Tag Archives: Bryan Caplan

How Empowered Bleeding Hearts Do Harden

01 Friday Feb 2019

Posted by in Collectivism, Socialism, The Road To Serfdom, Tyranny

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Here’s an empirical regularity: altruists attaining power to collectivize society’s productive machinery do not stay nice for long. In fact, aggressive pursuit of their goals might compel them to participate in brutal tyranny. But why? What happens to these sweet egalitarians who are, after all, imbued with the most earnest desire to elevate the common man by equalizing the fruits of society’s bounty?

Bryan Caplan offers Venezuela as Exhibit A in “A Short Hop from Bleeding Heart to Mailed Fist“:

“When Hugo Chavez began ruling Venezuela, he sounded like a classic bleeding-heart – full of pity for the poor and downtrodden. Plenty of people took him at his words – not just Venezuelans, but much of the international bleeding-heart community. … Almost every Communist dictatorship launches with mountains of humanitarian propaganda. Yet ultimately, almost everyone who doesn’t fear for his life wakes up and smells the tyranny.”

Venezuela’s collapse is merely the most recent in a long history of socialist debacles. Authoritarians certainly come in other stripes, but collectivists seem especially prone to the development of vicious alter-egos. But again, why?

Caplan knows the answer, and in something of a dialectical exercise, he proposes several explanations for the nice-to-nasty phenomenon. It’s not the infiltration of “bad guys”. Plenty of evidence suggests that the same people are at both ends of the transition, and for now let’s give the benefit of the doubt to the nicest elements of the avant guarde, or even those who go simply along on the basis of their idealism. It’s implausible that such humanitarian souls could believe it will be necessary, at the outset, to crush their opposition by force. Moreover, that approach risks immediate outcomes that are far too dire. Might an authoritarian or militaristic turn be necessary to deter hostile foreign actors who might attempt to foil collectivization? If so, it still doesn’t explain why subjugation of domestic citizens is ultimately accepted as a legitimate use of force by sincere altruists.

Caplan moves on to more compelling explanations of the disorder. Perhaps the expression of bleeding heart intentions is propaganda from the very start. Perhaps the rhetoric is really just hate speech disguised as noble intent. Surely those two explanations comport with the behavior of those having uglier motives for collectivism: envy and vengeance. And while those elements are certain to be active in any socialist front, they don’t explain why the bleeders also abecome beaters.

The best explanation for the horrid metamorphosis of empowered altruists is that egalitarian policies simply do not work very well. Caplan says:

“Bleeding-heart policies work so poorly that only the mailed fist can sustain them. In this story, the bleeding hearts are at least initially sincere. If their policies worked well enough to inspire broad support, the bleeding hearts would play nice. Unfortunately, bleeding-heart policies are exorbitantly expensive and often directly counter-productive. Pursued aggressively, they predictably lead to disaster. At this point, a saintly bleeding heart will admit error and back off. A pragmatic bleeding heart will compromise. The rest, however, respond to their own failures with rage and scapegoating. Once you institutionalize that rage and scapegoating, the mailed fist has arrived.” [Caplan’s emphasis]

The compulsory nature of policies advocated by leftists makes their system of social organization inherently unstable. With the imposition of every rule limiting the operation of private markets, with every compromise of the price mechanism, and with every new confiscatory policy, the economy becomes more feeble and inflexible. As several commenters on Caplan’s post note, socialists are people who simply do not understand economics.

The path to collectivism always involves promises that are impossible to keep. Personal concerns must be renounced in favor of the collective. Individuals are denied their freedom to act on creative impulses and their ability to cooperate freely with others in pursuit of personal well-being. Those are human rights that are quite unnatural to part with. That means it is impossible to achieve the collective without an implicit or explicit threat of enforcement through violent police power. Bleeding hearts will actually participate in the inevitable tyranny because they are so convinced of the righteousness of their cause.

Whether you call it socialism or social democracy makes no difference. The latter merely cloaks tyranny in a majoritarian dominance that would have enraged our nation’s founders. They understood the despotism inherent in allowing a majority to dictate the existence of basic rights. However, the bleeding hearts are always sure they know “what’s right” without weighing implications beyond the injustice du jour. That demands the application of force. And when confronted with the catastrophic results of their peremptory whimsy, they have no choice but to use still more force.

The banality of evil is truly a progressive disease. Fortunately, we have a preventive vaccine: the U.S. Constitution. But it will work only if we’re wise enough to rely on the framer’s original intent.

 

Right-to-Work Promotes Employment, Wage Growth

06 Monday Aug 2018

Posted by in Labor Markets, Right to Work

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The economic evidence is quite clear that state right-to-work (RtW) laws do not reduce wages, though a few seem desperate to convince us otherwise. In fact, RtW has proven to be an unambiguous economic tonic for states that have enacted such laws (though perhaps not for union lobbyists). Note that this has nothing to do with comparisons of nominal wage levels in RtW vs. non-RtW states, as organizations like the left-wing Economic Policy Institute (EPI) are wont to make. Adjusting for the cost of living often shows a different result. Either way, the recency of RTW laws in many states means that those differences tend to be legacy effects and are not useful as a gauge of the incremental impact of RtW laws.

