The federal government ran a budget surplus of $27 billion in June, much to the surprise of nearly everyone. The Trump Administration and MAGA-friendly media were eager to credit a big revenue boost from higher tariffs, which… ahem … they have assured us are notreally taxes. In any case, to attribute the June surplus to tariffs is flatly ridiculous. The truth is these “non-tax” magic revenue generators made a relatively small contribution to the apparent shift in the government’s fiscal position in June. And I say “apparent” because the surplus itself was something of a mirage.
Yes, tariffs brought in a total of almost $27B during June, which is about the same as the surplus recorded, but that was purely coincidental. It does not imply that tariffs “created” a surplus. Nor does it suggest that tariffs might just be able to balance the federal budget. Not a chance!
Here is one of two other sides of the story: the Treasury reported that the budget balance this June improved from a year ago by a total of $89 billion, from a deficit of $72B in June of 2024 to the aforementioned surplus of $27B in June 2025. Outlays were lower by about $38B this June, accounting for almost 43% of the improvement. Receipts were about $59B higher, with tariffs increasing by $20B relative to June 2024. So tariffs contributed just over a third of the boost in receipts. Altogether then, tariffs accounted for 22.5% of the improvement in the June budget balance between 2024 and 2025. That version of the story, as far as it goes, does not support the contention that tariffs “caused” the budget surplus in June, only that tariff revenue was a contributing factor.
Let’s dig a little deeper, however. Were it not for so-called “calendar adjustments” made by the Treasury, it would have reported a deficit of $70B in June. The reason? The first day of June fell on a Sunday this year, socertain payments were shifted to the last prior business day: Friday, May 30. That reduced June outlays substantially. Moreover, an extra business day in June 2025 added revenue. So the surplus in June was, in essence, an artifact of the calendar and had little to do with tariff revenue.
Incidentally, no one should be surprised by the growth of tariff revenue collected in June. When a tax rate more than triples (from a pre-Trump average of about 3% to 10% plus in June — net of tariff exclusions), one should expect revenue from that tax to increase substantially (and it was probably exaggerated by the extra business day).
Oh wait! Did I say tax?
With time, buyers will adjust and scale back their import purchases, reducing the revenue impact of the tariff hikes. However, we still don’t know how high tariffs will go. That means we could see substantially higher tariff revenue, though the demand response and a likely negative impact on incomes will cut into those gains. Either way, the revenue potential of tariffs is limited. Some estimates put the revenue impact of Trump’s tariffs at less than $250B annually. That seems conservative, but it’s significant revenue if it holds up. Still, it won’t come close to balancing a federal budget that’s almost $2 trillion in the hole. It certainly doesn’t justify a headlong dive into protectionism, which amounts to taking a crap on the economic freedom and prosperity of the American public.
Donald Trump’s latest volley against the Federal Reserve accuses the central bank of fixing interest rates at artificially high levels compared to rates in other developed countries. He repeatedly demands that the Fed make a large cut to its federal funds rate target, in the apparent belief that other rates will immediately fall with it. While a highly imperfect analogy, that’s a bit like saying that long-term parking in New York City would be cheaper if only hourly rates were cut to what’s charged in Omaha, and with only favorable consequences. Don’t tell Mamdani!
Trump believes the Fed’s restrictive monetary policy is preventing the economy from achieving its potential under his policies. He also argues that the Fed’s “high-rate” policy is costing the federal government and taxpayers hundreds of billions in excessive interest on federal debt. High rates can certainly impede growth and raise the cost of debt service. The question is whether there is a policy that can facilitate growth and reduce borrowing costs without risking other objectives, most notably price stability.
Delusions of Control
The financial community understands that the Fed does not directly control rates paid by the Treasury on federal debt. The Fed has its most influence on rates at the short end of the maturity spectrum. Rates on longer-term Treasury notes and bonds are subject to a variety of market forces, including expected inflation, the expected future path of federal deficits, and the perceived direction of the economy, to name a few. The Fed simply cannot dictate investor sentiments and expectations, and the ongoing flood of new Treasury debt complicates matters.
Another fundamental lesson for Trump is that cross-country comparisons of interest rates are meaningless outside the context of differing economic conditions. Market interest rates are driven by things that vary from one country to another, such as expected inflation rates, economic policies, currency values, and the strength of the home economy. Differences in rates are always the result of combinations of circumstances and expectations, which can be highly varied.
A Few Comparisons
A few examples will help reinforce this point. Below, I compare the U.S. to a few other countries in terms of recent short-term central bank rate targets and long-term market interest rates. Then we can ask what conditions explain these divergencies. For reference, the current fed funds rate target range is 4.25 – 4.5%, while 10-year Treasury bonds have traded recently at yields in the same range. Current U.S. inflation is roughly 2.5%.
It’s important to remember that markets attempt to price bonds to compensate buyers for expected future inflation. Currently, the10-year “breakeven” inflation implied by indexed Treasury bonds is about 2.35% (but it is closer to 3% at short durations). That means unindexed Treasury bonds yielding 4.4% offer an expected real yield just above 2%. Accounting for expected inflation often narrows the gap between U.S. interest rates and foreign rates, but not always.
Switzerland: The Swiss National Bank maintains a policy rate of 0%; the rate on 10-year Swiss government bonds has been in the 0.5 – 0.7% range. Why can’t we have Swiss-like interest rates in the U.S.? Is it merely intransigence on the part of the Fed, as Trump would have us believe?
No. Inflation in Switzerland is near zero, so in terms of real yields, the gap between U.S. and Swiss rates is closer to 1.4%, rather than 3.8%. But what of the remaining difference? Swiss government debt, even more than U.S. Treasury debt, attracts investors due to the nation’s “safe-haven” status. Also, U.S. yields are elevated by our ballooning federal debt and uncertainties related to trade policy. Economic growth is also somewhat stronger in the U.S., which tends to elevate yields.
These factors give the Fed reason to be cautious about cutting its target rate. It needs evidence that inflation will continue to trend down, and that policy uncertainties can be resolved without reigniting inflation.
Euro Area: The European Central Bank’s (ECB) refinancing rate is now 2.15%. Meanwhile, the 10-year German Bund is yielding around 2.6%, so both short-term and long-term rates in the Euro area are lower than in the U.S. In this case, the difference relative to U.S. rates is not large, nor is it likely attributable to lower expected inflation. Instead, sluggish growth in the EU helps explain the gap. Federal deficits and the ongoing issuance of new Treasury debt also keep U.S. yields higher. Treasury yields may also reflect a premium for volatility due to heavier reliance on foreign investors and private funds, who tend to be price sensitive.
Japan: The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) policy rate is currently 0.5%. Yields on Japanese 10-year government bonds have recently traded just below 1.5%. Expected inflation in Japan has been around 2.5% this year, which means that real yields are sharply negative. The BOJ has tightened policy to bring inflation down. The nearly 3% gap between U.S. and Japanese bond yields reflects very weak economic growth in Japan. In addition, despite a very high debt to GDP ratio, the depressed value of the yen discourages investment abroad, helping to sustain heavy domestic holdings of government debt.
Blame and Backfire
Trump might well understand the limits of the Fed’s control over interest rates, but if he does, then this is exclusively a case of scapegoating. Cross-country differences in interest rates represent equilibria that balance an array of complex conditions. These range from disparate rates of inflation, the strength of economic growth, currency values, fiscal imbalances, and the character of the investor base. .
