Tag Archives: Tax Reform

Tax Cuts Yes, Simplification a Mixed Bag

18 Monday Dec 2017

Posted by in Taxes, Trump Administration

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

President Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) this morning, the GOP tax bill with an acronym that simply won’t roll off my tongue. A useful summary of the Act produced by the House -Senate conference, and the full text of the Act, appear at this link. The TCJA hews more toward the earlier Senate bill than the House version. I’ve written about both (the House bill here and both here). Here is a good summary of the Act from Peter Suderman at Reason.com.

In my earlier assessments, I relied upon the principle of tax reform and real simplification as a justification for a tax cut without revenue neutrality. There are a few reforms and partial reforms, and the bill may simplify taxes for a number of individual taxpayers. However, on the whole I’m disappointed with the progress made by the GOP in those areas.

Notwithstanding my disappointment with the overall reform effort, the TCJA cuts taxes for most Americans and is likely to have salutary effects on economic growth and the job market. In fact, one of the most remarkable things about  the Act is the claim made by its adversaries on the Democrat side of the aisle. They apparently believe that the benefits of the TCJA flow primarily or even exclusively to the rich. This is a huge mistake for them. High-income taxpayers will receive greater benefits in absolute dollars, but not proportionally. This is shown by the table above, prepared by Chris Edwards from data produced by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT). In fact, the TCJA will extend tax reductions to a larger share of the middle class than either of its predecessor bills would have done. You cannot meaningfully reduce the taxes generated by a steeply progressive tax system without reducing the absolute dollars paid by high-income taxpayers. And you can’t lay the groundwork for sustainable economic growth without improving the investment incentives faced by high-income taxpayers and producers.

Here are some additional additional thoughts on the bill:

Yeah, I like me some tax cuts: The Act reduces taxes for many individuals and families by doubling the standard deduction and reducing tax rates. More importantly, perhaps, it will also reduce taxes for C-corporations, providing some relief from double taxation of corporate income, as will the switch to a territorial tax system on U.S. corporations doing business abroad. The latter is a real reform, while I consider the former a partial reform. Investment incentives are improved via the corporate rate cut and elimination of the corporate Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) — a real reform, as well as the ability to write-off spending on new equipment immediately. As I argued last month, lower corporate taxes are likely to benefit both workers and consumers. The actions of few companies (AT&T, Comcast, Wells Fargo, and Fifth-Third) seem to demonstrate that this is the case: they have announced bonuses and increases in their base wage rates in the immediate wake of the TCJA’s massage.

Pass-through tax cuts are iffy: One of the most difficult parts of the TCJA to evaluate involves the implications for pass-through business entities like sole proprietorships, partnerships and S-corporations. Some might not receive significant cuts. The Act includes a maximum 25% rate on business income, but that is dependent on the proportion of the owner’s income deemed to be business income under the new rules. It also allows a flat deduction of 20% against business income. These provisions will be of benefit to very successful and very capital-intensive pass-throughs. Owners of smaller or less profitable firms will get the benefit of lower individual tax rates and the higher standard deduction, but might not have income high enough to benefit from the 25% rate cap.

Simpler for some, but it is not simplification: The doubled standard deduction will mean fewer taxpayers claiming itemized deductions. That sounds like simplification, but many will find it reassuring to calculate their taxes both ways, so a compliance burden remains. The Act retains or partially retains a number of deductions and credits slated for elimination in earlier versions, failing a simple principle held by reformers: eliminate deductions in exchange for lower rates. Along the same lines, the individual AMT is retained, but the exemption amount is increased, so fewer taxpayers will pay the AMT. Again, simpler for some, but not real simplification.

Elimination of the corporate AMT is simplification, as are immediate expensing of equipment purchases and territorial tax treatment. However, most of the complexities of corporate taxes remain, as do certain tax breaks targeted at specific industries. What a shame. And unfortunately, taxes for pass-through entities are anything but simplified under the Act. Complex new rules would govern the division of income into business income and the owners’ wage income.

Reducing deductions and bad incentives: The mortgage interest deduction encourages over-investment in housing and subsidizes the wealthiest homebuyers. The TCJA leaves it intact for existing mortgages, but allows the deduction to be claimed on new mortgage loans of up to $750,000. So the bad incentive largely remains, though the very worst of it will be eliminated. There have been complaints that this change could reduce home prices in states with the highest real estate prices. Good — they have been inflated by the subsidy at the expense of other taxpayers.

The tax write-off for state and local taxes (SALT) will be limited to $10,000 a year under the TCJA, though it adds some flexibility by allowing that sum to be met by any combination of state or local income, sales or property taxes. This change will reduce the subsidies from federal taxpayers residents of high-tax states, and should make leaders in those states more circumspect about the size of government.

The TCJA preserves and even expands a number of individual deductions and credits, subsidizing families with children, medical expenses, student loans, graduate students, educational saving, retirement saving, and the working poor. The interests benefiting from these breaks will be relieved, but this is not simplification.

Yet another case of “simpler for some” is the estate tax: it remains, but the exemption amounts are doubled. The estate tax does not produce much revenue, but it is fundamentally unjust: it ensnares the families of deceased property owners, farmers and small businesses; planning for it is costly; and it often forces survivors to sell assets quickly, sustaining losses, in order to meet a tax liability. The TCJA will significantly reduce this burden, but the tax framework will remain in place and will be an ongoing temptation to ravenous sponsors of future tax legislation.

