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Lockdowns Subvert Public Health and Life Itself

15 Thursday Oct 2020

Posted by in Coronavirus, Lockdowns, Public Health, Uncategorized

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Acceptance of risk is a necessary part of a good life, and extreme efforts to avoid it are your own business. Government has no power to guarantee absolute safety, nor should we presume to have such a right. Ongoing COVID lockdowns are an implicit assertion of exactly that kind of government power, despite the impotence of those efforts, and they constitute a rejection of more fundamental rights.

Lockdowns have had destructive effects on health and economic well being while conferring little if any benefit in mitigating harm from the virus. The lockdowns were originally sold as a way to “flatten the curve”, that is, to avoid a spike in cases and an overburdened health care system. However, this arguably well-qualified rationale later expanded in scope to encompass the mitigation of smaller and much less deadly outbreaks among younger cohorts, and then to the very idea of extinguishing the virus altogether. It’s become painfully obvious that such measures are not capable of achieving those goals.

In the U.S., the ongoing lockdowns have been a cause célèbre largely on the interventionist Left, and they have been prolonged mainly by Democrats at various levels of government. In a way, this is not unlike many other policies championed by the Left, often ostensibly designed to help members of the underclasses: instead, those policies often destroy or wrongly obviate incentives and promote dependency on the state. In this case, the plunge into dependency is a reality the Left would very much like to ignore, or to blame on someone else. You know who.

The lockdowns have been largely unsuccessful in mitigating the spread of the virus. At the same time, they have been used as a pretext to deny constitutional rights such as the free practice of religion, assembly, and a broad range of unenumerated rights under the “penumbra” of the Bill of Rights and the Ninth Amendment. What’s more, the severity of the economic blow caused by lockdowns has been borne disproportionately by the working poor and the small businesses who employ so many of them.

Lockdowns are deadly. It’s not clear that they’ve saved any lives, but they have massively disrupted the operation of the health care system with major consequences for those with chronic and undiagnosed conditions. The lockdowns have also led to spikes in mental health issues, alcoholism, drug abuse, and deaths of despair. A recent study found that over 26% of the excess deaths during the pandemic were non-COVID deaths. Those deaths were avoidable or accelerated, whereas the lockdowns have failed to meaningfully curtail COVID deaths. Don’t tell me about reduced traffic fatalities: that reduction is relatively small relative to the increase in non-COVID excess deaths (see below).

What proof do we have that lockdowns cause excess deaths? See this study in The Lancet on cancer deaths due to lockdown-induced delays in diagnoses. See this study on UK school closures. See this Oxfam International report on lockdown-induced starvation. Other reports from the UK suggests that lockdown deaths are widespread, having taken nearly 2,800 per week early in the pandemic, and many other deaths yet to occur have been made inevitable by lockdowns. Doctors in the U.S. have warned that lockdowns are a “mass casualty incident”, and a German government study warned of the same.

The Ethical Skeptic (TES) on Twitter has been tracking a measure of lockdown deaths for some time now. The following graphic provides a breakdown of excess non-COVID deaths since the start of the pandemic. The total “pie” shows almost 320,000 excess deaths through September 26th (avoiding less complete counts in recent weeks), as reported by the CDC. COVID accounted for 202,000 of those deaths, based on state-level reporting. Of the remaining 117,000 excess deaths, TES uses CDC data to allocate roughly 85,000 to various causes, the largest (more than half) being “Suicide, Addiction, Abandonment, and Abuse”. Other large categories include Cardio/Diabetes, Stroke, premature Alzheimers/Dementia death, and Cancer Access. Nearly 32,000 excess deaths remain as a “backlog”, not yet reported with a cause by states.

Also of interest in the graphic are estimates of life-years lost. The vast bulk of COVID victims are elderly, of course, which means that any estimate of lost years per victim must be relatively low. On the other hand, most non-COVID, lockdown-related deaths are among younger victims, with correspondingly greater life-years lost. TES’s aggregate estimate is that lockdown-related excess deaths involve double the life-years lost of COVID deaths. Of course, that is an estimate, but even granting some latitude for error, the reality is horrifying!

John Tierney in City Journal cites several recent studies concluding that lockdowns have been largely ineffective in Europe and in the U.S. While Tierney doesn’t rule out the possibility that lockdowns have produced some benefits, they have carried excessive costs and risks to public health going forward, such as lingering issues for those having deferred important health care decisions as well as disruption in future economic prospects. Ultimately, lockdowns don’t accomplish anything:

“While the economic and social costs have been enormous, it’s not clear that the lockdowns have brought significant health benefits beyond what was achieved by people’s voluntary social distancing and other actions.”

Tierney also discusses the costs and benefits of lockdowns in terms of life years: quality-adjusted life-years (QALY), which is a widely-used measure for evaluating of the use of health care resources:

“By the QALY measure, the lockdowns must be the most costly—and cost-ineffective—medical intervention in history because most of the beneficiaries are so near the end of life. Covid-19 disproportionately affects people over 65, who have accounted for nearly 80 percent of the deaths in the United States. The vast majority suffered from other ailments, and more than 40 percent of the victims were living in nursing homes, where the median life expectancy after admission is just five months. In Britain, a study led by the Imperial College economist David Miles concluded that even if you gave the lockdown full credit for averting the most unrealistic worst-case scenario (the projection of 500,000 British deaths, more than ten times the current toll), it would still flunk even the most lenient QALY cost-benefit test.”

We can now count the World Health Organization among the detractors of lockdowns. According to WHO’s Dr. David Nabarro:

“Lockdowns just have one consequence that you must never ever belittle, and that is making poor people an awful lot poorer…. Look what’s happened to smallholder farmers all over the world. … Look what’s happening to poverty levels. It seems that we may well have a doubling of world poverty by next year. We may well have at least a doubling of child malnutrition.”

In another condemnation of the public health consequences of lockdowns, number of distinguished epidemiologists have signed off on a statement known as The Great Barrington Declaration. The declaration advocates a focused approach of protecting the most vulnerable from the virus, while allowing those at low risk to proceed with their lives in whatever way they deem acceptable. Those at low risk of severe disease can acquire immunity, which ultimately inures to the benefit of the most vulnerable. With few, brief, and local exceptions, this is how we have always dealt with pandemics in the past. That’s real life!

Evidence of Fading COVID Summer Surge

16 Sunday Aug 2020

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Lately I’ve talked a lot about reported deaths each week versus deaths by actual date of death (DOD). Much of that information came from Kyle Lamb’s Twitter account, and he’s the source of the charts below as well. The first one provides a convenient summary of the data reported through last week. The blue bars are reported deaths each week from the COVID Tracking Project (CTP), which are an aggregation of deaths that actually occurred over previous weeks. Again, the blue bars do NOT represent deaths that occurred in the reporting week. The solid orange bars are “provisional” actual deaths by DOD. “Provisional” means that recent weeks are not complete, though most deaths by DOD are captured within three to four weeks. The CDC also produces a “forecast” of final death counts by DOD, shown by the hatched orange bars.   

Note that the recent surge in deaths has been much smaller than the one in the spring, which was driven by deaths in the northeast. The CDC “expects” actual deaths by DOD to have declined starting after the week of July 23rd. However, CTP was still reporting deaths of over 1,000 per day last week. The actual timing of those deaths in prior weeks, and the ultimate extent of the summer surge in COVID deaths, remains to be seen.

