Tag Archives: Coronavirus

The Opportunity of Skewed Coronavirus Transmission

30 Monday Mar 2020

Posted by in economic growth, Pandemic

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

People talk about the transmission rate or reproduction rate (R0) of Covid-19 as if it’s a single number that applies to the entire population. John Cochrane emphasizes the huge implications of this misperception for how best to prevent the spread of the virus, and at lower cost, and for how best to “restart” the economy.

First, however, lets dispense with the absolutist position that there can be no compromise on virus mitigation in favor of economic activity. I am not opposed to the “lockdown” we are now living, but it will have significant and unnecessary costs if it goes on too long: the lost output is a huge blow not only to our current lifestyles but to our ability to grow in the future, or even to afford better health care in the future. Beyond that, the lockdown has immediate negative impacts of its own on public health: economic stress leads to all kinds of terrible health outcomes like heart disease and even suicide. About the latter, the President is absolutely correct: if you need research to prove it, see here, here, here, and here, all respected journals (the links all courtesy of The Federalist.) Economic stress and isolation is quite likely to promote poor dietary habits, lethargy, and possibly family dysfunction as well. Don’t pretend there aren’t real tradeoffs between the economy, virus interventions, and public health. The trick is to improve those tradeoffs. A balance can and must be struck, and depending on policy actions, the tradeoff can be made better or worse.

Back to the virus reproduction rate: the R0 values we see quoted are estimates of the average number of other people infected by each infected person. A value of three means that each person infected with the virus passes it on to three others, on average. If R0 is greater than one, an epidemic grows. If R0 is less than one, a contagion recedes. It becomes a “non-epidemic” if R0 remains less than one. It does not have to be zero (and probably cannot be zero).

But not everyone is the same: my R0 is different from your R0 if only because we have different occupational exposure to others and different levels of social engagement. We also differ physiologically, which probably leads to differences in our “personal” R0 values. And an individual’s R0 will differ by time and place, depending on random circumstances like which way the wind is blowing. But here is where it gets interesting. Cochrane describes an extreme version of the skewed distribution shown at the top of this post:

“Suppose there are 100 people with a 0.5 reproduction rate, and 1 super-spreader with a 100 replication rate. The average reproduction rate is 1.5. Clearly, locking everyone down is wildly inefficient. It’s much more important to find the 1 super-spreader and lock him or her down, or change the business or behavior that’s causing the super-spreading.

This is exaggerated, but not far off the mark. I have not seen numbers on the distribution of reproduction rates across people, but it is a fair bet that it has an extremely fat tail. Most of us are washing our hands, social distancing, work in businesses that are shut down or are taking great steps to limit contact. And a few people and activities contribute to most of the spread.

This wide and fat-tailed dispersion is ignored in a lot of simulations I’ve seen. They take the average reproduction rate as the same for everyone. That’s a big mistake.

The danger: we waste a huge amount of time and money moving you and me from a 0.5 reproduction rate to an 0.4 reproduction rate. …  The opportunity: focus on the super-spreaders, and the super-spreading activities, and you bring down the reproduction rate at much lower cost. “

There are many ways to reduce R0. Cochrane gets a little more specific about this and the policy implications of the skewed R0 distribution across individuals:

“All we need is to get the transmission rate under one. Activities with possible but very low transmission rates, and high economic benefits should go on. Don’t separate to ‘essential’ and ‘non-essential.’ Separate into ‘high likelihood of transmission’ and ‘low likelihood of transmission.’

Why are we not using masks everywhere? Sure, they’re not perfect. Sure, an old hankerchief might only cut the chance of transmission by half. We’re not all surgeons. Cutting by half is enough to stop the virus. 

