Rejecting Fossil Fuels at Our Great Peril

18 Wednesday May 2022

Posted by pnoetx in Central Planning, Energy, Risk, Technology

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Bartley J. Madden, Biden Administration, Dan Ervin, Don Boudreaux, Electric Vehicles, Energy Mandates, Energy subsidies, EV Adoption, External Benefits, External Costs, Fossil fuels, Grid Stability, Intermittancy, Kevin Williamson, Markets, Power Outages, Price Controls, regressivity, Renewable energy, Russia Sanctions, SEC Carbon Mandate, Sustainability

The frantic rush to force transition to a zero-carbon future is unnecessary and destructive to both economic well-being and the global environment. I do not subscribe to the view that a zero-carbon goal is an eventual necessity, but even if we stipulate that it is, a rational transition would eschew the immediate abandonment of fossil fuels and adopt a gradual approach relying heavily on market signals rather than a mad dash via coercion.

I’ve written about exaggerated predictions of temperature trends and catastrophes on a number of occasions (and see here for a similar view from a surprising source). What might be less obvious is the waste inherent in forcing the abandonment of mature and economic technologies in favor of, as yet, under-developed and uneconomic technologies. These failures should be obvious when the grid fails, as it does increasingly. It is often better to leave the development and dispersion of new technologies to voluntary decision-making. In time, advances will make alternative, low- or zero-carbon energy sources cost effective and competitive to users. That will include efficient energy storage at scale, new nuclear technologies, geothermal techniques, and further improvements in the carbon efficiency of fossil fuels themselves. These should be chosen by private industry, not government planners.

Boneheads At the Helm

Production of fossil fuels has been severely hampered by the Biden Administration’s policies. The sanctions on Russian oil that only began to take hold in March have caused an additional surge in the price of oil. Primarily, however, we’ve witnessed an artificial market disruption instigated by Biden’s advisors on environmental policy. After all, neither Russian oil imports nor the more recent entreaties to rogue states as Iraq and Venezuela for oil would have been necessary if not for the Administration’s war on fossil fuels. Take a gander at this White House Executive Order issued in January 2021. It reads like a guidebook on how to kill an industry. In a column this weekend, Kevin Williamson quipped about “the Biden administration’s uncanny ability to get everything everywhere wrong all at once.” That was about policy responses to inflation, but it applies to energy in particular.

Scorning the Miracle

Fossil fuels are the source of cheap and reliable energy that have lifted humanity to an unprecedented level of prosperity. Fossil fuels have given a comfortable existence to billions of people, allowing them to rise out of poverty. This prosperity gives us the luxury of time to develop substitutes, not to mention much greater safety against the kind of weather extremes that have always been a fact of life. The world still gets 80% of its energy from fossil fuels. These fuels are truly a miracle, and we should not discard such valuable technologies prematurely. That forces huge long-term investments in inferior technologies that are likely to be superseded in the future by more economic refinements or even energy sources and methods now wholly unimagined. There are investors who will still wish to pursue those new technologies, perhaps with non pecuniary motives, and there are a few consumers who really want alternatives to fossil fuels.

Biden’s apparent hope that his aggressive climate agenda will be a great legacy of his presidency is at the root of his intransigence toward fossil fuels. His actions in this regard have had a profoundly negative psychological effect on the oil and gas industry. Steps such as cancellations of pipeline projects are immediately impactful in that regard, to say nothing of the supplies that would have ultimately flowed through those pipelines. These cancellations reinforce the message Biden’s been sending to the industry and its investors since his campaign: we mean to shut you down! Who wants to invest in new wells under those circumstances? Other actions have followed: no new federal oil and gas leases, methane restrictions, higher drilling fees on federal land, and a variety of climate change initiatives that bode ill for the industry, such as the SEC’s mandate on carbon disclosures and the Federal Reserve’s proposed role in policing climate impacts.

And now, Democrats are contemplating a move that would make gasoline even more scarce: price controls. As Don Boudreaux says in a recent letter to The Hill:

“Progressives incessantly threaten to tax and regulate carbon fuels into oblivion. These threats cannot but reduce investors’ willingness to fund each of the many steps – from exploration through refining to transporting gasoline to market – that are necessary to keep energy prices low. One reality reflected by today’s high prices at the pump is this hostility to carbon fuels generally and to petroleum especially. And gasoline price controls would only make matters worse by further reducing the attractiveness of investing in the petroleum industry: Why invest in bringing products to market if the prices at which you’re allowed to sell are dictated by grandstanding politicians?”

