Suicides Happen, Guns or Not

20 Monday Jun 2016

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British Coal-Gas Story, Don B. Kates, Gary Mauser, Gun Rights, Guns and Suicide, Harvard, Impulsive Suicide, International Suicide Rates, Mises Institute, Mises Wire, OECD Suicide Comparison, Passion Suicide, Premeditated Suicide, Ryan McMaken, Teenage Suicide

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Gun-rights deniers often assert that access to guns increases the suicide rate, a question recently addressed by Ryan McMaken on the Mises Wire blog. He shows conclusively that suicide rates across countries are not related to gun laws. While gun ownership in the U.S. is extensive, and most gun deaths in the U.S. are suicides, the U.S. suicide rate is in the middle of the pack for OECD countries. Most of those countries have more restrictive gun laws. In fact, the U.S. suicide rate is lower than in Austria, Finland, France, Belgium, and Japan. Gun ownership rates are extremely low in Austria, France, and Japan. Therefore, suicide rates appear to be unrelated to legal gun ownership and the restrictiveness of gun laws. These facts, and simple logic, suggest that an individual in a state of extreme desperation has alternative means of taking their own life.

The most nuanced argument that guns encourage suicides is based on a dichotomy of premeditated suicides versus suicides of impulsivity or passion. Most impulsive suicides, according to this view, are carried out with faster, less painful and more reliable methods, which would include the use of guns. That’s based in part on interviews with suicide survivors and the mental health records of non-survivors. However, it would not be surprising to learn that survivors actually had less intent to begin with; a comparison is impossible because we can’t ask the non-survivors. And whether a mental health record, or the absence of one, is always a reliable guide to the degree of impulsivity is open to question. So while there are differences in the mental health records of firearm suicide victims versus those who have used less reliable methods, the conclusions seem to rest on fairly unreliable measures of impulsivity or on survivor-only samples. Researchers don’t have much choice in the matter, but drawing conclusions based only on survivors is prone to severe bias.

McMaken shows that guns account for most suicides only among those of age 55 and above, a group that is likely to be the least impulsive. Teenagers might be expected to be the most impulsive, but they tend to have lowest rates of suicide by firearms. However, a teen might not have ready access to a gun even if one is in the home. The teenage suicide rate is even less related to gun ownership across countries. New Zealand, Ireland, Finland and Canada come in much higher than the U.S. on this sad measure, and Australia, Japan, Switzerland, Belgium and Sweden are above the U.S.

At the previous link, the “British coal-gas story” is told to argue that cutting off a common means of suicide will lead to a permanent reduction in suicides. In this case, a changeover from coal gas for heating and cooking to natural gas is alleged to have led to a permanent decrease in total suicides in Great Britain in the 1960s, as death by “sticking your head in the oven” was no longer very reliable. However, other research has found compensatory increases in other forms of suicide, so the coal-gas lesson is suspect.

A Harvard study (circa 2007) by criminologists Don B. Kates and Gary Mauser focused on the ties between guns, murder and suicide; they concluded that suicide does not bear a relationship to gun possession. The authors examined cross-country and within-country data:

“There is simply no relationship evident between the extent of suicide and the extent of gun ownership. People do not commit suicide because they have guns available. In the absence of fire‐ arms, people who are inclined to commit suicide kill themselves some other way.”

Suicide is a manifestation of despair so deep that the victim simply cannot get on with life. Guns have nothing to do with that anguish. It may be true that failed attempts often lead to a renewal of spirit, but survivors still have a high rate of suicidal recidivism. Moreover, the question of the depth of the original intent for survivors is open to question. Those choosing guns for suicide might think it’s the best alternative, but clearly other alternatives will be chosen when guns are unavailable. The claim that access to guns makes people more vulnerable to taking their own lives is not supported by the data.

