Tag Archives: Tax Burden

A Tax On Imports Takes a Toll on Exports

10 Friday Oct 2025

Posted by in Free Trade, Tariffs

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Tariffs have far-reaching effects that strike some as counter-intuitive, but they are real forces nevertheless. Much like any selective excise tax, tariffs reduce the quantity demanded of the taxed good; buyers (importers) pay more, but sellers of the good (foreign exporters) extract less revenue. Suppose those sellers happen to be the primary buyers of what you produce. Because they have less to spend, you also will earn less revenue.

The Lerner Effect

The imposition of tariffs by the U.S. means that foreigners have fewer dollars to spend on exports from the U.S. (as well as fewer dollars to invest in the U.S. assets like Treasury bonds, stocks, and physical capital). That much is true without any change in the exchange rate. However, lower imports also imply a stronger dollar, further eroding the ability of foreigners to purchase U.S. exports.

The implications of the import tariff for U.S. exports may be even more starkly negative. Scott Sumner discusses an economic principle called Lerner Symmetry: a tax on imports can be the exact equivalent of a tax on exports! That’s because two-directional trade flows rely on two-directional flows of income.

Note that this has nothing to do with foreign retaliation against U.S. trade policy, although that will also hurt U.S. exporters. Nor is it a consequence of the very real cost increase that tariffs impose on U.S. export manufacturers who require foreign inputs. That’s a separate issue. Lerner Symmetry is simply part of the mechanics of trade flows in response to a one-sided tariff shock.

Assumptions For Lerner Symmetry

Scott Sumner enumerated certain conditions that must be in place for full Lerner Symmetry. While they might seem strict, the Lerner effect is nevertheless powerful under relaxed assumptions (though somewhat weaker than full Lerner Symmetry).

As Sumner puts it, while full Lerner Symmetry requires perfect competition, nearly all markets are “workably competitive”. In the longer-run, assumptions of price flexibility and full employment are anything but outlandish. Complete non-retaliation is an unrealistic assumption, given the breadth and scale of the Trump tariffs. Some countries will retaliate, but not all, and it is certainly not in their best interests to do so. The assumption of balanced trade is one and the same as the assumption of no capital flows; a departure from these “two” assumptions weakens the symmetry between tariffs and export taxes because a reduction in capital flows takes up some of the slack from lower revenue earned by foreign producers.

Trump Tariff Impacts

So here we are, after large hikes in tariffs and perhaps more on the way. Or perhaps more exceptions will be carved out for favored supplicants in return for concessions of one kind or another. All that is economically and ethically foul.

But how are imports and exports faring? Here I’ll quote the Yale Budget Lab’s (YBL) September 26th report on tariffs, which includes the chart shown at the top of this post:

“Consumers face an overall average effective tariff rate of 17.9%, the highest since 1934. After consumption shifts, the average tariff rate will be 16.7%, the highest since 1936. …

The post-substitution price increase settles at 1.4%, a $1,900 loss per household.“

The “post-substitution” modifier refers to the fact that price increases caused by tariffs would be somewhat larger but for consumers’ attempts to find lower-priced domestic substitutes. Suppose the PCE deflator ends 2025 with a 2.8% annual increase. The YBL’s price estimate implies that absent the Trump tariffs, the PCE would have increased 1.4%. If that seems small to you (and the tariff effect seems large to you), recall that monetary policy has been and remains moderately restrictive, so we might have expected some tapering in the PCE without tariffs.

We also know that the early effects of the tariffs have been dominated by thinner margins earned by businesses on imported goods. Those firms have been swallowing a large portion of the tariff burden, but they will increasingly attempt to pass the added costs into prices.

But back to the main topic … what about exports? Unfortunately, the data is subject to lags and revisions, so it’s too early to say much. However, we know exports won’t decline as much as imports, given the lack of complete Lerner symmetry. YBL predicts a drop in exports of 14%, but that includes retaliatory effects. In August the WTO predicted only about a 4% decline, which would be about half the decline in imports.

Seeking Compensatory Rents

More telling perhaps, and it may or may not be a better indicator of the Lerner effect, is the clamoring for relief by American farmers who face diminished export opportunities. As Tyler Cowen says, “Lerner Symmetry Bites”. Other industries will feel the pinch, but many are likely preoccupied with the more immediate problem of increases in the direct cost of imported materials and components.