The kicker is that all these policies are futile in terms of their actual impact on global carbon concentrations, let alone their highly tenuous link to global temperatures. The policies are also severely regressive, inflicting disproportionate harm on the poor, who can least afford such an extravagant transition. Biden wants the country to sacrifice its standard of living in pursuit of these questionable goals, while major carbon-emitting nations like China and India essentially ignore the issue.

Half-Baked Substitution

Market intervention always has downsides to balance against the potential gains of “internalizing externalities”. In this case, the presumed negative externalities are imagined harms of catastrophic climate change from the use of fossil fuels; the presumed external benefits are the avoidance of carbon emissions and climate change via renewables and other “zero-carbon” technologies. With those harms and gains in question, it’s especially important to ask who loses. Taxpayers are certainly on that list. Users of energy produced with fossil fuels end up paying higher prices and are forced to conserve or submit to coerced conversion away from fossil fuels. Then there are the wider impediments to economic growth and, as noted above, the distributional consequences.

Users of immature or inferior energy alternatives might also end up as losers, and there are likely to be external costs associated with those technologies as well. It’s not widely appreciated that today’s so-called clean energy alternatives are plagued by their need to obtain certain minerals that are costly to extract in economic and environmental terms, not to mention highly carbon intensive. And when solar and wind facilities fail or reach the end of their useful lives, disposal creates another set of environmental hazards. In short, the loses imposed through forced internalization of highly uncertain externalities are all too real.

Unfortunately, the energy sources favored by the Administration fail to meet base-load power needs on windless and/or cloudy days. The intermittency of these key renewables means that other power sources, primarily fossil-fuel and nuclear capacity, must remain available to meet demand on an ongoing basis. That means the wind and solar cannot strictly replace fossil fuels and nuclear capacity unless we’re willing to tolerate severe outages. Growth in energy demand met by renewables must be matched by growth in backup capacity.

A call for “energy pragmatism” by Dan Ervin hinges on the use of coal to provide the “bridge to the energy future”, both because there remains a large amount of coal generating capacity and it can stabilize the grid given the intermittency of wind and solar. Ervin also bases his argument for coal on recent increases in the price of natural gas, though a reversal of the Biden EPA’s attacks on gas and coal, which Ervin acknowledges, would argue strongly in favor of natural gas as a pragmatic way forward.

Vehicle Mandates

The Administration has pushed mandates for electric vehicle (EV) production and sales, including subsidized charging stations. Of course, the power used by EVs is primarily generated by fossil fuels. Furthermore, rapid growth in EVs will put a tremendous additional strain on the electric grid, which renewables will not be able to relieve without additional backup capacity from fossil fuels and nuclear. This severely undermines the supposed environmental benefits of EVs.

Once again, mandates and subsidies are necessary because EV technology is not yet economic for most consumers. Those buyers don’t want to spend what’s necessary to purchase an EV, nor do they wish to suffer the inconveniences that re-charging often brings. This is a case in which policy is outrunning the ability of the underlying infrastructure required to support it. And while adoption of EVs is growing, it is still quite low (and see here).

Wising Up

Substitution into new inputs or technologies happens more rationally when prices accurately reflect true benefits and scarcities. The case for public subsidies and mandates in the push for a zero-carbon economy rests on model predictions of catastrophic global warming and a theoretical link between U.S. emissions and temperatures. Both links are weak and highly uncertain. What is certain is the efficiency of fossil fuels to power gains in human welfare.

This Bartley J. Madden quote sums up a philosophy of progress that is commendable for firms, and probably no less for public policymakers:

“Keep in mind that innovation is the key to sustainable progress that jointly delivers on financial performance and taking care of future generations through environmental improvements.”

Madden genuflects to the “sustainability” crowd, who otherwise don’t understand the importance of trusting markets to guide innovation. If we empower those who wish to crush private earnings from existing technologies, we concede the future to central planners, who are likely to choose poorly with respect to technology and timing. Let’s forego the coercive approach in favor of time, development, and voluntary adoption!

Central Planning Fails to Scale, Unlike Spontaneous Order

05 Tuesday Jun 2018

Posted by pnoetx in Central Planning, Markets, Price Controls

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Bronze Age, central planning, Client-Server Network, Decentralized Decision-Making, Economies of Scale, Federalism, Francis Turner, Industrial Policy, Liberty.me, Markets, Peer-to-Peer Network, Price mechanism, Property Rights, Scalability, Spontaneous Order

The proposition that mankind is capable of creating a successful “planned” society is at least as old as the Bronze Age. Of course it’s been tried. The effort necessarily involves a realignment of the economic and political landscape and always requires a high degree of coercion. But putting that aside, such planning can never be successful relative to spontaneous order of the kind that dominates private affairs in a free society. The task of advancing human well-being given available resources has never been achieved under central planning. It always fails miserably in this regard, and it always will fail to match the success of decentralized decision-making and private markets.

