Tag Archives: Non-Pharmaceutical interventions

UFOs and the Crisis Seeking State

26 Friday Mar 2021

Posted by in Extraterrestrial Life, Government

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Happy with the government’s management of the pandemic? Happy with how much government grew during the pandemic? How well do you think governments would manage our realization that we have nearby extraterrestrial observers? It’s hard to know what that would mean for our future, but such a presence could well pose a singular menace to humanity. It might ignite panic, to say nothing of the bedlam that would ensue with the actual ingress of extraterrestrials or their intelligent machinery.

How would governments handle it? If the pandemic is any guide, my guess is they would follow the authoritarian impulse. For our own safety, that is. Hoarding and shortages of key goods might ensue. Curfews and stay-at-home orders would be seen as a way to limit civil disorder. Depending on the perceived threat, draconian measures such as limiting the use of electronics and communication devices might be considered. No telling what might seem appropriate to political leaders, but a military component to the response is much more likely than under a pandemic, and not just because of the external threat.

Let’s assume we’re talking about observers, not battalions of landing parties. A lot would depend on what’s known about them, or more specifically what the government knows. Why are they probing our atmosphere? Why are they studying our planet and our civilization? Are they waiting for a larger force to arrive? Can their machines self-replicate using resources mined from elsewhere in the solar system? Of course, the reaction of the public depends on how the government characterizes the presence of our observers. That gap in knowledge is of great concern.

But let’s take a step back. Is it real? We know the pandemic was “real”, but many question its true severity and the appropriateness of stringent non-pharmaceutical interventions, including yours truly. Some would say the government’s response was opportunistic, calibrated to force a change in political leadership, and calibrated to transform the role of government in our lives as well as attitudes about that role. Now imagine the opportunity for even more drastic change in the role of government given the prospect of an intersection with a potentially grabby alien civilization!

Like many others, I am fascinated by the possibility of life beyond our planet. Discussions of the Drake equation and the Fermi paradox are like candy to me. UFO sightings are always a matter of curiosity, except now we’re learning to call them “unexplained aerial phenomena” (UAPs) under guidance from government and military authorities. Lately, we’re hearing a lot about UAPs observed and filmed by military aircraft and detected by other forms of telemetry. These admissions are considered a sea change in the government’s attitude toward sharing sensitive, and possibly socially disruptive, information with the public. By June 1, a large batch of information on additional UAP sightings is due to be released under the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2021, which was signed into law by President Trump in December.

I’m as curious as anyone, but there are many reasons to be skeptical about UAP sightings, at least insofar as entertaining the possibility that these are extraterrestrial beings or machines. For example, there are natural (and technical) explanations for the images seen in the Navy videos. But some have speculated that these are sightings of top-secret technologies developed by an agency of the federal government such as the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA). A former Pentagon UFO Program Chief dismisses that as improbable. Well, if you say so. Another possibility is that a foreign government has leaped far ahead of the U.S. in the science of flight. That would be threatening to U.S. security, though perhaps not as threatening as the machinery of an interstellar expeditionary force.

Whether the potential threat is an intersection with extraterrestrials or simply advanced technology possessed by an earthbound adversary, might it be in the interests of certain factions to promote our vulnerability? Or to manufacture evidence of such a vulnerability? Forgive my tin-foil hat, but I think the answer is yes. For example, it would be an opportunity for the defense establishment to garner more funding. It’s also a potential opportunity for those who wish to impose a more authoritarian order. There is always something to be gained from potential threats, so much so that major segments of our society seem to thrive on them. But is that what’s happening?

Defense funding is one thing, but the kinds of threats in question might call for widespread actions on public safety at all levels of government. Federal funding will be required to meet these needs, after all, and only the federal government can print money to create the means of competing for resources with the private sector. This is consistent with other federal initiatives that, beyond their stated public purposes, seem almost designed to eviscerate the power of state and local governments:

“The plan to federalize government is already moving and has three parts:

  • Flood every unit of local government with federal cash, irrespective of need, while prohibiting tax cuts, thereby bailing out failing states and cities.
  • Make that flood of federal money made regular and permanent.
  • Annul or override state laws that make certain states competitive, thereby eliminating their competitive advantages, and federalize elections to make it all permanent.”