Back To The Restroom

29 Friday Apr 2016

Posted by pnoetx in Discrimination, Federalism, Privacy, Property Rights

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Anti-Discrimination, Arbitrary Discrimination, Charlotte, Gender Registration, Gender-Specific Restrooms, Hormone Replacement Therapy, LGBT Discrimination, Market Self-Regulation, Mises Institute, NC, North Carolina, Property Rights, Restroom Federalism, Roy Cardato, Separation of Bathroom and State, Transgender, Tyler Cowan

I’m following-up on “I’m a Restroom Federalist” by sharing “We Need Separation of Bathroom and State” by Roy Cordato at the Mises Institute. He makes a clean defense of the libertarian view that restrooms choices on private property must not be controlled by government. Any attempt to do so is a violation of private property rights, according to this view. I did not adequately treat the question of property rights in my first “restroom” post. Strong property rights in this context mean that you, a private businessperson, can set the rules for restroom use on your premises, or no rules at all. If you or your customers prefer gender-neutral restrooms in your place of business, so be it. If you believe your customers prefer separate restrooms based on a definition of gender, you can post appropriate signs and face any complaints privately without interference from government.

Many sincere observers hope for a way to fairly accommodate transgender individuals without unduly compromising the rights of others. In my mind, discrimination (or differences in accommodations) should not be tolerated in society if based on arbitrary distinctions. By that I mean the victim differs from the discriminator only in nonessential ways for the purposes at hand. For example, discriminating on the basis of race is wholly arbitrary in almost context. (A director casting the part of an individual of a specific race is a possible exception.) No real harm comes from tolerance and equal treatment in these contexts. I have argued that the market is self-regulating in punishing discrimination. And one can argue that certain freedoms may be violated (association, religion, expression and even property) when even arbitrary forms of discrimination are outlawed, as they are. In these situations, however, laws can work because there is little ambiguity in defining victims of discrimination and the legitimacy of their victimhood.

Is discrimination against transgenders in their restroom options just as arbitrary as it would be against other minorities? That depends upon whether “transgender” can be defined objectively. If it cannot, then denying the bearded lady’s transgender claim in the restroom is not so arbitrary, given the privacy rights of others.

Tyler Cowen discusses some of the complexities of determining whether there should be a legal definition of transgender, or a more “nuanced” definition of gender with three or more categories. That would eliminate any legitimate objections to gender-specific restrooms. However, a legal standard cannot be based solely on “inner feelings”. Aside from genitalia, are there objective facts that can be brought to bear in defining gender? A personal physician’s assessment of “gender intent” is one possibility. An active regimen of hormone replacement therapy is another. However, transgenders themselves might object to any specific definition of gender imposed by government. Many transgenders would prefer to have it remain a matter of self-identity, but it is impossible to clearly define rights on that basis. As Cowen notes, the “most libertarian view is to refuse to offer a legal definition of transgender.” He also adds:

“If we stick with no legal definition of transgender, let’s tackle the remaining problems directly. For instance we could significantly increase the penalties for men who abuse women or young girls in or near women’s rooms, if indeed that is an ongoing problem.“

As I intimated in my earlier post, I am unconvinced that gender-neutral restrooms won’t encourage voyeurism by posers. That implies a conflict between the rights of transgenders and the fundamental right to privacy. Given that fact, Cowen’s suggestion is sensible under any restroom regime. He also cites the existence of voluntary gender registration systems in other countries. Given a clear definition, transgenders choosing to register could use the restroom consistent with their gender identity and would have documented proof if any question arose as to their right to use a particular facility.

Cordato provides a good explanation of the Charlotte anti-discrimination ordinance and North Carolina’s new law striking it down. The Charlotte ordinance stripped owners of business property of their right to set rules for their own restrooms. The state law does several things: It restores the rights of business owners to provide separate restrooms for males and females, which is fine as far as it goes. It also mandates gender separation of multi-occupancy restrooms and locker rooms in government facilities. Truly, it is hard to imagine any good coming of mixing middle-school girls and boys in the same restrooms and locker rooms. However, the state law also prohibits the promulgation of any anti-discrimination law by lower jurisdictions. That seems a bit too sweeping.

