Tag Archives: Jacob Sullum

Virus Visuals and Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions

19 Saturday Sep 2020

Posted by in Government Failure, Pandemic

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There are a bunch of nice graphs below summarizing the course of the coronavirus (C19) pandemic in different countries, as well as their policy responses. The charts are courtesy of Kyle Lamb, who has been an unlikely (in my mind…) but forceful voice regarding the pandemic over the past few months. I’m sorry if the resolution in some of the charts is poor, but I hope you can click on them for a better view.

The data reported in the charts goes through September 12. The first few charts below are “mirror charts”: they show newly diagnosed C19 cases by day on top, right-side up; on the bottom of each chart are C19-attributed deaths, but the vertical axis is inverted to create the “mirror effect”. The scales on the bottom are heavily stretched compared to the top (deaths are much smaller than cases), and the scales for different countries aren’t comparable. The patterns are informative nevertheless, and I’ll provide per capita deaths separately.

Let’s start with the U.S., where the early part of the pandemic in the spring was quite deadly, while the second, geographically distinct “wave” of the pandemic was less deadly. It looks bad, but the high number of deaths in the spring was partly a consequence of mismanagement by a few prominent government officials in the Northeast, most glaringly Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York. The full pattern for the U.S. combines different waves in different regions. The overall outcome to-date is 622 deaths per million of population.

Then we have charts for (deaths/mil in parens): the UK (628), Italy (591), Spain (653), France (467), Germany (114), the Netherlands (364), and Switzerland (240), which all have had second waves in cases, of but hardly any noticeable second wave in deaths, at least not yet:

And finally, we have Sweden (576), which had many deaths during the first wave, but very few now. Overall, to-date, Sweden has faired better than the U.S., Spain, the UK, and Italy — not to mention Belgium (870), for which I don’t have mirror charts.

There are several points to make about the charts:

First, the so-called second wave this summer has not been as deadly as the virus was in the spring. The U.S. is not an exception in that regard, though it did have more C19 deaths than the other countries. The count of U.S. deaths in the summer was partly due to C19 false positives under a much heavier testing regime, as well as “death laundering” by public health authorities that looks suspiciously like a politicization of the attribution process: C19 deaths over the summer have been well in excess of what would be expected from C19 hospitalizations and ICU admissions. It’s also evident that deaths are being reallocated to C19 from other natural causes, as this chart from The Ethical Skeptic shows (compare the bright line for 2020 to the (very) dim but tightly clustered baselines from prior years):

Second, most of the charts for Europe (not Sweden) show a late summer escalation in cases, though cases in Spain and Germany appear to have crested already. If an uptrend in deaths is to follow, it should become noticeable soon. Thus far, the wave certainly looks less threatening. 

Finally, it’s noteworthy that Sweden’s early experience, which was plagued by mismanagement of the virus’ threat to the nursing home population, later transitioned to a dramatic fading of cases and deaths. There has been no late summer wave in Sweden as we’ve seen elsewhere. This despite Sweden’s far less stringent non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs). Sweden’s deaths per million of population are now less than in the US, the UK, Italy, Spain, and Belgium, and most of those differences are growing.

All of the other countries discussed above have had far more stringent lockdown policies than Sweden, and at far greater economic cost. The following charts show some cross-country comparisons of an Oxford University index of NPI stringency over time. It combines a number of different dimensions of NPIs, such as mask mandates, restrictions on public gatherings, and school closures. The first chart below shows the U.S. and the UK contrasted with Sweden. The other countries discussed above are shown in separate charts that follow. 

In the U.S., there has been tremendous variation across states in terms of stringency due to the federalist approach required by the U.S. Constitution, but overall, the Oxford measure for the U.S. has been broadly similar to the UK over time, with the largest departures from one another at the start of the pandemic.   

   

The stringency of NPIs over the full pandemic depends on their day-by-day strength as well as their duration at various levels. One could measure stringency indices and deaths at various points in time and produce all kinds of conflicting results as to the efficacy of NPIs. On the whole, however, these charts suggest that stringent NPIs hold no particular advantage except perhaps as a way to temporarily avoid overwhelming the health care system. Even the original “flatten the curve” argument acknowledged that the virus could not be avoided indefinitely at a reasonable cost via NPIs, especially in an otherwise free society.

