to-work (RtW) law already passed by the general assembly and signed by the governor last year. I’ve discussed reasons why some libertarians have expressed disagreement with this kind of legislation—primarily because it denies an employer the right to hire workers exclusively from a unionized pool of labor. As Daniel J. Mitchell has noted, right-to-work laws are a second-best, compensatory solution to other forms of government intervention in labor markets that essentially grant unions monopsony privileges. Furthermore, giving primacy to an employer’s right to deal exclusively with a union ignores the rights of non-union workers and the rights of union members who do not wish to contribute to a union’s political activities. Trampling on the latter stands in contrast to the established protection of my rights against coerced contributions to my employer’s PAC.

The standard economic argument in favor of RtW laws hinges on the favorability of a state’s business environment and its competitiveness with other states. Andrew Wilson explains how and why Prop A will create jobs in Missouri. He notes that over the ten years ending in 2014:

“…average job growth in the 22 states with RTW laws in place for most or all of that time was more than twice as fast (at 9.1 percent) as in the 28 forced-union states. The RTW states also had considerably faster growth in personal income (at 54.7 percent compared to 43.5 percent) and a much stronger economic growth (50.7 percent compared to 38.0 percent).”

Wilson also remarks on a historical phenomenon which pro-union forces refuse to acknowledge: unions have undermined the competitive position of the industries upon which their members rely. It’s a classic principal-agent problem. Workers appoint an agent for representation, but the agent acts independently to maximize its own gains, often at the expense of the workers. RtW applies discipline to the process, reinforcing the union’s incentive to put members’ interests above of its own. After all, nearly all employers have to compete for workers, and private employers have to compete in product markets. Union workers have been exempt from competition only to the extent that their wage demands have not undermined the business’ competitive position, but they frequently have.

The real rub, according to RtW opponents, is that business interests will simply “crush” unions under RtW and impose lower wages and poor work conditions on workers. But as I alluded above, there are employers that prefer to work with a union for a variety of reasons. Second, suppose that new employees of a unionized firm refuse to join the union, or that some union members opt out. That’s a pretty strong indication that union membership is an unattractive proposition. Whose fault is that?

I favor Proposition A because workers should not be forced to accept representation by any third party, firms should not be forced to hire exclusively from those willing to do so, and because workers should not be required to contribute to union political initiatives. But as Steve Spellman writes, unions could do much to enhance their value to both workers and firms, attracting membership and gaining advantages in bargaining with employers:

“If unions focused on providing helpful, outsourced H.R. functions to companies, such as worker recruitment, drug screening and taking care of all that labor-law-compliance paperwork, it would sure change their reputation. As would standing up for its members, while also taking necessary (and fair) disciplinary actions instead of covering up for the occasional bad apple (even if that is only one worker out of 1,000). … If we can dream a little here, unions could also be best positioned to stand up for workers who are discriminated against, for whatever reason, rather than waiting on the law to catch up with our evolving society.”

“Freedom of Representation” Is a Better Name Than “Right To Work”

15 Friday Sep 2017

Posted by in Right to Work, Unions

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Missouri’s Right-to-Work (RtW) legislation, signed into law by Governor Eric Greitens in February of 2016, essentially states that no employee or prospective employee, with certain exceptions, can be required to join a union or to pay union dues or agency fees. But before the RtW law’s effective date on August 28th, well over 300,000 signatures were collected in opposition, which is believed to meet state requirements for a referendum on the issue. As a consequence, the law was put on hold, pending a vote in November.

A casual look at a variety of statistics by state “right-to-work” status shows an impressive advantage for RtW states, though that doesn’t imply causality. One can certainly think of reasons why the causality might be operative, and I find some of them plausible, but that’s not the line of argument I want to pursue here.

The Libertarian Divide

Libertarians are of divided opinion on the desirability of RtW laws. David Boaz wrote about this division back in 2012. On one side, it’s clearly an abrogation of an individual workers’ rights to require, as a condition of employment, entry into a third-party association against their will, or to coerce payment of dues or fees for collective bargaining and ongoing representation on a variety of job-related issues. Such a requirement would violate the constitutional protections on freedom of association, freedom of speech, and freedom of contract. Boaz quotes Vinnie Vernuccio and Joe Lehman of the Mackinac Center for Public Policy:

“Right to work does not change any aspect of collective bargaining other than preventing employees from getting fired for choosing not to join or remain in a union and pay union dues or agency fees, which may go toward political causes they don’t support. Collective bargaining still exists in right-to-work states, and workers are of course free to organize.“

This may overstate the consequences for workers who would rather not join a union. Non-union workers have so-called Beck rights, which allow them to opt out of “core membership” and  pay reduced dues covering only representation. An appropriate accounting for that portion of dues might not be straightforward, however, and it is still likely to represent an involuntary payment. Moreover, awareness of Beck rights is far from universal, and asserting them might not be straightforward.