Investor expectations obviously play a huge role in all this. A central bank like the Fed cannot dictate long-term yields, and it can do much more harm than good by attempting to push the market where it does not want to go. That type of aggressiveness can spark changes in expectations that undermine policy objectives. It’s childish and destructive to insist that interest rates can and should be as low in the U.S. as in countries facing much different circumstances.
Seemingly everyone wants to know: where is this tariff inflation you economists speak of? Even my pool guy asked me! We haven’t seen it yet, despite the substantial tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration. The press has been wondering about this for almost two months, and some of the MAGA faithful are celebrating the resounding success of the tariffs in this and other respects. Not so fast, grasshoppers!
There are a couple of aspects to the question of tariff inflation. One has to do with the meaning of inflation itself. Strictly speaking, inflation is a continuing positive rate of increase in the price level. Certain purists say it is a continuous positive rate of increase in the money supply, which I grant is least a step beyond what most people understand as inflation. Rising prices over any duration is a good enough definition for now, but I’ll return to this question below in the context of tariffs.
There is near-unanimity among economists that higher tariffs will increase the prices of imports, import-competing goods, and goods requiring imported materials as inputs. Domestic importers pay the tariffs, so they face pressure on their profit margins unless they can pass the cost onto their customers. But so far, since Donald Trump made his “Liberation Day” tariff announcement, we’ve seen very little price pressure. What explains this stability, and will it last?
Several factors have limited the price response to tariffs thus far:
— Some importers are “eating” the tariffs themselves, at least for now, and they might continue to pay a share of the tariffs with smaller margins.
“… cargo loaded onto ships in Asia on April 4 was not subject to the reciprocal tariffs, while cargo loaded April 5 was. Cargo coming from Asia can take up to 45 days to make it to U.S. ports and then must be transported to distribution centers and then on to customers. It is possible that goods from Asia subjected to high tariffs are only now making their way to customers. These two factors suggest the economic effects of increased tariffs could merely be delayed.“
— Data on prices is reported with a lag. We won’t know the June CPI and PPI until July 15, and the PCE price index (and its core measure, of most importance to the Fed) won’t be reported until July 31, and will be subject to revisions in subsequent months.
— Importers stocked up on inventories before tariffs took effect, and even before Trump took office. Once these are depleted, new supplies will carry a higher cost. That’s likely over the next few months.
— Uncertainty about the magnitude of the new tariffs. Trump has zig-zagged a number of times on the tariff rates he’ll impose on various countries, and real trade agreements have been slow in coming. This makes planning difficult. Nevertheless, inventories are likely to carry a higher replacement cost, but adjusting price creates a danger of putting oneself at a competitive disadvantage and alienating customers. Many businesses would prefer to wait for a clearer read on the situation before committing to a substantial price hike.
— Tariff exemptions have reduced the average tariffs assessed thus far to about 10%, well below the 15% official average. This will reduce the impact on prices and margins, but it is still a huge increase in tariffs and another source of uncertainty that should give importers pause in any effort to recoup tariffs by repricing.
— Importers are storing goods in “bonded warehouse“ to delay the payment of tariffs. This helps importers buy time before committing to pricing decisions.
— Kashkari notes that businesses can find ways to alter trade routes so as to lower the tariffs they pay. For example, he says some goods are being routed to take advantage of the relatively favorable terms of the free trade agreement between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada.
So it’s still too early to have seen much evidence of price pressure from Trump’s tariffs. However, that pressure is likely to become more obvious over the summer months. The expectation that tariffs should have already shown up in prices is just one of several errors of those critical of the Federal Reserve’s patience in easing policy.
Is there a sound reason to expect higher tariffs to produce a continuing inflation? Or instead, should we expect a “one-time” increase in the price level without further complications? Tariffs could generate an ongoing inflation if accompanied by an increase in the rate of money growth, or at least enough money growth to create expectations of higher inflation. Thus, if the Federal Reserve seeks to “accommodate” tariffs by easing monetary policy, that might lead to more widespread inflation. That could be difficult to rein-in, to the extent that higher inflation gets embedded into expectations.
Tariffs are excise taxes, and while they put upward pressure on the prices of imports and import-competing goods, they may have a contractionary effect on economic activity. Tighter budgets might lead to softer prices in other sectors of the economy and moderate the impact of tariffs on the overall price level.
The Fed’s reluctance to ease policy has been reinforced by another development. It’s usually argued that tariffs will strengthen the domestic currency due to the induced reduction in demand for foreign goods (and thus the need for foreign currency). Instead, the dollar has declined more than 9% against the Euro since “Liberation Day”, and the overall U.S. dollar index experienced its steepest first-half decline in 50 years. A lower dollar stimulates exports and depresses imports, but it also can lead to “imported” inflation (in this case, apart from the direct impact of tariffs). Uncertainty regarding tariffs deserves some of the blame for the dollar sell-off, but the fiscal outlook and rising debt levels have also done their part.
The upshot is that Trump’s tariffs are likely to cause a one-time increase in the price level with possibly a mild contractionary effect on the real economy. So it’s a somewhat stagflationary effect. It won’t be disastrous, but the tariffs can be made more inflationary than they “need be”. That’s why Trump is foolish to persist in haranguing the Fed for not rushing to ease policy.
President Trump engaged in one of his favorite pastimes on June 18 while the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) was concluding its meeting on the direction of monetary policy. He publicly called Fed Chairman Jerome Powell “stupid” for not having cut rates already, and later said the Fed’s board was “complicit”.
“”I don’t know why the Board doesn’t override this Total and Complete Moron!“
Trump also tagged Powell with one of his trademark appellations: “Too Late”. Yep, that’s how Trump says he refers to Powell.
Later that day, the Fed once again announced that it had decided to leave unchanged its target range for the interest rate on federal funds. Powell described the overall tenor of current Fed policy as mildly restrictive, but FOMC members still “expect” (loosely speaking) two quarter-point cuts in the funds rate by year end.
Of course, Powell and the FOMC really were far too late in recognizing that inflation was more than transitory in 2021-22. Now, with inflation measures tapering but still higher than the Fed’s 2% target, Trump says “Too Late” Powell and the Fed are again behind the curve. Of course, because the central bank is outside the President’s direct control, it makes a convenient scapegoat for whatever might ail the Trump economy, and Trump frets that unnecessarily high rates will cost the U.S. Treasury hundreds of billions in interest on new and refinanced federal debt.
The President has no appreciation for the value of an independent central bank, as opposed to one captive to the fiscal whims of Presidents and Congress. Despite his frequent criticism of inflationary sins of the past, Trump doesn’t understand the dangers of a central bank that could be bullied into inflating away government debt.
The day after the Fed’s meeting, Trump said rates should be cut immediately by a huge 2.5%! As the Donald might say, no one’s ever seen anything like it!
Trump, however, is delusional to think the Fed can engineer reductions in the spectrum of interest rates by aggressively slashing its fed funds target. The Fed does not control long-term interest rates, nor is that part of the Fed’s formal mandate. In fact, an aggressively large reduction in the fed funds rate is likely to backfire, feeding expectations of higher inflation and a selloff in credit markets.
