Tag Archives: Due Process

Ubiquitous Guilt: EEOC Disparate Impact Liability

22 Thursday Sep 2022

Posted by in Discrimination, Regulation

≈ 3 Comments

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

A key part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was Title VII, which dealt with employment discrimination. Title VII applied only to intentional discrimination, but it didn’t take long for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with administering Title VII, to find ways to expand the scope of its enforcement mandate under the law. The EEOC eventually managed to convince virtually all parties, including employers, employees, job applicants, attorneys, and even the courts, that the law prohibited employment practices having disparate impacts on groups protected from actual discrimination under the law. Predictably, this warped reinterpretation created severe distortions to the efficiency and fairness of labor market outcomes .

Another Rogue Agency

On the EEOC’s complete and erroneous reimagining of Title VII, Gail Heriot’s “Title VII Disparate Impact Liability Makes Almost Everything Presumptively Illegal” is a must read. Heriot is a Professor at the University of San Diego School of Law and is a member of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. This post attempts to summarize most of the important points in Heriot’s paper, so if you don’t have time for Heriot’s paper, read on. All errors are mine, of course!

Heriot provides an incredible case study on the dangers of regulatory overreach. She first discusses the EEOC’s blatant usurpation of Congressional power:

“It is hardly surprising that EEOC officials would undertake to publish answers to the questions they were hearing repeatedly…. But publishing such ‘guidances’ also had the potential to spin out of control. The temptation would always be to use them to establish what the EEOC staff wanted the law to be rather than what it was. Instead of interpreting Title VII in good faith, guidances would soon become quasi-legislation—disguised as interpretation, but in reality imposing new duties on employers not found in Title VII itself.

None of this should be surprising. It is in the nature of bureaucracy. It naturally seeks to expand its powers, often beginning by occupying niches that are otherwise unoccupied. Over time, a little power often becomes a lot of power. What is surprising is how upfront EEOC officials were about their tactics in accumulating that power.”

Having gone this far, one might be tempted to ask the EEOC what limiting principle they actually apply to determine whether various employment and hiring practices are permissible. Are level of education, industry experience, and tests of physical and cognitive faculties verboten? The answer that is there is no consistent, limiting principle. Instead, Heriot says the EEOC “picks its battles” (see below). She also describes the EEOC’s adoption of a so-called “four-fifths rule”, which is about as arbitrary as it gets. It means the EEOC will challenge an employment practice only if it leads to a selection of any protected group at a rate less than 80% of the most-selected group. That is, the “disparate impact” must be less than 20% to rule out a challenge. This rule appears nowhere in Title VII.

Job Qualifications? You’re Guilty!

Unfortunately, as Heriot takes pains to demonstrate, it’s virtually impossible to identify a hiring guideline or method of employee assessment that does not have a disparate impact. The examples she provides on pp. 34 – 37 of her paper, and on p. 40, are convincing. Furthermore, the EEOC’s “four-fifths” rule hardly narrows the potential for challenge at all.

“Selection rates of less than four-fifths relative to the group with the highest rate are extremely common. Just as everything or nearly everything has a disparate impact, everything or nearly everything has a selection rate that fails the ‘four fifths rule’ for some race, color, religion, sex, or national origin group.”

So the EEOC is allowed to operate with tremendous discretion. Again, Heriot says the agency “picks its battles”, focusing on challenges to screening tools like “written tests, physical strength and endurance tests, criminal background tests [sic], high school diploma requirements, personal credit histories, residency requirements, and a few others.”

This regulatory environment encourages employers to keep job requirements vague, sometimes to the point at which potential applicants might not be sure what the job qualifications really are, or exactly what the job function entails. One upshot is that this makes it harder to detect and prove actual discrimination, and it often leads to more arbitrary decisions by hiring managers, which may, in fact, involve real discrimination, including nepotism and/or cronyism.

Unbiased Intent Doesn’t Matter

Heriot points to a disastrous decision by the Supreme Court that, perhaps unintentionally, helped legitimize the concept of disparate impact as legal doctrine, and as a valid cause of action by plaintiffs against employers. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), the Court rejected the premise that an employer’s innocence with respect to their intent to discriminate was an inadequate defense of an employment practice that had adverse consequences to a protected group. Heriot quotes the opinion of Chief Justice Warren Burger:

“… good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem…. Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.”

It’s as if the Court convinced itself that adverse consequences prove actual discrimination, even when there is no intent to discriminate. The Court also emphasized that it’s decision was based on “general deference” to the EEOC! And this was years before the unfortunate Chevron Doctrine (judicial deference to administrative agencies on interpretation of law) was formally established by the Court. Heriot and others assert that the decision in Griggs would have astonished the authors of Title VII.

Heriot also discusses changes in the treatment of “business necessity” as a defense against complaints of disparate impact. It is generally the employer’s burden to show the “necessity” of a challenged hiring practice. “Necessity” was the subject of several Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s and 1980s, but the Court stopped short of requiring an employer to show that a practice was “essential”. In one case, the court shifted some of the burden back onto the plaintiff to show that a practiced lacked necessity. In 1990, there was concern in the Bush Administration and Congress that the difficulty of proving business necessity would eventually lead to the adoption of racial quotas by employers in order to prevent EEOC challenges, though the authors of Title VII had staunchly opposed quotas. While the original hope was that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would resolve questions about “business necessity” and the burden of proof, it did not. Instead, it can be said that it legitimized disparate impact liability, with conditions. The standard for proving necessity, based on Court decisions, evolved to become more strict with time. There are cases in which courts seem to have left the EEOC to define “business necessity”, as if the EEOC would be in a better position to do that than the business itself!

Inviting Discrimination

Heriot devotes part of her paper to the perverse effects of disparate impact. When employers are faced with prohibitions or the threat of action against a certain practice, whether it be tests of aptitude, strength, or screening on criminal or credit records, they may abandon those devices and opt instead for “informal” proxies. The use of proxies, however, often leads to instances of actual discrimination, whether born of conscious or unconscious bias on the part of hiring managers.

Heriot provides a number of examples of the proxy phenomenon, some of which have been confirmed by empirical research. For example, an employer interviewing candidates for a job that requires math proficiency might reasonably use a test of math skill as a key criterion. If such a test is prohibited, the hiring manager might be tempted to hire an Asian candidate, since Asians have a reputation for good math skills. Similarly, an applicant of West European ancestry might be favored for a position requiring excellent grammar skills, absent the ability to explicitly test grammatical skill. Candidates for a job requiring a certain level of physical strength could be evaluated by various tests of strength, but barring that, a hiring manager might be inclined to hire based on gender.

When criminal background checks are prohibited, employers might be tempted to use proxies such as gender and race as a substitute. Likewise, if it’s forbidden to check a candidate’s credit record to gauge reliability, other proxies might lead to discrimination against members of protected classes. Needless to say, these kinds of outcomes are precisely the opposite of what the EEOC hopes to achieve.