It’s no coincidence that RtW laws have gained favor as a mechanism for encouraging economic growth in historically low-wage states. The efforts have been largely successful. Jeffrey Eisenach reported the following findings in 2015:

  • “RTW laws directly affect economic performance through their impact on business location decisions, especially in heavily unionized industries such as manufacturing. Other things being equal, businesses are more likely to locate in states with RTW laws. There is also evidence that RTW laws have a direct, positive effect on employment, output, and personal income.
  • RTW laws do not lead to lower average wages in either unionized or non-unionized industries. There is some evidence that the long-run effect of RTW laws is to raise wage rates as a result of increased productivity.
  • RTW laws also affect economic performance indirectly through lower rates of union density. The weight of the evidence indicates that lower union density is associated with higher levels of employment, increased investment and R&D spending, and increased innovation.”

Mark Mix reports similar evidence, including more rapid employment growth and larger wage gains in RtW states. And James Sherk addresses some of the myths surrounding RtW, including the misleading narrative that RtW reduces wages and that RtW is unpopular among the American public. Indeed, Sherk quotes a Gallup poll finding that Americans support right-to-work laws by more than a 3 to 1 margin, though it’s not clear how well the average American understands the issue.

A disturbing aspect of the opposition to RtW is an effort to disparage the business community by characterizing private enterprise as exploitative. I leave you with some wisdom from Bran Caplan on that point (HT: Don Boudreaux):

“Businesses produce and deliver virtually all of the wonderful, affordable products that we enjoy. Contrary to millennia of economic illiterates, businesses rarely do so by ‘exploiting’ their workers. Instead, businesses provide gentle but much-needed leadership. Left to our own economic devices, most of us are virtually useless; we don’t know how to produce much, and we don’t know how to find customers.  Businesspeople solve these problems: They recruit workers, organize them to vastly raise their productivity, then put these products in the hands of customers all over the world. Yes, they’re largely in it for the money; but – unlike every government on Earth – business rarely puts a gun to your head. Businesses assemble teams of volunteers to meet the needs of willing consumers – and succeed wildly.” (emphasis Caplan’s)

Open Borders and Club Goods

13 Saturday Jan 2018

Posted by in Immigration, Liberty

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The question of open borders divides libertarians as much as any. The arguments for open borders made by the likes of Bryan Caplan, Alex Tabarrok, Don Boudreaux and Sheldon Richman are in many ways quite appealing. Fewer borders means greater opportunities for gainful trade among individuals. For the U.S., the economic gains from in-migration have been unquestionable. From a pure libertarian perspective, governments should never interfere with the non-violent actions of free individuals, including freedom of movement. These great economists contend, in effect, that there is no real moral distinction between government actions that confine individuals within borders and those that keep people out, though our conciences are less burdened by the latter because the world abroad seems so large.

There is a gnawing contradiction in this viewpoint, however. It relates to the appropriate scope of “ownership”. At the link above, Caplan says:

“The only principled libertarian objection to this is that the citizens of each country are its rightful owners, so they’re entitled to regulate migration as they see fit. … But if you believe this, there is no principled libertarian objection to any act of government. Fortunately, the belief that citizens are countries’ rightful owners is crazy. The social contract is an utter myth. Contracts require unanimous consent, and no country has ever had unanimous consent.“

The Character of a Good

I contest Caplan’s assertion that any one act of government is like all others. Yes, there is always a danger of a majoritarian tyranny in any democracy. But there is also the question of sovereignty, for which borders of some kind are necessary. If policies governing those borders are established legislatively, they should be subject to checks and balances: executive consent as well as judicial review of disputes.

I also contest Caplan’s statement that ownership implies unanimous consent. In fact, there are many forms of property over which decisions do not imply unanimous consent of joint owners. One such form is the subject of what follows, and I believe that form of “ownership” is applicable to one’s citizenship or residency status.

To keep things simple, I’ll frame this discussion only in terms of citizenship. I therefore abstract from issues like green cards, visiting worker programs, and the presence of resident aliens in general. For a nation, the essence of barriers to immigration can be addressed by considering the simpler case of citizens versus non-resident non-citizens. For purposes of this discussion, if you are allowed to arrive on a nation’s shores, you will be a citizen.

If a country’s citizenship can be considered a good worth acquiring, what is its real character? It is privately possessed and not tradable, but not all goods are tradable. An important taxonomy of goods in the public finance literature is based on two dimensions: exclusivity and rivalrousness. The former is the degree to which other parties can be excluded from enjoyment or use of the good or resource.

Most goods have at least some degree of exclusivity: you can be denied admission to a concert, the use of an appliance or furniture, and even parks and port facilities. Pure public goods like national defense and the air we breath are completely non-exclusive, however. Broadcast television is non-exclusive as well, as long as you have the equipment to watch it.

Rivalrousness is the degree to which the use or enjoyment of a good precludes another’s use or enjoyment. My friend can’t eat the steak if I eat the steak. That’s rivalrous. But my friend and I can both enjoy the concert. That’s non-rivalrous. A private good is both exclusionary and rivalrous. A public good is neither.

Citizenship as a Good

Citizenship can be viewed as a bundle of attributes much as any good, but it is an extremely complex bundle: it includes the individual rights enshrined in a nation’s constitution (if any), the personal and economic opportunities available by virtue of access to in-country markets and resources, the culture(s), and any personal risk reduction provided collectively, i.e., a safety net via public support. How, then, would one classify citizenship, or its component attributes, in terms of exclusivity and rivalrousness?

