The Fed’s Balance Sheet: What’s the Big Deal?

08 Sunday May 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Government Failure, Inflation, Monetary Policy

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Allocation of Capital, Bank Reserves, crowding out, Debt Monetization, Fed Balance Sheet, Federal Funds, Federal Reserve, Fiscal Inflation, Inflation tax, Interest Rate Targeting, MBS, Monetary policy, Mortgage Backed Securities, QE, Quantitative Easing, Scarcity, Tapering

The Federal Reserve just announced tighter monetary policy in an attempt to reduce inflationary pressures. First, it raised its target range for the federal funds rate (on overnight loans between banks) by 0.5%. The new range is 0.75% – 1%. Second, on June 1, the Fed will begin taking steps to reduce the size of its $9 trillion portfolio of securities. These holdings were acquired during periods of so-called quantitative easing (QE) beginning in 2008, including dramatic expansions in 2020-21. A shorthand reference for this portfolio is simply the Fed’s “balance sheet”. It includes government debt the Fed has purchased as well as privately-issued mortgage-backed securities (MBS).

What Is This Balance Sheet You Speak Of?

Talk of the Fed’s balance sheet seems to mystify lots of people. During the 2008 financial crisis, the Fed began to inject liquidity into the economy by purchasing large amounts of assets to be held on its balance sheet. This was QE. It’s scope was unprecedented and a departure from the Fed’s pre-crisis reliance on interest rate targeting. QE had the effect of increasing bank reserves, which raised the possibility of excessive money supply growth. That’s when the Fed began to pay interest to banks on reserves, so they might be content to simply hold some of the reserves over and above what they are required to hold, rather than using all of that excess to support new loans and deposits (and thus money growth). However, that interest won’t stop banks from lending excess reserves if better opportunities present themselves.

The Fed has talked about reducing, “normalizing”, or “tapering” its balance sheet for some time, but it only recently stopped adding to it. With inflation raging and monetary policy widely viewed as too “dovish”, analysts expected the Fed to stop reinvesting proceeds from maturing securities, which amounts to about $95 billion per month. That would shrink or “taper” the balance sheet at a rate of about $1.1 trillion per year. Last week the Fed decided to cap the “runoff” at $47.5 billion per month for the first three months, deferring the $95 billion pace until September. Monetary policy “hawks” were disappointed by this announcement.

Monetizing Government

So, one might ask, what’s the big deal? Why must the Fed taper its securities holdings? Well, first, the rate of inflation is far above the Fed’s target range, and it’s far above the “average Joe’s” comfort range. Inflation imposes significant costs on the economy and acts as a regressive form of taxation, harming the poor disproportionately. To the extent that the Fed’s huge balance sheet (and the corresponding bank reserves) are supporting incremental money growth and fueling inflation, the balance sheet must be reduced.

In that connection, the Fed’s investment in government debt represents monetized federal debt. That means the Fed is essentially printing money to meet the Treasury’s financing needs. Together with profligate spending by the federal government, nothing could do more to convince investors that government debt will never be repaid via future budget surpluses. This dereliction of the government’s “full faith and credit”, and the open-armed acceptance of the inflation tax as a financing mechanism (à la Modern Monetary Theory), is the key driver of fiscal inflation. Reducing the balance sheet would represent de-monetization, which might help to restore faith in the Fed’s ability to push back against fiscal recklessness.

Buyer of First Resort

Perhaps just as critically, the Fed’s heavy investment in government debt and MBS represents an ongoing distortion to the pricing of financial assets and the allocation of capital. Some call this interference in the “price discovery process”. That’s because the Fed has represented a market-altering presence, a willing and inelastic buyer of government debt and MBS. Given that presence, it’s difficult for buyers and sellers to discern the true values of alternative uses of capital, or to care.

QE was, among other things, a welcome institutional development for the U.S. Treasury and for those who fancy that fresh money printing is an ever-valid form of government payment for scarce resources. The Fed’s involvement also means that other potential buyers of Treasury debt need not worry about interest rate risk, making public debt relatively more attractive than private debt. This is a dimension of the “crowding out” phenomenon, whereby the allocation of capital and flows of real resources between public and private uses are distorted.

