Tag Archives: Privacy Rights

The Push for Extreme Suffrage

29 Friday Mar 2019

Posted by in Voting Rights

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People aren’t required to know anything about issues or candidates to vote. While that might create challenges to the rationality of electoral outcomes, in the U.S. we’ve at least agreed that competent adults holding citizenship should have the opportunity to vote (with state-by-state exceptions for felons). Thus, over time, the nation has gravitated toward fairly broad suffrage rights, despite setbacks along the way created by Jim Crow laws in the South. Today, the voting rights debate centers around screening issues like voter identification laws, whether to allow undocumented immigrants to vote, and the voting age. The Left tends to oppose voter screening of almost any kind, prompting allegations that their motives are less than pure, and similar allegations are leveled at the Right for its resistance to expanded suffrage. What, then, are the merits of some of these screening mechanisms?

Require Identification?

There are at least two sources of opposition to voter ID laws. One is a Libertarian argument: the very idea of government-issued IDs is anathema to some privacy rights activists. I sympathize with this view, but I’ve always been troubled by the resistance it represents to the establishment and maintenance of trust in a modern society. It might or might not be any consolation that these laws would almost certainly be administered at the state or local level. It’s also not clear that voter ID laws would lead to an increment in the various forms of government-issued identification. On its face, these laws would simply require the voter to produce a valid ID at their polling place confirming that they do, in fact, appear on the roll of registered voters, and that they are not attempting to vote under a fraudulent identity or acting as someone’s stooge.

The second and more common objection to voter ID laws comes from the Left: almost any limit on voting rights can and will be construed as unfairly exclusionary. The argument usually relies on the existence of a disparate impact of the kind described in civil rights legislation. Voter ID laws do not overtly discriminate against minorities, but they are said to place a burden on the disadvantaged and therefore on racial minorities. Presumably, it is considered too burdensome to obtain, carry, or be asked to present some form of identification, even one issued free-of-charge by the government. There is evidence, however, that voter ID laws do not suppress minority voting. And let’s be blunt: individuals excluded by this so-called burden are self-excluded, they are unlikely to be well-informed voters, and they might be vulnerable to opportunists who would pay for their vote. But instead, the public is asked to accept the proposition that obtaining an ID is just too difficult for some people, and to accept the risk that those arriving to vote on election day might not be registered, might have voted already, and might not be the persons they purport to be. These things happen. (Also see here and here.)

Reduce the Voting Age?

It’s impossible to define a measurable threshold above which people can be trusted to cast well-considered votes. Recently, there have been calls from the Left to reduce the voting age to 16 from 18 years. Then why not 14? Or even 12? Well, they’d say, because 12 or even 14 year-olds are not sufficiently mature.

So we all agree that a line must be drawn somewhere. Voting rights were extended to those aged 18-20 in 1971 in response to charges that it was unfair to deny the right to vote to young adults who were eligible for conscription to fight in Vietnam. The age-18 threshold aligns with the legal age of majority in most states. We know that the vast bulk of teenagers of 16 or 17 years are not well-prepared to fight in foreign wars, or to fend for themselves in the world for that matter. Right or wrong, at 18 you can volunteer for military service, get married, you are legally eligible as a sex partner, you can buy alcohol in many states, and you no longer qualify for child support.

Most adults would agree that there are substantial differences in the maturity of 16 and 18 year-olds. The latter are better-educated and will tend to have many times the job experience of 16 year-olds (which is often zero). Will 16 year-old children have a sufficient grasp of the issues they will confront in the voting booth? Most of these kids are still essentially hungry mouths, and it is unlikely that they can make well-informed judgements about the costs of pleasant-sounding public benefits versus the attendant costs. Some will vote exactly the way their parents and teachers tell them, but that sort of vote replication is hardly the desired outcome.

One can also view the voting-age debate through the lens of disparate impact: minority populations tend to have younger demographic profiles with more children per household. Therefore, keeping children out of the voting booth could have a larger impact on votes cast by minorities. But this effect is incidental to the choice of any line one might draw. It does not provide an adequate rationale for giving weight to the preferences held by a class of children.

Suffrage for Illegals?

Another proposal offered by the Left is to allow illegal immigrants to vote. It goes without saying that along with illegals, other resident aliens would get to vote. They are all subject to public policy, so the argument goes, and many of them actually pay taxes. Yes, well, many of them draw on public benefits as well. The statist bet is that suffrage for illegals will undergird support for expansion of the welfare state. That’s bad enough, but the risks are not limited to a fiscal imbalance between taxes paid and public aid. More important is to avoid policies that create rewards and incentives for additional illegal entry. Suffrage for illegals would heighten those incentives. It would also devalue U.S. citizenship and reward those who have already entered illegally, many of whom have little knowledge of our system of government

Conclusions

Eligibility to vote should not be a matter of political gamesmanship. Voter ID laws serve to thwart efforts intended to subvert democratic outcomes, which are common enough to be of concern. And voting is a privilege that should be reserved for citizens, not offered to mere visitors or anyone who has disregarded U.S. sovereignty by entering the country illegally, possibly seeking economic rents from our generous public aid programs.

