Break the Market, Blame It, Then Break It Some More

28 Sunday Nov 2021

Posted by Nuetzel in Energy, Environmental Fascism, Free markets, Uncategorized

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Antitrust, Asymmetric Information, Build Back Better, Capital Controls, central planning, Endangered Species Act, Energy Policy, Externalities, Fossil fuels, Fracking, FTC, Government Failure, Green New Deal, Greenbook, Hart Energy, Industrial Policy, Industry Concentration, Joe Biden, Keystone XL Pipeline, Knowledge Problem, Line 5 Pipeline, Mark Theisen, Market Failure, Monetary policy, OPEC, Price Gouging, Principles of Economics, Quotas, Regulatory Overreach, Stephen Green, Strategic Petroleum Reserve, Subsidies, Tariffs, Taxes, The Fatal Conceit

Much of what is labeled market failure is a consequence of government failure, or rather, failure caused by misguided public intervention, not just in individual markets but in the economy more generally. Misguided efforts to correct perceived excesses in pricing are often the problem, but there are myriad cases of regulatory overreach, ham-handed application of taxes and subsidies for various enterprises, and widespread cronyism. But it is often convenient for politicians to appear as if they are doing something, which makes activism and active blame of private enterprise a tempting path. The Biden Administration’s energy crisis offers a case in point. First, a digression on the efficiency of free markets. Skip the next two sections to get straight to Biden’s mess.

Behold the Bounty

I always spent part of the first class session teaching Principles of Economics on some incredible things that happen each and every day. Most college freshmen seem to take them for granted: the endless variety of goods that arrive on shelves each day; the ongoing flow of services, many appearing like magic at the flick of a switch; the high degree of coincidence between specific wants and all these fresh supplies; the variety and flow of raw materials and skills that are brought to bear; the fantastic array of sophisticated equipment deployed to assist in these efforts; and the massive social coordination necessary to accomplish all this. How does it all happen? Who collects all the information on what is wanted, and by whom? On the feasibility of actually producing and distributing various things? What miracle computer processes the vast set of information guiding these decisions and actions? Does some superior intelligence within an agency plan all this stuff?

The answer is simple. The seemingly infinite set of knowledge is marshaled, and all these tasks are performed, by the greatest institution of social cooperation to ever emerge: decentralized, free markets! Buying decisions are guided by individual needs and wants. Production and selling decisions are guided by resource availability and technology. And all sides react to evolving prices. Preferences, resources, and technology are in a constant state of flux, but prices react, signaling producers and consumers to make individual adjustments that correct larger imbalances. It is tempting to describe the process as the evolving solution to a gigantic set of dynamic equations.

The Impossible Conceit

No human planner or government agency is capable of solving this problem as seamlessly and efficiently as markets, nor can they hope to achieve the surplus welfare that redound to buyers and sellers in markets. Central planners or intervening authorities cannot possess the knowledge and coordinating power of the market mechanism. That doesn’t mean markets are “perfect”, of course. Things like external costs and benefits, dominant sellers, and asymmetric information can cause market outcomes to deviate from the competitive “ideal”. Inequities can arise from some of these imperfections as well.

What can be much worse is the damage to market performance caused by government policy. Usually the intent is to “correct” imperfections, and the rationale might be defensible. The knowledge to do it very well is often lacking, however. Taxes, subsidies, regulations, tariffs, quotas, capital controls, and manipulation of interest rates (and monetary and credit aggregates) are very general categories of distortion caused by the public sector. Then there is competition for resources via government procurement, which is frequently graft-ridden or price-insensitive.

Many public interventions create advantages for large sellers, leading to greater market concentration. This might best serve the private political power of the wealthy or might convey advantages to investments that happen to be in vogue among the political class. These are the true roots of fascism, which leverages coercive state power for the benefit of private interests.

Energy Vampires

Now we have the curious case of the Biden Administration and it’s purposeful disruption of energy markets in an effort to incentivize a hurried transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. As I described in a recent post on stagflation,

“… Biden took several steps to hamstring the domestic fossil fuel industry at a time when the economy was still recovering from the pandemic. This included revoking permits for the Keystone pipeline, a ban on drilling on federal lands and federally-controlled waters in the Gulf, shutting down production on some private lands on the pretext of enforcing the Endangered Species Act, and capping methane emissions by oil and gas producers. And all that was apparently just a start.

As Mark Theisen notes, when you promise to destroy a particular industry, as Joe Biden has, by taxing and regulating it to death, who wants to invest in or even maintain production facilities? Some leftists with apparent influence on the administration are threatening penalties against the industry up to and including prosecution for ‘crimes against humanity’!”

In addition to killing Keystone, there remains a strong possibility that Biden will shut down the Line 5 pipeline in Michigan, and there are other pipelines currently under federal review. Biden’s EPA also conducted a purge of science advisors considered “too friendly” to oil and gas industry. This was intertwined with a “review” of new methane rules, which harm smaller, independent oil and gas drillers disproportionately.

Joe Biden’s “Build Back Better” (BBB) legislation, as clumsy in policy as it is in name, introduces a number of “Green New Deal” provisions that would further disadvantage the production and use of fossil fuels. Hart Energy provides descriptions of various tax changes that appeared in the Treasury’s so-called “Greenbook”, a collection of revenue proposals, many of which appear in the BBB legislation that recently passed in the House. These include rollbacks of various deductions for drilling costs, depletion allowances, and recovery rules, as well as hikes in certain excise taxes as well as taxes on foreign oil income. And all this while granting generous subsidies to intermittent and otherwise uneconomic technologies that happen to be in political favor. This is a fine payoff for cronies having invested significantly in these rent seeking opportunities. While the bill still faces an uphill fight in the Senate, apparently Biden has executive orders, held in abeyance, that would inflict more pain on consumers and producers of fossil fuels.

Biden’s energy policies are obviously intended to reduce supplies of oil, gas, and other fossil fuels. Prices have responded, as Green notes:

“Gas is up an average of 57% this year, with corresponding increases of 44% for diesel and a whopping 60% for fuel oil.”

The upward price pressure is not limited to petroleum: electricity rates are jumping as well. Consumers and shippers have noticed. In fact, while Biden crows about wanting “the rich” to pay for BBB, his energy policies are steeply regressive in their impact, as energy absorbs a much larger share of budgets among the poor than the rich. This is politically suicidal, but Biden’s advisors have chosen a most cynical tact as the reality has dawned on them.

Abusive Victim Blaming

Who to blame? After the predictable results of cramping domestic production and attacking fossil fuel producers, the Biden team naturally blames them for rising prices! “Price gouging” is a charge made by political opportunists and those who lack an understanding of how markets allocate scarce resources. More severe scarcity means that prices must rise to ration available quantities and to incentivize those capable of bringing forth additional product under difficult circumstances. That is how a market is supposed to function, and it mitigates scarcity!