There are various ways to explain this fact, but I recently came across an interesting take on the subject having to do with the notion of scalability. Francis Turner offer s this note on th e topic at the Liberty.me blog. To begin, he gives a lengthy quote from a software developer who relates the problems of social and economic planning to the complexity of managing a network. On the topic of scale, the developer notes that the number of relationships in a network increases with the square of the number of its “nodes”, or members:

“2 nodes have 1 potential relationship. 4 nodes (twice as many) has 6 potential relationships (6 times as many). 8 nodes (twice again) has 28 potential relationships. 100 nodes => [4,950] relationships; 1,000 nodes => 499,500 relationships—nearly half a million.“

Actually, the formula for the number of potential relationships or connections in a network is n*(n-1)/2, where n is the number of network nodes. The developer Turner quotes discusses this in the context of two competing network management structures: client-server and peer-to-peer. Under the former, the network is managed centrally by a server, which communicates with all nodes, makes various decisions, and routes communications traffic between nodes. In a peer-to-peer network, the work of network management is distributed — each computer manages its own relationships. The developer says, at first, “the idea of hooking together thousands of computers was science fiction.” But as larger networks were built-out in the 1990s, the client-server framework was more or less rejected by the industry because it required such massive resources to manage large networks. In fact, as new nodes are added to a peer-to-peer network, its capacity to manage itself actually increases! In other words, client-server networks are not as scalable as peer-to-peer networks:

“Even if it were perfectly designed and never broke down, there was some number of nodes that would crash the server. It was mathematically unavoidable. You HAVE TO distribute the management as close as possible to the nodes, or the system fails.

… in an instant, I realized that the same is true of governments. … And suddenly my coworker’s small government rantings weren’t crazy…”

This developer’s epiphany captures a few truths about the relative efficacy of decentralized decision-making. It’s not just for computer networks! But in fact, when it comes to network management, the task is comparatively simple: meet the computing and communication needs of users. A central server faces dynamic capacity demands and the need to route changing flows of traffic between nodes. Software requirements change as well, which may necessitate discrete alterations in capacity and rules from time-to-time.

But consider the management of a network of individual economic units. Let’s start with individuals who produce something… like widgets. There are likely to be real economies achieved when a few individual widgeteers band together to produce as a team. Some specialization into different functions can take place, like purchasing materials, fabrication, and distribution. Perhaps administrative tasks can be centralized for greater efficiency. Economies of scale may dictate an even larger organization, and at some point the firm might find additional economies in producing widget-complementary products and services. But eventually, if the decision-making is centralized and hierarchical, the sheer weight of organizational complexity will begin to take a toll, driving up costs and/or diminishing the firm’s ability to deal with changes in technology or the market environment. In other words, centralized control becomes difficult to scale in an efficient way, and there may be some “optimal” size for a firm beyond which it struggles.

Now consider individual consumers, each of whom faces an income constraint and has a set of tastes spanning innumerable goods. These tastes vary across time scales like hour-of-day, day-of-week, seasons, life-stage, and technology cycles. The volume of information is even more daunting when you consider that preferences vary across possible price vectors and potential income levels as well.

Can the interactions between all of these consumer and producer “nodes” be coordinated by a central economic authority so as to optimize their well-being dynamically, subject to resource constraints? As we’ve seen, the job requires massive amounts of information and a crushing number of continually evolving decisions. It is really impossible for any central authority or computer to “know” all of the information needed. Secondly, to the software developer’s point, the number of potential relationships increases with the square of the number of consumers and producers, as does the required volume of information and number of decisions. The scalability problem should be obvious.

This kind of planning is a task with which no central authority can keep up. Will the central authority always get milk, eggs and produce to the store when people need it, at a price they are willing to pay, and with minimal spoilage? Will fuel be available such that a light always turns on whenever they flip the switch? Will adequate supplies of medicines always be available for the sick? Will the central authority be able to guarantee a range of good-quality clothing from which to choose?

