The House GOP Tax Plan’s Disparate Treatment of Income Sources

09 Thursday Nov 2017

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Bernie Sanders, Bubble Tax, corporate income tax, Double Taxation, FICA Tax, House GOP Tax Plan, Investment Incentives, Obamacare Surtax, Pass-Through Income, Scott Sumner, Tax Burden, Tax Incentives

Update: In writing the following post, I neglected to devote sufficient attention to the rules that would govern taxation of pass-through income under the House GOP tax plan. Those rules significantly alter some of the conclusions below. Those rules are discussed in a later post: Stumbling Through Pass-Through Tax Reform.

Double taxation of corporate income is a feature of the U.S. income tax code that is partially addressed in the tax reform bill proposed by the House GOP. Corporate income is taxed to the firm and again to owners on their receipt of dividends or when a company’s growth results in capital gains. Ultimately, the total rate of taxation matters more than whether it is implemented as single or double taxation of income flows. However, there is an unfortunate tendency to view corporate taxes as if they are levied on entitites wholly separate from their owners, so double taxation carries a stench of politically sneakiness. It also creates multiple distortions in the decisions of investors and the separately managed firms they own.

Non-corporate income taxation is reduced by the House plan even more substantially than the cut in taxes on corporate-derived income. However, the plan does not reduce taxes on high-earning professionals, many of whom are situated similarly to successful business owners and investors from an economic perspective.

Tax Burdens and Distortions

The federal corporate tax is not borne 100% by shareholders, as discussed in the previous post on Sacred Cow Chips. Some part of the burden is borne by labor via reduced wages. It is difficult to correct for this distortion in terms of calculating an effective marginal tax rate on corporate income. For example, suppose a new 35% tax would reduce corporate income from $100 to $65. The firm finds, however, that it can reduce wage payments by half of the expected tax payment, or $17.50. The firm would now earn $117.50 before tax and $76.38 after tax. Relative to the new level of pre-tax income, the tax rate is still 35%. It is no less than that by way of the reduction in wages, though the impact on the firm’s pre-tax income is mitigated.

The discussion here of tax rates, and even double taxation, is not intended as commentary on tax fairness. It might or might not be fair that the burden of the tax is shared with labor. Instead, the issue is the magnitude of the economic distortions caused by taxes. Tax rates themselves are a reasonable starting point for such a discussion, and they are easy to measure. Lower tax rates beget fewer distortions in economic outcomes than high tax rates. Low rates provide greater incentives to save and invest in productive assets, which enhances labor productivity, wages, and economic growth. Indeed, businesses go to great lengths to avoid taxes altogether, if possible, but typically those are non-productive uses of resources, which demonstrates the very distortions at issue.

Current and Proposed Marginal Tax Rates

Under current law, the top personal income tax rate on dividends is 20%. It is 23.8% if we include the Obamacare surtax. Adding that to the corporate rate yields the effective top tax rate paid by shareholders: 23.8% + 35% = 58.8%. The GOP bill does not alter the 23.8% top rate on dividends or capitals gains. By virtue of the corporate tax reduction, however, the plan would reduce the overall top rate on shareholders to 23.8% + 20% = 43.8%.

The income earned by investors in pass-through entities like proprietorships, partnerships and S-corporations is taxed as personal income under current law at rates ranging from 15% to 39.6% (43.4% at the top, including the surtax). Thus, under present law, the owner of a pass-through company is taxed less heavily at the top rate than the owner of a public company (43.4% vs. 58.8%). (I am ignoring the 15.3% FICA payroll tax owed by self-emloyed individuals in proprietorships or partnerships on incomes up to $127,200, and 2.9% above that level. The combined tax rates would be almost equal even if we include the FICA tax.)

The tax on pass-through business income would be reduced under the GOP bill via a cap of 25% on federal business income taxes. Presumably, this cap would nullify the House plan’s “bubble tax” of 6% on personal income between $1.2 million and $1.6 million of income, as well as the Obamacare surtax. Thus, the tax advantage for pass-through entities over corporations would be somewhat wider under the House plan than under current law (25% vs. 43.4%). (The FICA tax on owners of proprietorships and partnerships would not quite equalize the overall marginal tax rates over a certain income range.)

In addition, the House plan rewards the owners of pass-through businesses relative to individuals earning high levels of wage and salary income. If anything, the bill would penalize these individuals. For example, while the owner of a high-earning pass-through would face a 25% tax rate, a high-earning professional or corporate employee would pay the top marginal rate (39.6%) plus the surtax (3.8%) and possibly the bubble tax (6%). This is one reason why Scott Sumner says it looks as if the House plan was designed by Bernie Sanders!