The third point has as much relevance in the context of any threat to our security as did the pandemic. Once lower levels of government are dependent on federal funds, there is little they can do to resist federal demands. The more credible the threat of an incursion by an extraterrestrial or foreign force with awesome technological power, the more likely are voters to accept expansive programs to enhance their safety, including assistance to lower levels of government for providing various forms of local protection … the federal way.

The pandemic did little to promote faith in the government’s ability to manage a crisis. Nevertheless, look no further than the federal budget explosion induced by the pandemic for evidence that advocates of expansive government did not let the crisis go to waste. Will they want new crises? I’m sure they will. There’s certainly a possibility that a drummed-up threat from UAP’s would be a candidate down the road. It might need a little more percolation, but make no mistake: it has potential value to statists.

I still prefer to call them UFOs, and it’s still fun to think about them, but if they’re “real”, or even if they belong to a foreign power, we might be in big trouble. If they’re not “real”, our own state actors might toy with us enough to make us wish we’d never heard of UFOs.

CDC Wags Finger; Diners Should Wag One Back

09 Tuesday Mar 2021

Posted by in Coronavirus, Public Health

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The CDC’s new study on dining out and mask mandates is a sham. On its face, the effects reported are small. And while it’s true most of the reported effects are statistically significant, the CDC acknowledges a number of factors that might well have confounded the results. This study should remind us of the infinite number of spurious and “significant” correlations in the world. Here, the timing of the mandates (or their removal) relative to purported effects and seasonal waves is highly suspicious, and as always, attributing causality on the basis of correlation is problematic.

On one hand, the CDC’s results are contrary to plentiful evidence that mandates are ineffective; on the other hand, the results are contrary to earlier CDC “guidance” that masks and limits on indoor dining are “highly effective”. Nevertheless, the latest report has massive propaganda value to the CDC. The media lapped up the story and provided cover for Democrats eager to pass the COVID (C19) relief package. Likewise, the Biden Administration is apparently committed to the narrative of an ongoing crisis as cover for continued attempts to shame political opponents in states that have elected to “reopen” or remain open.

Right off the bat, the study’s authors assert that the primary mode of transmission of C19 is from respiratory droplets. This is false. We know that aerosols are the main culprit in transmission, against which cloth masks are largely ineffective.

Be that as it may, let’s first consider the findings on dining. There was no statistically significant effect on the growth rate of cases or deaths up to 40 days after restrictions were lifted, according to the report. In fact, case growth declined slightly. There was, however, a small but statistically significant increase after 40 days. The fact that deaths seemed to “respond” faster and with greater magnitude than cases makes no sense and suggests that the results might be spurious.

The CDC offers possible explanations the long delay in the purported impact, such as the time required by restaurants to resume operations and early caution on the part of diners. These are speculative, of course. More pertinent is the fact that the data did not distinguish between indoor and outdoor dining, nor did it account for other differences in regulation such as rules on physical distancing, intra-county variation in local government mandates, and compliance levels.

Finally, the measurement of effects covered 100 days after the policy change, but this window spans different stages of the pandemic. There were three waves of infections during 2020, which correspond to the classic Hope-Simpson pattern of virus seasonality. One was near year-end, but as each of the first two waves tapered (April-May, August-September), it should be no surprise that many restrictions were lifted. Within two months, however, new waves had begun. Karl Dierenbach notes that most of the reopenings occurred in May. Here’s how he explains the pattern:

“The map on the left shows counties where there was no on-premises dining (pink) in restaurants as of the beginning of May (4/30). … The map on the right shows that by the end of May, almost the entire country moved to allow some on-premises dining (green).”

“In the 100 days after May 1, cases nationwide fell slightly, then began to rise, and then plateaued.”

“And what did the CDC find happened after restaurants were allowed (changing mostly in May) to have on-premises dining? … Surprise! The CDC found that cases fell slightly, then began to rise, and then plateaued.”

The summer “mini-wave” is typical of mid- and tropical-latitude seasonality. Thus, the CDC’s findings with respect to dining restrictions are likely an artifact of the strong seasonality of the virus, rather than having anything to do with the lifting of restrictions between waves.

What about the imposition of mask mandates? The CDC’s findings show a much faster response in this case, with statistically significant changes in growth during the first 20 days. Another indicator of spurious correlation is that the growth response of deaths did not lag that of cases, but in fact deaths have reliably lagged cases by over 18 days during the pandemic. Again, the CDC’s caveats apply equally to its findings on masks. A large share of individuals adopted mask use voluntarily before mandates were imposed, so it’s not even clear that the mandates contributed much to the practice.