The farm lobby is certainly on its toes. The Trump Administration is now asking U.S. taxpayers to subsidize soybean producers to the tune of $15 billion. Those exporting farmers are undoubtedly victimized by tariffs. But so much for deficit reduction! More from Cowen:

“Using tariff revenue to subsidize the losses of exporters is a textbook illustration of Lerner Symmetry because the export losses flow directly from the tax on imports! The irony is that President Trump parades the subsidies as a victory while in fact they are simply damage control for a policy he created.“

A List of Harms

Tariffs are as distortionary as any other selective excise tax. They restrict choice and penalize domestic consumers and businesses, whose judgement of cost and quality happen to favor goods from abroad. Tariffs create cost and price pressures in some industries that both erode profit margins and reduce real incomes. For consumers, a tariff is a regressive tax, harming the poor disproportionately.

Tariffs also diminish foreign flows of capital to the U.S., slowing the long-term growth of the economy as well as productivity growth and real wages. And the Lerner effect implies that tariffs harm U.S. exporters by reducing the dollars available to foreigners for purchasing goods from the U.S. In these several ways, Americans are made worse off by tariffs.

We now see attempts to cover for the damage done by tariffs by subsidizing the victims. A “tariff dividend” to consumers? Subsidies to exporters harmed by the Lerner effect? In both cases, we would forego the opportunity to pay down the bloated public debt. Thus, the American taxpayer will be penalized as well.

Fiscal Foolishness a Costly Salve For Midterm Jitters

05 Friday Aug 2022

Posted by in Fiscal policy, Inflation

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The “Inflation Reduction Act” (IRA) is about as fatuous a name for pork-barrel spending and taxes as its proponents could have dreamt up! But that’s the preposterous appellation given to the reconciliation bill congressional Democrats hope to approve. Are we to believe that Congress suddenly recognizes the inflationary effects of governments deficits? Well, the trouble is the projected revenue enhancements (taxes) and cost savings are heavily backloaded. It’s mostly spending up front, which is exactly how we got to this point. There are a number of provisions intended to increase domestic energy production in the hope of easing cost-push, supply-side price pressures. However, provisions relating to fossil fuel production are dependent on green energy projects in the same locales. So, even if we get more oil, we’ll still be pissing away resources on wind and solar technologies that will never be reliable sources of power. Even worse, the tax provisions in the bill will have burdens falling heavily on wage earners, despite the Administration’s pretensions of taxing only rich corporations and their shareholders.

The Numbers

The IRA (itself an irritating acronym) would add $433 billion of new federal outlays through 2031 (*investments*, because seemingly every federal outlay is an “investment” these days). At least that’s the deal that Chuck Schumer and Joe Manchin agreed to. As the table below shows, these outlays are mostly for climate initiatives, but the figure includes almost $70 billion of extended Obamacare subsidies. There is almost $740 billion of revenue enhancements, which are weighted toward the latter half of the ten-year budget window.

The deal reduces the federal budget deficit by about $300 billion over ten years, but that takes a while… somewhat larger deficits are projected through 2026. I should note that the Congressional Budget Office has issued a new score this week that puts the savings at a much lower $102 billion. However, that “new” score does not reflect the changes demanded by Kyrsten Sinema (R-AZ).

Spending

Budget projections are usually dependent on assumptions about the duration of various measures, among many other things like economic growth. For example, the increased Obamacare subsidies are an extension, and the scoring assumes they end in 2026. It’s hard to believe they won’t be extended again when the time comes. Over ten years, that would cut the deficit reduction roughly in half.

The bill is laden with green energy subsidies intended to reduce CO2 emissions. They will accomplish little in that respect, but what the subsidies will do is enrich well-healed cronies while reducing the stability of the electric grid. Tax credits for electric vehicles will be utilized primarily by wealthier individuals, though there are tax credits for energy-efficient appliances and the like, which might benefit a broader slice of the population. And while there are a few provisions that might address supplies of fossil fuels and investment in nuclear energy, these are but a sop to Joe Manchin and misdirection against critics of Joe Biden’s disastrous energy policies.