Voter eligibility should also relate to the individual’s ability to evaluate public policy choices based on some degree of experience and knowledge of the world. As a rule of thumb, high school sophomores and juniors fail that test. If you think “the children are leading the conversation”, then you’re probably having the wrong conversation. But no matter what voting age we choose, there will always be voters having a tenuous grasp of issues. Fortunately, most of those lacking relevant knowledge of ballot issues tend not to care and choose not to vote. They are free to vote should they develop an interest, and so much the better. 

 

I’m a Restroom Federalist

10 Sunday Apr 2016

Posted by in Discrimination, Privacy

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image

A joke I once heard: “What two words does a guy least want to hear at the urinal? … Nice d*ck!”  The truth is that privacy matters. While most men don’t wish to be “admired” by other men, mens’ public restrooms would seem to provide adequate privacy for those having a particular sensitivity. I presume that womens’ restrooms do too.

Still, voyeurism is more common than we’d like, and strong privacy advocates believe that’s an adequate rationale for prohibiting transgender women (M to F) from using womens’ restrooms. It’s not legitimate trans-women who are of concern, whether they’ve undergone full sexual reassignment or not. Rather, it’s men who would falsely claim to be trans-women. Put another way, does the state have any compelling interest in protecting privacy by discriminating against transgender women, barring their use of womens’ restrooms?

Laws against voyeurism are grounded in the presumed right to privacy under the U.S. Constitution. The expectation of privacy is well-established as a condition under which voyeurism can be prosecuted, and bathrooms meet that test. In fact, the prevalence of voyeurism is estimated to be quite high, especially among males. The Wikipedia entry on this subject states that:

“…research found voyeurism to be the most common sexual law-breaking behavior in both clinical and general populations. … In a national study of Sweden it was found that 7.7% of the population (both men and women) had engaged in voyeurism at some point. It is also believed that voyeurism occurs up to 150 times more frequently than police reports indicate.“

The estimate from Sweden is conservative for male voyeurs. However, only a portion of that voyeurism occurs in or around public restrooms. For the sake of argument, let’s suppose that 5% of the estimate above relates to males likely to commit some form of voyeurism in or around womens’ restrooms, or 0.38% of the adult male population. Each of those males may commit voyeurism against multiple females on any given bathroom escapade, so this value may underestimate the risk to the privacy of women.

On the other hand, the prevalence of transgender, or gender identification different from that assigned at birth, is very low. Again according to Wikipedia, the most commonly cited figure is that 1 in 10,000 assigned males is transgender (and far fewer birth-assigned females). Some argue that this is too low to account for even the cases of sexual reassignment surgery (SRS) that have occurred in the U.S.  I would argue, however, that trans-women (M to F) having undergone SRS would be welcome in womens’ restrooms. After all, they’d even pass a genital check at the door! That leaves transgender men who have not yet, or will not, undergo SRS. So, for the sake of argument, I will go with the incidence rate of 0.01% implied by the figure above. That is, 0.01% of the adult male population is an assigned-male trans woman having male genitals.

Assuming that all womens’ restrooms are thrown open to any male claiming to be a trans-woman, the conservative estimate of the incidence of voyeurism would be 38 times the incidence of legitimate trans-women disallowed from entering womens’ restrooms under traditional gender restrictions. Note that neither of these estimates has a time dimension. Repeat voyeurism is a likelihood, just as legitimate trans-women, pre-SRS, would be denied their rights on every trip to a public restroom.

Now we ask again which case is more compelling: protecting the right to privacy against the potential for voyeurism, or protecting the restroom rights of trans-women who are pre- or non-SRS? One possible solution is to acknowledge restrictions on restroom use as an incentive for transsexuals to undergo SRS. However, that is not practical in important respects: full gender transition can take a number of years; SRS is not and cannot be an immediate procedure for walk-ins at the doctor’s office for various reasons; and some transsexuals are never able to make a full transition.

Another consideration is the extent to which bathroom regulation makes any difference at all. While “throwing the doors open” might create some additional incentive to male voyeurs, they are already active, and most of them would be just as easy to prosecute if the rules on restroom use for trans-women were relaxed. However, to the extent that creates additional risk, it is borne by all women availing themselves of public restrooms. At the same time, it is certain that trans-women already make use of womens’ restrooms. If non-SRS, they must do so surreptitiously and at some legal risk, Again, their total number is limited.

