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Great Moments In Projection: Il Doofe Says His Opponents Are Anti-Democratic, Fascist

06 Tuesday Sep 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Democracy, fascism, Uncategorized

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Administrative State, Angelo M. Codaville, Babylon Bee, Benito Mussolini, Classical Liberal, Constitutional Republic, Corporatism, crony capitalism, Dan Klein, Democracy, fascism, FDR, Federalism, Friedrich Hayek, G.W.F. Hegel, Hitler, Il Duce, Joe Biden, Joseph Stalin, Majoritarianism, Nationalism, New Deal, Semi-Fascism, Sheldon Richman, Socialism

When partisans want to make sure they get their way, perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised to hear them claim their opponents are “anti-democratic”. Well, one-party rule is not democratic, just in case that’s unclear to leftists prattling about “hunting down” the opposition. We now have those forces hurling cries of “fascism” and “semi-fascism” at political adversaries for opposing their use of the state’s coercive power to get their way and to punish political enemies.

Restrained Democracy

The U.S. is not a democracy; it is a constitutional republic. The reason it’s not a democracy is that the nation’s founders were wary of the dangers of majoritarianism. There are many checks on unbridled majoritarianism built into our system of government, including the many protections and guarantees of individual rights in the Constitution, as well as federalism and three branches of government intended as coequals.

In a short essay on democracy, Dan Klein refers to a mythology that has developed around the presumed democratic ideal, quoting Friedrich Hayek on the “fantasy of consensus” that tends to afflict democratic absolutists. Broad consensus is possible on many issues, but it might have been an imperative within small bands of primitive humans, when survival of the band was of paramount concern. That’s not the case in modern societies, however. Classical liberals are often derided as “anti-democratic”, but like the founders, their distaste for pure democracy stems from a recognition of the potential for tyrannies of the majority. Klein notes that the liberal emphasis on individual rights is naturally at tension with democracy. Obviously, a majority might selfishly prefer actions that would be very much to the detriment of individuals in the minority, so certain safeguards are necessary.

However, the trepidation of classical liberals for democracy also has to do with the propensity for majorities to “governmentalize” affairs so as to codify their preferences. As Klein says, this often means regulation of many details of life and social interactions. These are encroachments to which classical liberals have a strong aversion. One might fairly say “small government” types like me are “anti-pure democracy”, and as the founders believed, democratic processes are desirable if governing power is distributed and restrained by constitutional principles and guarantees of individual rights.

Democracy has vulnerabilities beyond the danger posed by majoritarian dominance, however. Elections mean nothing if they can be manipulated, and they are easily corrupted at local levels by compromises to the administration of the election process. Indeed, today powerful national interests are seeking to influence voting for local election officials across the country, contributing substantial sums to progressive candidates. It’s therefore ironic to hear charges of racism and anti-democracy leveled at those who advocate measures to protect election integrity or institutions such as federalism.

And here we have the White House Press Secretary insisting that those in the “minority” on certain issues (dependent, of course, on how pollsters phrase the question) are “extremists”! To charge that someone or some policy is “anti-democratic” usually means you didn’t get your way or you’re otherwise motivated by political animus.

Fascism

Biden and others are throwing around the term fascism as well, though few of these partisans can define the term with any precision. Most who pretend to know its meaning imagine that fascism evokes some sort of conservative authoritarianism. Promoting that impression has been the purpose of many years of leftist efforts to redefine fascism to suit their political ends. Stalin actually promoted the view that anything to the right of the Communist Party was inherently fascist. But today, fascism is an accurate description of much of Western governance, dominated as it is by the administrative state.

I quote here from my post “The Fascist Roader” from 2016:

“A large government bureaucracy can coexist with heavily regulated, privately-owned businesses, who are rewarded by their administrative overlords for expending resources on compliance and participating in favored activities. The rewards can take the form of rich subsidies, status-enhancing revolving doors between industry and powerful government appointments, and steady profits afforded by monopoly power, as less monied and politically-adept competitors drop out of the competition for customers. We often call this “corporatism”, or “crony capitalism”, but it is classic fascism, as pioneered by Benito Mussolini’s government in Italy in the 1920s. Here is Sheldon Richman on the term’s derivation:

‘As an economic system, fascism is socialism with a capitalist veneer. The word derives from fasces, the Roman symbol of collectivism and power: a tied bundle of rods with a protruding ax.’”

Meanwhile, Hitler’s style of governing shared some of the characteristics of Mussolini’s fascism, but there were important differences: Hitler persecuted Jews, blaming them for all manner of social problems, and he ultimately had them slaughtered across much of Europe. Mussolini was often brutal with his political enemies. At the same time, he sought to unite an Italian people who were otherwise a fairly diverse lot, but once Mussolini was under Hitler’s thumb, Italian Jews were persecuted as well.

Angelo M. Codevilla provides an excellent account of Mussolini’s political career and the turns in his social philosophy over the years. He always considered himself a dedicated socialist, but the views he professed evolved as dictated by political expediency. So did his definition of fascism. As he took power in Italy with the aid of “street fighters”, fascism came to mean nationalism combined with rule by the administrative state and a corresponding preemption of legislative authority. And there were concerted efforts by Mussolini to control the media and censor critics. Sound familiar? Here’s a quote from Il Duce himself on this matter:

“Because the nature of peoples is variable, and it is easy to persuade them of things, but difficult to keep them thus persuaded. Hence one must make sure that, when they no longer believe, one may be able then to force them to believe.”

Here is Codevilla quoting Mussolini from 1919 on his philosophy of fascism:

“The fascist movement, he said, is ‘a group of people who join together for a time to accomplish certain ends.’ ‘It is about helping any proletarian groups who want to harmonize defense of their class with the national interest.’ ‘We are not, a priori, for class struggle or for class-cooperation. Either may be necessary for the nation according to circumstances.’”

This framing underlies another basic definition of fascism: a system whereby government coercion is used to extract private benefits, whether by class or individual. Codevilla states that Mussolini was focused on formal “representation of labor” in policy-making circles. Today, western labor unions seem to have an important, though indirect, influence on policy, and labor is of course the presumed beneficiary of many modern workplace regulations.

Modern corporatism is directly descended from Mussolini’s fascist state. The symbiosis that exists between large corporations and government has several dimensions, including regulatory capture, subsidies and taxes to direct flows of resources, high rates of government consumption, rich government contracts, and of course cronyism. This carries high social costs, as government dominance of economic affairs gives rise to a culture of rent seeking and diminished real productivity. Here is Codevilla’s brief description of the transition:

“Hegel, as well as the positivist and Progressive movements, had argued for the sovereignty of expert administrators. Fascist Italy was the first country in which the elected legislature gave up its essential powers to the executive, thus abandoning the principle, first enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, by which people are rightly governed only through laws made by elected representatives. By the outbreak of World War II, most Western countries’ legislatures—the U.S. Congress included—had granted the executive something like ‘full powers,’ each by its own path, thus establishing the modern administrative state.”

Mussolini saw Italian fascism as the forerunner to FDR’s New Deal and took great pride in that. On this point, he said:

“… the state is responsible for the people’s economic well-being, it no longer allows economic forces to run according to their own nature.”

The Babylon Bee’s take on Biden and fascism would have been more accurate had it alluded to Mussolini, but not nearly as funny! The following link (and photoshopped image) is obviously satire, but it has a whiff of eerie truth.

Biden Condemns Fascism in Speech While Also Debuting Attractive New Mustache

Conclusion

Biden’s slur that Republicans are “anti-democratic” is an obvious distortion, and it’s rather ironic at that. The nation’s support for democratic institutions has always been qualified for good reasons: strict majoritarianism tends to disenfranchise voters in the minority, and in fact it can pose real dangers to their lives and liberties. Our constitutional republic offers “relief valves”, such as “voting with your feet”, constitutional protections, and seeking recourse in court. Biden’s party, however, has a suspicious advantage via control of election supervision in many key urban areas of the country. This can be exploited in national elections to win more races as long as the rules on election administration are sufficiently lax. This is a true corruption of democracy, unlike the earnest efforts to improve election integrity now condemned by democrats.

Joe Biden hasn’t the faintest understanding of what fascism means. He uses the term mostly to suggest that Trump, and perhaps most Republicans, have authoritarian and racist sympathies. Meanwhile, he works to entrench the machinery and the breadth of our own fascist state, usurping legislative authority. He is buttressed by a treacherous security apparatus, “street fighters” under the guise of Antifa and BLM, and the private media acting as a propaganda arm of the administration. Joe Biden, you’re our fascist now.