Cowan says the North Carolina law is a solution in search of a problem, or worse:

“North Carolina made a mistake in signing the new law. Not just a practical mistake, because of the backlash, but a mistake outright. I’m not aware there was a problem needing to be solved, and yet new problems have been created.“

Maybe so, but the city of Charlotte clearly took a step in violation of private property rights, and one that threatened privacy rights. I stated in my first restroom post that alternative arrangements will be tested socially, at the ballot box, and by the courts. Some object to the strong privacy ethic that exists in the U.S. as prudish, but it is a cultural given, and privacy rights are protected by the Constitution. Given a conflict over rights between two parties, the courts must decide how to balance those interests.That’s as it should be. And so we’re back to the beauty of federalism!

Central Banks Stumble Into Negative Rates, Damn the Savers

01 Tuesday Mar 2016

Posted by pnoetx in Central Planning, Monetary Policy

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Bank of Japan, central planning, Federal Reserve, Helicopter Drop, Income Effect vs. Substitution Effect, Interest Rate Manipulation, Intertemporal Tradeoffs, Malinvestment, Mises Institute, Monetary policy, negative interest rates, NIRP, Printing Money, Privacy Rights, QE, Quantitative Easing, Reach For Yield, regulation, War on Cash, Zero Interest Rate Policy, ZIRP

Dollar Cartoon

Should government actively manipulate asset prices in an effort to “manage ” economic growth? The world’s central bankers, otherwise at their wit’s end, are attempting just that. Hopes have been pinned on so-called quantitative easing (QE), which simply means that central banks like the U.S. Federal Reserve (the Fed) buy assets (government and private bonds) from the public to inject newly “printed” money into the economy. The Fed purchased $4.5 trillion of assets between the last financial crisis and late 2014, when it ended its QE. Other central banks are actively engaged in QE, however, and there are still calls from some quarters for the Fed to resume QE, despite modest but positive economic growth. The goals of QE are to drive asset prices up and interest rates down, ultimately stimulating demand for goods and economic growth. Short-term rates have been near zero in many countries (and in the U.S. until December), and negative short-term interest rates are a reality in the European Union, Japan and Sweden.

Does anyone really have to pay money to lend money, as indicated by a negative interest rate? Yes, if a bank “lends” to the Bank of Japan, for example, by holding reserves there. The BOJ is currently charging banks for the privilege. But does anyone really “earn” negative returns on short-term government or private debt? Not unless you buy a short-term bill and hold it till maturity. Central banks are buying those bills at a premium, usually from member banks, in order to execute QE, and that offsets a negative rate. But the notion is that when these “captive” member banks are penalized for holding reserves, they will be more eager to lend to private borrowers. That may be, but only if there are willing, credit-worthy borrowers; unfortunately, those are scarce.

Thus far, QE and zero or negative rates do not seem to be working effectively, and there are several reasons. First, QE has taken place against a backdrop of increasingly binding regulatory constraints. A private economy simply cannot flourish under such strictures, with or without QE. Moreover, government makes a habit of manipulating investment decisions, partly through regulatory mandates, but also by subsidizing politically-favored activities such as ethanol, wind energy, post-secondary education, and owner-occupied housing. This necessarily comes at the sacrifice of opportunities for physical investment that are superior on economic merits.

The most self-defeating consequence of QE and rate manipulation, be that zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) or negative interest rate policy (NIRP), is the distortion of inter-temporal tradeoffs that guide decisions to save and invest in productive assets. How, and how much, should individuals save when returns on relatively safe assets are very low? Most analysts would conclude that very low rates prompt a strong substitution effect toward consuming more today and less in the future. However, the situation may well engender a strong “income effect”, meaning that more must be saved (and less consumed in the present) in order to provide sufficient resources in the future. The paradox shouldn’t be lost on central bankers, and it may undermine the stimulative effects of ZIRP or NIRP. It might also lead to confusion in the allocation of productive capital, as low rates could create a mirage of viability for unworthy projects. Central bank intervention of this sort is disruptive to the healthy transformation of resources across time.