Note that most of these countries eased their NPIs after the initial wave in the spring, but several remained far more stringent than Sweden’s policies. That did not prevent the second wave of cases, though again, those were far less deadly.

As Jacob Sullum writes, and what is increasingly clear to honest observers: lockdowns tend to be ineffective and even destructive over lengthy periods.

A working paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research finds that four different “stylized facts” about the growth in C19 deaths are consistent across countries and states having different policy responses to the virus. The authors say:

“… failing to account for these four stylized facts may result in overstating the importance of policy mandated [non-pharmaceutical interventions] for shaping the progression of this deadly pandemic.“

Here’s Bill Blain’s discussion of the inefficacy of lockdowns. And here is Donald Luskin’s summary of his firm’s research that appeared in the WSJ, which likewise casts extreme doubt on the wisdom of stringent NPIs.

The virus is far from gone, but this summer’s wave has been much more docile in both Europe and the U.S. There are reasons to think that subsequent waves will be dampened in many areas via the cumulative immunity gained from exposure thus far, not to mention improvements in treatment and knowledge regarding prophylaxis such as Vitamin D supplements. Government authorities and their public health advisors should dispense with the pretense that stringent NPIs can mitigate the impact of the virus at a reasonable cost. These measures are constitutionally flawed, impinge on basic freedoms, and look increasingly like government failure. Risk mitigation should be practiced by those who are either vulnerable or fearful, but for most people, particularly children and people of working age, those risks no longer appear to be much worse than a bad year for influenza.  

The Vagaries of Excess Deaths

02 Saturday May 2020

Posted by in Liberty, Pandemic, Tyranny

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The New York Times ran a piece this week suggesting that excess mortality from Covid-19 in the U.S. is, or will be, quite high. The analysis was based on seven “hard hit” states, including three of the top four states in Covid death rate and five of the top ten. Two states in the analysis, New York and New Jersey, together account for over half of all U.S. active cases. This was thinly-veiled cherry picking by the Times, as Jacob Sullum notes in his discussion of what excess mortality does and doesn’t mean. Local and regional impacts of the virus have varied widely, depending on population density, international travel connections, cultural practices, the quality of medical care, and private and public reaction to news of the virus. To suggest that the experience in the rest of the country is likely to bear any similarity to these seven states is complete nonsense. Make no mistake: there have been excess deaths in the U.S. over the past few weeks of available data, but again, not of the magnitude the Times seems to intimate will be coming.

Beyond all that, the Times asserts that the CDC’s all-cause death count as of April 11 is a significant undercount, though the vast majority of deaths are counted within a three week time frame. In fact, CDC data at this link show that U.S. all-cause mortality was at a multi-year low during the first week of April. The author admits, however, that the most recent data is incomplete. The count will rise as reporting catches up, but even an allowance for the likely additions to come would leave the count for the U.S. well below the kinds of levels suggested by the Times‘s fear-mongering article, based as it was on the seven cherry-picked states.

The author of this Twitter thread, John Burn-Murdoch, seems to engage in the same practice with respect to Europe. He shows charts with excess deaths in 12 countries, almost all of which show significant, recent bumps in excess deaths (the sole exception being Denmark). Inexplicably, he excludes Germany and a number of other countries with low excess deaths or even “valleys” of negative excess deaths. His most recent update is a bit more inclusive, however. (It was the source of the chart at the top of this post.) Euromomo is a site that tracks excess mortality in 24 European countries or major regions (non-overlapping), and by my count, 13 of have no or very little excess mortality. And by the way, even this fails to account for a number of other Eastern European nations having low Covid deaths.

Excess mortality is a tricky metric: it cannot be measured with certainty, and almost any measure has conceptual shortcomings. In the case of Covid-19, excess mortality seeks to measure the number of deaths attributable to the virus net of deaths that would have occurred anyway in the absence of the virus. For example, abstracting from some of the details, suppose there are 360 deaths per hundred-thousand of population during the average month of a pandemic. If the “normal” mortality rate is 60 per hundred-thousand, then excess mortality is 300 per month. It can also be expressed as a percentage of the population (0.3% in the example). But that’s just one way to measure it.