Certain leading indicators of deaths are signaling declines in actual deaths in August. Two of those indicators are 1) the positivity rate on standard PCR tests for infections; and 2) the share of emergency room visits made for symptoms of “COVID Like Illness” (CLI). The charts below show those indicators for FEMA regions that had the largest uptrends in cases in June and July. Florida is part of Region 4, shown in the next chart:

Here is the Region 6, which includes Texas:

Finally, Region 8 includes Arizona and California:

Out of personal interest, I’m also throwing in Region 7 with a few midwestern states, where cases have risen but not to the levels reached in Regions 4, 6, and 8:

With the exception of the last chart, the clear pattern is a peak or plateau in the positivity rate in late June through late July, followed by declines in subsequent weeks. The share or ER visits for CLI was not quite coincident with the positivity rate, but close. The decline in the CLI share is evident in Regions 4, 6 and 8. Again, these three regions include states that drove the nationwide increase in cases this summer (AZ, CA, FL, and TX), and the surge appears to have maxed out.     

Here is a chart showing the share of CLI visits to ERs for all ten FEMA region from mid-June through last week. Clearly, this measure is improving across the U.S.

Nationwide, the CLI percentage at ERs has decreased by about 47% over the past four weeks, and the positivity rate has decreased by about 28% in that time. In addition to these favorable trends, COVID hospitalizations have decreased by about 40% over the past three weeks. All of these trends bode well for a downturn in COVID-attributed deaths.

The summertime surge in the virus was not nearly as ravaging as in the spring, and it appears to be fading. We’ll await developments in the fall, but we’ve come a long way in terms of protecting the vulnerable, treating the infected, approaching herd immunity thresholds (which means reduced rates of transmission to susceptible individuals), and the real possibility that we can put the pandemic behind us. 

COVID at Midsummer

04 Tuesday Aug 2020

Posted by in Pandemic, Public Health

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It’s been several weeks since I last posted on the state of the coronavirus pandemic (also see here). The charts below show seven-day moving averages of new confirmed cases and reported C19 deaths from the COVID Tracking Project as of August 3. Daily new cases began to flatten about three weeks ago and then turned down (it can take a few days for such changes to show up in a moving average). Daily C19-attributed deaths began climbing again in early July, lagging new cases by a few weeks, and they slowed just a bit over the past several days. Obviously, both are good news if those changes are maintained. The other thing to note is that deaths have remained far below their levels of April and early May.

The daily death count is that reported on each date, not when the deaths actually occurred. Each day’s report consists of deaths that were spread across several previous weeks or even a month or more. That makes the slight downturn in deaths more tenuous from a data perspective. There are sometimes large numbers of deaths from preceding weeks reported together on a single day, so reporting can be ragged and the final pattern of actual deaths is not known for some time. More on that below.

States

The increase in cases and deaths during late June and July was concentrated in four states: Arizona, California, Florida, and Texas. Here’s how those states look now in terms of cases and deaths, from the interactive COVID Time Series site:

 

New cases began to flatten or drop in these states two to three weeks ago, driving the change in the national data. Daily deaths have not turned convincingly, but again, these are reported deaths, which actually occurred over previous weeks. One more chart that is suggestive: current hospitalizations in these four states. The recent declines should bode well for the trend in reported deaths, but it remains to be seen. 

Meanwhile, other parts of the country have seen an uptrend in cases and deaths, such as Illinois, Missouri, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Here are new cases in those states:

It’s worth emphasizing that the elevated level of new cases this summer has not been associated with the rates of fatality experienced in the Northeast during the spring. There are many reasons: better patient care, new treatments, more direct summer sunlight, higher humidity, and tighter controls in nursing homes.

More On the Timing of Deaths

Back to the discrepancies in the timing of reported deaths and actual deaths. This is important because the reported totals each day and each week can be highly misleading, even to the point of frightening the public and policy makers, with consequent psychological and economic impacts.

The latest summary of provisional vs. reported deaths is shown below, courtesy of Kyle Lamb, who posts updates on his Twitter feed. This report ends with the last complete week ending August 1. It’s a little hard to read, but you might get a better look if you click on it or turn your phone sideways. Some of the key series are also graphed below. 

The table shows the actual timing of deaths in the fourth column, with dates alongside. The pattern differs from the statistics reported by the Covid Tracking Project (CTP) in the top row (shaded orange), and from the totals of actual deaths by reporting day in the third row (shaded gray). The reporting dates are always later than the dates of death. This can be seen in the chart below. The most obvious illustration is how many of the deaths from around the peak in mid-April were reported in May. In March and April, the daily reports were short of the ultimate actual death counts because so few deaths with associated dates were known by then.

 

The right-hand end of the red line shows that many deaths reported by CTP have not yet been placed at an actual date of death by the CDC.  At this point, the actual date of death has not been placed for over 10,000 deaths! Again, those will be spread over earlier weeks.

The blue line is dashed over the last four weeks because those counts are most “highly” provisional. Small changes in the actual counts are likely for dates even before that, but the last four weeks are subject to fairly substantial upward revisions. Eventually, the right end of the blue line will more closely approximate the totals shown in red.

To get an indication of trends in the actual timing of deaths, I plotted the weekly actual deaths reported for the last four reporting weeks going back in time. In the table, those are the four lowest, color-coded diagonals. In the graph below, which should include the qualifier “by recency of report week”, actual deaths in the most recent report week are represented by the blue line, the prior weekly report is red, followed by green (three weeks prior), and purple (four weeks prior… sorry, the colors are not consistent with those in the table). The lines extend farther to the right for more recent report weeks.

The increase in actual deaths occurring in July has declined or flattened in each of the four most recent report weeks. Only the second-to-last week increased as of the August 1st report. On the whole, those changes seem favorable, but we shall see.

Closing

It’s getting trite to say, but the next few weeks will be interesting. The increase in deaths in July was a sad development, but at least the extent of it appears to have been limited. Even with a somewhat higher death count, the fatality rate continued to decline. Let’s hope any further waves of infections are even less deadly.

COVID Politics and Collateral Damage

26 Sunday Jul 2020

Posted by in Pandemic, Public Health

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Policymakers, public health experts, and the media responded to the coronavirus in ways that have often undermined public health and magnified the deadly consequences of the pandemic. Below I offer several examples of perverse politics and policy prescriptions, and a few really bad decisions by certain elected officials. Some of the collateral damage was intentional and motivated by an intent to inflict political damage on Donald Trump, and people of good faith should find that grotesque no matter their views on Trump’s presidency.

Politicized Treatment

The smug dismissal of hydroxychloraquine as Trumpian foolishness was a crime against humanity. We now know HCQ works as an early treatment and as a prophylactic against infection. It’s has been partly credited with stanching “hot spots” in India as well as contributing strongly to control of the contagion in Switzerland and in a number of other countries. According to epidemiologist Harvey Risch of the Yale School of Public Health, HCQ could save 75,000 to 100,000 lives if the drug is widely used. This is from Dr. Risch’s OpEd in Newsweek:

“On May 27, I published an article in the American Journal of Epidemiology (AJE) entitled, ‘Early Outpatient Treatment of Symptomatic, High-Risk COVID-19 Patients that Should be Ramped-Up Immediately as Key to the Pandemic Crisis.’ That article, published in the world’s leading epidemiology journal, analyzed five studies, demonstrating clear-cut and significant benefits to treated patients, plus other very large studies that showed the medication safety. …

Since [then], seven more studies have demonstrated similar benefit. In a lengthy follow-up letter, also published by AJE, I discuss these seven studies and renew my call for the immediate early use of hydroxychloroquine in high-risk patients.”

