Immigration and Reverse Discrimination

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Affirmative Action

Conflicts between anti-discrimination law and presumptive constitutional rights were discussed Monday’s SCC post. Another avenue for such conflicts is when anti-discrimination efforts interact with other policies to foster a perverse spiral of encroachments upon presumed rights. In a post entitled “Immigration and Equality“, Nicholas Rosenkranz asserts that affirmative action programs not only discriminate unfairly against “unprotected classes”, but that their interplay with an open-borders immigration policy makes these reverse discriminatory effects far more pernicious.

I favor a liberalized immigration policy, provided that it is accompanied by security at entry to ensure health and public safety, and without subsidizing either potential employers or the immigrants themselves (except perhaps for short-term settlement assistance). Most critics of liberalized immigration focus on negative employment and wage impacts for established residents, but this piece in The New York Times Magazine debunks that notion. Alex Tabarroc adds some great points on the subject here. In essence, the evidence suggests that the short-run economic impact of immigration is not negative, and the long-run impact is unambiguously positive. The always passionate Don Boudreaux makes a case for liberalized immigration, and he is skeptical of the assertion that immigrants, once endowed with voting rights, will always support statist policies.

Yet as Rosencranz argues, affirmative action policies may attract flows of immigrants to the U.S. that are not supported by the labor market and general economic conditions. In this view, the contention that immigration is an always beneficial flow of productive resources is erroneous. Instead, the policy may attract an excess supply of immigrant labor that truly would undermine wages and employment for established workers. It could also give rise to other negative consequences such as skewed college admission decisions.

Federal anti-discrimination law has roots of varying depth in a few different parts of the Constitution, but the “protected status” conferred to specific classes or minorities is statutory, based on several federal laws, beginning with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Government and private affirmative action programs favor hiring or advancement of members of protected classes to eliminate discrimination against them, or as a form of reparation for past discrimination. Rosenkranz has this to say about these programs:

American law and policy will discriminate in favor of most immigrants — those of favored races such as blacks and Hispanics — and their children, and their children’s children. Correspondingly, American law and policy will discriminate against Americans of disfavored races — Asian Americans, Indian Americans, Caucasian Americans — and their children, and their children’s children.

Rosenkranz believes this creates a “natural bargain”, a political compromise involving immigration reform in exchange for an end to government affirmative action programs, which have institutionalized “discrimination on the basis of race“:

Democrats believe that immigration is a winning political issue for them; they believe that it makes them look compassionate while it makes Republicans look churlish. Affirmative action, on the other hand, is a political winner for Republicans; polls overwhelmingly oppose it, and it allows Republicans to argue for the ringing principle of equality under law, while Democrats are left to defend the status quo of institutional discrimination and racial spoils.

I seriously doubt that such a compromise can be reached, but it’s a nice idea.

On a related note, the federal judge who placed a hold on President Obama’s immigration order has denied the administration’s request to lift the hold, and in rather dramatic fashion.

Suit Me, Or Face a Lawsuit: Adventures In Litigationland

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Suppose that Jim and Bob, who are life partners, own and operate a company that produces signage. A church group requests a banner to read “Only one man and one woman make a marriage”. Jim and Bob are likely to be offended by the suggestion that they use their art to express such a sentiment, and I think they are entitled to refuse the business. The freedom of expression granted by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects individuals against compulsion to express things they find objectionable. Will Jim and Bob engage in discrimination if they refuse the business? You bet, but I do not think the government has a “compelling interest” to intervene on behalf of the religious group, especially if there are other businesses capable of producing the banner or if the group can produce it themselves.

Has the exercise of free expression been tested as a defense against charges of illegal discrimination? The example above dealt with discrimination by a private company against a religious group. A similar case involved New Mexico photographers who refused to shoot photos at a same-sex wedding. The plaintiffs alleged discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, but the photographers claimed that compulsion to accept that work constituted a violation of their freedom of expression. The New Mexico Supreme Court ruled against the photographers. They appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court (SCotUS), which refused to hear the case without additional comment. While this case established a precedent in New Mexico for the compelling interest of government to enforce anti-discrimination law, the refusal of SCotUS to get involved did not create a wider precedent in favor of anti-discrimation law over free speech. There are a number of reasons why the Court might have refused to hear the case, including the fact that the suit was brought under state law, not federal law; simple prioritization across many competing cases for an always full docket; or the lack of any conflict with other court decisions.

At the link above, which was written just after the New Mexico court’s ruling, Eugene Volokh offered his views on the case:

Is it permissible for the law to require freelance writers, composers, artists, editors, and the like to create speech that they don’t want to create? Might it even be permissible for the law to require other conduits, such as bookstores and movie theaters, to distribute speech that they don’t want to distribute? (I use ‘speech’ here in the standard First Amendment sense, which includes music, pictures, video, and the like.) … It seems to me that having to create speech, using your own creative abilities and judgments as an artist, musician, writer, or what have you, is an even deeper ‘foster[ing]’ of ‘an idea [you might] find morally objectionable’ — an even deeper intrusion on ‘individual freedom of mind’

We often couch discussions like this in terms of “rights”, which is easily understood. However, there is a strong distinction between this framing and the actual structure of the Constitution. Rather than granting specific rights to individuals, that document presumes the existence of those rights and instead enumerates powers held by the federal government and restrictions on its exercise of those powers. For example, here is the First Amendment:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

And below is a key excerpt from the Fourteenth Amendment, upon which much anti-discrimination law is based. Note that its prohibitions apply only to government action, not private action:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

One right that should be presumptive is that of individuals to form a union in marriage. It is not addressed explicitly in the Constitution, and perhaps that would be less important if the government were not so intricately involved in the marriage business. Property rights, estate law, taxes, and legal benefits to employees and significant others can all be dependent on the legal status of a marriage. Still, it is not obvious why the government should be anything but neutral with respect to who can be married. Even if we concede a government interest in certifying marriages (it is a source of license fee revenue), are there other reasons for government authority in this area? Call me a skeptic. In any case, the legal recognition of marriage has been left up to the states.