It’s a stretch to believe that mask mandates would have had an immediate, incremental effect on the growth of cases and deaths, given probable lags in compliance, exposure, and onset of symptoms. Moreover, a number of mask mandates in 2020 were imposed near the very peak of the seasonal waves. Little wonder that the growth rates of cases and deaths declined shortly thereafter.

We’ve known for a long time that masks do little to stop the spread of viral particles. They become airborne as aerosols which easily penetrate the kind of cloth masks worn by most members of the public, to say nothing of making contact with their eyes. The table below contains citations to research over the past 10 years uniformly rejecting the hypothesis of a significant protective effect against influenza from masks. There is no reason to believe that they would be more effective in preventing C19 infections.

The CDC’s report on dining restrictions and mask mandates is a weak analysis. They wish to emphasize their faith in non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to minimize risks. They do so at a time when the vaccinated share of the most vulnerable population, the elderly, has climbed above 50% and is increasing steadily. Thus, risks are falling dramatically, so it’s past time to weigh the costs and benefits of NPIs more realistically. The timing of the report also seemed suspicious, coming as it did in the heat of the battle over the $1.9 trillion COVID relief bill, which subsequently passed.

It’s also a good time to note that zero risk, including “Zero COVID”, is not a realistic or worthwhile goal under any reasonable comparison of costs and benefits. Furthermore, NPIs have proven weak generally (also see here); claims to the contrary should always make us wary.

Revisiting Excess Mortality

31 Sunday Jan 2021

Posted by in Coronavirus, Pandemic

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , ,

In early December I said that 2020 all-cause mortality in the U.S. would likely be comparable to figures from about 15 years ago. Now, Ben Martin confirms it with the chart below. Over time, declines in U.S. mortality have resulted from progress against disease and fewer violent deaths. COVID led to a jump in 2020, though some of last year’s deaths were attributable to policy responses, as opposed to COVID itself.

Here’s an even longer view of the trend from my post in December (for which 2020 is very incomplete):

As Martin notes sarcastically:

“Surprising, since the US is undergoing a ‘century pandemic‘ – In reality it is an event that’s unique in the last ‘15 years’”

The next chart shows 2020 mortality by month of year relative to the average of the past five years. Clearly, excess deaths have occurred compared to that baseline.

Using the range of deaths by month over the past 20 years (the blue-shaded band in the next chart), the 2020 figures don’t look quite as anomalous.

Finally, Martin shows total excess deaths in 2020 relative to several different baselines. The more recent (and shorter) the baseline time frame, the larger the excess deaths in 2020. Compared to the five-year average, 364,000 excess deaths occurred in 2020. Relative to the past 20 years, however, 150,000 excess deaths occurred last year. While those deaths are tragic, the pandemic looks more benign than when we confine our baseline to the immediate past.

Moreover, a large share of these excess deaths can be attributed to non-COVID causes of death that represent excesses relative to prior years, including drug overdoses, suicide, heart disease, dementia, and other causes. As many as 100,000 of these deaths are directly attributable lockdowns. That means true excess deaths caused by COVID infections were on the order of 50,000 relative to a 20-year baseline.

As infections subside from the fall wave, and as vaccinations continue to ramp up, some policy makers are awakening to the destructive impacts of non-pharmaceutical interventions (lockdown measures). The charts above show that this pandemic was never serious enough to justify those measures, and it’s not clear they can ever be justified in a free society. Yet some officials, including President Biden and Anthony Fauci, still labor under the misapprehension that masks mandates, stay-at-home orders, and restaurant closures can be effective or cost-efficient mitigation strategies.

Spate of Research Shows COVID Lockdowns Fail

27 Sunday Dec 2020

Posted by in Lockdowns, Public Health

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , ,

For clarity, start with this charming interpretive one-act on public health policy in 2020. You might find it a little sardonic, but that’s the point. It was one of the more entertaining tweets of the day, from @boriquagato.