But here comes the mendacious and Bumbling Buster Biden. He wants antitrust authorities at the FTC to investigate oil pricing. Again from Stephen Green:

“… the Biden Administration has decided to launch a vindictive legal campaign against oil producers in order to deflect blame for the results of Biden’s policies: Biden’s Solution to Rising Gas Prices Appears to Be Accusing Oil Companies of Price Gouging.”

There’s nothing quite like a threat to market participants to prevent the price mechanism from performing its proper social function. But a failure to price rationally is a prescription for more severe shortages.

Biden has also ordered the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to release 50 million barrels of oil, a move that replaces a total of 2.75 days of monthly consumption in the U.S. The SPR is supposed to be drawn upon only in the case of emergencies like natural disasters, so this draw-down is as irresponsible as it is impotent. In fact, OPEC is prepared to offset the SPR release with a production cut. Biden has resorted to begging OPEC to increase production, which is pathetic because the U.S. was a net exporter of oil not long ago … until Biden took charge.

Conclusion

Properly stated, the challenge mounted against markets as an institution is not that they fall short of “perfection”. It is that some other system would lead to superior results in terms of efficiency and/or equity. Central planning, including the kind exercised by the Biden Administration in it’s hurried and foolish effort to tear down and remake the energy economy, is not even a serious candidate on either count.

Granted, there is a long history of subsidies to the oil and gas sector. I cannot defend those, but the development of the technology (even fracking) largely preceded the fruits of the industry’s rent seeking. At this point, green fuels receive far more subsidies (despite some claims to the contrary). Furthermore, the primacy of fossil fuels was not achieved by tearing down competing technologies and infrastructure. In contrast, the current round of central planning requires destruction of entire sectors of the economy that could otherwise produce efficiently for the foreseeable future, if left unmolested.

The Biden Administration has adopted the radical green agenda. Their playbook calls for a severe tilting of price incentives in favor uneconomic, renewable energy sources, despite the economy’s heretofore sensible reliance on plentiful fossil fuels. It’s no surprise that Biden’s policy is unpopular across the economic spectrum. His natural inclination is to blame a competitive industry victimized by his policy. It’s a futile attempt to avoid accountability, as if he thinks doubling down on the fascism will help convince the electorate that oil and gas producers dreamt up this new, nefarious strategy of overcharging customers. People aren’t that dumb, but it’s typical for the elitist Left presume otherwise.

Bill Gates, Wayward Climate Nerd

17 Wednesday Nov 2021

Posted by Nuetzel in Climate, Energy

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Abortion, Anti-Vaxers, Battery Technology, Bill Gates, Carbon Capture, Carbon Concentration, Carbon Efficiency, Carbon Emissions, CO2, David Solway, Fossil fuels, Gates Foundation, Green Premium, Health and Fertility, Hydrogen Power, Industrial Policy, Kaya Identity, Lockdowns, Median Voter, Natural Gas, Net Zero Carbon, Non-Pharmaceutical interventions, Nuclear power, Power Storage, Renewable energy, Reproductive Health Services, Solar Power, TED Talks, Thomas Malthus, Vaccine Passports, Wind Power, World Health Organization

Bill Gates’ considerable philanthropic efforts through the Gates Foundation are well known. Much of the foundation’s activity has focused on disease control and nutrition around the globe. Education reform has also been a priority. Many of these projects are laudable, though I’m repulsed by a few (see here and here). During the coronavirus pandemic, Gates has spoken approvingly of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (lockdown measures), which are both coercive and ineffective (and see here). He has earned the enmity of anti-vaxers, of course, though I’m not anti-vax as long as the jabs are voluntary. The Gates Foundation funded the World Health Organization’s effort to provide guidance on digital vaccine passports, which is a de facto endorsement of discrimination based on vaccination status. His priorities for addressing climate change also raise some troubling issues, a few of which I address below.

Squeezing Policy from a Definition

Gates put a special Malthusian twist on a TED Talk he did back in 2010 using an equation for carbon dioxide emissions, which he’s reprised over the years. It gained a lot of notice in 2016 when a few sticklers noticed that his claim to have “discovered” the equation was false. The equation is:

CO2 = P x S x E x C,

where P = People, S = Services per person, E = Energy per service, and C = CO2 per energy unit.

This equation first appeared as the so-called Kaya Identity in a scientific review in 2002. Such an equation can be helpful in organizing one’s thoughts, but it has no operational implications in and of itself. At one level it is superficial: we could write a similar identity for almost anything, like the quantity of alcohol consumed in a year, which must equal the population times the ounces of alcohol per drink times the number of drinks per person. At a deeper level, it can be tempting to build theories around such equations, and there is no question that any theory about CO2 must at least preserve the identity.

There’s an obvious temptation to treat an equation like this as something that can be manipulated by policy, despite the possibility of behavioral links across components that might lead to unintended consequences. This is where Gates gets into trouble.

Reality Checks

As David Solway writes, Gates’ jumped to the conclusion that population drives carbon emissions, reinforcing a likely perspective that the human population is unsustainable. His benevolent solution? A healthier population won’t breed as fast, so he prescribes more vaccinations (voluntary?) and improved health care. For good measure, he added a third prong: better “reproductive health services”. Let’s see… what share of the 0.9 -1.4 billion reduction in world population Gates prescribed in 2016 would have come from terminated pregnancies?

In fact, healthier people might or might not want more children, but lower child mortality in the developing world would reduce certain economic incentives for high fertility. Another reliable association is between income and child bearing: an increase in “services per person” is likely to lead to smaller families, but that wasn’t given any emphasis by Gates. Income growth is simply not part of the narrative! Yet income growth does something else: it allows us to more easily afford the research and investments required for advanced technologies, including cleaner energy. These things take time, however.

Solway points to other weaknesses in Gates’ interpretation of the Kaya Identity. For example, efforts to slow population growth are not reliably associated with “services per person”, fuel efficiency, or carbon efficiency. In other words, carbon emissions may be powerfully influenced by factors other than population. China is a case in point.

Centralized industrial and social planning is generally ill-suited to advancing human well being. It’s especially suspect if the sole objective is to reduce carbon emissions. But Gates knows that lowering emissions without a corresponding drop in real income requires continuing technological advances and/or more efficient decisions about which technologies to deploy. He is a big advocate of developing cheap hydrogen power, which is far from a reality. He is also excited about carbon capture technologies, which are still in their infancy.

Renewables like wind and solar power play a large part in Gates’ vision. Those technologies cannot deliver a reliable flow of power, however, without either adequate backup capacity or a dramatic advance in battery technology. Gates over-promotes wind and solar, but I give him credit for acknowledging their intermittency. He attempts to come to grips with it by advocating nuclear backup, but it’s just not clear that he has integrated the incremental cost of the necessary backup capacity with other direct costs of these renewables… not to mention the considerable environmental costs imposed by wind and solar (see the “back-to-nature” photo at the top for a cogent illustration). Power storage at scale is still a long way off, and its cost will be significant as well.