There has never been a central authority that successfully performed the job just described. Yet that job gets done every day in free, capitalistic societies, and we tend to take it for granted. The massive process of information transmission and coordination takes place spontaneously with spectacularly good results via private discovery and decision-making, secure property rights, markets, and a functioning price mechanism. Individual economic units are endowed with decision-making power and the authority to manage their own relationships. And the spontaneous order that takes shape remains effective even as networks of economic units expand. In other words, markets are highly scalable at solving the eternal problem of allocating scarce resources.

But thus far I’ve set up something of a straw man by presuming that the central authority must monitor all individual economic units to know and translate their demands and supplies of goods into the ongoing, myriad decisions about production, distribution and consumption. Suppose the central authority takes a less ambitious approach. For example, it might attempt to enforce a set of prices that its experts believe to be fair to both consumers and producers. This is a much simpler task of central management. What could go wrong?

These prices will be wrong immediately, to one degree or another, without tailoring them to detailed knowledge of the individual tastes, preferences, talents, productivities, price sensitivities, and resource endowments of individual economic units. It would be sheer luck to hit on the correct prices at the start, but even then they would not be correct for long. Conditions change continuously, and the new information is simply not available to the central authority. Various shortages and surpluses will appear without the corrective mechanism usually provided by markets. Queues will form here and inventories will accumulate there without any self-correcting mechanism. Consumers will be angry, producers will quit, goods will rot, and stocks of physical capital will sit idle and go to waste.

Other forms of planning attempt to set quantities of goods produced and are subject to errors similar to those arising from price controls. Even worse is an attempt to plan both price and quantity. Perhaps more subtle is the case of industrial policy, in which planners attempt to encourage the development of certain industries and discourage activity in those deemed “undesirable”. While often borne out of good intentions, these planners do not know enough about the future of technology, resource supplies, and consumer preferences to arrogate these kinds of decisions to themselves. They will invariably commit resources to inferior technologies, misjudge future conditions, and abridge the freedoms of those whose work or consumption is out-of-favor and those who are taxed to pay for the artificial incentives. To the extent that industrial policies become more pervasive, scalability will become an obstacle to the planners because they simply lack the information required to perform their jobs of steering investment wisely.

Here is Turner’s verdict on central planning:

“No central planner, or even a board of them, can accurately set prices across any nation larger than, maybe, Liechtenstein and quite likely even at the level of Liechtenstein it won’t work well. After all how can a central planner tell that Farmer X’s vegetables taste better and are less rotten than Farmer Y’s and that people therefore are prepared to pay more for a tomato from Farmer X than they are one from Farmer Y.”

I will go further than Turner: planning can only work well in small settings and only when the affected units do the planning. For example, the determination of contract terms between two parties requires planning, as does the coordination of activities within a firm. But then these plans are not really “central” and the planners are not “public”. These activities are actually parts of a larger market process. Otherwise, the paradigm of central planning is not merely unscalable, it is unworkable without negative consequences.

Finally, the notion of scalability applies broadly to governance, not merely economic planning. The following quote from Turner, for example, is a ringing endorsement for federalism:

“It is worth noting that almost all successful nations have different levels of government. You have the local town council, the state/province/county government, possibly a regional government and then finally the national one. Moreover richer countries tend to do better when they push more down to the lower levels. This is a classic way to solve a scalability problem – instead of having a single central power you devolve powers and responsibilities with some framework such that they follow the general desires of the higher levels of government but have freedom to implement their own solutions and adapt policies to local conditions.”

5G Wireless: The NSA Wants You On Its Plan

30 Tuesday Jan 2018

Posted by pnoetx in infrastructure, National Security, Privacy, Uncategorized

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5G Wireless, Ajit Pai, central planning, FCC, incentives, Markets, National Security Council, Nationalized Wireless, Net Neutrality, NSA, Privacy, Scott Shackford, Wireless Infrastructure

Please no, Mr. President, do not even flirt with putting the federal government in charge of building and operating a new 5G wireless network! Sure, you’ll hate to disappoint the hawks on the National Security Council (NSC), but please let this remain outside the scope of your infrastructure plan!! For one thing, the private sector already has it underway, and the task is not straightforward. Excessive government involvement would almost surely botch the job. Let’s face it: while shrill calls for central planning of one form or another are constantly heard from leftists and populists, the government is really lousy at it. But then good central economic planning is impossible, given the impossibility of knowing and tracking the vast and dynamic information flows necessary to get it done, not to mention knowing and executing the appropriate responses to that information. There is a better tool for that called “markets”.