Revenue

Should we be impressed that the Democrats have proposed a bill that raises revenue more than spending? For their part, the Democrats insist that the bill will impose no new taxes on those with taxable incomes less than $400,000. That’s unlikely, as explained below. As a matter of macroeconomic stability, with the economy teetering on the edge of recession, it’s probably not a great time to raise taxes on anyone. However, Keynesians could say the same thing about my preferred approach to deficit reduction: cutting spending! So I won’t press that point too much. However, the tax provisions in the IRA are damaging not so much because they depress demand, but because they distort economic incentives. Let’s consider the three major tax components:

1. IRS enforcement: this would provide about $80 billion in extra IRS funding over 10 years. It is expected to result in a substantial number of additional IRS tax audits (placed as high as 1.2 million). Democrats assert that it will raise an additional $400 billion, but the CBO says it’s likely to be much lower($124 billion). This will certainly ensnare a large number of taxpayers earning less than $400,000 and impose substantial compliance costs on individuals and businesses. A simplified tax code would obviate much of this wasteful activity, but our elected representatives can’t seem to find their way to that obvious solution. In any case, pardon my suspicions that this increase in funding to enforce a Byzantine tax code might be used to weaponize the IRS against parties harboring disfavored political positions. Shades of Lois Lerner!

2. Carried Interest: Oops! Apparently the Democrat leadership just bought off Kyrsten Sinema by eliminating this provision and replacing it with another awful tax…. See #3 below. The next paragraph briefly discusses what the tax change for carried interest would have entailed:

The original bill sought to end the favorable tax treatment of “carried interest”, which is earned by private equity managers but is akin to the “sweat equity” earned by anyone making a contribution to the value of an investment without actually contributing a proportionate amount of capital. I’ve written about this before here. Carried interest income is taxed at the long-term capital gains tax rate, which is usually lower than tax rates on ordinary income. This treatment is really the same as for any partnership that allocates gains to partners, but populist rhetoric has it that it is used exclusively by nasty private equity managers. Changing this treatment for private equity firms would represent gross discrimination against firms that make a valuable contribution to the market for the ownership control of business enterprises, which helps to discipline the management of resources in the private sector.

3. Tax on Corporate Stock Buy-Backs: it’s not uncommon for firms to use cash they’ve generated from operations to repurchase shares of stock issued in past. Unaccountably, Democrats regard this as a “wasteful” activity designed to unfairly enrich shareholders. However, it is a perfectly legitimate way for firms to return capital to owners. The tax would create an incentive for managers to choose less efficient alternatives for the use of excess funds. In any case, the unrestricted freedom of owners to empower managers to repurchase shares is a fundamental property right.

A tax on corporate stock buybacks can result in the triple taxation of corporate profits. Profits are taxed at the firm level, and if the firm uses after-tax profits to repurchases shares, then the profits are taxed again, and further, any gain to shareholders would be subject to capital gains tax. This is one more violation of the old principle that income should be taxed once and only once.

The proposed excise tax on buy-backs now added to the IRA is *expected* to raise more revenue than the carried interest revision would have, but adjustments to behavior have a way of stymying expectations. Research has demonstrated that firms who buy back their shares often outperform their peers. But again, there are always politicians who wish to create more frictions in capital markets because firms and investors are easy political marks, and because these politocos do not understand the key role of capital markets in allocating resources efficiently between uses and across time.

4. Corporate taxes: Imposing a minimum tax rate of 15% on corporate book income above $1 billion is a highly controversial part of the IRA. While supporters contend that the burden would fall only on wealthy shareholders, in fact the burden would be heavily distributed across lower income ranges. First, a great many working people are corporate shareholders through their individual or employer-sponsored savings plans. Second, corporate employees shoulder a large percentage of the burden of corporate taxes via reduced wages and benefits. Here’s Brad Polumbo on the incidence of the corporate tax burden:

“William C. Randolph of the Congressional Budget Office found that for every dollar raised by the corporate tax, approximately 70 cents comes out of workers’ wages. Further confirming this finding, research from the Kansas City Federal Reserve concluded that a 10% increase in corporate taxes reduces wages by 7%.”

This again demonstrates the dishonesty of claims that no one with an income below $400,000 will be taxed under the IRA. In addition, almost 50% of the revenue from this minimum tax will come from the manufacturing sector:

As Eric Boehm states at the last link, “So much for improving American manufacturers’ competitiveness!” Incidentally, it’s estimated that the bill would cause differential increases in the effective corporate tax on investments in equipment, structures, and inventories. This is not exactly a prescription for deepening the stock of capital or for insulating the American economy from supply shocks!

