Tag Archives: ISPs

Does Google Dominance Threaten Choice, Free Speech and Privacy?

29 Tuesday Aug 2017

Posted by in Censorship, Free Speech, monopoly

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I’ve long been suspicious of the objectivity of Google search results. If you’re looking for information on a particular issue or candidate for public office, it doesn’t take long to realize that Google searches lean left of center. To some extent, the bias reflects the leftward skew of the news media in general. If you sample material available online from major news organizations on any topic with a political dimension, you’ll get more left than right, and you’ll get very little libertarian. So it’s not just Google. Bing reflects a similar bias. Of course, one learns to craft searches to get the other side of a story,  but I use Bing much more than Google, partly because I bridle instinctively at Google’s dominance as a search engine. I’ve also had DuckDuckGo bookmarked for a long time. Lately, my desire to avoid tracking of personal information and searches has made DuckDuckGo more appealing.

Google is not just a large company offering internet services and an operating system: it has the power to control speech and who gets to speak. It is a provider of information services and a collector of information with the power to exert geopolitical influence, and it does. This is brought into sharp relief by Julian Assange in his account of an interview he granted in 2011 to Google’s chairman Eric Schmidt and two of Schmidt’s advisors, and by Assange’s subsequent observations about the global activities of these individuals and Google. Assange gives the strong impression that Google is an arm of the deep state, or perhaps that it engages in a form of unaccountable statecraft, one meant to transcend traditional boundaries of sovereignty. Frankly, I found Assange’s narrative somewhat disturbing.

Monopolization

These concerns are heightened by Google’s market dominance. There is no doubt that Google has the power to control speech, surveil individuals with increasing sophistication, and accumulate troves of personal data. Much the same can be said of Facebook. Certainly users are drawn to the compelling value propositions offered by these firms. The FCC calls them internet “edge providers”, not the traditional meaning of “edge”, as between interconnected internet service providers (ISPs) with different customers. But Google and Facebook are really content providers and, in significant ways, hosting services.

According to Scott Cleland, Google, Facebook, and Amazon collect the bulk of all advertising revenue on the internet. The business is highly concentrated by traditional measures and becoming more concentrated as it grows. In the second quarter of 2017, Google and Facebook controlled 96% of digital advertising growth. They have ownership interests in many of the largest firms that could conceivably offer competition, and they have acquired outright a large number of potential competitors. Cleland asserts that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FTC essentially turned a blind eye to the many acquisitions of nascent competitors by these firms.

The competitive environment has also been influenced by other government actions over the past few years. In particular, the FCC’s net neutrality order in 2015 essentially granted subsidies to “edge providers”, preventing broadband ISPs (so-called “common carriers” under the ruling) from charging differential rates for the high volume of traffic they generate. In addition, the agency ruled that ISPs would be subject to additional privacy restrictions:

“Specifically, broadband Internet providers were prohibited from collecting and using information about a consumer’s browsing history, app usage, or geolocation data without permission—all of which edge providers such as Google or Facebook are free to collect under FTC policies.

As Michael Horney noted in an earlier Free State Foundation Perspectives release, these restrictions create barriers for ISPs to compete in digital advertising markets. With access to consumer information, companies can provide more targeted advertising, ads that are more likely to be relevant to the consumer and therefore more valuable to the advertiser. The opt-in requirement means that ISPs will have access to less information about customers than Google, Facebook, and other edge providers that fall under the FTC’s purview—meaning ISPs cannot serve advertisers as effectively as the edge providers with whom they compete.”

Furthermore, there are allegations that Google played a role in convincing Facebook to drop Bing searches on its platform, and that Google in turn quietly deemphasized its social media presence. There is no definitive evidence that Google and Facebook have colluded, but the record is curious.

Regulation and Antitrust

Should firms like Google, Facebook, and other large internet platforms be regulated or subjected to more stringent review of past and proposed acquisitions? These companies already have great influence on the public sector. The regulatory solution is often comfortable for the regulated firm, which submits to complex rules with which compliance is difficult for smaller competitors. Thus, the regulated firm wins a more secure market position and a less risky flow of profit. The firm also gains more public sector influence through its frequent dealings with regulatory authorities.

Ryan Bourne argues that “There Is No Justification for Regulating Online Giants as If They Were Public Utilities“. He notes that these firms are not natural monopolies, despite their market positions and the existence of strong network externalities. It is true that they generally operate in contested markets, despite the dominance of a just few firms. Furthermore, it would be difficult to argue that these companies over-charge for their services in any way suggestive of monopoly behavior. Most of their online services are free or very cheap to users.

