Category Archives: infrastructure

Infrastructure: Public Waste & Private Rationality

25 Tuesday Jul 2017

Posted by in infrastructure, Privatization

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The exaggerated deterioration of American infrastructure is the basis of a perfect bipartisan spending coalition. Proposed public spending on capital such as roads, bridges, high-speed rail, locks, dams, and water and wastewater systems is of obvious value to those who would build it, but the benefits for the public are not always beyond question. As Jeffrey Harding notes at the link, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) rates U.S. infrastructure as seriously deficient, but it is in their interests to do so. The news media finds the kind of horror story promoted by ASCE hard to resist:

“What they don’t tell you is that if you look at transportation issues over time, things have been getting better, not worse. … The Reason Foundation’s studies on state-owned highways (they are widely recognized as being leaders in this field) and other studies on highways and bridges reveal that there have been significant improvements of infrastructure measures like road and bridge quality and fatalities over the past 20 or 30 years. The facts are that, on the state level, overall spending on highways doubled during that period, and overall measures of highway transportation have improved.“

The point of building new infrastructure is the future flow of service it can offer. Creating construction jobs is not the point. If it were, the government could hire workers to dig holes with spoons, to paraphrase Milton Friedman. Nor should the timing of infrastructure investment be dependent on employment conditions. Unworthy projects are not made worthy by high unemployment. Politicians often attempt to sell projects to the public on exactly that basis, yet as Harding points out, increases in public spending on infrastructure seldom happen in a timely manner, and they often fail to create jobs in any case. This is partly due to the regulatory morass that must be navigated to get approval for new infrastructure, and also because the skilled labor required to repair or add infrastructure is usually occupied already, even when the jobless rate is elevated. In addition, expensive infrastructure projects are vulnerable to graft, which is compounded by the many layers of approval that are typically required.

Harding questions the ASCE’s insistence that inadequacy of our infrastructure is inhibiting U.S. productivity growth. If there is any truth to this assertion, it is probably more strongly related to how infrastructure is priced to users than to the state of the facilities themselves. For example, road congestion in certain areas is a chronic problem that can only be solved via efficient pricing, not by endless attempts to expand capacity. Not only does efficient pricing ease congestion, it enhances the profitability of improvements as well as other modes of transportation. A proposal to add infrastructure that is destined to be mis-priced to users is a plan to waste resources.

Donald Trump conveniently bought into and re-sold the notion that America’s infrastructure is unsound, and he is likely to garner support for an infrastructure initiative on both sides of the aisle. He would undoubtedly include the proposed wall at the Mexican border as an infrastructural need, but we’ll leave the wisdom (and payback) of that project aside for purposes of this discussion. As I’ve discussed before on Sacred Cow Chips, President Trump has at least learned that infrastructure is not and should not be the exclusive domain of the public sector. Trump’s infrastructure proposal calls for tax credits for “public-private partnerships” (Harding’s acronym: P3s). As Harding says:

“P3s let private companies design, build, and operate new infrastructure projects. According to Bob Poole, the Reason Foundation’s expert on privatization, P3s will result in projects that will be more economically productive (no bridges to nowhere) and would be much more cost effective. … These projects would be based on privatized systems which generate an income stream, and are financed by revenue bonds. Thus, the risks of these projects are shifted to private companies rather than to taxpayers.“

P3s solve several problems: they allocate private resources toward facilities for which developers expect high demand and user willingness to pay; they avoid higher levels of general taxation, instead allocating costs to the cost causers (i.e., the users); they give users a more accurate measure of opportunity costs when considering alternatives; and they avoid overuse. Too often, users of public infrastructure pay nothing, or at most they pay enough to cover operating costs with very little contribution to capital costs. Ultimately, that makes the quality and service level delivered by the infrastructure unsustainable. Private developers are unlikely to invest in such boondoggles as long as taxpayers are not obliged to subsidize them.

The P3 tax credits in the Administration’s proposal would certainly represent a public contribution to the funding of a project, but the incentive provided by those credits helps avoid a much more substantial committment of public funds. Moreover, the credits do not create the degree of forced economic stimulus that publicly executed projects often do. Rather, the availability of credits means that projects will be initiated when and if they are economically viable and profitable to do so. We can therefore dispense with the nonsensical goal of “job creation” and focus on the real problems that infrastructure investment can solve.