Lawyers Sowing Legal Chaos

11 Monday Jul 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Big Government, Litigation, Living Constitution

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Activism, Administrative State, Bill of Rights, Homelessness, John O. McGinnis, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, Leviathan, Living Constitution, Mark Pulliam, Martin v. Boise, Ninth Circuit Court, Originalism, Pro Bono Litigation, Supreme Court, Trial Lawyers, West Virginia v. EPA

It goes without saying that the legal profession played a huge role in the development and growth of the administrative state. I reviewed some history about that growth in my last post, which dealt primarily with the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in West Virginia v. EPA. It’s certainly clear that courtrooms have served as venues for many of the steps in creating the federal Leviathan we know too well today. So has a large representation of attorneys in Congress. Environmental law? Tax law? Antitrust? Labor law? Civil Rights? Bank regulation? The examples and sub-examples are numerous, and while all might have laudable dimensions, there is no question that all present lucrative opportunities for attorneys… and for manipulative abuses. The burgeoning domain of administrative law enforced and adjudicated by federal agencies was itself a by-product of growth in the array of economic and social regulation, and it too was abetted by the legal profession. Moreover, it’s not inaccurate to say that the active rent-seeking efforts of private special interests, which undergird the “demand” for public intervention and regulation, are likely as not to have been spearheaded by corporate legal departments.

Ex post losses of various kinds are effective drivers of public intervention. Obviously, trial attorneys seek redress against various harms to clients who come their way, and they manage to stretch monetary damages to absurd levels. Public intervention, however, often takes the form of ex ante risk avoidance, and attorneys frequently take lead roles in agitating for ever-greater precautions against risk. A key characteristic of these measures is that they tend to be zero- and even negative-sum in nature. That is, in this kind of world, it is not atypical for one person’s gain to be less than another’s loss. This dynamic creates a formidable obstacle to economic growth.

Country Club Subversives

John O. McGinnis puts all this into a tidy nutshell in “Lawyers for Radical Change”:

“Since the birth of the modern regulatory state, lawyers are no longer primarily the allies of commercial classes, as they were in the early republic, but instead the technocrats and enablers of regulation and redistribution. The more the nation intervenes in economic affairs to regulate and redistribute, the greater slice of compliance costs and transfer payments lawyers can expect to receive. Thus, they cannot be counted on as supporters of property rights or even of a stable rule of law. Their interest lies frequently in dynamic forms of legal transformation and the uncertainty they bring. Far from supporting a sound, established social order, they are likely to seek to undermine it.”

McGinnis highlights the legal profession’s remarkable transition from once-active guardians of personal liberty, property rights, and the rule of law to active agitators for a nation grounded in non-productive rent seeking. The populist penchant for “do-something-ism” in response to every perceived risk, injustice, or grievance plays right into their skill set. And there are vast opportunities for attorneys in regulatory and fiscal matters. Compliance and legal work-arounds are enormously profitable to attorneys, to say nothing of the many forms of litigation. In all cases, one might say, “follow the fees”.

This is not exclusively a pecuniary matter, however. It’s also one of raw political ambition and status. A spectacular and perverse phenomenon has been the legal profession’s agitation for dismantling the rule of law, denying certain rights enumerated in the Constitution (e.g., free speech, gun rights) and insisting upon the enforcement of imagined rights through novel interpretations of the Bill of Rights and its amendments (e.g, guaranteed income, “equity”), even so-called rights and demands involving demonstrable harm to others (reparations, no bail laws, abortion).

Here’s McGinnis on the legal profession’s nearly complete sellout of the original text of the Constitution:

“Under living constitutionalism, lawyers and judges are not simply servants of the law but potentially tribunes of the people, because they can choose to create new rights and discard others. In a legal world without the formal anchoring in text and precedents that characterized the lawyer’s craft of the past, innovation and, indeed, radicalism are prized as sources of power.”

Legal “Realism”

There are other dimensions to the aberrant drift in the interests of the mainstream legal profession. Over 20 years ago, Mark Pulliam discussed some of these issues in “The Lawyer’s War on Law”. In that article, he decried so-called “legal realism”, which elevates prevailing attitudes about social policy and justice over legal formalism and originalism. This philosophy is used to justify what amounts to predation among trial lawyers seeking to smear the defense, especially those who suffer from unpopularity among current elites or the media. Gone is the idea of fighting for what is right under the law; instead the goal is to “win at all costs”. Here is Pulliam on this phenomenon:

“… lawsuits succeed without credible proof of injury or causation–‘junk science’ experts, paid by the hour, provide whatever pretext a jury requires–because of a combination of judge-made liability rules that tilt the playing field in favor of plaintiffs’ gripes, trial judges determined to redistribute wealth, and the brute force of endless dishonest lawsuits that seek unlimited, bankruptcy-threatening damages. Many businesses, having lost faith in courts’ ability or willingness to make rational rulings, routinely pay the equivalent of ransom just to escape the system. Most ominously, the trial lawyers have recently joined forces with state and local governments to loot unpopular industries for political purposes. Litigation is no longer just a way to bilk opponents; it is a political weapon.”

The legal realist school of thought is used as a ready excuse for nearly any form of judicial activism, including nullification of controlling statutes in election procedures, allowing lawyers and judges to run elections.

Pro Bono Subversion

More recently, Pulliam provided another example of a perverse activity sponsored by the legal profession, and in particular large law firms. In “Lawyers Cause Homelessness”, he discusses pro bono litigation and its paradoxical harms. Of course, pro bono work sounds so very good and generous. And, in fact, it can be very nice, as when attorneys offer free legal advice to those who cannot otherwise afford it. However, it is not uncommon to see these efforts used in the service of political activism. Pulliam contends that prestigious law firms use pro bono litigation as an inducement to attract young associates, fresh out of law school and full of the social justice blather taught there. How exciting to be offered a position at an elite firm with the opportunity to work on activist causes!

The case used by Pulliam to illustrate this dynamic is Martin v. Boise, decided by the Ninth Circuit Court in 2018, which he describes thusly:

“Martin v. Boise … declared unconstitutional—as ‘cruel and unusual punishment,’ of all things—any city ordinances that prohibit homeless people from sleeping or camping overnight on public property (such as parks, sidewalks, and, in California, beaches) unless the jurisdiction provides enough shelter beds to house every single ‘person experiencing homelessness,’ a burden no city will ever be able to meet. …

With a wave of the activist wand, the Ninth Circuit relieved vagrants of any responsibility to provide their own shelter. Society has this duty, and it must accept the consequences of its failure to provide cradle-to-grave care, no matter how improvident the lifestyle decisions of individual actors. In one fell swoop, in the absence of any relevant Supreme Court precedent, three unelected judges on the Ninth Circuit rendered more than 1,600 municipalities within the court’s jurisdiction powerless to curb urban homeless encampments.”

According to Pulliam, the Washington DC law firm Latham and Watkins dedicated more than 7,000 hours of attorney time to the case:

“Latham … publicly bragged about its ‘major Ninth Circuit victory’ and was honored for it by the Legal Services Corporation’s Board of Directors with a Pro Bono Service Award.”

This is a stark illustration of the depths of activism to which the legal profession has descended. And the case is hardly unique, as Pulliam goes on to illustrate. Despite the literal meaning of the term pro bono, this kind of activity is anything but for “the public good”.

Conclusion

Who really benefits from the kind of legalistic mayhem we see today? The written words of the Constitution are now said to mean things that are often diametrically opposed to the framers’ intent. The federal government absorbs ever greater shares of the nation’s resources. Private parties use federal power to petition for rents that could never have been gained in private markets. Laws are made by federal agencies who, in turn, internally adjudicate disputes between those very agencies and private parties. Litigation runs rampant in search of deep pockets. And elite law firms are somehow deemed praiseworthy for working to undermine safety, cleanliness, property rights, and the enumerated rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

Who benefits? Perhaps most of all it is the attorneys! The more chaotic, the better! Then again, if you’re at risk of legal trouble, you better damn well consult an attorney. We can’t seem to live without lawyers, but sadly, we can’t live free with them.