Laws against private discrimination are thought to derive their authority from an enumerated power in the commerce clause, in Article 1 of the Constitution. This allows Congress to “regulate commerce among the several states“. This power was traditionally held to relate only to interstate commerce, consistent with the preservation of federalist principles and states’ rights. The courts have interpreted the power more broadly at times, but it is certainly not unlimited. In the traditional context of interstate commerce, and in view of the presumptive nature of individual rights under the Constitution, this seems to be a strikingly thin rationale for regulating many kinds of private behavior, or for compelling certain activities that burden the exercise of other rights.

Returning to the example above, defending Jim and Bob for turning away the church group’s business is similar in most respects to defending the photographer in the New Mexico case, or the baker who refuses, on religious grounds, to decorate a cake with a gay wedding theme. The cases all involve a form of private discrimination and a conflict between anti-discrimination law and forms of free expression. Whether presumptive rights to free speech, religious practice, or even freedom of association can trump statutory prohibitions against discrimination, or vice versa, is unlikely to be resolved once and for all, at least not any time soon. The individual circumstances surrounding a dispute of this nature will always be helpful, if not determinative. But what sort of test can be applied in order to achieve a resolution?

When sufficient tension exists, it is up to the courts to consider the specific nature of the discrimination in question, its rationale under any presumptive rights, and whether the claimant has “protected” status under a relevant anti-discrimination law. In terms of anti-discrimination law, a line is often drawn by insisting on the universal, non-discriminatory provision of “public accommodations”. The exact meaning of this term can differ by jurisdiction, but it generally implies a sales channel for which the “doors are open”. The presence of competition and alternative providers would argue against the state’s contravention of the presumptive rights of individual sellers in order to satisfy a statuary requirement. The competitive landscape and presence of viable alternatives should be an important consideration in balancing interests in these kinds of conflicts.

Choosing to discriminate against a specific group is not costless, even when legally sanctioned. It is obvious to most business people that tolerance is more profitable than intolerance. The acceptance of this disparity was clearly articulated as a “taste” for discrimination by Gary Becker in his 1957 book, “The Economics of Discrimination“. Becker’s analysis of discrimination in the labor market noted that employers with such a “taste” are willing to pay higher wages in order to avoid hiring certain minorities. In the examples above, Bob and Jim are willing to turn away otherwise profitable business, as are the baker and the photographer. However, their tastes for discrimination do not imply economic irrationality. In all three cases, the business people hold the maintenance of certain principles to be of greater value than the foregone profits.

These issues are relevant to the recent controversy surrounding Indiana’s new Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The context for RFRAs is narrower, as they relate to religious expression as opposed to expression generally. The first RFRA was a federal law supported by liberals in response to a conservative SCotUS decision in a dispute over the use of peyote for religious purposes. Generally, RFRAs require that the government have a compelling interest in burdening religious exercise and then must do so using the least restrictive means available. A number of individual states have passed their own RFRAs in order to carve out religious exemptions to various rules. In a recent post, Eugene Volokh discusses the history that gave rise to RFRAs, and the irony that many liberals now decry their existence, while conservatives tend to support them. The principles underlying these laws were once championed by prominent liberal members of SCotUS.

The version of the Indiana RFRA originally signed by Governor Pence would have allowed religious expression to be used as a defense in a discrimination lawsuit. Subsequently, the Indiana state legislature amended the bill with a provision stating that the law does not authorize a “provider” to refuse business from a range of protected groups, including gays and lesbians (ministers, churches and non-profits are exempted). Does this nullify the impact of the bill on free exercise of religion? Many believe so. However, the absence of positive “authorization” may not mean the courts will decide that the state of Indiana has a compelling interest in preventing a particular case of discrimination.

[An aside: One interesting approach has been suggested for businesses in the wedding industry whose owners believe that accepting work at same-sex weddings would violate their religious principles. These businesses should continue to accept business through their “public accommodations” except for customized wedding goods and services. According to this approach, they should offer the latter exclusively through binding contracts with specific churches or places of worship, thereby operating  exemptions granted to those institutions.]

Critics of the original Indiana RFRA were generally silent regarding RFRAs in 19 other states, as well as a federal RFRA signed by President Clinton. Moreover, it is clear that there has been some contrived activity from partisans on both sides (see herehere and here). At least the contrived activity demonstrates a greater depth of understanding than some of the hateful speech that I have witnessed on social media. Some would claim my example of Jim and Bob is contrived as well, but it is a plausible scenario and it shows that the tension between rights can cut both ways. A call for the legal supremacy of anti-discrimination law over presumptive rights means that the freedoms of protected groups can be abrogated as well when in conflict with another protected group.

Persecution is well known to both gays and people of faith. Both groups are certainly aware that there will always be others who do not share their views, strictures and practices, and some who may well disapprove. Both groups should be sympathetic to the notion of “live and let live”, and they should have the forbearance to avoid insisting on everyone’s direct participation in their celebrations. Some might even call this good manners. Participation (even for profit) cannot be compelled any more than approval. Regardless of what one might think of the values of outsiders who do not wish to participate, the “discriminatory” actions (or failures to act) in question are not prima facie evidence of hatred.