Some would argue that many types of infrastructure are too public in nature to be left to P3s. In other words, projects with pure public benefits would be under-provided by P3s due an unwillingness to pay by users of “the commons”. Yet there is no rule limiting the public role in the design of a public-private partnership, whether that refers to physical development, operation, or funding. Presumably, the more “public” (and non-exclusive) the benefits, the greater the share of development and maintenance costs that should be funded by government. Whether a piece of true public infrastructure should be funded is a standard question of public finance. Assuming it should, there is likely to be a significant role for private builders and operators. Finally, P3’s do not eliminate the potential for graft. Public review and ongoing regulation would still be demanded. In a sense, P3s are all formalized corporatist efforts, but a key difference relative to current practice is the use and risk of private capital rather than public funds. Ultimately, that won’t matter if failed developments are bailed out by public “partners”. The assets of a failed infrastructure project must be sold off to the highest bidder, presumably at a steep discount.

The standard narrative is that America suffers from substandard infrastructure is highly misleading. There are certainly needs that should be met, many with urgency, and there will always be a series of worthwhile repairs and replacements that require funding. Using P3s to accomplish these objectives demands recognition that 1) users typically derive significant private benefits from infrastructure; and 2) use is often underpriced, especially with respect to allocating capital costs. Infrastructure development can be encouraged by inducing private firms to put “skin in the game”. High-risk but potentially valuable projects might have trouble attracting private funds, of course, and that is as it should be. Politicians might ask taxpayers to fund such a project rather than shopping it to private developers. It therefore behooves voter/taxpayers to evaluate the benefits and sustainability of the project with the utmost skepticism.

Postscript: The image at the top of this post prompts me to reflect on whether a starship is infrastructure. It is certainly a transportation system. Is it a public good? In a large sense, the diversification offered by spreading humanity across multiple worlds can be viewed as a benefit to mankind in the future. But rides on the starship would offer private benefits, depending on one’s sense of adventure as well as the prospects for the home planet. Those private benefits, and the voluntary payments they induce, just might get it done.

Private Incentives and Infrastructure

10 Tuesday Jan 2017

Posted by in infrastructure, Markets

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motorway-to-hell

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Material infrastructure is fixed plant and equipment providing services considered basic to the functioning of society. That definition leaves plenty of room for interpretation, however. For example, it does not limit the meaning of “infrastructure” to facilities necessary for the provision of “public goods”, for which benefits are non-exclusive. And it encompasses facilities used by firms in certain competitive markets, such as some forms of telecommunication. The character of infrastructure tends to change over time, as new technologies lead to changes in our way of life (e.g., the cellular network). That’s even more evident when infrastructure is defined more broadly, as Walter Buhr does in “What Is Infrastructure?” His definition of material infrastructure encompasses all facilities enabling “the activation or mobilization of the economic agents’ potentialities.”

Infrastructure ≠ Government

There is a popular fallacy that infrastructure is the exclusive province of government. Infrastructure often does provide some public, non-exclusive benefits, but the willingness of users to pay is the key test of private benefits. As it happens, most infrastructure needs can be met privately and partly, if not fully, supported by user fees. That follows from the high degree of exclusivity of benefits yielded by the infrastructure. Today, privately-owned infrastructure includes communication networks, power generation and distribution, some water and sewer systems, toll roads, ports, and landfills. The presumed monopolistic nature of some infrastructural services probably encourages the notion that infrastructure must be public, but that view is largely unjustified: the services may be “monopolized” only to the extent that the relevant market is defined narrowly, such as road travel, rather than transportation. Indeed, certain kinds of infrastructure functions in markets that are fairly competitive (e.g., wireless networks).

The great thing about most private infrastructure is that owner-operators have an incentive to put it up and keep it up. So it kind of takes care of itself. I say “kind of” because there is always a degree of public involvement, from land use and environmental approval to construction permits, to licensing, to spectrum auctions, to rate regulation, and many other varieties of oversight. Aside from those considerations, if there is a need for infrastructure that is commercially-viable, the project is likely to be proposed by private interests. The funds necessary to pay for construction can be raised from private investors, rather than taxpayers. It’s not at all strange to say that private infrastructure is highly advantageous from a public finance perspective.