Risch is careful to couch his statements in forward-looking terms, but this also implies that tens of thousands of lives could have been saved, or patients might have recovered more readily and without lasting harm, had use of the drug not been restricted. The FDA revoked its Emergency Use Authorization for HCQ on June 15th, alleging that it is not safe and has little if any benefit. An important rationale cited in the FDA’s memo was an NIH study of late-stage C19 patients that found no benefit and potential risks to HCQ, but this is of questionable relevance because the benefit appears to be in early-stage treatment or prophylaxis. Poor research design also goes for this study and this study, while this study shared in some shortcomings (e.g., and no use of and/or controls for zinc) and a lack of statistical power. Left-wing outlets like Politico seemed almost gleeful, and blissfully ignorant, in calling those studies “nails in the coffin” for HCQ. Now, I ask: putting the outcomes of the research aside, was it really appropriate to root against a potential treatment for a serious disease, especially back in March and April when there were few treatment options, but even now?

Then we have the state governors who restricted the use of HCQ for treating C19, such as Gretchen Whitmer (MI) and Steve Sisolak (NV). Andrew Cuomo (NY) decided that HCQ could be dispensed only for hospital use, exactly the wrong approach for early stage treatment. And all of this resistance was a reaction to Donald Trump’s optimism about the promise of HCQ. Yes, there was alarm that lupus patients would be left without adequate supplies, but the medication is a very cheap, easy to produce drug, so that was never a real danger. Too much of the media and politicians have been complicit in denying a viable treatment to many thousands of C19 victims. If you were one of the snarky idiots putting it down on social media, you are either complicit or simply a poster child for banal evil.

Seeding the Nursing Homes

The governors of several states issued executive orders to force nursing homes to accept C19 patients, which was against CMS guidance issued in mid-March. The governors were Andrew Cuomo (NY), Gretchen Whitmer (MI), Gavin Newsom (CA), Tom Wolf (PA), and Phil Murphy (PA). This was a case of stupidity more than anything else. These institutions are home to the segment of the population most vulnerable to the virus, and they have accounted for about 40% of all C19 deaths. Nursing homes were ill-prepared to handle these patients, and the governors foolishly and callously ordered them to house patients who required a greater level of care and who represented an extreme hazard to other residents and staff.

Party & Protest On

Then of course we had the mayor of New York City, Bill De Blasio, who urged New Yorkers to get out on the town in early March. That was matched in its stupidity by the array of politicians and health experts who decided, having spent months proselytizing the need to “stay home”, that it was in their best interests to endorse participation in street protests that were often too crowded to maintain effective social distance. That’s not a condemnation of those who sought to protest peacefully against police brutality, but it was not a good or consistent recommendation in the domain of public health. Thankfully, the protests were outside!

Testing, Our Way Or the Highway

The FDA and CDC were guilty of regulatory overreach in preventing early testing for C19, and were responsible for many lives lost early in the pandemic. By the time the approved CDC tests revealed that the virus was ramping up drastically in March, the country was already behind in getting a handle on the spread of the virus, quarantining the infected, and tracing their contacts. There is no question that this cost lives.

Masks… Maybe, But Our Way Or the Highway

U.S. public health authorities were guilty of confused messaging on the efficacy of masks early in the pandemic. As Joel Zinberg notes in City Journal, Anthony Fauci admitted that his own minimization of the effectiveness of masks was motivated by a desire to prevent a shortage of PPE for health care workers:

“In discouraging mask use, Fauci—for decades, the nation’s foremost expert on viral infectious diseases—was not acting as a neutral interpreter of settled science but as a policymaker, concerned with maximizing the utility of the limited supply of a critical item. An economist could have told him that there was no need to misinform the public. Letting market mechanisms work and relaxing counterproductive regulations would ease shortages. Masks for health-care workers would be available if we were willing to pay higher prices; those higher prices, in turn, would elicit more mask production.”

Indeed, regulators made acquisition of adequate supplies of PPE more difficult than necessary via compliance requirements, “price gouging” rules, and import controls.

Bans on Elective Surgery

Another series of unnecessary deaths was caused by various bans on elective surgeries across the U.S. (also see here), and we’re now in danger of repeating that mistake. These bans were thought to be helpful in preserving hospital capacity, but hospitals were significantly underutilized for much of the pandemic. Add to that the fright inspired by official reaction to C19, which keeps emergency rooms empty, and you have a universe of diverse public health problems to grapple with. As I said on this blog a couple of months ago:

“… months of undiagnosed cardiac and stroke symptoms; no cancer screenings, putting patients months behind on the survival curve; deferred procedures of all kinds; run-of-the-mill infections gone untreated; palsy and other neurological symptoms anxiously discounted by victims at home; a hold on treatments for all sorts of other progressive diseases; and patients ordinarily requiring hospitalization sent home. And to start back up, new health problems must compete with all that deferred care. Do you dare tally the death and other worsened outcomes? Both are no doubt significant.”

Lockdowns

The lockdowns were unnecessary and ineffectual in their ability to control the spread of the virus. A study of 50 countries published by The Lancet last week found the following:

“Increasing COVID-19 caseloads were associated with countries with higher obesity … median population age … and longer time to border closures from the first reported case…. Increased mortality per million was significantly associated with higher obesity prevalence … and per capita gross domestic product (GDP) …. Reduced income dispersion reduced mortality … and the number of critical cases …. Rapid border closures, full lockdowns, and wide-spread testing were not associated with COVID-19 mortality per million people.”

That should have been obvious for a virus that holds little danger for prime working-age cohorts who are most impacted by economic lockdowns.

Like the moratoria on elective surgeries, lockdowns did more harm than good. Livelihoods disappeared, business were ruined, savings were destroyed, dreams were shattered, isolation set in, and it continues today. These kinds of problems are strongly associated with health troubles, family dysfunction, drug and alcohol abuse, and even suicide. It’s ironic that those charged with advising on matters pertaining to public health should focus exclusively on a single risk, recommending solutions that carry great risk themselves without a second thought. After all, the protocol in reviewing new treatments sets the first hurdle as patient safety, but apparently that didn’t apply in the case of shutdowns.

Even as efforts were made to reopen, faulty epidemiological models were used to predict calamitous outcomes. While case counts have risen in many states in the U.S. in June and July, deaths remain far below model predictions and far below deaths recorded during the spring in the northeast.

One last note: I almost titled this post “Attack of the Killer Morons”, but as a concession to what is surely a vain hope, I decided not to alienate certain readers right from the start.

 

 

Case Fatality, Stale Ratios and Exaggerated Loss

14 Tuesday Jul 2020

Posted by in Analytics, Pandemic

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I hope someday I won’t feel compelled to write or worry about the coronavirus. However, as the pandemic wears on, it seems to take only a few days for issues to pile up, and I just can’t resist comment. Today I have a couple of beefs with uses of data and concomitant statements I’ve seen posted of late.

People are still quoting case fatality rates (CFRs) as if those cumulative numbers are relevant to the number of deaths we can expect going forward. They are not. Just as hair-brained are applications of cumulative hospitalization and ICU admittance rates to produce “rough and ready” estimates of what to expect going forward. Or, I’ve seen people express hospitalizations as ratios to CFR, as if those ratios will be the same going forward. Again, they are not. Let me try to explain.

The chart below shows the course of the U.S. CFR since the start of the pandemic. It’s taken from the interactive Covid Time Series site. My apologies if you have to click on the chart for decent viewing (or you can visit the site). The CFR at any date is the cumulative number of deaths to-date divided by the cumulative number of confirmed cases. It is a summary of past history, but it is not well-suited to making predictions about death rates in the future. The CFR began to taper a little before Memorial Day, and it is now at about 4% (as of July 13).