Conversely, why did they close the state parks? Really? Just how dangerous is it to drive the dog to a hiking trail and stay 6 feet away from other people? Parks, ski areas, golf courses, all sorts of businesses that surely can be run with a reproduction rate far less than one are just shut down. I met a realtor on our dog walk yesterday. They’re totally shut down. Just how hard is it to run a realty business with a 0.5 reproduction rate? One family in the house at a time, don’t touch anything, an hour between showings, stay 6 feet from the realtor… But instead the whole business is just shut down.”

The beginning of that last paragraph echoes a point I made in my last post about public park closures and the health benefits of getting outside generally.

Cochrane goes on to discuss several other policy options, including the potential benefits of simple kinds of testing and the overemphasis on false negatives and positives in policy discussions. Imperfect tests should not be discouraged by these concerns. If you’re worried about that, you shouldn’t use a thermometer either!

“Stay-at-home” or “shelter-in-place” orders will increasingly be tested by private parties if they remain in effect too long. That will be encouraged by the seemingly arbitrary distinctions some orders make between “essential” and “non-essential” activities. If workers or small businessmen judge themselves to be at low risk, they will take matters into their own hands to the extent they can. I believe that’s already happening where the specifics of “lockdown” orders have gone too far.  Workers at the low end of the income spectrum are especially hard hit by these orders. One can hardly blame them for trying to earn what they can if they believe, and their customers believe, their activities and interactions are of low risk.

Ultimately, the entire distribution of R0s will slide to the left. That will occur even at low levels of “herd immunity” and anything that offers at least weak prophylaxis. Broadly speaking, the latter includes maintaining distance, refusing admittance to venues with a fever, avoiding handshakes, wearing masks, and potentially chloroquine, which is already in widespread use by physicians treating coronavirus patients. Ultimately, a vaccine will slide the distribution far to the left, but the economy need not be held hostage until that time. To paraphrase Cochrane, we can get the transmission rate below one and keep it there without stopping the world permanently. There are many options, and now is the time for business and government to start planning for that.

Don’t Be Cowed: Shelter, But Get Outside

29 Sunday Mar 2020

Posted by in Pandemic, Uncategorized

≈ 4 Comments

Tags

, , , , , , , , ,

As the coronavirus ordeal continues, it’s astonishing to hear the refrain from government officials, celebrities, talking heads, and social media scolds to “stay inside“. President Trump did it again today at his press conference. WTF? In northern England a man was arrested for “unauthorized walking”. Orders to “shelter in place” are often interpreted to mean “don’t go outside your home” except when necessary, as if active shooters are marauding through neighborhoods. In fairness, I don’t think anyone in the U.S. has yet been arrested for taking a walk, except for this incident, which is bad enough. Still, the misplaced emphasis of such rhetoric is confusing to people. The threat to civil liberties is one thing, but the suggestion that we should all stay inside is itself a threat to public health.

If you can get out of your home without coming face-to-face with others, you SHOULD get outside whenever you can! Get out in the sun and out of the forced-air, dehumidified environment that is your dwelling unit. Get some vitamin D and breath some fresh, humid air.

Here’s a personal anecdote: My yard backs-up to an extensive wooded area of a huge corporate campus. It was built years ago, and ever since, the company has welcomed residents of our neighborhood to walk the grounds. The company even maintains an access road that connects our street to a route that is often more convenient than our main entrance. A very good neighbor. I was out walking along one of the roads through the campus yesterday. Employees have not reported to work there for three weeks due to an employee’s diagnosis with the virus, so it was very quiet. A security guard drove by and stopped to tell me that I could no longer walk the campus due to the coronavirus. “That’s corporate policy now with this thing…”, he trailed off. As if my solitary stroll through the campus would contribute to the spread of the virus! Again, WTF? Of course, it is private property and they are entitled to make their own rules. I’m okay with that, but the virus is nonsensical as a rationale.

Public parks are closed in many areas. I understand the wisdom of discouraging people from mingling and preventing the virus’s spread via surfaces like park benches and playground equipment. Nevertheless, I believe parks should remain open to individuals or families for walking, running or resting. Just keep your distance.