A growing body of research shows that stringent non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) — “lockdowns” is an often-used shorthand — are not effective in stemming the transmission and spread of COVID-19. A compendium of articles and preprints on the topic was just published by the American Institute for Economic Research (AEIR): “Lockdowns Do Not Control the Coronavirus: The Evidence”. The list was compiled originally by Ivor Cummins, and he has added a few more articles and other relevant materials to the list. The links span research on lockdowns across the globe. It covers transmission, mortality, and other health outcomes, as well as the economic effects of lockdowns. AIER states the following:

“Perhaps this is a shocking revelation, given that universal social and economic controls are becoming the new orthodoxy. In a saner world, the burden of proof really should belong to the lockdowners, since it is they who overthrew 100 years of public-health wisdom and replaced it with an untested, top-down imposition on freedom and human rights. They never accepted that burden. They took it as axiomatic that a virus could be intimidated and frightened by credentials, edicts, speeches, and masked gendarmes.

The pro-lockdown evidence is shockingly thin, and based largely on comparing real-world outcomes against dire computer-generated forecasts derived from empirically untested models, and then merely positing that stringencies and “nonpharmaceutical interventions” account for the difference between the fictionalized vs. the real outcome. The anti-lockdown studies, on the other hand, are evidence-based, robust, and thorough, grappling with the data we have (with all its flaws) and looking at the results in light of controls on the population.”

We are constantly told that public intervention constitutes “leadership”, as if our well being depends upon behavioral control by the state. Unfortunately, it’s all too typical of research on phenomena deemed ripe for intervention that computer models are employed to “prove” the case. A common practice is to calibrate such models so that the outputs mimic certain historical outcomes. Unfortunately, a wide range of model specifications can be compatible with an historical record. This practice is also a far cry from empirically testing well-defined hypotheses against alternatives. And it is a practice that usually does poorly when the model is tested outside the period to which it is calibrated. Yet that is the kind of evidence that proponents of intervention are fond of using to support their policy prescriptions.

In this case, it’s even worse, with some of the alleged positive effects of NPI’s wholly made-up, with no empirical support whatsoever! So-called public health experts have misled themselves, and the public, with this kind of fake evidence, when they aren’t too busy talking out of both sides of their mouths.

COVID Externalities: the Costs and Benefits of Intervention

13 Sunday Dec 2020

Posted by in Coronavirus, Public Health, Social Costs

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , ,

This post offers a simple representation of the argument against public non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to subdue the COVID-19 pandemic. The chart below features two lines, one representing the presumed life-saving benefits of lockdown measures or NPI stringency, and another representing the costs inflicted by those measures. The values on the axes here are not critical, though measures of stringency exist (e.g., the University of Oxford Stringency Index) and take values from zero to 100.

The benefits of lives saved due to NPI stringency are assigned a value on the vertical axis, as are the costs of lives lost due to deferred health care, isolation, and other stressors caused by stringency. In addition, there are the more straightforward losses caused by suspending economic activity, which should be included in costs.

One can think of the benefits curve as representing gains from forcing individuals, via lockdown measures, to internalize the external costs of risk inflicted on others. However, this curve captures only benefits incremental to those achieved through voluntary action. Thus, NPI benefits include only extra gains from coercing individuals to internalize risks, while losses from NPI stringency are captured by the cost curve.

My contention is that the benefits of stringency diminish and may in fact turn down at some point, and that costs always increase in the level of stringency. In the chart, for what it’s worth, the “optimal” level of stringency would be at a value of 2, where the difference between total benefits and total costs is maximized (and where the benefits of incremental stringency are equal to the marginal costs or losses). However, I am not convinced that the benefits of lockdown measures ever exceed costs, as they do in the chart above. That is, voluntary action may be sufficient. But if the benefits of NPIs do exceed costs, it’s likely to be only at low levels of stringency.

To the extent that people are aware of the pandemic and recognize risk, the external costs of possible infectiousness are already internalized to some degree. Moreover, there is mutual risk in most interactions, and all individuals face risks that are proportional to those to which they expose others: if your contacts are more varied and your interactions are more frequent and intimate, you face correspondingly higher risks yourself. After all, in a pandemic, an individual’s failure to exercise caution may lead to a very hard internalization of costs if an infection strikes them. This mutuality is an element absent from most situations involving externalities. And to the extent that you take voluntary precautions, you and your contacts both benefit. Nevertheless, I concede that there are individuals who face less risk themselves (the young or healthy) but who might behave recklessly, and they might not internalize all risk for which they are responsible. Yes, stringency may have benefits, but that does not mean it has net benefits.

