Government Failure as a Root Cause of Market Failure

10 Monday Jul 2023

Posted by Nuetzel in Government Failure, Market Failure

Tags

Capital Formation, central planning, Chevron Doctrine, Competitive Equilibrium, Corruption, crowding out, Declaration of Independence, Don Boudreaux, External Benefits, External Costs, Government Failure, Inflation, John Cochrane, Labor Supply, Market Failure, Michael Munger, monopoly power, Pareto Superiority, Peter Boettke, Price Controls, Protectionism, Redistribution, Regulatory Capture, rent seeking, Risk-Free Asset, Side Payments, Social Security, State Capacity, Tax Distortions, Thomas Jefferson, Treasury Debt, William R. Keech

We’re told again and again that government must take action to correct “market failures”. Economists are largely responsible for this widespread view. Our standard textbook treatments of external costs and benefits are constructed to demonstrate departures from the ideal of perfectly competitive market equilibria. This posits an absurdly unrealistic standard and diminishes the power and dramatic success of real-world markets in processing highly dispersed information, allocating resources based on voluntary behavior, and raising human living standards. It also takes for granted the underlying institutional foundations that lead to well-functioning markets and presumes that government possesses the knowledge and ability to rectify various departures from an ideal. Finally, “corrective” interventions are usually exposited in economics classes as if they are costless!

Failed Disgnoses

This brings into focus the worst presumption of all: that government solutions to social and economic problems never fail to achieve their intended aims. Of course that’s nonsense. If defined on an equivalent basis, government failure is vastly more endemic and destructive than market failure.

Related to this point, Don Boudreaux quotes from Peter Boettke’s Living Economics:

“According to ancient legend, a Roman emperor was asked to judge a singing contest between two participants. After hearing the first contestant, the emperor gave the prize to the second on the assumption that the second could be no worse than the first. Of course, this assumption could have been wrong; the second singer might have been worse. The theory of market failure committed the same mistake as the emperor. Demonstrating that the market economy failed to live up to the ideals of general competitive equilibrium was one thing, but to gleefully assert that public action could costlessly correct the failure was quite another matter. Unfortunately, much analytical work proceeded in such a manner. Many scholars burst the bubble of this romantic vision of the political sector during the 1960s. But it was [James] Buchanan and Gordon Tullock who deserve the credit for shifting scholarly focus.”

John Cochrane sums up the whole case succinctly in the “punchline” of a recent post:

“The case for free markets never was their perfection. The case for free markets always was centuries of experience with the failures of the only alternative, state control. Free markets are, as the saying goes, the worst system; except for all the others.”

Tracing Failures

We can view the relation between market failure and government failure in two ways. First, we can try to identify market failures and root causes. For example, external costs like pollution cause harm to innocent third parties. This failure might be solely attributable to transactions between private parties, but there are cases in which government engages as one of those parties, such as defense contracting. In other cases government effectively subsidizes toxic waste, like the eventual disposal of solar panels. Another kind of market failure occurs when firms wield monopoly power, but that is often abetted by costly regulations that deliver fatal blows to small competitors.

The second way to analyze the nexus between government and market failures is to first examine the taxonomy of government failure and identify the various damages inflicted upon the operation of private markets. That’s the course I’ll follow below, though by no means is the discussion here exhaustive.

Failures In and Out of Scope

An extensive treatment of government failure was offered eight years ago by William R. Keech and Michael Munger. To start, they point out what everyone knows: governments occasionally perpetrate monstrous acts like genocide and the instigation of war. That helps illustrate a basic dichotomy in government failures:

“… government may fail to do things it should do, or government may do things it should not do.’

Both parts of that statement have numerous dimensions. Failures at what government should do run the gamut from poor service at the DMV, to failure to enforce rights, to corrupt bureaucrats and politicians skimming off the public purse in the execution of their duties. These failures of government are all too common.

What government should and should not do, however, is usually a matter of political opinion. Thomas Jefferson’s axioms appear in a single sentence at the beginning of the Declaration of Independence; they are a tremendous guide to the first principles of a benevolent state. However, those axioms don’t go far in determining the range of specific legal protections and services that should and shouldn’t be provided by government.

Pareto Superiority

Keech and Munger engage in an analytical exercise in which the “should and shouldn’t” question is determined under the standard of Pareto superiority. A state of the world is Pareto superior if at least one person prefers it to the current state (and no one else is averse to it). Coincidentally, voluntary trades in private markets always exploit Pareto superior opportunities, absent legitimate external costs and benefits.