Savers might hoard cash to avoid a negative return, which would further undermine the efficacy of QE in creating monetary stimulus. This is at the root of central bank efforts to discourage the holding of currency outside of the banking system: the “war on cash“. (Also see here.) This policy is extremely offensive to anyone with a concern for protecting the privacy of individuals from government prying.

Another possible response for savers is to “reach for yield”, allocating more of their funds to high-risk assets than they would ordinarily prefer (e.g., growth funds, junk bonds, various “alternative” investments). So the supply of saving available for adding to the productive base in various sectors is twisted by central bank manipulation of interest rates. The availability of capital may be constrained for relatively safe sectors but available at a relative discount to risky sectors. This leads to classic malinvestment and ultimately business failures, displaced workers, and harsh adjustment costs.

With any luck, the Fed will continue to move away from this misguided path. Zero or negative interest rates imposed by central banks penalize savers by making the saving decision excessively complex and fraught with risk. Business investment is distorted by confusing signals as to risk preference and inflated asset prices. Central economic planning via industrial policy, regulation, and price controls, such as the manipulation of interest rates, always ends badly. Unfortunately, most governments are well-practiced at bungling in all of those areas.

Egalitarian Aggression

15 Thursday Oct 2015

Posted by pnoetx in Big Government, Equality, Liberty

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Comparative advantage, Dylan Matthews, Egalitarianism, Equality of Opportunity, Inequality, Integrity of the Family, John Rawls, Llewellyn Rockwell Jr., Mises Institute, Redistribution, Robert Nisbet, The Mises Daily, Vox, Wilt Chamberlain Problem

In what sense is “equality” a rational objective? Can it ever be achieved without aggression? It’s certainly admirable for individuals to treat all others fairly and without bias against personal traits. A society composed of individuals possessing that kind of integrity is one in which “equal opportunity” exists in an intuitive sense. Such a society would yield market outcomes that are free from personal discrimination.

There are many social pitfalls when central authorities attempt to enforce this sort of equality. There will always be minor and even random cases of treatment that someone considers unfair. Any effort to adjudicate such incidents comes at a great resource cost. The potential for moral hazard in pursuing grievances is also strong, and the enforcement authority may well have biases of its own.

Stronger forms of equality are even more difficult to achieve in a free society. There are many barriers to “equality” that most people would regard as natural, like genetics and the integrity of the family. And like family, many other barriers to equality are cultural virtues, such as educational and occupational rewards based on merit. The institution of strong private property rights provides an effective system of incentives that fosters efficient resource allocation, promoting economic growth and human well-being, but it’s rewards will not be distributed equally.

Institutionalized tampering with any of these features for the sake of equality tends to legitimize envy as a cause of social action. And the intrusions require design and enforcement of a system of social “overrides” by a central authority possessing police power. Needless to say, this must involve elements of aggression and tyranny. These overrides introduce significant risks to individual freedom and the functioning of markets, and are likely to cause widespread destruction of welfare. In that sense, forced equality cannot be a rational objective.

These points are developed more fully in “The Menace of Egalitarianism“, a piece by Llewellyn Rockwell Jr. at the Mises Daily blog.

“A libertarian is perfectly at peace with the universal phenomenon of human difference. He does not wish it away, he does not shake his fist at it, he does not pretend not to notice it. It affords him another opportunity to marvel at a miracle of the market: its ability to incorporate just about anyone into the division of labor. … Indeed the division of labor is based on human difference.“

Rockwell goes on to explain the law of comparative advantage, which allows more productive and less productive individuals to profit by specializing in areas for which each has the lowest opportunity cost. And when producers compete for rewards, as Rockwell notes, average consumers (and rich ones and poor ones) are the ultimate beneficiaries.