Individual cuts are temporary: The corporate tax changes in the TCJA are permanent. They won’t have to be revisited (though they might be), and permanence is a desirable feature for sustaining the impact of positive incentives. The individual cuts and reforms, however, all expire within eight to ten years. The sun-setting of these provisions is, as some have said, a gimmick to reduce the revenue impact of the Act, but sunsetting means another politically fractious battle down the road. It is also a device to ensure compliance with the Byrd Act, which limits the deficit effects of legislation under Senate reconciliation rules. Eight years is a fairly long “temporary” tax cut, as those things go; for now, the impermanence of the cuts might not weaken the influence on spending. However, that influence is likely to wane as the cuts approach expiration.

Deficit Effects: The TCJA’s impact on the deficit and federal borrowing is likely to be somewhere north of $500 billion, possibly as much as $1.4 trillion. Deficits must be funded by government debt, which competes with private debt for the available pool of savings and must be serviced, repaid via future taxes or inflated away. In the latter sense, government borrowing is not really different from current taxes, a proposition known as Ricardian equivalence.

Nonetheless, the incentives, complexities and compliance costs of our current tax code are damaging, and the TCJA at least accomplishes some measure of reform. Moreover, the incremental debt is small relative to the impact of prior estimates of government borrowing over the next decade, with or without extension of the individual tax cuts. The most fundamental problem that remains is excessive government spending and its competing demands for, and absorption of, resources, with no market guidance as to the value of those uses.

Liar-Left, Daft-Left Bellow: It’s the Unkindest Tax Cut of All

08 Friday Dec 2017

Posted by in Health Insurance, Taxes

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

A misapprehension of progressive leftists is that the tax reform bills under debate by the GOP will revoke something from the needy: the poor, cancer patients, the working class, the aged, you name it. Well, that is a misapprehension held by many earnest leftists, but it amounts to deceitful rhetoric from others. David Harsanyi, in an article about the Left’s penchant for corrupting the English language, attempts to set the record straight:

“Whenever the rare threat of a passable Republican bill emerges, we learn from Democrats that thousands, or perhaps millions, of lives are at stake. …

… the most obvious and ubiquitous of the Left’s contorted contentions about the tax bill deliberately muddles the concept of giving and the concept of not taking enough. This distortion is so embedded in contemporary rhetoric that I’m not sure most of the foot soldiers even think it’s odd to say anymore. …  Whatever you make of the separate tax bills the House and Senate have passed, though, the authors do not take one penny from anyone. In fact, no spending is being cut (unfortunately). Not one welfare program is being block-granted. Not one person is losing a subsidy. It’s just a wide-ranging tax cut without any concurrent spending cuts.“

The Left may have a basic math incompetency, or maybe they know better when they insist that the GOP plans will inflict a new burden on the middle class. The middle class actually receives larger reductions in taxes than higher strata. Veronique de Rugy highlighted this point recently:

“President Trump’s intention to give a real tax break to the middle class is counter-productive considering the middle class barely shoulders any of the income tax as it is. The top 10 percent of income earners—households making $133K [or more], not $1 million as most assume—currently pay more than 70 percent of all income tax revenue. The middle quintile pays, on average, 2.6 percent of the federal income tax.

And yet, in both the House and Senate plans the middle class receives the largest tax relief by reducing their marginal tax rates, increasing the child tax credit and doubling the standard deduction. The result is fewer taxpayers would be paying income tax at all, problematic from a small government perspective. It also means a more progressive income tax code than it already is.

The House plan also effectively jacks up the top marginal rate for some high earners by using a 39.6 percent bubble rate on the first $90K earned by single taxpayers making $1 million and married taxpayers making $1.2 million and a 12 percent rate like everyone else.“

I have listened to horror stories about school teachers who, in the past, were able to deduct supplies they purchased for their students. Now, the cruel GOP is trying to take that away! This argument neatly ignores the doubling of the standard deduction. Many teachers will find that it no longer makes sense to itemize deductions, and they will come out ahead. But for the sake of argument, suppose a teacher earning $50,000 itemizes and spends $2,500 on unreimbursed supplies for their students every year. At the Senate plan’s new rate in that bracket, the lost deduction will cost the teacher $550, but about $300 would be saved via rate reductions for every $10,000 of taxable income. The teacher is likely to come out ahead even if he unwisely passes on the improved standard deduction.

Liberal thought-whisperers have goaded their minions into believing that the GOP intends to cut Medicare funds by $25 billion a year going forward. The bills under discussion would do no such thing. However, in a rare gesture of fiscal responsibility, President Obama in 2010 signed the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act (Paygo), which may require automatic reductions in outlays when spending or tax changes lead to an increase in federal debt. The act has never been enforced, and Republican leadership in both houses insists that Paygo can and will be waived. Clearly, the GOP’s intent is not to allow the Paygo cuts to take place. Even the left-leaning Snopes.com is reasonably neutral on this point. But if Paygo takes hold, the lefties will have themselves to blame.

