Employee Speech and Its Consequences

18 Thursday Sep 2025

Posted by Nuetzel in Censorship, Free Speech

Tags

ABC, Charlie Kirk, DEI, Eugene Volokh, First Amendment, Free Speech, Hate Speech, Jimmy Kimmel, Julie Borowsky, MAGA, Pickering v. Bd. of Education, Second Amendment, Trust

I just can’t express any sympathy for those fired from their jobs for publicly endorsing or “celebrating” the assassination of Charlie Kirk. Regardless of how you felt about Charlie Kirk’s words, he was a nonviolent public figure who did everything he could to engage peacefully with those who disagreed with his views. Praising his assassination is morally repugnant.

The fairness and even the legality of these dismissals has been called into question, however. As Eugene Volokh notes, the First Amendment offers protection “against criminal punishment, civil liability” for all speech unless it “is intended to and likely to cause imminent illegal conduct”. It does not protect the speaker from other consequences, however, such as continued employment or social ostracism. It goes without saying that this applies to both sides of any debate.

But job dismissals for expressing controversial opinions should not extend beyond issues likely to threaten the mission of the employing organization, including reputation and the well being of clients and other employees. Even more importantly, prosecution under so-called “hate speech” laws (a flawed construct) should not extend outside the bounds of the First Amendment, and should not be prosecuted selectively on political grounds.

One prominent action with which I’m not comfortable is the “indefinite” cancellation of Jimmy Kimmel, who (like others on the Left) thought it would be clever to make the absurd claim, during his late-night monologue, that Kirk’s assassin was one of the MAGA tribe. Kimmel did not “celebrate” the murder per se, but his statement was enough to get his show pulled, for now. The cancellation was lauded by the Right as a response to the market. That’s plausible: Kimmel’s pronouncement might have damaged ABC’s brand, though it didn’t have far to drop. The Trump Administration seems to have employed some strong-arm tactics in this episode, however, which is awful. In any case, I’d rather keep Kimmel out there making a fool of himself.

Of course, private employers can generally employ whom they want and can often cite agreed-upon codes of conduct as justification for dismissals, if necessary. Who wants an employee announcing to the world that he or she endorses the murder of someone with whom they happen to disagree on public policy or expressions of faith? Or who wants an employee openly stating such a monstrous opinion in the workplace? It’s simply bad business to risk offense to customers, sowing discord in the workplace, or affiliating in any way with an individual willing to demonstrate such depraved values.

Things are a little different for public employees. In his post, Volokh outlined general legal conditions under which a public employee can be disciplined. These are (the full list is a quote):

the speech is said by the employee as part of the employee’s job duties, Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006), or
the speech is not on a matter of public concern, Connick v. Myers (1983), or
the damage caused by the speech to the efficiency of the government agency’s operation outweighs the value of the speech to the employee and the public, Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. (1968).

As Volokh says, strictly speaking, these conditions do not establish categorical grounds for dismissing a public employee for praising violence. He cites case law to support that position. But the third condition listed is critical in many cases. On that point, he notes that the case in question involved a private conversation with the speaker’s co-worker/boyfriend. So that case hardly seems dispositive.

Volokh goes on to say that #3 above, or really the Pickering case, establishes a kind of heckler’s veto for public employers. That is, it:

“… often allows government to fire employees because their speech sufficiently offends coworkers or members of the public. …

“This conclusion by lower courts applying Pickering might, I think, stem from the judgment that employees are hired to do a particular job cost-effectively for the government: If their speech so offends others (especially clients or coworkers) that keeping the employees on means more cost for the government than benefit, the government needn’t continue to pay them for what has proved to be a bad bargain.“

Whether it involves someone in the public or the private sector, concerns about endorsing the murder of an ideological opponent are particularly acute when issued by those in jobs requiring a high level of trust. That covers a broad swath of workers, but especially those in health care, education, and law enforcement. Can you trust a nurse, a surgeon, or any other caregiver who would endorse murder as a proper response to political or ideological differences? Are you willing to allow your child to be instructed by such an individual at any level? For that matter, would you trust a news anchor who spouted that kind of rhetoric?

It’s certainly doesn’t present as “normal” to espouse or praise murder and other violent acts, regardless of ideological passion. In fact, most people would fairly question the stability of anyone cheerleading for murder and the risk they might present to society. Words are cheap, but it might well signal an elevated propensity for acts of violent retaliation for perceived wrongs.

The question of trust really permeates our interactions with the whole of society, so the kind of behavior we’ve witnessed from this quarter is threatening. Will my waitress, overhearing a conversation, befoul or poison the food she serves me? Will my ride share driver deliver me to a torture chamber? Will a neighborhood contact attempt to exact some kind of retribution? It’s not quite there yet, but the encroachment is real. This should be more salient to anyone with an accessible social media profile who wishes to express an honest opinion, particularly on a college campus.

A brief word about some of the Charlie Kirk quotes that have made the rounds. They are often excerpted and divorced from the full context of the argument he was attempting to make. Julie Borowsky on X provides some direct, full quotes of Kirk on several important topics. I happen to think he made valid (if not fully developed) points about the value of the Second Amendment, the divisiveness of DEI, overuse of the word “empathy”, and the downsides of Civil Rights Act. At the same time, I am certain I’d disagree with other positions Kirk held, like his support for tariffs. Still, they were all debating points on policy (or matters of faith), and they did not qualify as “hate speech”, which is a subjective notion and highly resistant to consensus. In any case, his comments could never have justified the insane reaction of Kirk’s assassin or those who cheered his murder.

AntiSemitic Left Tests Limits of Free Speech

30 Tuesday Apr 2024

Posted by Nuetzel in anti-Semitism, Free Speech

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Agitators, Alex Tabarrok, Codes of Conduct, Eugene Volokh, Fighting Wirds, First Amendment, Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, Free Speech, Freedom of Assembly, Hamas, Instapundit, Intifada, Israel, Michael Munger, P.J. O'Rourke, Terrorism

The current protests on college campuses across the nation bring into focus differing opinions on the limits of free speech and assembly. Particular questions seem to defy resolution. Nevertheless, there is some misunderstanding regarding the settled breadth of the First Amendment.

The protestors have acted as if they have constitutional carte blanche to gather anywhere to say anything in opposition to Israel and its war against Hamas terrorists; a subset thinks this encompasses “occupation” of any space for any duration; a still smaller subset believes this includes a right to condemn Jews, all Jews.

I strongly doubt, however, that many of the protestors truly believe their constitutional protections extend to intimidation and bullying of Jewish students attempting to go about their business on campus (scroll to a few of the articles here), destruction of property, or the use of “fighting words”, or physical attacks on Jews or other “oppressors”.

It’s well known that the Constitution does not protect “fighting words”, including threats. Furthermore, Eugene Volokh explains that there is no constitutional right to “occupy” a college campus, either public or private.

Of course, private schools are not legally bound to respect free speech or assembly rights. They can regulate activity on their private campuses in any way they see fit. Some explicitly abide the same rights as public universities, which seems reasonable for any institution dedicated to the free spirit of inquiry.

Volokh, however, cites Supreme Court precedents in which a majority held that government can prohibit camping in certain parks, for example, and that public colleges and universities can impose restrictions on campus activities:

“There is no First Amendment right to camp out in any university, public or private. Indeed, there is no First Amendment right to camp out even in public parks (see Clark v. CCNV (1984)), and the government’s power to limit the use of property used for a public university is even greater than its power as to parks (Widmar v. Vincent (1981)):

“‘A university differs in significant respects for public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university’s mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a university’s authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities. We have not held, for example, that a campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or buildings.’

“Likewise, if UC Berkeley had held a law student party in the law school building rather than at Dean Chemerinsky’s house, it could have stopped students from using the party as an occasion to orate to the audience (especially with their own sound amplification devices, which the student brought to Chemerinsky’s house). See Spears v. Arizona Bd. of Regents (D. Ariz. 2019)(upholding public university’s right to stop people from speaking with sound amplification at an on-campus book fair).“

Volokh also notes, however, that public universities cannot restrict mere “offensive” expression, which would include certain antisemitic statements or even swastikas (for example), as long as the expression falls short of “fighting words” or explicit threats. Do calls for the “extermination of Jews” qualify as fighting words? That deserves a resounding yes. It’s clearly hate speech, and it’s exactly the sort of expression that might be deemed so offensive to counterprotestors (for example) as to constitute an immediate threat to public order.

Does the meaning of “fighting words” include such chants as “From the river to the sea…”? Some say that depends on the speaker, but that can’t provide a sound basis of distinction. It is clearly associated with calls to eliminate the state of Israel. Some believe it also implies the genocide of Jews in Israel, and Jews can’t be blamed for finding it threatening. Okay, how about “Intifada”? I doubt all of the students involved in the current protests understand the genocidal implications of these words. The agitators understand them well enough.

This is a grey area in our understanding of the First Amendment. The “River to the Sea” chant, and Intifada, seem like fighting words to me, but they might not qualify as direct threats to anyone on campus. By comparison, the swastika is “just” a party emblem, whatever policies it stands for, and apparently the Court did not deem it a direct threat to anyone in Skokie, Illinois. The legal distinctions here feel inadequate. Still, we say the “mere” expression of offensive ideas or symbols is protected speech, provided that it does not directly threaten harm to any party.