Jim and Bob, as well as the baker and the photographer, have broad presumptive rights under the constitution, whether they involve free speech or religious exercise. No one should be compelled to engage in expression they find objectionable without the ability to challenge it in court. Protections against discrimination are important, but they certainly do not confer the power to force others to participate in your celebrations. And why bother? Live and let live.

Postscript: Why bother, indeed! And here is Jonathan Turley on the key issue of defining an “expressive act”.

Poverty Maintenance Is Not A Win

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Merely keeping a patient alive is inferior to curing the disease. Likewise, merely allowing the impoverished to live under tolerable conditions is inferior to eliminating the underlying causes of poverty. Evidence for the former is used by Harvard Professor Christopher Jencks to proclaim the war on poverty a success. That is the upshot of his recent article in The New York Review of Books. But does the maintenance of a permanent dependent class constitute success? I believe that our goals should be loftier, and President Johnson’s original goals for the War on Poverty went much farther than Jencks suggests.

Ostensibly a review of other work by Martha Bailey and Sheldon Danziger, Professor Jencks devotes most of his essay to arguing that the official poverty rate published by the Census Bureau is distorted, and that a “corrected” measure has declined since the “war” was initiated by Johnson in the 1960s. The official rate has fluctuated in a range of 11-15% since the mid-1960s. Jencks corrects the 2013 rate of 14.5% for 1) the value of non-cash benefits received by certain program recipients (-3%); 2) the omission of refundable tax credits from the official incomes of employed individuals below the poverty line (-3%); and 3) a change in the price index used to adjust the official poverty thresholds over time to one that does not overstate changes in the cost of living (-3.7%). These three adjustments would reduce the poverty rate in 2013 to just 4.8%.

Taken at face value, that reduction is impressive, but the third adjustment is not directly attributable to antipoverty programs. It could also be due to economic growth or other factors. Jencks notes the following:

Both liberals and conservatives tend to resist the idea that poverty has fallen dramatically since 1964, although for different reasons. Conservatives’ resistance is easy to understand. They have argued since the 1960s that the federal government’s antipoverty programs were ineffective, counterproductive, or both. 

Liberals hear the claim that poverty has fallen quite differently, although they do not like it any better than conservatives do. Anyone, liberal or conservative, who wants the government to solve a problem soon discovers that it is easier to rally support for such an agenda by saying that the problem in question is getting worse than by saying that although the problem is diminishing, more still needs to be done.”

For my own part, I believe that many antipoverty programs succeed only as palliatives. They have not succeeded in breaking the cycle of poverty and dependence on the state. In other words, successful programs must foster self-sufficiency, which is a superior goal from a humanitarian and a Libertarian perspective. Jencks plans a follow-up on the “successes and failures specific anti-poverty programs”, but merely paying alms to the poor establishes a very low threshold for success.

In fairness to Jencks, anti-poverty programs serve a large number of individuals who are incapable of providing for themselves for a variety of reasons such as age, physical and mental disabilities. While it is beyond the scope of this post, some argue that private charities are more effective at providing for these individuals as well as the able poor. A greater role for charity could even be facilitated via public funding, but in any case, a larger role for private charity should always be on the menu of policy options.

A basic failing of many welfare programs is an incentive problem: able recipients perceive a penalty for work effort (additional hours or even kinds of employment) if rising earned income is associated with reduction or elimination of program benefits. This means that participants face a very high effective marginal tax rate on earned income.

This article from The CATO Institute contains a good overview of the federal welfare system, which consists of 126 separate programs. The article contains somewhat more detailed on the largest anti-poverty programs, such as Refundable Tax Credits (the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and Child Tax Credit (CTC)), Supplemental Security Income (SSI – for aged, blind and disabled), SNAP (food stamps), housing subsidies, child nutrition (WIC), Temporary Assistance For Needy Families (TANF) and unemployment insurance. Social Security is also included since it pays benefits to many low income seniors.

The CATO analysis shows that by one measure, refundable tax credits are by far the most cost efficient at lifting people out of poverty at a point in time, at least among the large programs, followed by SSI and using subsidies. In-kind programs such as SNAP and WIC tend to be less targeted and less effective by this measure. There is fairly widespread agreement that the tax credits have better incentives for work effort, but there are still high marginal tax rates in the phase-out range, a marriage penalty, and the credits are paid only once a year as tax refunds. Some contend that the phase-out of the EITC discourages labor supply even more than the credit increases labor supply at lower incomes. Still others believe that adding certain work requirements would make the EITC a more effective measure:

The [EITC] clearly does reduce poverty, but it raises work levels far less than some of the statistical studies of the past decade claim, and it appears to do so by encouraging working people to keep working, rather than driving the non-working poor toward jobs. If we wish the credit to promote work as well as raise incomes, we … must add other suasions to promote and enforce work, such as those found in the more successful work-incentive experiments…. These include mandating participation in work programs and setting some threshold of working hours that claimants have to achieve to get benefits.

The incentive effects of other programs are more negative than the tax credits. This paper found that the food stamp program reduces employment and hours worked. The TANF program, which was the successor to Aid To Families With Dependent Children (AFDC), also exposes recipients to high marginal tax rates. While CATO has been criticized for analyzing the combined impact on marginal tax rates of up to eight different programs, there is little question that the incentive problem is compounded for participants in multiple programs.

There are many different approaches that can be explored for eliminating poverty, supporting those who can’t work and ending dependency for those who can. Certainly, the work incentives of existing anti-poverty programs can be improved in a number of ways. More inventive approaches can be tested at the state level. However, programs such as guaranteed incomes should be eschewed, as they tend to aggravate the incentive problem and encourage dependency.