At the last link, Snopes also touches on one actual provision of the Senate tax plan, the repeal of the Obamacare individual mandate, or rather, the repeal of the “penalty tax” imposed by the IRS on uninsured individuals. The Supreme Court ruled that it is a tax in 2012, at the time giving rise to a mixture of delight and embarrassment on the Left. The ruling saved Obamacare, but the Left had been loath to call the penalty a tax. The supposed rub here is that repeal of the mandate will be greeted enthusiastically by many young and healthy individuals. Freed from coercion, many of them will elect to go without coverage, leading to a deterioration of the exchange risk pools and causing premiums paid by the remaining exchange buyers to rise. However, the critics conveniently ignore the fact that Obamacare individual subsidies will automatically ratchet upward with increases in the premium on the Silver Plan. So the panic related to this portion of the Senate tax bill is misplaced.

One other point about the mandate: because it coerces the payment of cross-subsidies by the young and healthy to higher-risk insurance buyers, the mandate distorts the pricing of risk, the incentives to insure, and the use of resources in the provision of health insurance and health care itself. This is how the proper function of a market is destroyed. And this is how resources are wasted. Good riddance to the mandate. The high-risk population should be subsidized directly, not through distorted pricing, at least until such time as a market for future insurability can be established. As Jeffrey Tucker has said, repeal of the mandate is a very good first step.

The loss of the medical expense deduction is not a done deal. While the House plan eliminates the deduction, the Senate plan reduces the minimum medical expense requirement from 10% to just 7.5% of qualified income, so it is more generous than under current law. I’ve seen bloggers commit basic misstatements of facts on this and other provisions, such as confusing this limit with a total limit on the amount of the medical deduction. This deduction tends to benefit higher-income individuals who itemize deductions, which will represent a higher threshold under the increased standard deduction. Of course, this deduction appeals to our sense of fairness, but like all the complexities in the tax code, it comes with costs: not only does it add to compliance costs and create a need for higher tax rates, but it subsidizes demand for medical care, much like the tax breaks available on employer-provided health care, and it therefore inflates health care costs for everyone. To the extent that these deductions and many others are still in play, the GOP plans fall short of real tax reform.

The GOP tax bills certainly have their shortcomings. I hope some of them are rectified in conference. The bills do not offer extensive simplification of the tax code, and they would not be truly historic: in real terms, an earlier version of the House bill would have been the fourth biggest cut in U.S. history relative to GDP, and I believe the version that passed the House is smaller. However, many of the arguments mounted by the Left against the bills are without merit and are often deceitful. The Left strongly identifies with the zero-sum philosophy inherent in collectivism, and the misleading arguments I’ve cited are plausible to the less-informed among that crowd. That brings me back to David Harsanyi’s point, discussed at the top of this post: “intellectuals” on the progressive Left find value in corrupting the meaning of words and phrases like “budget cuts”, “giving” and “taking”:

“Everyone tends to dramatize the consequences of policy for effect, of course, but a Democratic Party drifting towards Bernie-ism is far more likely to perceive cuts in taxation as limiting state control and thus an attack on all decency and morality.“

“There is a parallel explanation for the hysterics. With failure comes frustration, and frustration ratchets up the panic-stricken rhetoric. It’s no longer enough to hang nefarious personal motivations on your political opponents — although it certainly can’t hurt! — you have to corrupt language and ideas to imbue your ham-fisted arguments with some kind of basic plausibility.“

Stumbling Through Pass-Through Tax Reform

22 Wednesday Nov 2017

Posted by in Taxes

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

, , , , , , , ,

Small_tax

The GOP tax reform bill passed by the House of Representatives last week contains a reduced tax rate for “pass-through” business income. The discussion of this provision in my post of November 9 was accurate as far as it went, with one qualification: the highest marginal federal tax rate on pass-through profit income would be 25% under the bill, down from 39.6% currently. However, the bill contains complex rules for defining pass-through profit that qualifies for the lower rate, and my earlier treatment was woefully inadequate with regard to those rules.

The House bill seeks to address concerns that owners of personal-service businesses would be tempted to classify an “excessive” share of their income as profit rather than wages and salary. Profit would qualify for the new rate, but the wages and salary paid to the owner would not. Currently, all pass-through income is treated the same. Therefore, “safeguards” were inserted in the bill to prevent the presumed “abuse” that could occur under the bill (or see here or here). First, pass-throughs would be subject to a 70/30 rule: 70% of pass-through income would be treated as wage and salary payments; 30% would be treated as profit. That’s the simplest option. But it means that the true marginal rate on a dollar of income for an owner in the top bracket would be roughly 35.2% (0.7×39.6% + 0.3×25%). That’s much less favorable than my earlier post implied. It’s also less favorable than the corporate rate cut.

Alternatively, a business owner could use a schedule based on invested capital to determine a percentage of income qualifying for the 25% rate. This might benefit a physician invested in costly medical equipment, for example. However, other personal-service businesses are specifically assigned a percentage of zero. This list includes accountants, lawyers, financial advisors, and performers. Imagine that: the House approved a benefit for which lawyers cannot not qualify!!

Another important point is that many small businesses people do not earn enough to benefit from the 25% pass-through rate. Yes, they would see reductions in their marginal rates in lower brackets (and there would be fewer brackets), but in some cases the loss of deductions for items like state and local taxes would be more than offsetting. So it’s not clear how many pass-through business owners would actually benefit from the plan.