Out of curiosity, I also generated CFRs for AZ, CA, FL, GA, and TX, which now average about half of the national CFR. There’s an obvious lesson: if you must use CFRs, understand that they vary from place to place.

Again, CFRs are cumulative. Their changes over time can tell us something about recent trends, but even then they are flawed. For example, case counts have risen dramatically with more widespread testing. Those testing positive more recently are concentrated in younger age cohorts, for whom infections are much less severe. Treatment has improved dramatically as well, so there is little reason to expect the CFR’s of recently diagnosed cases to be as high as the latest CFRs shown above.

There is no easy way to calculate an unflawed “marginal” CFR for a recent period, though an effort to do so might improve the predictive value. Deaths lag behind case counts because the progression from early symptoms to death can take several weeks. Even more vexing for constructing a valid, recent fatality rate is that reporting of deaths is itself delayed, as I explained in my last post. Each day’s report of deaths captures deaths that may have occurred over a period of several weeks in the past, and sometimes many more.

Finally no CFR can capture the true mortality rate of the virus without ongoing, ubiquitous testing. As the state of testing stands, the true mortality rate must reflect undiagnosed cases in the denominator. The CDC’s latest “best” estimate of the true mortality rate is just 0.3%, and 0.05% for those aged 50 years or less. Those figures are based on serological tests for the presence of antibodies to C19 in more random samples of the population. Those findings reflect the extent of undiagnosed and/or asymptomatic cases.

The point is one shouldn’t be too blithe about throwing numbers around like 4% mortality based on the CFR, or even 1% mortality as a “nice, round number”, without heavy qualification. Those numbers are gross exaggerations of what we are likely to see going forward.

The same criticisms can be leveled at claims that hospitalizations will proceed at some fixed ratio relative to diagnosed cases, or some fixed ratio relative to deaths. Again, new cases tend to be less severe, so hospitalizations are likely to be a much lower ratio to cases than what is reflected in cumulative totals. Because of improved treatment, the ratio of deaths to hospitalizations will be much lower in the future as well.

CFRs are not a useful guide to future COVID deaths. The true mortality rate is a much better baseline, particularly for subsets of the population matching the current case load. Finally, and this is the only disclaimer I’ll bother to provide today, we all know that suffering is not confined to terminal cases, and it is not confined to the hospitalized subset. But don’t exaggerate the extent of your preferred interpretation of suffering by applying inappropriate cumulative calculations.

 

Reported and “Actual” COVID Deaths

13 Monday Jul 2020

Posted by in Pandemic, Political Bias

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I was updating my post from twelve days ago on the upward trend in new coronavirus cases when I came across a great tabular summary of a phenomenon that’s been underway since early April: significant delays in reporting deaths from COVID-19 (C19). Before I get to that, a quick word on what’s happened over the past 12 days. New coronavirus cases keep climbing in a number of states, and it’s been a grisly waiting game to see whether the severity and lethality of infections will follow the case counts upward. The following chart provides a very preliminary answer. It’s taken from Our World In Data, and it shows the seven-day moving average of C19 deaths in the U.S.

There has indeed been an upturn in reported deaths over the past week. Just prior to that, a temporary plateau in late June was caused by a set of “reclassifications” of earlier deaths in New Jersey (the “plateau effect is caused by seven-day averaging). These kinds of changes in reporting make it rather difficult to interpret trends accurately. Unfortunately, the reporting of deaths has been subject to continuing distortions that are even more difficult to discern than New Jersey’s spike.

Kyle Lamb provides the interesting table below, which might be difficult to read without either clicking on it or going to the link at Twitter. Here is another link to an annotated version of the table. The top row labeled “CTP Total” is the C19 death toll reported each week by the COVID Tracking Project. This is generally what the public sees. These reports show that deaths reached their highest levels during the weeks of April 11th through May 9th. However, the second column shows C19 deaths by their actual week of occurrence. This series shows a more distinct peak on April 18th with steady declines thereafter.

The weekly totals in the second column are not final, however. Take a look at the last reporting week in the far right column (July 11th). The CTP reported 4,286 deaths, an increase over the prior week consistent with the upturn in the first chart above. But the table shows that over half of that week’s reported deaths actually occurred in late April and early May! So the upturn in deaths is something of a mirage.

We won’t have a reasonable approximation of the death totals for the past several weeks (or how they compare) for at least several more weeks. In fact, one can argue that it might be a matter of months before we have a reasonable approximation of those deaths, but it’s worth noting that the vast bulk of “actual” C19 deaths tend to be reported within four weeks of the initial reporting week, and the additions or revisions to the two weeks in late April and early May in the last column were exceptionally large. Chances are we won’t see many more that big…. Or will we?

Aspects of this process hint at the ease with which the C19 death totals could be manipulated. The reported totals for all-cause mortality in the first column are incomplete; more recent weeks, especially, are not fully settled as to causes of death. Some of those fatalities are certain to be attributed to C19. Others might be reclassified as C19. And here is the scary part: the all-cause totals are certain to include a significant number of lockdown-related or COVID-phobic deaths: individuals who were unable or unwilling to seek medical care for urgent needs due to lockdowns or fears of rampant spread of C19 infections within hospital environments. To anyone with an interest in manipulating the C19 death toll, whether hospital officials seeking higher reimbursements, local or state officials seeking federal funds, or public officials at any level seeking to promote pandemic fears and/or political discord, these “extra” deaths might be tempting marks for reclassification.

I’m fairly confident that the uptrend of new cases will be far less severe than early in the pandemic. I believe much of the alarm I see on social and mainstream media is misplaced. More on that in a subsequent post, but for now I’ll simply note that those testing positive are concentrated in much lower ranges of the age distribution, and treatment has improved in a variety of ways. The table above shows that the downtrend in actual weekly C19 deaths is intact as of the admittedly incomplete July 11th reporting week. We won’t know the “actual” pattern of early-July C19 fatalities for another month or more. Even then, one might harbor suspicions that the totals are manipulated for economic or political reasons, but we can hope the reporting authorities are exercising the utmost objectivity in assigning cause of death.

Unfortunate COVID Follies

08 Wednesday Jul 2020

Posted by in Government Failure, Pandemic

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This post is devoted to a few coronavirus policies and positions that trouble me. 

Counting Deaths: People have the general impression that counting COVID-19 cases and deaths is straightforward. The facts are more reminiscent of the following exchange in the film Arsenic and Old Lace, when Jonathan Brewster angrily insists he has offed more souls than his sweet little aunties have poisoned with elderberry wine:

Dr. Einstein: You cannot count the one in South Bend. He died of pneumonia!
Jonathan Brewster: He wouldn’t have died of pneumonia if I hadn’t shot him! 

Here, Dr. Einstein wears the shoes of public health authorities who claim that C19 deaths are undercounted. But lives counted as lost from C19, in many cases, are individuals who also had the flu, pneumonia, stroke, kidney failure, and a variety of other co-morbidities. Yes, other causes of death might be induced by the coronavirus, but like Johnny’s victim in South Bend, many would not have died from C19 if they hadn’t had a prior health event. In addition, otherwise unexplained deaths are often attributed to C19 with little justification.

In fact, the C19 death toll has been distorted by a perverse federal hospital reimbursement policy that rewards hospitals for COVID patients. Death certificates seem to list C19 as the cause for almost anyone who dies in or out of a hospital during the pandemic, whether they’ve been tested or not. In fact, deaths have been attributed to C19 despite negative test results when officials decided, for one reason or another, that the test must have been unreliable!