The set of Pareto superior states available to government can be expanded by allowing for side payments or compensation to those who would have preferred the current state. Still, those side payments are limited by the magnitude of the gains flowing to those who prefer the alternative (and if those gains can be redistributed monetarily).

Keech and Munger define government failure as the unexploited existence of Pareto superior states. Of course, by this definition, only a benevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent dictator could hope to avoid government failure. But this is no more unrealistic than the assumptions underlying perfectly competitive market equilibrium from which departure are deemed “market failures” that government should correct. Thus, Keech and Munger say:

“The concept of government failure has been trapped in the cocoon of the theory of perfect markets. … Government failure in the contemporary context means failing to resolve a classic market failure.”

But markets must operate within a setting defined by culture and institutions. The establishment of a social order under which individuals have enforceable rights must come prior to well-functioning markets, and that requires a certain level of state capacity. Keech and Munger are correct that market failure is often a manifestation of government failure in setting and/or enforcing these “rules of the game”.

“The real question is … how the rules of the game should be structured in terms of incentives, property rights, and constraints.”

The Regulatory State and Market Failures

Government can do too little in defining and enforcing rights, and that’s undoubtedly a cause of failure in markets in even the most advanced economies. At the same time there is an undeniable tendency for mission creep: governments often try to do too much. Overregulation in the U.S. and other developed nations creates a variety of market failures. This includes the waste inherent in compliance costs that far exceed benefits; welfare losses from price controls, licensing, and quotas; diversion of otherwise productive resources into rent seeking activity, anti-competitive effects from “regulatory capture”; Chevron-like distortions endemic to the administrative judicial process; unnecessary interference in almost any aspect of private business; and outright corruption and bribe-taking.

Central Planning and Market Failures

Another category of government attempting to “do too much” is the misallocation of resources that inevitably accompanies efforts to pick “winners and losers”. The massive subsidies flowing to investors in various technologies are often misdirected. Many of these expenditures end up as losses for taxpayers, and this is not the only form in which failed industrial planning takes place. A related evil occurs when steps are taken to penalize and destroy industries in political disfavor with thin economic justification.

Other clear examples of government “planning” failure are protectionist laws. These are a net drain on our wealth as a society, denying consumers of free choice and saddling the country with the necessity to produce restricted products at high cost relative to erstwhile trading partners.

There are, of course, failures lurking within many other large government spending programs in areas such as national defense, transportation, education, and agriculture. Many of these programs can be characterized as centrally planning. Not only are some of these expenditures ineffectual, but massive procurement spending seems to invite waste and graft. After all, it’s somebody else’s money.

Redistribution and Market Failures

One might regard redistribution programs as vehicles for the kinds of side payments described by Keech and Munger. Some might even say these are the side payments necessary to overcome resistance from those unable to thrive in a market economy. That reverses the historical sequence of events, however, since the dominant economic role of markets preceded the advent of massive redistribution schemes. Unfortunately, redistribution programs have been plagued by poor design, such as the actuarial nightmare inherent in Social Security and the destructive work incentives embedded in other parts of the social safety net. These are rightly viewed as government failures, and their distortionary effects spill variously into capital markets, labor markets and ultimately product markets.

Taxation and Market Failures

All these public initiatives under which government failures precipitate assorted market failures must be paid for by taxpayers. Therefore, we must also consider the additional effects of taxation on markets and market failures. The income tax system is rife with economic distortions. Not only does it inflict huge compliance costs, but it alters incentives in ways that inhibit capital formation and labor supply. That hampers the ability of input markets to efficiently meet the needs of producers, inhibiting the economy’s productive capacity. In turn, these effects spill into output market failures, with consequent losses in .social welfare. Distortionary taxes are a form of government failure that leads to broad market failures.

Deficits and Market Failure

More often than not, of course, tax revenue is inadequate to fund the entire government budget. Deficit spending and borrowing can make sense when public outlays truly produce long-term benefits. In fact, the mere existence of “risk-free” assets (Treasury debt) across the maturity spectrum might enhance social welfare if it enables improvements in portfolio diversification that outweigh the cost of the government’s interest obligations. (Treasury securities do bear interest-rate risk and, if unindexed, they bear inflation risk.)