The Senate bill takes an entirely different approach. It reduces tax rates in lower brackets, but it would also allow pass-throughs to deduct a flat 17.4% from taxable income, effectively reducing the top marginal rate from 39.6% to 32.7%. Effective rates in all lower brackets would be reduced by the same percentage. There is no distinction in the Senate bill between wage and salary payments versus profits.

The post linked in the first paragraph left the impression that the House tax bill offered more relief for small businesses than the Senate bill, and that’s probably not true, at least for the most successful small businesses. However, the National Federation of Independent Business estimates that at least 85% of small business would not qualify for the 25% rate. Some businesses won’t qualify simply because they are too small to pay a rate exceeding 25%. And when a business qualifies, only 30% of its income will qualify for the reduced rate. Other pass-through businesses won’t qualify due to the nature of their services, another example of different tax treatment of different sources of income. The rules governing qualification for the 25% rate are distortionary and are hardly a simplification. The Senate bill, on the whole, probably does more for small business owners in lower brackets and probably many in higher brackets as well.

The Socially Seductive Tax Deduction

20 Monday Nov 2017

Posted by in Taxes

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , ,

deductions desert

The rat’s nest that is the federal income tax code is a testament to the counter-productive nature of central economic planning. Not only does the tax code force citizens to waste time and other resources on compliance activities. It also encourages us to direct resources into uses that would not be worthwhile in the absence of tax incentives, uses that are not worthwhile in a societal context.

A general rationale for many provisions of the tax code is that they serve some “worthwhile” public purpose. A special tax provision is created to subsidize activities contributing to that purpose. Since that reduces the flow of revenue, tax rates must increase as an offset. However, high tax rates are damaging to economic health in and of themselves. They blunt incentives and drive wedges between the values and rewards that guide all economic decisions.

The competing tax plans under debate in the House and Senate would eliminate or pare back deductions to varying degrees, enabling a reduction in tax rates. I applaud steps in that direction, though a consequence of doing so piecemeal is to invite later tinkering of the sort that got us into this mess in the first place. Both the House and Senate bills are piecemeal. Here is a run-down of some of the deductions that are under review in the GOP plans:

State and Local Tax (SALT) Deductions: this deduction prevents the imposition of federal “taxes on taxes”, which is a worthwhile consideration. However, SALT also gives lower levels of government a “discount” on tax burdens they impose on their citizens, thereby forcing that burden to be shared by members of other jurisdictions. According to the Tax Foundation:

“The deduction favors high-income, high-tax states like California and New York, which together receive nearly one-third of the deduction’s total value nationwide. Six states—California, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Texas, and Pennsylvania—claim more than half of the value of the deduction.“

Defenders of this deduction note peremptorily that it is used by taxpayers in all fifty states, as if that should come as a surprise. Well of course it is! And those who are taxed most heavily benefit the most from this deduction, and those benefits are most concentrated in high-tax states. The House GOP bill would limit the SALT deduction to $10,000, while the Senate version would eliminate it entirely.

Mortgage Interest (MI) Deduction: Long ago, the idea took hold that ownership of a home was of greater inherent value than mere occupancy. It’s obviously true that owners have greater rights than renters over use of a property. Those benefits are internalized, and owner-occupants might well be more inclined than renters to take pride in, care for, and improve a property. That suggests a social or external benefit from home ownership, one that at least benefits others in the vicinity of a given property.

The MI deduction creates an incentive for debt-financed home ownership, but only for the minority of taxpayers who can benefit from itemizing deductions. It therefore tends to subsidize the housing choices of those at higher levels of income and those with larger homes. It has contributed little, if anything, to the homeownership rate. Here are Edward Glaeser and Jesse Shapiro describing the findings of their NBER Working Paper:

“Externalities from living around homeowners are far too small to justify the deduction. … the home mortgage interest deduction is a particularly poor instrument for encouraging homeownership since it is targeted at the wealthy, who are almost always homeowners. The irrelevance of the deduction is supported by the time series which shows that the ownership subsidy moves with inflation and has changed significantly between 1960 and today, but the homeownership rate has been essentially constant.“

This deduction has fostered a massive over-investment in housing relative to other assets and forms of consumption. The House tax bill would allow a deduction on interest payments for up to $500,000 of mortgage debt, but this limit would apply only to new mortgages. The Senate bill would not alter the deduction in any way. These steps are severely limited in their reform ambitions.

Medical Expense Deduction: To take this deduction, you must 1) be an itemizer; and 2) have eligible medical expenses exceeding 10% of adjusted gross income (AGI). Then, you can deduct only the excess above 10%. A relatively small percentage of taxpayers actually take this deduction, mostly wealthy, older individuals or couples. It can be argued that the deduction encourages overuse of medical resources in some cases, but there are certainly others in which it provides relief from the hardship of an illness requiring expensive care. On the other hand, the deduction might serve to discourage the purchase of supplemental Medicare coverage by individuals who can afford it but are willing to bet that they won’t need it. Part of that bet is covered by the deduction.

The House bill would repeal this deduction in its entirety. The Senate bill would leave it untouched.

Student Loan Interest Deduction: Currently, up to $2,500 of student loan interest can be deducted “above the line” by non-itemizers, but only if their AGI is within certain limits. Higher education is often claimed to have social (external) benefits. To some extent, the student loan interest deduction helps bring the cost of an eduction to within reach of a broader swath of the citizenry. These considerations provide the rationale for public subsidies for funding tuition and other costs with debt. The tax deduction is only one of many forms of education subsidies. Another is provided by the below-market rates at which students are able to borrow from the federal government.