Let me reiterate: the Fed does not control long-term interest rates. Short-term rates are more heavily influenced by the Fed’s rate actions, and by expectations of Fed policy, but the Fed is likewise influenced by those very expectations. In fact, the Fed often follows market rates rather than leading them. In any case, a general truth is that long-term interest rates go where market forces direct them, not where the Fed might try to push them.
Today the Fed is attempting to walk a line between precipitating divergent and potentially negative outcomes. It wants to see clear evidence that inflation is settling down at roughly the 2% target. Also, the Fed is wary that Trump’s tariffs might generate a near-term spike in prices. Under those circumstances, prematurely easing policy could rekindle more permanent inflationary pressures. It seems clear that the Fed currently judges inflation as the dominant risk.
At the same time, the real economy shows mixed signals. Clear signs of a downturn would likely prompt the Fed to cut its fed funds target sooner. After the latest meeting, the Fed announced that it had reduced its own forecast for real GDP growth in 2025 to just 1.4%. Recent employment gains have been moderate, but jobless claims are trending up. The unemployment rate is low, but the labor force has declined over the past few months, which incidentally might be putting upward pressure on wages.
Policy uncertainty was a major theme in the Fed’s June rate decision. Tariffs loom large and would be a threat to continued growth if producers, facing weak demand, were unable to pass the cost of tariffs through to customers, undermining their profit margins. Prospects for passage of the budget reconciliation bill create more uncertainty, providing another rationale to stand pat without cutting the funds rate.
Again, Jerome Powell says that Fed policy is “modestly restrictive” at present. In fact, estimates of the “policy neutral” Fed funds rate are in the vicinity of 2.75%, well below the current target range of 4.25-4.50. However, the money supply (M2) has drifted up over the past year and by May was up 4.4% from a year earlier. That would be consistent with 2% inflation and better than 2% real growth, the latter being higher than the FOMC’s expectation.
Another consideration is that the Fed has nearly ended its quantitative tightening (QT) program, having recently trimmed the passive runoff of maturing securities in its portfolio to just $5 billion per month. This leads to less downward pressure on bank reserves and less upward pressure on the fed funds rate. In other words, policy has already shifted toward greater support for money growth. But out of caution, the Fed wants to defer reductions in the funds rate to avoid undermining the central bank’s inflation-fighting credibility.
Jerome Powell and the FOMC probably could not care less about Trump’s exhortations to reduce interest rates. For one thing, it is beyond the Fed’s power to force down rates that could spur housing and other economic activity. And Trump should be grateful: such a reckless attempt would risk great harm to markets and the economy, not to mention Trump’s economic agenda. Better to wait until near-term inflation risks and policy uncertainty clear up.
Trump can jawbone as aggressively as he wants. He cannot fire Powell, though he keeps saying he “should”. However, no matter what actions the Fed takes, he will almost certainly not reappoint Powell to lead the Fed when Powell’s term expires next May. Sadly, Trump will try to appoint a replacement he can rely upon to do his bidding. Let’s hope the Senate stands in his way to preserve Fed independence.
The GOP’s “Big Beautiful Bill” (BBB) has generated its share of controversy, not least between President Trump and his erstwhile ally Elon Musk. It is a budget reconciliation bill that was passed by a single vote in the House of Representatives. It’s now up to the Senate, which is sure to alter some of the bill’s provisions. That will require another vote in the House before it can head to Trump’s desk for a signature.
Slim But “Reconciled” Majority
As a reconciliation bill, the BBB is not subject to filibuster in the Senate, and only a simple majority is required for approval, not a 60% supermajority. Obviously, that’s why the GOP used the reconciliation process.
I hate big bills, primarily because they tend to provide cover for all sorts of legislative mischief and pork. However, the reconciliation process imposes limits on what kinds of budgetary changes can be included in a bill. A reconciliation bill can alter only mandatory spending programs like Medicaid and other entitlements, but not discretionary or non-mandatory spending. Social Security is an entitlement, but it would be off limits in a typical reconciliation bill (owing to an arcane rule). Reconciliation bills can also address changes in revenue and the debt limit.
The BBB includes provisions to reduce Medicaid outlays such as work requirements, denial of benefits to illegal aliens, and controls on fraud. These are projected to cut spending by nearly $700 billion. Of course, this is a controversial area, but efforts to impose better controls on entitlements are laudable.
Elon Musk criticized the bill’s failure to aggressively rein-in deficit spending, prompting what was probably his first public feud with Trump. At the time, it wasn’t clear whether Musk really understood the limits of reconciliation. If he had, he might at least have been mollified by the effort to tackle Medicaid waste and fraud. Entitlement programs like Medicaid are, after all, at the very root of our fiscal imbalances.
Extending Trump’s Tax Cuts
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) says that BBB will reduce tax revenue by $3.8 trillion over the next ten years. The Trump tariffs are not addressed in the BBB, but those won’t come close to offsetting this projected revenue loss.
The CBO’s score compares spending and tax revenue to “current law”. Thus, the baseline assumes that the 2017 tax cuts under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) expire in 2026. With spending cuts under the BBB, primary federal deficits (non-interest) are projected to rise $2.4 billion over that time. With interest costs on the higher federal debt, the increase in deficits rises to about $3 trillion. I’ll briefly address some of the major provisions below, including their budget impacts.
Spending Cuts
In addition to Medicaid, other significant cuts in spending in the BBB include reductions in benefits under the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (food stamps, -$267b). This includes tighter work requirements, eligibility rules, and higher matching requirements for states. Also included in BBB are more stringent student loan repayment rules and changes in other education funding programs (-$350b).
Other spending categories would increase. The bill would authorize an additional $144 billion for Armed Services and $79 billion for Homeland Security, including $50 billion for the border wall. Senator Rand Paul has called the border security provisions excessive, though many of those favoring greater fiscal discipline also believe defense is underfunded, so they probably don’t oppose these particular items.
Voting Tax Incentives
In terms of revenue, the BBB would extend the provisions of the TCJA. The deduction for state and local taxes (SALT) would be extended and increased to $40,000 at incomes less than $500,000. This would have a combined revenue impact of -$787 billion. No wonder deficit hawks are upset! A larger SALT deduction creates an even greater subsidy for states imposing high tax burdens on their residents. There’s an expectation, however, that this provision will be dialed back to some extent in the Senate version of the BBB.
There are also provisions to eliminate taxes on overtime (-$124b) and tip income (-$40b), and to increase the standard deduction for seniors (-$66b). As I’ve written before, these are all terribly distortionary policies. They would treat different kinds of income differently, create incentives to reclassify income, and impose a highly complex administrative burden on the IRS. The senior deduction creates an incremental revenue hole as a function of Social Security benefit payments. This is the wrong way to address the needs of a system that is insolvent. These policies were selected primarily with vote buying in mind.
Another notable change would eliminate subsidies and tax credits for EVs (+$191b). Some claim this was at the heart of Musk’s diatribes against the BBB. However, Musk has supported elimination of both EV subsidies and mandates for many years. Hestated as much to legislators on Capital Hill last December, so this theory regarding Musk’s opposition to BBB doesn’t wash.