The Fed’s presence as a buyer of MBS depresses mortgage rates and makes mortgage lending less risky for lenders and investors. As a result, it encourages an over-investment in housing and escalating home prices. This too distorts the allocation of capital and real resources, at the margin, toward housing and away from uses with greater underlying value.

Conclusion

The magnitude of the Fed’s balance sheet is an ongoing testament to an increasingly dominant role of central authorities in the economy. In this case, the Fed has served as a conduit for the inflation tax. In addition, it has unwittingly facilitated crowding out of private capital investment. The Fed’s purchases of MBS have distorted the incentives (and demand) for residential investment. These are subtle effects that the average citizen might not notice, just as one might not notice the early symptoms of a debilitating disease. The long-term consequences of the Fed’s QE activities, including the inflation tax and distorted allocations of capital, are all too typical of failures of government intervention and attempts at central planning. But don’t expect anyone at the Fed to admit it.

Central Banks Stumble Into Negative Rates, Damn the Savers

01 Tuesday Mar 2016

Posted by Nuetzel in Central Planning, Monetary Policy

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Bank of Japan, central planning, Federal Reserve, Helicopter Drop, Income Effect vs. Substitution Effect, Interest Rate Manipulation, Intertemporal Tradeoffs, Malinvestment, Mises Institute, Monetary policy, negative interest rates, NIRP, Printing Money, Privacy Rights, QE, Quantitative Easing, Reach For Yield, regulation, War on Cash, Zero Interest Rate Policy, ZIRP

Dollar Cartoon

Should government actively manipulate asset prices in an effort to “manage ” economic growth? The world’s central bankers, otherwise at their wit’s end, are attempting just that. Hopes have been pinned on so-called quantitative easing (QE), which simply means that central banks like the U.S. Federal Reserve (the Fed) buy assets (government and private bonds) from the public to inject newly “printed” money into the economy. The Fed purchased $4.5 trillion of assets between the last financial crisis and late 2014, when it ended its QE. Other central banks are actively engaged in QE, however, and there are still calls from some quarters for the Fed to resume QE, despite modest but positive economic growth. The goals of QE are to drive asset prices up and interest rates down, ultimately stimulating demand for goods and economic growth. Short-term rates have been near zero in many countries (and in the U.S. until December), and negative short-term interest rates are a reality in the European Union, Japan and Sweden.

Does anyone really have to pay money to lend money, as indicated by a negative interest rate? Yes, if a bank “lends” to the Bank of Japan, for example, by holding reserves there. The BOJ is currently charging banks for the privilege. But does anyone really “earn” negative returns on short-term government or private debt? Not unless you buy a short-term bill and hold it till maturity. Central banks are buying those bills at a premium, usually from member banks, in order to execute QE, and that offsets a negative rate. But the notion is that when these “captive” member banks are penalized for holding reserves, they will be more eager to lend to private borrowers. That may be, but only if there are willing, credit-worthy borrowers; unfortunately, those are scarce.

Thus far, QE and zero or negative rates do not seem to be working effectively, and there are several reasons. First, QE has taken place against a backdrop of increasingly binding regulatory constraints. A private economy simply cannot flourish under such strictures, with or without QE. Moreover, government makes a habit of manipulating investment decisions, partly through regulatory mandates, but also by subsidizing politically-favored activities such as ethanol, wind energy, post-secondary education, and owner-occupied housing. This necessarily comes at the sacrifice of opportunities for physical investment that are superior on economic merits.

The most self-defeating consequence of QE and rate manipulation, be that zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) or negative interest rate policy (NIRP), is the distortion of inter-temporal tradeoffs that guide decisions to save and invest in productive assets. How, and how much, should individuals save when returns on relatively safe assets are very low? Most analysts would conclude that very low rates prompt a strong substitution effect toward consuming more today and less in the future. However, the situation may well engender a strong “income effect”, meaning that more must be saved (and less consumed in the present) in order to provide sufficient resources in the future. The paradox shouldn’t be lost on central bankers, and it may undermine the stimulative effects of ZIRP or NIRP. It might also lead to confusion in the allocation of productive capital, as low rates could create a mirage of viability for unworthy projects. Central bank intervention of this sort is disruptive to the healthy transformation of resources across time.