You are highly unlikely to catch the virus outside unless you are in close proximity to an individual with the virus. Even then it’s unlikely. Yes, it can survive in air for about three hours, carried along in fine, exhaled aerosols. That is of much greater concern indoors, where the air is still and its volume limited. It is quickly dispersed outdoors into the vast atmosphere. And again, the virus is likely to degrade quickly in warm temperatures (> 54 degrees), direct sunlight, and high absolute humidity. All three are covered in this report. So enjoy your yard, your porch, your street, or at least open your windows when you can.

Supply-Gouging Laws Keep Goods Off Shelf

23 Monday Mar 2020

Posted by in Markets, Pandemic, Price Controls

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , ,

“Low prices say, ‘Take all you want, there’s plenty more.‘”

— Duke economist Michael Munger

See the prices marked on those shelves above? They say infinity!

Nothing drives economists crazy like anti-price “gouging” sentiment, and especially politicians who play on it. Hoarders hoard under such laws precisely because prices are too low given demand and supply conditions. Scarcity is defined by demand relative to supply, and freely adjusting prices register the degree of scarcity quite well. To what purpose? First, to ration available supplies; second, to encourage conservation; third, to incentivize producers to bring more product to market.

But when hoarders hoard, does that not create artificial scarcity? No, because the scarcity itself was already a condition, or else the hoarder would not have acted. And the hoarder would not have acted if developing conditions of scarcity had not been contradicted by the low price.

But what if the hoarders are mere speculators? Doesn’t that prove their actions create artificial scarcity? No, again, scarce conditions existed. Speculators don’t speculate to lose money, and they would certainly lose money if they buy when a product is not truly in short supply relative to demand. Speculators operate on the principle of arbitrage: transacting in response to profit opportunities created by gaps between prices and real value. Markets tend to eliminate such opportunities. Anti-“gouging” laws create them in times of crisis.

Should we demand that respiratory therapists not accept higher offers to practice in areas hit hard by the coronavirus? That bears a certain equivalence to laws preventing retailers from raising prices sufficiently to discourage hoarding. After all, retailers know that their dwindling inventory has gained value in a crisis situation, just as the respiratory therapist knows that her services have gained value in a world ravaged by a lung-damaging viral disease. Should we arrest her?

In a functioning market, the respiratory therapist, the retailer, and producers who supply the retailer would all earn more based on the true value of their skills, inventories, or ability to produce. These parties get to keep any premium they earn when conditions create more scarcity. Speculators however, generally don’t share their gains with the producer, which some find regrettable. (In fact, commodity speculators often provide valuable hedging opportunities for suppliers, so my last statement is not quite true.) Nevertheless, speculators serve a valuable function because they often provide the first source of information about changes in scarcity. That information, the price signal, has social value because it embeds incentives for conservation and added production.

Yes, retailers should be able to restock with some time. But it can fairly be said they did not react quickly enough to the “demand shock” caused by the range of precautions taken in response to the coronavirus pandemic. Perhaps retailers placed additional orders with suppliers in an effort to deal with the crisis, and some might have hiked certain prices marginally. I don’t know. However, it’s certain they were chastened in their price response by fears of damaging their public image, and even cowed by short-sighted laws and regulations in some cases. It doesn’t take much imagination, however, to think of ways they might have be able to deal with crisis conditions via pricing policy, such as charging quantity premiums: first package of TP at regular price, second at 2x regular price, three-plus at 10x regular price.

As J.D. Tucille says, people think of price “gouging” as a matter of degree. But at what threshold does price flexibility become inappropriate as conditions of scarcity change? No price controller can tell you exactly. That’s a good reason to eschew shortage-inducing pricing laws. Is it fair when prices rise drastically? Well, the price is infinite when the shelf is empty. Is that fair? Better let markets do their job.

Coronavirus: Framing the Next Few Weeks

19 Thursday Mar 2020

Posted by in Pandemic

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

See my March 28 update here.