In the spirit of Sullum’s article, it’s important to ask what we’re trying to learn from statistics on excess mortality. It’s easy to draw general conclusions if the number of Covid-19 deaths is far in excess of the normal death rate, but that depends on the quality of the data, and any conclusion is subject to limits on its applicability. Covid deaths are not that high in many places. By the same token, if the number of Covid deaths (defined narrowly) is below the normal death rate (measured by an average of prior years), it really conveys little information about whether excess mortality is positive of negative: that depends on the nature of the question. For each of the following I offer admittedly preliminary answers:

  • Are people dying from Covid-19? Of course, virtually everywhere. There is no “normal” death rate here. And while this is the most direct question, it might not be the “best” question.
  • Is Covid-19 causing an increase in respiratory deaths? Yes, in many places, but perhaps not everywhere. Here and below, the answer might depend on the time frame as well.
  • Is Covid-19 increasing deaths from infectious diseases (biological and viral)? Yes, but perhaps not everywhere.
  • Is Covid-19 increasing total deaths from natural causes? Yes, but not everywhere.
  • Is all-cause mortality increasing due to Covid-19? In some places, not others. Accurate global and national numbers are still a long way off.

All-cause mortality is the most “rough and ready” comparison we have, but it includes deaths that have no direct relationship to the disease. For example, traffic fatalities might be down significantly due to social distancing or regulation during a pandemic. Thus, if our purpose is purely epidemiological, traffic fatalities might bias excess mortality downward. On the other hand, delayed medical treatments or personal malaise during a pandemic might lead to higher deaths, creating an upward bias in excess deaths via comparisons based on all-cause mortality.

Do narrow comparisons give a more accurate picture? If we focus only on respiratory deaths then we exclude deaths from other causes and co-morbidities that would have occurred in the absence of the virus. That may create a bias in excess mortality. So narrow comparisons have their drawbacks, depending on our purpose.

That also goes for the length of time over which excess mortality is measured. It can make a big difference. Again, much has been made of the fact that so many victims of Covid-19 have been elderly or already ailing severely before the pandemic. There is no question that some of these deaths would have occurred anyway, which goes to the very point of calculating excess mortality. If the pandemic accelerates death by a matter of weeks or months for a certain percentage of victims, it is reasonable to measure excess mortality over a lengthier period of time, despite the (perhaps) highly valuable time lost by those victims (that being dependent on the decedent’s likely quality of life during the interval).

Conversely, too narrow a window in time can lead to biases that might run in either direction. Yet a cottage industry is busy calculating excess mortality even as we speak with the pandemic still underway. There are many fatalities to come that are excluded by premature calculations of excess mortality. On the other hand, if the peak in deaths is behind us, a narrow window and premature calculation may sharply exaggerate excess mortality.

Narrow measures of excess mortality are affected by the accuracy of cause-of-death statistics. There are always inaccuracies in this data because so many deaths involve multiple co-morbidities, so there is often an arbitrary element in these decisions. For Covid-19, cause-of-death attribution has been extremely problematic. Some cases are easy: those testing positive for the virus, or even its presence immediately after death, and having no other respiratory infections, can fairly be counted as Covid-19 deaths. But apparently just over half of Covid-19 deaths counted by the CDC are “Covid-Only” deaths. A significant share of deaths involve both Covid and the flu, pneumonia, or all three. There are also “probable” Covid-19 deaths now counted without testing. In fact, hospitals and nursing homes are being encouraged to code deaths that way, and there are often strong financial incentives to do so. Many deaths at home, sans autopsy, are now routinely classified as Covid-19 deaths. While I have no doubt there are many Covid deaths of untested individuals both inside or outside of hospitals, there is no question this practice will overcount Covid deaths. Whether you believe that or not, doubts about cause-of-death accuracy is another reason why narrow comparisons can be problematic.

More trustworthy estimates of the coronavirus’ excess mortality will be possible with the passage of time. It’s natural, in the heat of the pandemic, to ask about excess mortality, but such early estimates are subject to tremendous uncertainty. Unfortunately, those calculations are being leveraged and often mis-applied for political purposes. Don’t trust anyone who would use these statistics as a cudgel to deny your Constitutional rights, or otherwise to shame or threaten you.

