Tag Archives: Ham Sandwich Nation

JoyPolitik: Greed, Gouging, and Gullability

18 Wednesday Sep 2024

Posted by in Inflation, Price Controls

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Economic ignorance and campaign politics seem to go hand-in-hand, especially when it comes to the rhetoric of avowed interventionists. They love “easy” answers. If they get their way, negative but predictable consequences are always “unintended” and/or someone else’s fault. Unfortunately, too many journalists and voters like “easy” answers, and they repeatedly fall for the ploy.

This post highlights one of many bad ideas coming out of the Kamala Harris campaign. I probably won’t have time to cover all of her bad ideas before the election. There are just too many! I hope to highlight a few from the Trump campaign as well. Unfortunately, the two candidates have more than one bad idea in common.

Price Gouging

Here I’ll focus on Harris’ destructive proposal for a federal ban on “price gouging”. Unfortunately, she has yet to define precisely what she means by that term. On its face, she’d apparently support legislation authorizing the DOJ to go after grocers, gas stations, or other sellers in visible industries charging prices deemed excessive by the federal bureaucracy. This is a form of price control and well in keeping with the interventionist mindset.

As Michael Munger has said, when you charge “too much” you are “gouging”; when you charge “too little” you are “predatory”; and when you charge the same price as competitors you’ve engaged in a price fixing conspiracy. The fact that Harris’ proposal is deliberately vague is an even more dangerous invitation to arbitrary caprice by federal enforcers. It might be hard to price a ham sandwich without breaking such a law.

The great advantage of the price system is its impersonal coordination of the actions of disparate agents, creating incentives for both buyers and sellers to direct resources toward their most valued uses. Price controls of any kind short circuit that coordination, inevitably leading to shortages (or surpluses), misallocations, and diminished well being.

Inflation As Aggregate Macro Gouging

Aside from vote buying, Harris has broader objectives than the usual “anti-gouging” sentiment that accompanies negative supply shocks. She’s faced mounting pressure to address prices that have soared during the Biden Administration. The inflation during and after the COVID pandemic was induced by supply shortfalls first and then a spending/money-printing binge by the federal government. The pandemic induced shortages in some key areas, but the Treasury and the Fed together engineered a gigantic cash dump to accommodate that shock. This stimulated demand and turned temporary dislocations into permanently higher prices.

There were howls from the Left that greed in the private sector was to blame, despite plentiful evidence to the contrary. Blaming “price gouging” for inflated prices dovetails with Harris’ proclivity to inveigh against “corporate greed”. It’s typical leftist blather intended to appeal to anyone harboring suspicions of private property and the profit motive.

The profit motive is a compelling force for social good, motivating the performance of large corporations and small businesses alike. Diatribes against “greed” coming from the likes of a career politician with no private sector experience are not only unconvincing. They reveal childlike misapprehensions regarding economic phenomena.

More substantively, some have noted that mark-ups rose during and after the pandemic, but these markups are explained by normal cyclical fluctuations and the growing dominance of services in the spending mix. High margins are difficult to sustain without persistently high levels of demand. The Fed’s shift toward monetary restraint has dissipated much of that excessive demand pressure, but certainly not enough to bring prices back to pre-pandemic levels, which would require a severe economic contraction.

Claims that concentration among sellers has risen in some markets are also cited as evidence that greedy, price-gouging corporations are fueling inflation. If that is a real concern, then we might expect Harris to lean more heavily on antitrust policy. She should be circumspect in that regard: antitrust enforcement is too often used for terrible reasons (and also see here). In any case, rising market concentration does not necessarily imply a reduction in competitive pressures. Indeed, it might reflect the successful efforts of a strong competitor to please customers, delivering better value via quality and price. Moreover, mergers and acquisitions often result in stronger challenges to dominant players, energizing innovation, improved quality, and price competition.

If Harris is serious about minimizing inflation she should advocate for fiscal and monetary restraint. We’ve heard nothing of that from her campaign, however. No credible plans other than vaguely-defined price controls and promises to tax and spend our way to a joyful “opportunity economy”.

Disaster Supply Gouging

There is already a federal law against hoarding “scarce items” in times of war or national crisis and reselling at more than the (undefined) “prevailing market price”. There are also laws in 34 states with varying “anti-gouging” provisions, mostly applicable during emergencies only. These laws are counterproductive as they tend to “gouge” the flow of supplies.