As Heriot further notes, the outcomes can be much systematic and destructive than a bit of one-off discrimination in hiring, promotion, pay raises, or task assignment. These may inflict damage reaching well beyond having the wrong people gaining favorable labor market outcomes. For example, an employer might choose to relocate operations to a “safer” or more affluent community, barring an ability to perform criminal background or credit checks. Or businesses might decide to substitute capital for labor, given the interference in their attempts to identify the best job candidates. The difficulty in screening also creates an incentive to automate, just as premature automation is becoming more common with rising wage floors imposed by government.

Killing Jobs and Competition

Like many forms of regulation, however, large firms in less competitive industries are usually better positioned to survive EEOC scrutiny than smaller firms in competitive markets. Indeed, we often see large market players embrace regulation because it gives them a competitive advantage over smaller rivals. In this case, we see large firms adopting their own diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) goals. This is not solely related to the threat of EEOC challenges, however. Private lawsuits alleging discrimination or disparate impact are also a concern, as is pleasing activists inside and outside the company. Nevertheless, as Christopher Rufo reveals, there is growing push-back against the corporate DEI regime. Let’s hope it continues to gain traction.

Unconstitutional Executive Discretion

Heriot also dedicates part of her paper to constitutional issues related to the EEOC’s broad discretion in the application of disparate impact to employment practices. For one thing, disparate impact is a direct source of discrimination: when members of “protected groups” are awarded opportunities based on the possibility of disparate statistical outcomes, it means the majority candidates are denied those opportunities, no matter their qualifications. This is outright discrimination, and it’s instigation by a federal agency constitutes an explicit denial of equal protection under the law.

It should be no surprise that many consider disparate impact actions against employers to be denials of due process. Furthermore, when a federal agency like the EEOC exercises broad discretion, the so-called non-delegation doctrine should come into play. That is, the EEOC makes judgements on matters that are not necessarily authorized Congress. Thus, there are legitimate questions as to whether the EEOC’s discretion is a violation of the separation of powers. Granted, the courts have long deferred to administrative agencies in the interpretation of enabling statutes, but the Supreme Court has taken a new tack under Chief Justice Roberts. In some recent decisions, the Court has relied on a new “major questions” doctrine to place certain limits on executive discretion.

Conclusion

Hiring? Creating jobs? Better not get picky about checking your applicants’ skills and backgrounds or you risk liability for contributing to the statistical malaise of one, or of many, protected groups. That’s how it is under “disparate impact” rules imposed by the EEOC. The success of your business be damned!

Gail Heriot’s excellent paper details the way in which the EEOC transformed the meaning of its enabling legislation, expanding its reign over employment practices across the nation. She demonstrates the breadth of disparate impact rules with examples showing that virtually any attempt at systematic screening of job applicants can be held to be illegal. Your intent to hire the most qualified candidate without bias doesn’t matter, under an insane Supreme Court decision that buttressed the EEOC’s authority. As Heriot says, “… everything is presumptively illegal”. She also describes how disparate impact liability leads to employment decisions based on proxy criteria, which often lead to actual (even if unintended) discrimination. Further unintended consequences are the possibility of larger job losses in minority communities and less competition in product and labor markets. Finally, Heriot delineates several constitutional violations inherent in broad EEOC discretion and the enforcement of disparate impact.

One day a court challenge to the EEOC and disparate impact liability might rise to the level of the Supreme Court. Justice Antonin Scalia expected it, but it still hasn’t come before the Court. It should! Another way to do battle against the EEOC’s scourge is to challenge corporations who cow-tow to activists and to the EEOC with their own DEI initiatives. This manifestation of stakeholder capitalism is a cancer on the wealth and productivity of the U.S. economy, resting side-by-side with disparate impact liability.

The Impaired Impeachment

22 Sunday Dec 2019

Posted by in Impeachment

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

biden-impeach-trump

To avoid defections in their ranks, House Democrats had to pare back so much on the counts for impeaching Donald Trump that they laid bare the raw political motives for bringing the action. Not that their motives needed clarification. They’ve been dying to find grounds on which to impeach Trump since the day of his election. They also know the Senate will not remove Trump from office. Now, the real point is to stain the President as he seeks re-election, and that should strike anyone as an illegitimate purpose.

The two impeachment counts, abuse of power and obstruction of Congress, are flimsy. Proof of the first would require infallible mind-reading skills. It’s doubtful that the Democrats are any better at that than their inability to follow the simple facts of the case. During the controversial phone call with Ukrainian President Zelensky, Trump clearly expressed interest in whether the Ukraine would investigate possible interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and whether the Bidens had been involved, given their involvement with Ukrainian organizations that may have had connections to the Steele dossier. That’s a fair question and a legitimate area of inquiry for the chief executive. It can’t be helped that Joe Biden happens to be running for the Democrat presidential nomination in 2020, as if running for office was enough to absolve one of crime.

The second impeachment count against Trump relies on vacating the constitutional privileges accorded to the chief executive, privileges to which President Obama, and others before him, generously availed themselves (also see here).

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi now has opted to delay transmitting the impeachment articles to the Senate. She said it was important for the House to wrap up their proceedings quickly, so much so that her party could not be bothered to bring a court challenge against Trump’s assertion of executive privilege. But now, Pelosi insists that she must be assured the Senate trial will be conducted “fairly”, as if the proceedings in the House were remotely fair to the President.

One of the House Democrats’ own expert witnesses asserts that the President’s impeachment is not official until the articles are transmitted to the Senate. That might be, but he overlooks the Supreme Court’s 1993 ruling in Nixon vs. the United States in which the Court said that no trial is required for the Senate to acquit anyone impeached by the House, and it may do so without judicial review. So, the Senate can acquit the President now, without a trial and without waiting for Speaker Pelosi to transmit the “charges”, should Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell decide to bring it to a vote. Of course, he might not want to as a matter of optics as well as pressure from an incensed Trump to air all of the laundry.

Like the misguided impeachment itself, Pelosi’s motive for holding the transmittal in abeyance is political. Democrats, quite possibly unaware of the Senate’s power under Nixon, and facing their comeuppance, might hope the public forgets the charade that took place in the House and blame Republicans for an “unfair” Senate process that would let Trump off the hook. Or, Pelosi might be hoping for a weakening of Republican resolve on establishing rules for a trial in the Senate, but even that calculation is chancy. It’s even possible Pelosi imagines she can delay the transfer through the 2020 election, hoping to use the House impeachment again and again as a cudgel with which to batter Trump’s re-election chances. Fat chance!

Or is the delay a form of damage control? Does it have something to do with Joe Biden’s vulnerability? He is perhaps at greater risk under a Senate impeachment trial of Trump than Trump himself. Biden is the one who gloated publicly of how he cowed the Ukrainians into dropping an investigation of Burisma, the gas company for which his son Hunter was a board member, by threatening to withhold loan guarantees. Quid Pro Joe!