First, the entire citizenship bundle has a high degree of exclusivity. A nation can decide on closed borders, or partially open borders, if it chooses to do so, just as a theme park limits its gate. That is the political decision at hand. The degree of exclusivity of individual components of the bundle matters little if the bundle itself is highly exclusive.

At a high level, citizenship itself is non-rivalrous. My citizenship does not preclude citizenship for anyone else. Therefore, at the level of the bundle, citizenship is exclusive but non-rivalrous, so it has the character of what economists call a “club good“. Citizens are already part of the club; to that extent they are joint “owners”. Like many clubs, decisions about new membership need not be unanimous.

Classification of citizenship attributes as goods is trickier. The exclusivity of citizenship makes the non-rivalrous public goods available to citizens into club goods. Once admitted, for example, you are free to engage in speech, practice a religion of your choice, own a weapon, and receive due process and habeas corpus without interfering with any other citizen’s ability to exercise the same rights. You get national defense and a judicial system. You have equality of opportunity to the extent that your pursuit of economic gain does not interfere directly with anyone else’s opportunities. On the other hand, the freedom of assembly is rivalrous to at least some extent, as we learned last year from events in Charlottesville, VA. In fact, there may be congestion limits to some of the other freedoms mentioned above. 

Access to a nation’s markets permits mutually beneficial trade to take place. An individual’s participation usually does not rule out participation by others, so it is essentially non-rivalrous. (In some markets the entry of new sellers may be limited and exclusionary.) Of course, a nation’s resources are scarce; exploiting them for gain or enjoyment necessarily prevents others from using the same resources. From the point of view of existing citizens, these resources are non-exclusive and rivalrous, and are therefore classified as “common resources”, subject to congestion effects, but they are still exclusive to those citizens. The key here is not whether there are gains from trade, but that there is some rivalrousness embedded in this citizenship attribute.

In addition to the basic rights mentioned earlier, the entire legal structure, regulatory apparatus, and the political process are complex attributes of citizenship. These bear on the limits of legal conduct: Can you buy or sell liquor on Sundays? Do businesses require licensure? Is abortion legal? And on and on. In a democracy, the ability to participate in the political process is non-rivalrous: it does not prevent others from participating. However, the range of possible outcomes of the process can also be viewed as an attribute, and these outcomes, as they are promulgated, are certainly rivalrous. If the “other” side gets extra votes, then the power of my vote is diminished. So the limits of legal conduct are exposed to political rivalry. In the case of open borders, a large number of citizens may not favor existing rules, regulations, and the allocation of public spending.

So the attributes of citizenship are mixed in terms of rivalrousness: Some are rivalrous but many are not. The citizenship bundle, at a more detailed level, is therefore a mix of club goods (exclusive but non-rvalrous) and some goods that are rivalrous. This is important, because under the classical description club goods are public goods provided privately; they are therefore under-provided from the perspective of social welfare and the Pareto criterion that a new citizens can be made better off without making any existing citizen worse off. That might not be the case in the presence of congestion effects.

Should a Club Good Be Unrestricted?

Citizenship has value at the margin to both existing citizens, who should be regarded as established club members, and non-citizens. The foregoing establishes that there are some private (exclusive and rivalrous) attributes attached to citizenship. Sometimes this is due to the impact of congestion on the provision of public goods. Patrick McNutt, in his survey of literature on “Public Goods and Club Goods“, summarizes some basic conditions under which public goods are provided by clubs:

“The public good is not a pure public good, but rather there is an element of congestion as individuals consume the good up to its capacity constraint. What arises then is some exclusion mechanism in order to charge consumers a price for the provision and use of the good. Brown and Jackson (1990, p. 80) had commented that the purpose of a club ‘is to exploit economies of scale, to share the costs of providing an indivisible commodity, to satisfy a taste for association with other individuals who have similar preference orderings’. For Buchanan and Ng the main club characteristic is membership or numbers of consumers and it is this variable that has to be optimised.“

Citizenship (or residency) is generally not price rationed, though there are certainly costs to the immigrant. I make no pretense here as to the determination of an optimal membership from a club or larger social perspective. My point is that rationing membership is a rational choice by club members, or citizens in this case.

Okay, I Like My Club

Tribal affiliations, and ultimately nation states, were a natural outgrowth of early competition for resources, especially when identifying threats from outsiders was a constant preoccupation. Territorialism was a byproduct, and with the establishment of agriculture, the peoples of these early societies probably identified strongly with their homelands.

Modern nation-states have evolved from those early patterns, and nations continue to differ in terms of language, culture, and governance. Successful nations are undoubtedly more liberal (in the classical sense) and open to trade and cross-border movement. Maybe one day all nations will be united under the principles of libertarianism… don’t count on it! For now, to one degree or another, a nation’s inhabitants have an interest in minimizing economic and political risks and retaining access to resources within their borders. I don’t believe that desire is irrational or immoral. If the inhabitants of a nation have a moral obligation to share their rights, wealth, and political process with all comers, then they must accept the possibility that their rights will be compromised, and possibly even complete upheaval. They suffer a loss of sovereignty and a loss in the expected value of their citizenship.