In the aftermath of terrible storms or earthquakes, there are almost always shortages of critical goods like food, water, and fuel, not to mention specialized manpower, machinery, and materials needed for cleanup and restoration. As I pointed out some time ago, retailers often fail to adjust their prices under these circumstances, even as shelves are rapidly emptied. They are sometimes prohibited from repricing aggressively. If not, they are conflicted by the predictable hoarding that empties shelves, the higher costs of replenishing inventory, and the knowledge that price rationing creates undeservedly bad public relations. So retailers typically act with restraint to avoid any hint of “gouging” during crises.

Disasters often disrupt production and create physical barriers that hinder the very movement of goods. When prices are flexible and can respond to scarcity on the ground, suppliers can be very creative in finding ways to deliver badly needed supplies, despite the high costs those are likely to entail. Private sellers can do all this more nimbly and with greater efficiency than government, but they need price incentives to cover the costs and various risks. Price controls prevent that from happening, prolonging shortages at the worst possible time.

The chief complaint of those who oppose this natural corrective mechanism is that higher prices are “unfair”. And it is true that some cannot afford to pay higher prices induced by severe scarcity. The answer here is that government can write checks or even distribute cash, much as the government did nationwide during the pandemic. That’s about the only thing at which the state excels. Then people can afford to pay prices that reflect true levels of scarcity. If done selectively and confined to a regional level, the broader inflationary consequences are easily neutralized.

Instead, the knee-jerk reaction is to short-circuit the price mechanism and insist that available supplies be rationed equally. That might be a fine way for retailers to respond in the short run. Share the misery and prevent hoarding. But supplies will run low. When the shelves are empty, the price is infinite! That’s why sellers must have flexibility, not prohibitions.

Blame Game

Harris is engaged in a facile blame game at both the macro and micro level. She claims that inflation could be controlled if only corporations weren’t so greedy. Forget that they must cover their own rising costs, including the costs of compensating risk-averse investors. For that matter, she probably hasn’t gathered that a return to capital is a legitimate cost. Like many others, Harris seems ignorant of the elevated costs of bringing goods to market following either unpredictable disasters or during a general inflation. She also lacks any understanding of the benefits of relying on unfettered markets to bridge short-term gaps in supply. But none of this is surprising. She follows in a long tradition of ignorant interventionism. Let’s hope we have enough voters who aren’t that gullible.

The Due Process Right To Plea Bargain

16 Thursday Aug 2018

Posted by in Criminal Justice, Over-Criminalization

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Our criminal justice system is not the exemplar of due process we’d like to think. Instead, the deck is often stacked against defendants because prosecutorial incentives, mandatory minimum sentences and plea bargaining interact in perverse ways. This is exacerbated by our tendency to demand laws against every behavior that offends us, some that are redundant, some with lower burdens of proof, and some that are just silly. Civil justice is subject to excesses as well, as claims of victimhood are bounded only by the fertile imaginations of plaintiffs’ attorneys, but that’s a subject for another day.

Prosecutors tend to be ambitious, which is not necessarily a bad thing. But the U.S. is unique in electing prosecutors, and a “tough-on-crime” message is often successful at the polls. This magnifies the incentive for aggressive prosecution to achieve a high rate of conviction and lengthy sentences. Of course, defendants are often at a disadvantage in terms of the quality of their legal representation, but beyond that are a variety of prosecutorial tactics that can be used in pursuit of these goals.

A nexus between several factors has made the criminal justice system much harsher for defendants. Multiple charges on related and even unrelated crimes, often with harsh mandatory minimum sentences, can help secure a guilty plea on the original charge. The prosecution gets a conviction and avoids the cost of a trial, but the due process rights of the defendant are compromised in the process. Former Federal District Court Judge Kevin Sharp resigned from the bench because he could no longer tolerate the abuses done by mandatory minimum sentences. He offers a couple of examples:

“Antonio was driving down the street and, without being too graphic, he and his girlfriend were engaged in an activity that caused him to cross slightly over the double-yellow line. The police saw it and pulled him over. The police suspected his girlfriend was a prostitute, so they split Antonio and his girlfriend up and asked them questions. The police realized based on her answers that she in fact was Antonio’s girlfriend. Then, the police said, ‘OK, we are going to let you go. Oh, by the way, do you mind if we search your car?’ Antonio, forgetting that he had an unloaded pistol under the front seat of his car, responded, ‘No, go ahead.’ Antonio was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Because he was convicted as an adult in his prior crimes, his mandatory minimum sentence was 15 years. …