There are risks to private infrastructure developers, but those risks are too often borne publicly. A new facility, be it a water treatment plant or a road, might not prove to be profitable once a new revenue stream or reduction in operating costs is realized. Given those circumstances, private interests might seek additional incentives from public authorities to ensure profitbility. To the extent that the shortfall is due to an error in pricing administered by a public regulatory authority, it might be reasonable to make adjustments in the owner-operator’s favor. However, to the extent that demand falls short of the owner-operator’s expectations, it might be better to let the firm fail. That would allow the assets to be sold at a discount to a new operator who can make the cheaper investment profitable. No bailouts!

Trumpian Infrastructure Incentives

The coming Trump Administration is known to have certain steps in mind for encouraging infrastructure development. While the tax plan that has been discussed has a few questionable features, any policy that reduces corporate tax rates would increase the return to existing and prospective private infrastructure, and the profitability of private operation of public infrastructure. In addition, a proposal mentioned explicitly by Trump is a corporate tax credit for infrastructure development.

Here is where a more precise definition of infrastructure would be helpful. Would traditional categories of infrastructure investment by power, telecommunication, and water treatment companies qualify automatically? Moreover, the long timelines required in the planning and installation of most infrastructure might make it difficult to distinguish between new plans and those already in the works. Will the administration establish a bright line between infrastructure investment and run-of-the-mill corporate spending on new plant and equipment? Perhaps any form of corporate investment will qualify. These are questions that remain unanswered as we await Trump’s inauguration.

There is another public-finance dimension of the Trump infrastructure credit. Public infrastructure projects, such as roads, are frequently difficult for governments to fund because they face limits on the debt they can issue. This is emphasized by Randall O’Toole in a recent piece on the Trump credit. Instead of issuing its own debt, a government can take advantage of a large private road builder’s ability to raise funds in the capital market, agreeing to compensate the contractor over time. Thus, taxpayers will be obligated to pay-off the contractor’s debt. The term “Public-Private Partnership” has been invoked in this connection.

Private Incentives Or Central Planning?

I am never averse to reduced tax rates to the extent that taxation always distorts economic incentives. However, selective targeting of tax benefits at certain industries, specific forms of business organization (like corporations), or specific activities like capital investment is overt central planning. Overriding market incentives in this way is not desirable. (Neither are proposals to subsidize exporters and penalize importers. Tyler Cowen at the Marginal Revolution provides some salient quotes from Lawrence Summers on this point.) At this stage, Trump’s tax plan looks like central planning gone berserk.

Ideally, private investment and private infrastructure should be judged on its real merits, not on the prejudices of a central authority. To that end, I believe the Trump Administration’s intent to roll back regulatory distortions is commendable. A case in point is nuclear power generation. Despite the constant outcry against the burning of fossil fuels, there has been little emphasis on encouraging investment in new nuclear capacity. The lengthy approval process and costly regulatory requirements discourage this zero-carbon form of energy production relative to other forms of energy investment.

Users Are the Cost-Causers

I should note that O’Toole speaks favorably of “targeting” certain kinds of public infrastructure, but I think his point is that private operation of infrastructure, if not ownership, will allow markets to do the targeting more efficiently than government ever could. In particular, he notes that politicians tend to prefer new projects to the maintenance and repair of existing infrastructure, independent of the actual merit. Would relying on private operation and user fees encourage better maintenance?

“Unlike infrastructure paid for out of tax dollars, user-fee-funded projects tend to be well maintained because the agencies that manage them know they have to keep them in good shape to continue earning revenues.“

The cartoon above satirizes the consequences of providing free access to a costly facility. User fees encourage more rational patterns of use. For example, it is folly to think that projects like light rail can be financially viable when free alternatives exist. Specific highway routes under high demand must be priced in order for commuters to make rational decisions about the alternatives available to them, and for providers of transportation facilities, whether public or private, to rationally balance the resources dedicated to supporting various modes of travel.

Lower tax and regulatory burdens under the Trump infrastructure plan offer some encouragement for private development and operation of infrastructure projects. As a by-product, the plan might encourage greater reliance on user fees as a method of defraying the costs of infrastructure and promoting a more efficient allocation of resources toward infrastructure needs. However, there are unanswered questions about the details of the plan, and some of its heavy-handy features should be dispensed with.