What follows is an exercise intended to put the coronavirus in perspective as we move through a crucial phase in the U.S. I believe it’s more informative than speculative. However, I’m relying on several pieces of information in establishing bounds on how the caseload and mortality rate will play out over the next few months: the experience abroad; domestic developments thus far; risk mitigation; prospective treatments; and some mathematics.

Pandemic Progressions

Despite all the warnings we’ve heard about exponential growth in the number of infections, that is something characterizing only the earliest stages of epidemics. These episodes invariably follow a growth curve that accelerates for a time before tapering. The total number of individuals infected eventually flattens, like the top of the dashed red line in the chart below. Think of the blue line’s height as showing the number of new positive diagnoses each day. New cases (blue) peak as the slope of the red line, total positive diagnoses, begins to decrease. The blue line is the one we’d like to flatten. That’s because once the number of new cases exceeds a certain threshold, medical resources can no longer handle the load. Nevertheless, I’ll focus on the red line and how it’s growth accelerates and then decelerates. Where are various countries on that curve? 

I’ve been using the interactive tool at the Insights and Outliers web site to view curves like the red line above, by country. China and South Korea are at the top, where the line is flat, though I discount the Chinese numbers as quite likely manipulated. Italy is somewhere in the middle of the red curve — one hopes it will enter the deceleration phase soon, but it’s not clear from the numbers.

Setting Context

The U.S. caseload is accelerating; it will continue to accelerate until the availability of tests catches up with demand from individuals meeting the qualifications for testing. The delay in the availability of tests, which I mentioned in an earlier post, will exaggerate the acceleration in the number of diagnosed cases for another week, or perhaps a bit more. Some of those cases already existed, and we should have known about them before now. However, after starting high, the U.S. death rate from the virus is already well below the global death rate, suggesting that either 1) our testing is actually well ahead of the rest of the world; 2) our Covid-19 mortality is, and will be, lower than the rest of the world; or 3) deaths in the U.S. will increase much faster than new diagnoses over the next few weeks. I seriously doubt the latter given the high quality of U.S. health care, the time of year, and the promising treatments that have recently been approved for use.

I expect the daily number of new cases in the U.S. to fall after the “catch-up” in testing. That’s based on a combination of things: first, the time from infection to first symptoms can be up to about 14 days, but the mean is just five days. Second, in the U.S., we began to practice “social distancing” and “self-quarantine” in earnest just this past week. Among those infected before this week, those who develop symptoms serious enough to notice will know before the end of March. But people are still out trying to take care of business. Some of those people will catch the virus, and there will be secondary infections of family members or others in close proximity to individuals diagnosed earlier. It will take an additional week, accounting for overlap, for infections among that cohort to mature. Nevertheless, over the next three weeks, the number of infections transmitted to new “hosts” will fall drastically with social distancing, as each of us comes into contact with fewer people. 

Third, the transmissibility of the virus will decrease with rising temperatures, more direct sunlight, and higher absolute humidity. See my post on the topic here. I know, I know, skeptics wag their fingers and say, “Covid-19 is not the same as the flu virus”, and they’re right! It has some similarities, however: a so-called “envelope” lipid membrane, transmissability via fine aerosols or larger droplets expelled into the air by infected individuals, and symptoms that are similar, except for shortness of breath with Covid-19. And like the flu, the new virus seems to be more virulent in cold, dry environments. If you cannot avoid contact with other individuals during your workday, if you have a large family at home, or if you live in quarters with a number of other individuals, it might be a good idea to keep your humidifier on or don’t air-condition aggressively. That’s an implication of this study and this study:

“The current spread suggests a degree of climate determination with Coronavirus displaying preference for cool and dry conditions. The predecessor SARS-CoV was linked to similar climate conditions.”