The EPA’s Trip To the Constitutional Woodshed

07 Thursday Jul 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Administrative State, Constitution, Supreme Court, Uncategorized

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Administrative Law, Administrative Procedures Act, Administrative State, Affordable Care Act, Charles Lipson, Chevron Deference, Clarence Carson, Clean Air Act, Climate Alarmism, Constitutional Law, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, Francis Menton, Franklin D. Roosevelt, FTC, Gabriel Kolko, Great Society, Humphrey’s Executor, ICC, Jarkesy v. SEC, Jonathan Tobin, Kevin O. Leske, Lyndon B. Johnson, Major Questiins Doctrine, National Labor Relations Board, Neil Gorsuch, New Deal, Philip Hamburger, rent seeking, SEC, Sheldon Richman, Supreme Court, The Manhattan Contrarian, West Virginia v. EPA, Woodrow Wilson

The Supreme Court’s regular docket is done for the year, but one of last week’s rulings is of great interest to those concerned about the constitutional threat posed by the administrative state. In West Virginia v. EPA, the Court held that the Clean Air Act of 1970 does not authorize the EPA to regulate carbon emissions in power generation. Well, that’s getting to be a very old statute and no one thought much about carbon dioxide emissions when it became law, so of course it doesn’t! However, this decision is crucial as a check on the ever-growing, extra-legal power of the administrative bureaucracy. I say “extra-legal” because regulatory agencies are increasingly taking it upon themselves to write rules that reach well beyond their legislative mandates. Only the legislature can make law under our system of government, or at least law that settles “major questions”, a doctrine that the Court has applied in this case.

Consequential Side Issues

While many critics of the West Virginia decision might find this hard to believe, it has nothing to do with the Court’s views about the prospects for climate change. That is not the Court’s job and it knows it, or at least most of the justices know it. Even if climate change poses a real threat of global catastrophe, and it does not, that is not the Court’s job. Its primary function is to preserve constitutional law, and that is what this decision is about. (For more on the folly of climate alarmism, see here, here, and here.)

Apart from its constitutional implications, growth in the number of regulatory rules and their complexity also imposes massive costs on the economy, robbing the private sector of productive opportunities, often with little or no demonstrable public benefit. The unbridled promulgation of rules does, however, benefit special interests. That includes bureaucrats, litigators, and private parties who derive side benefits from regulation, such as protection of monopoly status, competitive advantages, and expanded professional opportunities. Leveraging government and political privilege for private benefit is rent seeking at its very heart, and it’s also at the very heart of fascistic corporatism.

A Little History

Regulation has been a channel for rent seeking going back to the earliest days of the Republic and even before. But a Great Leap Forward in federal regulatory intervention came in the late 1880s with several Supreme Court decisions involving railroad rates, and then the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The railroads practically begged to be regulated. At the last link, Sheldon Richmsn quotes historian Gabriel Kolko:

“The first regulatory effort, the Interstate Commerce Commission, had been cooperative and fruitful; indeed, the railroads themselves had been the leading advocates of extended federal regulation after 1887.”

The railroads wanted stability, of course, and less competition, and that’s what they got, though in the end they didn’t do themselves any favors. Here’s historian Clarence Carson on the ultimate result:

“Since the railroads could not effectively compete in so many ways, such opportunity for improving their situation as existed would usually be to combine roads cover­ing the same general area so as to maintain some control over rates and get as much of the profitable business as possible within an area. This is what rail­road financiers tended to do. The result, as far as the public was concerned, was a nonintegrated rail system, reduced competition, poorer service, and higher rates.”

Later, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt had strong roles in advancing the regulatory state. Wilson was smitten with the scientism inherent in centralized decision making and administrative expertise. He was also loath to concede his vision of administrative planning to democratic ideals. Justice Neil Gorsuch, in his concurrence on the EPA decision, offers some rather disturbing quotes from Wilson:

“Woodrow Wilson famously argued that ‘popular sovereignty’ ‘embarrasse[d]’ the Nation because it made it harder to achieve ‘executive expertness.’ The Study of Administration, 2 Pol. Sci. Q. 197, 207 (1887) (Administration). In Wilson’s eyes, the mass of the people were ‘selfish, ignorant, timid, stubborn, or foolish.’ Id., at 208. He expressed even greater disdain for particular groups, defending ‘[t]he white men of the South’ for ‘rid[ding] themselves, by fair means or foul, of the intolerable burden of governments sustained by the votes of ignorant [African-Americans].’ 9 W. Wilson, History of the American People 58 (1918). He likewise denounced immigrants ‘from the south of Italy and men of the meaner sort out of Hungary and Poland,’ who possessed ‘neither skill nor energy nor any initiative of quick intelligence.’ 5 id., at 212. To Wilson, our Republic ‘tr[ied] to do too much by vote.’ Administration 214.”

FDR’s New Deal was responsible for a huge expansion in the administrative apparatus, as this partial list of federal agencies created under his leadership indicates. Many of these agencies were subsequently ruled unconstitutional, but quite a few live on today with greatly expanded scope and presumed powers.

The Great Society policies of Lyndon B. Johnson also created new agencies and programs, with additional burdens on the ability of the private economy to function properly. Of course, the complexity of the administrative state has increased many-fold with more recent actions such as the Clean Air Act and the Affordable Care Act.

Major Questions

The agencies, despite any expertise they might have in-house, cannot create major rules and mandates without fairly specific statutory authorization. That is a constitutional imperative. It’s not quite clear, however, what test might distinguish a “major question” requiring enabling legislation from lesser matters. There is certainly some room for interpretation. According to Kevin O. Leske:

“Under the [major questions] doctrine, a court will not defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision in circumstances where the case involves an issue of deep economic or political significance or where the interpretive question could effectuate an enormous and transformative expansion of the agency’s regulatory authority.”

Unfortunately, this judicial deference to agency rule-making and interpretation led to further erosion of the separation of powers and due process rights. Vague legislation, aggressive special interests and rent seekers, and judicial deference have allowed agencies excessive latitude to interpret and stretch their mandates, to enforce expansive regulatory actions, and to adjudicate disputes with regulated entities in proceedings internal to the agencies themselves.

At issue in EPA v. West Virginia were the agency’s steps to radically transform the energy mix used in power generation, with potentially dramatic, negative impacts on the public. The Court said that won’t fly unless Congress gives the EPA more specific instructions along those lines. Agency expertise, by itself, is not enough to override the legitimate democratic interests of the public in such consequential matters.

But what about executive actions of the sort increasingly taken by presidents over the years? Why are those legal? Article Two of the Constitution grants discretion to the president for enforcement of laws and managing the executive branch. Furthermore, pieces of legislation can specifically grant discretionary power to the executive branch in particular areas. Nevertheless, it might be possible for even executive orders issued by the president to “go too far” in interpreting congressional intent. That is within the purview of courts in case of legal challenges.

Unaccountable Agency Power

So called “administrative expertise” was given some degree of deference by the Supreme Court as early as the 1930s. In 1947, the Court decided the application of such expertise should often take precedence over pre-established rules. There was also a recognition that legislators often lacked the expertise to formulate certain regulatory guidelines. The expanding scope and complexity of regulations gave rise to increasing legal disputes, however. This strained the judicial system for at least two reasons: the sheer limits of its capacity and the lack of technical expertise needed to settle many disputes. This ultimately led to the adjudication of many disputes within the agencies themselves. Agency tribunals of subject matter experts were formed to meet these growing demands. This was said to facilitate “cheap justice”, not to mention more rapid decisions. The passage of the Administrative Procedures Act in 1947 was a recognition that administrative law was necessary and required certain standards, though they differ from normal judicial standards, such as rules of evidence. This left very little to brake aggressive and extra-legal rule-making and enforcement by the agencies.

Another disturbing aspect of the growth in administrative power has been the advent of agencies said to be “independent” from the other branches of government, as if to intimate their existence as a fourth branch. As Francis Menton (the Manhattan Contrarian) says, agencies:

“… can create rules for your conduct free from the Congress, and … can prosecute you free from the President. In 1935, in a case called Humphrey’s Executor, the Supreme Court upheld the part of the FTC Act that made the Commissioners immune from discharge by the President other than in very limited circumstances. Humphrey’s Executor has not been overruled to this day.

The FTC was only the beginning of an explosion of creation of such ‘independent’ agencies and otherwise un-separated powers in the federal government. The Federal Reserve was created about the same time (actually 1913), and things really took off during Roosevelt’s New Deal, with agencies like the FCC, SEC, and NLRB.”

Later, the Supreme Court adopted a two-part test to determine whether courts may defer to administrative expertise in interpreting legislative intent, rather than substituting their own judgement or insisting on a clearer legislative mandate. This was the principle of so-called Chevron deference, named for the case Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in which the Court ruled for the EPA’s definition of a “stationary source” of pollution as “plantwide”. The test for Chevron deference was whether an agency’s rule was a “reasonable” statutory interpretation and whether Congress had not directly addressed the point in question.