Politicians and Infra-Hucksters

05 Thursday Jan 2017

Posted by in Government, infrastructure, Technology

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We’ll soon have a new president and already we’ve heard new promises of infrastructure investment. Once again, a chorus of politicians and pundits decries the woeful state of America’s road, bridges, sewers and airport terminals. Then, there are hosannas in adoration of the economic stimulus and job creation promised by large public works projects. And of course there are proposals to integrate politically-favored technologies with new infrastructure. All three rationales for a publicly-financed infrastructure program are flawed. Our infrastructure is not as inadequate as many believe; it is bad public policy to justify infrastructure decisions on the basis of the construction jobs required; and new infrastructure should not be treated as a vehicle for large-scale deployment of unproven technologies.

Ownership

Much of our nation’s infrastructure is privately owned. This includes, but is not limited to, power generation and the power grid, communication networks, many water systems and sewer systems, most rail lines, some toll roads and bridges, and some river, sea and space ports. Maintenance and upgrades to private facilities, and to some public facilities, depend on the adequacy of the rates or fees charged to users. On the other hand, the quantity and quality of publicly-owned and operated infrastructure is often left up to taxpayers rather than users. Proposals for federal infrastructure investment are largely about these public facilities, but they might also involve subsidies for the development of private infrastructure.

Crisis or Crock?

In a Heritage Foundation research report, Michael Sargent notes that the poor state of the country’s public infrastructure is wildly exaggerated:

“The notion that America’s infrastructure is ‘crumbling’ and in uniquely poor condition is not supported by data. The percentage of the nation’s bridges deemed ‘structurally deficient (not necessarily unsafe, but requiring extensive maintenance) has declined annually since 1990 and now sits at under 10 percent, well under half of what it was 25 years ago. Similarly, analyses of highway pavement quality conclude that the nation’s major roads have been steadily improving in quality and are likely in their best shape ever. Our airports and airways safely move more people and goods than those of any other nation. Overall, the U.S. ranks near the top of G-7 nations for infrastructure quality.“

The usual poster child of the infrastructure “crisis” is the nation’s transportation system, but this report from the Reason Foundation shows that those troubles are something of a myth.

Nevertheless, there are always repairs, maintenance and replacement projects to be considered, as well as possible expansion and new facilities. Infrastructural shortfalls and expansion must be prioritized, but as Sargent emphasizes, an even larger number of projects should and probably would be handled privately if not for burdensome federal regulations. In addition, an irrational mistrust of privately-operated facilities among some segments of the public creates pressure to burden taxpayers with costs, rather than users. Complaints about congestion on roads offer a case in point: the best solutions involve efficient (and positive) pricing of existing capacity, rather than continued expansion of a “free” good. The avoidance of rational solutions like efficient pricing underscores the extent to which demands for increased public investment in infrastructure are driven by hyperbole, rather than sound analysis.

It’s About the Infrastructure, Not the Jobs 

Public infrastructure projects are also pitched as effective engines of economic stimulus and job creation. Both of those claims are questionable. Most importantly, the real rationale for infrastructure investment is the value of the infrastructure itself and the needs it serves going forward. The public expense and the jobs required to produce it are cost items! This point was made recently by economist T. Norman Van Cott, who rightfully asserts that a given output is of greater benefit when its costs are low and when it requires less labor input. (Van Cott’s piece uses the Keystone pipeline as an example, a controversial private project that I find objectionable for its dependence on eminent domain actions.) The sharp distinction between creating value and creating jobs is also made here by Jerry L. Jordon and here by Steven Horowitz. Here is Horowitz:

“Creating jobs is easy; it’s creating value that’s hard. We could create millions of jobs quite easily by destroying every piece of machinery on U.S. farms. The question is whether we are actually better off by creating those jobs—and the answer is a definite no.“

Yet this is how so many infrastructure projects are pitched at the national, state and local levels. It’s also puzzling that economic stimulus is used as a rationale even when the economy is operating near its potential output. Even by the standards of traditional Keynesian economic analysis, that is the wrong time for stimulus. Infrastructure projects should be evaluated on their own merits, not on how many construction workers must be hired, or on how much of their paychecks those workers will spend. Many of them must be bid away from competing projects anyway.