5. Medicare Drug Prices: A final source of deficit reduction is the de facto imposition of price controls on certain prescription drugs under Medicare Part D. A small amount of savings to the government are claimed to begin in 2023. However, the rules under which this will be administered probably won’t be established for some time, so the savings may well be exaggerated. It’s unclear when the so-called “negotiations” with drug companies will begin, but they will take place under the threat of massive fines for failing to agree to CMS’s terms. And as with any price control, it’s likely to impinge on supply — the availability of drugs to seniors, and it is questionable whether seniors will reap any savings on drugs that will remain available.

Do Words Have No Meaning?

The IRA’s vaunted anti-inflationary effects are a pipe dream. A Wharton Study found that the reduction in inflation would be minuscule:

“We estimate that the Inflation Reduction Act will produce a very small increase in inflation for the first few years, up to 0.05 percent points in 2024. We estimate a 0.25 percentage point fall in the PCE price index by the late 2020s. These point estimates, however, are not statistically different than zero, thereby indicating a very low level of confidence that the legislation will have any impact on inflation.”

Over 230 economists have weighed in on the poor prospects that the IRA will achieve what its name suggests. And let’s face it: not even the general public has any confidence that the IRA will actually reduce inflation:

Conclusion

The Inflation Reduction Act is a destructive piece of legislation and rather galling in its many pretenses. I’m all for deficit reduction, but the key to doing so is to cut the growth in spending! Reducing the government’s coerced absorption of resources relative to the size of the economy prevents “crowding out” of private, voluntary, market-tested activity. It also prevents the need for greater tax distortions that undermine economic performance.

The federal government has played host to huge pandemic relief bills over the past two years. Then we have Joe Biden’s move to forgive student debt, a benefit flowing largely to higher income individuals having accumulated debt while in graduate programs. And then, Congress passed a bill to subsidize chip manufacturers who were already investing heavily in domestic production facilities. All the while, the Biden Administration was doing everything in its power to destroy the fossil fuel industry. So now, Democrats hope to follow-up on all that with a bill stuffed with rewards for cronies in the form of renewable energy subsidies, financed largely on the backs of the same individuals who they’ve sworn they won’t tax! The dishonesty is breathtaking! This crowd is so eager to do anything before the midterm elections that they’ll shoot for the nation’s feet!

The House GOP Tax Plan’s Disparate Treatment of Income Sources

09 Thursday Nov 2017

Posted by in Taxes

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Update: In writing the following post, I neglected to devote sufficient attention to the rules that would govern taxation of pass-through income under the House GOP tax plan. Those rules significantly alter some of the conclusions below. Those rules are discussed in a later post: Stumbling Through Pass-Through Tax Reform.

Double taxation of corporate income is a feature of the U.S. income tax code that is partially addressed in the tax reform bill proposed by the House GOP. Corporate income is taxed to the firm and again to owners on their receipt of dividends or when a company’s growth results in capital gains. Ultimately, the total rate of taxation matters more than whether it is implemented as single or double taxation of income flows. However, there is an unfortunate tendency to view corporate taxes as if they are levied on entitites wholly separate from their owners, so double taxation carries a stench of politically sneakiness. It also creates multiple distortions in the decisions of investors and the separately managed firms they own.

Non-corporate income taxation is reduced by the House plan even more substantially than the cut in taxes on corporate-derived income. However, the plan does not reduce taxes on high-earning professionals, many of whom are situated similarly to successful business owners and investors from an economic perspective.

Tax Burdens and Distortions

The federal corporate tax is not borne 100% by shareholders, as discussed in the previous post on Sacred Cow Chips. Some part of the burden is borne by labor via reduced wages. It is difficult to correct for this distortion in terms of calculating an effective marginal tax rate on corporate income. For example, suppose a new 35% tax would reduce corporate income from $100 to $65. The firm finds, however, that it can reduce wage payments by half of the expected tax payment, or $17.50. The firm would now earn $117.50 before tax and $76.38 after tax. Relative to the new level of pre-tax income, the tax rate is still 35%. It is no less than that by way of the reduction in wages, though the impact on the firm’s pre-tax income is mitigated.