New York’s Covid experience is not applicable to the country as a whole. Urban mortality statistics are not applicable to areas with lower population densities. Excess mortality for the elderly cannot be used to make broad generalizations about excess mortality for other age groups. And excess mortality at the peak of a pandemic cannot be used to make generalizations about the full course of the pandemic. In the end, I expect Covid-19 excess mortality to be positive, whether calculated by all-cause mortality or more narrow measures. However, it will not be uniform in its impact. Nor will it be of the magnitude we were warned to expect by the early epidemiological models.

Opioids and The War On Pain Treatment

08 Friday Mar 2019

Posted by in Prohibition, War On Drugs

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I repeatedly hear the bogus claim that prescription pain killers are a primary cause of opioid addiction. Twice this week I heard Geraldo Rivera prattling about it, blaming the drug companies for the opioid epidemic, expressing his view of the righteousness of the many lawsuits faced by Purdue Pharma and other firms. But these cases are hardly sure wins for the plaintiffs, and for good reason. The idea that pharmaceutical companies misleadingly promoted the effectiveness of drugs like Oxycontin for pain relief, and minimized their addictive potential, might appear credible, but there are a number of factors that argue strongly against these claims. Of course, opioids are legal prescription drugs, approved for pain relief by the FDA, and are generally marketed by drug companies under guidelines established by the FDA at the time of approval. And sadly, the narrative promoted by Rivera and many others is at tension with the needs of patients suffering from chronic pain.

In fact, opioids are effective for temporary and chronic pain relief, and they have been used for those purposes for many decades. In “The Other Opioid Problem“, anesthesiologist Dr. Ted Noel asserts that few chronic pain patients have overdosed or been killed by ODs. According to Scientific American:

“A Cochrane review of opioid prescribing for chronic pain found that less than one percent of those who were well-screened for drug problems developed new addictions during pain care; a less rigorous, but more recent review put the rate of addiction among people taking opioids for chronic pain at 8-12 percent [but less than 1% abuse].”

Those prescribed opioids for temporary relief after an injury or surgical procedure are even less likely to develop an addiction. The large majority of addicts are self-selected out of a population of individuals who want to get high. And most of them feed their addictions on opioids obtained illegally, often from imported heroin and fentanyl. Yes, opioids are stolen from legitimate patients, pharmacies, or elsewhere, and sometimes they are prescribed illegally by unscrupulous physicians. That might be the way many addicts get started, but most of the illegal opioid supply in the U.S. is imported heroin and fentanyl.

A causal linkage between opioid prescriptions, addiction and opioid deaths would imply a strong, positive correlation between prescription and death rates. However, Jacob Sullum reports that there is no correlation across states between prescription rates and death rates from opioids. As Sullum notes, this result offers “more reason to doubt that pain pill restrictions will save lives”.

In fact, in a separate article, Sullum writes of other evidence strongly suggesting that those restrictions may have counterproductive effects on opioid deaths, in addition to denying some patients access to the pain pills they legitimately need for treatment. According to Sullum, all 50 states have Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) that monitor controlled substances and keep tabs on prescribers and pharmacies. These have succeeded in discouraging opioid prescriptions, but research appearing in the Annals of Internal Medicine suggests that the programs might be doing more harm than good:

“Fink et al found six studies that included heroin overdoses, half of which reported a statistically significant association between adoption of PDMPs and increases in such incidents. … To the extent that PDMPs succeed in making pain pills harder to obtain, they encourage nonmedical users to seek black-market substitutes. ‘Changes to either the supply or cost of prescription opioids after a PDMP is instituted,’ Fink et al. observe, ‘might reasonably drive opioid-dependent persons to substitute their preferred prescription opioid with heroin or nonpharmaceutical fentanyl.’

The FDA has enforced quotas on the production of legal opioids. According to the CATO Institute:

“The tight quotas on opioid production contributed to the acute shortage of injectable opioids being felt in hospitals across the nation. It is not only making patients suffer needlessly but places them at increased risk for adverse drug reactions or overdose.”

The FDA’s restrictions were eased somewhat after complaints from the medical community, but the harm continues. At the time of CATO’s report, opioid prescriptions had declined by 41% since 2010, while the overdose rate continued to escalate.