The Public Investment Trough

Here’s a brief anecdote from my own experience with an “advanced” public infrastructure project. Some years ago in the region around my city, St. Louis, Missouri, transportation agencies began to install a network of electronic highway message boards to convey real-time information to drivers on road conditions, congestion, and various public service announcements. The 100+ signs in the area today are connected to operators in a central office via fiber optic cable. This type of system is used elsewhere, and it is partly funded by the federal government.

I seriously question the benefits of this system relative to cost. The signs themselves cost well in excess of $100,000 each. The fiber network is undoubtedly costly, and there are other fixed and variable system costs. The signs have an anachronistic look, vaguely the quality of old high school scoreboards. The information they provide generally adds little to what I already know (“12 minutes to I-270”). The signs are in fixed positions, so the occasional report of an accident or congestion usually comes too late to give motorists decent alternatives. The information the signs provide on road conditions is obvious. Missives such as “buckle up” are of questionable value. Before I depart on a commute, or if I have a passenger, we can consult maps and other apps on cell phones to avail ourselves of far better information. Other, more flexible technologies were outpacing the message boards even before they could be fully deployed, and the boards are still being deployed. This is a project that might have sounded brilliant to highway engineers 20 years ago, but it represented something of a luxury relative to other needs, and it still got funded. Today, it looks like waste.

The politics of infrastructure often means that the enabling legislation gets loaded with poorly-planned projects and shiny jewels to dangle before home constituencies. Legislators are so eager to demonstrate their sophistication that they fall over themselves to approve taxpayer funds for unproven but politically-favored technologies. For example, a recent post by Warren Meyer notes the technical folly of solar roads. These are unlikely to attract much private money because they represent such a monumentally stupid idea. Proponents will go after tax money instead. The same is true of ideas like Elon Musk’s tunnel boring project, for which he hopes to collect massive taxpayer subsidies. Musk claims that tunnels will eliminate road congestion, but efficient pricing would do much to eliminate this problem without tunnels, and other technologies like automated vehicles are likely to reduce congestion by the time Musk over-invests tax money in tunnel-boring equipment, roads and hyper-loops inside tunnels.

In general, taxpayers should be wary of “green infrastructure” proposals. A large number of bike lanes, pedestrian bridges and greenways sound wonderful, but they are serious cost inflators. Federal dollars are regularly squandered on charming but wasteful projects such as trolleys. Even worse are ongoing efforts to subsidize the construction of high-speed rail systems. All of these bright ideas should be resisted.

Let’s Be Rational

The country certainly has infrastructural needs, but claims that we face a crisis are greatly exaggerated. With a new administration and what are likely to be supporting majorities in both houses of Congress, the danger of rushing into big funding commitments is heightened. The sponsors of this kind of legislation will herald massive job creation, but that is incidental to the cost side of the ledger. The benefits of individual projects should be evaluated carefully in comparison to costs. Then they can be prioritized if deemed of sufficient value. Finally, large scale deployment of unproven technologies should be avoided on the public dime.

I haven’t even mentioned one very large infrastructure project that has been proposed by President-Elect Donald Trump: the border wall. I suspect that it would be easier and less expensive to solve the problem of border security using more advanced and flexible technologies, but the permanence and symbolism of a wall appeals to many of Mr. Trump’s supporters. The benefits of a wall in terms of border security and control of immigration flows are difficult if not impossible to evaluate, as are the costs to taxpayers, with Trump promising to extract some form of payment from Mexico. The wall, however, is being “sold” to the American public in emotional terms. Come to think of it, that’s how too many other infrastructure proposals are sold by politicians!

There are promising opportunities to improve the nation’s infrastructure through the private sector, where the value of projects is subject to evaluation by parties who must put “skin in the game”. This will be addressed in my next post.

Pricing Wizards Baffle Public Officials

22 Wednesday Jul 2015

Posted by in infrastructure

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traffic-cartoon

When government invests in physical infrastructure, voters are led to believe that the resources invested will enhance their well being and safety as well as the productivity of the nation’s economy. In any particular instance, however, there is a strong chance that confidence in such assurances is misplaced. Allocation of public monies is always subject to a high likelihood of mismanagement, not least because decision-making in this arena is highly politicized. Government efficiency is always compromised because its actions are not guided by a profit motive. And it is well known that politicians and bureaucrats often act on their own private motives, rather than as purely disinterested public servants.