The discussion here of tax rates, and even double taxation, is not intended as commentary on tax fairness. It might or might not be fair that the burden of the tax is shared with labor. Instead, the issue is the magnitude of the economic distortions caused by taxes. Tax rates themselves are a reasonable starting point for such a discussion, and they are easy to measure. Lower tax rates beget fewer distortions in economic outcomes than high tax rates. Low rates provide greater incentives to save and invest in productive assets, which enhances labor productivity, wages, and economic growth. Indeed, businesses go to great lengths to avoid taxes altogether, if possible, but typically those are non-productive uses of resources, which demonstrates the very distortions at issue.

Current and Proposed Marginal Tax Rates

Under current law, the top personal income tax rate on dividends is 20%. It is 23.8% if we include the Obamacare surtax. Adding that to the corporate rate yields the effective top tax rate paid by shareholders: 23.8% + 35% = 58.8%. The GOP bill does not alter the 23.8% top rate on dividends or capitals gains. By virtue of the corporate tax reduction, however, the plan would reduce the overall top rate on shareholders to 23.8% + 20% = 43.8%.

The income earned by investors in pass-through entities like proprietorships, partnerships and S-corporations is taxed as personal income under current law at rates ranging from 15% to 39.6% (43.4% at the top, including the surtax). Thus, under present law, the owner of a pass-through company is taxed less heavily at the top rate than the owner of a public company (43.4% vs. 58.8%). (I am ignoring the 15.3% FICA payroll tax owed by self-emloyed individuals in proprietorships or partnerships on incomes up to $127,200, and 2.9% above that level. The combined tax rates would be almost equal even if we include the FICA tax.)

The tax on pass-through business income would be reduced under the GOP bill via a cap of 25% on federal business income taxes. Presumably, this cap would nullify the House plan’s “bubble tax” of 6% on personal income between $1.2 million and $1.6 million of income, as well as the Obamacare surtax. Thus, the tax advantage for pass-through entities over corporations would be somewhat wider under the House plan than under current law (25% vs. 43.4%). (The FICA tax on owners of proprietorships and partnerships would not quite equalize the overall marginal tax rates over a certain income range.)

In addition, the House plan rewards the owners of pass-through businesses relative to individuals earning high levels of wage and salary income. If anything, the bill would penalize these individuals. For example, while the owner of a high-earning pass-through would face a 25% tax rate, a high-earning professional or corporate employee would pay the top marginal rate (39.6%) plus the surtax (3.8%) and possibly the bubble tax (6%). This is one reason why Scott Sumner says it looks as if the House plan was designed by Bernie Sanders!

The Upshot

The tax system should be neutral across different sources of income. Divergent effective tax rates on owners of corporations, pass-throughs, and high wage-earning individuals is undesirable and introduces arbitrary elements into private decision-making. If anything, the House GOP tax plan exacerbates those differences. By cutting marginal tax rates, it would reduce the magnitude of business tax distortions both for corporate and pass-through organizations and their owners, but the relative advantage of pass-throughs would increase relative to corporations, and owners of corporations and pass-throughs benefit relative to high-earning individuals. Let’s hope this is fixed as the bill evolves, but more balanced reductions in rates would require higher rates on business owners than contemplated in the current plan.

Labor Shares the Burden of the Corporate Income Tax

03 Friday Nov 2017

Posted by in Taxes

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As expected, a reduction of the corporate income tax rate from 35% to 20% is included in the GOP’s tax reform bill, a summary of which was released today. That rate cut would be a welcome development for workers, consumers, and corporate shareholders. It should be no surprise that the burden of the U.S. corporate income tax is not borne exclusively by owners of capital. In fact, it might hurt workers and consumers substantially while imposing relatively little burden on shareholders.

John Cochrane’s post on the incidence of the tax on corporate income is very interesting, though by turns it rambles and may be too technical for some tastes. He notes that the incidence of the corporate tax can fall on only three different groups: shareholders, workers and customers:

“As an accounting matter, every cent [of taxes] corporations pay comes from higher prices, lower wages, or lower payments to shareholders. The only question is which one.“

Cochrane quotes Lawrence Summers and Paul Krugman, both of whom are of the belief that the incidence of the corporate tax must fall primarily on capital and not on labor. That’s consistent with their view that a reduction in corporate taxes amounts to a gift to shareholders. But Cochrane isn’t at all convinced:

“The usual principle is that he or she bears the burden who can’t get out of the way. So, how much room do companies, as a whole, have to raise prices, lower wages, lower interest payments, or lower dividends?”