But anti-competitive behavior can be subtle. There are numerous ways it can manifest against consumers, developers, advertisers, and even political philosophies and those who espouse them. In fact, the edge providers do manage to extract something of value: data, intelligence and control. As mentioned earlier, their many acquisitions suggest an attempt to snuff out potential competition. More stringent review of proposed combinations and their competitive impact is a course of action that Cleland and others advocate.  While I generally support a free market in corporate control, many of Google’s acquisitions were firms enjoying growth rates one could hardly attribute to mismanagement or any failure to maximize value. Those combinations expanded Google’s offerings, certainly, but they also took out potential competition. However, there is no bright line to indicate when combinations of this kind are not in the public interest.

Antitrust action is no stranger to Google: In June, the European Union fined the company $2.7 billion for allegedly steering online shoppers toward its own shopping platform. Google faces continuing scrutiny of its search results by the EU, and the EU has other investigations of anticompetitive behavior underway against both Google and Facebook.

It’s also worth noting that antitrust has significant downsides: it is costly and disruptive, not only for the firms involved, but for their customers and taxpayers. Alan Reynolds has a cautionary take on the prospect of antitrust action against Amazon. Antitrust is a big business in and of itself, offering tremendous rent-seeking benefits to a host of attorneys, economists, accountants and variety of other technical specialists. As Reynolds says:

“Politics aside, the question ‘Is Amazon getting too Big?’ should have nothing to do with antitrust, which is supposedly about preventing monopolies from charging high prices. Surely no sane person would dare accuse Amazon of monopoly or high prices.“

Meanwhile, the proposed Amazon-Whole Foods combination was approved by the FTC and the deal closed Monday.

Speech, Again

Ordinarily, my views on “speech control” would be aligned with those of Scott Shackford, who defends the right of private companies to restrict speech that occurs on their platforms. But Alex Tabbarok offers a thoughtful qualification in asking whether Google and Apple should have banned Gab:

“I have no problem with Twitter or Facebook policing their sites for content they find objectionable, such as pornography or hate speech, even though these are permitted under the First Amendment. A free market in news doesn’t mean that every newspaper must cover every story. A free market in news means free entry. But free entry is exactly what is now at stake. Gab was created, in part, to combat what was seen as Facebook’s bias against conservative news and views. If Gab or services like cannot be accessed via the big platforms that is a significant barrier to entry.

When Facebook and Twitter regulate what can be said on their platforms and Google and Apple regulate who can provide a platform, we have a big problem. It’s as if the NYTimes and the Washington Post were the only major newspapers and the government regulated who could own a printing press.

In a pure libertarian world, I’d be inclined to say that Google and Apple can also police whom they allow on their platforms. But we live in a world in which Google and Apple are bound up with and in some ways beholden to the government. I worry when a lot of news travels through a handful of choke points.“

This point is amplified by Aaron M. Renn in City Journal:

“The mobile-Internet business is built on spectrum licenses granted by the federal government. Given the monopoly power that Apple and Google possess in the mobile sphere as corporate gatekeepers, First Amendment freedoms face serious challenges in the current environment. Perhaps it is time that spectrum licenses to mobile-phone companies be conditioned on their recipients providing freedoms for customers to use the apps of their choice.“

That sort of condition requires ongoing monitoring and enforcement, but the intervention is unlikely to stop there. Once the platforms are treated as common property there will be additional pressure to treat their owners as public stewards, answerable to regulators on a variety of issues in exchange for a de facto grant of monopoly.

Tyler Cowen’s reaction to the issue of private, “voluntary censorship” online is a resounding “meh”. While he makes certain qualifications, he does not believe it’s a significant issue. His perspective is worth considering:

“It remains the case that the most significant voluntary censorship issues occur every day in mainstream non-internet society, including what gets on TV, which books are promoted by major publishers, who can rent out the best physical venues, and what gets taught at Harvard or for that matter in high school.“

Cowen recognizes the potential for censorship to become a serious problem, particularly with respect to so-called “chokepoint” services like Cloudflare:

“They can in essence kick you off the entire internet through a single human decision not to offer the right services. …so far all they have done is kick off one Nazi group. Still, I think we should reexamine the overall architecture of the internet with this kind of censorship power in mind as a potential problem. And note this: the main problem with those choke points probably has more to do with national security and the ease of wrecking social coordination, not censorship. Still, this whole issue should receive much more attention and I certainly would consider serious changes to the status quo.“

There are no easy answers.