Bounding Expectations

How high will the numbers go? I’ll start by establishing some “very good” and “very bad” scenarios for total confirmed cases. South Korea (where masks were used widely) has had an excellent experience thus far. The county’s cumulative confirmed cases flattened out at less than 0.017% (0.00017) of the total population. Assuming that 90% of cases are asymptomatic and undiagnosed, that would mean 0.17% (0.0017) of the South Korean population has been infected. If the U.S. experience is the same, we’d have a total of about 60,000 confirmed infections when our curve flattens. But I won’t be that optimistic — we’re at about 25,000 cases already and I think we’ll be at 60,000 cases within a week. Instead, I’ll define the “very good” scenario as 2.5x the South Korean outcome, or 150,000 confirmed cases. 

For a “very bad” scenario one might look to Italy. Unfortunately, it’s impossible to say how much higher Italy’s case load will go before flattening. If it had flattened today (it didn’t), the rate of confirmed cases for the country would be 0.077% (0.00077). That yields 0.77% of the population including the undiagnosed at 90% of cases. Applying the same percentage to the U.S. would mean just over 250,000 confirmed cases. But again, for a really bad scenario, and because we don’t yet know how Italy’s experience will play out, let’s suppose Italy’s confirmed cases quadruple: For the U.S., using the same percentage of the population would imply just over 1 million confirmed cases, or about 1.6% of the population. That yields a total infected population of 10 million.  

I’ve illustrated these “very good” and “very bad” scenarios in the chart below as Gompertz curves, a form of sigmoid function or s-curve. First, a couple of caveats: Please note that this represents a “first wave” of the virus, as it were. I do not dismiss the possibility of a second wave should we relax our nonprescription safeguards prematurely, and obviously the chart does not speak to a return of the virus in the fall. Also, these are just two examples that allow us to examine the implications of extreme outcomes. I could have varied the timing, growth, and end-outcome in other ways, but I think the following is instructive.

The chart shows cumulative confirmed cases for each scenario. It also shows the actual confirmed case total through March 21st, which is the shorter red line at the bottom. The data plotted begins on March 6, when there were 248 cases confirmed. The horizontal axis shows days elapsed since then. The accompanying table shows the same information through March 28th, a week from today. 

There are a few things to note about the chart and table:

  1. The actual curve is still below the “very good” curve. If our experience proves to be marginally worse than the “very good” scenario, then we’ve already “caught-up” in terms of testing for Covid-19: the actual increase today is larger than the highest daily increases under that scenario. If our experience approaches the “very bad” scenario, then we are eight days behind in our testing. That is, today’s actual increase is about what that scenario would have predicted eight days ago.
  2. Under the “very good” scenario, the daily increase in cases would peak by Friday, March 27. We’ve already exceeded that level of daily increase, but it will be encouraging if the daily increase doesn’t accelerate much more over the next few days. Under the “very bad” scenario, and given a full “catch-up”, the daily increase would peak about a week from now at approximately 37,000. That would be delayed if the catch-up process is more protracted.
  3. New cases flatten out within a couple of months under both scenarios. Under the “very good” scenario, new cases fall below 1,000 per day by April 21. Under the “very bad’ scenario, they don’t reach that level until Mid-May.
  4. In the next week (by March 28th), we will know a lot more about where we’re trending relative to these scenarios. I plan to provide an update later in the week or next weekend. 

While it can’t be seen from the chart or the table, once the “catch-up” ends, if there really is a catch-up involved, the daily increase in cases might fall abruptly. That would be encouraging.

Other Thoughts

It’s also important to note that the experience within the U.S. might be as varied as what we see around the globe. For example, New York and Washington state seem to be hot spots. Cities with large international ports and flights are more likely to suffer relatively high infection rates. In contrast, St. Louis probably won’t have a comparable incidence of infection, as there are so few international flights terminating there. 