We could deploy existing energy technologies to greater advantage with respect to carbon efficiency. We’ve already reduced CO2 emissions in the U.S. by substituting natural gas for less carbon-efficient fuels, but the Biden Administration would rather discourage its use. Gates deserves credit for recognizing the huge role that nuclear energy can play in providing zero-carbon power. Despite that, he still can’t quite bring himself to admit the boneheadedness of heavy reliance on intermittent renewables.

Bill’s “Green Premium”

Gates seems to have deemphasized the Kaya Identity more recently. Instead, his focus has shifted to the so-called “green premium”, or the incremental cost of using zero-carbon technology relative to a traditional source. Needless to say, the premium is large for truly zero-carbon sources, but Gates emphasizes the importance of using the green premium to guide development even in the here and now.

That’s fine, but it’s not clear that he gives adequate consideration to cases in which emissions, while not eliminated, can be reduced at a negative incremental cost via appropriate substitution. That describes the transition to natural gas from other fuels. This is something that markets can do without the assistance of ham-handed interventionists. Gates prefers nuclear power and says natural gas is “not a real bridge technology” to a zero carbon future. That’s short-sighted and reflects an absolutist mindset that ignores both the economic and political environment. The thinking is that if it’s not zero emissions, it’s not worth doing.

Gates emphasizes the need to sharply reduce the range of green premia on various technologies to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. But the goal of net-zero emissions 2050 is based on the highly unlikely proposition that global catastrophe awaits failing net-zero. In fact, the predicted consequences of doing nothing are based on drastic and outdated carbon growth scenarios and rudimentary carbon-forcing models that have proven to be severely biased to the upside in terms of predicting global temperature trends.

The idea that 2050 is some kind of “deadline” is a wholly arbitrary determination. Furthermore, the absolutism with which such goals are stated belies a failure to properly assess the true costs and benefits of carbon-based energy. If we so much as accept the notion that fossil fuels have external costs, we are then expected to accept that zero carbon emissions is optimal. This is not “science”; it is doctrine propped-up by bizarre and false scare stories. It involves massive efforts to manipulate opinion and coerce behavior based upon shoddy forecasts produced by committee. Even carbon capture technology is considered “problematic” because it implies that someone, somewhere, will use a process that emits CO2. That’s a ridiculous bogeyman, of course, and even Gates supports development of carbon capture.

Conclusion

I’ve never felt any real antipathy for Bill Gates as a person. He built a fortune, and I used his company’s software for most of my career. In some ways I still prefer it to macOS. I believe Gates is sincere in his efforts to help humanity even if his efforts are misdirected. He seems to reside on the less crazy end of the spectrum of climate alarmists. He’s putting a great deal of his private resources toward development of technologies that, if successful, might actually lead to less coercion by those attempting to transform private energy decisions. Nevertheless, there is menace in some of the solutions to which Gates clings. They require concerted action on the part of central authorities that would commandeer private resources and abrogate liberty. His assertion that the world is over-populated is both dubious and dangerous. You can offer free health care, but a conviction that the population must be thinned can lead to far more radical and monstrous initiatives.

The “green premium” promoted by Gates is an indirect measure of how far we must go to achieve parity in the pricing of carbon and non-carbon energy sources, as if parity should be an objective of public policy. That proposition is based on bad economics, fraudulent analyses of trends in carbon concentrations and climate trends, and a purposely incomplete menu of technological alternatives. Yes, the green premium highlights various technological challenges, but it is also a direct measure of how much intervention via taxes or subsidies are necessary to achieve parity. Is that a temptation to policymakers? Or does it represent a daunting political barrier? It’s pretty clear that the “median voter” does not view climate change as the only priority.

Government Output: Illusions and Handicaps

09 Sunday Sep 2018

Posted by Nuetzel in Big Government

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Daniel J. Mitchell, Education, GDP, Heritage Foundation, Industrial Policy, infrastructure, Market Test, National Income Accounting, Redistribution, Spending Aggregates, Taxes Incentives

Building a big government is thought to be a luxury that prosperous nations can afford, but such efforts have a systematically negative effect on their ability to generate income, much as eating the seed corn delivers a farmer to poverty. Daniel J. Mitchell puts it bluntly in a piece entitled “Rich Nations That Enact Big Government Don’t Remain Rich“. This is nowhere more obvious than in Argentina and Venezuela, two nations that were prosperous 50 years ago and are now economically feeble, or in Venezuela’s case, imploding. Government, in the final analysis, extracts resources from the private economy, often contributing negatively to productivity. Yet the idea that government is a tonic for economic growth persists, and it persists even in the face of weakness induced by excessive government.

Government statistics on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) exaggerate the contribution of government to income in at least a couple of ways. To understand why, it’s necessary to distinguish between spending aggregates and income aggregates, which add up to the same total GDP. The former include consumption, investment, and government spending. Income aggregates are the other side of the GDP “coin”: payments made to factors of production, which represent GDP as a measure of output value.

A dissociation between these alternative views of GDP with respect to government’s contribution is that government payments count as spending and income regardless of the recipient’s contribution to output. Even if nothing is accomplished, nothing is produced, it is measured as income and spending and it is an increment to GDP. Payments to dig holes and refill them contribute to GDP as long as the government does the “job”. By contrast, if a worker in the private sector is paid but produces nothing of value, the firm’s owners suffer a loss of income corresponding to the worker’s pay, and GDP is unchanged! So increased factor payments by government cause an implicit bias in the measurement of output.

A second government bias implicit in GDP statistics is that public spending and government labor payments are often not subjected to a “market test” of value. The activity is “mandated”, so there is no correspondence to a willingness to pay or real value. Public employee unions exaggerate these distortions. There are generally no competitors for government provision of services, few incentives for efficiency, and often little discipline in government procurement processes. So the pricing of government transactions tends to be inflated. And yet when the government gets ripped off by overcharges or cronyist kickbacks, the excess payments contribute positively to GDP. In contrast, when a private firm gets ripped off, its income is correspondingly reduced and the transaction generally will not contribute to GDP.

It takes taxes to fund government, either immediate or deferred, and the taxes are either explicit or implicit in the form of eroded purchasing power. This creates negative incentives that retard private investment incentives, work incentives, and thereby private economic growth. Redistributional efforts retard work incentives as well because welfare–state beneficiaries often face high marginal tax rates on earned income.

Does big government represent a good investment for the wealth of a prosperous nation? In view of the above, one can hardly trust official statistics in rendering a judgement on that question. But despite these distortions, big government and measured economic growth are still negatively correlated. Mitchell provides more detailed analysis of government and economic growth at Heritage, including a set of references to academic papers on the topic.

One important way that government may contribute to economic growth is through the provision of physical infrastructure, which theoretically improves efficiency in private production. However, public infrastructure spending is subject to the same upward cost pressures discussed above, it is often tied to bumbling industrial policy efforts, its utilization by the public is usually mis-priced, and governments are congenitally inept at operating facilities efficiently. It is not clear that private developers could be counted upon to fill the void without some form of partnership with government, however, which has its own pitfalls. There are certainly reforms that could make private and public infrastructure investment and operation more viable, such as eliminating regulatory roadblocks to the installation of new facilities.