The Upshot

The tax system should be neutral across different sources of income. Divergent effective tax rates on owners of corporations, pass-throughs, and high wage-earning individuals is undesirable and introduces arbitrary elements into private decision-making. If anything, the House GOP tax plan exacerbates those differences. By cutting marginal tax rates, it would reduce the magnitude of business tax distortions both for corporate and pass-through organizations and their owners, but the relative advantage of pass-throughs would increase relative to corporations, and owners of corporations and pass-throughs benefit relative to high-earning individuals. Let’s hope this is fixed as the bill evolves, but more balanced reductions in rates would require higher rates on business owners than contemplated in the current plan.

Labor Shares the Burden of the Corporate Income Tax

03 Friday Nov 2017

Posted by pnoetx in Taxes

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Alex Tabarrok, corporate income tax, Greg Mankiw, John Cochrane, Lawrence Summers, monopoly, Monopsony, Pass-Through Income, Paul Krugman, Tax Burden, Tax Discounting, Tax Incidence, Tax Reform

As expected, a reduction of the corporate income tax rate from 35% to 20% is included in the GOP’s tax reform bill, a summary of which was released today. That rate cut would be a welcome development for workers, consumers, and corporate shareholders. It should be no surprise that the burden of the U.S. corporate income tax is not borne exclusively by owners of capital. In fact, it might hurt workers and consumers substantially while imposing relatively little burden on shareholders.

John Cochrane’s post on the incidence of the tax on corporate income is very interesting, though by turns it rambles and may be too technical for some tastes. He notes that the incidence of the corporate tax can fall on only three different groups: shareholders, workers and customers:

“As an accounting matter, every cent [of taxes] corporations pay comes from higher prices, lower wages, or lower payments to shareholders. The only question is which one.“

Cochrane quotes Lawrence Summers and Paul Krugman, both of whom are of the belief that the incidence of the corporate tax must fall primarily on capital and not on labor. That’s consistent with their view that a reduction in corporate taxes amounts to a gift to shareholders. But Cochrane isn’t at all convinced:

“The usual principle is that he or she bears the burden who can’t get out of the way. So, how much room do companies, as a whole, have to raise prices, lower wages, lower interest payments, or lower dividends?”

In fact, owners of capital can get out of the way. Capital is very mobile relative to labor. Here’s a counterfactual exercise Cochrane steps through in order to illustrate the implications of ownership bearing the incidence of the tax: if equity markets are efficient, share prices reflect all available information about the firm. If wages and product prices are unchanged after the imposition of the tax, then shareholders would suffer an immediate loss. Once the tax is discounted into share prices, there would be no further impact on current or future shareholders. Thus, future buyers of shares would escape the tax burden entirely. As a first approximation, the share price must fall to the point at which the ongoing return on the stock is restored to its value prior to imposition of the tax.

Cochrane notes that evidence on the reaction of stock prices to corporate tax changes is mixed at best, which implies that the incidence of corporate taxation falls more weakly on shareholders than many believe. That leaves consumers or workers to bear a significant part of the burden. Workers and consumers are mostly one and the same: economy-wide, higher prices mean lower real wages; lower wages also mean lower real wages. So I’ll continue to speak as if the incidence of the tax falls on either labor or capital, and we can leave aside consumers as a separate category. Cochrane says:

“It used to be thought that it was easy to lower payments to shareholders — ‘the supply of savings is inelastic’ — so that’s where the tax would come from. The newer consensus is that companies as a whole have very little power to pay less to investors, … so the corporate tax comes from lower wages or, equivalently, higher prices. Then, indirectly, reducing the corporate tax would increase capital, which would result in higher wages.”

Cochrane’s post and another on his blog were prompted by an earlier piece by Greg Mankiw showing that real wages, in an open economy, will have a strong negative response to a corporate tax increase. Here is the reasoning: the tax reduces the return earned from invested capital in the short run. Ideally, capital is deployed only up to the point at which its return no longer exceeds the opportunity cost needed to attract it. Given time to adjust, less capital must be deployed after the imposition of the tax in order to force the return on a marginal unit of capital back up to the given opportunity cost. That means less capital deployed per worker, and that, in turn, reduces labor productivity and wages.