There is obviously no limiting principle to the open borders policy, as Tyler Cowen says. Existing citizens would be obligated to accommodate all those who land upon their shores, granting them the full rights and opportunities accorded to all other residents. Perhaps there would be economic gains in the short or long run, as most libertarians would predict. But perhaps there would be some losses along the way. Perhaps there would be political stability after a large influx of new residents, but perhaps not. And ultimately, perhaps changes in the political climate would feed back to the detriment of economic performance. One simply cannot say, a priori, how things would go. There are risks to the existing citizenry, and if they are obliged to accept those risks, those might well include having to feed, clothe and house new residents. There should be no absolute obligation to accept those risks. If the debate is about individual liberty, then surely imposing those risks via open borders would  abrogate the rights of existing citizens.

Addendum: A Note on the Goods Taxonomy

Given the two dimensions of goods discussed above, exclusivity and rivalrousness, goods are classified as follows:

  • Private goods: exclusive and rivalrous;
  • Public goods: non-exclusive and non-rivalrous;
  • Club goods: exclusive but non-rivalrous: e.g., a concert;
  • Common resources: non-exclusive but rivalrous: the air we breath; an aquifer;

Another category is sometimes defined: contestable goods, which have the character of public goods or even club goods when under light use, and are common resources when under heavy use. There is a difference between an empty park and a crowded park; or an empty road and a crowded road.

See ThoughtCo. for a good exposition on the taxonomy.

The Insidious Guaranteed Income

26 Sunday Feb 2017

Posted by in Welfare State

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Praise for the concept of a “universal basic income” (UBI) is increasingly common among people who should know better. The UBI’s appeal is based on: 1) improvement in work incentives for those currently on public aid; 2) the permanent and universal cushion it promises against loss of livelihood; 3) the presumed benefits to those whose work requires a lengthy period of development to attain economic viability; and 4) the fact that everyone gets a prize, so it is “fair”. There are advocates who believe #2 is the primary reason a UBI is needed because they fear a mass loss of employment in the age of artificial intelligence and automation. I’ll offer some skepticism regarding that prospect in a forthcoming post.

And what are the drawbacks of a UBI? As an economic matter, it is outrageously expensive in both budgetary terms and, more subtly but no less importantly, in terms of its perverse effects on the allocation of resources. However, there are more fundamental reasons to oppose the UBI on libertarian grounds.

Advocates of a UBI often use $10,000 per adult per year as a working baseline. That yields a cost of a guaranteed income for every adult in the U.S. on the order of $2.1 trillion. We now spend about $0.7 trillion a year on public aid programs, excluding administrative costs (the cost is $1.1 trillion all-in). The incremental cost of a UBI as a wholesale replacement for all other aid programs would therefore be about $1.4 trillion. That’s roughly a 40% increase in federal outlays…. Good luck funding that! And there’s a strong chance that some of the existing aid programs would be retained. The impact could be blunted by excluding individuals above certain income thresholds, or via taxes applied to the UBI in higher tax brackets. However, a significant dent in the cost would require denying the full benefit to a large segment of the middle class, making the program into something other than a UBI.

Nathan Keeble at Mises Wire discusses some of the implications of a UBI for incentives and resource allocation. A traditional criticism of means-tested welfare programs is that benefits decline as market income increases, so market income is effectively taxed at a high marginal rate. (This is not a feature of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).) Thus, low-income individuals face negative incentives to earn market income. This is the so-called “welfare cliff”. A UBI doesn’t have this shortcoming, but it would create serious incentive problems in other ways. A $1.4 trillion hit on taxpayers will distort work, saving and investment incentives in ways that would make the welfare cliff look minor by comparison. The incidence of these taxes would fall heavily on the most productive segments of society. It would also have very negative implications for the employment prospects of individuals in the lowest economic strata.

Keeble describes another way in which a UBI is destructive. It is a subsidy granted irrespective of the value created by work effort. Should an individual have a strong preference for leisure as opposed to work, a UBI subsidy exerts a strong income effect in accommodating that choice. Or, should an individual have a strong preference for performing varieties of work for which they are not well-suited, and despite having a relatively low market value for them, the income effect of a UBI subsidy will tend to accommodate that choice as well. In other words, a UBI will subsidize non-economic activity:

“The struggling entrepreneurs and artists mentioned earlier are struggling for a reason. For whatever reason, the market has deemed the goods they are providing to be insufficiently valuable. Their work simply isn’t productive according to those who would potentially consume the goods or services in question. In a functioning marketplace, producers of goods the consumers don’t want would quickly have to abandon such endeavors and focus their efforts into productive areas of the economy. The universal basic income, however, allows them to continue their less-valued endeavors with the money of those who have actually produced value, which gets to the ultimate problem of all government welfare programs.“

I concede, however, that unconditional cash transfers can be beneficial as a way of delivering aid to impoverished communities. This application, however, involves a subsidy that is less than universal, as it targets cash at the poor, or poor segments of society. The UBI experiments described in this article involve private charity in delivering aid to poor communities in underdeveloped countries, not government sponsored foreign aid or redistribution. Yes, cash is more effective than in-kind aid such as food or subsidized housing, a proposition that economists have always tended to support as a rule. The cash certainly provides relief, and it may well be used as seed money for productive enterprises, especially if the aid is viewed as temporary rather than permanent. But that is not in the spirit of a true UBI.