Rolling It Back

Philip Hamburger, in his book “Is Administrative Law Unlawful?”, addressed the struggle between administrative power and “regular law” back to the days of “royal prerogative”. The advent of constitutional law was designed to prevent anything resembling the latter.

“… administrative law has returned American government and society to precisely the sort of consolidated or absolute power that the US Constitution―and constitutions in general―were designed to prevent.”

But now we have some very promising developments. Again, in the West Virginia case, the EPA’s authority to regulate carbon emissions in power generation has been denied by the Court, pending any future legislation that would specifically enable that authority. There was no mention of Chevron in this decision whatsoever! That’s a big win for constitutional principle. In another recent case before the Fifth Circuit Court in New Orleans, Jarkesy v. SEC, an administrative law judge (ALJ) at the SEC had assessed damages and fines against Jarkesy, but he challenged the SEC in court, as Menton describes:

“Jarkesy claimed that he was deprived of his Seventh Amendment right to have his case decided by a jury, and also that the SEC had unconstitutionally exercised legislative powers when deciding to try his case before an ALJ without having been given any guiding principles by Congress on how to make that decision. The Fifth Circuit ruled for Jarkesy on both points. This decision has the potential to force some significant changes on how the SEC does business. However, Mr. Jarkesy still does have to continue to run a gantlet that will likely include a request by the government for en banc review by the Fifth Circuit, and then a request for review by the Supreme Court.”

Conclusion

Here is a nice summary of the constitutional issues from an earlier post by Menton:

“… (1) the combining of powers into agencies that would enact, and also enforce, and also adjudicate regulations (directly contrary to the Constitution’s separation of powers into three branches of government); (2) agencies enacting regulations with the force of law on their own say so (contrary to the Constitution’s requirement that all laws be passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the President for signature); and (3) many agencies claiming to be “independent” of the President (contrary to the Constitution’s vesting all ‘ executive power’ in the President).

This is echoed by Jonathan Tobin, who says:

“Government by fiat of intellectuals or scientific experts may or may not be good policy. But it is alien to the U.S. Constitution, and it has nothing to do with democracy.”

One other critical point made by Charles Lipson is that the Court’s West Virginia decision, while sending an unmistakeable message to federal agencies, should also raise awareness in Congress that it is not enough to legislate vague statutes and rely on bureaucrats to make all the decisions about implementation. Instead, “major questions” must be dealt with legislatively and with full accountability to voters. Congress must address these issues, if not up-front, then whenever they arise as disputes in the courts or otherwise. Certainly, the West Virginia decision should make individuals or entities subject to regulatory action less likely to allow major questions to be settled by ALJ rulings within the agencies themselves. The Supreme Court has expressed a willingness for such cases to be reviewed in normal courts of law. That is a very positive development for liberty.

Defang the Administrative State

14 Wednesday Apr 2021

Posted by Nuetzel in Administrative State, Discrimination, Free Speech

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Administrative Law, Administrative State, discrimination, Human Subjects, Institutional Review Boards, Internal Revenue Code, Ku Klux Klan, Philip Hamburger, Religious Speech, rent seeking, Section (501)(c)(3), Tuskegee, Woodrow Wilson

The American administrative state (AS) was borne out of frustration by statist reformers with expanded voting rights. It continues to be an effective force of exclusion and discrimination today, according to Philip Hamburger of Columbia Law School. I’ve discussed Hamburger’s commentary in the past on the extra-legal power often wielded by administrative agencies, and I will quote him liberally in what follows. At the first link above, he provides some historical context on the origins of the AS and discusses the inherently discriminatory nature of administrative law and jurisprudence.

An Abrogation of Voting Rights

Hamburger quotes Woodrow Wilson from 1887 on the difficulty of appealing to a broad electorate, a view that was nothing short of elitist and bigoted:

“‘… the reformer is bewildered’ by the need to persuade ‘a voting majority of several million heads.’ He worried about the diversity of the nation, which meant that the reformer needed to influence ‘the mind, not of Americans of the older stocks only, but also of Irishmen, of Germans, of Negroes.’ Put another way, ‘the bulk of mankind is rigidly unphilosophical, and nowadays the bulk of mankind votes.’”

Wow! Far better, thought Wilson, to leave the administration of public policy to a class of educated technocrats and thinkers whose actions would be largely independent of the voting public. But Wilson spoke out of both sides of his mouth: On one hand, he said that administration “lies outside the proper sphere of politics“, but he also insisted in the same publication (“The Study of Administration“) that public administration “must be at all points sensitive to public opinion“! Unfortunately, the views of largely independent public administrators seldom align with the views of the broader public.

Administration and Prejudice

Wilson was elected President 25 years later, and his administration did much to expand the administrative powers of the federal executive. Over the years, the scope of these powers would expand to include far more than mere administrative duties. Administrative rule-making would come to form a deep body of administrative law. And while traditional legislation would nominally serve to “enable” this activity, it has expanded in ways that are not straightforwardly connected to statute, and its impact on the lives of ordinary Americans has been massive. Furthermore, a separate legal system exists for adjudicating disputes between the public and administrative agencies, with entirely separate rules and guarantees than our traditional legal system:

“It is bad enough that administrative proceedings deny defendants many of the Constitution’s guaranteed civil procedures. … In addition, all administrative proceedings that penalize or correct are criminal in nature, and they deny defendants their procedural rights, such as their right to a jury and their right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Of course, these administrative proceedings deny procedural rights to all Americans, but they are especially burdensome on some, such as the poor.“

The AS has truly become a fourth, and in many ways dominant, branch of government. Checks and balances on its actions are woefully inadequate, and indeed, Wilson considered that a feature! It represents a usurpation of voting rights, but one that is routinely overlooked by defenders of universal suffrage. It is also highly prejudiced and discriminatory in its impact, which is routinely overlooked by those purporting to fight discrimination.

Bio-Medical Discrimination

Hamburger devotes some of his discussion to Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), which are mandated by federal law to conduct prior reviews of research in various disciplines. These boards are generally under the authority of the Department of Health and Human Services. One major objective of IRBs is to prevent research involving human subjects, but this prohibition can be very misguided, and the reviews impose costly burdens and delays of studies, often stopping them altogether on trivial grounds:

“This prior review inevitably delays and prevents a vast array of much entirely innocent bio-medical research. And because the review candidly focuses on speech in both the research and its publication, it also delays and prevents much bio-medical publication.

The consequences, particularly for minorities, are devastating. Although supposedly imposed by the federal government in response to scientific mistreatment of black individuals, such as at Tuskegee, the very solicitousness of IRBs for minorities stymies research on their distinctive medical problems. …

When government interferes with medical research and its publication—especially when it places administrative burdens on research and publication concerning minorities—the vast costs in human life are entirely predictable and, of course, discriminatory.”

Stifling Political Speach

Hamburger tells the story of Hiram Evans, a 1930s crusader against religious influence on voters and legislators. Evans also happened to be the Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan. Hamburger classifies Evans’ agitation as an important force behind nativist demands to outlaw religious speech in politics. Ultimately, Congress acquiesced, imposing limits on certain speech by non-profits. Individuals are effectively prohibited from fully participating in the political process through religious and other non-profit organizations by Section (501)(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Of course, tax-exempt status is critical to the survival and growth of many of these institutions. More traditionally religious individuals are often heavily reliant upon their faith-based organizations not just for practicing their faith, but as centers of intellectual and social life. Needless to say, politics intersects with these spheres, and to prohibit political speech by these organizations has an out-sized discriminatory impact on their members.

The insulation of the AS from the democratic process, and the effective limits on religious speech, often mean there is little leeway or tolerance within the AS for individuals whose religious beliefs run counter to policy:

“The difference between representative and administrative policymaking is painfully clear. When a legislature makes laws, the policies that bear down on religion are made by persons who feel responsive to religious constituents and who are therefore usually open to considering exemptions or generally less severe laws.”

But there are other fundamental biases against religious faith and practices within the AS:

“… when policies come from administrative agencies, they are made by persons who are chosen or fired by the executive, not the public, and so are less responsive than legislators to the distinctive needs of a diverse people. They are expected, moreover, to maintain an ethos of scientism and rationality, which—however valuable for some purposes—is indifferent and sometimes even antagonistic to relatively orthodox or traditional religion, let alone the particular needs of local religious communities.“

Sucking Life From the Republic

The administrative state imposes a variety of economic burdens on the private sector. This is not just costly to economic growth. It also creates innumerable opportunities for rent-seeking by interest groups of all kinds, including private corporations whose competitive interests often lead them to seek advantage outside of traditional participation in markets.