Another issue addressed by Cochrane has to do with assertions that monopoly power in the corporate sector is a good rationale for a high tax on corporate income. You can easily convince me that the “average” firm in the corporate sector earns a positive margin over marginal cost. However, a microeconomic analysis of monopoly behavior by the entire corporate sector would be awkward, to say the least. Despite all that, Cochrane notes that monopolists have more power than firms in competitive sectors to raise prices, and monopsonists have more power to reduce wages. Therefore, the “tax the monopolists” line of argument does not suggest that labor will avoid a significant burden of a corporate tax. A safer bet is that firms in the U.S. corporate sector are price-takers in capital markets, but to some degree may be price-makers in product and labor markets.

Cochrane also emphasizes the inefficiency of the corporate tax as a redistributional mechanism, even if shareholders bear a significant share of its burden. It is still likely to harm workers via lost productivity, as discussed above. It is also true that many workers hold corporate equities in their retirement funds, so a corporate tax harms them directly in their dual role as owners of capital.

The cut in the corporate tax rate is but one element of many in the GOP bill, but a related provision is that so-called “pass-through” income, of the type earned via many privately-owned businesses, would be taxed at a maximum rate of 25%. These businesses generate more income than C-corporations. Currently, pass-through income is taxed as ordinary income, so capping the top rate at 25% represents a very large tax cut. As Alex Tabarrok points out at the last link, tax treatment should be neutral with respect to the form of business organization, but under the GOP bill, the effective gap between the top rate for pass-throughs versus corporate income would be even larger than it is now.

Critics of a reduction in corporate taxes should bear in mind that its incidence falls at least partly on labor, perhaps mainly on labor. The U.S. has the highest corporate tax rate in the industrialized world. That undermines U.S. competitiveness, as does the complexity of corporate tax rules. Tax planning and compliance burn up massive resources while drastically reducing the tax “take”, i.e., the revenue actually collected. The corporate income tax is something of a “show” tax that exists to appease populist and leftist elements in the electorate who consistently fail to recognize the unexpectedly nasty consequences of their own advocacy.

Do Not Rot Productive Capital

21 Saturday Feb 2015

Posted by pnoetx in Taxes

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Capital Gains Tax, corporate income tax, Dividend tax Rate, Double Taxation, Inflation tax, Kim Henry, stepped-up basis, The Freeman, Triple Taxation

Dividend and capital gains income are taxed at lower rates than regular wage and salary income. That such income is taxed lightly strikes progressives as offensive, but the intent and effects of these lower rates is not to redistribute income to rentiers. Rather, relatively low dividend and capital gains tax rates are in place because they limit double-taxation, minimize taxation of inflationary “gains”, and reward successful risk-taking.

Dividends, and ultimately capital gains, derive from corporate earnings. Corporate income in the U.S. is taxed at the highest rate in the OECD, with a top federal rate of 38% (though the rate drops to 35% above a certain level of earnings). Dividends may or may not be paid to shareholders from corporate income, but if so, they are subsequently taxed again as personal income. If dividends were taxed as regular income to individuals, the combined federal taxes (corporate and individual) on that marginal income in upper brackets would be in excess of 75%. With state corporate and personal income taxes added on, the after-tax dividend received by an individual shareholder from each dollar of pre-tax corporate income could then be less than 10 cents in some states.

The top federal tax rate on dividends is 20%, versus 39.6% for regular income. One reason that dividend income is taxed at lower rates than wage and salary income is recognition of the confiscatory nature of double taxation, as illustrated above. Realized capital gains are taxed at the same rate as dividends for the same reason. A capital gain is the increase in the value of an asset over time. Such gains are taxed only when an asset is sold, when the gain is realized. The low tax rate on gains from the sale of corporate stock also limits double taxation (and even triple taxation).

Stock prices tend to rise along with the expected stream of future after-tax corporate earnings and dividends. A prospective buyer of shares knows they will incur taxes on future dividends, which limits the price they are willing to pay for the shares. So, higher future earnings will be taxed to the corporation when they occur, higher future dividends will be taxed to the buyer of shares when dividends are eventually paid, and the resulting gain in the share price received by the seller today is taxed as a capital gain to the seller. Triple (and anticipatory) taxation! A relatively low tax rate on capital gains at least helps to limit the damage from the awful incentives created by multiple taxation of the same income.

Another important reason for taxing capital gains more lightly than wages and salaries is that the tax, in the presence of inflation, diminishes the real value of an asset. As an example, compare the following situations in which the price level increases by 20% over five years: Worker Joe earns $10 an hour to start with and $12 an hour at the end of year 5; Saver Dev earns $1 dividends per share of the Prophet Corp (which he plans to hold indefinitely) to start with and $1.20 at the end of year 5; Retiree Cap buys one share of Gaines Corp worth $100 at the start and sells it for $120 at the end of year 5. On a pre-tax basis, these three individuals all keep pace with inflation. The real value of their pre-tax earnings, or the share value in Cap’s case, is unchanged after five years. Cap keeps pace by virtue of a $20 capital gain, so the real value of his share is unchanged.