Another area in which government may generate a positive economic return is public investment in education, but that return is far from guaranteed. The success of public education investment depends on a wide range of cultural, political, and economic factors. For example, Cuba has the third largest proportion of government education spending to GDP, but the country’s ability to profit from that investment is severely crimped by its totalitarian economic and political system. I have been a frequent critic of public education in general, and I am not persuaded that education is truly a public good, despite some degree of spillover benefit. And while education may be a worthwhile national priority in many circumstances, it is not clear that government should necessarily fund education, let alone “run” education. Public education spending certainly doesn’t automatically translate to effective education outcomes, and it does not guarantee economic growth.

There is great exaggeration regarding the success of certain nations that have allowed government to absorb a large share of resources. That includes many of the European states, for which average incomes are roughly comparable to the Mississippi Delta. Only Luxembourg, Norway and Switzerland have income levels that are respectable relative to the U.S., and Norway relies heavily on oil extraction. Attributing economic power to government in the Nordic countries is especially misleading because the strength of those economies has always stemmed from their fundamentally capitalist underpinnings. Sweden built its wealth on capitalism, but it has cannibalized that strength over several decades with a burgeoning welfare state and high taxes. It only recently has begun attempting to reverse course.

Economic progress is unlikely to be achieved by “investing” in a larger public sector. Instead, encouraging private activity via positive incentives and minimal regulatory interference is a better route to success. The measured economic benefits of government spending are illusory to a significant degree. Even those activities thought to be the most productive avenues for government involvement, like investment in infrastructure and education, are plagued by cost inflation and incompetent execution. Finally, cross-country empirical evidence confirms that a more dominant public sector is associated with lower income growth. And yet there will always be a faction subscribing to the infantile, “free-lunch” belief that big government can deliver growth, and deliver it in excess of the predictable damage it inflicts on the private economy.

Central Planning Fails to Scale, Unlike Spontaneous Order

05 Tuesday Jun 2018

Posted by Nuetzel in Central Planning, Markets, Price Controls

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Bronze Age, central planning, Client-Server Network, Decentralized Decision-Making, Economies of Scale, Federalism, Francis Turner, Industrial Policy, Liberty.me, Markets, Peer-to-Peer Network, Price mechanism, Property Rights, Scalability, Spontaneous Order

The proposition that mankind is capable of creating a successful “planned” society is at least as old as the Bronze Age. Of course it’s been tried. The effort necessarily involves a realignment of the economic and political landscape and always requires a high degree of coercion. But putting that aside, such planning can never be successful relative to spontaneous order of the kind that dominates private affairs in a free society. The task of advancing human well-being given available resources has never been achieved under central planning. It always fails miserably in this regard, and it always will fail to match the success of decentralized decision-making and private markets.

There are various ways to explain this fact, but I recently came across an interesting take on the subject having to do with the notion of scalability. Francis Turner offer s this note on th e topic at the Liberty.me blog. To begin, he gives a lengthy quote from a software developer who relates the problems of social and economic planning to the complexity of managing a network. On the topic of scale, the developer notes that the number of relationships in a network increases with the square of the number of its “nodes”, or members:

“2 nodes have 1 potential relationship. 4 nodes (twice as many) has 6 potential relationships (6 times as many). 8 nodes (twice again) has 28 potential relationships. 100 nodes => [4,950] relationships; 1,000 nodes => 499,500 relationships—nearly half a million.“

Actually, the formula for the number of potential relationships or connections in a network is n*(n-1)/2, where n is the number of network nodes. The developer Turner quotes discusses this in the context of two competing network management structures: client-server and peer-to-peer. Under the former, the network is managed centrally by a server, which communicates with all nodes, makes various decisions, and routes communications traffic between nodes. In a peer-to-peer network, the work of network management is distributed — each computer manages its own relationships. The developer says, at first, “the idea of hooking together thousands of computers was science fiction.” But as larger networks were built-out in the 1990s, the client-server framework was more or less rejected by the industry because it required such massive resources to manage large networks. In fact, as new nodes are added to a peer-to-peer network, its capacity to manage itself actually increases! In other words, client-server networks are not as scalable as peer-to-peer networks:

“Even if it were perfectly designed and never broke down, there was some number of nodes that would crash the server. It was mathematically unavoidable. You HAVE TO distribute the management as close as possible to the nodes, or the system fails.

… in an instant, I realized that the same is true of governments. … And suddenly my coworker’s small government rantings weren’t crazy…”

This developer’s epiphany captures a few truths about the relative efficacy of decentralized decision-making. It’s not just for computer networks! But in fact, when it comes to network management, the task is comparatively simple: meet the computing and communication needs of users. A central server faces dynamic capacity demands and the need to route changing flows of traffic between nodes. Software requirements change as well, which may necessitate discrete alterations in capacity and rules from time-to-time.

But consider the management of a network of individual economic units. Let’s start with individuals who produce something… like widgets. There are likely to be real economies achieved when a few individual widgeteers band together to produce as a team. Some specialization into different functions can take place, like purchasing materials, fabrication, and distribution. Perhaps administrative tasks can be centralized for greater efficiency. Economies of scale may dictate an even larger organization, and at some point the firm might find additional economies in producing widget-complementary products and services. But eventually, if the decision-making is centralized and hierarchical, the sheer weight of organizational complexity will begin to take a toll, driving up costs and/or diminishing the firm’s ability to deal with changes in technology or the market environment. In other words, centralized control becomes difficult to scale in an efficient way, and there may be some “optimal” size for a firm beyond which it struggles.

Now consider individual consumers, each of whom faces an income constraint and has a set of tastes spanning innumerable goods. These tastes vary across time scales like hour-of-day, day-of-week, seasons, life-stage, and technology cycles. The volume of information is even more daunting when you consider that preferences vary across possible price vectors and potential income levels as well.

Can the interactions between all of these consumer and producer “nodes” be coordinated by a central economic authority so as to optimize their well-being dynamically, subject to resource constraints? As we’ve seen, the job requires massive amounts of information and a crushing number of continually evolving decisions. It is really impossible for any central authority or computer to “know” all of the information needed. Secondly, to the software developer’s point, the number of potential relationships increases with the square of the number of consumers and producers, as does the required volume of information and number of decisions. The scalability problem should be obvious.

This kind of planning is a task with which no central authority can keep up. Will the central authority always get milk, eggs and produce to the store when people need it, at a price they are willing to pay, and with minimal spoilage? Will fuel be available such that a light always turns on whenever they flip the switch? Will adequate supplies of medicines always be available for the sick? Will the central authority be able to guarantee a range of good-quality clothing from which to choose?

There has never been a central authority that successfully performed the job just described. Yet that job gets done every day in free, capitalistic societies, and we tend to take it for granted. The massive process of information transmission and coordination takes place spontaneously with spectacularly good results via private discovery and decision-making, secure property rights, markets, and a functioning price mechanism. Individual economic units are endowed with decision-making power and the authority to manage their own relationships. And the spontaneous order that takes shape remains effective even as networks of economic units expand. In other words, markets are highly scalable at solving the eternal problem of allocating scarce resources.