The balance between the threat to privacy rights and the desire for equitable treatment of transsexuals is not as clear-cut as some on either side would have us believe. However, given the need to determine that balance, the classic federalist approach seems ideal. That is, states or more limited political jurisdictions should decide how best to handle the issue. That is more or less our current approach, as the issue is otherwise beyond our ability to find a consensus. Full conversion to unisex restrooms might even be acceptable in some parts of the U.S. Fortunately, individuals can “vote with their feet”, rewarding those jurisdictions having laws they find best-protect their rights as individuals. It’s another great experiment in the determination of social preferences. That’s what federalism is all about.

 

 

 

Central Banks Stumble Into Negative Rates, Damn the Savers

01 Tuesday Mar 2016

Posted by in Central Planning, Monetary Policy

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Dollar Cartoon

Should government actively manipulate asset prices in an effort to “manage ” economic growth? The world’s central bankers, otherwise at their wit’s end, are attempting just that. Hopes have been pinned on so-called quantitative easing (QE), which simply means that central banks like the U.S. Federal Reserve (the Fed) buy assets (government and private bonds) from the public to inject newly “printed” money into the economy. The Fed purchased $4.5 trillion of assets between the last financial crisis and late 2014, when it ended its QE. Other central banks are actively engaged in QE, however, and there are still calls from some quarters for the Fed to resume QE, despite modest but positive economic growth. The goals of QE are to drive asset prices up and interest rates down, ultimately stimulating demand for goods and economic growth. Short-term rates have been near zero in many countries (and in the U.S. until December), and negative short-term interest rates are a reality in the European Union, Japan and Sweden.

Does anyone really have to pay money to lend money, as indicated by a negative interest rate? Yes, if a bank “lends” to the Bank of Japan, for example, by holding reserves there. The BOJ is currently charging banks for the privilege. But does anyone really “earn” negative returns on short-term government or private debt? Not unless you buy a short-term bill and hold it till maturity. Central banks are buying those bills at a premium, usually from member banks, in order to execute QE, and that offsets a negative rate. But the notion is that when these “captive” member banks are penalized for holding reserves, they will be more eager to lend to private borrowers. That may be, but only if there are willing, credit-worthy borrowers; unfortunately, those are scarce.

Thus far, QE and zero or negative rates do not seem to be working effectively, and there are several reasons. First, QE has taken place against a backdrop of increasingly binding regulatory constraints. A private economy simply cannot flourish under such strictures, with or without QE. Moreover, government makes a habit of manipulating investment decisions, partly through regulatory mandates, but also by subsidizing politically-favored activities such as ethanol, wind energy, post-secondary education, and owner-occupied housing. This necessarily comes at the sacrifice of opportunities for physical investment that are superior on economic merits.

The most self-defeating consequence of QE and rate manipulation, be that zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) or negative interest rate policy (NIRP), is the distortion of inter-temporal tradeoffs that guide decisions to save and invest in productive assets. How, and how much, should individuals save when returns on relatively safe assets are very low? Most analysts would conclude that very low rates prompt a strong substitution effect toward consuming more today and less in the future. However, the situation may well engender a strong “income effect”, meaning that more must be saved (and less consumed in the present) in order to provide sufficient resources in the future. The paradox shouldn’t be lost on central bankers, and it may undermine the stimulative effects of ZIRP or NIRP. It might also lead to confusion in the allocation of productive capital, as low rates could create a mirage of viability for unworthy projects. Central bank intervention of this sort is disruptive to the healthy transformation of resources across time.

Savers might hoard cash to avoid a negative return, which would further undermine the efficacy of QE in creating monetary stimulus. This is at the root of central bank efforts to discourage the holding of currency outside of the banking system: the “war on cash“. (Also see here.) This policy is extremely offensive to anyone with a concern for protecting the privacy of individuals from government prying.

Another possible response for savers is to “reach for yield”, allocating more of their funds to high-risk assets than they would ordinarily prefer (e.g., growth funds, junk bonds, various “alternative” investments). So the supply of saving available for adding to the productive base in various sectors is twisted by central bank manipulation of interest rates. The availability of capital may be constrained for relatively safe sectors but available at a relative discount to risky sectors. This leads to classic malinvestment and ultimately business failures, displaced workers, and harsh adjustment costs.

With any luck, the Fed will continue to move away from this misguided path. Zero or negative interest rates imposed by central banks penalize savers by making the saving decision excessively complex and fraught with risk. Business investment is distorted by confusing signals as to risk preference and inflated asset prices. Central economic planning via industrial policy, regulation, and price controls, such as the manipulation of interest rates, always ends badly. Unfortunately, most governments are well-practiced at bungling in all of those areas.