Members of Congress, in their desire to be elected and reelected, often show how tough on crime they can be, and they say, ‘Look, mandatory minimums are necessary so that we can take discretion away from the judges.’ But these legislators have not taken away discretion, they have just moved it to the prosecutor, who has a dog in the hunt.“

The so-called “trial penalty” is the subject of a study on the disparate sentences offered in plea deals versus those likely to be imposed if the defendant goes to trial. This disparity is truly a threat to the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. Over 97% of federal criminal cases are now settled by plea, and again, rejecting a plea deal can carry considerable risk for a defendant. In fact, in discussing this study, Walter Pavlo puts things starkly: innocent people are pleading guilty. He quotes this finding:

“There is ample evidence that federal criminal defendants are being coerced to plead guilty because the penalty for exercising their constitutional rights is simply too high to risk.”

“How to make an innocent client plead guilty” is the topic of Jeffrey Stein’s confessional on the topic:

“... according to the National Registry of Exonerations, 15 percent of all exonerees — people convicted of crimes later proved to be innocent — originally pleaded guilty. That share rises to 49 percent for people exonerated of manslaughter and 66 percent for those exonerated of drug crimes.

You tell your client that they would probably win at trial, but if they lose, they will go to prison. The plea promises some meaningful benefit: getting out of jail sooner, avoiding deportation, not losing a job, seeing a daughter before her next birthday. But your client would have to accept responsibility for a crime they may not have committed.

The final stage happens in court. Your client has signed the paperwork admitting to something you believe in your gut they did not do. Maybe they acted in self-­defense. Maybe they were standing near the actual perpetrator and were presumed guilty by association because of the color of their skin. Maybe they were the victim of an honest misidentification.”

An episode in South Carolina indicating possible manipulation by prosecutors involved a grand jury, which is convened to hear preliminary evidence in a case and decide whether the defendant should be indicted on charges brought by the prosecution. This particular grand jury approved 904 indictments in a single day, averaging 39 seconds per indictment! In response, 27 defense attorneys filed a motion to have the indictments thrown out. It’s impossible to imagine that all of those cases received serious deliberation. Instead, the grand jury appears to have served as a rubber-stamp for the prosecution.

Over-criminalization is another major factor contributing to the erosion of due process rights. As Glenn Reynolds says, the next step should be fewer laws. This earlier paper by Reynolds made the point more forcefully: “Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime” (free download):

“Overcriminalization has thus left us in a peculiar place: Though people suspected of a crime have extensive due process rights in dealing with the police, and people more charged with a crime have even more extensive due process rights in court, the actual decision whether or not to charge a person with a crime is almost completely unconstrained. Yet, because of overcharging and plea bargains, that decision is probably the single most important event in the chain of criminal procedure.

Reynolds offers a number of remedies, including replacement of absolute immunity for prosecutors with “qualified good-faith immunity”, pro-rata allocation of defense costs based on the ratio of convictions to the number of charges, and requiring that earlier plea offers be revealed to the jury at trial.

Today, the many laws we have against victimless behavior overburden the justice system. Have you ever: purchased a large soda? Used recreational drugs? Purchased raw milk? Engaged in oral sex? Played fantasy sports? Used a plastic straw? Vaped? Paid for a sex toy? Sold lemonade from a stand without a permit? Purchased a Happy Meal? Given food to a homeless person? These are just a few activities that are, or soon-to-be, illegal in certain jurisdictions, and I mentioned only one case having to do with licensure. I have not even mentioned crimes promulgated by federal regulators.

In “Enforcing the Law Is Inherently Violent“, Conor Friedersdorf quotes Yale Law Professor Stephen L. Carter:

“Every law is violent. We try not to think about this, but we should.  On the first day of law school, I tell my Contracts students never to argue for invoking the power of law except in a cause for which they are willing to kill. They are suitably astonished, and often annoyed. But I point out that even a breach of contract requires a judicial remedy; and if the breacher will not pay damages, the sheriff will sequester his house and goods; and if he resists the forced sale of his property, the sheriff might have to shoot him.