Hamburger’s arguments are even more fundamental to the proper functioning of a republic, but they are probably difficult for many journalists and politicians to fully grasp. He identifies some core structural defects of the administrative state, and he does so with great passion. He sums things up well in his closing:

“… was founded on racial and class prejudice, it is still supported by class prejudice. Moreover, by displacing laws made by elected lawmakers, it continues to discriminate against minorities of all sorts. Along the way, it stifles much scientific inquiry and publication with devastating costs, particularly for minorities. It is especially discriminatory against many religious Americans. And it eviscerates the Constitution’s procedural rights, not least in cases criminal in nature.

So, if you are inclined to defund oppression, defund the administrative state. If you want to tear down disgraceful monuments, demolish the prejudiced and discriminatory power that is Woodrow Wilson’s most abysmal legacy. If you are worried about stolen votes, do not merely protest retail impediments to voting, but broadly reject the wholesale removal of legislative power out of the hands of elected legislators. And if you are concerned about the injustice of the criminal justice system, speak up against the loss of juries, due process, and other rights when criminal proceedings get transmuted into administrative proceedings.

Little in America is as historically prejudiced or systematically discriminatory as administrative power. It is a disgrace, and it is time to take it down.“

Slam the Damn Brakes on the Regulatory Potentate

28 Saturday Oct 2017

Posted by Nuetzel in Regulation

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Administrative State, Barry Brownstein, Corn Ethanol, crony capitalism, DARPA, Deregulation, Donald Trump, Drug Review, EPA, FCC, FDA, Greg Ip, Industrial Policy, Mercatus Center, NASA, Net Neutrality, Paris Climate Accord, Patrick McLaughlin, Puerto Rico, Renewable Fuel Standards, Steve Bannon, The Brookings Institution, Two-For-One Regulatory Order

The stock market’s recent gains have at least three plausible explanations: corporate earnings growth, the prospect of tax reform, and deregulation. Tax reform and deregulation are stated priorities of the Trump Administration and have the potential to lift the economy and generate additional earnings. Investors obviously like that prospect, though regulation itself is a tool used subversively by crony capitalists to stifle competition in their markets. Conceivably, some of the large firms that dominate major stock indices could suffer from deregulation. And I have to wonder whether the economic threat of Trumpian trade protectionism is not taken seriously by the equity markets. Let’s hope they’re right.

It’s no mystery that high taxes and tax complexity can inhibit economic growth. Let’s face it: when it comes to productive effort, we can all think of better things to do than tax planning, crony capitalist or not. The same is true of regulation: the massive diversion of resources into non-productive compliance activities stifles innovation, growth, and even the stability of the status quo. Regulation creates obstacles to activities like new construction and the diffusion of telecommunications services. And it discourages the creation of new products and services like potentially life-saving drugs and slows their introduction to market. The sheer number of federal regulations is so spectacular that one wonders how anything productive ever gets done! Patrick McLaughlin of The Mercatus Center and several coauthors tell of “The Impossibility of Comprehending, or Even Reading, All Federal Regulations“.

Regulation is more than a mere economic burden. It is the product of an administrative apparatus that is not subject to the checks and balances that are at the very heart of our system of constitutional government. That is a threat to basic liberties. Barry Brownstein offers an instructive case study of “The Tyranny of Administrative Power” involving violations of property rights in New Hampshire. The case involves the administrative machinations surrounding an installation of high-power lines.

Governmental efforts to spur innovation ordinarily take the form of spending on research, subsidies for certain technologies or favored industries (e.g., alternative energy), and large government programs dedicated to the achievement of various technological goals (e.g., NASA, DARPA). Together with regulatory rules that influence the allocation of resources, these governmental efforts are called industrial policy. An unfortunate recent example is Trump’s decision to retain the renewable fuel standard (RFS), but on the whole, industrial policy does not seem central to Trump’s effort to stimulate innovation.

It’s clear that a deregulatory effort is well underway: the so-called “deconstruction of the administrative state” hailed by Steve Bannon not long after Trump took office. First came Trump’s 2-for 1 executive order (also see here) requiring the elimination (or modification) of two rules for every new rule. In the Wall Street Journal, Greg Ip writes about changes at the FDA and the FCC that could dramatically alter the pace of innovation in the pharmaceutical and telecom industries. (If the link is gated, you access the article on the WSJ’s Facebook page.) Speedier and less burdensome reviews of new drugs will greatly benefit consumers. An end to net neutrality rules will support greater investment in broadband infrastructure and access to innovative services. There is a new emphasis at the FCC on enabling innovative solutions to communications problems, such as Google’s effort to provide cell phone service in Puerto Rico by flying balloons over the island. The Trump Administration is also reining-in an aggressive EPA, the source of many questionable rules that weaken property rights and inhibit growth. (Again, the RFS is a disappointing exception.) Health care reform could offer much needed relief from overzealous insurance regulation and high compliance costs for physicians and other providers.

But deconstructing the administrative state is hard. Regulations just seem to metastasize, so deregulatory gains are offset by continued rule-making. This is partly from new legislation, but it is also a consequence of the incentives facing self-interested regulators. With that in mind, it’s impressive that regulation has not grown, on balance, thus far into Trump’s first year in office. According to Patrick McLaughlin, zero regulatory growth has been unusual going back at least to the Carter Administration. In quoting McLaughlin, The Weekly Standard says that Trump might well earn the mantle of “King of Deregulation“, but he has a long way to go. Brookings has this interactive tool to keep track of his deregulatory progress. One item on the Brookings list is the President’s intention to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord. That represents a big save in terms of avoiding future regulatory burdens.

I can’t help but be wary of other avenues through which the Trump Administration might regulate activity and undermine economic growth. Chief among these is Trump’s negative attitude toward foreign trade. Government interference with our freedom to freely engage in transactions with the rest of the world is costly in terms of both foreign and domestic prices. With something of a history as a crony capitalist himself, Trump is not immune to pressure from private economic interests, as illustrated by his recent cow-tow to the ethanol lobby. Nevertheless, I’m mostly encouraged by the administration’s deregulatory efforts, and I hope they continue. The equity market apparently expects that to be the case.

Administrative Supremacy, Lost Checks and Balances

16 Friday Jun 2017

Posted by Nuetzel in Regulation

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Administrative State, Chevron Deference, Cost of Regulation, Due Process, Eric Boehm, Evan D. Bernick, Executive Power, Fourth Branch, George Mason University, Glenn Reynolds, Inez Stepman, Jarrett Stepman, Judicial Deference, Mercatus Center, Philip Hamburger, Reason.com, Regulatory Dark Matter, Separation of Powers, Townhall, Two-For-One Regulatory Order

The two-for-one regulatory order issued by the Trump White House in January raises some practical difficulties in implementation. It requires that federal agencies eliminate two regulatory rules for every new rule promulgated, both in terms of the number of rules and any incremental regulatory costs imposed. Two out for every one in. Questions surrounding the meaning of “a regulation”, how to define incremental costs, and whether a particular rule is actually mandated by legislation are not trivial. Nevertheless, the spirit of this order is admirable and it serves as the leading edge of the Administration’s attempt to roll back the scope and impact of excessive government authority.

The cost of regulation is vast. Economists at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University have estimated the total cumulative cost of regulation in the U.S., finding that regulation has reduced economic growth by 0.8 percent per year since 1980. Without the additional regulatory growth since 1980, the U.S. economy would have been about 25 percent larger than it was in 2012. That’s a $4 trillion shortfall, or roughly $13,000 per person.

While regulation and administrative control over the private economy takes an increasing toll on economic growth and human welfare, the problem goes beyond economic considerations: administrative agencies have “progressively” usurped not just legislative but also judicial power. The concentration of executive, legislative and judicial power constitutes a “fourth branch of government“, a development inimical to the principles enshrined in our Constitution and a prescription for slow-boil tyranny. It facilitates rent seeking and corporatism just as surely as it creates a ruling class of individuals who act on their personal and arbitrary inclinations. We are ruled by men backed by police power, not impartial laws.

Glenn Reynolds writes that unelected rule makers and central planners are able to manipulate decisions across a broad swath of the economy and society. He quotes a new book by Philip Hamburger of Columbia Law School called “The Administrative Threat“:

“Government agencies regulate Americans in the full range of their lives, including their political participation, their economic endeavors, and their personal conduct. Administrative power has thus become pervasively intrusive. But is this power constitutional?