Even if there is some meaningful point at which NPIs are “optimized”, government does not possess the knowledge required to find that point. It lacks detailed knowledge of both costs and benefits of NPIs. This is a manifestation of the “knowledge problem” articulated by Friedrich Hayek, which hampers all efforts at central planning. In contrast, individual actors know their own tolerance for risk, and they surely have some sense of the risks they create in their normal course of affairs. And again, there is a strong degree of proportionality and voluntary internalization of mutual risks.

While relying on voluntary action is economically inefficient relative to an ideal, full-information and perfectly altruistic solution, it is at least based on information that individuals possess: their own risk profile and risk preferences. In contrast, government does not possess information necessary to impose rules in an optimal way, and those rules are rife with unintended consequences and costs inflicted on individuals.

My next post will present empirical evidence of the weakness of lockdown measures in curbing the coronavirus as well as the high costs of those measures. The coronavirus is a serious infection, but it is not terribly deadly or damaging to the longer-term health of the vast majority of people. This, in and of itself, should be sufficient to demonstrate that the array of non-pharmaceutical interventions imposed in the U.S. and abroad were and are not worthwhile. People are capable of assessing risks for themselves. The externality argument, that NPIs are necessary because people do not adequately assess the risk they pose to others, relies on an authority’s ability to assess that risk, and they invariably go overboard on interventions for which they underestimate costs. COVID is not serious enough to justify a surrender of our constitutional rights, and like every concession to government authority, those rights will be difficult to recover.

Joe’s “Boom”: Mendacity or Memory Loss?

06 Tuesday Oct 2020

Posted by in economic growth, Executive Authority

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Joe Biden has claimed that he and Barack Obama had left Donald Trump with a “booming” economy to start his term in office. Of course, if he had anything to do with economic performance during the Obama Administration, it may have been his oversight of the mismanaged and ineffective “shovel-ready” stimulus program of 2009, For his sake, one might hope (and suspect) his oversight was nominal. In any case, his characterization of the Obama economy is not really accurate, as this editorial at Issues and Insights demonstrates. I could argue with a few of their points, but the thrust of it is correct. The economy weakened in 2015 and 2016, and expectations were for continued slow growth or possibly a recession in 2017 or after. At that point, many economists thought the aging expansion might be on its last legs. But economic growth exceeded expectations after Trump took office. As for job growth, economists predicted relatively sluggish growth in 2017-2019, but actual job growth exceeded those projections by more than three times.

Finally, Biden’s assertion that “Trump caused the recession” was laughable, especially when the punchline is his willingness to “shut down the economy“! He insists “I would listen to the scientists”, presumably the same knuckleheads who don’t understand the public health tradeoffs between the pandemic itself and lockdown risks (and who don’t understand the Constitution). Biden might not understand that the President lacks constitutional powers to demand a nationwide shutdown. Trump was quite sensibly persuaded to leave non-pharmaceutical interventions in the hands of the private sector as well as state and local governments, with guidance from federal health authorities. That some state and local leaders instituted draconian policies, which were largely ineffective and often damaging. was and is a terrible misfortune. The more sensible approach is to  protect the most vulnerable and allow others to gauge their own risks, as we always have in earlier pandemics.

Virus Visuals and Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions

19 Saturday Sep 2020

Posted by in Government Failure, Pandemic

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , ,

There are a bunch of nice graphs below summarizing the course of the coronavirus (C19) pandemic in different countries, as well as their policy responses. The charts are courtesy of Kyle Lamb, who has been an unlikely (in my mind…) but forceful voice regarding the pandemic over the past few months. I’m sorry if the resolution in some of the charts is poor, but I hope you can click on them for a better view.

The data reported in the charts goes through September 12. The first few charts below are “mirror charts”: they show newly diagnosed C19 cases by day on top, right-side up; on the bottom of each chart are C19-attributed deaths, but the vertical axis is inverted to create the “mirror effect”. The scales on the bottom are heavily stretched compared to the top (deaths are much smaller than cases), and the scales for different countries aren’t comparable. The patterns are informative nevertheless, and I’ll provide per capita deaths separately.

Let’s start with the U.S., where the early part of the pandemic in the spring was quite deadly, while the second, geographically distinct “wave” of the pandemic was less deadly. It looks bad, but the high number of deaths in the spring was partly a consequence of mismanagement by a few prominent government officials in the Northeast, most glaringly Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York. The full pattern for the U.S. combines different waves in different regions. The overall outcome to-date is 622 deaths per million of population.