Another primary shortcoming of government infrastructure investment is that it is mis-priced. Highways are a perfect example. They are often congested because they are free. A weak objection to the last statement is that “pricing” is accomplished through gas taxes, which should provide incentives for curtailing the use of automobiles, but that is true only in the most general sense. The marginal cost to a driver of using a specific route is zero all day long. This leads to greater congestion, higher maintenance costs and, invariably, calls for expanding highway infrastructure.

Robert Krol has an excellent essay on the e21 website in which he lays out the strong case for congestion pricing:

“Although current federal law prohibits charging tolls on existing interstates, states may apply for permission to charge tolls on new lanes. This has occurred on a limited basis in Southern California. Variable tolls have been used outside the United States to successfully reduce congested highways. Before we spend more on highways, we need to change how we price highways. …

… the revenues could be used for highway maintenance and construction. Most importantly, by pricing roads correctly, we may actually find that we don’t need to spend more on highways. …

Economists Gilles Duranton and Matthew Turner have shown that building more highway capacity in U.S. cities results in residents driving more, greater commercial traffic, and population in-migration. Congestion remains, resulting in wasted time. A recent estimate from the Texas A&M Transportation Institute shows that these delays cost drivers $121 billion per year. Congestion also increases air pollution in neighborhoods near the congested highways.“

Public transit proposals are almost always boondoggles, including light rail. These systems usually generate fare revenue that falls short of operating costs (with zero contribution to capital costs). But at least fares are non-zero! The ability of mass transit systems to charge fares that pay for themselves is seriously undermined by the ongoing expansion of “free” urban highways.

Reihan Salam reinforces these points in a post about Hillary Clinton’s infrastructure proposals. Clinton pushes the general idea that more infrastructure spending is a must, going so far as to promote a public / private “infrastructure bank” for a wide range of projects that quite possibly are unnecessary, given more rational pricing. She doesn’t promote the latter and she probably doesn’t even think about it, or whether scarcity should be priced.

“If new infrastructure is to be financed with private capital, investors are going to expect spending discipline and, eventually, a meaningful return. Will this return be extracted from taxpayers or from users of the infrastructure service in question? The Obama administration, to its credit, supports allowing state government to collect tolls on their Interstate highway segments if they choose. Would Clinton favor giving states the freedom to make greater use of user fees? ….

I don’t think our main problem is that we’re not spending enough on highways, as Clinton seems to believe. If anything, I think our highway system is overbuilt. ​… The chief problem with our airports is not … that they’re not as sleek and modern as the vast white elephants you’ll find in East Asia. Rather, it is that they are congested, and the reason they are congested is that the federal government doesn’t provide for market-rate pricing for take-off and landing slots. This straightforward reform would greatly increase the productivity, not to mention the pleasantness, of our aviation system. Yet it doesn’t involve spending billions of dollars and cutting ribbons, so politicians are by and large not interested.“

Voters should not grant free points to politicians who merely utter the I-word: infrastructure. A more creative approach involves efficient, market pricing of highways and other public assets. The technology to price highways efficiently is now available. That may involve some loss of privacy, as it requires detecting the presence of individual vehicles on the roads, but privacy could be protected to some extent by using private firms to manage billing.

High-Speed Third Rail For Taxpayers

15 Friday May 2015

Posted by in Big Government, infrastructure, Taxes

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bullet train

Public boondoggles come in many forms, including sports stadiums and entertainment venues, convention centers, local trolly lines, light rail, superhighways, “gold-plated” public offices, and even subsidies for politically-favored (as opposed to market-favored) industries. Anything involving “infrastructure” has an almost perverse  political appeal. The many varieties of boondoggles have much in common from a public finance perspective: ultimately, they are almost always funded by taxpayers; when they confer benefits to private parties (and they usually do), they are underpriced to those users. Taxpayers are often lucky if these projects cover their operating costs, let alone capital costs, via direct revenue generation. Taxpayers are usually on the hook for the bonds. Pure public benefits might offer some justication for this burden, but those cited by project proponents are often unconvincing on that basis. Let’s face it: projects are seldom evaluated against something approximating the true opportunity costs faced by the public or taxpayers.

A prominent example of such a project that seems to capture the political imagination is high-speed rail (HSR). My friend John Crawford emailed the following link: “Doing the math on California’s bullet train fares“. John provided this summary:

“Not surprisingly, today’s fare estimate has risen 72% over the estimate that was cited during planning. That’s telling but probably not surprising to anyone, even those that tried to change opinions by citing the $50 fare. What I think is most interesting follows.