Nevertheless, borrowing can reflect and magnify deleterious government efforts to “do too much”, ultimately leading to market failures. Government borrowing may “crowd out” private capital formation, harming economy-wide productivity. It might also inhibit the ability of households to borrow at affordable rates. Interest costs of the public debt may become explosive as they rise relative to GDP, limiting the ability of the public sector to perform tasks that it should *actually* do, with negative implications for market performance.

Inflation and Market Failure

Deficit spending promotes inflation as well. This is more readily enabled when government debt is monetized, but absent fiscal discipline, the escalation of goods prices is the only remaining force capable of controlling the real value of the debt. This is essentially the inflation tax.

Inflation is a destructive force. It distorts the meaning of prices, causes the market to misallocate resources due to uncertainty, and inflicts costs on those with fixed incomes or whose incomes cannot keep up with inflation. Sadly, the latter are usually in lower socioeconomic strata. These are symptoms of market failure prompted by government failure to control spending and maintain a stable medium of exchange.

Conclusion

Markets may fail, but when they do it’s very often rooted in one form of government failure or another. Sometimes it’s an inadequacy in the establishment or enforcement of property rights. It could be a case of overzealous regulation. Or government may encroach on, impede, or distort decisions regarding the provision of goods or services best left to the market. More broadly, redistribution and taxation, including the inflation tax, distort labor and capital markets. The variety of distortions created when government fails at what it should do, or does what it shouldn’t do, is truly daunting. Yet it’s difficult to find leaders willing to face up to all this. Statism has a powerful allure, and too many elites are in thrall to the technocratic scientism of government solutions to social problems and central planning in the allocation of resources.

Trump Bumbles On Trade With Tariffs

02 Friday Mar 2018

Posted by Nuetzel in Free Trade, Protectionism, Tariffs

≈ 1 Comment

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Carve-Outs, central planning, Fair Trade, Import Quotas, monopoly power, Protectionism, Tariffs, Trade Barriers, Trade War, Trading Partners, Trump Tariffs

You can get away with lousy policy by calling it a “negotiating tactic” for only so long. But that dubious ploy is one of the rationales offered last week by the Trump Administration for imposing a 25% tariff on imported steel and a 10% tariff on imported aluminum. Sure, the tariffs are like gifts rendered onto American steel and aluminum producers, their shareholders, and their unionized workers. The tariffs allow them to compete more effectively, without any effort, with foreign steel and aluminum in the domestic market, and the tariffs may also give them leeway to raise prices. The tariffs are also forgiving of degraded performance by domestic producers, since reduced competition relieves pressure for efficiency, a primary social cost of monopoly power.

So who pays for these gifts to the domestic steel and aluminum industries? A tariff, of course, is a tax, and a significant portion of it will be passed along into higher prices of both imported and domestically-produced steel and aluminum. Therefore, the burden of that tax will be borne to a large extent by domestics users, including every domestic industry that uses steel or aluminum as an input, and by consumers who purchase those products. That erodes the job security of many domestic workers outside of the steel and aluminum industries. In fact, the tariffs are unlikely to create more jobs even in the steel and aluminum industries given the negative impact of higher prices on the quantities of those metals demanded.

The desperate story line in support of tariffs also includes the assertion that the U.S. steel and aluminum industries are in such dire straits that they are in danger of vanishing. Statistics on U.S. production hardly suggest that is the case, however. Steel output in the U.S. has been reasonably steady since recovering from the last recession, though it has not achieved its pre-recession level. While aluminum output has been declining, it is hardly in a free fall. The stock prices of major steel and aluminum producers, which are forward-looking, have not demonstrated a particular need for government aid (as if that could ever justify a too-big or too-important-to-fail mentality).

Defenders of the tariffs claim that one effect will include additional direct investment in the U.S. by foreign producers of steel and aluminum, because they can avoid the tariffs by setting up production within our borders. Perhaps a few will, but capital is mobile in other sectors as well. Producers in other industries requiring intensive use of steel or aluminum inputs will now have an incentive to shift production overseas, where the tariffs won’t apply. Attempting to prevent such shifts via import tariffs on final products would quickly become a nightmare of central planning.

Apologists for the tariffs go even further, noting that our new regulatory and tax environment will bring foreign producers to the U.S., essentially making the tariffs irrelevant. If that’s the case, why bother imposing the tariffs at all? And why penalize consumers and industries requiring intensive use of steel or aluminum?