Many libertarians, with whom I usually agree, urge tolerance of the protests and encampments, including at least cautious tolerance of the protests. The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) has strenuously objected to the actions of police in Austin, Texas in dispersing demonstrators at the University of Texas. Alex Tabarrak has reposted a tweet or two apparently critical of the government’s response to protestors in Texas and at Emory University in Atlanta, though it should be noted that the economics professor who was taken down and handcuffed on video had actually hit a police officer. Michael Munger, in a variation of his “worst enemy test” of government power, says that giving campus authorities “the power to crush us, at their discretion” is probably a bad idea. But they have that power if they choose to exercise it, for better or worse. (By “us”, I don’t think Munger intended to take sides).

I’m highly skeptical of the motives and incentives of some of the “occupiers” of campus spaces, not to mention their status as students. More importantly, there is ample evidence that “fighting words” and threats against Jews have been used by many of the protesters. This violates the codes of conduct at many schools, and should not only be censured, but any student identified as guilty of this sort of hate speech should be expelled, not merely suspended. There should be severe consequences for professors choosing to participate in these protests as well.

This behavior should have long-term consequences, and that is happening at some schools. I saw the following quote from P.J. O’Rourke on Instapundit, which seems appropriate here:

“There’s only one basic human right, the right to do as you damn well please. And with it comes the only basic human duty, the duty to take the consequences.”

The kids are wearing masks for a reason, and it ain’t Covid! Now, the protestors’ demands include “amnesty” for their participation in the protests. That shouldn’t play well if you’re provably guilty of calling for the extermination of a race of people. But here’s the thing: certain institutions like Columbia University have allowed the aberrant behavior to go on with little challenge, showing that the real limits to free speech and assembly are whatever acquiescent campus administrators are willing to put up with.

Removing these encampments is more than justified on constitutional grounds at any school, public or private. The arrest of some of the more intransigent elements among the protesters may be well justified. Insulting hate speech is one thing, but eliminationist hate speech constitutes fighting words and should not be tolerated. Of course, forcibly removing the encampments is risky in terms of public safety because some of the protestors will physically challenge the police. Comparatively innocent (though naive) students might get caught up in a conflict with law enforcement, but ignorance is no defense. They should not be there. Those risks must be taken to end the “hate encampments”, which are a direct threat to the rights of others wishing only to go about their business.

The Twitter Files and Political Exploitation of Social Media

07 Wednesday Dec 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Censorship, Regulation, Social Media

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Bari Weiss, Censorship, Common Carrier, Communications Decency Act, Content Moderation, Disinformation Governance Board, Elon Musk, Eugene Volokh, Fighting Words, First Amendment, Hunter Biden, In-Kind Campaign Contribution, James Baker, Mark Zuckerberg, Matt Taibbi, Michael Munger, Munger Test, Public Accompdation, Public Square, Section 230 Immunity, Social Media, Telecommunications Act, Trump-Russia Investigation, Twitter Files, Your Worst Enemy Test

I’ve been cheering for Elon Musk in his effort to remake Twitter into the kind of “public square” it always held the promise to be. He’s standing up for free expression, against one-party control of speech on social media, and especially against government efforts to control speech. That’s a great and significant thing, yet as Duke economist Michael Munger notes, we hear calls from the Biden Administration and congressional Democrats to “keep an eye on Twitter”, a not-so-veiled threat of future investigative actions or worse.

Your Worst Enemy Test, Public or Private

As a disclaimer, I submit that I’m not an unadulterated fan of Musk’s business ventures. His business models too often leverage wrong-headed government policy for profitability. It reeks of rent seeking behavior, whatever Musk’s ideals, and the availability of those rents, primarily subsidies, violates the test for good governance I discussed in my last post. That’s the Munger Test (the “Your Worst Enemy” Test), formally:

“You can only give the State power that you favor giving to your worst enemy.”

On the other hand, Musk’s release of the “Twitter Files” last weekend, with more to come, is certainly a refreshing development. Censorship at the behest of political organizations, foreign governments, or our own government are all controversial and possibly illegal. While we’d ordinarily hope to transact privately at arms length with free exchange being strictly an economic proposition, one might even apply the Munger Test to the perspective of a user of a social media platform: would you trust your worst enemy to exercise censorship on that platform on the basis of politics? Like Donald Trump? Or Chuck Schumer? If not, then you probably won’t be happy there! Now, add to that your worst enemy’s immunity to prosecution for any content they deem favorable!

Cloaked Government Censorship?

Censorship runs afoul of the First Amendment if government actors are involved. In an interesting twist in the case of the Twitter Files, the two independent journalists working with the files, Matt Taibbi and Bari Weiss, learned that some of the information had been redacted by one James Baker, Twitter’s Deputy General Counsel. Perhaps not coincidentally, Baker was also formerly General Counsel of the FBI and a key figure in the Trump-Russia investigation. Musk promptly fired Baker from Twitter over the weekend. We might see, very soon, just how coincidental Baker’s redactions were.

Mark Zuckerberg himself recently admitted that Facebook was pressured by the FBI to censor the Hunter Biden laptop story, which is a key part of the controversy underlying the Twitter Files. The Biden Administration had ambitious plans for working alongside social media on content moderation, but the Orwellian-sounding “Disinformation Governance Board” has been shelved, at least for now. Furthermore, activity performed for a political campaign may represent an impermissible in-kind campaign donation, and Twitter falsely denied to the FEC that it had worked with the Biden campaign.

Solutions?

What remedies exist for potential social media abuses of constitutionally-protected rights, or even politically-driven censorship? Elon Musk’s remaking of Twitter is a big win, of course, and market solutions now seem more realistic. Court challenges to social media firms are also possible, but there are statutory obstacles. Court challenges to the federal government are more likely to succeed (if its involvement can be proven).

The big social media firms have all adopted a fairly definitive political stance and have acted on it ruthlessly, contrary to their professed role in the provision of an open “public square”. For that reason, I have in the past supported eliminating social media’s immunity from prosecution for content posted on their networks. A cryptic jest by Musk might just refer to that very prospect:

“Anything anyone says will be used against me in a court of law.”

Or maybe not … even with the sort of immunity granted to social media platforms, the Twitter Files might implicate his own company in potential violations of law, and he seems to be okay with that.

Immunity was granted to social media platforms under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (DCA). It was something many thought “the state should do” in the 1990s in order to foster growth in the internet. And it would seem that a platform’s immunity for content shared broadly should be consistent with promoting free speech. So the issue of revoking immunity is thorny for free speech advocates.

Section 230 And Content Moderation

There have always been legal restrictions on speech related to libel and “fighting words”. In addition, the CDA, which is a part of the Telecommunications Act, restricts “obscene” or “offensive” speech and content in various ways. The problem is that social media firms seem to have used the CDA as a pretext for censoring content more generally. It’s also possible they felt as if immunity from liability made them legally impervious to objections of any sort, including aggressive political censorship and user bans on behalf of government.

The social value of granting immunity depends on the context. There are two different kinds of immunity under Section 230: subsection (c)(1) grants immunity to so-called common carriers (e.g. telephone companies) for the content of private messages or calls on their networks; subsection (c)(2) grants immunity to social media companies for content posted on their platforms as long as those companies engage in content moderation consistent with the provisions of the CDA.

Common carrier immunity is comparatively noncontroversial, but with respect to 230(c)(2), I go back to the question: would I want my worst enemy to have the power to grant this kind of immunity? Not if it meant the power to forgive political manipulation of social media content with the heavy involvement of one political party! The right to ban users is completely unlike the “must serve” legal treatment of “public accommodations” provided by most private businesses. And immunity is inconsistent with other policies. For example, if social media acts to systematically host and to amplify some viewpoints and suppress others, it suggests that they are behaving more like publishers, who are liable for material they might publish, whether produced on their own or by third-party contributors.

Still, social media firms are private companies and their user agreements generally allow them to take down content for any reason. And if content moderation decisions are colored by input from one side of the political aisle, that is within the rights of a private firm (unless its actions are held to be illegal in-kind contributions to a political campaign). Likewise, it is every consumer’s right not to join such a platform, and today there are a number of alternatives to Twitter and Facebook.

Again, political censorship exercised privately is not the worst of it. There are indications that government actors have been complicit in censorship decisions made by social media. That would be a clear violation of the First Amendment for which immunity should be out of the question. I’d probably cut a platform considerable slack, however, if they acted under threat of retaliation by government actors, if that could be proven.

Volokh’s Quid Pro Quo

Rather than simply stripping away Section 230 protection for social media firms, another solution has been suggested by Eugene Volokh in “Common Carrier Status as Quid Pro Quo for § 230(c)(1) Immunity”. He proposes the following choice for these companies:

“(1) Be common carriers like phone companies, immune from liability but also required to host all viewpoints, or

(2) be distributors like bookstores, free to pick and choose what to host but subject to liability (at least on a notice-and-takedown basis).”

Option 2 is the very solution discussed in the last section (revoke immunity). Option 1, however, would impinge on a private company’s right to moderate content in exchange for continued immunity. Said differently, the quid pro quo offers continued rents created by immunity in exchange for status as a public utility of sorts, along with limits on the private right to moderate content. Common carriers often face other regulatory rules that bear on pricing and profits, but since basic service on social media is usually free, this is probably not at issue for the time being.