Savers might hoard cash to avoid a negative return, which would further undermine the efficacy of QE in creating monetary stimulus. This is at the root of central bank efforts to discourage the holding of currency outside of the banking system: the “war on cash“. (Also see here.) This policy is extremely offensive to anyone with a concern for protecting the privacy of individuals from government prying.

Another possible response for savers is to “reach for yield”, allocating more of their funds to high-risk assets than they would ordinarily prefer (e.g., growth funds, junk bonds, various “alternative” investments). So the supply of saving available for adding to the productive base in various sectors is twisted by central bank manipulation of interest rates. The availability of capital may be constrained for relatively safe sectors but available at a relative discount to risky sectors. This leads to classic malinvestment and ultimately business failures, displaced workers, and harsh adjustment costs.

With any luck, the Fed will continue to move away from this misguided path. Zero or negative interest rates imposed by central banks penalize savers by making the saving decision excessively complex and fraught with risk. Business investment is distorted by confusing signals as to risk preference and inflated asset prices. Central economic planning via industrial policy, regulation, and price controls, such as the manipulation of interest rates, always ends badly. Unfortunately, most governments are well-practiced at bungling in all of those areas.

Central Bank Bubbles Pop On Our Heads

09 Wednesday Sep 2015

Posted by Nuetzel in Big Government, Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy

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Asset Bubble, Asset Price Distortion, Boom and bust, capital costs, Capital investment, Easy Money, Jim Grant, Market Manipulation, Martin Feldstein, Quantitative Easing, Ryan McMaken, Seigniorage, Supportive Earnings, Zero Interest Rate Policy, ZIRP

Printing money is a temptation that central banks can’t resist. And they distort prices when they do it. The new “liquidity” finds its way into higher asset values: stocks, bonds, real estate, even art. But as Jim Grant points out (as quoted by Ryan McMaken), the inflated prices are artificial, decoupled from the actual value those assets are capable of generating. The high asset prices are unsustainable:

“The idea is that you put the cart of asset values before the horse of enterprise. By raising up asset values, you mobilize spending by people who have assets… It was otherwise known as trickle-down economics before the enlightenment, then it became something much fancier in economic lingo. But that’s essentially the idea. So what you have seen is an artificial structure of prices worldwide.”

This comports with the general drift one gets from chatting with financial market professionals about the Federal Reserve and other central banks. These advisors usually add a reflexive assurance that corporate earnings are adequate to support stock prices. So which is it? Those very earnings might reflect trading gains on assets held by financial institutions and others, so the “supportive earnings” argument is circular to some degree. That aside, it’s suggestive that the recent market selloff has been centered on tighter monetary conditions:

“‘The risk of global liquidity conditions swinging is real for the markets, justifying a significant reduction in exposure for all asset classes,’ said Didier Saint-Georges, managing director at Carmignac, in a note to clients.“

Likewise, significant rebounds have been attributed, at least in part, to softening expectations that the Fed will move to increase short-term interest rates next week. If asset values are so heavily dependent on a continuation of a zero-interest rate, easy-money policy at this stage of an economic expansion, then it looks like a bubble is waiting to pop. More liquidity might delay the inevitable.

How did we get here? Martin Feldstein describes the policy of “quantitative easing” (QE) in “The Fed’s Stock Price Correction“:

“When the Obama administration’s poorly designed 2009 stimulus legislation failed to produce a strong economic turnaround, then-Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke announced that the central bank would pursue an ‘unconventional monetary policy’ by purchasing immense amounts of long-term bonds and promising to hold short-term interest rates near zero for an extended period.

Mr. Bernanke explained that the Fed’s policy was designed to drive down long-term interest rates, inducing portfolio investors to shift from bonds to stocks. This ‘portfolio substitution’ strategy, as he labeled it, would increase share prices, raising household wealth and therefore consumer spending.“

Feldstein does not buy the contention that “earnings are supportive”. Despite his conventional demand-side approach to macroeconomics, he too emphasizes that loose monetary policy has distorted asset prices.