Then we have charts for (deaths/mil in parens): the UK (628), Italy (591), Spain (653), France (467), Germany (114), the Netherlands (364), and Switzerland (240), which all have had second waves in cases, of but hardly any noticeable second wave in deaths, at least not yet:

And finally, we have Sweden (576), which had many deaths during the first wave, but very few now. Overall, to-date, Sweden has faired better than the U.S., Spain, the UK, and Italy — not to mention Belgium (870), for which I don’t have mirror charts.

There are several points to make about the charts:

First, the so-called second wave this summer has not been as deadly as the virus was in the spring. The U.S. is not an exception in that regard, though it did have more C19 deaths than the other countries. The count of U.S. deaths in the summer was partly due to C19 false positives under a much heavier testing regime, as well as “death laundering” by public health authorities that looks suspiciously like a politicization of the attribution process: C19 deaths over the summer have been well in excess of what would be expected from C19 hospitalizations and ICU admissions. It’s also evident that deaths are being reallocated to C19 from other natural causes, as this chart from The Ethical Skeptic shows (compare the bright line for 2020 to the (very) dim but tightly clustered baselines from prior years):

Second, most of the charts for Europe (not Sweden) show a late summer escalation in cases, though cases in Spain and Germany appear to have crested already. If an uptrend in deaths is to follow, it should become noticeable soon. Thus far, the wave certainly looks less threatening. 

Finally, it’s noteworthy that Sweden’s early experience, which was plagued by mismanagement of the virus’ threat to the nursing home population, later transitioned to a dramatic fading of cases and deaths. There has been no late summer wave in Sweden as we’ve seen elsewhere. This despite Sweden’s far less stringent non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs). Sweden’s deaths per million of population are now less than in the US, the UK, Italy, Spain, and Belgium, and most of those differences are growing.

All of the other countries discussed above have had far more stringent lockdown policies than Sweden, and at far greater economic cost. The following charts show some cross-country comparisons of an Oxford University index of NPI stringency over time. It combines a number of different dimensions of NPIs, such as mask mandates, restrictions on public gatherings, and school closures. The first chart below shows the U.S. and the UK contrasted with Sweden. The other countries discussed above are shown in separate charts that follow. 

In the U.S., there has been tremendous variation across states in terms of stringency due to the federalist approach required by the U.S. Constitution, but overall, the Oxford measure for the U.S. has been broadly similar to the UK over time, with the largest departures from one another at the start of the pandemic.   

   

The stringency of NPIs over the full pandemic depends on their day-by-day strength as well as their duration at various levels. One could measure stringency indices and deaths at various points in time and produce all kinds of conflicting results as to the efficacy of NPIs. On the whole, however, these charts suggest that stringent NPIs hold no particular advantage except perhaps as a way to temporarily avoid overwhelming the health care system. Even the original “flatten the curve” argument acknowledged that the virus could not be avoided indefinitely at a reasonable cost via NPIs, especially in an otherwise free society.

Note that most of these countries eased their NPIs after the initial wave in the spring, but several remained far more stringent than Sweden’s policies. That did not prevent the second wave of cases, though again, those were far less deadly.

As Jacob Sullum writes, and what is increasingly clear to honest observers: lockdowns tend to be ineffective and even destructive over lengthy periods.

A working paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research finds that four different “stylized facts” about the growth in C19 deaths are consistent across countries and states having different policy responses to the virus. The authors say:

“… failing to account for these four stylized facts may result in overstating the importance of policy mandated [non-pharmaceutical interventions] for shaping the progression of this deadly pandemic.“

Here’s Bill Blain’s discussion of the inefficacy of lockdowns. And here is Donald Luskin’s summary of his firm’s research that appeared in the WSJ, which likewise casts extreme doubt on the wisdom of stringent NPIs.

The virus is far from gone, but this summer’s wave has been much more docile in both Europe and the U.S. There are reasons to think that subsequent waves will be dampened in many areas via the cumulative immunity gained from exposure thus far, not to mention improvements in treatment and knowledge regarding prophylaxis such as Vitamin D supplements. Government authorities and their public health advisors should dispense with the pretense that stringent NPIs can mitigate the impact of the virus at a reasonable cost. These measures are constitutionally flawed, impinge on basic freedoms, and look increasingly like government failure. Risk mitigation should be practiced by those who are either vulnerable or fearful, but for most people, particularly children and people of working age, those risks no longer appear to be much worse than a bad year for influenza.