Defining a Baseline
Advocates of extending the TCJA say the CBO’s baseline case is inappropriate, and that the proper baseline should incorporate the continued tax provisions of the TCJA. Again, the extension increases the ten-year deficit by $3.8 trillion, but that total includes the revenue effects of other provisions. Perhaps $3 trillion might be a more accurate upward adjustment to baseline deficits. In that case, the BBB would actually reduce ten-year deficits by $0.2 trillion.
Another criticism is that the CBO does not attempt to estimate dynamic changes in revenue induced by policy. Those in support of extending the TCJA believe that this static treatment unfairly discounts the revenue potential of pro-growth policies.
I don’t have a problem with the alternative baseline, but the fact is that deficits will still be problematic. Over the 2025-2034 time frame, a baseline incorporating an extension of TCJA would yield deficits in excess of $20 trillion. That includes mounting interest costs, which might overwhelm serious efforts at fiscal discipline in the unlucky event of an updraft in interest rates. Of course, these large, ongoing deficits raise the likelihood of inflationary pressure. The recent downgrade in the credit rating assigned to U.S. Treasuries by Moody’s is an acknowledgement that bondholder wealth could well be undermined by future attempts to “inflate away” the real value of the debt.
Debt Ceiling
In addition to its direct budgetary effects, the BBB calls for a $5 trillion increase of the federal debt limit. I admit to mixed feelings about this large increase in borrowing authority. Frequent debt limit negotiations tend to create lots of political theater and chew up scarce legislative time. Moreover, it’s easy to conclude that they usually accomplish little in terms of restraining deficit spending. Dominic Pino argues otherwise, citing historical examples in which the debt limit “was paired with” reforms and spending restraint. In other words, despite its apparent impotence, Pino asserts that deficits would have been much higher without it. I’m still skeptical, however, that frequent showdowns over the debt ceiling have much value given entitlements that are seemingly beyond legislative control. In the end, elected representatives must respect the judgement of credit markets and face consequences at the ballot box.
Final Thoughts on BBB
Superficially, the Big Beautiful Bill looks like an abomination to deficit hawks. The GOP decided to structure it as a reconciliation bill to strengthen its odds of passage. That decision sharply limited its potential for spending restraint. Other legislation will be required to make the kinds of rescissions necessary to eliminate wasteful spending identified by DOGE.
As for the bill itself, the effort to extend the 2017 Trump tax cuts was widely expected. That, in and of itself, is neutral with respect to a more reasonable baseline assumption. Elimination of EV tax subsidies is a big plus, as are the permanent incentives for business investment. Unfortunately, Trump and his congressional supporters also propose to create the additional fiscal burdens of no taxes on tips and overtime pay, as well as an increased standard deduction for seniors. The ill-advised increase in the SALT deduction was a compromise to ensure the support of certain blue-state republicans, but with any luck it will be curtailed by the Senate.
On the spending side, the big item is Medicaid. Reforms are long past due for a system so riddled with waste. In addition, there are new rules in the BBB that would reduce SNAP outlays and increase student loan repayments. Outlays for defense, Homeland Security, and border security would increase, but these were known to be Trump priorities. Too bad they’ve been paired with several wasteful tax policies.
But even with those flaws, the BBB would reduce deficits marginally relative to a baseline that incorporates extension of the TCJA. Yes, excessive ongoing deficits still have to be dealt with, but spending reductions on the discretionary side of the budget were out of the question this time due to reconciliation rules. They will have to come later, but that sort of legislation will face tough political headwinds, as will Social Security and Medicare reform. arever introduced.
Just a few weeks back I engaged in wishful speculation that Trump’s drastic imposition of “reciprocal” and punitive tariffs could actually prove to be a free-trade play, but only if the U.S. used its universally dominant position in trade wisely at the bargaining table. I worried, however, that any notion Trump might have along those lines was eclipsed by his antipathy for otherwise harmless trade deficits. Another bad indicator was his conviction that manipulating tariffs could restore “fairness” in trade relations while raising revenue to pay for the selective tax cuts he promised for tips, overtime wages, and social security benefits.
My hopes for reduced trade barriers were dashed when the first “deal” (or really a “Memorandum of Understanding”) was announced with the United Kingdom. The U.S. runs a trade surplus with the UK, so one might think Trump would find it unnecessary to levy tariffs on U.S. imports from the UK. No dice! Clearly this was not motivated by the trade deficit bogeyman of Trump’s fever dreams. The White House stated that buyers of goods from the UK will pay the minimum 10% tariff (up from 3.3% before Trump took office).
Trump simply likes tariffs. Apparently he’s never given much thought to their incidence, which falls largely on domestic consumers and businesses. The MAGA faithful are in blissful denial that such a burden exists, despite ample evidence of its reality.
As Eric Boehm notes, the U.S. received a few concessions on British tariffs under the deal, but the reductions only amount to about a 2% equivalent. There are sharp reductions in special tariffs on U.S. agricultural products, especially meat. There are also exceptions to tariffs on certain British goods, like autos (up to 100,000 units). The selective nature of the concessions on both sides underscores the cronyist underpinnings of this style of economic governance, which amounts to ad hoc central planning.
Also troubling is the misleading spin the Administration attempted to put on news coverage of the deal. They claimed to have reduced tariffs of goods imported from the UK, which is true only in comparison to post-“Liberation Day” tariff levels established in early April. In fact, the baseline tariff now applied to most UK goods sold in the U.S. has more than tripled since last year! As Boehm states, American consumers and businesses are paying a lot more for this “deal” than their British counterparts.
Raw Deals To Be?
The “deal” with China is worse, partly because it’s only a 90-day pause in implementation (pending negotiation), and partly because the “reciprocal” tariff rate of 30% applied to Chinese goods is much higher than before Trump imposed the punitive rates. Still worse, the 10% tariff on U.S. exports to China applied during the pause is also much higher. What a deal! And it could get worse. These tariff hikes have little to do with “national security” and they are regressive, having disproportionately large burdens on lower-income consumers and small businesses.
The only other agreement announced thus far is with India. It is not a “trade deal” at all, but a so-called “Terms of Reference On Bilateral Trade Agreement”. It is a “roadmap” for future negotiations. Perhaps it will come together quickly, but it’s hard to expect much after the UK agreement.
Uniting Western Civilization
Just this week we had another hardball move by Trump: a 50% tariff on goods from the European Union starting in June, up from an average of about 3.8% on a trade-weighted basis. The new tariff rate is also higher than the 10% baseline tariff in place since the 90-day pause was announced in April. Trump claims the EU has been levying tariffs of 39% on U.S. goods, which might include what the Administration would call effective tariffs from non-tariff barriers to trade. Or it might refer to retaliatory tariffs announced by the EU in response to Trump’s Liberation Day announcement, but all of those have been paused. In any case, the World Trade Organization says EU tariffs on US goods average 4.8%. Quite a difference!
The move against the EU is much like Trump’s earlier ploy with China, but he says he’s “not looking for a deal”. He also says talks with the EU are “going nowhere”, though the Polish Trade Minister reassures that talks are “ongoing”. The outcome is likely to be a disappointment for anyone (like me) hoping for freer trade. The EU will probably make commitments to buy something from the U.S., maybe beef or liquified natural gas. But U.S. tariffs on EU goods will be higher than in the past.