More fundamentally, a UBI is objectionable from a libertarian perspective because it involves a confiscation of resources. In “Why Libertarians Should Oppose the Universal Basic Income“, Bryan Caplan makes the point succinctly:

“Forced charity is unjust. Individuals have a moral right to decide if and when they want to help others….

Forcing people to help others who can’t help themselves… is at least defensible. Forcing people to help everyone is not. And for all its faults, at least the status quo makes some effort to target people who can’t help themselves. The whole idea of the Universal Basic Income, in contrast, is to give money to everyone whether they need it or not.”

Later, Caplan says:

…libertarianism isn’t about the freedom to be coercively supported by strangers. It’s about the freedom to be left alone by strangers.“

Both Keeble and Caplan would argue that the status quo, with its hodge-podge of welfare programs offering tempting but rotten incentives to recipients, is preferable to the massive distortions that would be created by a UBI. The mechanics of such an intrusion are costly enough, but as Don Boudreaux has warned, the UBI would put government in a fairly dominant position as a provider:

“… such an income-guarantee by government will further fuel the argument that government is a uniquely important and foundational source of our rights and our prosperity – and, therefore, government is uniquely entitled to regulate our behavior.“

Government As Hazard

10 Friday Feb 2017

Posted by in Big Government, Markets

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Lots of people think government can do good things, even if its always in fashion to wink about the state’s legendary incompetence. It can do lots of things, but the only way it can do them is by exercising its power to coerce. It’s simply impossible to form an effective government without granting it that power. We must hope it will do only good things, and there is reasonable consensus that its basic functions are good, at least in kind: national defense, law enforcement and protection of basic rights, and a judicial system. The mere performance of those functions requires coercive power, and funding them requires the coercive power of taxation.

To make things simple, for now let’s stipulate that all agree on both the necessary functions of government, some minimal scale and scope of those functions, and the taxes necessary to pay for them. We may all feel that we are better off. Anything in excess of that minimal portfolio as might be desired by an individual or group would necessarily make some feel better off and some feel worse off. Additional taxes would have to be collected to pay for it, and the activities themselves might be seen in some quarters as inappropriate, wasteful, or intrusive. Now, the coercion of the state becomes more binding on some individuals and groups. We no longer have a win-win proposition, and that is what  distinguishes marginal government activity from marginal private exchange. The latter is always predicated on mutual benefits for the transacting parties. In the jargon of economics, these voluntary, private trades are Pareto-improving moves, meaning that some individuals are made better off and no one is made worse off. In general, if all mutually beneficial trades are exploited, the final result is Pareto optimal (after Vilfredo Pareto), because no further activity can make anyone better off without making someone else worse off.

The limited government described in the hypothetical sounds as if it might be Pareto optimal, but let’s add a little more realism. Are there additional government functions that would improve well being without doing harm to anyone? There is general agreement that government should provide for other “public goods”, which would otherwise be under-demanded in the market, and under-provided, due the nonexclusive nature of their benefits (think public parks). Once those are provisioned, the outcome may be Pareto optimal. There may be unanimous agreement, as well, that government should take actions to mitigate certain external costs arising from private activity. (If some of the costs of private activity are not internalized, then those market transactions fail the test of Pareto improvement). These additional government functions require coercive power, of course. Now we are into more complex issues of public choice. The provision of goods with at least some public benefits requires judgement as to degree, and judgement is necessary as to the appropriate degree of mitigation of external costs when they are an issue. In other words, Pareto-improving moves get scarce once government assumes responsibilities beyond those described in our original hypothetical.

As the scale and scope of government grow, its coercive force must advance as well. Therefore, unanimous consent for this growth, and even widespread consensus, will be impossible to achieve. Its size will reach a level at which a substantial share of the population will assume the roles of “public servants”, all having a vested interest in the state’s continued growth, if only to boost their own pay. The potential conflict of those personal interests with the public interest could not be clearer. That’s a good reason to support strict limits on the size and power of government, not to mention restrictions on the power of public employees to unionize.

Those who wish for government to play a dominant role in society might think it’s all for the good. They might support changes in the rules of governance that facilitate the dominance and coercive power it confers upon them. That might include, for example, pushing the use of executive authority to extreme levels based on interpretations of complex, but often vague, legislation. It might include changes in parliamentary rules that make it easier for thin majorities of legislators to work their will. No doubt these rule  changes will lead to Pareto-degrading actions, though the ruling faction will be quite happy with their new powers.

But what happens when a shift in the balance of public opinion brings new leaders to power? Those leaders will inherit rules that facilitate their agenda and authority to exercise coercive power. No one at any point along the ideological spectrum should dismiss this sort of risk. That’s the spirit of a recent Bryan Caplan post, “Limited Government as Insurance“. Stretching powers in the service of particular policy goals may well backfire when those powers become available to an opposing faction:

“Imagine going back in time to January 20, 2009. Obama’s Inauguration Day. You’re a cheering fan. On that day, an angel appears and makes you this offer: If you give up on Obama’s best ideas, none of Trump’s worst ideas will happen either. Obamacare will never happen – but neither will Trump’s immigration policies. Would you take that deal?

I know, it’s a galling hypothetical. You want the good stuff without the bad stuff.“

Caplan characterizes strict limits on government as a form of insurance against the risk of swings in the balance of power. He also considers plausible reasons for rejecting such a deal: “the arc of the moral universe”, or, you think your side will ultimately win, and will win for all time; and “asymmetric hyperbole”, or, the greatness of your policies outweighs any damage the other side can do with the same powers. If you really believe those things, it might seem reasonable to take your chances on an expansive state with expansive powers! A preference for limited government, however, does not require the contorted logic required to reject this insurance.