This pattern is all too familiar to those who have been arguing against drug prohibition for years. The flood of fentanyl into the country, and into what is sold as street heroin, is a direct consequence of prohibitions on supplies of legal heroin and other narcotics. But breaking through the puritanical and bumptious mentality of drug warriors is almost impossible. The worse the situation gets, the tighter they turn the screws, doubling down on the policies that have repeatedly failed in the past. Here I repeat the concluding paragraph of a Sacred Cow Chips post from January 2018 on the opioid epidemic:

“There are solutions to the deadly nature of the opioid epidemic, but prohibition is not one of them and never will be. If anything, prohibition in varying degrees has aggravated the dangers of opioids. To truly solve the problem, we should eliminate restrictions on the production and distribution of legal opioids for pain management, legalize heroin, and stop interfering in markets. That would be merciful for patients in real pain, make recreational use of opioids dramatically safer, and put an end to the gangland violence associated with underground competition. Second, redirect those resources into … harm reduction programs. [Jeffrey] Miron notes that legalization has worked in other countries, like Portugal and France, to reduce overdoses and opioid deaths. As a political matter, however, these steps might not be feasible unless we get over the cultural bias stigmatizing recreational opioid use as ‘evil’, and the idea that laws and enforcement can actually prevent people from trying to get high.

Hillary’s (C)mail Fail

13 Wednesday Jul 2016

Posted by in National Security, Privilege

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Clinton email

Hillary Clinton’s classified email scandal might look like a minor distraction once facts about the suspicious dealings of the Clinton Foundation are unraveled. I’ll cover the foundation later this week. In this post, I’ll review some considerations relevant to the email case. This is the second in a three-part series of posts on Hillary’s more recent foibles, following the first installment on her role in the Benghazi disaster.

Hillary Clinton’s “grossly negligent” misuse of classified email during her tenure as Secretary of State was harshly criticized by FBI Director James Comey last week. Nevertheless, the Bureau declined to recommend an indictment to the Department of Justice (DOJ) based on their inability to prove mens rea, or any awareness of guilt or an intent to do harm. It is doubtful that Clinton had any intent to harm the country. At a minimum, however, Comey’s statements implied that she did not take security seriously.

The basis of any claim that Clinton lacked awareness of her security responsibilities is shaky, to say the least. Clinton’s private email stunt was a willful effort to avoid legitimate scrutiny, such as FOIA requests. The IT expert who set up her private servers and other devices pled the Fifth Amendment to avoid self-incrimination! There have been reports that Clinton asked aides to remove classified markings (also see here). All we have from the State Department on that allegation is a denial. Clinton repeatedly lied to the public and to Congress (under oath) about classified material and the number of devices she used. She also lied to a federal judge (under oath) about having turned over all work-related emails to the State Department. Many of those emails were deleted, leaving suspicious gaps in the pattern of traffic. Indeed, Clinton’s actions in the case give every appearance of an effort to obstruct justice.

Some of the missing emails will come to light. Wikileaks has released a trove of Clinton’s emails showing additional classified material. There are also pending civil cases related to the emails in which the plaintiffs wish to subpoena Mrs. Clinton. Needless to say, her lawyers are making every effort to stop the subpoenas.

Jacob Sullum at Reason discusses Comey’s decision in the context of mens rea. He notes that Clinton’s offenses were certainly prosecutable under the letter of the law. Despite denials from Clinton apologists, the case of a Navy operations specialist in 1992 is instructive. The defendant in that case claimed that willingness to mishandle classified information was not sufficient for a conviction, but the military court disagreed under the same provision of the law referenced by Comey:

“… the court turned to the subsection at issue in Mrs. Clinton’s case: ‘Section 793(f) has an even lower threshold, punishing loss of classified materials through ‘gross negligence’ and punishing failing to promptly report a loss of classified materials.’”

Nevertheless, Sullum thinks Comey’s defense of mens rea protections for individuals accused of certain violations of law is admirable, and I agree (except Comey’s second clause in the quote below, regarding “in that statute in particular“, is not strictly true). The explosion of federal law, especially regulatory law, makes this more crucial than ever from a libertarian perspective. Here is Comey:

“‘The protection we have as Americans is that the government in general, and in that statute in particular, has to prove before [it] can prosecute any of us that we did this thing that’s forbidden by the law, and when we did it, we knew we were doing something that was unlawful. We don’t have to know the code number, but [the government must show] that we knew we were doing something that was unlawful.’“

For background on the issue of a defendant’s willingness to violate the law, Paul Rosenzweig of the Heritage Foundation has a great article called  “Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse But It Is In Reality“. By that title, Rosenzweig means that there are so many federal crimes today that ignorance of the law very often should be a valid excuse. However, the contention that Hillary Clinton was ignorant of the law regarding her duties in handling classified information is dubious at best.