Libertarians who disagree with the perspective expressed in the quote above emphasize the employers’ freedom of contract as though it takes primacy over worker autonomy in the shaping of voluntary and mutually beneficial employment relationships. The thinking is that an employer might actually prefer to host a union shop. There are presumed efficiencies of collective bargaining, standard and agreed-upon work rules, lower turnover, and perhaps even worker loyalty. Among this group of libertarians are Holman Jenkins, Sheldon Richman, and Gary Chartier:

“When a legislature interferes with voluntary employment contracts, it infringes people’s freedom to bargain with their own labor and possessions. Treating this kind of interference as acceptable means licensing arbitrary interventions into the market by politicians, who are ill-equipped to second-guess the decisions made by the real people making work agreements with one another.“

Labor Law

One could be forgiven for thinking that Chartier and the others view RtW as a form of government intervention in otherwise free labor markets. These critics acknowledge, however, that there is already intervention in labor relations via the Wagner Act (1935), which among other things prohibits any refusal “to bargain collectively with the representative of the employer’s employees.” Under the Act, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is charged with:

“… overseeing the process by which employees decide whether to be represented by a labor organization and prosecuting violations. ... issue rules interpreting the labor legislation. This will generally be binding, unless a court deems it to have acted outside its authority. … prevent unfair labor practices, lead investigations, collect evidence, issue subpoenas, and require witnesses to give evidence.“

So, the NLRB is empowered to force employers, if it so chooses, to bargain collectively and even to rule on whether a vote by employees was “fair”. RtW laws are defended as a force to countervail against this federal power. The Wagner Act was later amended by the Taft-Hartley Act (1947) to curb union power and abuses. It created more balance in the relations between unions and employers and it offered some protection to non-union job seekers by prohibiting closed shops. It also allowed states to pass RtW laws to proscribe the forced payment of agency fees by non-union employees, if states so choose. Nevertheless, labor law continues to support monopoly union privileges and abusive tactics. Moreover, restrictions on unions’ use of dues and agency fees for political activities are difficult to enforce in the absence greater requirements for union financial transparency. The response from libertarian critics of RtW laws is that there are avenues for additional reform at the federal level without adding additional interventions (RtW) at the state level.

One of the clearest rebuttals to the above arguments against RtW laws comes from Ivan Osorio of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, who first quotes Chartier on prospective legislation in Indiana:

“‘If employers choose to conclude union-shop contracts with unions, what gives the Indiana legislature the right to interfere?‘”

Here is Osorio’s rejoinder:

“... there is no jurisdiction anywhere in the United States where there is no such interference at all. Simply replace “union shop” with “open shop,” and the one-sidedness of Chartier’s query … becomes clear. Why should the government forbid an employer from negotiating a voluntary membership agreement with a union?“

Exclusive Representation

Another side of the RtW debate is the contention that non-union workers receive the same benefits achieved via collective bargaining if they are employed by a firm having an otherwise unionized work force. Thus, the non-union workers are said to be “free riding” on the union’s efforts. This framing is highly misleading, however. Under the Wagner Act, a firm’s non-union workers are not entitled to pay for benefits negotiated by the union unless the union has opted for exclusive representation. In that case, those non-union workers are not so much free riders as “compelled riders“, who may be forced to accept certain terms, working conditions and particular representation in grievances against their wishes. The union’s exclusive power is thus flexed in two ways: as a monopoly seller of labor to the firm, and as a monopoly seller of agency services to the worker, extracting dues or agency fees in the process.

Balancing Rights

David Henderson’s perspective on the RtW issue is appealing, as he accounts for the tradeoff between emphasizing the rights of workers and employers:

“It’s true that [RtW] laws make it illegal for employers to do what some of them might want to do: namely hire only union workers, require everyone who works for them to join unions, or require everyone who works for them to pay dues to a union. But are there really likely to be many such employers? I don’t think so. …

Now, I don’t know that there are no such employers. Maybe there are some. If so, then it becomes a tradeoff. On the one hand, preserve the rights of many non-union workers, many union workers, and unionized employers but trample on the rights of those few unionized employers. On the other hand, trample on the rights of many union workers, non-union workers, and unionized employers but preserve the rights of those few unionized employers. I choose the first option because I think it tramples on way fewer people’s rights. And, remember, that if you say right-to-work is wrong and you get your way just on that issue, the federal government will continue to trample on many people’s rights. …

… the best solution is to abolish the law that gives government-enforced monopoly power to unions. Sheldon [Richman] and I agree on this. The issue here is whether we should just settle for saying that and pushing for that or do something else meanwhile.“

Union representation can protect workers from an imbalance of power between a large employer and individual workers. But it is not all sweetness and light for unionized workers, not to mention consumers who pay for the influence of unions on prices in general. While unions played a critical role in establishing and defending workers’ rights over the years, they have increasingly presented agency problems for their constituencies. They have also hastened declines in industries facing competitive pressures, which in turn have hastened the decline of union representation generally. (Public sector unions present a different set of problems involving conflicts of interest with taxpayers, but those are beyond the scope of this post.) In general, worker rights in the private sector are better served by allowing self-determination in the matter of union representation. To the extent that state RtW laws protect that autonomy, they are probably worthwhile at this point in the evolution of labor relations. However, if that is the primary effect, RtW is something of a misnomer.