Conclusions

The so-called edge providers pose certain threats to individuals, both as internet users and as free citizens: the potential for anti-competitive behavior, eventually manifesting in higher prices and restricted choice; tightening reins on speech and free expression; and compromised privacy. All three have been a reality to one extent or another. As a firm like Google attains the status of an arm of the state, or multiple states, it could provide a mechanism whereby those authorities could manipulate behavior and coerce their citizens, making the internet into a tool of tyranny rather than liberty. “Don’t be evil” is not much of a guarantee.

What can be done? The FCC’s has already voted to reverse its net neutrality order, and that is a big step; dismantling the one-sided rules surrounding the ISPs handling of consumer data would also help, freeing some powerful firms that might be able to compete for “edge” business. I am skeptical that regulation of edge providers is an effective or wise solution, as it would not achieve competitive outcomes and it would rely on the competence and motives of government officials to protect users from the aforementioned threats to their personal sovereignty. Antitrust action may be appropriate when anti-competitive actions can be proven, but it is a rent-seeking enterprise of its own, and it is often a questionable remedy to the ills caused by market concentration. We have a more intractable problem if access cannot be obtained for particular content otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Essentially, Cowen’s suggestion is to rethink the internet, which might be the best advice for now.

Ultimately, active consumer sovereignty is the best solution to the dominance of firms like Google and Facebook. There are other search engines and there are other online communities. Users must take steps to protect their privacy online. If they value their privacy, they should seek out and utilize competitive services that protect it. Finally, perhaps consumers should consider a recalibration of their economic and social practices. They may find surprising benefits from reducing their dependence on internet services, instead availing themselves of the variety of shopping and social experiences that still exist in the physical world around us. That’s the ultimate competition to the content offered by edge providers.

Net Neutrality: Degradation For All

20 Tuesday Jun 2017

Posted by in Net neutrality, Regulation

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The FCC recently voted to reverse its earlier actions on so-called net neutrality, which would have treated internet service providers (ISPs) as “common carriers” and subjected them to detailed federal regulation of their services, pricing, and profits. Many believe net neutrality would ensure a sort of fairness and nondiscrimination on the internet, but it is actually a destructive regulatory regime under which certain firms are allowed to extract economic rents from the efforts of others. Warren Meyer has a nice take on this at Coyote Blog:

“Net Neutrality is one of those Orwellian words that mean exactly the opposite of what they sound like…. What [it] actually means is that certain people … want to tip the balance in this negotiation towards the content creators ….  Netflix, for example, takes a huge amount of bandwidth that costs ISP’s a lot of money to provide. But Netflix doesn’t want the ISP’s to be be able to charge for this extra bandwidth Netflix uses – Netflix wants to get all the benefit of taking up the lion’s share of ISP bandwidth investments without having to pay for it. Net Neutrality is corporate welfare for content creators.“

I made the same point almost three years ago in “The Non-Neutrality of Network Hogs“. Meyer emphasizes that in the net-neutrality fight, the primary tension is between content creators and ISPs (and transport providers), but it is like any other battle to capture the gains from a vertical supply chain. Think of suppliers of goods versus shippers, for example, or traditional publishers versus delivery services, or oil extraction versus refining. Ultimately, all of the various parties must cover their costs in order to survive, and obviously each would like to capture a larger share of the value from its stage of the production process. In a series of arms-length transactions, one might assume that their shares would correspond roughly to the value they add to the final product, but things are more complicated than that. Much depends on the competitive state of the market and on the cost structures faced by different parties.

While the ISPs are often said to exercise monopoly power, there are few if any local markets in which that is actually the case, even in rural areas. Almost everywhere in the U.S., local internet markets could be better described as oligopolistic: there are at least a couple of rival firms (and alternatives for consumers), even if the technologies are sometimes radically different, so some competition exists. The same is true of the internet backbone.

Obviously, content providers compete with one another in a large sense, but many popular forms of content are unique and consumers demand access to them through their ISPs. Therefore, some content providers exercise a degree of monopoly power. And they might also require a lot of bandwidth.