Unfortunately, Clinton’s interview with the FBI just days before Comey’s announcement was not conducted by Comey, was not made under oath, and was not recorded. That leaves significant doubt about the seriousness of the FBI’s effort to learn the truth about the record, or any contradictions in the record, that might shed light on Clinton’s awareness or intent to violate the law. And Attorney General Loretta Lynch, after a “personal” meeting with Bill Clinton, recused herself and her office from prosecutorial duties prior to Comey’s announcement, stating that she would accept the FBI’s recommendation without examining the case. That step casts doubt on her seriousness as an independent prosecutor. Hillary skates, for now.

 

Gagging On Campaign Finance Reform

10 Wednesday Feb 2016

Posted by in Big Government, Campaign Finance

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campaign-finance-reform

Campaign finance is an area of internal conflict for some libertarians. On one hand, they do not believe in restrictions of any kind on freedom of expression. That implies no limits on what an individual can spend in support of a political cause, by themselves or in association with others, and whether it merely promotes a point of view or supports a political candidate. At the same time, libertarians are strongly opposed to rent-seeking activity, or efforts to use government power to promote private interests. Political spending is seen by many as an avenue for rent seeking, which suggests to them a need for limits on campaign contributions.

In fact, full-throated support of free speech and opposition to campaign limits do not stand in conflict. The reasons are: 1) such limits are an assault on free speech; 2) campaign contributions represent “small change” in the larger scheme of rent-seeking pursuits; 3) contributions seldom represent direct efforts to influence policy; and 4) imposed limits have a detrimental effect on the ability of elected officials to do their jobs.

Speech

Free speech, long interpreted by the courts more broadly as free expression, is protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This includes political expression, but traditionally it included campaign contributions as well, the latter being an obvious mechanism by which one can express views. However, the Supreme Court has upheld statutory limits on individual contributions to specific campaigns, as well as disclosure rules, on the grounds that they prevent corruption (Buckley v. Valeo and more recently McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission(FEC)). I view the contribution limits as a contravention of the First Amendment, denying an enumerated right on the grounds that it “might” lead to corruption. If preventing corruption is the sole rationale for these limits, then government itself should be sharply limited, as it most certainly leads to graft and corruption at the expense of relatively powerless taxpayers.

Citizens United

A well-known Supreme Court case decided in 2010 involved independent political speech, as opposed to expression of political preference revealed by campaign spending. This was Citizens United v FEC, in which the Court ruled that political speech cannot be restricted on any basis other than corruption. As described by Ilya Shapiro, the case is widely misunderstood. One point of interest here is that the case related to speech by an organization rather than an individual. The Court ruled that a corporation (a nonprofit in the case) could not be prevented from airing a film critical of Hillary Clinton, striking down provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1990 (McCain-Feingold) under the First Amendment.

The Citizens United decision was NOT about campaign contributions. As an interesting aside, in a search of cartoons related to campaign finance, a great many imply that the Supreme Court abolished such limits in Citizens United. It did not. Even given some level of disaffection, it is hard to account for the near-complete lack of understanding about the case.

More informed critics of the decision bemoan that fact that it allows speech by corporations (and unions and other associations) to go unlimited, though they don’t seem to mind the absence of limits on political speech by media corporations. (See Eugene Volokh’s view in the Brown Daily Herald and Michael McConnell’s reinterpretation of Citizen’s United as a Press Clause case in the Yale Law Journal.) The critics also fail to recognize that corporations are associations of individuals, who are otherwise subject to no restrictions on independent speech or on what they can spend to speak independent of any political candidate (as established in Speechnow.org v. FEC in 2010). The technical treatment of a corporation as a “person”, which many find objectionable, is beside the point. Only by distorting the meaning of the First Amendment can any limitation be placed on the freedom of individuals to speak in association with others.

Jacob Sullum covers the confused legal thinking of leading Democrats Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders on campaign finance reform, and on Citizens United in particular. Jeb Bush is no better. Most of the opposition to the decision centers around the notion of “balancing” speech, but Sullum offers a piece of wisdom from a 1996 quote of future Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan: “the government may not restrict the speech of some to enhance the speech of others.”