A similar sort of power was once used by English kings, and this book shows that the similarity is not a coincidence. In fact, administrative power revives absolutism. On this foundation, the book explains how administrative power denies Americans their basic constitutional freedoms, such as jury rights and due process. No other feature of American government violates as many constitutional provisions or is more profoundly threatening. As a result, administrative power is the key civil liberties issue of our era.“

Two previous posts on Sacred Cow Chips have dealt with Hamburger’s work. The first, “Hamburger Nation: An Administrative Nightmare“(1) provides the following explanation of his position:

“Hamburger examines the assertion that rule-making must be delegated by Congress to administrative agencies because legislation cannot reasonably be expected to address the many details and complexities encountered in the implementation of new laws. Yet this is a delegation of legislative power. Once delegated, this power has a way of metastasizing at the whim of agency apparatchiks, if not at the direction of the chief executive. If you should want to protest an administrative ruling, your first stop will not be a normal court of law, but an administrative review board or a court run by the agency itself! You’ll be well advised to hire an administrative attorney to represent you. Eventually, and at greater expense, an adverse decision can be appealed to the judicial branch proper.“

The exercise of rule-making authority, and even extra-legal legislative action by the administrative state, has economic costs that are bad enough. Hamburger also emphasizes the breakdown of the separation of executive and judicial powers inherent in the enforcement and adjudication of disputes under administrative law. This was the subject of the second Sacred Cow Chips post referenced above: “Courts and Their Administrative Masters“. It reviewed an unfortunate standard established by court precedent involving judicial (“Chevron”) deference to administrative agency fact-finding and even interpretation of law. While the decisions of administrative courts, which are run by the agencies themselves, can be appealed to the judicial branch, such appeals often amount to exercises in futility.

“…courts apply a test of judgement as to whether the administrative agency’s interpretation of the law is “reasonable”, even if other “reasonable” interpretations are possible. This gets particularly thorny when the original legislation is ambiguous with respect to a certain point.

…the courts should not abdicate their role in reviewing an agency’s developmental evidence for any action, and the reasonability of an agency’s applications of evidence relative to alternative courses of action. Nor should the courts abdicate their role in ruling on the law itself.“

This paper on Judicial Deference to Agencies by Evan D. Bernick of Georgetown Law makes the case that judicial deference is a violation of the constitutional separation of powers, concluding that:

“… in cases involving administrative deprivations of core private rights to ‘life, liberty, or property,’ fact deference violates Article III’s vesting of ‘[t]he judicial power’ in the federal courts; constitutes an abdication of the duty of independent judgment that Article III imposes upon federal judges; and violates the Fifth Amendment by denying litigants ‘due process of law,’ which requires (1) judicial proceedings in an Article III court prior to any individualized deprivation of ‘life, liberty, or property’; and (2) fact-finding by independent, impartial fact-finders.“

Inez and Jarrett Stepman in Townhall note that there are almost three million well-paid federal employees with job security that would make most private sector workers envious.

“Though the abolishment of the spoils system [which allowed civil service hiring and firing based on political party] was meant to mitigate corruption and incompetence, it has resulted in a toxic combination of enhanced agency power and an entrenched civil servant class with its own institutional—and frequently political—interests, virtually unaccountable to the president or any other elected official.“

The Stepmans discuss legislation that might stem the usurpation of lawmaking power by the administrative state. They are convinced that the administrative state must be reigned-in. Ironically, expanded executive authority means that the process of reversal is not that difficult in many cases. By way of example, here’s a piece on the ease of undoing certain Obama era regulations. Executive orders, or “the pen and the phone” in Obama’s charming parlance, lack legitimate legislative authority and can be reversed by new executive orders. I firmly believe that reversing the earlier orders is the right thing to do at the moment, but the unchecked authority that makes it possible (and the supremacy of the administrative state) is a source of economic instability, and it must end. Eric Boehm makes this point eloquently in Reason at the last link above:

“New policies that affect wide swaths of the economy and reshape entire business models should go through Congress, or at the very least should be subject to the public rulemaking process. Guidance documents and other ‘dark matter’ regulations that by-pass those processes can be un-made as quickly as they were made, leaving businesses to deal with an ever-changing and unpredictable regulatory state that does not really help anyone, no matter which side you’re on in any individual policy fight.“

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(1) The principle title “Hamburger Nation” was intended as a play on Glenn Reynolds’ paper “Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime“, in which he discussed the judicial implications of over-criminalization and regulatory overreach.

 

Trump Budget Facts and Falsehoods

02 Friday Jun 2017

Posted by Nuetzel in Federal Budget, Government, Trump Administration

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Administrative State, Baseline Budget, Budget Reconciliation, Deficit Reduction, Double Counting, Dynamic Scoring, Lawrence Summers, Math Error, Obamacare, Office of Management and Budget, Repeal and Replace, Revenue Neutrality, Ryan McMaken, Spending Priorities, Static Scoring, Steve Bannon, Tax Reform, Trump Budget, Welfare reform

The innumerate left is unhappy over cuts in various categories of spending in the budget proposal submitted by the Trump Administration last week. However, they have adopted “talking points” that are incorrect in an effort to rail against the budget. There is no reduction in overall spending in the proposal. Instead, there is a reduction in the growth of total spending. Ryan McMaken calls the mistaken assertions about spending “the media version of ‘cuts’“. The budget plan calls for an increase in total spending of 41% ($1.7 trillion) by 2027, versus 63% ($2.6 trillion) under the baseline (based on current law). Many of the actual cuts and growth reductions are in so-called discretionary spending. However, in one key mandatory component, Medicaid, spending increases by 39% under the plan, or $146 billion, versus 82% under the baseline. That is not a spending cut.

Another issue over which the Trump budget has been attacked is the so-called “math error,” or “double counting” of economic growth, to which former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers alluded with apparent delight. The gist of it is that the proposal somehow double-counted the salutary effects of growth in eliminating the projected deficit over the next ten years. In other words, the tax cuts proposed by Trump would be not just revenue-neutral due to stronger growth; they would result in an increase in tax revenue sufficient to eliminate the deficit by 2027.

Thus far, the Trump tax reform plan has been revealed in only a one-page summary released in late April. In static terms, it implied a loss of revenue of $5 trillion over ten years, though the summary left many features unclear. There could be additional provisions to broaden the tax base that might bring the ten-year static revenue loss down to somewhere between $3 and $4 trillion. In dynamic terms, however, the impact of the tax cuts would be smaller. The cuts would stimulate the economy (yes, they would!), but the precise impact on growth is unknown. In the budget, economic growth is assumed to increase from 1.8% to 3.0% annually over most of the ten year period. That has been criticized as unrealistic, but such a boost would likely be enough to make the tax cuts revenue neutral.

Here is a summary of the budget from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The tables at the back of the document, on pages 27 and 29, provide enough information on the cumulative ten-year changes to evaluate Summers’ double-counting claim. Keep in mind that his claim applies to changes expressed relative to a baseline. The proposed budget shows a total ten-year deficit projection of $3.2 trillion, compared to baseline of $6.7 trillion. So the deficits are reduced by a total of $3.5 trillion over the full ten years.

Individual and corporate income tax receipts are virtually unchanged over the ten-year period. There’s our revenue neutrality. Other receipts are down by $0.9 trillion, however. Most of that decline is attributed to a $1 trillion “allowance for repeal and replacement of Obamacare”, presumably elimination of taxes on such things as medical devices, Cadillac insurance policies, and fines for failing to comply with insurance mandates. So increased tax revenues do not account for the decline in the budget deficit.

Total cumulative outlays are reduced by $4.6 trillion in the budget proposal relative to the baseline. That more than accounts for the ten-year deficit reduction. Like the policies or not, the decline in spending is sufficient, relative to the baseline, to fully explain the deficit reduction. Yes, the budget assumes that some of the spending reductions are afforded by the faster assumed rate of economic growth, such as welfare payments, but that is not double-counting.

Revenue neutrality of the tax cuts is certainly an assumption worth questioning, especially because the summary of the tax plan gave every impression of abandoning neutrality. Neutrality was probably imposed on the budget plan as a matter of convenience. In a sense, it made the job of presenting the Administration’s spending priorities (like them or not) a cleaner exercise. For another, while budget reconciliation rules do not require the tax plan to be revenue neutral, Senate leaders have stated their strong desire for neutrality. The Trump budget proposal thereby allows Congress’ budget process to get underway while deferring the introduction of a more detailed and potentially controversial tax plan, one that is obviously still in flux and is likely to involve a loss of revenue, even in a dynamic sense.