In fact, owners of capital can get out of the way. Capital is very mobile relative to labor. Here’s a counterfactual exercise Cochrane steps through in order to illustrate the implications of ownership bearing the incidence of the tax: if equity markets are efficient, share prices reflect all available information about the firm. If wages and product prices are unchanged after the imposition of the tax, then shareholders would suffer an immediate loss. Once the tax is discounted into share prices, there would be no further impact on current or future shareholders. Thus, future buyers of shares would escape the tax burden entirely. As a first approximation, the share price must fall to the point at which the ongoing return on the stock is restored to its value prior to imposition of the tax.

Cochrane notes that evidence on the reaction of stock prices to corporate tax changes is mixed at best, which implies that the incidence of corporate taxation falls more weakly on shareholders than many believe. That leaves consumers or workers to bear a significant part of the burden. Workers and consumers are mostly one and the same: economy-wide, higher prices mean lower real wages; lower wages also mean lower real wages. So I’ll continue to speak as if the incidence of the tax falls on either labor or capital, and we can leave aside consumers as a separate category. Cochrane says:

“It used to be thought that it was easy to lower payments to shareholders — ‘the supply of savings is inelastic’ — so that’s where the tax would come from. The newer consensus is that companies as a whole have very little power to pay less to investors, … so the corporate tax comes from lower wages or, equivalently, higher prices. Then, indirectly, reducing the corporate tax would increase capital, which would result in higher wages.”

Cochrane’s post and another on his blog were prompted by an earlier piece by Greg Mankiw showing that real wages, in an open economy, will have a strong negative response to a corporate tax increase. Here is the reasoning: the tax reduces the return earned from invested capital in the short run. Ideally, capital is deployed only up to the point at which its return no longer exceeds the opportunity cost needed to attract it. Given time to adjust, less capital must be deployed after the imposition of the tax in order to force the return on a marginal unit of capital back up to the given opportunity cost. That means less capital deployed per worker, and that, in turn, reduces labor productivity and wages.

Another issue addressed by Cochrane has to do with assertions that monopoly power in the corporate sector is a good rationale for a high tax on corporate income. You can easily convince me that the “average” firm in the corporate sector earns a positive margin over marginal cost. However, a microeconomic analysis of monopoly behavior by the entire corporate sector would be awkward, to say the least. Despite all that, Cochrane notes that monopolists have more power than firms in competitive sectors to raise prices, and monopsonists have more power to reduce wages. Therefore, the “tax the monopolists” line of argument does not suggest that labor will avoid a significant burden of a corporate tax. A safer bet is that firms in the U.S. corporate sector are price-takers in capital markets, but to some degree may be price-makers in product and labor markets.

Cochrane also emphasizes the inefficiency of the corporate tax as a redistributional mechanism, even if shareholders bear a significant share of its burden. It is still likely to harm workers via lost productivity, as discussed above. It is also true that many workers hold corporate equities in their retirement funds, so a corporate tax harms them directly in their dual role as owners of capital.

The cut in the corporate tax rate is but one element of many in the GOP bill, but a related provision is that so-called “pass-through” income, of the type earned via many privately-owned businesses, would be taxed at a maximum rate of 25%. These businesses generate more income than C-corporations. Currently, pass-through income is taxed as ordinary income, so capping the top rate at 25% represents a very large tax cut. As Alex Tabarrok points out at the last link, tax treatment should be neutral with respect to the form of business organization, but under the GOP bill, the effective gap between the top rate for pass-throughs versus corporate income would be even larger than it is now.

Critics of a reduction in corporate taxes should bear in mind that its incidence falls at least partly on labor, perhaps mainly on labor. The U.S. has the highest corporate tax rate in the industrialized world. That undermines U.S. competitiveness, as does the complexity of corporate tax rules. Tax planning and compliance burn up massive resources while drastically reducing the tax “take”, i.e., the revenue actually collected. The corporate income tax is something of a “show” tax that exists to appease populist and leftist elements in the electorate who consistently fail to recognize the unexpectedly nasty consequences of their own advocacy.