Biden’s has stated that he would not comply with a subpoena to appear before the Senate in the matter of the Trump impeachment, apparently confusing Trump’s status as the executive with privilege with his own status as an out-of-office candidate for the Democrat nomination. Oh, wait! Now Biden says he would appear after all! Is the contrast between Trump’s phone conversation with the Ukrainian President and Biden’s gloating admission pertinent? You bet!

Or perhaps Pelosi believes it’s unwise to hand the impeachment counts over to the Senate with John Durham’s investigation still hanging in the balance. Durham is looking into the efforts of U.S. intelligence agencies to spy on the Trump campaign in 2016. An ill-timed and damaging outcome for the Obama Administration could make the impeachment trial into a catastrophic event for Biden and other Democrats.

The Democrats’ have brought their longstanding lust for impeaching Trump to fruition only to find that they’ve miscalculated. First, Trump is practically guaranteed an acquittal, so the whole effort was and is a waste of time. Second, public opinion is far from rallying to the Dems cause. According to Gallup, Trump’s approval now is higher than Obama’s at the same point in his presidency, and support for impeachment hasn’t responded as the Democrats had hoped. In fact, if anything, support has eroded, especially in swing states, and the effort has strengthened Trump’s base of support. I would argue that it’s much worse for Democrats than the polls show. Many anti-Democrats, like me, actively avoid participating in polls. That’s partly because the framing of questions is often biased, and partly because I don’t want to be bothered. Finally, the Democrats seem not to fathom the political risks they face with impeachment: 28 Democrat representatives from districts Trump won in 2016 may now face stiffer odds against reelection in 2020, having cast their votes for impeachment. More critically, there are severe risks of a Senate trial to the Bidens, potentially other Obama Administration officials, and the Clintons.

Note: An acknowledgement goes to the Legal Insurrection blog and A.F. Branco for the cartoon at the top.

The Court and Kavanaugh

08 Monday Oct 2018

Posted by in Supreme Court

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , ,

There are both great and hysterically negative expectations for Brett Kavanaugh’s seating on the Supreme Court, depending on one’s perspective. The changes are likely to be much less dramatic than many think, however, according to Glenn Reynolds in his Sunday column. As he says, most cases before the Supreme Court are decided by easy majorities, and that won’t change. On split decisions, Kavanaugh will be less of a “swing vote” than Anthony Kennedy, no doubt, and he will have influence over the choice of cases to be heard by the Court because the selection of a case requires only four justices.

Reynolds thinks Kavanaugh is not as conservative as partisans hope or fear. For example, Reynolds believes he is unlikely to vote to overturn Roe vs. Wade, when and if that question comes before the Court. There may be shifts on narrower questions, such as an earlier definition of fetal viability (in recognition of improved medical technology) and greater protection against arrangements that facilitate illegal funding of abortions by federal taxpayers. Reynolds acknowledges, however, that Kavanaugh is a stronger advocate of Second Amendment rights than Kennedy, so those protections are less likely to be eroded.

Reynolds’ also notes a shift that is likely to take place in legal academia:

“Strange new respect for judicial minimalism. As Harvard Law professor Adrian Vermeule remarked, ‘Law review editors: brace for a tidal wave of legal academic theories supporting judicial minimalism, Thayerianism, and strong — very strong — theories of precedent. Above all: the Court must do nothing without bipartisan agreement, otherwise it is illegitimate.’ The past half-century’s enthusiasm for judicial activism will vanish, as legal academia turns on a dime to promote theories that will constrain the court until a left-leaning majority returns, at which point they’ll turn on a dime again.”

That is all too likely. My liberal friends insist that the four justices on the left are free of political bias. Don’t laugh! I’ll be happy if Kavanaugh, as a justice, sticks to his traditional originalist philosophy on constitutional interpretation. I’m under no illusion that the left side of the bench takes the original meaning of the Constitution seriously.

My own concerns about Kavanaugh have to do with his earlier work in the Bush White House on issues related to national security, including work on the PATRIOT Act. In fairness, that work took place at a time when the horrors of 9/11 were still fresh in our minds. However, years later he wrote a favorable judicial opinion on metadata collection by the government. It’s disturbing that Kavanaugh has ever shown a willingness to relinquish the rights to privacy and due process as a routine matter of national security. The founders’ intent was to protect individual rights from the threat of tyranny, so they expressly limited the power of government through the Constitution. Those who would claim that threats to national security are so compelling as to supersede individual rights are perhaps the very tyrants the Constitution was meant to foil. Nevertheless, my hope is that Kavanaugh, having come face-to-face with those who would prefer to deny privacy and due process rights when it suits them, has gained additional respect for these protections.

The Due Process Right To Plea Bargain

16 Thursday Aug 2018

Posted by in Criminal Justice, Over-Criminalization

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Our criminal justice system is not the exemplar of due process we’d like to think. Instead, the deck is often stacked against defendants because prosecutorial incentives, mandatory minimum sentences and plea bargaining interact in perverse ways. This is exacerbated by our tendency to demand laws against every behavior that offends us, some that are redundant, some with lower burdens of proof, and some that are just silly. Civil justice is subject to excesses as well, as claims of victimhood are bounded only by the fertile imaginations of plaintiffs’ attorneys, but that’s a subject for another day.

Prosecutors tend to be ambitious, which is not necessarily a bad thing. But the U.S. is unique in electing prosecutors, and a “tough-on-crime” message is often successful at the polls. This magnifies the incentive for aggressive prosecution to achieve a high rate of conviction and lengthy sentences. Of course, defendants are often at a disadvantage in terms of the quality of their legal representation, but beyond that are a variety of prosecutorial tactics that can be used in pursuit of these goals.

A nexus between several factors has made the criminal justice system much harsher for defendants. Multiple charges on related and even unrelated crimes, often with harsh mandatory minimum sentences, can help secure a guilty plea on the original charge. The prosecution gets a conviction and avoids the cost of a trial, but the due process rights of the defendant are compromised in the process. Former Federal District Court Judge Kevin Sharp resigned from the bench because he could no longer tolerate the abuses done by mandatory minimum sentences. He offers a couple of examples:

“Antonio was driving down the street and, without being too graphic, he and his girlfriend were engaged in an activity that caused him to cross slightly over the double-yellow line. The police saw it and pulled him over. The police suspected his girlfriend was a prostitute, so they split Antonio and his girlfriend up and asked them questions. The police realized based on her answers that she in fact was Antonio’s girlfriend. Then, the police said, ‘OK, we are going to let you go. Oh, by the way, do you mind if we search your car?’ Antonio, forgetting that he had an unloaded pistol under the front seat of his car, responded, ‘No, go ahead.’ Antonio was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Because he was convicted as an adult in his prior crimes, his mandatory minimum sentence was 15 years. …

Members of Congress, in their desire to be elected and reelected, often show how tough on crime they can be, and they say, ‘Look, mandatory minimums are necessary so that we can take discretion away from the judges.’ But these legislators have not taken away discretion, they have just moved it to the prosecutor, who has a dog in the hunt.“

The so-called “trial penalty” is the subject of a study on the disparate sentences offered in plea deals versus those likely to be imposed if the defendant goes to trial. This disparity is truly a threat to the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. Over 97% of federal criminal cases are now settled by plea, and again, rejecting a plea deal can carry considerable risk for a defendant. In fact, in discussing this study, Walter Pavlo puts things starkly: innocent people are pleading guilty. He quotes this finding:

“There is ample evidence that federal criminal defendants are being coerced to plead guilty because the penalty for exercising their constitutional rights is simply too high to risk.”