The nature of the costs faced by ISPs and content providers is quite different. The latter have a much lower proportion of fixed costs than ISPs, who must invest in network capacity. Ultimately, the costs of providing that capacity must be priced. At first blush, it seems natural for users of capacity to be billed proportionately, but allocating those costs over customers and over time is a complex undertaking. Like all problems in economics, however, network usage involves a scarce resource. A large increment to demand can lead to network congestion and higher costs, not only directly to the ISPs but to users experiencing a degradation in the speed and quality of their service. ISPs have traditionally had the flexibility to negotiate with large content providers, reaching mutually agreeable terms. That’s what brought us to the state of today’s internet, and most observers would say that it’s pretty damn good!

It is the network that makes all of these wonderful services possible. The ISPs provide and maintain that network, and they must provide for expansion of that network as traffic grows. It is important that ISPs have adequate incentives to do so. However, the form of regulation to which so-called common carriers are subjected is known historically for its failure to provide good incentives. That history goes back as far as 130 years in transportation and about 80 years in telecommunications. This is why many analysts, and FCC Chairman Ajit Pai, contend that common carrier status for ISPs, and “net neutrality”, would lead to shortfalls in network capacity and a deterioration in the quality of service. It would also reward large content providers (think Netflix) in the short term at the expense of ISPs, essentially giving the former access to the existing network at less than cost. That’s the whole idea for industry advocates of net netrality, of course. But in the end, net neutrality is a shortsighted goal, even for the content providers.

The content providers have made every effort to propagandize the public, stoking fears that the ISPs are treating certain kinds of traffic unfairly. Without net neutrality, would ISPs unfairly discriminate against certain kinds of content? Or against certain types of users? Price discrimination is one of the primary criticisms of the presumed behavior of ISPs in the absence of net neutrality. Economist Bronwyn Howell points out that price discrimination is not unusual, however, and is not necessarily undesirable. Indeed, consumers of internet, telephone, mobile, and cable TV services seem to prefer certain forms of price discrimination! Consumers with heavy usage who purchase flat rate monthly internet access pay a lower charge per Gb than light users. Consumers who purchase “bundles” of internet and voice service may benefit from price discrimination relative to those who choose not to bundle their services. Strictly usage-based pricing would prevent price discrimination on this basis, but few would advocate the abolition of bundled offers, which provide benefits in terms of flexibility of use and predictability of cost, yielding net welfare gains for many consumers at no incremental cost to others. Like all voluntary trade, these are positive sum transactions: consumers capture more  “surplus” value while ISPs earn a greater contribution to the fixed costs of the network.

When ISPs charge a data rate based on usage, consumers face a positive marginal cost on incremental data. As usage increases, its marginal value to the consumer declines; the consumer will not use data beyond the point at which its value equals the data rate they pay. That places a cap on consumer surplus (the area above the price and below the consumer’s demand curve). When the consumer faces a zero marginal cost (an unlimited data plan), their usage rises to the point at which its marginal value is zero. The total amount of “surplus” in that scenario is larger, and it is possible for an ISP to split the gain with the consumer by offering a price for unlimited usage. Thus, as long as the network capacity is in place, both parties are made better off! If not, the practice can lead to congestion, but competition for users often dictates that such packages be offered.

Especially in the presence of positive network externalities, it makes no sense for the ISPs, as a group, to price users or traffic out of the market, unless they are punished for doing otherwise at below cost. As always, pricing is an exercise in balancing costs with the benefits to potential buyers. It should remain a private and unfettered exercise ending only in trades that are mutually beneficial.

And what of network capacity and the big content providers? At the “price discrimination” link above, Howell says:

“… available bandwidth allowed Netflix to happen, not the other way around. But now, as Netflix comes to dominate existing bandwidth, leading to higher costs, it is causing externalities (delays) and higher costs (ISP fees are now rising in real terms in some markets) to pay for new capacity.“

Should the ISPs charge all customers higher rates in order to manage growth in traffic and fund new capacity? How can they allocate costs to the cost-causers? Usage-based data rates are one simple alternative. Tiered rates would act to minimize the extent to which light users are penalized. ISPs have also negotiated with individual content providers directly, reaching agreements to compensate ISPs for access to their customers. Tim Wu, the Columbia Law professor credited with coining the term “net neutrality”, was quoted at the last link bemoaning these types of deals:

“‘I think it is going to be bad for consumers,’ he added, because such costs are often passed through to the customer.“

Well, yes! Netflix charges its customers, and it will attempt to recover these payments for network capacity. Streaming is an integral component of the service they offer, and they cannot do it without the ISPs. Would Wu propose that the pipes be provided at less than cost?