But thus far I’ve set up something of a straw man by presuming that the central authority must monitor all individual economic units to know and translate their demands and supplies of goods into the ongoing, myriad decisions about production, distribution and consumption. Suppose the central authority takes a less ambitious approach. For example, it might attempt to enforce a set of prices that its experts believe to be fair to both consumers and producers. This is a much simpler task of central management. What could go wrong?

These prices will be wrong immediately, to one degree or another, without tailoring them to detailed knowledge of the individual tastes, preferences, talents, productivities, price sensitivities, and resource endowments of individual economic units. It would be sheer luck to hit on the correct prices at the start, but even then they would not be correct for long. Conditions change continuously, and the new information is simply not available to the central authority. Various shortages and surpluses will appear without the corrective mechanism usually provided by markets. Queues will form here and inventories will accumulate there without any self-correcting mechanism. Consumers will be angry, producers will quit, goods will rot, and stocks of physical capital will sit idle and go to waste.

Other forms of planning attempt to set quantities of goods produced and are subject to errors similar to those arising from price controls. Even worse is an attempt to plan both price and quantity. Perhaps more subtle is the case of industrial policy, in which planners attempt to encourage the development of certain industries and discourage activity in those deemed “undesirable”. While often borne out of good intentions, these planners do not know enough about the future of technology, resource supplies, and consumer preferences to arrogate these kinds of decisions to themselves. They will invariably commit resources to inferior technologies, misjudge future conditions, and abridge the freedoms of those whose work or consumption is out-of-favor and those who are taxed to pay for the artificial incentives. To the extent that industrial policies become more pervasive, scalability will become an obstacle to the planners because they simply lack the information required to perform their jobs of steering investment wisely.

Here is Turner’s verdict on central planning:

“No central planner, or even a board of them, can accurately set prices across any nation larger than, maybe, Liechtenstein and quite likely even at the level of Liechtenstein it won’t work well. After all how can a central planner tell that Farmer X’s vegetables taste better and are less rotten than Farmer Y’s and that people therefore are prepared to pay more for a tomato from Farmer X than they are one from Farmer Y.”

I will go further than Turner: planning can only work well in small settings and only when the affected units do the planning. For example, the determination of contract terms between two parties requires planning, as does the coordination of activities within a firm. But then these plans are not really “central” and the planners are not “public”. These activities are actually parts of a larger market process. Otherwise, the paradigm of central planning is not merely unscalable, it is unworkable without negative consequences.

Finally, the notion of scalability applies broadly to governance, not merely economic planning. The following quote from Turner, for example, is a ringing endorsement for federalism:

“It is worth noting that almost all successful nations have different levels of government. You have the local town council, the state/province/county government, possibly a regional government and then finally the national one. Moreover richer countries tend to do better when they push more down to the lower levels. This is a classic way to solve a scalability problem – instead of having a single central power you devolve powers and responsibilities with some framework such that they follow the general desires of the higher levels of government but have freedom to implement their own solutions and adapt policies to local conditions.”

Slam the Damn Brakes on the Regulatory Potentate

28 Saturday Oct 2017

Posted by Nuetzel in Regulation

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Administrative State, Barry Brownstein, Corn Ethanol, crony capitalism, DARPA, Deregulation, Donald Trump, Drug Review, EPA, FCC, FDA, Greg Ip, Industrial Policy, Mercatus Center, NASA, Net Neutrality, Paris Climate Accord, Patrick McLaughlin, Puerto Rico, Renewable Fuel Standards, Steve Bannon, The Brookings Institution, Two-For-One Regulatory Order

The stock market’s recent gains have at least three plausible explanations: corporate earnings growth, the prospect of tax reform, and deregulation. Tax reform and deregulation are stated priorities of the Trump Administration and have the potential to lift the economy and generate additional earnings. Investors obviously like that prospect, though regulation itself is a tool used subversively by crony capitalists to stifle competition in their markets. Conceivably, some of the large firms that dominate major stock indices could suffer from deregulation. And I have to wonder whether the economic threat of Trumpian trade protectionism is not taken seriously by the equity markets. Let’s hope they’re right.

It’s no mystery that high taxes and tax complexity can inhibit economic growth. Let’s face it: when it comes to productive effort, we can all think of better things to do than tax planning, crony capitalist or not. The same is true of regulation: the massive diversion of resources into non-productive compliance activities stifles innovation, growth, and even the stability of the status quo. Regulation creates obstacles to activities like new construction and the diffusion of telecommunications services. And it discourages the creation of new products and services like potentially life-saving drugs and slows their introduction to market. The sheer number of federal regulations is so spectacular that one wonders how anything productive ever gets done! Patrick McLaughlin of The Mercatus Center and several coauthors tell of “The Impossibility of Comprehending, or Even Reading, All Federal Regulations“.

Regulation is more than a mere economic burden. It is the product of an administrative apparatus that is not subject to the checks and balances that are at the very heart of our system of constitutional government. That is a threat to basic liberties. Barry Brownstein offers an instructive case study of “The Tyranny of Administrative Power” involving violations of property rights in New Hampshire. The case involves the administrative machinations surrounding an installation of high-power lines.

Governmental efforts to spur innovation ordinarily take the form of spending on research, subsidies for certain technologies or favored industries (e.g., alternative energy), and large government programs dedicated to the achievement of various technological goals (e.g., NASA, DARPA). Together with regulatory rules that influence the allocation of resources, these governmental efforts are called industrial policy. An unfortunate recent example is Trump’s decision to retain the renewable fuel standard (RFS), but on the whole, industrial policy does not seem central to Trump’s effort to stimulate innovation.

It’s clear that a deregulatory effort is well underway: the so-called “deconstruction of the administrative state” hailed by Steve Bannon not long after Trump took office. First came Trump’s 2-for 1 executive order (also see here) requiring the elimination (or modification) of two rules for every new rule. In the Wall Street Journal, Greg Ip writes about changes at the FDA and the FCC that could dramatically alter the pace of innovation in the pharmaceutical and telecom industries. (If the link is gated, you access the article on the WSJ’s Facebook page.) Speedier and less burdensome reviews of new drugs will greatly benefit consumers. An end to net neutrality rules will support greater investment in broadband infrastructure and access to innovative services. There is a new emphasis at the FCC on enabling innovative solutions to communications problems, such as Google’s effort to provide cell phone service in Puerto Rico by flying balloons over the island. The Trump Administration is also reining-in an aggressive EPA, the source of many questionable rules that weaken property rights and inhibit growth. (Again, the RFS is a disappointing exception.) Health care reform could offer much needed relief from overzealous insurance regulation and high compliance costs for physicians and other providers.