“How to make an innocent client plead guilty” is the topic of Jeffrey Stein’s confessional on the topic:

“... according to the National Registry of Exonerations, 15 percent of all exonerees — people convicted of crimes later proved to be innocent — originally pleaded guilty. That share rises to 49 percent for people exonerated of manslaughter and 66 percent for those exonerated of drug crimes.

You tell your client that they would probably win at trial, but if they lose, they will go to prison. The plea promises some meaningful benefit: getting out of jail sooner, avoiding deportation, not losing a job, seeing a daughter before her next birthday. But your client would have to accept responsibility for a crime they may not have committed.

The final stage happens in court. Your client has signed the paperwork admitting to something you believe in your gut they did not do. Maybe they acted in self-­defense. Maybe they were standing near the actual perpetrator and were presumed guilty by association because of the color of their skin. Maybe they were the victim of an honest misidentification.”

An episode in South Carolina indicating possible manipulation by prosecutors involved a grand jury, which is convened to hear preliminary evidence in a case and decide whether the defendant should be indicted on charges brought by the prosecution. This particular grand jury approved 904 indictments in a single day, averaging 39 seconds per indictment! In response, 27 defense attorneys filed a motion to have the indictments thrown out. It’s impossible to imagine that all of those cases received serious deliberation. Instead, the grand jury appears to have served as a rubber-stamp for the prosecution.

Over-criminalization is another major factor contributing to the erosion of due process rights. As Glenn Reynolds says, the next step should be fewer laws. This earlier paper by Reynolds made the point more forcefully: “Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime” (free download):

“Overcriminalization has thus left us in a peculiar place: Though people suspected of a crime have extensive due process rights in dealing with the police, and people more charged with a crime have even more extensive due process rights in court, the actual decision whether or not to charge a person with a crime is almost completely unconstrained. Yet, because of overcharging and plea bargains, that decision is probably the single most important event in the chain of criminal procedure.

Reynolds offers a number of remedies, including replacement of absolute immunity for prosecutors with “qualified good-faith immunity”, pro-rata allocation of defense costs based on the ratio of convictions to the number of charges, and requiring that earlier plea offers be revealed to the jury at trial.

Today, the many laws we have against victimless behavior overburden the justice system. Have you ever: purchased a large soda? Used recreational drugs? Purchased raw milk? Engaged in oral sex? Played fantasy sports? Used a plastic straw? Vaped? Paid for a sex toy? Sold lemonade from a stand without a permit? Purchased a Happy Meal? Given food to a homeless person? These are just a few activities that are, or soon-to-be, illegal in certain jurisdictions, and I mentioned only one case having to do with licensure. I have not even mentioned crimes promulgated by federal regulators.

In “Enforcing the Law Is Inherently Violent“, Conor Friedersdorf quotes Yale Law Professor Stephen L. Carter:

“Every law is violent. We try not to think about this, but we should.  On the first day of law school, I tell my Contracts students never to argue for invoking the power of law except in a cause for which they are willing to kill. They are suitably astonished, and often annoyed. But I point out that even a breach of contract requires a judicial remedy; and if the breacher will not pay damages, the sheriff will sequester his house and goods; and if he resists the forced sale of his property, the sheriff might have to shoot him.

This is by no means an argument against having laws. … It is an argument for a degree of humility as we choose which of the many things we may not like to make illegal. Behind every exercise of law stands the sheriff – or the SWAT team – or if necessary the National Guard. Is this an exaggeration? Ask the family of Eric Garner, who died as a result of a decision to crack down on the sale of untaxed cigarettes. That’s the crime for which he was being arrested. Yes, yes, the police were the proximate cause of his death, but the crackdown was a political decree.”

Yes, we need “a degree of humility as we choose which of the many things we may not like to make illegal.” We have over-crowded prisons and we have failed to protect the due process rights of the accused. A conviction should require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In statistical terms, that would mean a very low p-value. Instead, our system has devolved into one in which defendants presumed innocent are forced to reckon with myriad risks, exaggerated by “kitchen sink” prosecutors and mandatory minimum sentences. The tradeoffs facing defendants are so unfavorable that few cases ever go to trial. The plea bargaining system often reduces the burden of proof to a matter of gamesmanship. For prosecutors, it’s like shooting fish in a barrel.

Administrative Supremacy, Lost Checks and Balances

16 Friday Jun 2017

Posted by in Regulation

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The two-for-one regulatory order issued by the Trump White House in January raises some practical difficulties in implementation. It requires that federal agencies eliminate two regulatory rules for every new rule promulgated, both in terms of the number of rules and any incremental regulatory costs imposed. Two out for every one in. Questions surrounding the meaning of “a regulation”, how to define incremental costs, and whether a particular rule is actually mandated by legislation are not trivial. Nevertheless, the spirit of this order is admirable and it serves as the leading edge of the Administration’s attempt to roll back the scope and impact of excessive government authority.

The cost of regulation is vast. Economists at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University have estimated the total cumulative cost of regulation in the U.S., finding that regulation has reduced economic growth by 0.8 percent per year since 1980. Without the additional regulatory growth since 1980, the U.S. economy would have been about 25 percent larger than it was in 2012. That’s a $4 trillion shortfall, or roughly $13,000 per person.

While regulation and administrative control over the private economy takes an increasing toll on economic growth and human welfare, the problem goes beyond economic considerations: administrative agencies have “progressively” usurped not just legislative but also judicial power. The concentration of executive, legislative and judicial power constitutes a “fourth branch of government“, a development inimical to the principles enshrined in our Constitution and a prescription for slow-boil tyranny. It facilitates rent seeking and corporatism just as surely as it creates a ruling class of individuals who act on their personal and arbitrary inclinations. We are ruled by men backed by police power, not impartial laws.

Glenn Reynolds writes that unelected rule makers and central planners are able to manipulate decisions across a broad swath of the economy and society. He quotes a new book by Philip Hamburger of Columbia Law School called “The Administrative Threat“:

“Government agencies regulate Americans in the full range of their lives, including their political participation, their economic endeavors, and their personal conduct. Administrative power has thus become pervasively intrusive. But is this power constitutional?