If all three types of income are taxed at the same rate, Joe and Dev both keep pace with inflation on an after-tax basis as well. But what about Cap? After taxes, the proceeds of his stock sale are $115. Cap’s after-tax gain is only 15%, less than the inflation that occurred, so the real value of his investment was diminished by the combination of inflation and the capital gains tax. The same would be true for farmland, artwork, or any other kind of asset. It is one matter to tax flows of income that change with inflation. It is another to tax changes in property value that would otherwise keep pace with inflation. This is truly a form of wealth confiscation, and it provides a further rationale for taxing capital gains more lightly than wage and salary income, or not at all.

There are further complexities that influence the results. For one thing, all three individuals would suffer real losses if inflation pushed them into higher tax brackets. This is why bracket thresholds are indexed for inflation. Another wrinkle is the “stepped-up basis at death”, by which heirs incur taxable gains only on increases in value that occur after the death of their benefactor. This aspect of the tax code was recently discussed on Sacred Cow Chips here.

The third rationale for taxing capital gains more lightly than wage and salary income is an attempt to improve the risk-return tradeoff: larger rewards, ex ante and ex post, are typically available only with acceptance of higher risk of loss or complete failure. This is true for private actors and from a societal point of view. It is hoped that lighter taxes on contingent rewards will encourage savings and their deployment into promising ventures that may entail high risk.

This post was prompted by a article in The Freeman entitled “A Loophole For the Wealthy? Demystifying Capital Gains“, by Dr. Kim Henry. I was somewhat surprised to learn that Dr. Henry is a dentist. His theme is of interest from a public finance perspective, and he provides a good discussion of the advantages of maintaining a low tax rate on capital gains. My only complaint is with the first of these two points:

“[The capital gains tax rate] is lower for two important reasons:
1. Although the gain is realized in one year, it actually took place over more than one year. The wine did not increase in value just in the year it was sold. It took 30 years to achieve its higher price.
2. Capital gains are not indexed to inflation. …”

To be fair, Dr. Henry’s point relative to the time required to achieve a gain probably has more to do with the riskiness of an asset or venture’s returns, rather than the passage of time per se. If an asset’s value increases by 4% per year, the three points raised above (multiple taxation, taxing of inflationary gains, and rewarding successful risk-taking) would be just as valid after year 1 as they are after year 5.

Taxing income from capital is fraught with dangers to healthy investment incentives, which are primary drivers of employment and income growth. Double taxation of corporate income is not helpful. Capital gains taxes suffer from the same defect and others. But capital income is a ripe target for those who wish to score political points by inflaming envy. It’s a dark art.

Punitive Taxes Chase Off a Rational King

28 Thursday Aug 2014

Posted by pnoetx in Uncategorized

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Burger King, consumption tax, corporate desertion, corporate income tax, economic patriotism, Greg Mankiw, Learned Hand, Megan McArdle, tax inversions

The counterproductive U.S. corporate tax code was a major incentive for Burger King’s prospective merger with the Canadian doughnut chain Tim Hortons. The merger will allow BK to change its domicile to Canada, thereby reducing its tax bill. This is known as a corporate “tax inversion.” Canada’s tax system is less punishing because its corporate tax rate is lower than in the U.S., and Canadian taxes are based on territorial earnings, rather than global earnings as in the U.S. Megan McArdle explains that the latter is the more important consideration: “If we’re worried about inversion, then the U.S. government should follow the lead of other developed countries, and move to territorial taxation.”

The corporate income tax represents double taxation of income paid out as dividends and imposes, at least partly, a double tax burden on shareholders even when earnings are retained. Greg Mankiw believes that the corporate income tax should be abolished.

“The burden of the corporate tax is ultimately borne by people — some combination of the companies’ employees, customers and shareholders. After recognizing that corporations are mere conduits, we can focus more directly on the people.”

On the topic of “economic patriotism” and so-called “corporate desertion,” Mankiw quotes Learned Hand:

“Anyone may arrange his affairs so that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which best pays the treasury. There is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”

Mankiw also proposes a consumption tax as a replacement for federal income taxation, which has great merit, but it is a very ambitious plan and probably at odds with current political realities.