Scott Shackford reports that the chairman of the FCC, Ajit Pai, reacted with swift condemnation to the 5G discussions taking place within the NSC. Do read the whole Shackford piece. Apparently, there are some in the NSC who imagine government being good at building, maintaining, and securing a wireless network. This despite the antiquated nature of the federal government’s information systems and, as Shackford notes, their poor security. There is also the potential threat that communications over such a network would be subject to monitoring by nosey law enforcement and other public officials. If national security always implies state control, I’ll take less, but I don’t believe that’s the case for a minute.

The government tends to be a poor custodian of infrastructure — really public assets in general, and there is a reason: incentives are lacking. Private communication networks keep improving thanks to private incentives, like the prices and profits that promote efficient behavior and the market pressures to offer data plans that private users value. The government, on the other hand, struggles even to maintain the interstate highway system, which is simple technology by comparison. But statists tend to view the lack of private incentives as a feature: it’s free! And as a consequence, it is over-utilized and under-maintained. Ultimately the taxpayer is on the hook for capital costs and any upkeep that can be mustered, not the user, but the user suffers the degraded quality of those assets. A nationalized wireless network and its users would suffer the same fate.

Private infrastructure like wireless networks is best encouraged by eliminating regulatory roadblocks to private construction and operation of those assets. That includes the welcome rollback of the stifling network neutrality rules. Low taxes also help, not to say special incentives for wireless carriers.

Ridley’s Case For Free Market Capitalism

05 Saturday Aug 2017

Posted by pnoetx in Free markets

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Capitalism, Corporatism, crony capitalism, Invisible Hand, Liberalism, Markets, Matt Ridley, monopoly, Profit Motive

Matt Ridley delivered an excellent lecture in July addressing a generally unappreciated distinction: markets and free enterprise vs. corporatism. Many don’t seem to know the difference. Ridley offers an insightful discussion of the very radical and liberating nature of free markets. The success of the free market system in alleviating poverty and increasing human well-being is glaringly obvious in historical perspective, but it’s become too easy for people to take market processes for granted. It’s also too easy to misinterpret outcomes in a complex society in which producers must navigate markets as well as a plethora of regulatory obstacles and incentives distorted by government.

I agree with almost everything Ridley has to say in this speech, but I think he does the language of economics no favors. I do not like his title: “The Case For Free Market Anti-Capitalism”. Free Markets are great, of course, and they are fundamental to the successful workings of a capitalistic system. Not a corporatist system, but capitalism! Ridley seems to think the latter is a dirty word. As if to anticipate objections like mine, Ridley says:

“‘Capitalism’ and ‘markets’ mean the same thing to most people. And that is very misleading. Commerce, enterprise and markets are – to me – the very opposite of corporatism and even of ‘capitalism’, if by that word you mean capital-intensive organisations with monopolistic ambitions.“

No, that is not what I mean by capitalism. Commerce, free enterprise, markets, capitalism and true liberalism all imply that you are free to make your own production and consumption decisions without interference by the state. Karl Marx coined the word “capitalism” as a derogation, but the word was co-opted long ago to describe a legitimate and highly successful form of social organization. I prefer to go on using “capitalism” as synonymous with free markets and liberalism, though the left is unlikely to abandon the oafish habit of equating liberalism with state domination.

Capital is man-made wealth, like machines and buildings. It can be used more intensively or less in production and commerce. But capitalism is underpinned by the concept of private property. You might own capital as a means of production, or you might operate an enterprise with very little capital, but the rewards of doing so belong to you. Saving those rewards by reinvesting in your business or investing in other assets allows you to accumulate capital. That’s a good way to build or expand a business that is successful in meeting the needs of its customers, and it’s a good way to provide for oneself later in life.

Capitalism does not imply monopolistic ambitions unless you incorrectly equate market success with monopoly power. Market success might mean that you are an innovator or just better at what you do than many of your competitors. It usually means that your customers are pleased. The effort to innovate or do your job well speaks to an ambition rooted in discovery, service and pride. In contrast, the businessperson with monopolistic ambitions is willing to achieve those ends by subverting normal market forces, including attempts to enlist the government in protecting their position. That’s known as corporatism, rent-seeking, and crony capitalism. It is not real capitalism, and Ridley should not confuse these terms. But he also says this:

“Free-market ideas are often the very opposite of business and corporate interests. “

Most fundamental to business interests is to earn a profit, and the profit motive is an essential feature of markets and the operation of the invisible hand that is so beneficial to society. Why Ridley would claim that business interests are inimical to free market ideals is baffling.