But deconstructing the administrative state is hard. Regulations just seem to metastasize, so deregulatory gains are offset by continued rule-making. This is partly from new legislation, but it is also a consequence of the incentives facing self-interested regulators. With that in mind, it’s impressive that regulation has not grown, on balance, thus far into Trump’s first year in office. According to Patrick McLaughlin, zero regulatory growth has been unusual going back at least to the Carter Administration. In quoting McLaughlin, The Weekly Standard says that Trump might well earn the mantle of “King of Deregulation“, but he has a long way to go. Brookings has this interactive tool to keep track of his deregulatory progress. One item on the Brookings list is the President’s intention to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord. That represents a big save in terms of avoiding future regulatory burdens.

I can’t help but be wary of other avenues through which the Trump Administration might regulate activity and undermine economic growth. Chief among these is Trump’s negative attitude toward foreign trade. Government interference with our freedom to freely engage in transactions with the rest of the world is costly in terms of both foreign and domestic prices. With something of a history as a crony capitalist himself, Trump is not immune to pressure from private economic interests, as illustrated by his recent cow-tow to the ethanol lobby. Nevertheless, I’m mostly encouraged by the administration’s deregulatory efforts, and I hope they continue. The equity market apparently expects that to be the case.

Now, What About Trump?

25 Wednesday Jan 2017

Posted by Nuetzel in Trump Administration

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Ajit Pai, Barack Obama, Bill Weld, Donald Trump, Drug War, eminent domain, Entitlement Reform, Executive Authority, FCC, FDA, Fourth Amendment, Gary Johnson, Hillary Clinton, Industrial Policy, Jim O'Neil, Keystone Pipeline, Legal Immigration, Limited government, Paris Climate Accord, Protectionism, Scott Alexander, Slate Star Codex, Standing Rock Sioux, State's Rights, Trade Partnerships, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump's Great Wall, USA Freedom Act, Wilbur Ross

This guy I voted for… Hoo boy! I’m tellin’ ya’, this guy’s a real beaut! But now, it’s time for me to make an accounting of the good and the bad I see in a Donald Trump presidency. I’ll cover a number of policy areas and how well I think, at this point, the Trump Administration will match my preferences, which are generally libertarian. In posting this list, I’m reminded of a wonderful quote of the late guitarist Jerry Garcia on his ideas for a new project: “I’m shopping around for something to do that no one will like.” I certainly don’t expect many to agree with the entirety of my “scorecard”, but here it is. But before getting to it, a few preliminaries:

First, I’ve had mixed feelings about Trump since he first announced that he’d seek the republican nomination. A basic concern was the difficulty of knowing his real philosophy about the role of government and fundamental constitutional rights. Trump has a history of contradictory positions on big issues like taxes, health care, and gun rights. It was a gamble to count on him to follow any particular idealogical course, and some of it remains unclear even now. My misgivings about Trump’s inclinations as a whirligig were discussed on Sacred Cow Chips in “Trump Flaunts Shape-Shifting Powers” in 2015. Uncertainty still colors my views, though his cabinet picks and other alliances have served to clarify the direction of policy. My discussion below reflects this uncertainty. Also, Trump shows every intention of moving fast on a number of fronts, so I hope the relevance of this post isn’t too perishable.

Second, it’s worth noting that Trump’s policy statements and predilection to “keep-’em-guessing” are probably a by-product of his instincts as a negotiator. His bellicosity may be something of a ploy to negotiate more favorable compromises in international affairs, trade and domestic issues. Still, I can’t know that. Should I evaluate all those statements at face value as policy positions? I have to make some allowance for the reasonability of a bargaining position, but I’ll try to be consistent in my approach.

Third, revelations during the campaign of Trump’s past remarks about women, and some in-campaign remarks like his attack on Megyn Kelly, were highly offensive. I’ve heard plenty of “locker-room talk” over my years, but some of Trump’s statements were made well outside the locker room and well beyond the age at which “youthful indiscretion” could be taken as a mitigating factor. Trump has plenty of female defenders, however, and he has a record of placing women in key roles within the Trump organization and for paying them well. While I do not condone the remarks, and I doubt that complete reform is possible, he cannot change his history and he is now the president. Evaluating his policy positions is now an entirely separate matter. I only hope the exposure has taught him to be more respectful.

Finally, I do not buy the narrative that Trump is a racist. This “Crying Wolf” essay on Scott Alexander’s Slate Star Codex blog demonstrates that Trump’s rhetoric and behavior during his campaign was not racist when viewed in the broader context of his record of denigrating anyone who opposes him. He seems to be an equal opportunity offender! In fact, Trump made strong attempts to appeal to minority voters and succeeded to some extent. His positions on border security and immigration were boisterous, but they were not truly about race or ethnicity. Instead, they were rooted in concerns about illegal immigration and public safety. Efforts by the left to characterize those points as de facto evidence of racism are simply not credible. Nor are claims that he practiced racial discrimination at his apartment buildings early in his career. Today, I would call those cases garden-variety disparate impact actions, as when a business is challenged on the use of screening criteria that might be correlated with race, such as credit rating. A legitimate business purpose is generally a valid defense, though Trump did agree to settle out of court.

So what about Trump from a policy perspective? Here is what I expect of his administration thus far:

I’m Pretty Sure of the Following, Which I Rate As Bad

Trump is a protectionist. He is extremely ignorant of trade principles and favors import duties to punish those who wish to purchase goods from abroad. This would raise both domestic and import prices and directly harm employment in import-dependent industries. It would also discourage innovation by domestic producers, who would face less competition. I cover these protectionist tendencies here as an unqualified negative, but I have a more mixed view on his opposition to certain government-negotiated trade agreements (e.g., the Trans-Pacific Partnership ), which are covered below.

Trump is likely to be a drug warrior. He could do much to restore order in inner cities by ending the drug war, but he will not. He will thereby encourage activity in the black market for drugs, which produces both violence and more dangerous varieties of drugs. He might well interfere with the rights of states to determine their own policies toward relatively benign substances like marijuana, including medical marijuana, by choosing to enforce destructive federal drug laws. The possible appointment of marijuana legalization advocate Jim O’Neil to head the FDA looks decreasingly likely. That might be a game changer, but I doubt it will happen.

Big public infrastructure outlays. This is distinct from private infrastructure, to be discussed below. The latter is motivated by private willingness-to-pay. Rushing into a large public construction program with questionable economic justification will bring waste, and it will probably be sold as an economic stimulus package, which is unnecessary and dangerous at a time when the economy is finally operating near capacity. The decrepitude of American infrastructure is greatly exaggerated by those with a private interest in such projects, and the media eats it up. The breathless promotion of massive but noneconomic projects like high-speed rail is also greeted with enthusiasm by the media. And politicians love to boast to constituents of their efforts to secure federal funds for big local projects. We also know that Trump wants to build a massive border wall, but I’m convinced that border security could be achieved at lower cost by leveraging surveillance technology and other, less costly barriers.