Does Volokh’s quid pro quo pass the Munger Test? Well, at least it’s a choice! For social media firms to host all viewpoints isn’t nearly as draconian as the universal service obligation imposed on local phone companies and other utilities, because the marginal cost of hosting an extra social media user is negligible.

Would I give my worst enemy the power to impose this choice? The CDA would still obligate social media firms selecting Option 1 to censor obscene or offensive content. Option 2 carries greater legal risks to firms, who might respond by exercising more aggressive content moderation. The coexistence of common carriers and more content-selective hosts might create competitive pressures for restrained content moderation (within the limits of the CDA) and a better balance for users. Therefore, Volokh’s quid pro quo option seems reasonable. The only downside is whether government might interfere with social media common carriers’ future profitability or plans to price user services. Then again, if a firm could reverse its choice at some point, that might address the concern. The CDA itself might not have passed the “Worst Enemy” Munger Test, but at least within the context of established law, I think Volokh’s quid pro quo probably does.

We’ll Know More Soon

More will be revealed as new “episodes” of the Twitter Files are released. We may well hear direct evidence of government involvement in censorship decisions. If so, it will be interesting to see the fallout in terms of legal actions against government censorship, and whether support coalesces around changes in the social media regulatory environment.

Dobbs, Roe, and the Freakout Over Federalism

25 Wednesday May 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Abortion, Federalism, Uncategorized

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Abortion, Adoption, Akhil Amar, Artificial Womb, Bill of Rights, Birth Control, CDC, Classism, Court Leak, dependency, Disparate impact, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, Due Process Clause, Emergency Contraception, Equal Protection Clause, Establishment Clause, Eugene Volokh, Eugenics, Federalism, Fetal Homicide Laws, Fetal Rights, Fetal Viability, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Great Society, Josh Blackman, Judicial Activism, Later-Term Abortion, Margaret Sanger, Morning After Pill, Personhood, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Privacy Rights, Pro-Life, racism, Roe v. Wade, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Samuel Alito, Supreme Court, War Drugs, World Health Organization

The leak of a Supreme Court draft opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization has created uproars on several fronts. The opinion, written by Justice Samuel Alito, represented a 5-4 majority at the time of its writing, but it is a draft opinion, and the substance and the positions of other justices might change before a final decision is handed down by the Court by the end of June. The draft would essentially uphold a Mississippi law restricting abortions after the first 15 weeks of pregnancy. This would overturn the Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) decisions. The former established that states could regulate abortion only beyond a certain stage of pregnancy (originally the first trimester), while the latter allowed states to regulate once a pregnancy reached the stage of fetal viability. While 24 weeks is often cited as the lower limit of viability, it is considered to be as early as 20 weeks by the World Health Organization, an estimate that could decline with future advances in prenatal and neonatal care (such as artificial wombs). In any case, viability would no longer be the standard if the draft opinion stands. Indeed, it would once again be up to states as to how they wish to regulate abortion.

Here is an update on where things stood on May 11th. Reportedly, the 5-4 majority still stood, and no other draft opinions existed in the case at that time. No news since.

Due Process and Privacy Rights

Was Roe v. Wade a good legal decision? Ruth Bader Ginsburg did not hold the opinion in high regard as a matter of the jurisprudence. Apparently, she felt that the Court should have simply struck down the restrictive Texas law in question without imposing a set of rules, which amounted to an aggressive infringement on the legislative function and the evolution of law, and case law, at the state level. Her words were:

“Doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, experience teaches, may prove unstable. The most prominent example in recent decades is Roe v. Wade.”

She also felt the Court should not have leaned on the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the denial of “life, liberty or property, without due process of law”. And she believed that relying on due process and the privacy rights of a woman and her physician made Roe vulnerable to challenge. She was probably right.

Yale Law School professor Akhil Amar, who is pro-choice, also believes the Roe decision was misguided and calls its reliance on due process “textual gibberish”. The objection to substantive due process is based on the absence of any principle establishing which “rights” not found explicitly in the Bill of Rights are valid, and which are not.

Equal Protection

In fact, Amar defends Justice Alito’s draft opinion and believes, as Ginsberg did, that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a better defense of abortion rights. The contention is that unless a woman possesses the right to terminate a pregnancy, she is not on an equal footing with similarly situated men in terms of self-determination and life opportunities. Of course, none of this weighs the interests of the unborn child.

Establishment Clause

Josh Blackman has an interesting series of comments about whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment may be a valid defense of abortion rights. That seemingly preposterous claim relies on abortion as a right, in some cases, protected by the free exercise of religion. As Blackman sums up in his sixth point:

“… abortion rights groups should be careful what they wish for. If the Court recognizes a Free Exercise right to perform or receive an abortion, then conservatives can cook up even more aggressive religious liberty strategies. I’ll bring the bagels for the next meeting of the Temple of Automatic Weapons.”

Eugene Volokh makes several interesting points on attempts to use the Establishment Clause “to obtain exemptions from generally applicable laws”. A separate, misguided take at the Establishment Clause is that a law must be unconstitutional if it was based on religious beliefs. Volokh handily disposes of that contention here.

Judicially-Prescribed Rights vs. Constitutional Rights

Blackman has written that the Alito draft is a tour de force, addressing many constitutional principles and concerns expressed by other justices. In another post, Blackman explains a very basic rationale for a decision to overturn Roe. It is related to the objections expressed by Ginsberg and Amar, and to the many “lamentations” expressed in the Court’s abortion opinions over the years since Roe. Namely, that rule and establishment of new rights by court decision was not a mechanism intended by the framers of the Constitution, but self-government and federalist principles were:

“It is a mistake to argue that Dobbs extinguishes a right, without also acknowledging that the decision would restore another right. Overruling Roe would extinguish a judicially-created right to abortion, but it would restore a very different right: the right of the people to govern themselves.”

Personhood

Of course, none of these points are really germane to the crux of the pro-life argument to which I subscribe. However, both Roe and Casey acknowledge the state’s interest in protecting the fetus beyond some point in a pregnancy. The closer to term, the greater the interest. The implication is that a fetus gradually takes on degrees of “personhood” through the course of gestation, and that rights attach to that nascent individual at some point. Both Roe and Casey, by allowing states to regulate abortion beyond some point, offer recognition that the closer an abortion occurs to full term, the stronger the case that it may be prohibited.

The law in most European nations carries the same implication, and if anything leans more heavily in favor of fetal rights than Roe. Furthermore, there are 38 states with fetal homicide laws, which treat the fetus as a person in the case of a murder of a pregnant woman. In 29 of those states, the law applies at the earliest stages of pregnancy. This suggests that in most states, sentiments may weigh in favor of treating the fetus as a person imbued with constitutional rights.

In the end, this is not an exclusively religious argument, as the pro-abortion Left always suggests. For me, it’s purely an ethical one. At what point beyond conception are pro-abortion activists willing to concede that a human life is at stake? Apparently a heartbeat is not enough to convince them. Neither does the appearance of small fingers and toes. Nor the ability to feel pain. These are all things that happen before the child is “viable”. But even viability is not enough for some of the more radical abortion activists, who are proposing choice right up to the moment of birth. Incredibly, and despite the real limitations imposed on mid- or late-term abortions in many states (in line with Roe and Casey), some pro-choice advocates are now acting as if overturning these cases causes women to lose such an unfettered right!

Practical Matters

Anyone can obtain a variety of birth control alternatives without a prescription (and often for free). This includes emergency contraception, or the “morning after pill”. Granted, sometimes birth control measures fail, which places the prospective mother (and perhaps an involved or conscientious father) in a difficult position. Nevertheless, careful use of birth control would minimize the abortion problem and obviate much of the debate, but people are often too impulsive or careless about sex.

Late term abortions are a fairly small percentage of all abortions. The CDC reported that in 2018, 50,000 (~8%) abortions occurred after the first trimester (14+ weeks), and 6,200 (1%) took place at or beyond the point of theoretical viability (21+ weeks). This study found that of abortions at 20+ weeks, mothers tended to be younger (20 -24), discovered their pregnancies somewhat later, faced logistical and financial delays in arranging the abortion, or faced other challenging life circumstances. However, the researchers rebut a common rationale for late-term abortion when they say:

“… most women seeking later terminations are not doing so for reasons of fetal anomaly or life endangerment.”

Eugenics and Classism

Pregnancies among black women are terminated at a disproportionately high rate. That’s consistent with the original, eugenicistic and racist goals of Planned Parenthood founder Margaret Sanger. This is an outcome to top all disparate impacts. I have witnessed pro-abortion activists counter that these aborted lives would have been miserable, impoverished, and without opportunity — essentially not worth living — but these are value judgements of the most monstrous kind. I’ve also heard the pathetic argument that fiscal conservatives should be happy that abortions will reduce spending on aid programs. Of course, the plight of the would-be mother is also emphasized by pro-abortion advocates, but we should not be so eager to accept the tradeoff here: abortion gets the mother is off the hook, but a child’s life is at stake. No matter the odds of success, human beings are all endowed with potential and opportunity, and it’s not necessary to be economically secure to be happy or pursue dreams.