So, thus far we have only one “deal” (such as it is), one roadmap for negotiations to follow, and a bunch of pauses pending negotiation (China included). The Trump team says about 100 countries hope to negotiate trade deals, but that is a practical impossibility. Even Trump says “… it’s not possible to meet the number of people that want to see us.” But it could be easy: just drop all U.S. trade barriers and allow protectionist countries to tax their own citizens, denying them access to free choice.
Bullying Enemies, Allies and Producers
Higher U.S. tariffs will put some upward pressure on the prices of imports and import-competing goods. We haven’t seen this play out just yet, but it’s early. In a defensive move, Trump is attempting to bully and shame domestic companies such as WalMart for attempting to protect their bottom lines in the face of tariffs. He also warned automakers about their pricing before carving out an exception for them. And now Apple has been singled-out by Trump for a special 25% tariff after it had announced plans to move assembly of iPhones to India, rather than in the U.S.
You better stay on Trump’s good side. This is a loathsome kind of interference. It encourages firms to seek favors in the form of tariff exemptions or to accept what amounts to state expropriation of profits. Cronyism and coercion reign.
Swamped By Spendthrifts?
The market seems to believe the negative impact of tariffs on economic growth will be more than offset by other stimulative forces. This includes the extension of Trump’s 2017 tax cuts. The so-called “big beautiful bill” passed by the House of Representatives also includes new tax breaks on tip and overtime pay, and an increase in the deduction for state and local taxes. While the bill reduces the growth of federal spending, there is disappointment that spending wasn’t reduced. The Senate might pass a version with more cuts, but the market sees nothing but deficits going forward. This is not the sort of “fiscal restraint” the market hoped for, particularly with escalating interest costs on the burgeoning federal debt.
Conflicting Goals
Trump has bargained successfully for some major investments in the U.S. by wealthy nations like Saudi Arabia and Dubai, as well as a few major manufacturing and technology firms. That’s wonderful. He doesn’t understand, however, that strong foreign investment in the U.S. will encourage larger trade deficits. That’s because foreign capital inflows raise incomes, which increase demand for imports. In addition, the capital inflows cause the value of the dollar to appreciate, making imports cheaper but exports more expensive for foreigners. It would be a shame if Trump reacted to these eventualities by doubling down on tariffs.
Conclusion
Alas, my hopes that Trump’s bellicose trade rhetoric was mere posturing were in vain. He could have used our dominant trading position to twist arms for lower trade barriers all around. While I worried that he massively misunderstood the meaning of trade deficits, and that he viewed higher tariffs as a magic cure, I should have worried much more!
Supporters of President Trump’s hard line on trade make so many false assertions that it’s hard to keep up. I’ve addressed several of these in earlier posts and I’ll address two more fallacies here: 1) that the U.S. manufacturing sector is in a state of crisis; and 2) that tariffs played a key role in promoting economic growth in the U.S. during the so-called gilded age of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Security
First, let’s revisit one tenet of protectionism: national security demands self-sufficiency. This undergirds the story that we must produce physical “things”, in addition to often higher-valued services, to be a great nation, or even to survive!
Of course, protecting industries critical to national security might seems like a natural concession to make, even for those supportive of liberalized trade. Ross Douthat says this:
“I think trying to reshore some manufacturing and decouple more from China makes sense from a national security standpoint, even if it costs something to G.D.P. and the stock market.“
Unfortunately, this kind of rationale is far too malleable. There is never a clearly defined limiting principle. Someone decides which goods are “critical” to national security, and this deliberation becomes the subject of much political jockeying and favor-seeking. But wait! Economic security is also cited as an adequate excuse for trade protections! And how about data security? Health security? Job security? Always there is insistence that “security” of one sort or another demands that we provide for our own needs. For definitive proof, take a look at this nonsense! Give them an inch and they’ll take a mile.
Pretty soon you “protect” such a wide swath of industries in a quest for self-sufficiency that the entire economy is unmoored from opportunity costs, comparative advantages, and the information about scarcities provided by market prices. Absolute “security” comes at the cost of transforming the economy’s productive machinery into a complacent hulk rivaling the inefficiency of Soviet industrial planning. Competition is the solution, but not limited to firms under the same set of protective trade barriers.
Manufacturing Is Mostly Fine
Trade warriors, including members of Trump’s team, insist that our decline as a nation is being hastened by a crisis in manufacturing. However, value added in U.S. manufacturing is at an all-time high.
There has been a long-term decline in manufacturing employment, but not manufacturing output. In fact, manufacturing output has doubled since 1980. As Jeff Jacoby notes, “the purpose of manufacturing is to make things, not jobs.” If our overarching social goal was job security, we’d have revolted long ago against the tremendous reduction in agricultural employment experienced over the past century. We’d rely on switchboard operators to load web pages, and we’d dig trenches and tunnels with spoons (to paraphrase Milton Friedman).
The secular decline in manufacturing employment is a consequence of growth in manufacturing productivity. Economy-wide, this phenomenon allows real income and our standard of living to grow.
Take That Job and …
It’s also significant that few Americans have much interest in factory work. It’s typically less dangerous than in times past, but many of today’s factory jobs are still physically challenging and relatively risky. Perhaps that helps explain why nearly half-a-million jobs in manufacturing are unfilled.
Jacoby describes the transition that has changed the face of American manufacturing:
“… US plants have largely turned away from making many of the low-tech, labor-intensive consumer items they once specialized in — sneakers, T-shirts, small appliances, toys. Those jobs have mostly gone overseas, and trying to bring them back by means of a trade war would be ruinous. Yet America remains a global manufacturing powerhouse — highly skilled, highly innovative, and highly efficient.“
And yet, even as wages in manufacturing have grown, many factory jobs do not pay as well as positions requiring far less strenuous toil in the services sector. It’s also true that the best manufacturing jobs in the U.S. today require high-level skills, which are in short supply. These factors help explain why manufacturers believe finding qualified workers is one of their biggest challenges.
Isolating Weak Sectors
There are specific sectors within manufacturing that have fared poorly, including textiles, furniture, metals, and low-end electronics. The loss of competitiveness that drove those sectoral declines is not a new development. It has, however, devastated communities in the U.S. that were heavily dependent on these industries. These misfortunes are regrettable, but trade barriers are not an effective prescription for revitalizing depressed areas.
Meanwhile, other manufacturing sectors have enjoyed growth, such as computers, aerospace, and EVs. While we’ve seen a decline in the number of manufacturing firms, theperformance of U.S. manufacturing in the 21st century can be described as mixed at the very worst.
The author of this piece seems to accept the false notion that U.S. manufacturing is moribund, but he knows tariffs aren’t an effective way to strengthen domestic goods production. He has a number of better suggestions, including a commitment to infrastructure investment, reforms to education and health, and reconfiguring certain corporate income tax policies. Unfortunately, his ideas on tariffs are sometimes as mistaken as Trump’s,
The Gilded Age
Finally, the other false assertion noted in the opening paragraph is that tariffs somehow spurred economic growth in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Brian Albrecht corrects this protectionist fallacy, which lies at the root of many defenses of Trump’s tariffs. Albrecht cites favorable conditions for growth that were sufficient to overwhelm the negative effects of tariffs, including:
“… explosive population growth, mass European immigration, rapid technological innovation, westward expansion, abundant natural resources, high literacy rates, and stable property rights.”