The social benefits of higher education are strongly associated with the value it adds for the individual. It can be argued that as a society, we may have pushed college education well beyond that point. A large number of indebted students decide, too late, that continued enrollment has little value, so they drop out and often default on their federally-subsidized debt. Moreover, these loan subsidies stimulate the demand for college education, which leads to a certain amount of escalation in tuition and fees. These ill effects make elimination of this deduction a tempting way to broaden the income-tax base, enabling a reduction in tax rates.

The House bill eliminates the deduction for student loan interest, but the Senate bill leaves it intact.

Conclusion: There are plenty of shortcomings in both the House and Senate versions of tax reform. Three liberalizing goals of reform are tax simplification, elimination of provisions that benefit special interests, and of course lower rates. Most of the complexities in the tax code benefit special interests in one way or another. The deductions discussed above fall into that category and necessitate higher tax rates on personal income. That in turn makes the deductions more valuable to those who claim them. In terms of the liberalizing goals of reform, the House tax bill is wider ranging than the Senate version, though the Senate bill’s complete elimination of the SALT deduction is better.

Labor Shares the Burden of the Corporate Income Tax

03 Friday Nov 2017

Posted by in Taxes

≈ 3 Comments

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , ,

As expected, a reduction of the corporate income tax rate from 35% to 20% is included in the GOP’s tax reform bill, a summary of which was released today. That rate cut would be a welcome development for workers, consumers, and corporate shareholders. It should be no surprise that the burden of the U.S. corporate income tax is not borne exclusively by owners of capital. In fact, it might hurt workers and consumers substantially while imposing relatively little burden on shareholders.

John Cochrane’s post on the incidence of the tax on corporate income is very interesting, though by turns it rambles and may be too technical for some tastes. He notes that the incidence of the corporate tax can fall on only three different groups: shareholders, workers and customers:

“As an accounting matter, every cent [of taxes] corporations pay comes from higher prices, lower wages, or lower payments to shareholders. The only question is which one.“

Cochrane quotes Lawrence Summers and Paul Krugman, both of whom are of the belief that the incidence of the corporate tax must fall primarily on capital and not on labor. That’s consistent with their view that a reduction in corporate taxes amounts to a gift to shareholders. But Cochrane isn’t at all convinced:

“The usual principle is that he or she bears the burden who can’t get out of the way. So, how much room do companies, as a whole, have to raise prices, lower wages, lower interest payments, or lower dividends?”

In fact, owners of capital can get out of the way. Capital is very mobile relative to labor. Here’s a counterfactual exercise Cochrane steps through in order to illustrate the implications of ownership bearing the incidence of the tax: if equity markets are efficient, share prices reflect all available information about the firm. If wages and product prices are unchanged after the imposition of the tax, then shareholders would suffer an immediate loss. Once the tax is discounted into share prices, there would be no further impact on current or future shareholders. Thus, future buyers of shares would escape the tax burden entirely. As a first approximation, the share price must fall to the point at which the ongoing return on the stock is restored to its value prior to imposition of the tax.

Cochrane notes that evidence on the reaction of stock prices to corporate tax changes is mixed at best, which implies that the incidence of corporate taxation falls more weakly on shareholders than many believe. That leaves consumers or workers to bear a significant part of the burden. Workers and consumers are mostly one and the same: economy-wide, higher prices mean lower real wages; lower wages also mean lower real wages. So I’ll continue to speak as if the incidence of the tax falls on either labor or capital, and we can leave aside consumers as a separate category. Cochrane says:

“It used to be thought that it was easy to lower payments to shareholders — ‘the supply of savings is inelastic’ — so that’s where the tax would come from. The newer consensus is that companies as a whole have very little power to pay less to investors, … so the corporate tax comes from lower wages or, equivalently, higher prices. Then, indirectly, reducing the corporate tax would increase capital, which would result in higher wages.”

Cochrane’s post and another on his blog were prompted by an earlier piece by Greg Mankiw showing that real wages, in an open economy, will have a strong negative response to a corporate tax increase. Here is the reasoning: the tax reduces the return earned from invested capital in the short run. Ideally, capital is deployed only up to the point at which its return no longer exceeds the opportunity cost needed to attract it. Given time to adjust, less capital must be deployed after the imposition of the tax in order to force the return on a marginal unit of capital back up to the given opportunity cost. That means less capital deployed per worker, and that, in turn, reduces labor productivity and wages.

Another issue addressed by Cochrane has to do with assertions that monopoly power in the corporate sector is a good rationale for a high tax on corporate income. You can easily convince me that the “average” firm in the corporate sector earns a positive margin over marginal cost. However, a microeconomic analysis of monopoly behavior by the entire corporate sector would be awkward, to say the least. Despite all that, Cochrane notes that monopolists have more power than firms in competitive sectors to raise prices, and monopsonists have more power to reduce wages. Therefore, the “tax the monopolists” line of argument does not suggest that labor will avoid a significant burden of a corporate tax. A safer bet is that firms in the U.S. corporate sector are price-takers in capital markets, but to some degree may be price-makers in product and labor markets.

Cochrane also emphasizes the inefficiency of the corporate tax as a redistributional mechanism, even if shareholders bear a significant share of its burden. It is still likely to harm workers via lost productivity, as discussed above. It is also true that many workers hold corporate equities in their retirement funds, so a corporate tax harms them directly in their dual role as owners of capital.