It’s easy to be pessimistic that public policy can ever mitigate the economic burden on impoverished women who bring unexpected or unwanted pregnancies to term, or to brighten the economic future of their children. After all, over the decades since the Great Society program was conceived, the welfare state has proven no better than a dependency treadmill. Family structure has been decimated by those programs and the destructive consequences of the failed (but ongoing) war on drugs. Likewise, public education is a disaster. However, there are also alternatives such as adoption, and there are many private individuals and organizations working to encourage prospective mothers and ease those burdens.

The Leak

The leak of the draft opinion in Dobbs is unfortunate as it compromises the ongoing integrity of the Court’s internal debates and proceedings. In addition to this institutional damage, the impropriety of staging protests outside the homes of justices and inside places of worship should be roundly condemned by people with respect for judicial integrity, privacy and free exercise. These protests are partly attempts to intimidate, and they have even been accompanied by threats of violence. The belligerent posture of these activists is unconscionable.

Long Live Federalism

Again, the Court’s final decision in Dobbs might not be the opinion in the leaked draft. However, if the Court does indeed overturn Roe, it would not outlaw abortion. Rather, it would allow voters in each state to have a voice in aligning the law with public sentiment. Some states will have more restrictive abortion laws than others, but even the Mississippi law at issue in Dobbs allows abortion up through week 15, almost two weeks longer than the original Roe limitation.

The country is still deeply divided on the issue of abortion. Fundamentally, a broader acceptance of the life-and-death reality of abortion would help bring more consensus on the issue. One theory I have is that many who oppose overturning Roe would simply rather not think about that reality. In their minds, Roe keeps abortion compartmentalized, safely walled off from conscience and sometimes even spiritual convictions. They rationalize Roe based on their inability to observe the person whose life is at stake, and they accept justifications that minimize the value of that life.

A single rule imposed by the Court has not and will not resolve these differences. Indeed, Roe and Casey were failed acts of judicial activism that should be reversed. While bad legislation is regrettable, it is always subject to review and challenge by the people. In a federalist system, a bad law is contained like a single experimental treatment in a large trial with multiple arms. However, in this case, unlike a trial with random selection of subjects, one treatment group may differ from others in important respects, and the objective is not to identify one single-best solution, but different solutions that work best for different groups. That is a closer approximation to real self-government than federal legislation and especially one-size-fits-all Court rule-making.

On Quitting Facebook, One Year Later

25 Friday Feb 2022

Posted by Nuetzel in Censorship, Social Media, Uncategorized

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Censorship, CIA, CloutHub, Common Carrier, Content Moderation, Eugene Volokh, Facebook, Facebook Jail, Fact Checkers, FireEye, First Amendment, Frenemies, Friend Requests, Gab, GETTR, Hosting Function, Meta, MeWe, Parler, Public Square, Recommendation Function, Section 230 Immunity, Telecommunications Act of 1996, Telegram, Truth Social, Vivek Ramaswamy

I’m very happy to be off Facebook, or “Meta” as it now calls itself. The platform has become, effectively, a propaganda arm of governments, and one that appears to be engaging in unconstitutional censorship. More on that below.

One year ago my profile dropped off of FB entirely. I had decided to quit in January 2021 after about 15 years. I downloaded everything from my profile and wrote a blog post called “On Quitting Facebook”. It was my last entry there, so that’s really when I quit, but it took a month before they completely deactivated me.

You have to resist the temptation to go back during that interim month or it starts all over again — a new interim period, that is — when you finally decide to get out. I knew immediately that I loved being free of it, so that part was easy. My feelings haven’t changed a bit.

F-R-Double E

I no longer have to put up with the propaganda that FB prioritizes nor the “demoted post” phenomenon. None of my posts had actually been blocked outright, but I knew “Facebook jail” was happening to users with increasing frequency, as well as post blocking and “red flags” authorized by politically-motivated FB “fact checkers”.

Free of FB, I no longer have to put up with various “frenemies” I’d somehow collected. And quitting FB allowed me to reclaim precious time I’d been wasting on an obsession that one would think avoidable: scrolling through my news feed, sometimes more than once a day, to view an assortment of photos of meals, puppies, and peoples’ lovely feet propped-up in “relax mode”, plus huge dollops of left-wing political and economic BS, often delivered with snark. But of course the lefty BS is almost everywhere in media.

There was one other disturbing anomoly on FB that became more frequent for me: friend requests from exceptionally gruesome-looking characters. I think they were fake requests, but I had tight security on my profile, so the source and motive is anyone’s guess. The increasing frequency led me to wonder whether someone had information about me, which my security settings should not have allowed. That would have meant it was partly an “inside job” on FB, perhaps designed to intimidate me in one way or another. I have no idea, but I don’t miss those requests.

So there’s a lot to like about quitting FB! It certainly brought a few disappointments and challenges. Unfortunately, I did lose touch with some good people. In what follows I elaborate on certain legal ramifications of FB’s poor conduct in hosting users both privately and within what’s purported to serve as a “public square”; the social media frustrations I’ve experienced since quitting; and my impressions of a few other platforms.

Government Censorship?

FB is a private company, so the usual libertarian position is that it can run its platform any way it wants. It is therefore no business of the government’s whether FB moderates content, bans certain users, or takes editorial positions. However, FB benefits from immunity to prosecution under Section 230 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which was traditionally intended for common carriers like telephone companies. That means they can’t be held liable for anything a third party might say on their network. Say what you want on the phone, because liability-free carriers shouldn’t care. FB and other social media platforms receive this same protection. But should they?

While we can think of FB as a kind of modern public square, in some respects it looks more like a common carrier. By that I mean much of the communication that takes place on the platform is voluntary and between private contacts, or groups of “friends”. The voluntary nature of these connections is a key aspect of what Eugene Volokh calls the “hosting function”. No one is forced to look at what you post. Yet FB makes a habit of moderating the content of those posts and conversations and still receives immunity under Section 230.

In other respects, FB does resemble a public square. Content posted by one party can be shared by each contact with their own network of friends, and thus can “go viral”. But if FB moderates content, censors users, or takes political positions of its own via the “recommendation function” often exercised by social media platforms, then it is not acting purely as a public square. Indeed, in that case it is more like a publisher, which otherwise would not be immune from lawsuits.

The case against FB is even stronger than that, however. It has acted as a de facto agent of the government in several respects. A recent FOIA request has revealed a White House email showing:

“… Facebook, Merck, and the CDC Foundation, whose corporate partners includes Pfizer, have formed an alliance ‘to use social media and digital platforms to build confidence in and drive uptake of vaccines.’”

FB has also acted to delete user accounts at the behest of the U.S. and Israeli governments. And FB has partnered with a security firm called FireEye, which is funded by the CIA. There are other areas of “cooperation” between entities performing government-funded activities described at the last link.

The topic of social media giants censoring speech on behalf of the U.S. and other governments has been discussed by Vivek Ramiswamy, who notes the obvious breach of constitutional rights that it represents. It’s fine for a private firm to regulate speech on its own premises, but conducting censorship at the behest of government is equivalent to censorship by government and a flat out a violation of the First Amendment.

Moreover, FB has had the audacity to propose government “oversight” in its effort to moderate content. What, in the name of regulatory capture, could go wrong? I’d say the whole thing is Orwellian, but perhaps no more than what we’ve already seen. The best policy response, as Volokh suggests, might be to separate the hosting and conversation functions of social media from the recommendation function. The former can be treated as “common carrier” functions for the purpose of applying Section 230, with an obligation for non-discrimination and minimal content moderation, while the latter function would receive no immunity under Section 230.

My Post-FB Social Media Escapades

My blog lost a lot of readership when I quit FB. Last spring, however, I began a roughly five-month stint as a contributing blogger on a site that brought a jump in my readership. Unfortunately, it became clear, over time, that it was largely an audience unwilling to entertain more objective and sometimes technical considerations. I also became disillusioned after finding myself writing posts to debunk certain conspiratorial fantasies of other contributing bloggers on the site. I didn’t want to be associated with those writers, so I cut ties. My readership crashed again, but I’m not sure I lost many high-quality readers in that instance.

I joined various “free speech” social media platforms: first Parler (until it was taken down by Amazon, and I haven’t been back), and I’d been on MeWe, but then Gab, CloutHub, GETTR, and Telegram. MeWe, Gab, and CloutHub sponsor groups with shared interests, and I’ve made it a point to join Libertarian groups when I can find them. Those groups are not very active on CloutHub. GETTR feels a bit more like Twitter to me, and there are no group pages. Telegram is a secure messaging app with extra features. I just started a so-called “channel” there to which I can post my content. Users can view and subscribe to my channel if they wish, but I have to cross-post to other channels to find them. We’ll see how it goes, but there are a lot of people who LOVE Telegram!

A few friends from my FB days followed me to one or two of the “free speech” platforms, but only one of them seems to have maintained any presence there. Most of them became entirely inactive from what I can tell. I know some went back to FB, upon which so many people are dependent. Sometimes that’s for business reasons, which is both understandable and regrettable. Anyway, at least one of my former FB connections is still cross-posting some of my articles to FB, which is fine and I truly appreciate it.