The global death rate from Covid-19 has been widely quoted as somewhere around 4%, but that came into question with the revelation of low mortality aboard the Diamond Princess, despite the many seniors aboard. And it appears that the death rate from coronavirus is declining in the U.S. This was noted here at Endless Metrics several days ago. It’s also discussed in some detail by Aaron Ginn in this excellent this Medium article. Again, the death rate will decline as our testing “catches-up”, if indeed it must, and it will decline with spring weather as well as treatments if they are effective. Ultimately, I’ll be surprised if it comes in at more than 1% of confirmed cases in the U.S., and I won’t be surprised if it’s much less. At 1% under the “very bad” scenario, the U.S. would have about 10,000 deaths associated with coronavirus, the large majority of which would be individuals older than 70 years of age with significant co-morbidities.  

Conclusion

I hope this exercise proves useful to others in establishing a framing for what will ensue over the next few weeks. However, even the “very bad” scenario discussed above involves an infected share of the population of much less than we’ve heard we’re in for. Yet that scenario is far worse than Italy’s experience thus far, which most people consider pretty bad. For this reason, I am increasingly convinced that this pandemic will not prove to be the widespread calamity we’re still being told to expect. Those warning us might be alarmists, or perhaps they simply lack a sufficient level of numeracy.

This post was partly inspired by The Math of Epidemics by Willis Eschenbach, as well as Scott Alexander’s March 2nd post at Slate Star Codex. Also, see the Medium article by Aaron Ginn. It is a thorough examination of many aspects of the pandemic and very much aligned with my views. (Something is wrong with the link … I’ll try to fix it later.)

 

 

at WUWT 

Left’s Pandemic Response: Politics As Usual

17 Tuesday Mar 2020

Posted by in Health Care, Pandemic, Regulation

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The Left asserts that President Trump dismissed and dismantled the nation’s Pandemic Response Team. That’s bullshit. So is the claim that the CDC was defunded. The news media and certain pundits have helped to feed this narrative. Or, as Glenn Reynolds calls those pundits, “Democrat operatives with bylines”.

First of all, the team in question was not at the CDC, a fact that hasn’t always been clear from the commentary on this issue. It was a team of White House overseers at the National Security Council’s “Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense”. What happened was this: the senior director of that team resigned after John Bolton was appointed to head the NSC. Bolton might have wanted him out, but what we know is the director resigned. Subsequently, that team was folded into another directorate as part of an long-overdue consolidation. Health experts from the team remain on the NSC staff today. Yet Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-OH)—and many others since—had the temerity to charge that Trump had fired “the entire Whilte House pandemic team”. Well, at least he didn’t imply that it was the CDC.

Tim Morrison wrote the following in the Washington Post yesterday:

“Because I led the very directorate assigned that mission, the counterproliferation and biodefense office, for a year and then handed it off to another official who still holds the post, I know the charge is specious. …

When I joined the National Security Council staff in 2018, I inherited a strong and skilled staff in the counterproliferation and biodefense directorate. This team of national experts together drafted the National Biodefense Strategy of 2018 and an accompanying national security presidential memorandum to implement it; an executive order to modernize influenza vaccines; and coordinated the United States’ response to the Ebola epidemic in Congo, which was ultimately defeated in 2020.”

This assessment at Brietbart.com quotes former senior NSC official Richard Goldberg:

“Weird. A year later I was inside the NSC working with talented global health/biodefense professionals who coordinated an incredibly effective response to Ebola. They’re still there. Working hard. On .”

It’s true that Bolton sought to eliminate red tape, duplication, and bureaucracy within the NSC, and that was wholly justified. According to Morrison, the NSC staff quadrupled from the 1990s through the second Obama term. Pandemics are supposed to be the CDC’s purview, but the proliferation of administrative layers is what happens as government grows uncontrollably. Leslie Eastman at Legal Insurrection questions whether the U.S. needs a permanent “Pandemic Response Team” in the White House. She quotes GOP Chairwoman Ronna McDaniel:

“JAN 7: CDC established a coronavirus incident management system, two days before China announced the outbreak. … Pelosi began Week 3 of withholding her sham impeachment articles. 