Corporate Campaign Spending

Another point raised by Ilya Shapiro is that corporate spending growth has neither accelerated nor decelerated in the wake of Citizens United. Moreover, restrictions on direct campaign contributions are still in place. However, campaign contributions are a relatively small percentage of corporate “influence spending”, averaging roughly 10% of the total between 2007 and 2012 for 200 large “politically active” corporations. Thus, direct campaign contributions are unlikely to be the primary avenue for rent-seeking activity. They might help buy “access” to politicians, but they may not be especially effective in influencing policy. These points are supported by University of Missouri economist Jeffrey Milyo in “Politics Ain’t Broke, So Reforms Won’t Fix It“. Milyo marshals empirical evidence that should make us skeptical of campaign finance reform efforts.

Incapacitated Legislators

Jonathan Adler of Case Western emphasizes the legislative dysfunction created by campaign finance reforms. McCain-Feingold places limits on funds candidates can receive from their political parties and other sources, forcing them to spend a large proportion of their time on fundraising (and placing incumbents at a distinct advantage). If there is a shred of sincerity in the populist insistence that members of Congress be subject to tighter term limits, or that Congress is woefully unproductive, then full repeal of these limitations should be a priority.

Visibility Versus Effectiveness

The chief advantage of combatting corruption through regulating campaign finance is that it is a visible target. However, it is a target too rich with free speech implications. Disclosure requirements are one thing (through arguments can be made against infringements on the privacy of contributors as well). Limiting forms of expression outright is draconian, and reformers are unlikely to be satisfied until campaigns are funded entirely by taxpayers. Attacking “corruption” via limits on campaign contributions presumes a need to protect both contributor and recipient from their own guilt. Even if contributions help gain better access to an elected representative, it does not imply that the representative will act on motives counter to the perceived public merits of an issue. Moreover, the argument that limits on direct contributions to candidates “keep money out of politics” is flawed. Limits simply change the distribution of political spending, increasing the reliance on bundlers and organizations like Super PACs, and shifting the tables in favor of incumbents.

There are far better ways to combat corruption among legislators and others in government, some with more severe drawbacks than others. Term limits are one possibility, but would deny voters of legitimate choices. Another option is to allow candidates to have unrestricted access to campaign funds through central organizations, rather than forcing them to rely on independent Super PACs, which cannot always be relied upon to craft a candidate’s preferred messages. Immediate disclosure of contributors and amounts would help to bring more transparency to the campaign finance process. Stiffer disclosure requirements for “bundlers” would also help. Perhaps elected executives could be prohibited from appointing bundlers to positions of authority, though a precise definition of “bundler” might become contentious. There are other reform possibilities related to limiting permissible lobbying activity.

The libertarian’s dilemma with respect to campaign finance is easily resolved once the focus is placed squarely on protecting individual rights. In the end, the best defense of individual rights and against corruption in government is to limit government. It’s wise to place strong reigns on an institution that operates by virtue of coercive authority. The danger was well-acknowledged by the limits on government power enshrined in the Constitution.

Wanna Help People? End the Drug War!

03 Tuesday Nov 2015

Posted by in War On Drugs

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August 20, 2013

We’re taught that illegal drugs are a scourge on humanity, that their use is immoral and that legalization is out of the question. Yet far more of us, our friends, and our loved ones have been intimate with the destructive effects of alcohol and dependency on legal drugs than on illegal drugs. Pharmacologically, the “worst effects” of illegal drugs are no worse than the well-known effects of alcohol abuse. In fact, the “worst effects” have more to do with prohibition than with the illegal drugs themselves.

Rules are codified into law successfully when widespread agreement exists among the citizenry that a rule is sensible. This should trouble drug prohibitionists: a substantial proportion of the population has used illegal drugs as adults, indicating a strong lack of consensus that recreational drugs should be illegal. For this reason alone, drug prohibition is and always will be ineffectual.