The cut in the corporate tax rate is but one element of many in the GOP bill, but a related provision is that so-called “pass-through” income, of the type earned via many privately-owned businesses, would be taxed at a maximum rate of 25%. These businesses generate more income than C-corporations. Currently, pass-through income is taxed as ordinary income, so capping the top rate at 25% represents a very large tax cut. As Alex Tabarrok points out at the last link, tax treatment should be neutral with respect to the form of business organization, but under the GOP bill, the effective gap between the top rate for pass-throughs versus corporate income would be even larger than it is now.

Critics of a reduction in corporate taxes should bear in mind that its incidence falls at least partly on labor, perhaps mainly on labor. The U.S. has the highest corporate tax rate in the industrialized world. That undermines U.S. competitiveness, as does the complexity of corporate tax rules. Tax planning and compliance burn up massive resources while drastically reducing the tax “take”, i.e., the revenue actually collected. The corporate income tax is something of a “show” tax that exists to appease populist and leftist elements in the electorate who consistently fail to recognize the unexpectedly nasty consequences of their own advocacy.

 

Trump Budget Facts and Falsehoods

02 Friday Jun 2017

Posted by in Federal Budget, Government, Trump Administration

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The innumerate left is unhappy over cuts in various categories of spending in the budget proposal submitted by the Trump Administration last week. However, they have adopted “talking points” that are incorrect in an effort to rail against the budget. There is no reduction in overall spending in the proposal. Instead, there is a reduction in the growth of total spending. Ryan McMaken calls the mistaken assertions about spending “the media version of ‘cuts’“. The budget plan calls for an increase in total spending of 41% ($1.7 trillion) by 2027, versus 63% ($2.6 trillion) under the baseline (based on current law). Many of the actual cuts and growth reductions are in so-called discretionary spending. However, in one key mandatory component, Medicaid, spending increases by 39% under the plan, or $146 billion, versus 82% under the baseline. That is not a spending cut.

Another issue over which the Trump budget has been attacked is the so-called “math error,” or “double counting” of economic growth, to which former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers alluded with apparent delight. The gist of it is that the proposal somehow double-counted the salutary effects of growth in eliminating the projected deficit over the next ten years. In other words, the tax cuts proposed by Trump would be not just revenue-neutral due to stronger growth; they would result in an increase in tax revenue sufficient to eliminate the deficit by 2027.

Thus far, the Trump tax reform plan has been revealed in only a one-page summary released in late April. In static terms, it implied a loss of revenue of $5 trillion over ten years, though the summary left many features unclear. There could be additional provisions to broaden the tax base that might bring the ten-year static revenue loss down to somewhere between $3 and $4 trillion. In dynamic terms, however, the impact of the tax cuts would be smaller. The cuts would stimulate the economy (yes, they would!), but the precise impact on growth is unknown. In the budget, economic growth is assumed to increase from 1.8% to 3.0% annually over most of the ten year period. That has been criticized as unrealistic, but such a boost would likely be enough to make the tax cuts revenue neutral.

Here is a summary of the budget from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The tables at the back of the document, on pages 27 and 29, provide enough information on the cumulative ten-year changes to evaluate Summers’ double-counting claim. Keep in mind that his claim applies to changes expressed relative to a baseline. The proposed budget shows a total ten-year deficit projection of $3.2 trillion, compared to baseline of $6.7 trillion. So the deficits are reduced by a total of $3.5 trillion over the full ten years.

Individual and corporate income tax receipts are virtually unchanged over the ten-year period. There’s our revenue neutrality. Other receipts are down by $0.9 trillion, however. Most of that decline is attributed to a $1 trillion “allowance for repeal and replacement of Obamacare”, presumably elimination of taxes on such things as medical devices, Cadillac insurance policies, and fines for failing to comply with insurance mandates. So increased tax revenues do not account for the decline in the budget deficit.

Total cumulative outlays are reduced by $4.6 trillion in the budget proposal relative to the baseline. That more than accounts for the ten-year deficit reduction. Like the policies or not, the decline in spending is sufficient, relative to the baseline, to fully explain the deficit reduction. Yes, the budget assumes that some of the spending reductions are afforded by the faster assumed rate of economic growth, such as welfare payments, but that is not double-counting.

Revenue neutrality of the tax cuts is certainly an assumption worth questioning, especially because the summary of the tax plan gave every impression of abandoning neutrality. Neutrality was probably imposed on the budget plan as a matter of convenience. In a sense, it made the job of presenting the Administration’s spending priorities (like them or not) a cleaner exercise. For another, while budget reconciliation rules do not require the tax plan to be revenue neutral, Senate leaders have stated their strong desire for neutrality. The Trump budget proposal thereby allows Congress’ budget process to get underway while deferring the introduction of a more detailed and potentially controversial tax plan, one that is obviously still in flux and is likely to involve a loss of revenue, even in a dynamic sense.

The assumed change in economic growth is not solely attributable to tax effects, however. It would be reasonable to expect some growth to be driven by deregulation and the “deconstruction of the administrative state“, as Steve Bannon described so eloquently. This intention is embodied in the budget proposal. In that sense, it was unnecessary for OMB to impose revenue neutrality of the tax plan to eliminate the budget deficit over ten years. The economic growth spurred by deregulation would generate some of the extra growth in tax revenue.