Lockdowns: almost all of the “curve flattening” in late March and April was accomplished by voluntary action, which I’ve covered before here. The lockdowns imposed by state and local governments were highly arbitrary and tragic for many workers and business owners who could have continued to operate as safely as many so-called “essential” businesses. Lockdowns in certain areas were also blatant violations of religious rights. There is little to no evidence that lockdowns themselves led to any actual abatement of the virus. And of course, people are fed up! 

The Beach: Right now I’m at a wonderful beach condo in Florida for a week. There are other people on the beach, mostly families and a few groups of friends, but there is plenty of open space. You will not catch the coronavirus on a beach like this. And there is almost zero chance you’ll catch it on any beach. In fact, the chance you’ll catch it anywhere outside is minuscule unless you’re jammed so tightly among hundreds of protesters that you can’t even turn around. Yet government officials have closed beaches in many parts of the country while allowing the protests to go on. Oh sure, they think people will CROWD onto beaches as if they’re at a BLM protest… except they’re not. Ah, then it must be banned! That takes a special kind of dumbass.     

Waiting for Results: How could we have spent trillions of dollars as a nation on economic stimulus, much of it skimmed off by grifters, but we can’t seem to get sufficient resources to make calls to those awaiting test results? This is a case of misplaced priorities. Even now, people are waiting more than a week for their results, and many are wandering around in the community without knowing their status. Wouldn’t you think we’d get that done? We can conduct well over a half million tests a day, but can’t we find a few bucks to deliver results via phone, email, or text within 24 hours of processing results. This is truly absurd. 

Vaccine Candidates: A similar point can be made about vaccine development: We are spending $5 billion on Operation Warp Speed to build capacity in advance for five promising vaccine candidates. These will be identified over the next few months, and it looks as if all five will come from established pharmaceutical majors. There are many more vaccine candidates, however, some being developed by smaller players using inventive new techniques. The OWS expenditure looks pretty meager when you compare it to the trillions in funds the federal government is spending on economic stimulus, especially when finding an effective vaccine would obviate much of the stimulus. 

Treatment: Hydroxycloroquine has been found to lower the death rate from COVID-19 in a large controlled trial. Congratulations, morons, for trashing HCQ as a potential treatment, solely because Trump mentioned it. Way to go, dumbasses, for banning the use of a potential treatment that could have saved many thousands of lives. 

Air Conditioning: I’m shocked that public health experts haven’t been more vocal about the potentially dangerous effects of running air conditioners at high levels in public buildings. The virus is known to thrive in cool, dry environments, which is exactly what AC creates, yet this seems to have been almost completely ignored.   

Vitamin D: Likewise, I think public health experts have been far too reticent about the connection between Vitamin D deficiencies and the severity of C19 (also see here and here). The accumulating evidence about this association offers an explanation for the disturbingly high severity of cases among Black, Asian and Minority Ethnics (BAME), not to mention a possible role in C19 deaths among the generally D-deficient nursing home population. For the love of God, get the word out to the community that Vitamin D supplements might help, and they won’t hurt, and otherwise, tell people to get some sun!

Masks: I’m not in favor of strict mask mandates, but I have trouble understanding the aversion to masks among certain friends. Of course, there’s been way too much mixed messaging on the benefits of masks, and it didn’t all come from politicians! Scientists, the CDC, and the World Health Organization seemingly did everything possible to squander their credibility on this and other issues. However, a consensus now seems to have developed that masks protect others from the wearer and seem to protect the wearer from others as well. It should be obvious that masks offer a middle ground on which the economy can be restarted while mitigating the risks of further contagion. But even if you don’t believe masks protect the wearer, but only protect others from an infected wearer, donning a mask inside buildings, and when social distancing is impossible, still qualifies as a mannerly thing to do.  

 

Coronavirus Framing #7: Second Wave Uncertainty

19 Friday Jun 2020

Posted by in Pandemic

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We’re now said to be on the cusp of a “second wave” of coronavirus infections. It’s become a new focus of media attention in the past week or so. Increased infections have been reported across a number of states, especially in the south, but I’m not especially alarmed at this point for reasons explained below. Either way, the public policy response will certainly be different this time, at least in most areas. We’ve learned that a more targeted approach to managing coronavirus risk is far less costly, which means eschewing general lockdowns in favor of focusing resources on protecting the most vulnerable. That approach is supported by research weighing the costs and benefits of the alternatives (also see here and here).

The targeted approach I’ve advocated does not call for any less caution on the part of individuals. That means avoiding prolonged, close contact with others, especially indoors. I don’t mind wearing a mask when inside stores or public buildings, but I believe it should be voluntary. I do my best to stay out of close proximity to most others in public places anyway, masked or otherwise. This is voluntary social distancing. I also believe public health authorities should be more active in disseminating information on known correlates of coronavirus severity, such as Vitamin D deficiency, high LDL cholesterol, and the “reverse seasonal effect” caused by low humidity in air-conditioned spaces. I would also strongly agree that the effort to identify and mass produce vaccine candidates, known as Operation Warp Speed, should be ramped up considerably, with heavier funding and more than five vaccine candidates.

We’ve seen a continuing increase in coronavirus testing since my last “framing” post about a month ago. Testing has increased to a daily average of almost 500,000 over the past two weeks. At present we appear to have an excess supply of testing capacity in many areas, as Rich Lowry notes:

“The problem with testing nationally is becoming less a shortfall of availability of the tests and more a shortfall of people showing up to get tested. An insider in the diagnostics industry says that laboratories are reporting that they are ‘sample starved’ — i.e., they aren’t getting enough specimens. He notes, ‘We have all seen stories about sample-collection sites in some regions not seeing that many patients.’

An HHS official says that in May there was the capacity to do twice as many tests as were actually performed, calling it a function of ‘allocation and efficiency, but more just demand.’ Says Giroir, ‘We really see areas in the country now that there’s more tests available than people who want to get tested or the need for testing.'”

Before turning to some charts, a word about the data in the charts I’ve been using throughout the pandemic. Some of the nationwide information was directly from the CDC or the Johns Hopkins dashboard. In other cases, I’ve reported state level data and some nationwide data published by The COVID Tracking Project (CTP) and the COVID Time Series (CTS) dashboard, which uses state data from CTP. I first noticed a few discrepancies in the national totals in April, which have become larger with growth in the counts of cases and deaths. Here is a key part of CTP’s explanation:

“For many states, the CDC publishes higher testing numbers than the states themselves report, which raises questions about the structure and integrity of both state and federal data reporting. … Another point of contrast between the CDC’s new reporting and the official state data compiled by The COVID Tracking Project is that the CDC has not released historical, state-level testing data for the first three months of the outbreak.”

Thus, the CDC currently reports almost 120,000 U.S. deaths, while CTP reports about 112,000. Nevertheless, I will continue to report numbers from both sources for the sake of continuity, and I will try to remember to note the source in each case.

The first chart below shows the number of daily tests from CTP; the second chart shows the number of daily confirmed cases (CTP). Since mid-May, daily testing has increased by more than 50%, calculated on a moving average basis, and is now approaching half a million per day or more than 3 million per week. Pooled testing is coming, which will ultimately increase testing capacity several-fold. Daily confirmed cases have been hovered just above 20,000 since around Memorial Day, with a recent turn upward to around 24,000.

Early in the pandemic, I made the mistake of focusing too heavily on case numbers. Yes, I adjusted for population size and was aware that the initial shortage of tests was restraining diagnoses. Still, I did not foresee the great expansion in testing we’ve witnessed, the great transmissibility of the virus in some regions, nor the large number of asymptomatic cases that would ultimately be diagnosed.