The argument that tariffs provide a stronger position from which to negotiate with foreign “trading partners” (or rather, their governments) is tenuous at best. More likely, the tariffs will prompt retaliation by foreign governments against a range of American products. The very notion that “trade wars are good”, tweeted by President Trump on Friday morning, is as nonsensical as a suggestion that voluntary exchange is destructive. Already, the EU has announced plans to retaliate by imposing tariffs on bourbon and motorcycles produced in the U.S.

Negotiations are unlikely to be successful. Perhaps some foreign governments who subsidize their steel and aluminum producers could be persuaded to enter talks. Our own domestic producers are penalized by various tariffs and quotas in place abroad, and those might be used by foreign interests as a lever in negotiations. However, the most fundamental foreign trade advantages, when they exist, have to do with low wages, less regulation, more efficient production facilities, and sometimes a more favorable tax environment. Wage levels reflect labor productivity, but those wage levels are valued more highly in their home countries than in the U.S, and penalizing these countries with trade sanctions merely penalizes their workers. Not all dimensions of a cost advantage can be negotiated, and in any case, healthy competition in any industry is always in the interests of a nation’s consumers.

National security is another standard argument in favor of protectionist measures. We’re told, for example, that we cannot allow China to produce all of the steel, but China provides only a small fraction of U.S. steel imports. Canada, Brazil and Mexico provide far more. In fact, China was in 11th place on that list in 2017. So our sources of steel are fairly well diversified. A domestic shortage of steel or aluminum caused by a breakdown in relations with one or more steel-exporting countries would lead to higher prices, but it would bring forth greater supplies from other countries and even from high-cost domestic sources. That is not a national emergency.

It’s possible that the Trump Administration will create “carve-outs”, exempting goods from certain countries from the tariffs. Presumably, those would be based on an assessment of each country’s trade policies and whether they are consistent with “fair” trade, in the judgement of U.S. trade authorities. However, all nations play the protectionist game in one form or another, including the U.S. Any carve outs would be better than none at all, but the remaining tariffs imposed by the administration will be a net burden to the U.S. economy.

Up till now, I have been pleasantly surprised by the Trump Administration’s efforts to de-tax and deregulate the U.S. economy. However, the threat that Donald Trump would adopt protectionist trade policies was one of my major trepidations about his candidacy. And here it is, as he promised. The dilemma often expressed by protectionists is that foreign producers can put elements of the domestic economy out of business by selling below cost. That drain on a country’s resources cannot span all industries — the U.S. has a comparative advantage in many areas. Such an effort cannot last forever or else these nations would cannibalize their own industrial base. Foreign governments quite simply cannot afford it economically and politically. On our end, the best advice is to accept the gift of low-cost goods. With access to ultra-cheap goods, whether steel, sorghum, or some finished product, American consumers and producers who use those imports gain unambiguously, and the purchasing power released can be spent on other goods and services.

Trade Enragement Syndrome

31 Sunday Jul 2016

Posted by Nuetzel in Free Trade, Protectionism

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Bernie Sanders, Capital Account Surplus, Don Boudreaux, Donald Trump, Free trade, Geocentrism, Heliocentrism, Import Competition, monopoly power, NAFTA, Protectionism, Trade Deficit, Trans-Pacific Partnership

Trade makes us richer, not poorer. The anti-trade rhetoric spouted by neo-mercantilists like Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders is about as sensible as a boycott on goods produced in the next town, or for that matter, on anyone with whom one might otherwise choose to trade. Don Boudreaux perfectly captures my feelings about the rising trend of protectionist sentiment by comparing it to geocentrism:

“Lately I feel as I imagine an astronomer would today feel if, centuries after Copernicus and Galileo proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that the earth isn’t the center of the solar system, large numbers of people – including popular media pundits and politicians – began to insist that the sun and the planets and the stars do indeed all revolve around a stationary earth that is situated in the center of the universe.“

The very motivation for trade is to obtain something of value that one did not produce, to acquire that which one cannot easily acquire without trade, or to acquire it on more favorable terms than otherwise. It recognizes the reality that one’s productive efforts should be focused in an area that best suits their skills or natural talents. That’s better for the individual and better for society! Countries should produce what they are best at producing, which gives them a cost advantage in their areas of specialization. Trade allows individuals and nations to specialize in production but diversify in consumption, allowing them to enjoy access to the broadest possible range of goods and services produced worldwide.