CA-HSR price of 86 is about 20c/mile. Comparable prices are 22c for a Chinese train that everybody agrees to be subsidized, 54c for a French train that is profitable and 50c for the Amtrak corridor on the East coast, which is probably profitable; 46c in Germany. Somehow, they think they can do what nobody else in the world can do…profit at 20c/mile.“

The California authority is either spectacularly arrogant or stupid. Probably the former, because they are doing what self-interested bureaucrats and politicians always do. They want the project to get done, thus creating an empire, kicking a can-full of fare increases and taxpayer liabilities down the road, beyond the time when anyone will hold them accountable for the malinvestment. But the true extent of the malinvestment will never be obvious, because the counter-factual will remain in the unseen world of lost opportunity.

Something I find exasperating about articles like this are references to “profitability”, as in “… state officials say the system will quickly become profitable“, when the meaning is not actual profitability. My friend John did it too, but I forgive him because he knew the score, and because he’ll forgive me for being a pedant (I hope). But this is important! What the California officials mean by “profitability” (and it is a misuse of the term) is fare revenue in excess of operating costs. The latter do not include initial capital costs, so these officials are not making claims about actual profitability. Profitability means that revenue exceeds ALL costs, including capital costs. Many observers consider the California authority’s estimates of operating costs to be suspect, so it’s not even clear that revenue will cover the future costs of capital replacement, let alone the initial installation costs. Construction and planning costs are expected to be $68 billion for Phase 1 only, and you can safely bet on significant additional overruns by the projected completion of Phase 1 in 2029.

Fares calibrated to cover operating costs are not defensible in terms of long-run marginal cost pricing. While an incremental rider does not cause the capital cost of the system to increase in the short run, incremental riders absolutely do have an impact on long-run capital costs. In any case, there are many incremental riders at start-up. The long run is now. Yet, like many public projects, the burden of uncovered costs is justified in terms of other benefits of a supposedly public nature. Here is a vague description of such benefits from the CA HSR Authority:

“California high-speed rail will connect the mega-regions of the state, contribute to economic development and a cleaner environment, create jobs and preserve agricultural and protected lands.“

Let’s take these one at a time:

  • connecting “mega-regions”, if that is a real benefit of HSR relative to alternative modes of transportation, will largely accrue to riders, not the general public.
  • Economic development benefits are possible along the route or near stations, but that is hardly a pure public benefit, and it is likely to come at the expense of development elsewhere.
  • The trains will be powered, at least in part, by energy from fossil fuels. If HSR produces less carbon than equivalent airplanes, autos and other alternatives, that might represent a pure public benefit (according to the carbonphobic), but this is a costly way to achieve a minor reduction in carbon emissions. It is of value only to the extent that HSR brings real substitution away from other, higher carbon modes.
  • Construction jobs are part of the cost of the project, but this is a common ploy and very handy way to sell the project. Gains for the workers are certainly not a pure public benefit. To paraphrase Bastiat, calling construction jobs from malinvested capital a “public benefit” is like calling a broken window beneficial because it provides work for the glazier.
  • As for preserving agricultural and public lands, I do not believe that HSR will make much of a dent in future, land-gobbling highway construction (and if it did, it would offset those vaunted HSR job gains).

The public should always view large public projects like HSR with skepticism and insist that private benefits should be paid privately. There are always alternative uses of taxpayer funds, including the possibility that taxpayers should keep them. Too many public projects become funding disasters. In many cases, private parties would not be willing to buy the facilities for more than 10 cents on the dollar.of original cost.  Without access to tax revenue, only a low purchase price would allow them to operate at a profit.

At the national level, this week’s tragic Amtrak crash near Philadelphia was the context for misguided calls to provide additional funding to the rail service. Sean Davis in The Federalist has a more logical proposal, even if it is a bit radical: not only should Amtrak be privatized, its assets should be given away! And how could anyone reach such a conclusion?

“Amtrak lost nearly $1.3 billion in 2013. Since its creation, Amtrak has racked up over $31 billion in accumulated losses. And every penny of those losses has been covered by federal taxpayers.

… Hand over the entire enterprise to whichever rail company wants it. ‘But that’s crazy!’ you might say. ‘Giving it away for free makes no cents [sic]!’