I hope and believe that Ridley is merely guilty of imprecision, and that he intended to convey that certain paths to profit are inconsistent with free market ideals. And in fact, he follows that last sentence with the following, which is quite right: capitalism is subverted by corporatism:

“We need to call out not just the worst examples of crony capitalism, but an awful lot of what passes for capitalism today — a creature of subsidy that lobbies governments for regulatory barriers to entry.“

And, of course, crony capitalism is not capitalism!

Now I’ll get off my soapbox and briefly return to the topic of an otherwise beautiful lecture by Ridley. He makes a number of fascinating points, including the following, which is one of the most unfortunate and paradoxical results in the history of economic and social thought:

“Somewhere along the line, we have let the market, that most egalitarian, liberal, disruptive, distributed and co-operative of phenomena, become known as a reactionary thing. It’s not. It is the most radical and liberating idea ever conceived: that people should be free to exchange goods and services with each other as they please, and thereby work for each other to improve each other’s lives.

In the first half of the 19th century this was well understood. To be a follower of Adam Smith was to be radical left-winger, against imperialism, militarism, slavery, autocracy, the established church, corruption and the patriarchy.

Political liberation and economic liberation went hand in hand. Small government was a progressive proposition. Insofar as there was a revolution during the Industrial Revolution, it was the weakening of the power of the aristocracy and the landed interests, and the liberation of the bulk of the people.“

Do read the whole thing!

Code Word: Sustainability

16 Thursday Apr 2015

Posted by pnoetx in Uncategorized

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central planning, George Leef, Locavorism, Markets, National Association of Scholars, Progressive dialectic, Sustainability, Technocratic elite

Sustainability is a meaningful concept that has been bastardized as a code word for virtually anything that suits the progressive narrative. It is used as a catch-all for presumed goodness, while “unsustainable” is a catch-all for anything deserving of condemnation. Strictly speaking, a sustainable activity, or level of activity, is one that can be maintained indefinitely. That does not mean that the activity itself or its level is optimal; as any economist or engineer can demonstrate, “sustainable” in that sense does not necessarily imply that something is “too fast” or “too much”. In fact, a thing or an activity can occur at a rate that is unsustainably slow, or too little.

Progressives seem to have stumbled into the use of “sustainable” in another sense: that a thing or idea can be defended in argument as part of their dialectic. The broad array of things deemed to be sustainable, and those deemed unsustainable, map nicely to the progressive policy agenda. This is brought forward in “Sustainability: A new college fad with fangs“, by Geaorge Leef, a review of a paper published by the National Association of Scholars. Some colleges have established “sustainability” programs offering such challenging courses as “Ethics of Eating”, “Trash Studies”, “Environmental Poetry,” and Small Spaces Studio”:

“Frequently, courses link some ‘identity’ belief with sustainability, such as that ‘patriarchy’ is the enemy of sustainable life and therefore must be ended. … Most often, however, courses involve the supposedly unquestionable science of global warming and impending catastrophe.“

And here is a critical assessment of “sustainability” as an academic discipline:

“It’s just a farrago of beliefs, attitudes, and grievances centering around the general notion that most humans aren’t living the right way and unless we make drastic changes, we’re doomed. … [The authors] argue that sustainability is not really an academic discipline; rather, it’s an ‘ideology that unites environmental activism, anti-capitalism, and a progressive vision of social justice.’ Like a religion (hence the reference to fundamentalism), sustainability never questions its tenets. It posits them and even has ‘pledges’ for students and school officials to adhere to.“

It’s fascinating for me to read hysterical claims that capitalism is “unsustainable”. I suppose that means that market prices are simply useless at conveying information about scarcity, and that elite technocrats from the progressive tribe can make better decisions about what the rest of us can do and have. All that in the absence of incentives and information needed to align benefits with costs. I suppose it also means that strong property rights are useless for encouraging individuals to husband resources, and that the tragedy of the commons is a wicked fiction. I suppose it also means that resources should not be directed to their most valued uses, but instead to those uses most valued by the subjective judgement of the technocratic elite.

There are many other logical contradictions in the progressive sustainability mantra. This Scared Cow Chips post from several months ago, “Locavoracious Rent Seeking“, covered the uncritical acceptance of locavorism as “sustainable”.

“The reactionary mindset of today’s locavores prevents them from understanding the true nature of “sustainability,” which is best promoted by markets and a willingness to engage in trades that are mutually beneficial.“

America’s academic institutions should keep progressive sustainability doctrine at arms length. It is fine as a campus movement, but it is not worthy or appropriate as a set of governing rules for a community of higher learning. Ultimately, it has nothing to do real learning and the process of inquiry.