There are many other approaches to attacking poverty and its causes that do not strictly qualify as “welfare reform.” These include measures that would improve education and employment prospects, including apprenticeship and other training programs. School choice is a fundamental reform with enormous potential to improve the quality of education among poor children. Transitioning to market-based health care reform, including competition among health insurers, would reduce medical costs across the board. Eliminating costly regulation of business can encourage economic growth, which is basic to lifting the incomes of the working poor. Minimum wage legislation should be avoided as it simply eliminates opportunities for the least productive members of society and it is not well-targeted at the poor. Tax reform that encourages saving and investment, including corporate tax reform, will increase the economy’s long-term growth potential, as would a general reduction in the size of the public sector. An end to wasteful subsidies to “privileged” industries can minimize malinvestment and release resources to uses that pass a true market test, leading to a more general prosperity.

Obamacare Swampland: Mendacity Made the Sale

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Perhaps I’d quit writing about Obamacare if President Obama would quit lying about it. No, probably not, because the flaws of Obamacare are so numerous that they deserve to be exposed again and again. In fairness to Obamacare, the president lies about many other things, but tonight’s topic is his latest assertion about the supposed success of the health care law. On the occasion of the five-year anniversary of the passage of the ACA, the president said:

“… one thing couldn’t be clearer: This law is working, and in many ways, it’s working even better than anticipated… After five years of the Affordable Care Act, more than 16 million uninsured Americans have gained the security of health insurance – an achievement that has cut the ranks of the uninsured by nearly one third.

Actually, the Administration claims that the ACA is responsible for an additional 16.4 million insured Americans, 14.1 million of which are presumed to have gained coverage since the start of open enrollment in late 2013. The latter figure was extrapolated by HHS from Gallup survey data, and its full attribution to the ACA is gratuitous. Even if we stipulate to the integrity of the extrapolation, it is severely at odds with information reported on actual enrollments, as noted here by Edmund Haislmaier:

Taken together, the administrative data tell us that the number of Americans with health insurance coverage increased by around 9.7 million individuals during 2014—not the 14.1 million estimated by Health and Human Services.

Not only are the incremental insureds severely overstated, but Obama now asks us to judge the “success” of the law based on an implied 35% reduction in the number of uninsured, which still leaves well over 25 million people uninsured. Lest anyone forget, the original projections for exchange enrollments were far higher than even the rosy numbers reported by Obama. The so-called “target” population remains mostly unserved. The vast bulk of the coverage gains have come from Medicaid, which is free to eligible enrollees. Exchange enrollments have been light relative to expectations despite the promise of subsidies. (About half of the enrollees receiving subsidies will have to pay some of those benefits back to the IRS, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation. While the other half of subsidy recipients will get refunds, on average, the taxes owed by the first group will pose hardships.)

As noted above, a number of previous posts on Sacred Cow Chips have covered the flaws inherent in Obamacare. These fall into two general categories of destructive effects: 1) on the market for health care insurance; and 2) on actual access to, and delivery of, patient care. See here, here, and here for discussions of various clumsy and shortsighted ways in which the law attempts to regulate care. Scott Atlas points to another fundamental truth about Obamacare: it fails the poor and middle class by inhibiting access to care and making employer-based coverage less likely. Edmund Haislmaier has another excellent article on four key design flaws in the ACA as it relates to health care coverage. The negative employment effects of the law will continue to play out.

The cost of Obamacare to taxpayers is staggering, despite the CBO’s recent reduction in its estimates due entirely to lower than expected enrollments:

The CBO now projects that the law will cost nearly $2 trillion over the next ten years. Obamacare’s subsidies alone will cost $1.1 trillion. In 2010, the agency put the cost of the entire law at $940 billion over its first decade.

The author at the last link above also notes that the employment effects of Obamacare will be costly to taxpayers:

Obamacare hasn’t just failed to expand coverage as projected — it’s caused more people to lose their insurance than its architects intended. The CBO now estimates that 10 million people will lose their employer-provided health benefits by 2021. That’s a tenfold increase over the agency’s 2011 projections…. Employers might cut back on their workers’ hours so that they’re considered part-time — or stop hiring workers. Some firms may dump their health plans altogether, thanks to Obamacare’s many other cost-inflating mandates and regulations. The fine may be cheaper than the cost of coverage.

Some of the statist cheerleaders of the administration offer anecdotes and testimonials from the new class of happily insured. Given the (expected) subsidies and some of the expanded coverage provisions, these individuals certainly think they have something to be happy about, but anecdotes are easy. A great many anecdotes have also been heard about lost individual coverage, severely limited and even lost access to physicians and care, lost work hours and reduced employment opportunities. Further disappointments lie ahead, even for the newly insured. Provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) that are least likely to be popular have been delayed by executive fiat.

We have a destructive health care law that should be replaced at our earliest “convenience”. That will be either when Obama leaves office or, more optimistically, in June if the Supreme Court rules against federal exchange subsidies in the King v. Burwell case.