I happen to like many of the priorities expressed in the proposed budget, despite the document’s lack of specificity. This includes the deregulatory initiatives, Obamacare repeal and replacement (we’re waiting…), and some of the welfare reform proposals. I am not happy about the scale of the shift toward defense, and I am not happy that government continues to grow in the aggregate. And as for the still-incubating tax reform plan, I like many of the features originally described, though not all.

Many believe that the Administration’s economic growth assumptions are unrealistic, and many dislike the spending priorities. Those cannot be used as excuses for mischaracterizing the proposal, however. Reductions in some spending categories occur only relative to the baseline growth path. They are not real cuts in spending. Likewise, Summers’ double-counting allegation is false. The recovery of tax revenue via economic growth is not double counted, and there is no “math error”. The proposed reductions in spending relative to the baseline more than account for the deficit reduction. I suspect that Summers’ motives were strictly polemic and not grounded in a careful examination of the budget proposal. He is not innumerate. What’s worse, a number of economists swallowed the “double-counting” story hook, line, and sinker.

A Trump Tax Reform Tally

03 Wednesday May 2017

Posted by in Big Government, Taxes, Trump Administration

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

IMG_4199

The Trump tax plan has some very good elements and several that I dislike strongly. For reference, this link includes the contents of an “interpretation” of the proposal from Goldman Sachs, based on the one-page summary presented by the Administration last week as well as insights that the investment bank might have gleaned from its connections within the administration. At the link, click on the chart for an excellent summary of the plan relative to current law and other proposals.

At the outset, I should state that most members of the media do not understand economics, tax burdens, or the dynamic effects of taxes on economic activity. First, they seem to forget that in the first instance, taxpayers do not serve at the pleasure of the government. It is their money! Second, Don Boudreaux’s recent note on the media’s “taxing” ignorance is instructive:

“In recent days I have … heard and read several media reports on Trump’s tax plan…. Nearly all of these reports are juvenile: changes in tax rates are evaluated by the media according to changes in the legal tax liabilities of various groups of people. For example, Trump’s proposal to cut the top federal personal income-tax rate from 39.6% to 35% is assessed only by its effect on high-income earners. Specifically, of course, it’s portrayed as a ‘gift’ to high-income earners.

… taxation is not simply a slicing up of an economic pie the size of which is independent of the details of the system of taxation. The core economic case for tax cuts is that they reduce the obstacles to creative and productive activities.“

Boudreaux ridicules those who reject this “supply-side” rationale, despite its fundamental and well-established nature. Thomas Sowell makes the distinction between tax rates and tax revenues, and provides some history on tax rate reductions and particularly “tax cuts for the rich“:

“… higher-income taxpayers paid more — repeat, MORE tax revenues into the federal treasury under the lower tax rates than they had under the previous higher tax rates. … That happened not only during the Reagan administration, but also during the Coolidge administration and the Kennedy administration before Reagan, and under the G.W. Bush administration after Reagan. All these administrations cut tax rates and received higher tax revenues than before.

More than that, ‘the rich’ not only paid higher total tax revenues after the so-called ‘tax cuts for the rich,’ they also paid a higher percentage of all tax revenues afterwards. Data on this can be found in a number of places …“

In some cases, a proportion of the increased revenue may have been due to short-term incentives for asset sales in the wake of tax rate reductions. In general, however, Sowell’s point stands.

Kevin Williamson offers thoughts that could be construed as exactly the sort of thing about which Boudreaux is critical:

“It is nearly impossible to cut federal income taxes in a way that primarily benefits low-income Americans, because high-income Americans pay most of the federal income taxes. … The 2.4 percent of households with incomes in excess of $250,000 a year pay about half of all federal income taxes; the bottom half pays about 3 percent.”

The first sentence of that quote highlights the obvious storyline pounced upon by simple-minded journalists, and it also emphasizes the failing political appeal of tax cuts when a decreasing share of the population actually pays taxes. After all, there is some participatory value in spreading the tax burden in a democracy. I believe Williamson is well aware of the second-order, dynamic consequences of tax cuts that spread benefits more broadly, but he is also troubled by the fact that significant spending cuts are not on the immediate agenda: the real resource cost of government will continue unabated. We cannot count on that from Trump, and that should not be a big surprise. Greater accumulation of debt is a certainty without meaningful future reductions in the growth rate of spending.

Here are my thoughts on the specific elements contained in the proposal, as non-specific as they might be:

What I like about the proposal:

  • Lower tax rate on corporate income (less double-taxation): The U.S. has the highest corporate tax rates in the developed world, and the corporate income tax represents double-taxation of income: it is taxed at the corporate level and again at the individual level, perhaps not all at once, but when it is actually received by owners.
  • Adoption of a territorial tax system on corporate income: The U.S. has a punishing system of taxing corporate income wherever it is earned, unlike most of our trading parters. It’s high time we shifted to taxing only the corporate income that is earned in the U.S., which should discourage the practice of tax inversion, whereby firms transfer their legal domicile overseas.
  • No Border Adjustment Tax (BAT): What a relief! This was essentially the application of taxes on imports but tax-free exports. Whatever populist/nationalist appeal this might have had would have quickly evaporated with higher import prices and the crushing blow to import-dependent businesses. Let’s hope it doesn’t come back in congressional negotiations.
  • Lower individual tax rates: I like it.
  • Fewer tax brackets: Simplification, and somewhat lower compliance costs.
  • Fewer deductions from personal income, a broader tax base, and lower compliance costs. Scrapping deductions for state and local taxes in exchange for lower rates will end federal tax subsidies from low-tax to high-tax states.
  • Elimination of the Alternative Minimum Tax: This tax can be rather punitive and it is a nasty compliance cost-causer.