A similar sort of power was once used by English kings, and this book shows that the similarity is not a coincidence. In fact, administrative power revives absolutism. On this foundation, the book explains how administrative power denies Americans their basic constitutional freedoms, such as jury rights and due process. No other feature of American government violates as many constitutional provisions or is more profoundly threatening. As a result, administrative power is the key civil liberties issue of our era.“

Two previous posts on Sacred Cow Chips have dealt with Hamburger’s work. The first, “Hamburger Nation: An Administrative Nightmare“(1) provides the following explanation of his position:

“Hamburger examines the assertion that rule-making must be delegated by Congress to administrative agencies because legislation cannot reasonably be expected to address the many details and complexities encountered in the implementation of new laws. Yet this is a delegation of legislative power. Once delegated, this power has a way of metastasizing at the whim of agency apparatchiks, if not at the direction of the chief executive. If you should want to protest an administrative ruling, your first stop will not be a normal court of law, but an administrative review board or a court run by the agency itself! You’ll be well advised to hire an administrative attorney to represent you. Eventually, and at greater expense, an adverse decision can be appealed to the judicial branch proper.“

The exercise of rule-making authority, and even extra-legal legislative action by the administrative state, has economic costs that are bad enough. Hamburger also emphasizes the breakdown of the separation of executive and judicial powers inherent in the enforcement and adjudication of disputes under administrative law. This was the subject of the second Sacred Cow Chips post referenced above: “Courts and Their Administrative Masters“. It reviewed an unfortunate standard established by court precedent involving judicial (“Chevron”) deference to administrative agency fact-finding and even interpretation of law. While the decisions of administrative courts, which are run by the agencies themselves, can be appealed to the judicial branch, such appeals often amount to exercises in futility.

“…courts apply a test of judgement as to whether the administrative agency’s interpretation of the law is “reasonable”, even if other “reasonable” interpretations are possible. This gets particularly thorny when the original legislation is ambiguous with respect to a certain point.

…the courts should not abdicate their role in reviewing an agency’s developmental evidence for any action, and the reasonability of an agency’s applications of evidence relative to alternative courses of action. Nor should the courts abdicate their role in ruling on the law itself.“

This paper on Judicial Deference to Agencies by Evan D. Bernick of Georgetown Law makes the case that judicial deference is a violation of the constitutional separation of powers, concluding that:

“… in cases involving administrative deprivations of core private rights to ‘life, liberty, or property,’ fact deference violates Article III’s vesting of ‘[t]he judicial power’ in the federal courts; constitutes an abdication of the duty of independent judgment that Article III imposes upon federal judges; and violates the Fifth Amendment by denying litigants ‘due process of law,’ which requires (1) judicial proceedings in an Article III court prior to any individualized deprivation of ‘life, liberty, or property’; and (2) fact-finding by independent, impartial fact-finders.“

Inez and Jarrett Stepman in Townhall note that there are almost three million well-paid federal employees with job security that would make most private sector workers envious.

“Though the abolishment of the spoils system [which allowed civil service hiring and firing based on political party] was meant to mitigate corruption and incompetence, it has resulted in a toxic combination of enhanced agency power and an entrenched civil servant class with its own institutional—and frequently political—interests, virtually unaccountable to the president or any other elected official.“

The Stepmans discuss legislation that might stem the usurpation of lawmaking power by the administrative state. They are convinced that the administrative state must be reigned-in. Ironically, expanded executive authority means that the process of reversal is not that difficult in many cases. By way of example, here’s a piece on the ease of undoing certain Obama era regulations. Executive orders, or “the pen and the phone” in Obama’s charming parlance, lack legitimate legislative authority and can be reversed by new executive orders. I firmly believe that reversing the earlier orders is the right thing to do at the moment, but the unchecked authority that makes it possible (and the supremacy of the administrative state) is a source of economic instability, and it must end. Eric Boehm makes this point eloquently in Reason at the last link above:

“New policies that affect wide swaths of the economy and reshape entire business models should go through Congress, or at the very least should be subject to the public rulemaking process. Guidance documents and other ‘dark matter’ regulations that by-pass those processes can be un-made as quickly as they were made, leaving businesses to deal with an ever-changing and unpredictable regulatory state that does not really help anyone, no matter which side you’re on in any individual policy fight.“

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

(1) The principle title “Hamburger Nation” was intended as a play on Glenn Reynolds’ paper “Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime“, in which he discussed the judicial implications of over-criminalization and regulatory overreach.

 

Anti-Gun Babes Up In Arms

17 Friday Jun 2016

Posted by in Gun Control, Gun Rights

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

image

Passion for various forms of gun control was inflamed by the tragic murder of 49 patrons (with 53 injured) at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida in the early hours of last Sunday morning. A man with ties to radical Islam was the perpetrator, but that’s not convenient to the left’s narrative, so scapegoats for the massacre run the gamut from guns to transgender bathroom laws to Christian “intolerance”, as opposed to the intolerance of a bat-shit crazy Islamic extremist. The Soopermexican notes the following:

“It’s really amazing how liberals [sic] are finding a way to blame Christians for the actions of the Orlando terrorist, who was, 1) gay, 2) Muslim, 3) Democrat, and 4) racist. … But then that’s what they did that time when a crazed liberal gay activist tried to shoot up the Family Research Council. Remember that? He literally said he wanted to kill everyone and then ‘smear Chick-Fil-A in the victim’s faces.’“

In case there’s any misunderstanding, I include that quote NOT to denigrate gays, Muslims, or Democrats, but to emphasize the absurdity of blaming Christians for the Orlando shootings. To get a sense of the infectious silliness going around in leftist circles over the slaughter, read this account of a vigil for the Pulse victims held in Columbia, MO by several student organizations near the main campus of the University of Missouri, at which Latino activists scolded the gay activist crowd for being “too white” and for paying insufficient attention to racial issues. Of course, it’s true that many of the Orlando victims were Latino, but after all, the vigil was for them, too, not just the white victims.

The left despises private gun ownership, or perhaps private anything except for their own privileges. Gun-blame feels so compassionate to them, and in this case, it conveniently avoids any mention of the killer’s ethnicity and radical ideology. Agitators say that “assault weapons” must be banned, but they are generally unable to articulate a precise definition. More thorough background checks are another favorite “solution”, but that’s based on an article of faith that such checks would be effective. Without proof that background checks actually work, and there is none, it still seems like a good idea to the “do something” crowd. Then, there are those whose real agenda is to ban guns outright, despite the fact that gun bans are counterproductive and infringe on the rights of law-abiding citizens.