This is unlikely to be my last post on Obamacare, if the history of Obama’s mendacious claims about the law is any guide: “If you like your coverage, you can keep your coverage“. “If you like your doctor, you can keep your doctor“. “The individual mandate is not a tax“. “No family making less than $250,000 a year will see any form of tax increase“. “I will not sign a plan that adds one dime to our deficits – either now or in the future.” The ACA will “cut the cost of a typical family’s premium by up to $2,500 a year.” “I don’t believe that government can or should run healthcare“. All lies about Obamacare issued from the lips of President Obama. And I could go on…

Taking The Air Out Of The Deflation Scare

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Deflation is not the evil so many journalists have been taught to believe. The historical evidence does not support the contention that deflation is always a consequence of “underconsumption”, that it leads to a self-reinforcing spiral, or that it is destructive in and of itself. A new academic paper on the costs of deflation is reviewed here by John Cochrane, who reproduces some of the interesting evidence from the paper showing that deflation is not correlated with output growth historically. Cochrane quotes the paper’s authors:

‘The almost reflexive association of deflation with economic weakness is easily explained. It is rooted in the view that deflation signals an aggregate demand shortfall, which simultaneously pushes down prices, incomes and output. But deflation may also result from increased supply. Examples include improvements in productivity, greater competition in the goods market, or cheaper and more abundant inputs, such as labour or intermediate goods like oil. Supply-driven deflations depress prices while raising incomes and output.’

The Science Times has a succinct review of the same paper:

After analyzing figures going back to 1870 from 38 countries, Borio [one of the co-authors] concludes that declines in consumer prices are not actually the problem. He argues that the negative effects associated with deflation are in reality caused by huge declines in real estate prices and equity values. All this time, he posits, economists have been deceived by the fact that prices for goods and services have at times decreased at the same time that asset prices have gone down, especially during the Great Depression.

An earlier op-ed on deflation by Cochrane was the subject of this Sacred Cow Chips post a few months ago, which noted an unfortunate tendency among traditional Keynesian economists related to the statist agenda they often support:

Quick to blame insufficient private demand for economic ills, they propose to ratchet government to higher levels to make up for the supposed shortfall. That diagnosis is often debatable; the prescription may be a palliative at best and destructive at worst.

Deflation is usually a symptom of other, more primary economic phenomena. Whether it can be taken as a sign of economic malaise depends on the underlying cause. Certainly, as noted above, deflation is quite welcome when it results from supply-driven growth of output, especially if wages are supported by advances in labor productivity.

On the other hand, deflation may be a demand-side symptom of weakness engendered by restrictive monetary policy, fragile confidence among consumers or employers, trade restrictions, excessive taxation, over-regulation, or adjustments to a binge of malinvested capital. It does not follow, however, that a resulting deflation is unhealthy. Quite the opposite: Downward price adjustments help to clear the economy of excesses and pave the way for renewal, as excess goods, capital and other resources are repriced to levels at which purchases become gainful. This may involve more severe declines in some relative prices due to specific excesses, such as real estate. Some recent examples of deflation and reversals of economic weakness are discussed in this post at The Mises Daily.

One consequence of expected deflation is that market interest rates are driven below “real” interest rates, or the rates at which economic agents are indifferent between present and future consumption (abstracting from risk and liquidity premia). The latter is sometimes called the rate of time preference, the natural interest rate, or the originary interest rate. Recently, some short-term market interest rates in Europe have been negative, prompting some to offer arguments that the natural rate may have turned negative. This post by Thorsten Polliet reveals these arguments as nonsense:

If the originary interest rate was near-zero [let alone negative], it means that you prefer two apples available in, say, 1,000 years over one apple available today. A truly zero originary interest rate implies that the actor’s planning horizon or “period of provision” is infinitely long, which is another way of saying that he would never act at all but would continually push the attainment of his goals into the future.

Polleit discusses the fact that market real interest rates may be negative, but that is a consequence of central bank manipulation of nominal market rates, including the Federal Reserve’s so called ZIRP, or zero interest-rate policy. Polleit has this to say about the destructive consequences of this kind of behavior, albeit in extreme form:

Should a central bank really succeed in making all market interest rates negative in real terms, savings and investment would come to a shrieking halt: as time preference and the originary interest rate are always positive, “capitalistic saving” — the accumulation of goods designed for improving the production process — would come to an end.

While Keynesians imagine that expansive government policy can rescue the economy from the ravages of weak private demand, they also know that accumulation of public debt is an unavoidable by-product. That reveals an underlying motive for policies such as ZIRP, as Polite explains:

It is an actually perfidious policy for debasing the real value of outstanding debt; and it is a recipe for wreaking havoc on the economy.

An otherwise innocuous supply-side deflation, or a deflation corrective of demand-side forces, may well be accompanied by intervention by an activist central bank. The ostensible purpose would be to stimulate the demand for goods, but a more direct consequence is a reduction in the government’s interest costs. If the policy succeeds in pushing real market interest rates to zero or below, the intervention may well undermine capital formation and economic growth.

One Year Of Sacred Cow Chipping

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Tomorrow, March 19 is the one-year anniversary of my first blog post on Sacred Cow Chips (SCC). This is my 242nd post and traffic is increasing. Please forgive this bit of self-congratulation, but I think 242 in a year is okay for a guy with a fairly busy professional and family life, plus a few other hobbies. My earliest posts tended to be brief. More recently, I’ve been unable to keep my posts down to a paragraph or two, but perhaps I’ll try to add some shorter posts to the mix in the future. I also had frequent formatting issues in my first month or two of blogging, some of which remain uncorrected. That’s my fault, but in my defense, the editing software on WordPress at the time was primitive compared to subsequent upgrades.

I confess to some self-inflicted pressure to “feed the monster”, to post something after any absence of a few days. Fortunately, finding inspiration for posts is simple. There is always a surfeit of tempting memes on social media, and traditional media provide a steady stream of questionable commentary. And then there are the politicians. Of course, I have some favorite blogs and sites from which I draw ideas on a regular basis.