Deficits: Increased defense outlays, a big infrastructure package, a “great” wall, tax credits and lower tax rates will almost certainly add up to ballooning federal deficits in the years ahead. That fiscal combination will be unsustainable if accompanied by higher interest rates and could very well have inflationary consequences.

Trump favors public and private eminent domain and believes it should be treated as a hallowed institution. He truly thinks that a “higher-valued use” is a superior claim to existing ownership of property. This is perverse. I have trouble accepting eminent domain action even for a public purpose, let alone a private purpose; it should only be motivated by the most compelling public interest, as a last resort, and with handsome compensation to the existing property owner. We can only hope that Trump’s public and private infrastructure programs do not lead to many takings of this kind.

Industrial policy. This is the essence of government central planning, picking winners and losers by granting tax and loan subsidies, lenient reviews, and other advantages. The most obvious example of Trump’s amenability to industrial policy is his penchant for trade protectionism, but I fear it will go much deeper. For some reason, Trump believes that manufacturing activity creates private and public benefits far beyond its market value. Moreover, manufacturers require far fewer workers now than they did in his youth, so the sector is not the job engine it once was. His appointee for Commerce Secretary is Wilbur Ross, an investor with a history of trading on prospects for government assistance. This article provides disturbing background on Ross, along with this quote: “We ought, as a country, to decide which industries are we going to really promote — the so-called industries of the future.” Trump’s plan to meet regularly with leaders of giant corporations is a sure sign that corporatism will be alive and well for at least the next four years… as long as they tow The Donald’s line.

Restricting Legal Immigration. I’m all for securing the border, but legal immigration is a major driver of economic growth. Many industries rely on a flow of skilled and unskilled workers from abroad, a need that will be more intense given Trump’s plan to tax outsourcing. Moreover, the country will face a low ratio of workers to retirees over the next few decades; short of massive entitlement reform, immigration is perhaps the only real chance of meeting public obligations to retirees.

Endangered Privacy Rights: As a “law and order” guy, Donald Trump might not be a reliable defender of the privacy protections enshrined in the Fourth Amendment. He has expressed a willingness to repeal the USA Freedom Act, which restricts the bulk collection of metadata and provides other privacy protections. Trump also has expressed an interest in forcing technology companies to enable “back doors” into the devices and programs they sell to the public. I’m concerned that we’ll see the creation of security databases with an excessively broad scope. As a likely drug warrior, Trump will support the sort of privacy violations in law enforcement that have become all too common.

I’m Pretty Sure of the Following, Which I Rate As Good

He’s not Hillary Clinton, and he is not a statist in the mold of Clinton and Barack Obama, though he does embody some statist tendencies as described above. I thought I would vote for Gary Johnson, but he made crucial mistakes, such as choosing Bill Weld as his running mate and fumbling at attempts to explain libertarian philosophy. At some point, my distaste for Clinton’s criminality and her advocacy of big government in so many aspects of life convinced me she had to be defeated, and that Trump was the only real possibility. But whether he can actually reduce the resources that the federal government absorbs is hard to say, as he has his own spending priorities.

Trump favors deregulation generally, as it places an enormous burden on society’s ability to improve well being. This covers aspects of the Affordable Care Act and reducing the role of the federal government in education. He opposes the costly Paris Climate Accord and other intrusive federal environmental measures, such as wetlands regulation.

Obamacare repeal and replacement with market-oriented delivery of health care, insurance with broad choices, and equalized tax treatment across the employer and individual market segments via refundable tax credits. There is a chance that Trump’s preferred alternative will assign excessive responsibility to the federal government rather than markets, but I’m optimistic on this point.

Entitlement reform is a possibility. Social Security and Medicare are insolvent. Ideas about how future retirees might take advantage of market opportunities should be explored. This includes private retirement accounts with choices of investment direction and greater emphasis on alternatives like Medicare Advantage.

Tax reform of some kind is on Trump’s agenda. This is likely to involve lower corporate and individual tax rates and some tax simplification. It is likely to stimulate economic growth from both the demand and the supply sides. In the short-run, traditional demand-side macroeconomic analysis would suggest that upward price pressures could arise. However, by encouraging saving and investment, the economy’s production capacity would increase, mitigating price pressure in the longer run.

Trump favors border security. No mystery here. My enthusiasm for this is not based on a physical wall at the border. That might come and it might be very costly. I favor a liberalized but controlled flow of immigration and vetting of all immigrants. The recent order of a temporary hold on refugees from a short list of countries will be of concern if it is not short-lived, and it remains to be seen what “extreme vetting” will entail. Nevertheless, I support enhanced integrity of our borders and our right as a nation to be cautious about who enters.

Education reform and school choice. Increased spending on public education, especially at the federal level, has made no contribution to educational productivity, and the country is burdened with too many failing schools.

Encouraging private infrastructure. This relies on private incentives to build and finance infrastructure based on users’ willingness to pay, thereby avoiding stress on public funding capacity.

Deregulating energy: This includes encouraging zero-carbon nuclear power, deregulation of fossil fuels, and lower energy costs.

Deregulating financial institutions. Repeal of the burdensome Dodd-Frank Act, which has imposed costs on both banks and consumers with little promise of a benefit in terms of financial stability.

Unabashed support for Israel. I strongly favor repairing our damaged ties with Israel and the proposed move of our embassy to West Jerusalem, which has been a part of Israel proper since its founding. Israel is the only real democracy in the middle east and a strong ally in an extremely dangerous part of the globe.

Trump supports Second Amendment rights. This is fundamental. Private gun ownership is the single-best line of self-defense, especially for those with the misfortune to live in areas rife with black market drug activity.

States’ rights and federalism. On a range of issues, Trump seems amenable to transferring more responsibility to states, rather than asserting federal supremacy on issues that are unsettled from region-to-region.

Ending federal funding for abortion. Tax dollars should not be used for a purpose that is morally abhorrent to a large segment of the population. This is not the same as the “right” to abort a child, as settled by Roe vs. Wade.

Putting the screws to the UN. This organization is not aligned with U.S. interests, yet the U.S. foots a large part of the bill for its activities. Sharp reductions in funding would be a powerful message.

Reduced federal funding for the arts. I’ve never been comfortable with allowing the federal government to disburse funds in support of the arts. Lower levels of government are less objectionable, where there is greater accountability to local voters. Dependence on federal purse strings creates a powerful line of influence that usurps authority and may conflict with the desires of local taxpayers. Individuals pay for art voluntarily if they find it of value, and people give privately to support the arts for the same reason. Federal taxpayers certainly have other valued uses for the funds. Art is not a “public good” in a strict sense, and its external benefits, to the extent they exist, do not justify a federal role.

Reversing the FCC’s net neutrality rules. Trump has appointed Ajit Pai as the new chairman of the FCC. Pai is no fan of net neutrality, a policy that rewards heavy users of network capacity and is likely to discourage the growth of network infrastructure.