Well, neither does keeping it on the taxpayers’ books. The status quo costs taxpayers at least a billion dollars each year.“

Davis makes a fair point, though a give-away might attract multiple takers. Ultimately, bidding just might be necessary! Or, perhaps it would be necessary to PAY a private rail operator to take Amtrak off the federal government’s hands. A fairly high payment would still be worthwhile to taxpayers.

Randall O’Toole provides this excellent discussion of privatizing transit in a video  of approximately 17 minutes. He discusses trends in ridership, the inefficiencies inherent in public transportation systems, and compares various market structures and types of private transportation systems, including private intercity buses (Megabus). He also addresses concerns that private transportation systems will not meet the needs of the poor by proposing the substitution of “transit stamps” for the huge subsidies currently paid into transportation bureaucracies.

Stimulus and The Infrastructural Itch

06 Friday Feb 2015

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govBrownCartoon

Politicians may be rightly convinced that to utter the phrase “investment in infrastructure” is to goose the dopamine levels of voters and political reporters. It is an hypnotic mantra, especially if it can be paired with “economic stimulus”. And it seemingly matters not whether the benefits of an actual project exceed costs. The time-lines involved in infrastructure investment, legislative, planning, and construction, almost guarantee an absence of political accountability for projects that end badly.

Apparently, it doesn’t even matter whether an infrastructure project actually gets underway. President Obama knows that the promised spending can go to any pet initiative. This is driven home in “Infrastructure Bait and Switch” by Warren Meyer. He distinguishes between two types of this “B&S”:

“The first time around [Obama] sold the stimulus bill as mainly an infrastructure spending bill — remember all that talk of shovel-ready projects? Only a trivial percentage of that bill was infrastructure. At most 6% was infrastructure, and in practice a lot less since Obama admitted later there were no shovel-ready projects. … The rest of it was mainly stuff like salary support for state government officials. Do you think he would have as easily sold the ‘wage support for state government officials’ bill in the depth of a recession? No way, so he called it, falsely, an infrastructure bill.

The other bait and switch that occurs is within the infrastructure category. We have seen this at the state level in AZ several times. Politicians love light rail, for some reason I do not understand, perhaps because it increases their personal power in a way that individual driving does not. Anyway, they always want money for light rail projects, but bills to fund light rail almost always fail. So they tack on a few highway projects, that people really want, call it a highway bill and pass it that way. But it turns out most of the money is for non-highway stuff.”

Meyer links to this post in support of his “6%-was-infrastructure” claim, and he is right.

Holman Jenkins makes the same basic point in “The Infrastructure Medicine Show“, noting that the temptation to misallocate resources into boondoggles is made worse by the perception that “free money” is available by virtue of the Federal Reserves’s zero interest rates policy:

“In the U.S., why does top-down infrastructure enthusiasm always seem to turn to California-style bullet trains—i.e., projects certain to lose money but beloved by politicians and pork-barreling interest groups?”

I disagree with Jenkins’ assertion that public infrastructure investment should only follow economic growth. Rather, it should occur on an ongoing basis to meet important needs as they arise, and the threshold for any project’s benefits should match the opportunity cost of private capital investment. To some approximation, this might help protect against crowding out of the sort decried by John Cochrane.

The supposed infrastructure crisis, so often invoked by politicians, appeals to any motorist who has ever encountered a pothole. But in terms of basic transportation infrastructure, the “crisis” is something of a myth. In fact, if the widely anticipated revolution in autonomous vehicles transpires, it will greatly diminish needs for expanded transportation infrastructure of all kinds.

President Obama touts infrastructure investment in his new budget proposal using the Keynesian language of economic stimulus. But in another interesting post, Warren Meyer points out that a proposal to run budget deficits of $500+ billion going forward, in the middle of an economic expansion, is not exactly sensible as countercyclical fiscal policy. When might the U.S. government run a budget surplus? In a mild fit of sarcasm, Meyer highlights an irony:

“While those evil private short-term-focused private actors have used the improving economy to de-leverage back below 2007 levels, governments have increased their debt as a percentage of GDP by just over 50% since just before the last recession.”

P.S.: Jerry Brown wasn’t the focus here, but I love the cartoon above. It’s a nice depiction of the boondoggling impulse common to so many politicians.