This is by no means an argument against having laws. … It is an argument for a degree of humility as we choose which of the many things we may not like to make illegal. Behind every exercise of law stands the sheriff – or the SWAT team – or if necessary the National Guard. Is this an exaggeration? Ask the family of Eric Garner, who died as a result of a decision to crack down on the sale of untaxed cigarettes. That’s the crime for which he was being arrested. Yes, yes, the police were the proximate cause of his death, but the crackdown was a political decree.”

Yes, we need “a degree of humility as we choose which of the many things we may not like to make illegal.” We have over-crowded prisons and we have failed to protect the due process rights of the accused. A conviction should require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In statistical terms, that would mean a very low p-value. Instead, our system has devolved into one in which defendants presumed innocent are forced to reckon with myriad risks, exaggerated by “kitchen sink” prosecutors and mandatory minimum sentences. The tradeoffs facing defendants are so unfavorable that few cases ever go to trial. The plea bargaining system often reduces the burden of proof to a matter of gamesmanship. For prosecutors, it’s like shooting fish in a barrel.

Hamburger Nation: An Administrative Nightmare

04 Friday Mar 2016

Posted by in Big Government, Judicial Branch, Legislative Branch, Regulation

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By what authority do unelected bureaucrats in administrative agencies increasingly make laws, enforce those laws and adjudicate violations? The fact that all of these activities take place within the executive branch of government appears to be an obvious contradiction of the separation of powers required by the first three articles of the Constitution, the principle of “Rule By Consent” of the governed, and protections of individual liberty. In a strong sense, the regulatory apparatus has grown so unwieldy that the powers routinely exercised by administrative agencies today seem beyond even the reach of elected executives. The rules promulgated by this “fourth branch” of government are essentially extralegal, a point discussed at length in Philip Hamburger’s “Is Administrative Law Unlawful“. He has also explained these issues at the Volokh Conspiracy blog in “Extralegal power, delegation, and necessity“, and “The Constitution’s repudiation of extralegal power“.

Hamburger examines the assertion that rule-making must be delegated by Congress to administrative agencies because legislation cannot reasonably be expected to address the many details and complexities encountered in the implementation of new laws. Yet this is a delegation of legislative power. Once delegated, this power has a way of metastasizing at the whim of agency apparatchiks, if not at the direction of the chief executive. If you should want to protest an administrative ruling, your first stop will not be a normal court of law, but an administrative review board or a court run by the agency itself! You’ll be well advised to hire an administrative attorney to represent you. Eventually, and at greater expense, an adverse decision can be appealed to the judicial branch proper.

This adds up to a dangerous lack of accountability and power. Marginal Revolution points out that critics of Hamburger’s book overlook the potential for harm that could be done by a “vindictive” president. But we should not lose sight of the fact that bureaucrats themselves, at any level, can be vindictive, as the IRS targeting scandal has shown. But that is only one motive for abuse of power; another motive may be more pervasive: the ability to reward those in a position to promote the self-interests of those who populate the administrative state. These are dangers that are endemic to big government. In a post entitled “Are Government Regulators More Virtuous than Everyone Else” (No!), Ivan Carrino highlights the weakness of arguments like those made by George Akerlof and Robert Shiller in “Phishing For Phools“, who call for greater government regulation on the grounds that consumers are vulnerable to manipulation by businesses. Carrino says:

“One can’t help but notice the central contradiction in this analysis. On the one hand, it is assumed that markets fail because of ‘normal human weakness.’ On the other hand, it is assumed that regulation, which must necessarily be implemented by human beings with equal or greater ‘weaknesses,’ will somehow solve the problem.

Akerlof and Shiller simultaneously demonize human beings who operate in the private sector while idealizing human beings who operate in the public sector.“

Glenn Reynolds has been a prominent critic of the administrative state. As a consequence of the vast and growing body of regulatory rules, it’s become increasingly difficult for individuals, acting on their own or as businesspeople, to know whether they are in acting in violation of administrative law. Reynolds discusses regulatory crime and over-criminalization in “You May Be Breaking The Law Right Now“, and in his great paper “Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything is a Crime” (free download).

Hamburger’s main position is that law should be made by elected representatives, not by bureaucrats who lack direct accountability to voters. Ilya Somin believes that with time, Hamburger will have great influence on legal theorists in this regard. He compares Hamburger’s insights on administrative law to Richard Epstein’s work on takings. Epstein insisted that “almost all regulations that restrict property rights should be considered ‘takings’ that require compensation under the Fifth Amendment.” Somin notes that Epstein’s position, despite harsh criticism from certain quarters, has influenced legal thinking in a dramatic way over the years.