The consummation of any trade heralds the attainment of mutual benefits to the parties: one produces and employs at a profit; the other consumes a thing of greater value than the price paid. The payments for foreign goods must come from either domestically-produced goods or from foreign investment in domestic real estate, buildings, factories or other real and financial assets. That is, if we purchase more goods from abroad than we export, then foreigners must either hold the dollars they receive or invest them in other ways. The latter represent trades in assets, and those trades, too, are mutually beneficial. The result is that U.S. investors gain and/or the economy benefits from new, productivity-enhancing plant and equipment, not terrible outcomes. Trade deficits are balanced by capital surpluses, and trade surpluses are balanced by capital deficits. Taken together, trade in goods and capital (assets) always balance and are mutually beneficial in every case, whether we run a trade deficit or a surplus.

That said, it’s worth emphasizing that so-called free trade agreements are something of a sham. Countries don’t trade. People do. Unfortunately, I have indulged the notion of national trade negotiation in the past, if only implicitly, by vouching for trade agreements like NAFTA and TPP as sort of second-best solutions to the horrid reality of trade restrictions promulgated by protectionist politicians. I reasoned that dismantling those barriers, one-country (or region) at-a-time was preferable to doing nothing. However, negotiations like these become mired in extraneous issues such as environmental policies, labor laws, immigration rules and other commercial policies. Nor do those negotiations always inhibit domestic subsidies to politically-favored activities. Indeed, they might actually encourage subsidies for value-eroding projects. Again, the entire process of trade negotiations is extraneous to the extent that trade takes place between individuals. Unfettered gains from trade require the absence of trade barriers. Dropping them unilaterally would benefit consumers, encourage efficiency by domestic producers, and provide a great example for other nations.

Opponents of trade, like Messrs. Trump and Sanders, lack a basic understanding of the reasons why individuals engage in cooperative exchange. Or at least they fail to acknowledge, for political reasons or sheer density, that what improves well-being at home is freedom to transact, across our borders as well as within our borders. To prevent this activity is to forcibly deny individual freedom. Boudreaux makes this point be asking trade opponents a series of questions, the first few of which are listed below:

“– Are you made richer if the supermarket … at which you once shopped hires armed goons to force you to start shopping there again?

– Do you believe that the owners and the employees of [that store] are so ethically entitled to your continuing patronage as a consumer that they are justified in employing armed goons to prevent you from shopping elsewhere?

– Do you believe that, now that [the store] has successfully forced you not to shop at competing supermarkets, that the owners and employees … will work as diligently and as creatively as possible to keep the prices they charge low and the quality of their service high?

– Do you believe that the higher profits and higher wages reaped by [the store’s] owners and workers as a result of their holding you hostage as a customer make you more prosperous?

– Do you believe that the higher profits and higher wages reaped by [the store’s] owners and workers as a result of their holding you hostage as a customer make your community more prosperous, even though [the store’s] higher profits and higher wages are necessarily funded by money that you and other … ‘customers’ are forced not to spend on other goods, services, or investment options?

– If you believe that [the store] has a right to force you not to shop for food at other supermarkets, do you believe also that [the store] has a right to force you not to grow more of your own food, or not to eat out more often at restaurants, or not to go on a diet?“

It is difficult to believe that educated people believe restrictions on the freedom of individuals to cooperate with others will improve their well being. Of course, those educated people are often politicians who stand to benefit from frightening voters, and who have no interest in reminding them that a flow of foreign goods broadens choices, reduces prices, and provides valuable discipline to domestic businesses. Without competitive discipline, we forgo important benefits and instead allow quality and price to come under the arrogant power of monopolists. There are, of course, many producers who are willing to provide meaningful support to politicians who will protect them from foreign competition. That’s not capitalism. Its cronyism!

If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Defame ‘Em

02 Friday May 2014

Posted by Nuetzel in Uncategorized

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charter schools, competition, monopoly power, Public education, Thomas Sowell

Can public and charter schools peacefully coexist? “Demonizing the Helpers” wouldn’t be a theme of so many posts if it wasn’t such a common defensive strategy adopted by entrenched interests. In this case, Thomas Sowell notes that “charter schools provoke the ire of those who have failed students up to now.” It’s good to reflect on the actual goals of our educational system and to weigh every option that could help to achieve those goals. Real outcomes show that changes in public education are sorely needed, and charter schools have proven that they can be part of the solution. Instead, stakeholders in the failing public education monopoly have sought only to protect their turf, engaging in a systematic campaign to vilify charter schools and their supporters.

Sacred Cow Chips

Tag Archives: monopoly power

Trump Bumbles On Trade With Tariffs

Trade Enragement Syndrome

If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Defame ‘Em