I have been using the most basic WordPress account plan, which imposes some limits on features and formats. Among other shortcomings, the text on SCC always looks too large to me. I plan on upgrading to a premium plan in the next few days. That might interfere with regular posting activity as I arrange a new format, but we’ll see how it goes.

If you are following my blog, thank you, and I hope you’ll keep visiting. It’s a lot of fun for me! In the meantime, Happy Anniversary, SCC!

Causal Confusion In The Gun Debate

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As a follow up to my recent post on defensive gun uses (DGUs), I think it’s appropriate to discuss international comparisons sometimes cited in support of the anti-gun rights agenda.This was prompted by correspondence from a fellow blogger, to whom I’ll refer as HH, who followed up with a post featuring some international data. I respect HH’s effort to collect the data and to present it with some eloquence, and with a little less rancor than the original correspondence. Nevertheless, the international comparisons are not as straightforward as HH would like to believe.

Let me state at the outset that I am not a big “gun guy”. I support individual liberty and a minimal state apparatus in general, along with gun rights, but I am not affiliated in any way with the NRA or any other pro-gun organization. As I told my well-armed older brother, he would not be impressed with my weaponry. I still keep a nasty, old fireplace iron under my bed. And I have a few rocks in my backyard.

HH believes that the high U.S. homicide rate relative to the handful of other developed countries he mentions (along with India) proves that “gun control works”. I differ for several reasons discussed below.

Causality and Gun Control: HH’s conclusion brings into focus two different aspects of the gun control question. The first is whether a change to more restrictive gun control leads to a reduction in homicides. That is not as obvious an outcome as HH thinks. For example, a gun ban cannot eliminate all guns, especially within limited jurisdictions. (Perhaps the federalist approach is partly why HH considers our gun laws “a mess”, but federalism is a feature of our system, not a bug, not least if it discourages local politicians from enacting ineffective rules.) Black market traffic in guns is likely to be sufficiently profitable to justify the legal risks in the presence of a ban. And the empirical evidence as to whether more stringent gun control reduces homicides is mixed at best (see here, here, here and here).

The empirical evidence presented by HH is not related to changes in gun laws (except for one or two suspect assertions about mass shootings). Instead, cross-country comparisons of homicide rates are given along with a single correlate: “gun laws”. The one data point driving the presumed direction of causality is the U.S., which has lenient gun laws and a high homicide rate relative to the four other countries (five if we include the U.K., from whence HH hails). The comparisons are made with no controls for the history of gun rights and ownership, demographics, other prohibitions, or any other confounding influences. For HH, it’s all because of guns.

Mass Shootings: HH spends some of the post discussing this phenomenon, which is rare albeit horrifying. Mass shootings account for very few of U.S. homicides, and there has been no discernible upward trend in the U.S. (see here, here and here). Moreover, multiple victim shootings are just as common in Europe as they are in the U.S. They usually prompt calls for bans on arbitrarily-defined “assault weapons”, but the bans do little to prevent such tragedies.

Historical Background: Guns owned by private individuals played an important role in the American revolution. In fact, early British attempts to confiscate weapons led to an increase in the hostilities leading up to the war. The Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was intended to protect individual gun rights and to protect the nation from future tyrants.

The homicide rate has declined steadily in the U.S. over the past three hundred years, from estimates of more than 30 per 100,000 people in the early 1700s to less than five today. A similar pattern occurred in other parts of the world, but after 1850, the decline in the U.S. failed to keep pace with declines in Europe.

Private guns were integral to westward expansion in the U.S. Leaving aside the tragic consequences for Native Americans, the scramble for resources and the under-developed legal system in the west undoubtedly contributed to homicides. At the same time, the need of settlers to defend life and property in an insecure environment made gun ownership (and DGUs) a necessity. This history and the generally high value placed by Americans on individual rights set the tone for today’s generally permissive attitude toward gun ownership in the U.S.

Alcohol, Drug Prohibition and Homicide: The temporary lows in the homicide rate prior to the 1910s “may have been illusory“, according to this abstract, because many homicides were reported as accidents in that time frame. More accurate reporting created the impression of a rising homicide rate during the 1910s. Alcohol prohibition began in 1920 and contributed to an increase in U.S. homicides until after repeal. Likewise, later in the twentieth century, the drug war, together with a bulge in the youth population, contributed to an even larger increase in the homicide rate. It is interesting that this increase was accompanied by an apparent decrease in the rate of spousal homicide. (A curious aside: one analyst has noted the strong correlation between homicide rates in the U.S. and fluctuations in the use of lead-based paints and leaded gasoline.)

Illegal drugs are just one area of black market activity in which the U.S. is a world leader. The connection between heavier underworld and gang activity and prevalent restrictions on victimless, individual behavior, on the one hand, and homicide rates on the other, helps explain the elevated U.S. homicide rate. The existence of this link is supported by an extremely strong concentration of homicides within specific social networks.

Demographics: The interaction of legal restrictions on behavior and weak economic circumstances is undoubtedly a factor contributing to high homicide rates. It is striking that U.S. homicides are so heavily concentrated within the African American community. The relative lack of legal economic opportunities within the African American community may be connected to greater illegal trade and homicides. Homicide rates are also somewhat elevated among U.S. Hispanics and Native Americans. Among the White and Asian segments of the U.S. population, homicide rates are comparable to those of Europe (and well under India’s rate).