Like FB, the alternative platforms I’ve tried are dominated by meme warriors. While a few trolls lurk there, MeWe, Gab, and CloutHub are very much echo chambers. But at least dissident voices have a place where they aren’t censored! In an ideal world we’d have diversity of thought and civility.

I’ve grown kind of numb to all the memes. I tend to scroll right past them in search of meatier fare. Memes tend to over-simplify complex issues and appeal to mood affiliations. They generally offer zero evidence in support of their messages. Even worse is their impact on attention span. It’s extremely difficult to get users to read anything longer than a meme blurb. In fact, there are people who notice the headlines on my posts and make immediate comments on that basis, as if I’m posting memes! But again, FB is very much a hall of memes, so I don’t mean to imply that there’s been any change for me in that respect … I just like to bitch about memes!

There are a few anti-semites on some of the “free-speech” sites, Gab in particular. In fact, Gab is thoroughly dominated by the religious right, so the anti-semitism is all the more striking. Excepting the Jew haters, whom I can block, I respect the religious right, and our interests are often aligned. However, a steady diet of posts with Christianity as an emphasis makes Gab less than ideal for me. Besides, every time I click on the Gab app it takes like 15 seconds to load on my phone!

I joined MeWe well before I quit FB. Nevertheless, I’ve had trouble getting traction there and I’m thinking of dropping out just to simplify my life. So far, CloutHub seems a little better in terms of generating visits to my blog.

It’s hard for a small-time blogger like me to get much notice on GETTR. There are some well-known conservative personalities there, so there are some decently informative posts. I have not been very active on Telegram, but that might change, as I said above.

I’ve been on LinkedIn for many years, but I’ve only recently decided to begin posting my articles there. I’ve lost a handful of connections as a result! That’s okay. As I like to say, eventually I’ll piss everyone off! I do get some views from LinkedIn, but users who might agree with my point of view are often too chickenshit to say so. That’s more understandable on a platform oriented toward career and professional contacts. However, I think the perception of social pressure is not very much different than the intimidation some people feel on FB.

I’ve considered joining the Truth Social platform, Donald Trump’s foray into social media. It’s billed as a “big tent”, but it will be another echo chamber, I’m sure. It’s also been a technical mess so far (not unique among new apps in that respect). I’m no Trump hater by any means, but any post that might be critical of him is almost certain to attract some hate on Truth Social (the link no is satire, btw). That’s not censorship per se, but TS might not be a great place for some of my posts.

No Going Back

Maybe the last section above was more self-assessment than anything else. As a personal decision, quitting FB was unequivocally positive for me. It hurt my blog readership, but I still hope to gain momentum on other platforms and to promote Sacred Cow Chips by placing links on other sites. In any case, I blog for myself as much as anyone else, just because I enjoy writing, thinking about issues, and occasionally doing a “deep dive” to research an issue.

The censorship occurring on the big social media platforms is simply unacceptable, and I wish more people would rise-up against it. I experienced some schadenfreude when I saw that Meta’s (Facebook’s) financials were a disappointment last quarter. The number of active users declined ever so slightly, but that was a first for FB. One can only hope it’s a trend in the making. And see this, though it might be a bit over-optimistic. Damn the censorship!

Censorship and Content Moderation in the Public Square

30 Thursday Sep 2021

Posted by Nuetzel in Censorship, Free Speech, Social Media

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Anthony Fauci, Censorship, Clarance Thomas, Common Carrier, Communications Decency Act, Eugene Volokh, Facebook, First Amendment, Good Samaritan Provision, Hosting Function, LinkedIn, Luigi Zingales, Mark Zuckerberg, Network Externalities, Philip Hamburger, Public Accomodations, Section 230 Immunity, Sheryl Sandberg, Supreme Court, Trump Administration, Vivek Ramaswamy

I’m probably as fed up with social media as anyone, given the major platforms’ penchant for censoring on the basis of politics, scientific debate, religion, and wokeism (or I should say a lack thereof). I quit Facebook back in January and haven’t regretted it. It’s frustratingly difficult to convince others to give it up, however, and I’ve tried. Ultimately, major user defections would provide the most effective means of restraining the company’s power.

Beyond my wild fantasies of a consumer revolt, I will confess to a visceral desire to see the dominant social media platforms emasculated: broken up, regulated, or even fined for proven complaints of censorial action. That feeling is reinforced by their anti-competitive behavior, which is difficult to curb.

Are There Better Ways?

While my gut says we need drastic action by government, my head tells me … not … so … fast! These are private companies, after all. I’m an adherent of free markets and private property, so I cannot abide government intrusions to force anyone to sponsor my speech using their private facilities. At the same time, however, our free speech rights must be protected in the “public square”, and the social media companies have long claimed that their platforms offer a modern form of the public square. If they can be taken at their word, should there be some remedy available to those denied a voice based upon their point-of-view by such a business? This seems especially pertinent when access to “public accommodations” is so critical to the meaning of non-discrimination under current law (not that I personally believe businesses should be forced to accommodate the specific demands of all comers).

In a lengthy and scholarly treatment of “Treating Social Media Platforms Like Common Carriers”, Eugene Volokh states the following about U.S. Supreme Court case law (pg. 41):

“Under PruneYard and Rumsfeld, private property owners who open up their property to the public (or to some segment of the public, such as military recruiters) may be required by state or federal law to share their real estate with other speakers.”

The Common Carrier Solution

Volokh’s article is very detailed and informative. I highly recommend it to anyone hoping to gain an understanding of the complex legal issues associated with the rights of big tech firms, their users, and other interested parties. His article highlights the long-standing legal principle that so-called “common carriers” in telecommunications cannot discriminate on the basis of speech.

Volokh believes it would be reasonable and constitutional to treat the big social media platforms as common carriers. Then, the platforms would be prohibited from discriminating based on viewpoint, though free to recommend material to their users. He also puts forward a solution that would essentially permit social media firms to continue to receive protection from liability for user posts like that granted under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act:

“… I think Congress could categorically treat platforms as common carriers, at least as to their hosting function. But Congress could also constitutionally give platforms two options as to any of their functions: (1) Claim common carrier status, which will let them be like phone companies, immune from liability but also required to host all viewpoints, or (2) be distributors like bookstores, free to pick and choose what to host but subject to liability (at least on a notice-and- takedown basis).”

Economist Luigi Zingales emphasizes the formidable network externalities that give the incumbent platforms like Facebook a dominance that is almost unshakable. Zingales essentially agrees with Volokh, but he refers to common carrier status for what he calls the “sharing function” with Section 230-like protections, while the so-called “editing function” can and should be competitive. Zingales calls recommendations of material by a platform part of the editing function which should not be granted protection from liability. In that last sense, his emphasis differs somewhat from Volokh’s. However, both seem to think an change in the law is necessary to allow protections only where they serve the “public interest”, as opposed to protecting the private interests of the platforms.

The most destructive aspect of Section 230 immunity is the so-called “Good Samaritan” clause aimed at various kinds of offensive material (“… obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”), which the social media platforms have used as “a license to censor”, as Philip Hamburger puts it. Here, Eugene Volokh and others, including Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, assert that this provision should not receive a broad interpretation in determining immunity for content moderation decisions. In other words, the phrase “otherwise objectionable” in the provision must be interpreted within the context of the statute, which, after all, has to do with communications decency! (Here again, I question whether the government can legitimately authorize censorship in any form.)

Arm of Government?

Viewpoint discrimination and censorship by the platforms is bad enough, but in addition, by all appearances, there is a danger of allowing companies like Facebook to become unofficial speech control ministries in the service of various governments around the world, including the U.S. Here is Vivek Ramaswamy’s astute take on the matter:

“… Facebook likely serves increasingly as the censorship arm of the US government, just as it does for other governments around the world.

In countries like India, Israel, Thailand, and Vietnam, Facebook frequently removes posts at the behest of the government to deter regulatory reprisal. Here at home, we know that Mark Zuckerberg and Sheryl Sandberg regularly correspond with US officials, ranging from e-mail exchanges with Dr. Anthony Fauci on COVID-19 policy to discussing “problematic posts” that “spread disinformation” with the White House.

If Zuckerberg and Sandberg are also directly making decisions about which posts to censor versus permit, that makes it much more likely that they are responsive to the threats and inducements from government officials.”

Even LinkedIn has censored journalists in China who have produced stories the government finds unflattering. Money comes first, I guess! I’m all for the profit motive, but it should never take precedence over fundamental human rights like free speech.

There is no question of a First Amendment violation if Facebook or any other platform is censoring users on behalf of the U.S. government, and Section 230 immunity would be null and void under those circumstances.

Elections … Their Way

On the other hand, we also know that platforms repeatedly censored distribution of the Trump Administration’s viewpoints; like them or not, we’re talking about officials of the executive branch of the U.S. government! This raises the possibility that Section 230 immunity was (or should have been) vitiated by attempts to silence the government. And of course, there is no question that the social media platforms sought to influence the 2020 election via curation of posts, but it is not clear whether that is currently within their rights under Section 230’s Good Samaritan clause. Some would note the danger to fair elections inherent in any platform’s willingness to appease authoritarian governments around the world, or their willingness and ability to influence U.S. elections.