JAN 21: The CDC activated its emergency operations center to provide ongoing support to confront coronavirus. …What were Congressional Democrats focused on? Writing their opening arguments for their bogus impeachment trial.”

Well, bully for the CDC. As for “defunding the CDC”, the facts are this: the proposed budget submitted to Congress by the Trump Administration in February, but never passed, did indeed include cuts to the CDC’s budget, which has grown over the years as it expanded its mission from fighting infectious diseases to matters like obesity, racism, and questions of social justice. The cuts proposed by Trump, however, were primarily to state grants. Actually, the proposal called for increased CDC staffing, and it funded all programs related to infectious diseases. But no matter, because that proposal is unlikely to become part of any appropriations bill that would pass Congress.

True to form, the Left plays politics in the middle of a national crisis. When the Trump Administration told airlines that it was considering banning flights from China in late January, it was called racist. Now, of course, he hasn’t done enough. A huge irony, however, is that Trump’s biggest mistake was in trusting the FDA and the CDC’s authority to develop and regulate testing for the coronavirus. They botched it. In a classic case of over-regulation, they prohibited hospitals and labs from conducting tests developed privately or by academic researchers, insisting that everyone wait for the “approved” test to be distributed. Then, the test they released in early February was flawed, costing additional weeks before testing was available.

 

Covid-19: Killing It With Sunshine, Fresh Air

14 Saturday Mar 2020

Posted by in Health Care, Pandemic

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , ,

Update: also see “Don’t Be Cowed: Shelter, But Get Outside”

Patients with viral and bacterial infections seem to respond better if exposed to sunshine and fresh air. In fact, anyone hoping to keep infections at bay would do well to get outside in the sun for a while every day. A friend’s post alerted me to this fascinating article in Medium.com: “Coronavirus and the Sun: a Lesson from the 1918 Influenza Pandemic“, by Richard Hobday. It is well-sourced, though the references aren’t hyperlinked. Here’s the main point:

“... records from the 1918 pandemic suggest one technique for dealing with influenza — little-known today — was effective. … Put simply, medics found that severely ill flu patients nursed outdoors recovered better than those treated indoors. A combination of fresh air and sunlight seems to have prevented deaths among patients; and infections among medical staff. There is scientific support for this. Research shows that outdoor air is a natural disinfectant. Fresh air can kill the flu virus and other harmful germs. Equally, sunlight is germicidal and there is now evidence it can kill the flu virus.

On the last assertion, see here. Viruses always ebb as the weather warms in the spring. Light conditions improve, which might be more important than temperature: UV light is thought to kill germs of many kinds. Moreover, Vitamin D is generally protective against infections, and a deficiency is thought to increase Covid-19 risk.

Hobday goes on to describe the Open Air Factor, which probably is related to the presence of ozone, but maybe other curatives:

“Doctors who had first-hand experience of open-air therapy at the hospital in Boston were convinced the regimen was effective. It was adopted elsewhere. If one report is correct, it reduced deaths among hospital patients from 40 per cent to about 13 per cent. …

Patients treated outdoors were less likely to be exposed to the infectious germs that are often present in conventional hospital wards. They were breathing clean air in what must have been a largely sterile environment. We know this because, in the 1960s, Ministry of Defence scientists proved that fresh air is a natural disinfectant. Something in it, which they called the Open Air Factor, is far more harmful to airborne bacteria — and the influenza virus — than indoor air. They couldn’t identify exactly what the Open Air Factor is. But they found it was effective both at night and during the daytime. 

I’m not sure they were able to control for the relative absence of germs in fresh air, as opposed to the presence of something beneficial, but it’s certainly intriguing.

So whether you’re still on the “office team” or otherwise on the job, try to get outside! Whether you’re in a Covid-19 self-quarantine or worried about catching it, get outside if you can. Get some sun and fresh air, especially after a thunderstorm, when the air is rich with ozone. But drink plenty of fluids and don’t get burned! I’ll be hanging out in my back yard.