Suicides: My antipathy for anti-gun arguments is probably softest with respect to gun suicides. Guns are certainly “weapons of convenience”, easily transported, fast and highly effective. Within the U.S., there is some evidence that gun ownership and total suicides are positively correlated, despite a negative correlation with non-gun suicides. However, total suicide rates in the U.S. and U.K. are similar. The rates in France and especially Japan are higher, while the rates in Denmark and India are lower. Moreover, suicide is symptomatic of larger social problems that have little to do with gun rights. Our inability as a society to deal effectively with mental health issues probably has much more to do with suicide and homicide rates than gun ownership.

Summary: There are many reasons to discount international comparisons of homicide rates and regulation of firearms. The comparisons often neglect measurement issues, but more importantly, strong conclusions about the efficacy of gun control from such top-line comparisons are often drawn without carefully addressing the question of causality between changes in gun laws and changes in homicide rates. The comparisons also fail to consider variations in the larger historical and legal context within which gun ownership occurs. For a large society like the U.S., there are vast differences in sub-groups that usually reflect other social problems, some of which are created by intrusive government itself.

I close below with some thoughts on HH’s criticism of my original post on DGUs.

DGU Denialism: HH’s objections to my post on DGUs were based on a belief that I:  1) quoted misleading statistics on gun violence in the U.S.; 2) engaged in scaremongering (apparently by quoting a wide range of estimates of DGUs); and 3) used a headline (“When Government Prohibits Self-Defense”) demonstrating a wildly paranoid view of the intent of the U.S. government.

The statistics on gun violence I cited in that post came from the U.S. Department of Justice and The Law Center To Prevent Gun Violence, which are hardly representative of the gun lobby. By providing information on gun homicides, suicides, accidents and nonfatal wounds presented in emergency rooms, I was seeking to provide a fairly comprehensive list of the “downsides” of guns in the U.S. I thought that was only fair as a way to lend perspective on estimates of DGUs. The statistics on gun violence vary from year-to-year, of course, and even the homicide numbers vary across different “official” sources for a given year (the example given at the link is total homicides). For these reasons, my initial intent was to quote ranges. However, not all of the data were available over multiple years from my original sources. Some of the figures were simply DOJ “estimates”. And apparently, my searches did not turn up the most recent data available (most of the figures I quoted were either 2010 or from 2005 – 2010). Well, mea culpa, mea culpa. My range for gun homicides of 10-12 thousand per annum was off, according to HH: it was actually 9 thousand! So, my range should have been broader in view of the continuing decline in gun homicides in the U.S., but I’m heartened to know that they were lower than I thought.

As for DGU’s, it is undeniable that they are a real phenomenon, though HH seems apoplectic that anyone would dare to discuss them. They obviously happen, though no one claims “there is always a good guy with a gun“. In fact, homicide statistics often exclude deaths from DGU’s and police shootings. (In the U.K., apparently one has to be found guilty of a murder for it to be counted as a homicide.)

Since any proposal to limit firearms would be more successful in disarming the law-abiding population than miscreants, it is reasonable to ask whether DGUs would decline more than non-justifiable homicides. Moreover, the low end of the range of DGU estimates I quoted came from DGU skeptics. In any case, I don’t think the following statements qualify me as a “scaremonger”:

Estimates range from under 100 thousand per year to more than 2.5 million. There are reasons to doubt both of the extremes. … Given this range of estimates, it would be conservative to hedge toward the lower end.

Finally, the headline: Now, I like a punchy headline, and I’ll bet HH does too. I also believe that the ultimate goal of the statist anti-gun lobby is to outlaw private firearms. Again, such a policy would have the largest impact on gun possession among the law-abiding population; the headline was meant to convey the consequences of doing so.

When Government Prohibits Self Defense

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The Obama Administration is dropping a proposed ban on a certain kind of AR-15 ammunition after the ATF was deluged with negative comments. Gun rights supporters asserted that the ban, to be accomplished by administrative fiat, would have constituted a form of “back-door” gun control. There is no doubt that the “right to keep and bear arms” would be compromised by piecemeal bans on various types of ammo. In this case, the rationale for the proposal was that the “green-tip” ammo in question was said to be armor-piercing and therefore a greater threat to law enforcement. A spokesman for the Fraternal Order of Police says that the ammo in question “has historically not posed a law enforcement problem“. Moreover, the Law Enforcement Officers Protection Act of 1986, which banned armor-piercing bullets, specifically exempted the green-tip ammo and other types of rifle ammo because they did not meet “either part of the two-part definition of ‘armor-piercing’“.

Gun control advocates have little sympathy for broad interpretations of second amendment rights granted by the U.S. Constitution. The amendment reads:

A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.

A statist interpretation of this sentence puts “the people”, and more specifically individuals, in a subservient position to the “militia” and ultimately the government. However, we know that the Constitution was intended as a device to limit the power of the federal government and protect individual rights. This is what Glenn Reynolds means by “ordinary constitutional law“. As he notes, “… individual citizens’ lives and autonomy are themselves, in some important aspects, beyond the power of the state to sacrifice.” The right of self-defense, and to bear arms, was part of English common law and was certainly an important issue in the times of the founders, and it is still important today.

Beyond the legal interpretations, an empirical and philosophical debate rages over whether gun violence, including homocides, accidents and suicides, and gun crimes in general, can be weighed against crimes prevented by so-called defensive gun uses (DGUs). Not that DGUs are the end of the pro-gun rights story: private gun ownership in society carries with it an enormous deterrent value against criminality, but that is obviously difficult to quantify.