Pledge of Facebook Allegiance

Some of our domestic social media companies have become supra-national entities without a shred of loyalty to the U.S. This article in The Atlantic, of all places, is entitled “The Largest Autocracy on Earth“, and it has a sub-heading that says it all:

“Facebook is acting like a hostile foreign power; it’s time we treated it that way.”

The article reports that Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg has promoted the mantra “company over country”. That should disabuse you of any notion that he cares one whit about the ideals embodied in the U.S. Constitution. He is a child consumed with dominance, control, and profit for his enterprise, and he might be a megalomaniac to boot. If he wants to host social media relationships in this country, let’s make Facebook a common carrier hosting platform.

Insuring Health Insurability

22 Saturday Dec 2018

Posted by Nuetzel in Health Insurance

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Community Rating, Consumer Sovereignty, Death Spiral, Eugene Volokh, Health Insurance Options, Health Status Insurance, Individual Mandate, John C. Goodman, John Cochrane, Obamacare, Pre-Existing Conditions, Premium Subsidies, Tax Subsidies

The latest blow to Obamacare went down just before the holidays when a federal judge in Texas ruled that the individual mandate was unconstitutional. The decision will be appealed, so it will have no immediate impact on the health-care law or insurance markets. But as Eugene Volokh noted, the mandate itself became meaningless from an enforcement perspective after the repeal of the penalty tax for non-coverage in 2017, despite the fact that some individuals might still opt for coverage out of “respect for the law”. What will really matter, when and if the decision is upheld, is the nullification of the complex web of regulations created by Obamacare, officially known as the Affordable Care Act or ACA. Perhaps most important among these is the requirement that buyers in good health and those in poor health must be charged the same price for coverage. That is “community rating” and it is the chief reason for the escalation of insurance premiums under Obamacare.

One Size Misfits All

Community rating means that everyone pays the same premium regardless of health. Those in good health must pay higher than actuarially fair premiums to subsidize the sick or high-risk with premiums that are less than actuarially fair. Two provisions of the ACA were intended to make this work: first, the individual mandate required everyone to remain in the game (and paying the subsidies) rather than going uninsured and paying the “tax” penalty. But the penalty was so light that many preferred it to actually buying insurance. Now, of course, the penalty has been repealed. Second, individuals with incomes below 250% of poverty line receive premium subsidies from the federal government to offset the high cost of coverage. That means low-income buyers do not have to confront the high premiums, which was hoped to keep them in the game.

Community rating caused premiums in the individual insurance market to increase dramatically. This was compounded by the law’s minimum coverage requirements, which are more comprehensive than many consumers would have preferred. Lots of younger, healthier consumers opted out while the sick opted in, or even worse, opted in only when they became sick. This deterioration in the “risk pool” is the so-called insurance “death spiral”. The pool of insureds becomes increasingly risky, premiums escalate, more healthy consumers opt out, and the process repeats. At the root of it is the distortion in the way that risk is priced by community rating.

Tailored Coverage

The coverage and pricing of risk is better left to markets. That means consumers and insurers will reach agreement on policy provisions that are mutually beneficial ex ante. Insurers will offer to cover risks up to the point at which the expected marginal cost of underwriting is equal to value, or the buyer’s willingness to pay. An insurer who offers unattractive policies or charges too much will find its business undercut by competitors. But when risk is priced by government fiat and community rating, this natural form of market information discovery is impossible.

Tax vs. Premium Subsidies

Many in the high-risk population will be unable to afford coverage in the absence of community rating. There are only two general options: they pay what they can for care but otherwise go without insurance coverage, accepting charity care if they are willing; or, taxpayers pay, as under Medicaid. Most lack coverage because they simply cannot afford it, even when they earn too much to qualify for Medicaid.

That situation can be resolved in the long-term (as I’ll describe below), but an overhang of individuals with pre-existing conditions in need of subsidies will persist for a period of years. Under Obamacare, subsidies were paid by charging higher premia to healthy individuals through community rating. Again, that distorted signals about risk and value, creating unhealthy incentives among insurance buyers. The death spiral is the outcome. Subsidies funded by general taxation do not create these price distortions, however, and should be relied upon for assisting the high-risk population, at least those who are determined to qualify.

Health Status Insurance

The overhang of individuals with pre-existing conditions requiring subsidies can never be eliminated entirely—every day there are children born with critical, unanticipated health needs. However, the overhang can shrink drastically over time under certain conditions. A development that is already receiving meaningful attention in the market is the sale of health insurance options, as described by John Cochrane. I have written about this method of protecting future insurability here.

Cochrane raises the subject within the context of new HHS rules allowing insurance companies to offer “temporary” insurance coverage up to a year, but with guaranteed renewability through a total of 36 months of coverage. Unfortunately, if you get sick before the end of the 36th month, you’ll have to give up your policy and pay more elsewhere. But Cochrane speculates:

“Unless, perhaps, they really are letting insurance companies offer the right to buy health insurance as a separate product, and that can have as long a horizon as you want? If they haven’t done that, I suggest they do so! I don’t think the ACA forbids the selling of options on health insurance of arbitrary duration.”

Cochrane links to this earlier article in which John C. Goodman discusses the ruling allowing the sale of temporary plans:

“The ruling pertains to ‘short-term, limited duration’ health plans. These plans are exempt from Obamacare regulations, including mandated benefits and a prohibition on pricing based on expected health expenses. Although they typically last up to 12 months, the Obama administration restricted them to 3 months and outlawed renewal guarantees that protect people who develop a costly health condition from facing a big premium hike on their next purchase.

The Trump administration has now reversed those decisions, allowing short-term plans to last up to 12 months and allowing guaranteed renewals up to three years. The ruling also allows the sale of a separate plan, call ‘health status insurance,’ that protects people from premium increases due to a change in health condition should they want to buy short-term insurance for another 3 years.”

That is far from permanent insurability, but the concept has nevertheless taken hold. An active market in health status insurance would reduce the pre-existing conditions problem to a bare minimum. The financial risks of deteriorating health would be underwritten in advance. Once stricken with illness, those unlucky individuals would then have coverage at standard rates by virtue of the earlier pooling of the risk of future changes in health status. At standard rates, relatively few high-risk individuals would require subsidies in order to afford coverage .

Will healthy, temporarily insured or uninsured individuals buy these options? Some, but not all, so subsidies will never disappear entirely. Still, the population of uninsured individuals with pre-existing conditions will shrink drastically. In the meantime, a healthy market for health insurance coverage should flourish, reestablishing the authority of the consumer over the kind of health care coverage they wish to purchase and the kinds of financial risks they are willing to bear.

Gays and Bakers: Expression or Repression?

26 Monday Feb 2018

Posted by Nuetzel in Discrimination, Free Speech

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Anti-discrimination law, CO Anti-Discrimination Act, Common Carrier, David Henderson, Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Association, Freedom of Speech, Gay Wedding Cake, Masterpiece Bakeshop, Public Accommodations, Richard Epstein, Unruh Act

A lot rides on the legal interpretation of “expression” in the gay-wedding-cake dispute. Eugene Volokh discusses a recent ruling in California in which a trial court judge ruled that the baker’s right to free expression, buttressed by her right to free exercise of religion, protected her from demands that she participate in a form of expression to which she objected. Specifically, she had no legal obligation to create a cake for the celebration of a gay couple’s wedding, according to the ruling.

The facts in the case, CA Dept. of Fair Employment and Housing v. Cathy’s Creations, are that the baker refused to bake the couple a wedding cake but expressed a willingness to sell them anything that was already available in the shop. Thus, she did not discriminate against the couple by denying them access to her “public accommodations”. She also gave the couple a referral to another baker whom she believed would be willing to produce the cake. So there were probable alternatives available to the couple, and the baker’s assistance in locating one mitigated against any harm suffered by the gay couple. That sort of mitigation is an important factor to consider in weighing the rights of conflicting parties. Courts have tended to view “dignitary harm” as less compelling than forced expression.

Volokh argues that the baker’s role in the episode did not demand expression on her part. He says the proposed cake was a pre-existing design and did not involve writing of any kind. Otherwise, Volokh would have supported the ruling. He and a coauthor discuss the distinctions between an artist (who expresses) and an artisan (who merely executes), and an expressive and a non-expressive cake, in an amicus brief, as noted in the article linked above. Here is Volokh’s summary of his view:

“While creating photographs, videos, and text would be constitutionally protected speech (so we support the right of, for instance, photographers not to photograph same-sex weddings), creating wedding cakes with no text or symbolic design on them is not.“

The Volokh article is a little confusing because the amicus brief seems to have been filed in a different but similar case, Masterpiece Bakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which is now before the U.S. Supreme Court. A ruling is expected this summer. Here is a transcript of the oral arguments in that case, which were heard late last year. It’s a fascinating discussion.

Volokh’s analysis is fine as far as it goes. However, a wedding cake is likely to be considered expressive to both the baker and the cake’s buyers. The baker’s effort in executing even a pre-existing design may involve meaning for her beyond mere execution, since the usual intent of a wedding cake is to celebrate a sacred union. Likewise, the baker knows that the buyers consider the cake to be expressive of their union. The baker doesn’t want any involvement in that expression, asserting that it is not for the government to intercede, forcing them to participate by producing the cake.