The assumed change in economic growth is not solely attributable to tax effects, however. It would be reasonable to expect some growth to be driven by deregulation and the “deconstruction of the administrative state“, as Steve Bannon described so eloquently. This intention is embodied in the budget proposal. In that sense, it was unnecessary for OMB to impose revenue neutrality of the tax plan to eliminate the budget deficit over ten years. The economic growth spurred by deregulation would generate some of the extra growth in tax revenue.

I happen to like many of the priorities expressed in the proposed budget, despite the document’s lack of specificity. This includes the deregulatory initiatives, Obamacare repeal and replacement (we’re waiting…), and some of the welfare reform proposals. I am not happy about the scale of the shift toward defense, and I am not happy that government continues to grow in the aggregate. And as for the still-incubating tax reform plan, I like many of the features originally described, though not all.

Many believe that the Administration’s economic growth assumptions are unrealistic, and many dislike the spending priorities. Those cannot be used as excuses for mischaracterizing the proposal, however. Reductions in some spending categories occur only relative to the baseline growth path. They are not real cuts in spending. Likewise, Summers’ double-counting allegation is false. The recovery of tax revenue via economic growth is not double counted, and there is no “math error”. The proposed reductions in spending relative to the baseline more than account for the deficit reduction. I suspect that Summers’ motives were strictly polemic and not grounded in a careful examination of the budget proposal. He is not innumerate. What’s worse, a number of economists swallowed the “double-counting” story hook, line, and sinker.

Courts and Their Administrative Masters

04 Tuesday Apr 2017

Posted by Nuetzel in Big Government, Regulation

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Administrative Law, Administrative State, Chevron Deference, Chevron USA, Clyde Wayne Crews, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Ilya Somin, Jonathan Adler, Kent Jordan, Natural Resources Defense Council, Neil Gorsuch, Philip Hamburger, Regulatory Dark Matter, Separation of Powers

IMG_4007

Supreme Court nominee Neil Gorsuch says the judicial branch should not be obliged to defer to government agencies within the executive branch in interpreting law. Gorsuch’s  opinion, however, is contrary to an established principle guiding courts since the 1984 Supreme Court ruling in Chevron USA vs. The Natural Resources Defense Council. In what is known as Chevron deference, courts apply a test of judgement as to whether the administrative agency’s interpretation of the law is “reasonable”, even if other “reasonable” interpretations are possible. This gets particularly thorny when the original legislation is ambiguous with respect to a certain point. Gorsuch believes the Chevron standard subverts the intent of Constitutional separation of powers and judicial authority, a point of great importance in an age of explosive growth in administrative rule-making at the federal level.

Ilya Somin offers a defense of Gorsuch’s position on Chevron deference, stating that it violates the text of the Constitution authorizing the judiciary to decide matters of legal dispute without ceding power to the executive branch. The agencies, for their part, seem to be adopting increasingly expansive views of their authority:

“Some scholars argue that in many situations, agencies are not so much interpreting law, but actually making it by issuing regulations that often have only a tenuous basis in congressional enactments. When that happens, Chevron deference allows the executive to usurp the power of Congress as well as that of the judiciary.”

Jonathan Adler quotes a recent decision by U.S. Appeals Court Judge Kent Jordan in which he expresses skepticism regarding the wisdom of Chevron deference:

Deference to agencies strengthens the executive branch not only in a particular dispute under judicial review; it tends to the permanent expansion of the administrative state. Even if some in Congress want to rein an agency in, doing so is very difficult because of judicial deference to agency action. Moreover, the Constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment (along with the President’s veto power), which were intended as a brake on the federal government, being ‘designed to protect the liberties of the people,’ are instead, because of Chevron, ‘veto gates’ that make any legislative effort to curtail agency overreach a daunting task.

In short, Chevron ‘permit[s] executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the [F]ramers’ design.’

The unchecked expansion of administrative control is a real threat to the stability of our system of government, our liberty, and the health of our economic system. It imposes tremendous compliance costs on society and often violates individual property rights. Regulatory actions are often taken without performing a proper cost-benefit analysis, and the decisions of regulators may be challenged initially only within a separate judicial system in which courts are run by the agencies themselves! I covered this point in more detail one year ago in “Hamburger Nation: An Administrative Nightmare“, based on Philip Hamburger’s book “Is Administrative Law Unlawful?“.

Clyde Wayne Crews of the Competitive Enterprise Institute gives further perspective on the regulatory-state-gone-wild in “Mapping Washington’s Lawlessness: An Inventory of Regulatory Dark Matter“. He mentions some disturbing tendencies that may go beyond the implementation of legislative intent: agencies sometimes choose to wholly ignore some aspects of legislation; agencies tend to apply pressure on regulated entities on the basis of interpretations that stretch the meaning of such enabling legislation as may exist; and as if the exercise of extra-legislative power were not enough, administrative actions have a frequent tendency to subvert the price mechanism in private markets, disrupting the flow of accurate information about resource-scarcity and the operation of incentives that give markets their great advantages. All of these behaviors fit Crews’ description of “regulatory dark matter.”

Chevron deference represents an unforced surrender by the judicial branch to the exercise of power by the executive. As Judge Jordan notes in additional quotes provided by Adler at a link above, this does not deny the usefulness or importance of an agency’s specialized expertise. Nevertheless, the courts should not abdicate their role in reviewing an agency’s developmental evidence for any action, and the reasonability of an agency’s applications of evidence relative to alternative courses of action. Nor should the courts abdicate their role in ruling on the law itself. Judge Gorsuch is right: Chevron deference should be re-evaluated by the courts.

Hamburger Nation: An Administrative Nightmare

04 Friday Mar 2016

Posted by Nuetzel in Big Government, Judicial Branch, Legislative Branch, Regulation

≈ 4 Comments

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Administrative Law, Administrative State, Constitutional convention, Delegated Powers, Due Process, Extralegal Powers, Fourth Branch, George Akerlof, Glenn Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation, Ilya Somin, IRS Targeting, Ivan Carrino, Joseph Postell, Marginal Revolution, Mia Love, Michael Ramsey, Philip Hamburger, Richard Epstein, Robert Shiller, Rule of Consent, Takings, The Originalism Blog, Volokh Conspiracy

nanny-state

By what authority do unelected bureaucrats in administrative agencies increasingly make laws, enforce those laws and adjudicate violations? The fact that all of these activities take place within the executive branch of government appears to be an obvious contradiction of the separation of powers required by the first three articles of the Constitution, the principle of “Rule By Consent” of the governed, and protections of individual liberty. In a strong sense, the regulatory apparatus has grown so unwieldy that the powers routinely exercised by administrative agencies today seem beyond even the reach of elected executives. The rules promulgated by this “fourth branch” of government are essentially extralegal, a point discussed at length in Philip Hamburger’s “Is Administrative Law Unlawful“. He has also explained these issues at the Volokh Conspiracy blog in “Extralegal power, delegation, and necessity“, and “The Constitution’s repudiation of extralegal power“.

Hamburger examines the assertion that rule-making must be delegated by Congress to administrative agencies because legislation cannot reasonably be expected to address the many details and complexities encountered in the implementation of new laws. Yet this is a delegation of legislative power. Once delegated, this power has a way of metastasizing at the whim of agency apparatchiks, if not at the direction of the chief executive. If you should want to protest an administrative ruling, your first stop will not be a normal court of law, but an administrative review board or a court run by the agency itself! You’ll be well advised to hire an administrative attorney to represent you. Eventually, and at greater expense, an adverse decision can be appealed to the judicial branch proper.

This adds up to a dangerous lack of accountability and power. Marginal Revolution points out that critics of Hamburger’s book overlook the potential for harm that could be done by a “vindictive” president. But we should not lose sight of the fact that bureaucrats themselves, at any level, can be vindictive, as the IRS targeting scandal has shown. But that is only one motive for abuse of power; another motive may be more pervasive: the ability to reward those in a position to promote the self-interests of those who populate the administrative state. These are dangers that are endemic to big government. In a post entitled “Are Government Regulators More Virtuous than Everyone Else” (No!), Ivan Carrino highlights the weakness of arguments like those made by George Akerlof and Robert Shiller in “Phishing For Phools“, who call for greater government regulation on the grounds that consumers are vulnerable to manipulation by businesses. Carrino says:

“One can’t help but notice the central contradiction in this analysis. On the one hand, it is assumed that markets fail because of ‘normal human weakness.’ On the other hand, it is assumed that regulation, which must necessarily be implemented by human beings with equal or greater ‘weaknesses,’ will somehow solve the problem.