 

A Trump Tax Reform Tally

03 Wednesday May 2017

Posted by in Big Government, Taxes, Trump Administration

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IMG_4199

The Trump tax plan has some very good elements and several that I dislike strongly. For reference, this link includes the contents of an “interpretation” of the proposal from Goldman Sachs, based on the one-page summary presented by the Administration last week as well as insights that the investment bank might have gleaned from its connections within the administration. At the link, click on the chart for an excellent summary of the plan relative to current law and other proposals.

At the outset, I should state that most members of the media do not understand economics, tax burdens, or the dynamic effects of taxes on economic activity. First, they seem to forget that in the first instance, taxpayers do not serve at the pleasure of the government. It is their money! Second, Don Boudreaux’s recent note on the media’s “taxing” ignorance is instructive:

“In recent days I have … heard and read several media reports on Trump’s tax plan…. Nearly all of these reports are juvenile: changes in tax rates are evaluated by the media according to changes in the legal tax liabilities of various groups of people. For example, Trump’s proposal to cut the top federal personal income-tax rate from 39.6% to 35% is assessed only by its effect on high-income earners. Specifically, of course, it’s portrayed as a ‘gift’ to high-income earners.

… taxation is not simply a slicing up of an economic pie the size of which is independent of the details of the system of taxation. The core economic case for tax cuts is that they reduce the obstacles to creative and productive activities.“

Boudreaux ridicules those who reject this “supply-side” rationale, despite its fundamental and well-established nature. Thomas Sowell makes the distinction between tax rates and tax revenues, and provides some history on tax rate reductions and particularly “tax cuts for the rich“:

“… higher-income taxpayers paid more — repeat, MORE tax revenues into the federal treasury under the lower tax rates than they had under the previous higher tax rates. … That happened not only during the Reagan administration, but also during the Coolidge administration and the Kennedy administration before Reagan, and under the G.W. Bush administration after Reagan. All these administrations cut tax rates and received higher tax revenues than before.

More than that, ‘the rich’ not only paid higher total tax revenues after the so-called ‘tax cuts for the rich,’ they also paid a higher percentage of all tax revenues afterwards. Data on this can be found in a number of places …“

In some cases, a proportion of the increased revenue may have been due to short-term incentives for asset sales in the wake of tax rate reductions. In general, however, Sowell’s point stands.

Kevin Williamson offers thoughts that could be construed as exactly the sort of thing about which Boudreaux is critical:

“It is nearly impossible to cut federal income taxes in a way that primarily benefits low-income Americans, because high-income Americans pay most of the federal income taxes. … The 2.4 percent of households with incomes in excess of $250,000 a year pay about half of all federal income taxes; the bottom half pays about 3 percent.”

The first sentence of that quote highlights the obvious storyline pounced upon by simple-minded journalists, and it also emphasizes the failing political appeal of tax cuts when a decreasing share of the population actually pays taxes. After all, there is some participatory value in spreading the tax burden in a democracy. I believe Williamson is well aware of the second-order, dynamic consequences of tax cuts that spread benefits more broadly, but he is also troubled by the fact that significant spending cuts are not on the immediate agenda: the real resource cost of government will continue unabated. We cannot count on that from Trump, and that should not be a big surprise. Greater accumulation of debt is a certainty without meaningful future reductions in the growth rate of spending.

Here are my thoughts on the specific elements contained in the proposal, as non-specific as they might be:

What I like about the proposal:

  • Lower tax rate on corporate income (less double-taxation): The U.S. has the highest corporate tax rates in the developed world, and the corporate income tax represents double-taxation of income: it is taxed at the corporate level and again at the individual level, perhaps not all at once, but when it is actually received by owners.
  • Adoption of a territorial tax system on corporate income: The U.S. has a punishing system of taxing corporate income wherever it is earned, unlike most of our trading parters. It’s high time we shifted to taxing only the corporate income that is earned in the U.S., which should discourage the practice of tax inversion, whereby firms transfer their legal domicile overseas.
  • No Border Adjustment Tax (BAT): What a relief! This was essentially the application of taxes on imports but tax-free exports. Whatever populist/nationalist appeal this might have had would have quickly evaporated with higher import prices and the crushing blow to import-dependent businesses. Let’s hope it doesn’t come back in congressional negotiations.
  • Lower individual tax rates: I like it.
  • Fewer tax brackets: Simplification, and somewhat lower compliance costs.
  • Fewer deductions from personal income, a broader tax base, and lower compliance costs. Scrapping deductions for state and local taxes in exchange for lower rates will end federal tax subsidies from low-tax to high-tax states.
  • Elimination of the Alternative Minimum Tax: This tax can be rather punitive and it is a nasty compliance cost-causer.