The process is exacerbated by the bloated federal government’s appetite for funds. The Treasury is able to float debt at very low interest rates, thanks to the Fed’s willingness to provide liquidity to the banking system. By that, I mean the Fed’s willingness to buy Treasury bonds and monetize federal deficit spending.

Jim Grant’s argument regarding price distortion goes further. Increases in the prices of financial assets artificially deflate the cost of raising new capital, translating into over-investment in physical assets such as office buildings and machinery. Here’s Grant:

The prices themselves are the cosmetic evidence of underlying difficulty. So if you misprice something, it’s not just the price that’s wrong. It’s the thing itself that has been financed by the price. So you have perhaps too many oil derricks, too many semi-conductor fabs. We have too much of something, which is financed by an excess of credit or debt.“

Thus, the boom feeds the inevitable bust. That is certainly a danger. I’m sympathetic to Grant’s reasoning, but we have not experienced much of a boom in physical capital investment in the U.S., except perhaps for commercial real estate and in capital-intensive oil and gas extraction, and the latter is now on the skids. China, however, has been aggressively over-investing, and that is coming to an end.

While asset values have likely been inflated, it is fair to ask why the Fed’s accommodative policy has not led to a more general inflation in the prices of goods and services. For one thing, the strong dollar has held import prices down. (The international value of the dollar has been buttressed by the view that dollar-denominated assets are relatively safe, despite the risks created by the Fed.) More importantly, aging baby boomers have contributed to relatively strong saving activity (and less spending). Paradoxically, it’s possible that saving has been reinforced by the zero-rate policy of the Fed, as noted before on Sacred Cow Chips. Buying extra comfort in retirement requires greater set-asides if rates are low.

I am not optimistic about the direction of asset values, but I am not adjusting my own investment profile. Market timing is generally a bad strategy, and I will do my best to ride out the market’s ups and downs, even if they are manipulated by the Fed. However, we should all demand more discipline from the federal government and more restraint from the Fed. Better yet, limit the Fed’s discretion in the conduct of monetary policy by relying on a monetary standard that is less prone to manipulation and seigniorage.

Mortgage Mania at the Fed

09 Thursday Oct 2014

Posted by Nuetzel in Uncategorized

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Fannie Mae, Federal Reserve, Freddie Mac, Industrial Policy, Monetary Stimulus, Mortgage Interest Deduction, Mortgage Securities, Quantitative Easing, Richmond Fed, Wall Street Journal

The Federal Reserve has no business distorting incentives by dabbling with billions in markets for private debt. Kudos to two officials at the Richmond Fed for making this point forcefully in the Wall Street Journal** today.

Normally, the Fed conducts monetary policy by buying or selling Treasury debt, which is thought to be neutral with respect to relative private interest rates. In other words, the Fed’s impact on the Treasury market, whatever that might be, does not encourage investment in housing at the expense of factory investment or vice versa. Since 2009, however, the Fed has attempted to support the housing and mortgage markets via massive purchases of mortgage securities originally issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This has the effect of reducing mortgage interest rates relative to rates on other kinds of private debt. It also constitutes a form of bailout for mortgage investors, who tend to receive favorable bids from the Fed for these assets. Free money! And more free money is dolled out by the Fed when it pays banks interest on the new reserve balances these transactions ultimately create.

One might object that the struggling mortgage market needed the Fed’s support in the wake of the housing crash. I do not accept that view because the mortgage and housing markets needed to unwind their excesses and monetary stimulus did not require mortgage purchases. But this also begs the question: what gave rise to the crisis? Over-investment in housing and a home price bubble fueled by tax-deductible interest, easy Fed monetary policy, regulatory capital standards that favored mortgage lending, prospective bailouts in case of failure, and loose bank credit standards. Those should all sound familiar. Now, the Fed believes it’s necessary to re-inflate the mortgage market via continuing asset purchases.

The Fed’s policies can be criticized on other grounds, but interfering in private debt markets should be avoided. It is an example of industrial policy that is clearly not even part of the Fed’s so-called mandate, and it ultimately means a continuing massive misallocation of resources into housing at the expense of other forms of investment.

** The article at the link should be ungated. If not, try Googling “wsj Fed’s Mortgage Favoritism.”