What’s to be done? Can a line reasonably be drawn between constitutional legislative power and delegated rule-making authority? Somin is skeptical that absolute restrictions on lawmaking by the administrative state are practical, in the sense that there will always be details that cannot be addressed in enabling legislation. Others have suggested practical paths forward: Joseph Postell attempts to give a roadmap in “From Administrative State to Constitutional Government“. A recent Glenn Reynolds op-ed, “Blow Up The Administrative State“, gives a qualified defense of Texas Governor Greg Abbot’s proposed amendments to the Constitution. Among other things, Abbot proposes to:

“–Prohibit administrative agencies … from creating federal law.
  –Prohibit administrative agencies … from preempting state law.
  –Give state officials the power to sue in federal court when … officials overstep their bounds.
  –Allow a two-thirds majority of the states to override a federal law or regulation.”

I would add that administrative review and adjudication should be independent of the agencies themselves. Also, Representative Mia Love (R-UT) has proposed legislation that would restrict Congress to bills focused on points directly related to a single issue (i.e., no omnibus bills), which would help to check the growth of the administrative state.

All of these measures seem consistent with Hamburger’s views. Reynolds is fully cognizant of the dangers of a constitutional convention. Nevertheless, he recognizes that Abbot’s proposals would impose harder limits on the size of government, and defends them in colorful fashion:

“A smaller government would mean fewer phony-baloney jobs for college graduates with few marketable skills but demonstrated political loyalty. It would mean fewer opportunities for tax dollars to be directed to people and entities with close ties to people in power. It would mean less ability to engage in social engineering and ‘nudges’ aimed at what are all-too-often seen as those dumb rubes in flyover country. The smaller the government, the fewer the opportunities for graft and self-aggrandizement — and graft and self-aggrandizement are what our political class is all about.“

For further reading, Michael Ramsey at The Originalism Blog posts links to several other essays by Hamburger at The Volokh Conspiracy, where he acted as a guest-blogger.

 

 

 

You Probably Broke The Law Today

15 Wednesday Apr 2015

Posted by in Over-Criminalization

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More widespread ignorance of “the law” is an implication of a regulatory state growing in size and complexity. The tendency of expanding regulation to over-criminalize prompted this reexamination of the legal doctrine of “presumed knowledge of the law”, by Michael Anthony Cottone (abstract at the link, but it offers a free download of the full paper). I believe the cause of justice compels additional protections for individuals or companies against administrative accusers. Not only does this appeal to my sense of fair play, it also should incent bureaucrats to write clear rules and minimize conflicts with existing regulations. And it may discourage overaggressive bureaucrats from pursuing charges over disputes whose resolution might be subject to more reasonable compromise.

Over-criminalization was also the impetus for Glenn Reynolds’ “Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything is a Crime” (another abstract with a free download available):

“Though extensive due process protections apply to the investigation of crimes, and to criminal trials, perhaps the most important part of the criminal process — the decision whether to charge a defendant, and with what — is almost entirely discretionary. Given the plethora of criminal laws and regulations in today’s society, this due process gap allows prosecutors to charge almost anyone they take a deep interest in.”

The “due process gap” is said to give rise to the expression, “a good prosecutor can get an indictment against a ham sandwich.” Here is a good discussion of the Reynolds paper at The Volokh Conspiracy, with additional links. Reynolds offers a number of possible remedies, including the creation of certain forms of liability for prosecutors, banning plea bargains, and limiting criminal prosecution for regulatory crimes. There are a few other interesting suggestions at the last link.

Heavy regulation of economic and social affairs places burdens on a society’s ability to prosper economically and culturally. It requires real resources to administer and imposes compliance costs on those it regulates. There are unnecessarily high social costs to a system of detailed rule-making by unelected bureaucrats who have incentives to both increase their dominion and to enhance their long-term career prospects. The latter is often accomplished via “partnership” with some of the largest regulated entities, which leads to rules favoring those entities at the expense of smaller competitors. And a large regulatory complex also offers an avenue through which the executive branch can promulgate rules based on expansive interpretations of existing law, circumventing checks on executive power enshrined in the Constitution. To these drawbacks we can add the consequences of over-criminalization. These should be addressed through limits on prosecutorial discretion and a more neutral perspective on presumed knowledge of administrative law.