Akerlof and Shiller simultaneously demonize human beings who operate in the private sector while idealizing human beings who operate in the public sector.“

Glenn Reynolds has been a prominent critic of the administrative state. As a consequence of the vast and growing body of regulatory rules, it’s become increasingly difficult for individuals, acting on their own or as businesspeople, to know whether they are in acting in violation of administrative law. Reynolds discusses regulatory crime and over-criminalization in “You May Be Breaking The Law Right Now“, and in his great paper “Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything is a Crime” (free download).

Hamburger’s main position is that law should be made by elected representatives, not by bureaucrats who lack direct accountability to voters. Ilya Somin believes that with time, Hamburger will have great influence on legal theorists in this regard. He compares Hamburger’s insights on administrative law to Richard Epstein’s work on takings. Epstein insisted that “almost all regulations that restrict property rights should be considered ‘takings’ that require compensation under the Fifth Amendment.” Somin notes that Epstein’s position, despite harsh criticism from certain quarters, has influenced legal thinking in a dramatic way over the years.

What’s to be done? Can a line reasonably be drawn between constitutional legislative power and delegated rule-making authority? Somin is skeptical that absolute restrictions on lawmaking by the administrative state are practical, in the sense that there will always be details that cannot be addressed in enabling legislation. Others have suggested practical paths forward: Joseph Postell attempts to give a roadmap in “From Administrative State to Constitutional Government“. A recent Glenn Reynolds op-ed, “Blow Up The Administrative State“, gives a qualified defense of Texas Governor Greg Abbot’s proposed amendments to the Constitution. Among other things, Abbot proposes to:

“–Prohibit administrative agencies … from creating federal law.
  –Prohibit administrative agencies … from preempting state law.
  –Give state officials the power to sue in federal court when … officials overstep their bounds.
  –Allow a two-thirds majority of the states to override a federal law or regulation.”

I would add that administrative review and adjudication should be independent of the agencies themselves. Also, Representative Mia Love (R-UT) has proposed legislation that would restrict Congress to bills focused on points directly related to a single issue (i.e., no omnibus bills), which would help to check the growth of the administrative state.

All of these measures seem consistent with Hamburger’s views. Reynolds is fully cognizant of the dangers of a constitutional convention. Nevertheless, he recognizes that Abbot’s proposals would impose harder limits on the size of government, and defends them in colorful fashion:

“A smaller government would mean fewer phony-baloney jobs for college graduates with few marketable skills but demonstrated political loyalty. It would mean fewer opportunities for tax dollars to be directed to people and entities with close ties to people in power. It would mean less ability to engage in social engineering and ‘nudges’ aimed at what are all-too-often seen as those dumb rubes in flyover country. The smaller the government, the fewer the opportunities for graft and self-aggrandizement — and graft and self-aggrandizement are what our political class is all about.“

For further reading, Michael Ramsey at The Originalism Blog posts links to several other essays by Hamburger at The Volokh Conspiracy, where he acted as a guest-blogger.

 

 

 

Borkians Preserve Federal Obamacare Subsidies

29 Monday Jun 2015

Posted by Nuetzel in Obamacare

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

ACA, Administrative State, Affordable Care Act, Chief Justice Roberts, Damon Root, Ilya Shapiro, Judicial Activism, Judicial Restraint, King vs. Burwell, Obamacare, Randy Barnett, Robert Bork, Robert Laszlewski, SCOTUS, SCOTUSblog, Tyler Cowen

ACA Supremes cartoon

I have mixed feelings about the Supreme Court’s King vs. Burwell decision upholding federal subsidies for health insurance purchased in states that did not establish their own exchanges. My biggest concerns are that the decision gives a pass to the unchecked exercise of executive fiat as well as congressional carelessness (“lassitude”, to use Justice Scalia’s term), and the smearing of the separation of legislative and judicial powers. I admit that I was eager to see the exchanges unravel under the weight of their own lousy economics. However, the economics remain lousy even with the ruling, which will become more evident as major subsidies to health insurers expire over the next 18 months. It will be interesting to watch as the process of escalating premia plays out. I’m relieved that the Obamacare opposition in Congress (primarily Republicans) is now off the hook. These legislators never coalesced around an alternative and would have received a good portion of the blame for any further disruptions in the insurance “market” had the decision gone the other way. Probably their best approach would have been to extend the subsidies to all exchanges, at least for the remainder of Obama’s term. As Tyler Cowen notes, an extension would have occurred:

“… only after a lot of political stupidity and also painful media coverage. So on net I take this to be good news, although arguably it is bad news that it is good news.“

On the merits of health care policy, given the failure to put forward a better plan, what would have been gained over the next 18 months from a ruling for the plaintiffs? Not much.

Cowen links to a Robert Laszlewski post emphasizing the fragile economic and political condition of Obamacare:

“Obamacare has only enrolled about 40% of the subsidy eligible market in two years worth of open enrollments. That level of consumer support does not make Obamacare either financially sustainable or politically sustainable. The surveys say the 40% who have enrolled like their plans. Of course they do, they are the poorest with the biggest subsidies and the lowest deductibles. The working and middle-class have most often not signed up for Obamacare because it costs too much and delivers too little.

That Obamacare is not financially sustainable is evidenced by the first wave of big 2016 rate increases by so many large market share insurers. The next wave of rate increases a year from now will also be large and will be in the middle of the 2016 election.“

The SCOTUS decision flies in the face of the roles and responsibilities assigned to the branches of government by the Constitution. The implication of the ruling is that a law means whatever the executive branch says it means, even when it says the opposite unambiguously. This goes too far in granting executive power to “reimagine” legislation, and the Left may well come to regret it as a precedent. Executive rulings in implementing laws is nothing new, but one hopes for the courts to keep a tight rein on this discretion in an era when the regulatory environment is growing increasingly complex.

A Randy Barnett post at SCOTUSblog quotes Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion:

“Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and avoids the latter.“

Improve health care markets? Not destroy them? Wait… I’m confused! But seriously, at this point in the process, Justice Roberts must be confused about actual outcomes. An objective assessment of Obamacare would include an accounting for the many individuals whose policies were cancelled against their wishes, premium escalation, and the fact that the ACA has fallen well short of expectations for reducing the number of uninsured; the law has certainly not improved markets. Barnett describes Roberts’ apparent philosophy on this point thusly:

“... the Chief Justice seems to be telling us that he is once again putting a thumb on the scale for the government here as he did in his solo opinion in NFIB. Rather than assessing the constitutionality of the law as written – or enforcing it according to its terms – the court will rewrite the law to suit the government.” 

This is not merely “legislative deference”, it is legislative rescue and a rewriting of the law. And Barnett points out that the Courts should provide a check on bad legislation, not serve as enablers.

Damon Root offers an excellent clarification of Roberts’ thinking: the strand of conservative judicial philosophy calling for deference to legislative intent is often attributed to Robert Bork. This obviously conflicts with the notion that conservatives are judicial activists. I discussed judicial activism here a few months ago, including Randy Barnett’s assertion that the term seems to be invoked as a pejorative almost any time someone doesn’t like a court decision. If it means preserving the Constitution, then count me as an activist.

Ilya Shapiro sums up the “intent” of the legislation and the “deferential” position taken by the court in King vs. Burwell:

“Roberts explains his transmogrification by finding it ‘implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate in this manner,’ to deny subsidies to millions of people as part of legislation intended to expanded coverage. But it’s hardly implausible to think that legislation that still says that states ‘shall’ set up exchanges—the drafters forgot to fix this bit after lawyers pointed out that Congress can’t command states to do anything—would effectively give states an offer nobody thought they’d refuse. It was supposed to be a win-win: states rather than the federal government would run health care exchanges (yay federalism!) and all those who need subsidies to afford Obamacare policies would get them (yay universal healthcare!).

But a funny thing happened on the way to utopia, and only 14 states (plus D.C.) took that too-tempting offer, perhaps having been burned too many times before by the regulations that accompany any pots of “free” federal money. And that’s why we ended up with King v. Burwell: Obamacare the reality doesn’t accomplish Obamacare the dream.“

We’ll watch to see how badly Obamacare fares over the next two years. And we’ll hope that eventually Congress can fashion a new health care plan that creates more choice, reduces taxes, increases competition and reduces coercive rules and regulatory burdens.

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