While cross-country comparisons indicate a positive correlation between tariffs and growth during the 1870 – 1920 period, those differences were caused by other forces that dominated tariffs. Cross-industry research discussed by Albrecht indicates that tariffs on manufactured goods during the gilded era reduced labor productivity and stimulated the entry of smaller, less productive firms. Likewise, natural experiments find that tariffs allowed inefficient firms to survive and discouraged innovation.
Conclusion
The U.S. manufacturing sector is not in any sort of crisis, and its future growth won’t be powered by attempts to restore the sort of low-value production offshored over the past several decades. What protectionists interpret as failure is the natural progression of a technically advanced market-based civilization, where high-value services account for greater shares of growing total output. Of course, low-value production is sometimes “crowded out” in this process, depending on its trade-ability and comparative advantages. The logic of the process is encapsulated by Veronique de Rugy’s recent discussion of iPhone production (HT: Don Boudreaux):
“Then there’s [Commerce Secretary Howard] Lutnick, pining for a world where Americans flood back into massive factories to assemble iPhones. This is nostalgic industrial cosplay masquerading as economic strategy. Yes, iPhones aren’t assembled by Americans. But this isn’t a failure; it’s a feature of smart economic specialization. We design the iPhone here. That’s the high-value, high-margin part. The sophisticated chips, software, architecture, and intellectual property are all created in the U.S. The marketing is done here, too. That’s most of the value of the iPhone. The lower-value labor-intensive assembly work is done abroad because those tasks are more efficiently performed abroad.“
There is certainly no crisis in U.S. manufacturing. That narrative is driven by a combination of politics, rent seeking, and misplaced nostalgia.
First, a few more comments re: my speculative musings that Donald Trump’s tariff rampage could ultimately result in a regime with lower trade barriers, at least with a subset of trading partners. Arthur Laffer and Stephen Moore suggested last week that the White House should propose reciprocal free trade with zero barriers and zero subsidies for exports to any country that wishes to negotiate. A more cynical Ben Zycher scoffed at the very possibility, noting that Trump and his lieutenants view any trade deficit as evidence of cheating in one form or another. Zycher is convinced that Trump lacks a basic understanding of the (mostly) benign forces that drive trade imbalances.
I’ve said much the same. Trump’s crazy notions about trade could scuttle negotiations, or he might later accuse a trading partner of cheating on the pretext of a bilateral trade deficit (he’s done so already). And all this is to say nothing of the serious constitutional questions surrounding Trump’s tariff actions.
The mistaken focus on bilateral trade deficits also manifests in certain proposals made during trade negotiations: “Okay, but you’re gonna have to purchase vast quantities of our soybeans every year.” This sort of export promotion is a further drift into industrial planning, and it’s just too much for Trump’s trade negotiators to resist.
This might well turn out as an exercise in self-harm for Trump. However, I’ve also wondered whether his trade hokum is pure posturing, especially because he expressed support for a free trade regime in 2018. Let’s hope he meant it and that he’ll pursue that objective in trade talks. Please, just negotiate lower trade barriers on both sides without the mercantilist baggage.
Which brings me to the theme of this post: it would probably be simpler and more effective for the U.S. to simply drop all of its trade barriers unilaterally. There should be limited exceptions related to national security, but in general we should “turn the other cheek” and let recalcitrant trade partners engage in economic self-harm, if they must.
Okay, Wise Guy, What’s Your Plan?
I have a few friends who bemoan the lack of “fair play” against the U.S. in foreign trade. They have a point, but they also hold an unshakable belief that the U.S. can be just as efficient at producing anything as any other country. They are pretty much in denial that comparative advantages exist in the real world. They are seemingly oblivious to the critical role of specialization in unlocking gains from trade and lifting much of the world’s population out of penury over the past few centuries.
Furthermore, these friends believe that Trump is justified in “retaliating” against countries with whom the U.S. runs trade deficits. If tariffs are so bad, they ask, what would I do instead? Again, here’s my answer:
Eliminate (almost) all barriers to trade imposed by the U.S. Let protectionist nations choke themselves with tariffs/trade barriers.
Before getting into that, I’ll address one fact that is often denied by protectionists.
Yes, a Tariff Is a Tax!
Protectionists often claim that tariffs are not really taxes on U.S. buyers. However, tariffs are charged to buyers of imported goods (often businesses who sell imported goods to consumers or other businesses). In principle, tariffs operate just like a sales tax charged to retail buyers. Both raise government revenue, and they are both excise taxes.
In both cases, the buyer pays but generally bears less than the full burden of the tax. That’s because demand curves slope downward, so sellers (foreign exporters) try to avoid losing sales by moderating their prices in response to the tariff. In both cases, sellers end up shouldering part of the tax burden. How much depends on how buyers react to price: a steep (inelastic) demand curve implies that buyers bear the greater part of the burden of a tariff or sales tax.
People sometimes buy imports due to a lack of substitutes, which implies a steep demand curve. Consumer imports are often luxury items, and well-heeled buyers may be somewhat insensitive to price. Most imports, however, are inputs purchased by businesses, either capital goods or intermediate goods. In the face of higher tariffs, those businesses find it difficult and costly to arrange new suppliers, let alone domestic suppliers, who can deliver quickly and meet their specifications.
These considerations imply that the demand for imports is fairly inelastic (steeper), especially in the short run (when alternatives can’t easily be arranged). Thus, import buyers bear a large portion of the burden in the immediate aftermath of an increased tariff. By imposing tariffs we tax our own citizens and businesses, forcing them to incur higher costs. Correspondingly, if demand is inelastic, an importing country tends to gain more than its trading partners by unilaterally eliminating its own tariffs.
Tariffs on imports also trigger price hikes by import-competing producers. Sometimes this is opportunistic, but even these producers incur higher costs in attempting to meet new demand from buyers who formerly purchased imports. (See this post for an explanation of the costly transition, including a nice exposition of the waste of resources it entails.)
Other Forms of Blood Letting
Beyond tariffs, certain barriers to trade make it more difficult or impossible to purchase goods produced abroad. This includes import quotas and domestic content restrictions. These barriers are often as bad or worse than tariffs because they increase costs and encumber freedom of choice and consumer sovereignty.
Another kind of trade intervention, export subsidies, must be funded by taxpayers. Subsidies are too easily used to protect special interests who otherwise can’t compete. Currency manipulation can both subsidize exports and discourage imports, but it is often unsustainable. The common theme of these interventions is to undermine economic efficiency by shielding the domestic economy from real price signals.
Let Them Tax Themselves
Suppose the U.S. simply turns the other cheek, eliminating all of our own trade interventions with respect to country X despite X’s tariffs and other interventions.
To start with, the existence of barriers means that both countries are unable to exploit all of the benefits of specialization and mutually beneficial trade. Both countries must produce an excess of goods in which they lack a comparative advantage, and both countries produce too few goods in which they have a comparative advantage. Both incur extra costs and produce less output than they could in the absence of trade barriers.
Unilateral elimination of U.S. tariffs and other barriers would reduce high-cost domestic production of certain goods in favor of better substitutes from country X. But Country X gains as well, because it is now able to produce more goods and services for export in which it possesses a comparative advantage. Therefore, the unilateral move by the U.S. is beneficial to both countries.