Does the baker’s offer to supply an existing cake (or any other bakery good) undermine their case? Does the necessity of baking a new cake for a gay wedding differ from offering a cake already on the shelf for the same purpose? That may be irrelevant to the cases at hand, because no other wedding cakes were available at the time, and freshness might demand the preparation of a new cake for such an occasion. Nevertheless, that sort of line between an acceptable sale for the baker and unacceptable expression strikes me as thin.

As for the matter of the baker’s religious beliefs and their importance to her expressive rights, Volokh derides some of the language of the ruling. Those beliefs, Volokh says, are irrelevant to the question of whether a particular kind of expression is protected or compelled:

“By the way, I take it that it’s clear that the Free Speech Clause issue can’t turn on whether Miller’s belief ‘is part of the orthodox doctrines’ of many religions, or whether it’s instead ‘trivial, arbitrary, nonsensical, or outrageous’ — the Free Speech Clause protects views regardless of whether they express views that are seen as orthodox, outrageous, or nonsensical.“

Bravo! However, when the rights of two parties are in conflict, it is appropriate to weigh any impingement upon other, secondary rights of both parties.

A disturbing aspect of these cases is that they do not turn in any way on freedom of association, a freedom that encompasses a right not to associate (since any association must be voluntary for both parties). The presumption is that the baker’s right to freely associate or not associate with whomever they please is superseded by their obligations under public accommodation laws, despite the fact that freedom of association is an enumerated right in the U.S. Constitution. While public accommodation laws have generally been found to be constitutional, those laws do not apply in all circumstances, such as when a particular product or service involves expression. But on its own, a violation of the baker’s freedom of association seems to matter less, in today’s legal environment, than abridgment of her free expression, and perhaps less than any obligation she has to provide public accommodation.

Richard Epstein gives a general treatment of the balance between freedom of association and anti-discrimination law. David Henderson has bemoaned the dilution of the f reedom of association suffered in the name of non-discrimination. He does not defend discrimination on the basis of race, gender or sexual preference. Quite the contrary. However, as a matter of individual liberty, he prefers that we retain our right to associate on any basis of our choosing and pay the price imposed by the market for discrimination. For example, if you hang a sign outside your restaurant saying that you won’t serve African Americans, you are likely to suffer a loss of business from all who find your preference offensive, as many will. That solution is obviously unappealing to those who believe that participation in civil society requires public standards of equal access in private transactions. Still, there is some truth to a quote Henderson provides from an anonymous individual comparing the idea of non-discrimination in public accommodations to the “common carrier” designation:

“‘Either way, the theory boils down to “you brought forth a good or service and abracadabra you now have fewer rights”‘”.

The legal actions against the bakers in the cases discussed above rely on anti-discrimination law (in CA, the Unruh Act, and in CO, the Anti-Discrimination Act). Those laws must face limits in their application, as may be necessary in the case of compelled expression, especially expression against one’s most deeply-held convictions, religious or otherwise. The most basic question in this regard is whether the creation of the proposed wedding (or union) cakes can be described as expression. Whether the bakers are acting as mere fabricators or as artists, there is no doubt that the wedding parties desired the cakes as part of the celebration of their unions. That use of a cake constitutes expression on their part, and it is a kind of expression and an association from which the bakers would prefer to demure.

I support the right of homosexuals to enter into legal marriage, but I also support the bakers’ right to refuse the business. To invoke a phrase used by Richard Epstein in the article linked above, the world would be a better place if all agreed to simply “live and let live”.

What Part of “Free Speech” Did You Not Understand?

27 Thursday Apr 2017

Posted by Nuetzel in Censorship, Free Speech

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Antifa, Censorship, Eugene Volokh, Fighting Words, First Amendment, Free Speech, Harry A. Blackmun, Hate Speech, Imminent Lawless Action, John Daniel Davidson, New York University, prior restraint doctrine, Reason.com, Robby Soave, The Federalist, Ulrich Baer

The left has adopted an absurdly expansive definition of “hate speech”, and they’d like you to believe that “hate speech” is unconstitutional. Their objective is to establish a platform from which they can ostracize and ultimately censor political opponents on a variety of policy issues, mixed with the pretense of a moral high ground. The constitutional claim is legal nonsense, of course. To be fair, the moral claim may depend on the issue.

John Daniel Davidson writes in The Federalist of the distinction between protected and unprotected speech in constitutional law. The primary exception to protected speech has to do with the use of “fighting words”. Davidson describes one Supreme Court interpretation of fighting words as “a face-to-face insult directed at a specific person for the purpose of provoking a fight.” Obviously threats would fall into the same category, but only to the extent that they imply “imminent lawless action”, according to a major precedent. As such, there is a distinction between fighting words versus speech that is critical, discriminatory, or even hateful, all of which are protected.

Hate speech, on the other hand, has no accepted legal definition. In law, it has not been specifically linked to speech offensive to protected groups under employment, fair housing, hate crime or any other legislation. If we are to accept the parlance of the left, it seems to cover almost anything over which one might take offense. However, unless it qualifies as fighting words, it is protected speech.

The amorphous character of hate speech, as a concept, makes it an ideal vehicle for censoring political opponents, and that makes it extremely dangerous to the workings of a free society. Any issue of public concern has more than one side, and any policy solution will usually create winners and losers. Sometimes the alleged winners and losers are merely ostensible winners and losers, as dynamic policy effects or “unexpected consequences” often change the outcomes. Advocacy for one solution or another seldom qualifies as hate toward those presumed to be losers by one side in a debate, let alone a threat of violence. Yet we often hear that harm is done by the mere expression of opinion. Here is Davidson:

“By hate speech, they mean ideas and opinions that run afoul of progressive pieties. Do you believe abortion is the taking of human life? That’s hate speech. Think transgenderism is a form of mental illness? Hate speech. Concerned about illegal immigration? Believe in the right to bear arms? Support President Donald Trump? All hate speech.“

Do you support the minimum wage? Do you oppose national reparation payments to African Americans? Do you support health care reform? Welfare reform? Rollbacks in certain environmental regulations? Smaller government? You just might be a hater, according to this way of thinking!

The following statement appears in a recent proposal on free speech. The proposal was recommended as policy by an ad hoc committee created by the administration of a state university:

“… Nor does freedom of expression create a privilege to engage in discrimination involving unwelcome verbal, written, or physical conduct directed at a particular individual or group of individuals on the basis of actual or perceived status, or affiliation within a protected status, and so severe or pervasive that it creates an intimidating or hostile environment that interferes with an individual’s employment, education, academic environment, or participation in the University’s programs or activities.“

This is an obvious departure from the constitutional meaning of free expression or any legal precedent.

And here is Ulrich Baer, who is New York University‘s vice provost for faculty, arts, humanities, and diversity (and professor of comparative literature), in an opinion piece this week in the New York Times:

“The recent student demonstrations [against certain visiting speakers] should be understood as an attempt to ensure the conditions of free speech for a greater group of people, rather than censorship. … Universities invite speakers not chiefly to present otherwise unavailable discoveries, but to present to the public views they have presented elsewhere. When those views invalidate the humanity of some people, they restrict speech as a public good. …

The idea of freedom of speech does not mean a blanket permission to say anything anybody thinks. It means balancing the inherent value of a given view with the obligation to ensure that other members of a given community can participate in discourse as fully recognized members of that community.“

How’s that for logical contortion? Silencing speakers is an effort to protect free speech! As noted by Robby Soave in on Reason.com, “... free speech is not a public good. It is an individual right.” This cannot be compromised by the left’s endlessly flexible conceptualization of “hate speech”, which can mean almost any opinion with which they disagree. Likewise, to “invalidate the humanity of some people” is a dangerously subjective standard. Mr. Baer is incorrect in his assertion that speakers must balance the “inherent” value of their views with an obligation to be “inclusive”. The only obligation is not to threaten or incite “imminent lawless action”. Otherwise, freedom of speech is a natural and constitutionally unfettered right to express oneself. Nothing could be more empowering!

Note that the constitution specifically prohibits the government from interfering with free speech. That includes any public institution such as state universities. Private parties, however, are free to restrict speech on their own property or platform. For example, a private college can legally restrict speech on its property and within its facilities. The owner of a social media platform can legally restrict the speech used there as well.

Howard Dean, a prominent if somewhat hapless member of the democrat establishment, recently tweeted this bit of misinformation: “Hate speech is not protected by the first amendment.” To this, Dean later added some mischaracterizations of Supreme Court decisions, prompting legal scholar Eugene Volokh to explain the facts. Volokh cites a number of decisions upholding a liberal view of free speech rights (and I do not use the word liberal lightly). Volokh also cites the “prior restraint doctrine”:

“The government generally may not exclude speakers — even in government-owned ‘limited public forums’ — because of a concern that the speakers might violate the rules if they spoke.“

If a speaker violates the law by engaging in threats or inciting violence, it is up to law enforcement to step in, ex post, just as they should when antifa protestors show their fascist colors through violent efforts to silence speakers. Volokh quotes from an opinion written by Supreme Court Justice Harry A. Backmun:

“… a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable.”