The U.S. Constitution includes many provisions originally intended to limit government and the exercise of coercive power. Those protections from the state have eroded over time, a process hastened by increasingly flexible judicial interpretations of the founding document. Caplan notes that there are a number of mechanisms by which limited government can be made durable:

“Supermajority rules require more than a majority to act. Division of powers makes it hard for government bodies to accomplish anything on their own. Judicial review allows judges to invalidate acts of government. Federalism greatly reduces the cost of “voting with your feet.” If you think these institutions aren’t working, the obvious solution is to strengthen them. Impose more supermajority requirements. Divide more powers. Overturn legislation that fails to get support from six, seven, eight, or all nine Supreme Court Justices. Make states pay for their own spending with their own taxes, not federal grants.“

Then comes the most insightful, but most disheartening, part of Caplan’s post: real steps to limit government will never be taken:

“Limited government helps everyone in the long-run, but immediately hurts the ruling party. They fought hard to win power; now that they have it, they yearn to flex their muscles.“

We might see a federal department abolished here or there, and we might see certain regulations rolled back, but those steps will be selective. The powers that put them there in the first place can be reapplied in the future. We might see more “business-friendly” actions, but those will be selective as well. In other words, corporatism will persist. And we might see tax cuts, but that won’t reduce the government’s absorption of resources, which is driven by the spending side. While this sounds discouraging, I nevertheless admire Caplan’s characterization of limited government as insurance against the other side’s bad policies. If only we could pull it off!

Prospective Professionals Don’t Snub Minimum Wage Waivers

01 Tuesday Sep 2015

Posted by in Free markets

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Are unpaid internships of any benefit to the student/intern? If not, then why do you suppose several hundred thousand smart students accept them each year? And there are many more internships for which the pay is nominal. Clearly these students have something to gain, though some would still argue that interns are exploited. They would like to be paid, of course, but they are sufficiently forward-thinking to recognize opportunities, even if they are unpaid gigs.

What’s really silly is the Department of Labor’s “tests” for whether an unpaid internship can be offered. In truth, it would be impossible to meet the DOL’s requirements, but that doesn’t seem to matter. Bryan Caplan is on very safe ground in arguing that “Every Unpaid Internship Is Illegal“. Apparently the rules are just for show, though again, some would like to see the practice ended. But here is the truth from Caplan:

“Internships are vocational education. If schools can educate students in exchange for their tuition, why can’t businesses educate students in exchange for their labor? No reason, just anti-market bigotry.“

Caplan’s description of the transaction is apt. From the firm’s point of view, bringing an intern into the office has disadvantages. With some introduction, the intern can perform various low-level tasks, but they absorb the time of paid staff because some degree of oversight is required. And there is some risk: an intern might prove capable of performing fairly complex tasks, but some don’t work out at all. The hope is that they can make a minor contribution to the work effort, add to the firm’s recruiting pipeline, and perhaps strengthen the firm’s ties to the student’s learning institution. In exchange, the intern gains valuable experience in an actual business environment and walks away with a stronger resume and some contacts. A mutually beneficial trade.

For the sake of intellectual consistency, proponents of the minimum wage should oppose unpaid or low-paying internships. The situations differ only in terms of the typical job description and its educational requirements. In both instances, opposition to the voluntary exchange of labor for training and experience would foreclose opportunities of which many are happy to avail themselves. The worst of it is that the minimum wage itself inflicts its damage on the least skilled, who need opportunities the most. This is harmful and foolish intervention, however well-intentioned.

The harm is vividly illustrated by responses to President Obama’s proposal to raise the minimum wage to $10.10 an hour from $7.25, and to various moves on the part of state and local governments to raise the minimum wage within their jurisdictions. The end-game will be higher prices, more automation, lower employment and reduced hours among low-skilled workers (and those with less work experience). This article about Wendy’s is pertinent. It also notes that McDonald’s is planning to automate. Apparently Walmart is cutting hours after responding to pressure to increase wages.

The jury is out on the damage from changes in the minimum wage in cities like Seattle, San Francisco and Los Angeles. Initial signs have indicated some negative employment effects, but the data is noisy and reported at a higher level of aggregation. Regardless, the least skilled will suffer negative consequences. Interestingly, unions backed the increases but have found ways to gain exemptions for their own contracts.

One of the most absurd assertions about wage floors comes from the DOL itself:

“…the DOL cites numerous studies to support its claim that higher wages are associated with higher levels of worker productivity, but the agency gets the causality reversed, among other errors of interpretation.“

The correct rationale for the DOL’s claim is with reference to the productivity of remaining workers near the margin, since less productive workers will have been canned. Too bad! The last link, from Antony Davies of the Mercatus Center, shows the positive relationship between unemployment and the minimum wage for less educated workers. Of course, this does not capture the negative effect on hours worked for those who remain employed following an increase in the wage floor.

Prohibition of unpaid internships would undoubtedly reduce the total number of internships offered to motivated students and others seeking vocational experience and training. The losers are prospective entrants to the knowledge work force who gain valuable experience and credibility as future job candidates by virtue of unpaid or low-paid gigs. But the consequences to would-be interns might not compare to the impact of lost training and experience already suffered by society’s least skilled as a consequence of the minimum wage. They are rendered unemployable by the state, and their alternatives are often limited to dependency or illegal activity.