Outcomes such as the inequality of wealth and income are not only impossible to avoid, they are natural consequences of economic freedom. Several earlier posts on Sacred Cow Chips have dealt with this topic, and can be viewed from the Home page by typing “inequality” into the search box near the top. For his part, Rockwell discusses the “Wilt Chamberlain” problem, whereby private demand to witness great athletic prowess results in a shift towards an unequal distribution of income:

“… the pattern of wealth distribution is disturbed as soon as anyone engages in any exchange at all. Are we to cancel the results of all these exchanges and return everyone’s money to the original owners? Is Chamberlain to be deprived of the money people freely chose to gave [sic] him in exchange for the entertainment he provided?“

The fact that “equality” is seldom well-defined as an actual objective should be met with skepticism. Here’s more Rockwell:

“It is precisely this lack of clarity that makes the idea of equality so advantageous for the state. No one is entirely sure what the principle of equality commits him to. And keeping up with its ever-changing demands is more difficult still. … Equality is a concept that cannot and will not be kept restrained or nailed down.”

He takes a dismal view of “cultural inequality” and “equality of opportunity” as worthwhile causes for invoking the power of the state. For example, two families in different economic circumstances will generally confer different opportunities to their children. Dylan Matthews at Vox makes the same point in “Equality of Opportunity“, though Matthews’ analysis is weak in several respects. The point here is that there is only so much that can be done to correct for unequal family-related endowments without undermining the integrity of the family (not to mention property rights). This has long been a bone of contention with respect to the design of U.S. welfare programs. But the problem is much deeper:

“In the course of working toward equality, the state expands its power at the expense of other forms of human association, including the family itself. The family has always been the primary obstacle to the egalitarian program. The very fact that parents differ in their knowledge, skill levels, and devotion to their offspring means that children in no two households can ever be raised ‘equally.’

Robert Nisbet, the Columbia University sociologist, openly wondered if [John] Rawls would be honest enough to admit that his system, if followed to its logical conclusion, had to lead to the abolition of the family. ‘I have always found treatment of the family to be an excellent indicator of the degree of zeal and authoritarianism, overt or latent, in a moral philosopher or political theorist,’ Nisbet said.“

And here is Rawls himself expressing doubts, as quoted by Rockwell:

“It seems that when fair opportunity (as it has been defined) is satisfied, the family will lead to unequal chances between individuals. Is the family to be abolished then? Taken by itself and given a certain primacy, the idea of equal opportunity inclines in this direction.“

The quest for “equality” is a creeping force. It infects economic life in a way that makes widespread gains in welfare difficult to achieve, diminishes expectations and fosters social devolution. It also leads to demands for eliminating useful distinctions, which can only be erased though aggression by the state. This forces a convergence toward the least common denominator throughout the culture. I believe the following statement by Rockwell rings true:

“The obsession with equality… undermines every indicator of health we might look for in a civilization. It involves a madness so complete that although it flirts with the destruction of the family…. It leads to the destruction of standards — scholarly, cultural, and behavioral. It is based on assertion rather than evidence, and it attempts to gain ground not through rational argument but by intimidating opponents into silence. There is nothing honorable or admirable about any aspect of the egalitarian program.“

Dismal Implications of Aggregate Analysis

12 Thursday Feb 2015

Posted by pnoetx in Macroeconomics

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Aggregate demand, Aggregation, Collectivism, FEE, Gary Galles, I Pencil, incentives, Interventionism, Keynesians, Leonard Read, Macroeconomics, Mises Institute, Scarcity, Stabilization policy, statism

Economic aggregation is basic to traditional macroeconomic analysis, but it distorts and drastically oversimplifies the enormous number of transactions and the vast network of decision-makers that comprise almost any economic system, especially a market economy. There are some basic problems with aggregating across individuals and markets, but these are typically glossed over in macro-policy analyses. Instead, the focus is on a few key outcomes, such as aggregate spending by sector and saving, masquerading as collective “decisions” amenable to behavioral analysis. In this kind of framework, the government sector occupies an equal place to consumers and business investors. It is usually depicted as a great exogenous demander of goods and services, capable of “stabilizing” demand in the event of underconsumption, for example.