The daily percentage of positive tests (CTP), which is smoothed in the chart below using a seven-day moving average to eliminate within-week variability, has declined gradually since early April to about 4% before the uptick in the last few days. Still, that’s a drop of about 75% from the peak when tests were in very short supply. Those were days when even heavily symptomatic individuals were having trouble getting tested.

We’d hope to see a resumption in the decline of the positive percentage as testing continues to grow, but even with a relatively constant positivity rate, the number of daily confirmed cases must grow as testing expands. There may be several reasons the positivity rate has remained stubbornly near 5% over the past few weeks. One is the obvious reversal in social distancing as states have opened up. People became less fearful about the virus in general, and protesters jammed the streets after the George Floyd murder in Minneapolis. Another reason is that there are new areas of focus for testing that might be picking up cases. For example, hospitals in some states are now testing all admissions for COVID-19. This will tend to pick up more infections to the extent that individuals with co-morbidities are hospitalized at higher rates in general and are also more susceptible to the coronavirus. Finally, testing more broadly is likely to pick up a larger share of asymptomatic cases even as the “true rate” of infection declines.

The daily death toll (CTP) attributed to coronavirus has continued to decline. See below. It is now running at about a third of the peak level it reached in mid-April. There are several reasons for the decline. One is the lower number of active cases, changes in which lead deaths by a few weeks. Awareness and testing capacity have undoubtedly led to earlier diagnosis of the most severe cases. There is also the strong possibility that the virus, having felled some of the most susceptible individuals, is now up against more hosts with effective immune responses. An ongoing degree of social distancing, more humid weather, and more direct sunlight have probably reduced initial viral loads from those experienced early-on, when the case load was escalating. Finally, treatment has improved in multiple ways, and there are now a few medications that have shown promise in shortening the duration and severity of infection.

The course of the pandemic has varied greatly across countries and across regions of the U.S. The New York City area was especially hard hit along with several other large cities, as well as Louisiana. CTS shows that states with the highest cumulative number of coronavirus deaths (New York (blue line), New Jersey (green), Massachusetts, Illinois, and Pennsylvania in the charts below) have experienced downward trends in positive cases per day (the first chart below), leading daily deaths downward in May and early June (the second chart — NY’s downtrend began earlier). I apologize if the charts below are difficult to read, but they have resisted my efforts at resizing. Note: I’m mainly focused on trends here, and I have not shown these series on a per capita basis.

More recently, almost two dozen states have begun to see higher daily case diagnoses. Several of these had more favorable outcomes in the early months of the pandemic and were in more advanced stages of reopening. The charts below (CTS) show results for Arizona, Florida, Georgia, and Texas. The new “hot spots” in these states are mostly urban centers. It’s not clear that the reopenings are to blame, however. The protests after George Floyd’s murder may have contributed in cities like Houston, though no increase in New York is apparent as yet. The states in the chart are all in the south or southwest, so the increases have occurred despite sunny, warm conditions. It’s possible that hot weather has prompted more intensive use of air conditioning, which dries indoor environments and can promote the spread of the virus. These southern states have not yet experienced a corresponding increase in deaths, though that would occur with a lag. 

Missouri has seen an slow upward trend in its daily positive test count over the past four weeks, even though the state’s positive rate has trended down slowly since early May. I show MO’s confirmed cases per day below (in green) together with Illinois’ (because my hometown is on the border and the two states are a nice contrast). IL is much larger and has had a much higher case load, but the downward trend in new cases in IL is impressive. Coronavirus deaths per day are shown in the second chart below, with seven-day averages superimposed. Deaths have also trended down in both states, though MO has experienced a few bad days very recently, and MO’s case fatality rate is slightly higher than in IL.

We’ll know fairly soon whether we’re really headed for a second major wave. However, the case count, in and of itself, is not too informative. Testing has increased markedly, so we would expect to see more cases diagnosed. The percent of tests that are positive is a better indicator, and it has flattened at a still uncomfortable 5% for about a month, with a slight uptick in the past few days. Even more telling will be the future path of coronavirus deaths. My expectation is that more recent infections are likely to be less deadly, if only because of the lessons learned about protecting the care-bound elderly. I also believe we’re not too far from what I have called effective herd immunity. 

The pandemic has taken a heavy toll, especially among the aged. In fact, total deaths in the U.S. have now exceeded both the Hong Kong flu of the late 1960s and the Asian flu of the late 1950s. Unfortunately, risks will remain elevated for some time. However, any reasonable estimate of the life-years lost is considerably less than in those earlier pandemics due to the differing age profiles of the victims. In any case, the coronavirus pandemic has not been the kind of apocalyptic event that was originally feared and erroneously predicted by several prominent epidemiological models. It can be tackled effectively and at much lower cost by focusing resources on protecting vulnerable segments of the population. 

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Trump and Coronavirus

26 Tuesday May 2020

Posted by in Pandemic, Public Health, Risk Management, Stimulus, Trump Administration

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It’s a bit early to fully evaluate President Trump’s performance in dealing with the coronavirus pandemic, but there are a number of criteria on which I might assign marks. I’ll address some of those below, but in so doing I’m reminded of Jerry Garcia’s quip that he was “shopping around for something no one will like.” That might be how this goes. Of course, many of the sub-topics are worthy of lengthier treatment. The focus here is on the pandemic and not more general aspects of his performance in office, though there is some unavoidable overlap.

General “Readiness”

Many have criticized the Trump Administration for not being “ready” for a pandemic. I assign no grade on that basis because absolutely no one was ready, at least not in the West, so there is no sound premise for judgement. I also view the very general charge that Trump did not provide “leadership” as code for either “I don’t like him”, or “he refused to impose more authoritarian measures”, like a full-scale nationwide lockdown. Such is the over-prescriptive instinct of the Left.

Equally misleading is the allegation that Trump had “disbanded” the White House pandemic response team, and I have addressed that here. First, while the NSC would play a coordinating role, pandemic response is supposed to be the CDC’s job, when it isn’t too busy with diseases of social injustice to get it done. Second, it was John Bolton who executed a reorganization at the NSC. There were two high profile departures from the team in question at the time, and one one was a resignation. Most of the team’s staff remained with the NSC with the same duties as before the reirganization.

Finally, there was the matter of a distracting impeachment on false charges. This effort lasted through the first three years of Trump’s administration, finally culminating in January 2020. Perhaps the Administration would have had more time to focus on what was happening in China without the histrionics from the opposition party. So whatever else I might say below, these factors weigh toward leniency in my appraisal of Trump’s handing of the virus.

Messaging: C

As usual, Trump’s messaging during the pandemic was often boorish and inarticulate. His appearances at coronavirus briefings were no exception, often cringeworthy and sometimes featuring misinterpretations of what his team of experts was saying. He was inconsistent in signaling optimism and pessimism, as were many others such as New York Governor Andrew Cuomo and New York City Mayor Bill De Blasio. It shifted from “the virus is about like the flu” in February to a more sober assessment by mid-March. This was, however, quite consistent with the messaging from Dr. Anthony Fauci over the same time frame, as well as the World Health Organization (WHO). Again, no one really knew what to expect, so it’s understandable. A great deal of that can be ascribed to “the fog of war”.

Delegation and Deference: B

Trump cannot be accused of ignoring expert advice through the episode. He was obviously on-board with Fauci, Dr. Deborah Birx, Dr. Robert Redfield, and other health care advisors on the “15 Days to Slow the Spread” guidelines issued on March 16. His messaging wavered during those 15 days, expressing a desire to fully reopen the nation by Easter, which Vice President Michael Pence later described as “aspirational”. Before the end of March, however, Trump went along with a 30-day extension of the guidelines. Finally, by mid-April, the White House released guidelines for “Opening Up America Again“, which was a collaboration between Trump’s health care experts and the economic team. Trump agreed that the timeline for reopening should be governed by “the data”. There is no question, however, that Trump was chomping at the bit for reopening at several stages of this process. I see value in that positioning, as it conveys an intent to reopen asap and that people should have confidence in progress toward that goal.  