On the other hand, U.S. export industries are still constrained by country X’s import tax or other restraints. These would-be exporters are no worse off than before, but they are worse off relative to a state in which buyers in country X could freely express their preferences in the marketplace.
What exactly does country X gain from tariffs and other trade burdens on its citizens? It denies them full access to what they deem to be superior goods and services at an acceptable price. It means that resources are misallocated, forcing abstention or the use of inferior or costlier domestic alternatives. Resources must be diverted to relatively inefficient firms. In short, the tariff makes country X less prosperous.
Empirical evidence shows that more open economies (with fewer trade barriers) enjoy greater income and productivity growth. This study found that “trade’s impact on real income [is] consistently positive and significant over time.”See this paper as well. Trade barriers tend to increase the income gap between rich and poor countries. The chart below (from this link) compares real GDP per capita from the top third and bottom third of the distribution of countries on a measure of trade “openness”. Converting logs to levels, the top third has more than twice the average real GDP per capita of the bottom third. And of course, the averaging process mutes differences between very open and very closed trade policies.
The chart also shows that countries more “open” to trade have more equal distributions of income, as measured by their Gini coefficients.
An important qualification is that domestic production of certain goods and services might be critical to national security. We must be willing to tolerate some inefficiencies in that case. It would be foolish to depend on a hostile nation for those supplies, despite any comparative advantage they might possess. It’s reasonable to expect such a list of critical goods and services to evolve with technological developments and changing security threats. However, merely acknowledging this justification leaves the door open for excessively broad interpretations of “critical goods”, especially in times of crisis.
Setting a Good Policy and Example
Here’s an attempt to summarize:
Tariffs are taxes, and non-tariff barriers inflict costs by distorting prices or diminishing choice
Trade barriers reduce economic efficiency and produce welfare losses
Trade barriers deny the citizens of a country the benefits of specialization
Both countries gain when one trading partner eliminates tariffs on imports from the other
The demand for imports is fairly inelastic, at least in the short run. Thus, the gain from eliminating a tariff will be skewed toward the domestic importers
Both countries gain when they agree to eliminate any and all trade barriers
Across countries, trade barriers are associated with lower incomes, lower income growth, and more unequal distributions of income
The U.S. has a large number of trading partners. Every liberalization we initiate means a welfare gain for us and one trading partner, who would do well to follow our example and reciprocate in full. Not doing so foregoes welfare gains and leads to incremental losses in income relative to more trade-friendly nations. Across all of our trading relationships, a unilateral end to U.S. trade barriers would almost certainly convince some countries to reciprocate. Those that refuse would suffer. Let them self-flagulate. Let them tax themselves.
I’m nowhere near eating crow over the skepticism I’ve directed at Donald Trump’s trade offensive. The uncertainty created by his erratic policy changes is very likely to drag the U.S. into recession. However, there were signs last week of movement in a more promising direction, as he placed a 90-day pause on the targeted “reciprocal” tariffs announced in early April. However, a “baseline” universal tariff of 10% still applies to all imported goods. So do tariffs targeted at China, which have ratcheted up through a few rounds of retaliation. Now, he’s announced exemptions for some key electronics products, many of which come from China, and there are signs that he’s ready to exempt imports of auto parts. Needless to say, the tariffs and their exemptions represent an ill-advised escapade in central planning, replete with ample opportunities for politically-motivated favoritism and prejudice.
Why the Pause?
The pause in reciprocal tariffs was ostensibly intended to allow time to negotiate lower trade barriers with “more than 75 countries” that came forward to engage with Trump rather than retaliate. Now, there are said to be as many as 90 countries that wish to negotiate. This more or less aligns with an evolution of the strategy I described in my last post: game theory suggests that a dominant trading partner may be able to threaten or impose higher tariffs and ultimately achieve agreement on a regime with lower trade barriers on both sides. In Trump’s case, that would involve reaching many different bilateral agreements within a very short time, an imposing challenge given the history of trade negotiations. So far we have no deals, though Trump claims some are close. If only we didn’t have to reach formal agreements not to interfere with mutually beneficial trade!
A debate ensued almost immediately over whether Trump’s pause showed that he “caved” to the negative market reaction to his tariffs, but perhaps he acted primarily because a number of nations approached with hats in hand. Trump knew he had the leverage to force other nations to make concessions on trade barriers. They obviously responded.
The timing of the pause was surely a combination of those overtures, market reaction, advisor opinion, and Trump’s own instincts. This view is buttressed by the unaltered universal 10% tariffs, the remaining special tariffs on specific nations and product categories, and the punative tariffs on China. Furthermore, Trump knows he can reimpose a targeted tariff on any country that refuses a deal satisfactory to him. Let’s hope he’s reasonable and doesn’t allow his love affair with tariffs to color his position in these talks.
My hope is that the Trump Administration can negotiate a large number of new agreements with trading partners to reduce or eliminate tariffs and other barriers to trade. Obviously the pause is no guarantee of success, and severe challenges remain with more belligerent trading partners, especially China.
Disclaimer!
None of the foregoing is intended as a dispensation for the many apparent misconceptions Trump has about trade. In the MAGA cult clamor to defend all-things Trump, there have been a number of absurd claims about tariffs and trade, such as: tariffs are not a tax; tariffs don’t raise the price of imports; trade deficits are a deduction from GDP; tariffs can replace the income tax; trade deficits will bankrupt the country; high tariffs produced rapid growth in the late 19th century; “reciprocal” tariffs will eliminate our bilateral trade deficits; U.S. manufacturing is in crisis; value added taxes are trade barriers; it’s better to export goods than services; and trade deficits reduce investment. Every one a laugher, but I’ll leave most of them aside for now.
In the remainder of this post, I’ll focus on Trump’s aims for coaxing firms, via tariff avoidance, to make capital investment in the U.S., and the implications of that effort for the trade balance. An influx of capital might be construed as a strength of Trump’s policy agenda, though his effort to “cut deals” in this manner is a form of economic meddling as well as a vehicle for cronyism. Moreover, he doesn’t understand the nexus between foreign investment, the federal deficit, and the balance of payments. He’ll be disappointed to learn that his notion that trade deficits are ruinous conflicts with his vision of encouraging foreign accumulations of productive U.S. assets.
Oh No! A Capital Surplus!
It isn’t a widely understood equivalence, but each year we have a surplus in foreign purchases of U.S. assets (the capital account surplus) that is roughly matched by a deficit in trade for foreign goods and services (the current account deficit). This is why the balance of payments (BoP) balances! Here is the near mirror image of these two sides of the BoP, from Scott Lincicome’s “Things Everyone Should Know about Trade Deficits”:
The two sides of the BoP are very much codetermined. One does not exclusively drive the other.
It’s wonderful to be in a position to avail ourselves of foreign savings to invest in our economy. Unfortunately, a large portion of this foreign investment finances our huge government budget deficit, and that is a real problem. Otherwise, the investment would make a greater contribution to U.S. growth.
Funding the Federal Deficit
As John Cochrane explains, transfer payments account for a large share of government spending and borrowing. In turn, these transfers are spent by recipients on consumer goods, some of which come from overseas. Cochrane emphasizes that we are borrowing from abroad, as shown by our capital surplus, to finance this consumption, rather than investing foreign capital in productive assets. While one might conclude that our capital surplus and our trade deficit are creating a long-term vulnerability, the root of the problem is the federal government’s largess.