An insightful post by Gary Galles at the Mises blog drives home the inherent distortion involved in the analysis of macro-aggregates: “How Economic Aggregation Hides the Problems of Interventionism“. The problems start with a nearly complete misapplication (if not neglect) of the basic problem of scarcity, as if that problem can be solved via manipulation of aggregate constructs. Galles offers a simple example of the macro distortion of “net taxes,” or aggregate taxes minus government transfer payments. Both taxes and transfers are complicated subjects, and both are subject to negative incentive effects. The net-tax aggregation is of little use, even if some rudimentary supply function is given treatment in a macro model.

By its very nature, aggregate government activity is distorted by the prices at which it is valued relative to market activity, and intervention in markets by government makes market aggregates less useful:

“For example, if government gives a person a 40 percent subsidy for purchasing a good, all we know is that the value of each unit to the buyer exceeded 60 percent of its price. There is no implication that such purchases are worth what was paid, including the subsidy. And in areas in which government produces or utilizes goods directly, as with defense spending, we know almost nothing about what it is worth. Citizens cannot refuse to finance whatever the government chooses to buy, on pain of prison, so no willing transaction reveals what such spending is worth to citizens. And centuries of evidence suggest government provided goods and services are often worth far less than they cost. But such spending is simply counted as worth what it cost in GDP accounts.”

Galles article emphasizes the unintended (and often unpleasant) consequences that are bound to flow from policies rationalized on the basis of aggregate macro variables, since they can tell us little about the impact on individual incentives and repercussions on the ability of markets to solve the problem of scarcity. In fact, the typical Keynesian macro perspective lends itself to slow and steady achievement of the goals of collectivists, but the process is destined to be perverse: more G stabilizes weak aggregate demand, or so the story goes, but as G expands, government entwines itself into the fabric of the economy, and it seldom shrinks. Taxes creep up, dependencies arise, regulation grows and non-productive cronies capture resources bestowed by their public sector enablers. At the same time, the politics of taxes almost ensures tat they grow more slowly that government spending, so that the government must borrow. This absorbs saving that would otherwise be available for productive, private investment. As investment languishes, so does growth in productivity. When economic malaise ultimately appears, we hear the same policy refrain: more G to stabilize aggregate demand! All the way down! Perhaps unemployed dependents are simpler to aggregate.

Aggregation masks the most basic issues in economics. A classic lesson in the complexity of creating even a simple product is told in “I, Pencil“, by Leonard Read. In it, he allows the pencil itself to tell the story of it’s own creation:

“Here is an astounding fact: Neither the worker in the oil field nor the chemist nor the digger of graphite or clay nor any who mans or makes the ships or trains or trucks nor the one who runs the machine that does the knurling on my bit of metal nor the president of the company performs his singular task because he wants me. Each one wants me less, perhaps, than does a child in the first grade. Indeed, there are some among this vast multitude who never saw a pencil nor would they know how to use one. Their motivation is other than me. Perhaps it is something like this: Each of these millions sees that he can thus exchange his tiny know-how for the goods and services he needs or wants. I may or may not be among these items.

There is a fact still more astounding: The absence of a master mind, of anyone dictating or forcibly directing these countless actions which bring me into being. No trace of such a person can be found. Instead, we find the Invisible Hand at work. This is the mystery to which I earlier referred. “

How many individual decisions and transactions are involved, throughout all intermediate and final stages of the process? How many calculations of marginal value and marginal cost are involved, and ultimately how many prices? While the consumer may think only of the simple pencil, it would be a mistake for a would-be “pencil czar” to confine their planning to final pencil transactions. But macro-analysts and policymakers go a giant leap further: they lump all final transactions together, from pencils to pineapples (to say nothing of the heroics involved in calculating “real values”, an issue mentioned by Galles). They essentially ignore the much larger set of decisions and activities that are precedents to the final transactions they aggregate.