Some have said that it is more economically efficient for ISPs to charge users directly for incremental short-run network “externalities” caused by large data demands. (Conceptually, it is better to think of these costs as long-run marginal costs of network expansion.) It may be that a tiered rate structure can approximate the optimal solution, and packages are often tiered by download speed. Nevertheless, passing costs along to large content providers is a viable approach to allocating costs as well.

Another argument is that small content providers cannot afford these payments. However, if they don’t generate a significant amount of traffic, they probably won’t have to negotiate special deals. If they grow to require a large share of the “pipe”, it would indicate that they have passed a market test. Ultimately, their customers should pay the costs of providing the capacity in one way or another.

Net neutrality and regulation of ISPs is the wrong approach to encouraging the growth and value delivered by the internet. It would stifle incentives to provide the needed capacity and to develop new network technologies. We certainly didn’t get here by treating the ISPs like public utilities. Rather, the process was facilitated by the freedom to experiment technologically and contractually. ISPs are well aware that the value of their networks are enhanced by ubiquity. Affordable access to a broad share of the population is in their best interest. In the end, consumers are sovereign and should be the sole arbiters of the value offered by ISPs and content providers. Regulators will promise to protect us, but the inevitable result will be a market hampered by rules that degrade the network, leading to substandard service and a less vibrant internet.

Big Daddy Wants To Neutralize Your Net

09 Friday Jan 2015

Posted by in Uncategorized

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Net-Neutrality

Once again, President Obama is trying his hand as populist candyman, now pressing the FCC to adopt “net neutrality” rules for regulating internet service providers (ISPs) as common carriers. Net neutrality refers to regulations on ISPs that would prohibit different treatment of different types of internet content, matters that are better left to market participants. Obama has no idea what he’s doing or who he’ll be hurting (hint: internet users of all stripes). The candy is an illusion. Peter Suderman’ has an aptly titled article on this topic at Reason: “Will 2015 Be the Year the FCC Regulates the Internet Back to 1934?” He offers some background on the history of U.S. telecommunications regulation and explains the context within which FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler and the Commission will deal with the issue. Suderman closes with this thought:

“If Wheeler does take this route (reclassification of ISPs as common carriers], as he now seems to determined (sic), we’ll end up with an Internet that is more regulated, more subject to regulatory uncertainty in the near-term, and more like a public utility from another era than an information delivery service for the modern age. It’ll be 2015—but for the Internet, it’ll be 1934 all over again.”

Wired also gives its perspective but implies that Wheeler is seeking ways to reclassify the ISPs, impose neutrality rules, while also creating sufficient exceptions to mollify the ISPs, avoiding litigation as well as market disruption. That would be nice as far as it goes.

Net neutrality is a misnomer, as Sacred Cow Chips has discussed on two previous occasions in “The Non-Neutrality of Network Hogs“, and “Net Neutrality: A Tangled Web“. A lowlight is the corporate cronyism inherent in calls for net neutrality. The biggest beneficiaries are not consumers, but large content providers such as Netflix and Google, though the latter has altered its position on neutrality now that it is entering the market as an ISP. Another lowlight is the disincentive for network expansion created by forced subsidies to the large content providers, who are extremely heavy users of internet capacity.

Jeffrey Eisenach at AEI picks apart the arguments in favor of internet regulation. He also counters assertions that consumers are likely to benefit from internet regulation. Here are two choice quotes:

“And while much is made of consumers’ limited choices, the broadband market is actually less concentrated than the markets for search engines, social networks, and over-the-top video services: discriminatory regulation of ISPs cannot be justified on the basis of market power.”

“Finally, there’s the argument about fast lanes and slow lanes, or, in regulatory jargon, “paid prioritization.” The simple reality is that edge providers like Netflix require prioritization for their services to work. It’s just the “paid” part they don’t like.”

Finally, Don Boudreaux provides two relevant quotes on regulation, one from the great Ronald Coase, along with some of his own thoughts. I close with Boudreaux’s summation:

“Government imposition of “net neutrality” will substitute bureaucrats’ politically poisoned judgments on what are and what are not appropriate business practices for the market-tested judgments of legions of suppliers competing for the patronage of hundreds of millions – indeed, often billions – of consumers.“