There is a sense in which different prongs of Trump’s policy agenda could act to address this problem. These are his efforts to reduce government waste, deregulate, and encourage direct investment in new plant and equipment. Reducing the federal budget deficit is paramount, but huge doubts remain over his determination to control spending or undertake real entitlement reforms. Tariffs will generate some revenue, but part of that will be required to offset other tax breaks Trump is contemplating.
Deepening the Capital Base
Trump harps on the need for firms, both foreign and domestic, to produce goods here in the U.S. Currently he’s taking credit for $5 trillion of new investment in the U.S., though we really don’t know whether all of these are “new deals” or had already been planned. Deregulation can improve incentives to invest in physical capital and increase the speed with which it comes online. To the extent that investment in productive capital replaces government borrowing, the debt we accumulate (held by foreign and domestic lenders) will be more sustainable.
However, Trump seems oblivious to a fact made inescapable by the balance of payments relationship. This new investment, should it come to fruition, will bring with it future excesses of imports over exports. Foreign demand for U.S. capital assets lifts domestic income and leads to a stronger dollar, both of which boost imports and the trade deficit. The trade deficit will persist even if foreign investment in new factories fully replaces the bloated federal deficit as a use of foreign capital.
Of course, the intent of Trump’s reshoring campaign is for new domestic output to substitute for imports and increase exports. That would bring positive returns for domestic and foreign capital, but rising income and a stronger dollar will stimulate demand for other imports, while exports would flag with the strength of the dollar. In any case, the new investments and a larger capital surplus will increase the trade deficit.
Donald Trump’s imposition of higher tariffs — much higher tariffs — on our trading partners carries tremendous risk. See this article for a good summary of the tariffs Trump levied (and now paused for 90 days) on imported goods from different countries. The President believes he can win major concessions from other nations in terms of trade barriers as well as foreign policy objectives. But he would also have us believe that we’ll be better off even if those concessions fall short of his hopes.
Perhaps he’s posturing, but Trump seems to thinks tariffs are some kind of elixir. That is nonsense for a variety of reasons. I’ve discussed several of those previously and I’ll add more in a subsequent post. Here, I’ll attempt to give Trump his due. I’m highly skeptical, but I’ll be happy to eat crow if he is successful in achieving a trade regime with lower tariffs and other barriers across many of our trading partners.
Markets
The tariff announcements last week on “Liberation Day” spooked markets, prompting a continuation of the classic flight to safety we’ve witnessed since Trump began to rattle his trade saber. This has driven bond prices up and long-term interest rates down, though now we’re seeing a partial reversal (if it holds). Will lower interest rates help save the day for Trump? It will bring lower borrowing costs to many borrowers, including the federal government, and it should help to buttress stock values, softening the blow to some extent.
The tariffs, should they remain in place, are likely to boost inflation temporarily (a one-time increase in the price level) and could very well tip the U.S. economy into recession. Depending on the severity, those developments would undercut the GOP’s hopes of maintaining a congressional majority in the 2026 mid-term elections. Then, he’d truly have managed to cut off his nose to spite his face. Still, Trump thinks he knows something about tariffs that markets don’t.
Dominoes
Bill Ackman has expressed a view of how markets are reacting and how they might evolve under Trump’s trade policy. He thinks markets would be fine had the President set tariffs at levels matching our trading partners (doubtful at best), but Trump went bigger in order to jolt other nations into negotiating. Ackman thinks there might be a “tipping point” when countries line up at the negotiating table. And indeed, as of April 7, the administration said “up to” 70 countries had reached out to enter new trade negotiations with the U.S. That probably helped bring investors out of their doldrums, pending actual deals.
Elon Musk states a desire to see tariffs eliminated between the U.S. and the EU, and the EU has made a limited offer along those lines. This might be indicative of similar thinking by others in the administration. But Trump insists he’ll always revisit tariffs wherever he sees a bilateral trade deficit. Contrary to all economic logic, he is convinced that trade deficits are harmful, when in fact they mainly reflect our relative prosperity.
Hard-Nosed, High Stakes
Economists have been almost uniform in their condemnation of Trump’s approach trade. To some extent, that’s a visceral reaction to Trump’s pro-tariff rhetoric and revulsion to his opening moves. But is there an economic rationale for this type of aggressive attempt to bargain for lower trade barriers? Yes, and it’s not a terribly deep insight, and it carries great risks in the real world.
From a game-theoretic perspective, it’s possible that a dominant trading partner, in repeated rounds, can ultimately achieve lower bilateral trade barriers through the threat or imposition of higher barriers to imports from a trading partner. The key is the difference in costs that barriers impose on the two nations. One is in a position to leverage its dominant position, inflicting greater costs on the other nation as an inducement to gain concessions and achieve improved conditions for mutual trade.
The U.S. is almost uniformly the dominant partner in bilateral trade relationships. That’s because U.S. GDP is so large and U.S. trade with any given country is a comparatively small fraction of GDP. But dominance can mean different things: there are countries that supply critical goods to the U.S., like oil, semiconductors, or rare earths, which may give certain countries disproportionate leverage in trade negotiation. Those products along with many others are exempted from Trump’s tariffs.
Other Cards
Nevertheless, the U.S. has economic leverage over individual trading partners in the vast majority of cases, which Trump certainly is willing to exploit. And Trump has another powerful tool with which to negotiate with some trading partners: U.S. military protection. Using it might expose the U.S. to strategic disadvantages, but don’t put it past Trump to bring this up in negotiations!
Trump is doing his best to prove a readiness to escalate. That might build his credibility except for a couple of critical facts: first, his actions have already violated at least 15 existing treaties. Why should they trust him? Second, some groups of nations are likely to present a united front, putting them on a more equal footing with the U.S. This makes a trade war between the U.S. and the rest of the world more likely.One nation in particular stands ready to capitalize on severed relations between other nations and “Donald Trump’s” America: Xi Jinping’s China. Bilateral trade with China might just be the Super Bowl of these tariff games. Unfortunately, it could be a Super Bowl where everyone loses!
An additional complication: while the U.S. has dominance in most of its trade relationships, the barriers to U.S. goods erected by other nations are often supported by powerful special interests. Trump’s ability to strike deals will be complicated where governments are captive to these interests, which might be concentrated among powerful elites or of a more diffuse, nationalist/populist nature.
Deep In the Woods
There is optimism in some quarters that a few successful trade deals will lead to a “tipping point” in the willingness of other nations to negotiate with Trump. Despite the sudden clamor among our trade partners to negotiate, we’re a long way from getting solid agreements. Investors still assess a greater risk of a world trade war than vanishing barriers to trade.
Look I've been as critical of tariffs as anyone but if the long term vision is domestic Nike sweatshops filled with fired DC bureaucrats, I'm willing to listen https://t.co/CmsJ7bx5vk
In advanced civilizations the period loosely called Alexandrian is usually associated with flexible morals, perfunctory religion, populist standards and cosmopolitan tastes, feminism, exotic cults, and the rapid turnover of high and low fads---in short, a falling away (which is all that decadence means) from the strictness of traditional rules, embodied in character and inforced from within. -- Jacques Barzun