What I dislike about the proposal:

  • The corporate tax rate should be zero (with no double taxation).
  • Taxation of cash held abroad, an effort to encourage repatriation of the cash for reinvestment in the U.S. Taxes on capital of any kind are an act of repeated taxation, as the income used to accumulate capital is taxed to begin with. And such taxes are destructive of capital, which represents a fundamental engine for productivity and economic growth.
  • Retains the mortgage interest and charitable deductions: Both are based on special interest politics. The former leads to an overallocation of resources to owner-occupied housing. Certainly the latter has redeeming virtues, but it subsidizes activities conferring unique benefits to large donors.
  • Increase in the standard deduction: This means fewer “interested” taxpayers. See the  discussion of the Kevin Williamson article above.
  • We should have just one personal income tax bracket, not three: A flat tax would be simpler and would reduce distortions to productive incentives.
  • Tax relief for child-care costs: More special interest politics. Subsidizing market income relative to home activity, hired child care relative to parental care, and fertility is not an appropriate role for government. To the extent that public aid payments are made, they should not be contingent on how the money is spent.
  • Many details are missing: Almost anything could happen with this tax “plan” when the real negotiations begin, but that’s politics, I suppose.

Mixed Feelings:

  • Descriptions of the changes to treatment of pass-through” income seem confused. There is only one kind of tax applied to the income of pass-through entities like S-corporations, and it is the owner’s individual tax rate. Income from C-corporations, on the other hand, is taxed twice: once at a 15% corporate tax rate under the Trump plan, and a second time when it is paid to investors at an individual tax rate, which now range from 15% to almost 24% for “qualified dividends” (most dividend payments), but are likely to range up to 35% for “ordinary” dividends under the plan. So effectively, double-taxed C-corporate income would be taxed at total rates ranging from 30% to 50% after tallying both the C-corp tax and the individual tax. (This is a simplification: C-corp income paid as dividends would be taxed to the corporation and then immediately to the shareholder at their individual rate, while retained corporate income would be taxed later).

Presumably, the Trump tax plan is to reduce the rate on “pass-through” income to just 15% at the individual level, regardless of other income. (It is not clear how that would effect brackets or the rate of taxation on other components of individual income.) Is that good? Yes, to the extent that lower tax rates allow individuals to keep more of their hard-earned income, and to the extent that such a change would help small businesses. S-corps have always had an advantage in avoiding double taxation, however, and this would not end the differential taxation of S and C income, which is distortionary. It might incent business owners to shift income away from salary payments to profit, however, which would increase the negative impact on tax revenue.

  • Interest deductibility and expensing of capital expenditures are in question. Interest deductibility puts debt funding on an equal footing with equity funding only if the double tax on C-corp income is fully repealed. Immediate expensing of “capex” would certainly provide an investment incentive (as long as “excess” expenses can be carried forward), and for C-corporations, it would certainly bring us closer to elimination of the double-tax on income (the accounting matching principle be damned!).
  • There is no commitment to shrink government, but that’s partly (only partly) a function of having abandoned revenue neutrality. It’s also something that has been promised for the next budget year.
  • The tax reform proposal represents a departure from insistence on revenue neutrality: On the whole, I find this appealing, not because I like deficits better than taxes, but because there may be margins along which tax policy can be improved if unconstrained by neutrality, assuming that the incremental deficits are less damaging to the economy than the gains. The political landscape may dictate that desirable changes in tax policy can be made more easily in this way.

Shikha Dalmia wonders whether a real antidote for “Trumpism” might be embedded within the tax reform proposal. If the reforms are successful in stimulating non-inflationary economic growth, a “big if” on the first count, the popular preoccupations inspired by Trump with immigration policy, the “wall” and protectionism might just fade away. But don’t count on it. On the whole, I think the tax reform proposal has promise, though some of the good parts could vanish before a bill hits Trump’s desk, and some of the bad parts could get worse!

The Mortgage Interest Deduction Delusion

29 Saturday Mar 2014

Posted by in Uncategorized

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, ,

Image

The home mortgage interest deduction does not encourage home ownership and it disproportionately benefits high-income taxpayers. A study of the MI deduction’s various impacts in National Affairs demonstrates the extent to which its benefits are skewed to high-earners, wealthy suburbs, the coasts and other areas with high real estate prices. The study also discusses the perverse incentives created by the deduction.

If you think the MI deduction helps you personally, remember that it almost certainly inflated the price you paid for your home and the amount you had to finance, and it likely has caused the income tax rate you pay to be higher than it would be in its absence. There is little or nothing to recommend the deduction as policy. Even the ostensible goal of a federally-directed increase in home ownership is of questionable value. Reform of the tax code will be politically charged, and this provision will have its share of staunch defenders. The authors discuss various alternatives and approaches to reform that could ease the transition away from the deduction.