Most of those who wish to ban assault weapons think they are referring to guns that fire repeatedly when the trigger is pulled. In other words, they believe that assault weapons are fully automatic weapons. But fully automatic weapons have been banned in the U.S. since 1934! Semi-automatic weapons require the trigger to be pulled to fire each bullet but load the next bullet automatically. James B. Jacobs of the NYU School of Law gives a fairly detailed description of the distinction between so-called assault weapons and other firearms, which essentially comes down to appearance:

“‘Assault weapons’ are semiautomatic firearms designed to look like military rifles. They are not military rifles—sometimes called assault rifles24—such as the U.S. Army’s M-16 … that can be fired in automatic or semiautomatic mode, or Russia’s AK-47, Germany’s HK G36 assault rifle, and Belgium’s FN Fal assault rifle. In contrast to assault rifles, these semiautomatic look-alikes do not fire automatically. Functionally, they are identical to most other semiautomatics. … Practically all modern rifles, pistols, and shotguns are semiautomatics; non-semiautomatic long guns include bolt action, slide action, and breach loaders; non-semiautomatic pistols are called revolvers.“

Jacobs discusses the futility of a ban on assault weapons and offers accounts of some historical assault weapon bans that were ineffective. Those outcomes were due in part to the flimsy distinction between assault weapons and other guns, as well as the fact that assault weapons are used in a relatively small percentage of gun crimes and in few mass shootings (also see here). This is corroborated by a recent paper appearing in the journal Applied Economics in which the authors report:

“… common state and federal gun laws that outlaw assault weapons are unrelated to the likelihood of an assault weapon being used during a public shooting event. Moreover, results show that the use of assault weapons is not related to more victims or fatalities than other types of guns. However, the use of hand guns, shot guns and high-capacity magazines is directly related to the number of victims and fatalities in a public shooting event. Finally, the gunman’s reported mental illness is often associated with an increase in the number of victims and fatalities.“

Another contention made by ill-informed opponents of gun rights is that mass shootings are never stopped by citizens with guns. That is simply not true, but it is good propaganda because foiled shooting attempts tend to receive much less notice than actual mass shootings. This article by Eugene Volokh provides a list of confirmed incidents in which a mass shooting was averted by a citizen carrying a gun. This situation has its counterpart in the left’s denial that defensive gun uses (DGUs) occur more frequently than gun crimes. DGUs are difficult to count because they often go unreported and may not even require the firing of a shot.

Another mistake is the continued advocacy for “gun-free zones” (such as the Pulse nightclub) within which even guards are not allowed to carry firearms. Andrew Napolitano rightly labels these “killing zones”.

More stringent background checks are another favorite solution of gun-rights opponents. However, actual background checks have done nothing to stop the most vicious mass shootings that have occurred over the past few years. This is another testament to the naiveté of relying on government to protect you, in this case, a government information system. Sheldon Richman has explained the futility of background checks thusly:

“… people with criminal intent will find ways to buy guns that do not require a check. Proponents of background checks seem to think that a government decree will dry up the black market. But why would it? Sales will go on beyond the government’s ability to monitor them. Out of sight, out of government control. … Thus the case against mandating ‘universal’ background checks withstands scrutiny. This measure would not keep criminally minded people from acquiring guns, but it would give a false sense of security to the public by promising something they cannot deliver.“

Advocates of assault weapon bans and wider background checks are inclined to characterize gun rights supporters as paranoid. As Volokh explained last year, however, there is strong reason to believe that the pro-gun lobby has correctly assessed the motives among the opposition as more extreme. Volokh notes that an ineffectual ban, like the 1994-2004 assault weapon ban and many other gun bans internationally, cannot outweigh the interests of society in protecting a basic liberty.

And as to basic liberties, Rolling Stone offers a wonderful illustration of the left’s disregard for individual rights and constitutional protections in an angry missive to gun rights supporters: “4 Pro-Gun Arguments We’re Sick of Hearing“. The author not only holds the Second Amendment in distain: vogue left-think has it that the entire Constitution is tainted because the framers were unable to agree on abolition 230 years ago (at a time when slave ownership was commonplace among the aristocracy). The fact that many of the founders were sympathetic to abolition makes little difference to these critics. They say the Constitution is not a legitimate framework for governance, despite its extremely liberal point of view on issues of individual rights. Apparently,  Rolling Stone would be just fine with abrogating the free speech rights of gun advocates.

Over the past 20 years or so, case law has increasingly viewed the Second Amendment as “ordinary constitutional law“, meaning that it protects individuals’ right to bear arms. The “well-regulated militia” limitation written into the Second Amendment is no longer accepted by the courts and most legal scholars as a limitation on individual rights. The militias it references were state militias raised from the civilian population, and the armaments they used were generally owned by the same civilians. In any case, there is no time limitation imposed on gun ownership by the Second via that clause. An earlier discussion of these issues was provided by Eugene Volokh in “The Commonplace Second Amendment“.

All this is quite apart from the Ninth Amendment, which states that nothing in the Constitution should be interpreted as limiting rights that are unenumerated. That would include self-defense, and ownership of a gun for that purpose is well advised. The Wikipedia entry on the Ninth Amendment says:

“One of the arguments the Federalists gave against the addition of a Bill of Rights, during the debates about ratification of the Constitution, was that a listing of rights could problematically enlarge the powers specified in Article One, Section 8 of the new Constitution by implication. For example, in Federalist 84, Alexander Hamilton asked, ‘Why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?’“

In other words, we do not derive our rights from government or the majoritarian passions of the moment.

Finally, the debate in Congress this week has centered on whether individuals on the FBI’s Terrorist Watch List should be denied the right to purchase a gun. That might seem like a no-brainier, but it raises legitimate concerns about civil liberties. There are about 700,000 people on that list (some reports put the number much higher), many of them U.S. citizens; some of them are there by mistake. Individuals on the list have not been convicted of a crime and are therefore entitled to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Watch Rep. Trey Gowdy’s passionate defense of due process to a DHS official this past week. When the ACLU and congressional republicans agree on the tyrannical nature of a restriction like this, you just can’t dismiss it out-of-hand. Such a change in the law cannot be justified without a fast and effective process giving citizens on the list a right of challenge.

The left is bereft of competence on the matter of guns, gun rights and the Constitution generally. They consistently demonstrate a dismissive view of individual liberties, whether that involves guns, religion, property, speech or due process. The tragedy in Orlando deserves more than ill-informed, knee-jerk conclusions. The most productive approach to terror risks involves individuals able to protect themselves and help watch out for others. That’s consistent with the position of the gay gun-rights group Pink Pistols. More power to them!

 

 

 

Hamburger Nation: An Administrative Nightmare

04 Friday Mar 2016

Posted by in Big Government, Judicial Branch, Legislative Branch, Regulation

≈ 4 Comments

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

nanny-state

By what authority do unelected bureaucrats in administrative agencies increasingly make laws, enforce those laws and adjudicate violations? The fact that all of these activities take place within the executive branch of government appears to be an obvious contradiction of the separation of powers required by the first three articles of the Constitution, the principle of “Rule By Consent” of the governed, and protections of individual liberty. In a strong sense, the regulatory apparatus has grown so unwieldy that the powers routinely exercised by administrative agencies today seem beyond even the reach of elected executives. The rules promulgated by this “fourth branch” of government are essentially extralegal, a point discussed at length in Philip Hamburger’s “Is Administrative Law Unlawful“. He has also explained these issues at the Volokh Conspiracy blog in “Extralegal power, delegation, and necessity“, and “The Constitution’s repudiation of extralegal power“.