Strangling By Stimulus

01 Sunday Feb 2015

Posted by pnoetx in Government

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Austerity, Countercyclical Fiscal Policy, crowding out, Fiscal Stimulus, Growth in government, infrastructure, John Cochrane, Mercatus Center, Mises Institute, regulation, Robert Higgs, Scott Sumner, Sequestration, Timely Targeted Temporary

Will more government spending fix a weak economy? That is certainly a common refrain heard from economists and other pundits, including prominent members of the private business community. The historical record suggests otherwise, however, and there are practical reasons to doubt the efficacy of this sort of “fiscal stimulus.” Some of these are explored in “‘Timely, Targeted and Temporary?’ An Analysis of Government Expansions Over the Past Century“, from the Mercatus Center. In particular, countercyclical spending efforts have violated the “three Ts” often said to be required for successful demand-side policies. These efforts have been systematically late, badly targeted, and have resulted in permanent expansions in the resources absorbed by the government sector.

“Fiscal stimulus efforts going back to the 1930s consistently fail to meet the three Ts objective:

Improper timing. Policymakers have consistently struggled to properly time fiscal stimulus spending. In every postwar recession in the 20th century where stimulus spending was attempted, government spending peaked well after the economy was already in recovery. Policy lags—recognition, decision-making, implementation, and impact—are largely responsible for this fact.

Inefficient targeting. Going back to the New Deal, policymakers have targeted stimulus funds on the basis of politics rather than what delivers the most bang for the taxpayer buck. Further, individual policymakers cannot possess all the collective knowledge required to allocate and direct economic resources in the most efficient and effective manner, as markets do.

Permanent expansion of government. Stimulus funding has almost always led to permanent expansion in the size and scope of government. Indeed, the alleged need for immediate stimulus opens the door for expansions in government that might not have occurred under normal circumstances. On the rare occasions that the increased spending has been temporary, the costs have generally outweighed the benefits.“

As for inefficient targeting, I often hear that our nation’s infrastructural needs clinch the argument for stimulus spending. But those needs should be the focus of long-term planning and addressed on a continuing basis, not in bursts dictated by the state of the business cycle. Good projects should not be neglected in good times or bad, and there is no justification for undertaking a project if is not worthwhile on its merits. If increased spending can stabilize a weak economy, government should simply do something it does well: write checks. Who does infrastructure spending help in those bad times? It certainly fails to address the basic human needs left unmet in a weak economic environment; it may or may not add high-paying construction jobs. (An aside: in the last recession, the stimulus program didn’t so much add construction jobs as it did accelerate certain “shovel-ready” projects.)

Proponents of government stimulus always have a culprit in mind for the economy’s ills: weak demand or under-consumption. They say government can lead the way out with more spending. This post on Sacred Cow Chips, “Keynesian Bull Chips“, disputes this point of view and provides some links on the topic, including this post by John Cochrane that is now ungated on his blog. Stimulus efforts are usually billed as temporary but rarely are. The expanded budgets always seem to remain expanded, and government absorbs an increasing share of the nation’s spending. Meanwhile, the value of government’s contribution to output is overstated, since most of the output is not subject to a market test or valuation.

The growth of government increasingly burdens private sector. Apart from tax distortions, the resources available to the private sector are gradually crowded and squeezed by the growth of public spending. Private investment is curtailed as government deficits absorb a growing share of private saving. Increasingly detailed regulation diminishes the private sector’s productivity. Robert Higgs at the Mises Institute asks: “How Much Longer Can the U.S. Economy Bear the Burdens?” That’s a very good question.

The opposite of expansionary fiscal policy is fiscal austerity: lower spending, and lower deficits. The budget sequester, originally passed in 2011, is a good example. Keynesians typically contend that austerity will weaken the economy, but the evidence often suggests the contrary. Here is a Scott Sumner post on that point. For robust economic growth, cut spending broadly, cut taxes, and deregulate.