The great economist Milton Friedman was a long-time critic of the drug war. Several of his articles on the topic are linked at this site. One of the links is this interview from 1992, which is lengthy but sticks primarily to the issue of the drug war. I’m not sure that all of the facts Friedman cites have held up over time, especially with respect to trends in alcohol consumption. Nevertheless, it is a great interview:

“There are [sic] an enormous number of innocent victims now. You’ve got the people whose purses are stolen, who are bashed over the head by people trying to get enough money for their next fix. You’ve got the people killed in the random drug wars. You’ve got the corruption of the legal establishment. You’ve got the innocent victims who are taxpayers who have to pay for more and more prisons, and more and more prisoners, and more and more police. You’ve got the rest of us who don’t get decent law enforcement because all the law enforcement officials are busy trying to do the impossible.“

Here is a brief list of the pernicious effects of drug prohibition:

  • Prices are driven upward by the legal risk inherent in black market trade;
  • High prices lead to more crime as heavy users seek means of payment;
  • Impure and more dangerous variants are traded in attempts to stretch quantities and increase potency;
  • Dealers advance “samples” to gain trust and cultivate dependency among users;
  • Addiction is stubbornly resistant to legal barriers;
  • Unnecessary deaths from impure and excessively potent drug varieties;
  • Black market trade leads to violent crime as underworld elements seek to control markets and enforce discipline in their organizations;
  • Unnecessary deaths from gangland violence;
  • Arrest, imprisonment and ruined lives for victimless crimes;
  • A huge burden on taxpayers;
  • A huge burden on the criminal justice system;
  • Inevitable corruption in law enforcement as officials face hefty rewards for protecting the drug trade;
  • Innocent people become casualties of violence instigated by gangs and sometimes by police actions.

A fascinating dynamic of the black market in drugs is the tendency toward monopolization at the top: Large cartels dominate the importation of supplies due to the risk and expense of such operations. As Friedman noted, the war on drugs contributes to the difficulty of entering into competition with established players. At the same time, the drug war guarantees huge rewards to the cartels by inflating drug prices:

“What more could a monopolist want? He’s got a government who makes it very hard for all his competitors and who keeps the price of his products high.“

The drug war creates greater danger for users. In “Prohibition Kills“, Jacob Sullum discusses four recent examples of more dangerous and even deadly drug variants that have been developed as a direct consequence of prohibition. Friedman is often quoted as saying that crack cocaine was a direct consequence of the drug war. Sullum asks whether this could be an intentional strategy by drug warriors for discouraging consumption. I’m not convinced they are quite so nefarious, but it’s something to ponder.

More dangerous varieties of drugs would not vanish overnight if drugs were legalized, though the incentive to develop them would diminish. Of course, if legalization brings prices and risks down, as we’d expect, it would encourage greater recreational use. That should not be viewed as a “bad” any more than better access to cocktails at happy hour. Abuse is unlikely to increase because problem users tend to be undeterred by prohibition. And as unsavory as an increase in recreational drug use might seem to the temperance faction, it would still represent only a small fraction of the real costs of ruined lives imposed by prohibition and the drug war.

Legalization would bring other complexities, as Colorado’s experience with marijuana shows. For example, rules with respect to driving under the influence must be updated, as well as laws prohibiting possession by minors. Colorado went so far as to regulate packaging, and tax treatment of the drug trade will stoke debate, as governments will hope for something of a tax bonanza. But the more that government attempts to regulate and tax drugs, the more that problems similar to those associated with drug prohibition will persist, albeit on a smaller scale.

Economically, legalization should eliminate a burden on taxpayers. It would free up law enforcement resources to battle real crime and should make more funds available for treatment programs. It would also help to improve lives and safety in inner cities and other areas ravaged by black market drug trade and the violence it foments. And of course, legalization would put an end to the ruin of lives caused by the arrest of individuals for victimless crimes.

Prohibition of drugs belongs to a larger class of social problems brought on by efforts to bring the police power of government to bear on private behavior. I already mentioned that alcohol prohibition had similar consequences. To lesser degrees, similar harmful consequences are associated with laws against prostitution, large soft drink containers, sugary foods, and practicing almost any commercial art without a license. The same can be said for price regulations like rent control and the minimum wage. The former has led to the destruction of vast quantities of housing; the latter harms low-skilled workers along non-wage dimensions and makes it difficult for unskilled workers to gain valuable experience in the job market. Government interference with individual liberty might well restrain certain activities deemed “undesirable” by busybodies, but it it also leads to higher prices, greater risk, black market activity, violence, unnecessary legal actions against individuals, and greater expense for society.