Hamburger examines the assertion that rule-making must be delegated by Congress to administrative agencies because legislation cannot reasonably be expected to address the many details and complexities encountered in the implementation of new laws. Yet this is a delegation of legislative power. Once delegated, this power has a way of metastasizing at the whim of agency apparatchiks, if not at the direction of the chief executive. If you should want to protest an administrative ruling, your first stop will not be a normal court of law, but an administrative review board or a court run by the agency itself! You’ll be well advised to hire an administrative attorney to represent you. Eventually, and at greater expense, an adverse decision can be appealed to the judicial branch proper.

This adds up to a dangerous lack of accountability and power. Marginal Revolution points out that critics of Hamburger’s book overlook the potential for harm that could be done by a “vindictive” president. But we should not lose sight of the fact that bureaucrats themselves, at any level, can be vindictive, as the IRS targeting scandal has shown. But that is only one motive for abuse of power; another motive may be more pervasive: the ability to reward those in a position to promote the self-interests of those who populate the administrative state. These are dangers that are endemic to big government. In a post entitled “Are Government Regulators More Virtuous than Everyone Else” (No!), Ivan Carrino highlights the weakness of arguments like those made by George Akerlof and Robert Shiller in “Phishing For Phools“, who call for greater government regulation on the grounds that consumers are vulnerable to manipulation by businesses. Carrino says:

“One can’t help but notice the central contradiction in this analysis. On the one hand, it is assumed that markets fail because of ‘normal human weakness.’ On the other hand, it is assumed that regulation, which must necessarily be implemented by human beings with equal or greater ‘weaknesses,’ will somehow solve the problem.

Akerlof and Shiller simultaneously demonize human beings who operate in the private sector while idealizing human beings who operate in the public sector.“

Glenn Reynolds has been a prominent critic of the administrative state. As a consequence of the vast and growing body of regulatory rules, it’s become increasingly difficult for individuals, acting on their own or as businesspeople, to know whether they are in acting in violation of administrative law. Reynolds discusses regulatory crime and over-criminalization in “You May Be Breaking The Law Right Now“, and in his great paper “Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything is a Crime” (free download).

Hamburger’s main position is that law should be made by elected representatives, not by bureaucrats who lack direct accountability to voters. Ilya Somin believes that with time, Hamburger will have great influence on legal theorists in this regard. He compares Hamburger’s insights on administrative law to Richard Epstein’s work on takings. Epstein insisted that “almost all regulations that restrict property rights should be considered ‘takings’ that require compensation under the Fifth Amendment.” Somin notes that Epstein’s position, despite harsh criticism from certain quarters, has influenced legal thinking in a dramatic way over the years.

What’s to be done? Can a line reasonably be drawn between constitutional legislative power and delegated rule-making authority? Somin is skeptical that absolute restrictions on lawmaking by the administrative state are practical, in the sense that there will always be details that cannot be addressed in enabling legislation. Others have suggested practical paths forward: Joseph Postell attempts to give a roadmap in “From Administrative State to Constitutional Government“. A recent Glenn Reynolds op-ed, “Blow Up The Administrative State“, gives a qualified defense of Texas Governor Greg Abbot’s proposed amendments to the Constitution. Among other things, Abbot proposes to:

“–Prohibit administrative agencies … from creating federal law.
  –Prohibit administrative agencies … from preempting state law.
  –Give state officials the power to sue in federal court when … officials overstep their bounds.
  –Allow a two-thirds majority of the states to override a federal law or regulation.”

I would add that administrative review and adjudication should be independent of the agencies themselves. Also, Representative Mia Love (R-UT) has proposed legislation that would restrict Congress to bills focused on points directly related to a single issue (i.e., no omnibus bills), which would help to check the growth of the administrative state.

All of these measures seem consistent with Hamburger’s views. Reynolds is fully cognizant of the dangers of a constitutional convention. Nevertheless, he recognizes that Abbot’s proposals would impose harder limits on the size of government, and defends them in colorful fashion:

“A smaller government would mean fewer phony-baloney jobs for college graduates with few marketable skills but demonstrated political loyalty. It would mean fewer opportunities for tax dollars to be directed to people and entities with close ties to people in power. It would mean less ability to engage in social engineering and ‘nudges’ aimed at what are all-too-often seen as those dumb rubes in flyover country. The smaller the government, the fewer the opportunities for graft and self-aggrandizement — and graft and self-aggrandizement are what our political class is all about.“

For further reading, Michael Ramsey at The Originalism Blog posts links to several other essays by Hamburger at The Volokh Conspiracy, where he acted as a guest-blogger.

 

 

 

Ev’rybody’s Gone Serfin’, Serfdom USA

11 Tuesday Aug 2015

Posted by in Big Government, Regulation

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , ,

image

Any new or existing enterprise can be strangled with ease when regulatory coercion is brought to bear. Whole industries can be strangled. And the strangulation of freedoms is not limited to business concerns. Individuals are impacted as well by the loss of employment choices and opportunities, choices in the marketplace, and even more basic freedoms such as speech and assembly. In an excellent paper, “The Rule of Law in the Regulatory State“, John Cochrane of The University of Chicago highlights the negative consequences of growth in the scope and complexity of regulation. It looks like a working paper with a few items in need of editorial attention. Nevertheless, it contains several interesting ideas, some noteworthy examples of regulatory overreach, and useful dimensions along which to think about regulatory power and its application.

Cochrane’s first two paragraphs give an overview of the pernicious social effects of regulation gone wild, yet they only scratch the surface:

“The United States’ regulatory bureaucracy has vast power. Regulators can ruin your life, and your business, very quickly, and you have very little recourse. That this power is damaging the economy is a commonplace complaint. Less recognized, but perhaps even more important, the burgeoning regulatory state poses a new threat to our political freedom.

What banker dares to speak out against the Fed, or trader against the SEC? What hospital or health insurer dares to speak out against HHS or Obamacare? What business needing environmental approval for a project dares to speak out against the EPA? What drug company dares to challenge the FDA? Our problems are not just national. What real estate developer needing zoning approval dares to speak out against the local zoning board?“

The centerpiece of Cochrane’s paper is his elaboration on a list of bullet points, or dimensions for assessing a regulatory process. The list is given below in italics (without quote marks), and each bullet is followed by my own brief clarification:

  • Rule vs. Discretion? – Rules are better. How much latitude shall a regulator have?
  • Simple/precise or vague/complex? – Simple is better. Vague/complex ≈ discretion.
  • Knowable rules vs. ex-post prosecutions? – Surprise! You’re busted. Vague ≈ unknowable. 
  • Permission or rule book? – Don’t make me ask. Review my plans non-arbitrarily. 
  • Plain text or fixers? – Must I hire a specialist with agency connections?
  • Enforced commonly or arbitrarily? – Objective vs. motivated enforcement.
  • Right to discovery and challenge decisions. – Transparency of evidence & standards.
  • Right to appeal. – to courts, not the agency.
  • Insulation from political process. – Limit discretion and scope of powers.
  • Speed vs. delay. – six months or approve by default.
  • Consultation, consent of the governed. – Formal representation in rule-making.