As a baseline, the annual number of gun deaths in the U.S. is known with a fairly high degree of accuracy. The number of non-justifiable gun homocides each year is roughly 10- 12 thousand (see p. 27 of this publication from the DOJ). The number of accidental gun deaths is typically less than 1 thousand per year (see here for this and the following statistics). About 18-20 thousand gun suicides occur each year, though some of these would have occurred by other means if a gun had not been available. Together, roughly 29-33 thousand gun deaths occur annually in the U.S. Again, some of these deaths would have occurred with or without guns. In addition, in 2010, there were 73,505 non-fatal gunshot wounds treated in emergency rooms. And crime victimization with firearms should be defined more broadly. While the following would double count the deaths cited above, the DOJ reports an annual average of about 250 thousand victimizations involving strangers with guns, and roughly 170 thousand involving known individuals with guns. Also, the DOJ estimates that each year, there are an average of about 180 thousand unreported incidents of victimization involving guns.

These are daunting numbers, but again, some of these incidents would have occurred in the absence of guns. Note as well that violent crime rates have been in decline over most of the past 25 years, including gun crime.

DGUs are phenomena that occur with greater frequency than gun opponents care to admit. DGUs include the actual discharge of a gun in self-defense or merely brandishing or threatening the use of a gun. Estimates range from under 100 thousand per year to more than 2.5 million. There are reasons to doubt both of the extremes. This article by Brian Doherty in Reason and this paper from The CATO Institute do a good job of explaining some of the controversies surrounding measurement of DGUs. The high-end estimates and some of the low-end estimates come from  survey data, but the reliability of both can be called into question. Police reports and media coverage have been used as well, but these are certain to undercount the actual number of DGU incidents, especially for cases in which no shots are fired.

Given this range of estimates, it would be conservative to hedge toward the lower end. One researcher attempted to reconcile the gap in 1997, but he did so with the use of some very rough discounting and gross-up factors that brought the range of annual DGUs up to 256-373 thousand at the low end, and down to 1.2 million at the high end. And while it would be simplistic to assert that these estimates, in any absolute sense, outweigh those given above for gun violence, the DGU estimates are certainly nontrivial by comparison. Again, there is no way to estimate of the value of the general deterrent against violent crime provided by legal gun ownership, but it must be considered to reinforce the DGU side of the ledger.

Case studies cover a variety of crimes prevented by DGUs. But even if you subscribe to the low-end estimates of DGUs, Brian Doherty points out that the statistics are irrelevant to those who have had to defend themselves with guns:

Those people who lived out the stories in any case study collection of newspaper or police reports of DGUs would doubtless find it curious to hear they shouldn’t have had the right to defend themselves, because an insufficiently impressive number of other citizens had done the same. But underestimating the significance of what’s at stake in Second Amendment rights—even though it can clearly be life itself, not to mention dignity—is a favorite pastime of gun controllers and their ideological soldiers.

Finally, to pretend that any form of prohibition can be successful in stamping out objectionable activity is foolhardy. That lesson is offered by the drug war, alcohol prohibition, prostitution laws, and many other misguided attempts to control behavior. The same is even true of laws upon which there is broad consensus. However, there is a difference when government attempts to prohibit victimless behavior. And the difference is more pernicious when government prohibits tools with which citizens can defend themselves against victimhood.

While outright prohibition exceeds the extent of most serious gun control proposals, prohibition is the ultimate goal of anti-gun activists. Laws against gun ownership do not eliminate guns, but they do hinder the possession of guns and self-defense by law-abiding citizens.

Netflix: Oops… No, Let’s Not Regulate The Internet

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john-perry-barlow

Netflix was heralded only recently as a strong supporter of net neutrality, but the company has changed its position in the wake the the FCC’s decision to reclassify broadband ISPs as common carriers. The link goes to a Google search page. The top article listed there should be ungated, from L. Gordon Crovitz in the Wall Street Journal. I have posted a number of times on the misguided policy of net neutrality (see here, here, here, and here). While I hesitate to post on the topic again, I think a short description of the Netflix flip-flop, or should I say its “evolving position“, is worthwhile, and especially with a few quotes from the Crovitz article.

Crovitz notes that Netflix videos “take up one-third of broadband nationwide at peak times.” The company’s support for so-called neutrality seemed grounded in its frustration at the prospect of having to negotiate for massive use of resources controlled and sometimes owned by the ISPs. Here’s Crovitz:

Today Netflix is a poster child for crony capitalism. When CEO Reed Hastings lobbied for Internet regulations, all he apparently really wanted was for regulators to tilt the scales in his direction with service providers. Or as Geoffrey Manne of the International Center for Law and Economics put it in Wired: ‘Did we really just enact 300 pages of legally questionable, enormously costly, transformative rules just to help Netflix in a trivial commercial spat?‘”

Indeed! But the powers at Netflix have had a revelation:

Net-neutrality advocates oppose ‘fast lanes’ on the Internet, arguing they put startups at a disadvantage. Netflix could not operate without fast lanes and even built its own content-delivery network to reduce costs and improve quality. This approach will now be subject to the ‘just and reasonable’ test. The FCC could force Netflix to open its proprietary delivery network to competitors and pay broadband providers a ‘fair’ price for its share of usage.

There’s no need for the FCC to override the free-market agreements that make the Internet work so well. Fast lanes like Netflix’s saved the Internet from being overwhelmed, and there is nothing wrong with the ‘zero cap’ approach Netflix is using in Australia. Consumers benefit from lower-priced services.

I will leave you with my favorite part of the Crovitz piece:

Last week John Perry Barlow, the Grateful Dead lyricist-turned-Internet-evangelist, participated in a conference call of Internet pioneers opposed to the FCC treating the Internet as a utility. He called the regulatory step ‘singular arrogance.’

In 1996 Mr. Barlow’s ‘Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’ helped inspire a bipartisan consensus for the open Internet: ‘Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.’