What I dislike about the proposal:

  • The corporate tax rate should be zero (with no double taxation).
  • Taxation of cash held abroad, an effort to encourage repatriation of the cash for reinvestment in the U.S. Taxes on capital of any kind are an act of repeated taxation, as the income used to accumulate capital is taxed to begin with. And such taxes are destructive of capital, which represents a fundamental engine for productivity and economic growth.
  • Retains the mortgage interest and charitable deductions: Both are based on special interest politics. The former leads to an overallocation of resources to owner-occupied housing. Certainly the latter has redeeming virtues, but it subsidizes activities conferring unique benefits to large donors.
  • Increase in the standard deduction: This means fewer “interested” taxpayers. See the  discussion of the Kevin Williamson article above.
  • We should have just one personal income tax bracket, not three: A flat tax would be simpler and would reduce distortions to productive incentives.
  • Tax relief for child-care costs: More special interest politics. Subsidizing market income relative to home activity, hired child care relative to parental care, and fertility is not an appropriate role for government. To the extent that public aid payments are made, they should not be contingent on how the money is spent.
  • Many details are missing: Almost anything could happen with this tax “plan” when the real negotiations begin, but that’s politics, I suppose.

Mixed Feelings:

  • Descriptions of the changes to treatment of pass-through” income seem confused. There is only one kind of tax applied to the income of pass-through entities like S-corporations, and it is the owner’s individual tax rate. Income from C-corporations, on the other hand, is taxed twice: once at a 15% corporate tax rate under the Trump plan, and a second time when it is paid to investors at an individual tax rate, which now range from 15% to almost 24% for “qualified dividends” (most dividend payments), but are likely to range up to 35% for “ordinary” dividends under the plan. So effectively, double-taxed C-corporate income would be taxed at total rates ranging from 30% to 50% after tallying both the C-corp tax and the individual tax. (This is a simplification: C-corp income paid as dividends would be taxed to the corporation and then immediately to the shareholder at their individual rate, while retained corporate income would be taxed later).

Presumably, the Trump tax plan is to reduce the rate on “pass-through” income to just 15% at the individual level, regardless of other income. (It is not clear how that would effect brackets or the rate of taxation on other components of individual income.) Is that good? Yes, to the extent that lower tax rates allow individuals to keep more of their hard-earned income, and to the extent that such a change would help small businesses. S-corps have always had an advantage in avoiding double taxation, however, and this would not end the differential taxation of S and C income, which is distortionary. It might incent business owners to shift income away from salary payments to profit, however, which would increase the negative impact on tax revenue.

  • Interest deductibility and expensing of capital expenditures are in question. Interest deductibility puts debt funding on an equal footing with equity funding only if the double tax on C-corp income is fully repealed. Immediate expensing of “capex” would certainly provide an investment incentive (as long as “excess” expenses can be carried forward), and for C-corporations, it would certainly bring us closer to elimination of the double-tax on income (the accounting matching principle be damned!).
  • There is no commitment to shrink government, but that’s partly (only partly) a function of having abandoned revenue neutrality. It’s also something that has been promised for the next budget year.
  • The tax reform proposal represents a departure from insistence on revenue neutrality: On the whole, I find this appealing, not because I like deficits better than taxes, but because there may be margins along which tax policy can be improved if unconstrained by neutrality, assuming that the incremental deficits are less damaging to the economy than the gains. The political landscape may dictate that desirable changes in tax policy can be made more easily in this way.

Shikha Dalmia wonders whether a real antidote for “Trumpism” might be embedded within the tax reform proposal. If the reforms are successful in stimulating non-inflationary economic growth, a “big if” on the first count, the popular preoccupations inspired by Trump with immigration policy, the “wall” and protectionism might just fade away. But don’t count on it. On the whole, I think the tax reform proposal has promise, though some of the good parts could vanish before a bill hits Trump’s desk, and some of the bad parts could get worse!