International Travel Bans: A

If anyone wonders why the world was so thoroughly blindsided by the coronavirus, look no further than China’s failure to deliver a proper warning as 2019 drew to a close. Wuhan, China was ground zero; the virus spread to the rest of the world with travelers out of Wuhan and other Chinese cities. The White House announced severe restrictions on flights from China on January 31, including a two-week quarantine for returning U.S. citizens. In retrospect, it wasn’t a minute too soon, yet for that precaution, Trump was attacked as a racist by the Left. In early February, WHO actually said travel bans were unnecessary, among other missteps. Other bans were instituted on entry from Iran and Brazil, as well as entry from Europe in early March, as countries around the globe closed their borders. Trump’s actions on incoming travelers were prescient, so I’ll score this one for Trump. Some of these travel restrictions can and should be eased now, and certainly that is expected in coming months, so we’ll see how well that process is managed.

Deference to States: A-

As a federalist, I was pleased that Trump and his team left most of the specifics on closures and bans on public gatherings up to state and local governments. That allowed more targeted mitigation efforts as dictated by local conditions and, to some extent, public opinion. This is a classic case of “laboratory federalism” whereby the most effective policies can be identified, though as we’ve seen, there’s no guarantee less successful states will emulate them. I grade Trump well on this one.

On reopening, too, Trump has been a consistent advocate of allowing flexility where local conditions permit, though he wrongly claimed he had “total authority” over ending social distancing rules. It’s hard to square that remark with his general stand on the issue of autonomy except as a tactic to strong-arm certain governors on other points.   

CDC/FDA Snafus: D

I applaud the Administration for its emphasis on the salutary effects of deregulation, but Trump went along with some major pieces of “expert advice” that were not only poor from regulatory perspective, but an affront to federalism. One was a directive issued by the CDC to delay “all elective surgeries, non-essential medical, surgical, and dental procedures during the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak“. (See my post “Suspending Medical Care in the Name of Public Health“.)

This is exactly the kind of “one size fits all” regulatory policy that has proven so costly, sacrificing not just economic activity but lives and care for the sick, creating avoidable illnesses and complications. The idea was to assure that adequate health care resources were available to treat an onslaught of coronavirus patients, but that was unneeded in most jurisdictions. And while the contagion was in it’s early “exponential” phase at the time, a more nuanced approach could have been adopted to allow different geographic areas and facilities more discretion, especially for different kinds of patients, or perhaps something less than a complete suspension of care. In any case, the extensions into May were excessive. I must grade Trump poorly for allowing this to happen, despite what must have been extreme pressure to follow “expert advice” on the point and the others discussed earlier.

That’s not the only point on which I blame Trump for caving to the CDC. In a case of massive regulatory failure, the CDC and FDA put the U.S. well over a month behind on testing when the first signs of the virus appeared here. Not only did they prohibit private labs and universities from getting testing underway, insisting on exclusive use of the CDC’s own tests, they also distributed faulty tests in early February that took over a month to replace. The FDA also enforced barriers to imported N95-type masks during the pandemic. Trump tends to have a visceral understanding of the calcifying dangers of regulation, but he let the so-called “experts” call the shots here. Big mistake, and Trump shares the blame with these agencies.  

Health Resources: B-

Managing the emergency distribution of PPE and ventilators to states did not go as smoothly as might have been hoped. The shortage itself left FEMA with the unenviable task of allocating quantities that could never satisfy all demands. A few states were thought to have especially acute needs, but there was also an obligation to hold stockpiles against potential requests from other states. In fact, a situation of this kind creates an incentive for states to overstate their real needs, and there are indications that such was the case. Trump sparred with a few governors over these allocations. There is certainly blame to be shared, but I won’t grade Trump down for this.

Vaccines and Treatments: C+

 

The push to develop vaccines might not achieve success soon, if ever, but a huge effort is underway. Trump gets some of the credit for that, as well as the investment in capacity now to produce future vaccine candidates in large quantities. As for treatments, he was very excited about the promise of hydroxychloraquine, going so far as to take it himself with zinc, a combination for which no fully randomized trial results have been reported (the recent study appearing in the Lancet on HCQ taken by itself has been called into question). Trump also committed an unfortunate gaffe when the DHS announced the results of a study showing that sunlight kills coronavirus in a matter of minutes, as do bleach and other disinfectants. Trump mused that perhaps sunlight or some form of disinfectant could be used as a treatment for coronavirus patients. He might have been thinking about an old and controversial practice whereby blood is exposed to UV light and then returned to the body. Later, he said he used the term “disinfectant” sarcastically, but he probably meant to say “euphemistically” …. I’m not sure he knows the difference. In any case, his habit of speculating on such matters is often unhelpful, and he loses points for that.

Fiscal Policy: B

The several phases of the economic stimulus program were a collaboration between the Trump Administration and Congress. A reasonably good summary appears here. The major parts were the $2.3 trillion CARES Act in late March and a nearly $500 billion supplemental package in late April. These packages were unprecedented in size. Major provisions were direct cash payments and the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), which provides loans and grants to small businesses. The execution of both was a bit clunky, especially PPP, which placed a burden on private banks to extend the loans but was sketchy in terms of qualifications. The extension of unemployment compensation left some workers with more benefits than they earned in their former jobs, which could be an impediment to reopening. There were a number of other reasonable measures in these packages and the two smaller bills that preceded them in March. A number of these measures were well-targeted and inventive, such as waiving early withdrawal penalties from IRA and 401(k) balances. The Trump Administration deserves credit for helping to shape these efforts as well as others taken independently by the executive branch. 

Trump’s proposal to suspend payroll taxes did not fly, at least not yet. The idea is to reduce the cost of hiring and increase the return to work, if only temporarily. This is not a particularly appealing idea because so much of the benefits would flow to those who haven’t lost their jobs. It could be improved if targeted at new hires and rehires, however.

Trump’s proposal to grant liability waivers to reopened private businesses is extremely contentious, but one I support. Lockdowns are being eased under the weight of often heavy public and private regulation of conduct. As John Cochrane says in “Get Ready for the Careful Economy“: 

“One worry on regulation is that it will provide a recipe for a wave of lawsuits. That may have been a reason the Administration tried to hold back CDC guidance. A long, expensive, and impractical list of things you must do to reopen is catnip when someone gets sick and wants to blame a business. Show us the records that you wiped down the bathrooms every half hour. A legal system that can sue over talcum powder is not above this.”

Indeed, potential liability might represent a staggering cost to many businesses, one that might not be insurable. Accusations of negligence, true or false, can carry significant legal costs. Customers and employees, not just businesses, must accept some of the burden of risks of doing business. I give Trump good marks for this one, but we’ll see if it goes anywhere.

Some of the proposals for new stimulus legislation from democrats are much worse, including diversity initiatives, massive subsidies for “green” technologies, and bailouts for state and local government for unfunded pension liabilities. None of these has anything to do with the virus. The burden of pension shortfalls in some states should not fall on taxpayers nationwide, but on the states that incurred them. The Trump Administration and congressional Republicans should continue resisting these opportunistic proposals.