Censor Me, For My Fathers Have Sinned

30 Thursday Apr 2015

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Male Privilege

Are you White? Asian? Male? A stay-at-home mom? Or maybe your family earns too much? Or your parents did? If any of those are “yes”, you just might be disqualified to engage in debate with those who self-proclaim their big-heartedness. You won’t be disqualified if your views are deemed “correct”, but then “debate” won’t really be an issue. If your views are “incorrect”, your privileged-group status is the stain of original sin, as Warren Meyer would say. Not only are you disqualified; you are an appropriate target for ad hominems.

I wrote about this phenomenon after experiencing it first-hand a few months ago in “Privileged While Males May Not Comment“. Warren Meyer at Coyote Blog just got me excited again when he expressed his amazement in “The Left and Original Sin“:

“… the sins of past generations somehow accrue to individuals of this generation. If you are male, you are born guilty for the infractions of all past males.“

Meyer mentions the recent incident involving Ben Affleck, who asked the host of a PBS documentary to omit any mention of a slave-owning Affleck ancestor:

“So an ancestor held opinions about slavery we all would find horrifying today. But given the times, I can bet that pretty much every relative of Affleck’s of that era, slaveholder or no, held opinions (say about women) that we would likely find offensive today.

Congrats to Affleck for achieving some negative alchemy here. He took an issue (his ancestor’s slave-holding) that did not reflect on him at all and converted it via some “I am a star” douchebaggery into something that makes him look like a tool.”

In addition to the demographic origins of sin mentioned above, you are likely to be stained if you believe in the profit motive, gun rights, or any number of other individual liberties. If you can’t be marked as a sinner by some privileged-group identity, the Left will find another label. If you are a black conservative, you will be called an “Uncle Tom”. Dealing with your arguments is just too inconvenient. As Meyer mentions in another recent post, Leftists are particularly unlikely to pass Bryan Caplan’s Ideological Turing test. They simply don’t listen to, or understand, other points of view.

Free Trade Lets You Make a Deal

29 Wednesday Apr 2015

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tariff_cartoon

“Economists have the least influence on policy where they know the most and are most agreed; they have the most influence on policy where they know the least and disagree most vehemently.”

And what a shame! That quote is Alan Blinder’s Murphy’s Law of economic policy, provided by Greg Mankiw in the New York Times. Mankiw’s article, “Economists Actually Agree on This: The Wisdom of Free Trade“, discusses the prospective Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an agreement that would liberalize trade between the U.S. and a number of Asian nations. A bill is before Congress that would give President Obama “fast track” authority to negotiate the deal. Some provisions of TPP are settled in principle, such as reduced tariffs, free trade unions, a reduced role for the state in the economy, and more transparency. Admittedly, it feels odd to advocate for Barack Obama to negotiate over less government — not to mention transparency!

As Mankiw says, “Among economists, the issue is a no-brainer.” Just as individuals voluntarily engage in trade because it is mutually beneficial, nations should engage in trade when they can specialize in their areas of comparative advantage. Liberalized trade, including reductions in tariffs and removal of quotas and other obstructions, ultimately brings more goods at lower prices. And ultimately, trade liberalization is not really about nations trading with one another. Rather, it is about liberating individuals to trade freely with one another across international borders.

Passage of fast-track authority is not assured. A great deal of nonsense has been written about the agreement. Oddly, people have a big hang-up about imports, but Mankiw notes that this is precisely wrong:

“A nation benefits from imports, [Adam Smith] argued, because they expand its opportunities for consumption. Exports are necessary only because other nations have the temerity to want to be paid for the goods they provide.“

Again, economists across the idealogical spectrum agree with this perspective. Mankiw offers three reasons, attributed to Bryan Caplan, for the public’s ambivalence to free trade:

“The first is an anti-foreign bias. People tend to view their own country in competition with other nations and underestimate the benefits of dealing with foreigners. Yet economics teaches that international trade is not like war but can be win-win.

The second is an anti-market bias. People tend to underestimate the benefits of the market mechanism as a guide to allocating resources. Yet history has taught repeatedly that the alternative — a planned economy — works poorly.

The third is a make-work bias. People tend to underestimate the benefit from conserving on labor and thus worry that imports will destroy jobs in import-competing industries. Yet long-run economic progress comes from finding ways to reduce labor input and redeploying workers to new, growing industries.“

Tyler Cowan is enthusiastic about the prospects for some of the poorest Asian nations to benefit from TPP, especially Vietnam. I seem to recall that he likes the cuisine! Cowan says: “Do you get that, progressives? Poorest country = biggest gainer.“

Dogma, Intolerance and The Decline of Inquiry

11 Wednesday Feb 2015

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Bias in academic research is more common than most people realize. Some recent posts on this topic by Lee Jussim on the Psychology Today Rabble Rouser blog caught my eye. In “Psychology’s Political Diversity Problem“, Jussim shows the abstract of a paper he coauthored on the decline in political diversity among psychological researchers, and the nefarious effects that decline has had on the scope and quality of research. From the abstract:

“This lack of political diversity can undermine the validity of social psychological science via mechanisms such as the embedding of liberal values into research questions and methods, steering researchers away from important but politically unpalatable research topics, and producing conclusions that mischaracterize liberals and conservatives alike;”

Similar phenomena can and have corrupted other areas of research, such as climate science, in which outright fraud has been committed (East Anglia, temperature records) amid a   breakdown in the integrity of the peer-review process. The destructive mechanisms, according to Jussim and his coauthors,  are “self-selection, hostile climate, and discrimination” against researchers holding minority views. I would add that research often will be colored when future funding is perceived as contingent on the nature of the findings.