Put Consumers In Charge

25 Wednesday Feb 2015

Posted by pnoetx in Markets

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Comparative advantage, competition, Consumer Sovereignty, Contrived Scarcity, Free trade, Legalized Restraint of Trade, Markets, Matt Ridley, regulation, rent seeking, Richard Ebeling, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

The interests of consumers should always be placed first. That’s what happens in a free market economy, with the consent of competitive producers, and that is how public policy should be crafted. Too often, however, regulations and the laws on which they are based are written primarily with producer interests in mind. Don’t be cowed by the appealing names given to pieces of legislation or their ostensible purposes. These may be couched in terms of consumer protections, but more often than not they create barriers to entry, stifle innovation and confer advantages to big players, thus restricting competition. A case in point is occupational licensing, which inflates prices by preventing the entry of innovative and less costly competitors. In this political exchange, consumers gain “protections” that are often of questionable value, especially when incentives for improved service are blunted by the licensing rules.

Consumer primacy is of value in a general sense, as Richard Ebeling explains in “Consumers’ Sovereignty and Natural Vs. Contrived Scarcities“. When consumers are sovereign in their ability to decide for themselves among competing alternatives, including their own personal comparison of value to price, they essentially take charge of the flow of resources into and out of various uses. And they capture a positive gap between value and price as a personal gain in any transaction to which they are (by definition) a voluntary party. At the same time, producers must reckon with real costs, which reflect natural scarcities. But, by virtue of competition, it is in the interests of producers to deliver the best values to consumers at the lowest prices compatible with costs. Here is part of Ebeling’s introduction:

“One of the great myths about the capitalist system is the presumption that businessmen make profits at the expense of the consumers and workers in society. Nothing could be further from the truth. … In the free market, consumers are the sovereign rulers who determine what gets produced, and with what qualities and features. … The ‘captains of industry’ are not the businessmen, but the buying public who steer the directions into which production is taken.”

Ebeling gives a number of good examples demonstrating the ways in which this efficient market process is compromised by the hand of government. Regulations, mandates, licensure, price floors and ceilings, taxes and subsidies all act to distort the normal workings of the market, creating direct and indirect scarcities. The perverse effect is to generate a flow of economic rents to producer interests at the expense of consumers (and taxpayers). And that is why is those same producer interests are often inclined to seek market interventions. The successful rent-seeking effort ends in legally-sanctioned restraint of trade.

An example of contrived scarcity given by Ebeling results from protectionist trade policy, which ostensibly “protects” domestic producers and workers from “cutthroat” foreign competition. The plight of workers seems to be an easy sell to the public, though historically protectionism has inured to the benefit of relatively highly-paid workers, often unionized, who have an interest in restricting competition. Consistent with Ebeling’s point of view, Matt Ridley writes that trade policy should be driven by the benefits to domestic consumers, rather than producers. Ridley focuses on the UK’s interests in negotiating a free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The following thoughts from Ridley should be taken to heart by anyone with an interest in trade policy, and especially those who fancy themselves liberal:

“The argument for free trade is paradoxical and much misunderstood. Free trade benefits consumers because it is the scourge of expensive or monopolistic national suppliers. It benefits both sides: yet it works unilaterally. Your citizens benefit if you let them buy cheap goods from abroad, while foreigners are punished if their government does not reciprocate. This creates more demand for local services and hence more growth and jobs in the importing country.

Contrary to what most people think, therefore, it is imports that bring the greatest benefit, not exports — which are the price we have to pay to get the imports. At the centre of the debate lies David Ricardo’s beautiful yet counterintuitive idea of comparative advantage — that it will always pay a country (or a person) to import some goods from another, even if the first country or person is better at making everything. Truly free trade cannot be a predatory phenomenon.“

Statists Make a Mess of Markets

20 Tuesday Jan 2015

Posted by pnoetx in Markets, Regulation

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Foundation for Economic Education, Government Interference, Howard Baejter, Mark Perry, Markets, Mises Daily, Over-regulation, Patrick Barron, regulation, Self-Regulation, statism

Government is not well suited to regulate markets in many respects. In the first place, regulation is never absent from free markets: consumers, competitors, technology and all factors of production such as labor ultimately represent a network of forces that regulate market outcomes. The power of market self-regulation, and the often destructive results of government regulation, are discussed by Howard Baejter in “There is No Such Thing as an Unregulated Market“. Beyond the efficiency with which markets direct resources, Baejter notes that markets regulate the quality and pricing of goods and services. Mark Perry reviews Baejter’s post approvingly and adds some thoughts of his own:

“… the ruthless consumer-regulators also waste no time praising, endorsing and recommending the products, restaurants, movies, services, sellers, contractors and businesses they like, both by supporting them with plenty of their regulatory certificates of approval (dollars), and by giving them positive, sometimes even glowing reviews on Amazon, Yelp, Rotten Tomatoes, eBay, Angie’s List, Uber, etc….”