The Grade

Without assigning weights to the sub-topics covered above, I’d put the overall grade for Trump and his Administration’s handling of matters during the pandemic at about a B-, thus far. When it comes to politics, it’s often unfair to credit or blame one side for the promulgation of an overall set of policies. Nevertheless, I think it’s fair to say that Trump, could have done much better and could have done much worse. We will learn more with the passage of time, the continued evolution of the virus, the development of treatments or vaccines, and the course of the economy.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Vagaries of Excess Deaths

02 Saturday May 2020

Posted by in Liberty, Pandemic, Tyranny

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The New York Times ran a piece this week suggesting that excess mortality from Covid-19 in the U.S. is, or will be, quite high. The analysis was based on seven “hard hit” states, including three of the top four states in Covid death rate and five of the top ten. Two states in the analysis, New York and New Jersey, together account for over half of all U.S. active cases. This was thinly-veiled cherry picking by the Times, as Jacob Sullum notes in his discussion of what excess mortality does and doesn’t mean. Local and regional impacts of the virus have varied widely, depending on population density, international travel connections, cultural practices, the quality of medical care, and private and public reaction to news of the virus. To suggest that the experience in the rest of the country is likely to bear any similarity to these seven states is complete nonsense. Make no mistake: there have been excess deaths in the U.S. over the past few weeks of available data, but again, not of the magnitude the Times seems to intimate will be coming.

Beyond all that, the Times asserts that the CDC’s all-cause death count as of April 11 is a significant undercount, though the vast majority of deaths are counted within a three week time frame. In fact, CDC data at this link show that U.S. all-cause mortality was at a multi-year low during the first week of April. The author admits, however, that the most recent data is incomplete. The count will rise as reporting catches up, but even an allowance for the likely additions to come would leave the count for the U.S. well below the kinds of levels suggested by the Times‘s fear-mongering article, based as it was on the seven cherry-picked states.

The author of this Twitter thread, John Burn-Murdoch, seems to engage in the same practice with respect to Europe. He shows charts with excess deaths in 12 countries, almost all of which show significant, recent bumps in excess deaths (the sole exception being Denmark). Inexplicably, he excludes Germany and a number of other countries with low excess deaths or even “valleys” of negative excess deaths. His most recent update is a bit more inclusive, however. (It was the source of the chart at the top of this post.) Euromomo is a site that tracks excess mortality in 24 European countries or major regions (non-overlapping), and by my count, 13 of have no or very little excess mortality. And by the way, even this fails to account for a number of other Eastern European nations having low Covid deaths.

Excess mortality is a tricky metric: it cannot be measured with certainty, and almost any measure has conceptual shortcomings. In the case of Covid-19, excess mortality seeks to measure the number of deaths attributable to the virus net of deaths that would have occurred anyway in the absence of the virus. For example, abstracting from some of the details, suppose there are 360 deaths per hundred-thousand of population during the average month of a pandemic. If the “normal” mortality rate is 60 per hundred-thousand, then excess mortality is 300 per month. It can also be expressed as a percentage of the population (0.3% in the example). But that’s just one way to measure it.

In the spirit of Sullum’s article, it’s important to ask what we’re trying to learn from statistics on excess mortality. It’s easy to draw general conclusions if the number of Covid-19 deaths is far in excess of the normal death rate, but that depends on the quality of the data, and any conclusion is subject to limits on its applicability. Covid deaths are not that high in many places. By the same token, if the number of Covid deaths (defined narrowly) is below the normal death rate (measured by an average of prior years), it really conveys little information about whether excess mortality is positive of negative: that depends on the nature of the question. For each of the following I offer admittedly preliminary answers:

  • Are people dying from Covid-19? Of course, virtually everywhere. There is no “normal” death rate here. And while this is the most direct question, it might not be the “best” question.
  • Is Covid-19 causing an increase in respiratory deaths? Yes, in many places, but perhaps not everywhere. Here and below, the answer might depend on the time frame as well.
  • Is Covid-19 increasing deaths from infectious diseases (biological and viral)? Yes, but perhaps not everywhere.
  • Is Covid-19 increasing total deaths from natural causes? Yes, but not everywhere.
  • Is all-cause mortality increasing due to Covid-19? In some places, not others. Accurate global and national numbers are still a long way off.

All-cause mortality is the most “rough and ready” comparison we have, but it includes deaths that have no direct relationship to the disease. For example, traffic fatalities might be down significantly due to social distancing or regulation during a pandemic. Thus, if our purpose is purely epidemiological, traffic fatalities might bias excess mortality downward. On the other hand, delayed medical treatments or personal malaise during a pandemic might lead to higher deaths, creating an upward bias in excess deaths via comparisons based on all-cause mortality.

Do narrow comparisons give a more accurate picture? If we focus only on respiratory deaths then we exclude deaths from other causes and co-morbidities that would have occurred in the absence of the virus. That may create a bias in excess mortality. So narrow comparisons have their drawbacks, depending on our purpose.

That also goes for the length of time over which excess mortality is measured. It can make a big difference. Again, much has been made of the fact that so many victims of Covid-19 have been elderly or already ailing severely before the pandemic. There is no question that some of these deaths would have occurred anyway, which goes to the very point of calculating excess mortality. If the pandemic accelerates death by a matter of weeks or months for a certain percentage of victims, it is reasonable to measure excess mortality over a lengthier period of time, despite the (perhaps) highly valuable time lost by those victims (that being dependent on the decedent’s likely quality of life during the interval).

Conversely, too narrow a window in time can lead to biases that might run in either direction. Yet a cottage industry is busy calculating excess mortality even as we speak with the pandemic still underway. There are many fatalities to come that are excluded by premature calculations of excess mortality. On the other hand, if the peak in deaths is behind us, a narrow window and premature calculation may sharply exaggerate excess mortality.

Narrow measures of excess mortality are affected by the accuracy of cause-of-death statistics. There are always inaccuracies in this data because so many deaths involve multiple co-morbidities, so there is often an arbitrary element in these decisions. For Covid-19, cause-of-death attribution has been extremely problematic. Some cases are easy: those testing positive for the virus, or even its presence immediately after death, and having no other respiratory infections, can fairly be counted as Covid-19 deaths. But apparently just over half of Covid-19 deaths counted by the CDC are “Covid-Only” deaths. A significant share of deaths involve both Covid and the flu, pneumonia, or all three. There are also “probable” Covid-19 deaths now counted without testing. In fact, hospitals and nursing homes are being encouraged to code deaths that way, and there are often strong financial incentives to do so. Many deaths at home, sans autopsy, are now routinely classified as Covid-19 deaths. While I have no doubt there are many Covid deaths of untested individuals both inside or outside of hospitals, there is no question this practice will overcount Covid deaths. Whether you believe that or not, doubts about cause-of-death accuracy is another reason why narrow comparisons can be problematic.

More trustworthy estimates of the coronavirus’ excess mortality will be possible with the passage of time. It’s natural, in the heat of the pandemic, to ask about excess mortality, but such early estimates are subject to tremendous uncertainty. Unfortunately, those calculations are being leveraged and often mis-applied for political purposes. Don’t trust anyone who would use these statistics as a cudgel to deny your Constitutional rights, or otherwise to shame or threaten you.

New York’s Covid experience is not applicable to the country as a whole. Urban mortality statistics are not applicable to areas with lower population densities. Excess mortality for the elderly cannot be used to make broad generalizations about excess mortality for other age groups. And excess mortality at the peak of a pandemic cannot be used to make generalizations about the full course of the pandemic. In the end, I expect Covid-19 excess mortality to be positive, whether calculated by all-cause mortality or more narrow measures. However, it will not be uniform in its impact. Nor will it be of the magnitude we were warned to expect by the early epidemiological models.