Jussim follows up with another post on the Rabble Rouser blog entitled “Liberal Bias Distorts Scientific Psychology (and Education)“. In this post, he links to a “disclaimer” essentially stating that his conclusions are NOT a condemnation of the personal morals, competence, or fair-mindedness of so-called liberals in his profession (I disagree with his use of the term “liberal”– these are leftists, not real liberals). He also elaborates on the article he coauthored and provides links on various dimensions of the topic, such as this post by economist Michael Munger entitled “Our higher education system fails leftist students.” From Munger:

“Our colleagues on the left could choose to educate their liberal students, but since education requires ‘collision with error,’ that is no longer possible. That’s because the faculty on the left were themselves educated by neglect, never confronting counterarguments, in a now self-perpetuating cycle of ignorance and ideological bigotry.”

Of course, none of this is new. Bryan Caplan, who is a big fan of the Jussim article, confronted the same topic ten years ago as it pertained then (and still does) to academic economists:

“Even if we control for quality of publications, the gatekeepers – journal editors and referees – also feel virtually no financial cost of rejecting articles they find ideologically distasteful. So there is probably more discrimination against right-wingers than the data suggest, not less. …

If there is no discrimination, how does it happen that Alex [Tabarrok] and I and half the other staunch libertarian economists in the world are all in the same department? Segregation is the predicted effect of worker-on-worker discrimination. And that’s what we see.”

These are the lamentations of some extremely talented academics, not amateurs or pseudoscientists. This is not sour grapes; they are all engaged in a principled fight against bad odds. More importantly, they marshall powerful arguments that their respective fields of study suffer greatly from the effects of “monoculturalism”. After all, differences and argument are the essence of vibrant research and, ultimately, truth-seeking.

Live Long and Prosper With Fossil Fuels

12 Friday Dec 2014

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AltFuelReindeer

Do your friends have even a clue as to the massive cost of eliminating fossil fuels? What it would mean for their way of life? Perhaps they do, but it’s not polite to admit to such obvious truths in many circles. Alex Epstein cares enough to tell the world about the spectacular benefits and currently dismal alternatives to fossil fuels in his new book, The Moral Case For Fossil Fuels. His thesis and and a few of his arguments are reviewed in a pair of posts by Bryan Caplan, who really likes the book. According to Caplan:

“Epstein’s book has two key claims. His first claim is descriptive: Laymen and experts alike greatly underestimate the benefits of fossil fuels and greatly overestimate their costs… .

Epstein’s second key claim is normative: Human well-being is the one fundamentally morally valuable thing. Unspoiled nature is only great insofar as mankind enjoys it… .”

Both claims strike me as reasonable, though the first is true only as a generalization about modern energy mythology, punditry and statist philosophy. In fact, one might say that society acts as if it understands the benefits of fossil fuels very well, as evidenced by our emphasis on maintaining a high and/or growing standard of living supported by these energy sources. Yet the popular misconceptions are a reality, and we persist in choosing leaders who favor policies that handicap fossil fuels and human well-being.

Caplan offers some choice quotes from Epstein’s book. I repeat only three. The first is on the benefits of plentiful energy:

“Energy is what we need to build sturdy homes, to purify water, to produce huge amounts of fresh food, to generate heat and air-conditioning, to irrigate deserts, to dry malaria-infested swamps, to build hospitals, and to manufacture pharmaceuticals, among many other things. And those of us who enjoy exploring the rest of nature should never forget that energy is what enables us to explore to our heart’s content, which preindustrial people didn’t have the time, wealth, energy, or technology to do.”

The second quote might seem controversial to some, but it is unequivocally true:

“[W]hen we look at the data, a fascinating fact emerges: As we have used more fossil fuels, our resource situation, our environment situation, and our climate situation have been improving, too.”

The third quote is about the drawbacks of some prominent alternative energy sources:

“Traditionally in discussions of solar and wind there are two problems cited: the diluteness problem and the intermittency problem. The diluteness problem is that the sun and the wind don’t deliver concentrated energy, which means you need a lot of materials per unit of energy produced…

Such resource requirements are a big cost problem, to be sure, and would be one even if the sun shone all the time and the wind blew all the time. But it’s an even bigger problem that the sun and wind don’t work that way. That’s the real problem– the intermittency problem, or more colloquially, the unreliability problem. As we saw in the Gambian hospital, it is of life and death importance that energy be reliable.”

There is no doubt that technology will someday bring better and cleaner energy sources, but we are nowhere close. The flow of subsidies to weak alternatives destroys resources, and the subsidies themselves skew heavily toward the upper end of the wealth distribution. And of course, popular fears about nuclear energy have limited our ability to diversify. For the indefinite future, we would do well to embrace plentiful and cheap fossil fuels, especially to help reduce poverty and poor living conditions in the developing world.