Anti-Gun Babes Up In Arms

17 Friday Jun 2016

Posted by Nuetzel in Gun Control, Gun Rights

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ACLU, Alexander Hamilton, Andrew Napolitano, Applied Economics, Assault Weapons, Background checks, Defensive Gun Uses, DGUs, Due Process, Eugene Volokh, Fully-Automatic Guns, Glenn Reynolds, Gun Blame, Gun-Free Zones, Individual Right to Bear Arms, James B. Jacobs, Killing Zones, Mass Shootings, Mizzou, Ninth Amendment, Ordinary Constitutional Law, Pink Pistols, Pulse Nightclub, Rolling Stone Magazine, Second Amendment, Semi-Automatic Guns, Soopermexican, Terror Watch List, Trey Gowdy, Unenumerated Rights, Well-Regulated Militia

Passion for various forms of gun control was inflamed by the tragic murder of 49 patrons (with 53 injured) at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida in the early hours of last Sunday morning. A man with ties to radical Islam was the perpetrator, but that’s not convenient to the left’s narrative, so scapegoats for the massacre run the gamut from guns to transgender bathroom laws to Christian “intolerance”, as opposed to the intolerance of a bat-shit crazy Islamic extremist. The Soopermexican notes the following:

“It’s really amazing how liberals [sic] are finding a way to blame Christians for the actions of the Orlando terrorist, who was, 1) gay, 2) Muslim, 3) Democrat, and 4) racist. … But then that’s what they did that time when a crazed liberal gay activist tried to shoot up the Family Research Council. Remember that? He literally said he wanted to kill everyone and then ‘smear Chick-Fil-A in the victim’s faces.’“

In case there’s any misunderstanding, I include that quote NOT to denigrate gays, Muslims, or Democrats, but to emphasize the absurdity of blaming Christians for the Orlando shootings. To get a sense of the infectious silliness going around in leftist circles over the slaughter, read this account of a vigil for the Pulse victims held in Columbia, MO by several student organizations near the main campus of the University of Missouri, at which Latino activists scolded the gay activist crowd for being “too white” and for paying insufficient attention to racial issues. Of course, it’s true that many of the Orlando victims were Latino, but after all, the vigil was for them, too, not just the white victims.

The left despises private gun ownership, or perhaps private anything except for their own privileges. Gun-blame feels so compassionate to them, and in this case, it conveniently avoids any mention of the killer’s ethnicity and radical ideology. Agitators say that “assault weapons” must be banned, but they are generally unable to articulate a precise definition. More thorough background checks are another favorite “solution”, but that’s based on an article of faith that such checks would be effective. Without proof that background checks actually work, and there is none, it still seems like a good idea to the “do something” crowd. Then, there are those whose real agenda is to ban guns outright, despite the fact that gun bans are counterproductive and infringe on the rights of law-abiding citizens.

Most of those who wish to ban assault weapons think they are referring to guns that fire repeatedly when the trigger is pulled. In other words, they believe that assault weapons are fully automatic weapons. But fully automatic weapons have been banned in the U.S. since 1934! Semi-automatic weapons require the trigger to be pulled to fire each bullet but load the next bullet automatically. James B. Jacobs of the NYU School of Law gives a fairly detailed description of the distinction between so-called assault weapons and other firearms, which essentially comes down to appearance:

“‘Assault weapons’ are semiautomatic firearms designed to look like military rifles. They are not military rifles—sometimes called assault rifles24—such as the U.S. Army’s M-16 … that can be fired in automatic or semiautomatic mode, or Russia’s AK-47, Germany’s HK G36 assault rifle, and Belgium’s FN Fal assault rifle. In contrast to assault rifles, these semiautomatic look-alikes do not fire automatically. Functionally, they are identical to most other semiautomatics. … Practically all modern rifles, pistols, and shotguns are semiautomatics; non-semiautomatic long guns include bolt action, slide action, and breach loaders; non-semiautomatic pistols are called revolvers.“

Jacobs discusses the futility of a ban on assault weapons and offers accounts of some historical assault weapon bans that were ineffective. Those outcomes were due in part to the flimsy distinction between assault weapons and other guns, as well as the fact that assault weapons are used in a relatively small percentage of gun crimes and in few mass shootings (also see here). This is corroborated by a recent paper appearing in the journal Applied Economics in which the authors report:

“… common state and federal gun laws that outlaw assault weapons are unrelated to the likelihood of an assault weapon being used during a public shooting event. Moreover, results show that the use of assault weapons is not related to more victims or fatalities than other types of guns. However, the use of hand guns, shot guns and high-capacity magazines is directly related to the number of victims and fatalities in a public shooting event. Finally, the gunman’s reported mental illness is often associated with an increase in the number of victims and fatalities.“

Another contention made by ill-informed opponents of gun rights is that mass shootings are never stopped by citizens with guns. That is simply not true, but it is good propaganda because foiled shooting attempts tend to receive much less notice than actual mass shootings. This article by Eugene Volokh provides a list of confirmed incidents in which a mass shooting was averted by a citizen carrying a gun. This situation has its counterpart in the left’s denial that defensive gun uses (DGUs) occur more frequently than gun crimes. DGUs are difficult to count because they often go unreported and may not even require the firing of a shot.

Another mistake is the continued advocacy for “gun-free zones” (such as the Pulse nightclub) within which even guards are not allowed to carry firearms. Andrew Napolitano rightly labels these “killing zones”.

More stringent background checks are another favorite solution of gun-rights opponents. However, actual background checks have done nothing to stop the most vicious mass shootings that have occurred over the past few years. This is another testament to the naiveté of relying on government to protect you, in this case, a government information system. Sheldon Richman has explained the futility of background checks thusly:

“… people with criminal intent will find ways to buy guns that do not require a check. Proponents of background checks seem to think that a government decree will dry up the black market. But why would it? Sales will go on beyond the government’s ability to monitor them. Out of sight, out of government control. … Thus the case against mandating ‘universal’ background checks withstands scrutiny. This measure would not keep criminally minded people from acquiring guns, but it would give a false sense of security to the public by promising something they cannot deliver.“

Advocates of assault weapon bans and wider background checks are inclined to characterize gun rights supporters as paranoid. As Volokh explained last year, however, there is strong reason to believe that the pro-gun lobby has correctly assessed the motives among the opposition as more extreme. Volokh notes that an ineffectual ban, like the 1994-2004 assault weapon ban and many other gun bans internationally, cannot outweigh the interests of society in protecting a basic liberty.

And as to basic liberties, Rolling Stone offers a wonderful illustration of the left’s disregard for individual rights and constitutional protections in an angry missive to gun rights supporters: “4 Pro-Gun Arguments We’re Sick of Hearing“. The author not only holds the Second Amendment in distain: vogue left-think has it that the entire Constitution is tainted because the framers were unable to agree on abolition 230 years ago (at a time when slave ownership was commonplace among the aristocracy). The fact that many of the founders were sympathetic to abolition makes little difference to these critics. They say the Constitution is not a legitimate framework for governance, despite its extremely liberal point of view on issues of individual rights. Apparently, Rolling Stone would be just fine with abrogating the free speech rights of gun advocates.

Over the past 20 years or so, case law has increasingly viewed the Second Amendment as “ordinary constitutional law“, meaning that it protects individuals’ right to bear arms. The “well-regulated militia” limitation written into the Second Amendment is no longer accepted by the courts and most legal scholars as a limitation on individual rights. The militias it references were state militias raised from the civilian population, and the armaments they used were generally owned by the same civilians. In any case, there is no time limitation imposed on gun ownership by the Second via that clause. An earlier discussion of these issues was provided by Eugene Volokh in “The Commonplace Second Amendment“.

All this is quite apart from the Ninth Amendment, which states that nothing in the Constitution should be interpreted as limiting rights that are unenumerated. That would include self-defense, and ownership of a gun for that purpose is well advised. The Wikipedia entry on the Ninth Amendment says:

“One of the arguments the Federalists gave against the addition of a Bill of Rights, during the debates about ratification of the Constitution, was that a listing of rights could problematically enlarge the powers specified in Article One, Section 8 of the new Constitution by implication. For example, in Federalist 84, Alexander Hamilton asked, ‘Why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?’“

In other words, we do not derive our rights from government or the majoritarian passions of the moment.

Finally, the debate in Congress this week has centered on whether individuals on the FBI’s Terrorist Watch List should be denied the right to purchase a gun. That might seem like a no-brainier, but it raises legitimate concerns about civil liberties. There are about 700,000 people on that list (some reports put the number much higher), many of them U.S. citizens; some of them are there by mistake. Individuals on the list have not been convicted of a crime and are therefore entitled to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Watch Rep. Trey Gowdy’s passionate defense of due process to a DHS official this past week. When the ACLU and congressional republicans agree on the tyrannical nature of a restriction like this, you just can’t dismiss it out-of-hand. Such a change in the law cannot be justified without a fast and effective process giving citizens on the list a right of challenge.

The left is bereft of competence on the matter of guns, gun rights and the Constitution generally. They consistently demonstrate a dismissive view of individual liberties, whether that involves guns, religion, property, speech or due process. The tragedy in Orlando deserves more than ill-informed, knee-jerk conclusions. The most productive approach to terror risks involves individuals able to protect themselves and help watch out for others. That’s consistent with the position of the gay gun-rights group Pink Pistols. More power to them!