Baejter’s concluding section covers some ways in which government regulation short-circuits healthy market regulation. Regulatory actions not only impose significant compliance costs, but they often have the effect of suspending market price signals and hampering voluntary adjustments to change that would otherwise lead to improved welfare. Furthermore, regulated firms are often successful in “capturing” regulators, enabling the most powerful players in an industry to manipulate and obtain regulatory treatment that blunts competition. As Baetjer says:

“… government regulation often “crowds out” regulation by market forces and consumer-regulators, and markets therefore operate less efficiently because the interests of the producers take priority over the interests of consumers…”

The Mises Daily ran a post in early January by Patrick Barron in which he elaborates on the truism that peaceful, voluntary exchange necessarily improves well-being relative to third-party interference. Such interference may take the form of forced exchanges, rules, mandates, price controls, or distortions from taxation. A recent post on Sacred Cow Chips, “The State and the Invisible Future Lost“, emphasized the sacrifice of human well-being brought on by over-regulation. From that post:

“Our society routinely destroys economic opportunities as a matter of policy. This includes immediate discouragement of economic activity via tax disincentives and regulatory obstacles as well as lost capital investment and innovation. And it includes actions that grant protected status for monopolists, a steady by-product of the regulatory state.“

Unicorns, The State and Sustainability

15 Friday Aug 2014

Posted by pnoetx in Uncategorized

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Cafe Hayek, Don Boudreaux, Government Failure, Markets, Matt Ridley, Michael Munger, Platitudes, Sustainablility, Unicorns

Every time someone says “the government should …,” ask them to replace the “G word” with “politicians I actually know, running in electoral systems with voters and interest groups that actually exist.” Does the speaker still think “the government should?” It’s a good test suggested by Michael Munger in his article “Unicorn Governance.” His point is that nearly all calls for state intervention really profess a kind of belief in unicorns. So let’s remove the unicorn from the argument. He says:

My friends generally dislike politicians, find democracy messy and distasteful, and object to the brutality and coercive excesses of foreign wars, the war on drugs, and the spying of the NSA.

But their solution is, without exception, to expand the power of “the State.” That seems literally insane to me—a non sequitur of such monstrous proportions that I had trouble taking it seriously.

Along the same lines, Don Boudreaux at Cafe Hayek offers a quote from Matt Ridley’s book, The Rational Optimist:

Economists are quick to speak of ‘market failure’, and rightly so, but a greater threat comes from ‘government failure‘. Because it is a monopoly, government brings inefficiency and stagnation to most things it runs; government agencies pursue the inflation of their budgets rather than the service of their customers; pressure groups form an unholy alliance with agencies to extract more money from taxpayers for their members. Yet despite all this, most clever people still call for government to run more things and assume that if it did so, it would somehow be more perfect, more selfless, next time.

Finally, Boudreaux has a recent piece in which he proposes a little Platitude Test. Is the speaker offering up a platitude? Well, “ask yourself if you can imagine a normal human adult believing the opposite.” If so, then there is truly something of substance at issue. Boudreaux notes that this is usually not the case when the word “sustainability” is trotted out:

p style=”padding-left:30px;”>You’ll discover, of course, that you can’t imagine anyone seriously supporting ‘unsustainability.’ Therefore, you should conclude that mere expressions of support for ‘sustainability’ are empty. And they can be downright harmful if they mislead people into supporting counterproductive government policies. Substantive issues involving sustainability invoke questions that have non-obvious answers. For example: At what rate must the supply of a resource fall before we conclude that continued use of that resource is unsustainable?

Ultimately, market mechanisms are fabulous guardians of real sustainability, since they price scarce resources so as to allocate them efficiently across time and space, providing incentives for conservation, to bring forth new supplies of the resource, and to develop rational substitutes. Unicorns and the state don’t do nearly as well.

NOTE: I apologize for the haphazard formatting in this post. I cannot seem to get the editor to cooperate tonight. I had similar problems last night but resolved them, though not in a fully satisfactory way. Tonight the issues seem worse.