Sorry if lists make you snooze, but I think it’s a good list, even if the bullets aren’t mutually exclusive. The items highlight the always-present choice between restraining government’s exercise of coercive power versus restraining and coercing the governed.

Cochrane then takes the reader on a “tour” of regulatory areas, including several aspects of financial regulation, health care, foods & drugs, the environment, the internet, campaign finance, national security, immigration and education. These sections are brief, but in each of these areas, Cochrane highlights negative consequences of regulation that illustrate government failure based on the dimensions given in his list of bullets. Here’s an anecdote from his section on environmental regulation:

“Already, anyone opposed to a project for other reasons — like, it will block my view — can use environmental review to stop it. Delay is as good as denial in any commercial project.

The small story of Al Armendariz, head of EPA region 6 who proposed ‘crucifying’ some oil companies as an example to the others is instructive. He was caught on tape saying:

‘The Romans used to conquer little villages in the Mediterranean. They’d go into a little Turkish town somewhere, they’d find the first five guys they saw and they would crucify them. And then you know that town was really easy to manage for the next few years.

…we do have some pretty effective enforcement tools. Compliance can get very high, very, very quickly.’

According to the story, Armendariz shut down Range Resources, one of the first fracking companies. Range fought back and eventually a Federal Judge found in its favor. But an agency that operates by “crucifying” a few exemplars, explicitly to impose compliance costs, is ripe to choose just which exemplars will be crucified on political bases.“

Cochrane closes by describing his vision of a “Magna Carta for the regulatory state” in order to protect “citizens from arbitrary power“:

“It is time for a Magna Carta for the regulatory state. Regulations need to be made in a way that obeys my earlier bullet list. People need the rights to challenge regulators — to see the evidence against them, to challenge decisions, to appeal decisions. Yes, this means in court. Everyone hates lawyers, except when they need one.

People need a right to speedy decision. A “habeas corpus” for regulation would work — if any decision has not been rendered in 6 months, it is automatically in your favor.“

Accomplishing great things is difficult, both in the physical world and in creating value in any form for which other free individuals will trade. By comparison, failure is easy, and so are regulatory decisions that precipitate failure. So often, so easily, so arbitrarily, and with little accountability, those decisions destroy freedom, value and our ability to improve human welfare.

You Probably Broke The Law Today

15 Wednesday Apr 2015

Posted by in Over-Criminalization

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , ,

RegulatoryCartoon

More widespread ignorance of “the law” is an implication of a regulatory state growing in size and complexity. The tendency of expanding regulation to over-criminalize prompted this reexamination of the legal doctrine of “presumed knowledge of the law”, by Michael Anthony Cottone (abstract at the link, but it offers a free download of the full paper). I believe the cause of justice compels additional protections for individuals or companies against administrative accusers. Not only does this appeal to my sense of fair play, it also should incent bureaucrats to write clear rules and minimize conflicts with existing regulations. And it may discourage overaggressive bureaucrats from pursuing charges over disputes whose resolution might be subject to more reasonable compromise.

Over-criminalization was also the impetus for Glenn Reynolds’ “Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything is a Crime” (another abstract with a free download available):

“Though extensive due process protections apply to the investigation of crimes, and to criminal trials, perhaps the most important part of the criminal process — the decision whether to charge a defendant, and with what — is almost entirely discretionary. Given the plethora of criminal laws and regulations in today’s society, this due process gap allows prosecutors to charge almost anyone they take a deep interest in.”

The “due process gap” is said to give rise to the expression, “a good prosecutor can get an indictment against a ham sandwich.” Here is a good discussion of the Reynolds paper at The Volokh Conspiracy, with additional links. Reynolds offers a number of possible remedies, including the creation of certain forms of liability for prosecutors, banning plea bargains, and limiting criminal prosecution for regulatory crimes. There are a few other interesting suggestions at the last link.

Heavy regulation of economic and social affairs places burdens on a society’s ability to prosper economically and culturally. It requires real resources to administer and imposes compliance costs on those it regulates. There are unnecessarily high social costs to a system of detailed rule-making by unelected bureaucrats who have incentives to both increase their dominion and to enhance their long-term career prospects. The latter is often accomplished via “partnership” with some of the largest regulated entities, which leads to rules favoring those entities at the expense of smaller competitors. And a large regulatory complex also offers an avenue through which the executive branch can promulgate rules based on expansive interpretations of existing law, circumventing checks on executive power enshrined in the Constitution. To these drawbacks we can add the consequences of over-criminalization. These should be addressed through limits on prosecutorial discretion and a more neutral perspective on presumed knowledge of administrative law.

Due Process Is the Enemy of Racism

13 Monday Oct 2014

Posted by in Uncategorized

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , ,

due process casualty

There is nothing racist about upholding the 14th Amendment right to due process under the law. The tragic Michael Brown shooting this summer in Ferguson, Missouri has led to shocking calls for denial of due process to Darren Wilson, the police officer involved. The African-American community in Ferguson may have legitimate grievances with aspects of their local government, including their representation on the local police force. However, the calls for Wilson’s immediate conviction appear to be motivated by simple ignorance of the legal system.

The image above appeared in several publications as the controversy surrounding the shooting escalated. That the mainstream media, or even alternative media outlets, and politicians would make calls for immediate charges against Officer Wilson led some to ask whether due process was a casualty of the Michael Brown shooting:

“The idea that you can tell who is innocent and who is guilty by the color of their skin is a notion that was tried out for generations, back in the days of the Jim Crow South. I thought we had finally rejected that kind of legalized lynch law.”

As the quote makes clear, due process rights should be respected as a source of protection against racism in law enforcement and the prosecution of crimes. Citizens should also be aware that they have a due process right to record the police; those engaged in acts of protest or civil disobedience would be wise to do so in order to defend themselves against false accusations.

Some would argue, of course, that Michael Brown himself was denied due process in his altercation with Officer Wilson, but that unproven assertion does not trump Wilson’s right to due process. Alan Dershowitz bemoans the lack of video evidence in the Brown shooting, but he staunchly defends Officer Wilson’s due process right. It is too easy to vilify those accused or suspected of the most serious and despicable offenses; that is why due process must be respected, even if the system isn’t free of errors. Of course, even accused murderers and rapists are entitled to due process.

In the end, the verdicts that come out of the system must be respected, or there is no hope of moving closer to perfect justice. Let us hope that is remembered when the grand jury ends its deliberations over whether to charge Darren Wilson in the Brown shooting, no matter the verdict.