I’m Not Sure How To Rate the Following

Foreign policy reset. I welcome several likely foreign policy initiatives from the Trump Administration, such as deemphasizing our role in the UN, restoring our relationship with Israel, and taking a harder line on nuclear development by Iran. I also favor greater scrutiny of outlays for foreign aid, much of which is subject to graft by recipient governments. However, I would not welcome a continuation of foreign policy designed around U.S. strategic interests that are, in fact, private investments.

Defense build-up. Our armed forces have suffered a decline in their ability to defend the country during the Obama years. I favor some restoration of the defense budget, but I am concerned that Trump will go on a defense binge. I’m also concerned about how aggressively he’ll wish to project American power overseas. Let’s not go to war!

Upending Trade Partnerships. I am a free-trader, and I abhor Trump’s belligerent talk about erecting trade barriers. So how could I be “unsure” about anything that promotes trade? Formal trade partnerships between nations are an aggravation to me because governments don’t trade… people do! And they do because they reap unambiguous benefits from trade. I’d much rather the U.S. simply eliminated all trade barriers unilaterally than get entangled in complicated trade agreements. These agreements are rats nests. They stipulate all sorts of conditions that are not trade related, such as environmental rules and labor policy. I therefore view them as a compromise to sovereignty and a potential impediment to economic growth. To the extent that trade agreements can be renegotiated in our favor, I should not complain. And to the extent that we’ll never see a government allow completely free and open trade, I should probably hope for agreements that at least reduce trade barriers.

The Keystone pipeline. I am happy with Trump’s decision to approve completion of the pipeline on its merits for energy delivery, and also because it is environmentally less risky than rail, barge and container ships. And yes, it is private infrastructure. But I am unhappy about the heavy application of eminent domain against landowners in the path of the pipeline. The Standing Rock Sioux tribe’s opposition is suspect because the path does not cross its tribal land, and the tribe originally gave its consent to the project. The tribe’s recent position could be an effort to extract rents from the process.

Executive authority. I am somewhat wary of Trump’s aggressiveness thus far. He seems eager to take actions that are questionable under existing law, such as seizing wire-transfer remittances by undocumented immigrants. Granted, he is busy “undoing” some of Obama’s actions, but let’s hope he doesn’t get carried away.

Summary

What we have here is a very mixed bag of policies. On the whole, I’m still pleased that Trump was elected. I believe he favors a smaller role for government in most affairs. But while the balance of considerations listed above seems to be in Trump’s favor, the negatives have the potential to be disastrous. He certainly wants to spend. My biggest fears, however, are that Trump will not respect the Constitution, that he will govern as a cronyist, and that he will succumb to the notion that he can actively manage the economy like a casino build.

The Fascist Roader

04 Thursday Aug 2016

Posted by Nuetzel in Central Planning, fascism

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Barack Obama, Benito Mussolini, central planning, competition, Dodd-Frank, fascism, Industrial Concentration, Industrial Policy, Innovation, Jonah Goldberg, Obamacare, rent seeking, Sheldon Richman, Socialism, Thomas Sowell

President Obama is a believer in centralized social and economic management, despite the repeated disasters that have befallen societies whose leaders have applied that philosophy in the real world. Those efforts have often taken the form of socialism, with varying degrees of government ownership of resources and productive capital. However, it is not necessary for government to own the means of production in order to attempt central planning. You can keep your capital as long as you take direction from the central authority and pay your “fair share” of the public sector burden.

A large government bureaucracy can coexist with heavily regulated, privately-owned businesses, who are rewarded by their administrative overlords for expending resources on compliance and participating in favored activities. The rewards can take the form of rich subsidies, status-enhancing revolving doors between industry and powerful government appointments, and steady profits afforded by monopoly power, as less monied and politically-adept competitors drop out of the competition for customers. We often call this “corporatism”, or “crony capitalism”, but it is classic fascism, as pioneered by Benito Mussolini’s government in Italy in the 1920s. Here is Sheldon Richman on the term’s derivation:

“As an economic system, fascism is socialism with a capitalist veneer. The word derives from fasces, the Roman symbol of collectivism and power: a tied bundle of rods with a protruding ax.“

With that in mind, here’s an extra image:

The meaning of fascism was perverted in the 1930s, as noted by Thomas Sowell:

“Back in the 1920s, however, when fascism was a new political development, it was widely — and correctly — regarded as being on the political left. Jonah Goldberg’s great book ‘Liberal Fascism’ cites overwhelming evidence of the fascists’ consistent pursuit of the goals of the left, and of the left’s embrace of the fascists as one of their own during the 1920s. …

It was in the 1930s, when ugly internal and international actions by Hitler and Mussolini repelled the world, that the left distanced themselves from fascism and its Nazi offshoot — and verbally transferred these totalitarian dictatorships to the right, saddling their opponents with these pariahs.“

The Obama Administration has essentially followed the fascist playbook by implementing policies that both regulate and reward large corporations, who are only too happy to submit. Those powerful players participate in crafting those policies, which usually end up strengthening their market position at the expense of smaller competitors. So we have transformational legislation under Obama such as Obamacare and Dodd-Frank that undermine competition and encourage concentration in the insurance, health care, pharmaceutical and banking industries. We see novel regulatory interpretations of environmental laws that destroy out-of-favor industries, while subsidies are lavished on favored players pushing economically questionable initiatives. Again, the business assets are owned by private cronies, but market forces are subjugated to a sketchy and politically-driven central plan designed jointly by cronies inside and outside of government. That is fascism, and that’s the Obama approach. He might be a socialist, and that might even be the end-game he hopes for, but he’s a fascist in practice.

As Sowell points out, Obama gains some crucial advantages from this approach. For starters, he gets a free pass on any claim that he’s a socialist. And however one might judge his success as a policymaker, the approach has allowed him to pursue many of his objectives with the benefit of handy fall-guys for failures along the way:

“… politicians get to call the shots but, when their bright ideas lead to disaster, they can always blame those who own businesses in the private sector. Politically, it is heads-I-win when things go right, and tails-you-lose when things go wrong. This is far preferable, from Obama’s point of view, since it gives him a variety of scapegoats for all his failed policies, without having to use President Bush as a scapegoat all the time.

Thus the Obama administration can arbitrarily force insurance companies to cover the children of their customers until the children are 26 years old. Obviously, this creates favorable publicity for President Obama. But if this and other government edicts cause insurance premiums to rise, then that is something that can be blamed on the “greed” of the insurance companies.The same principle, or lack of principle, applies to many other privately owned businesses. It is a very successful political ploy that can be adapted to all sorts of situations.“

Obama’s most ardent sycophants are always cooing that he’s the best president EVAH, or the coolest, or something. But the economy has limped along for much of his presidency; labor force participation is now at its lowest point since the late 1970s; and median income has fallen on his watch. He has Federal Reserve policy to thank for stock market gains that are precarious, at least for those companies not on the fascist gravy train. Obama’s budgetary accomplishments are due to a combination of Republican sequestration (though he has taken credit) and backloading program shortfalls for his successors to deal with later. Obamacare is a disaster on a number fronts, as is Dodd-Frank, as is the damage inflicted by questionable environmental and industrial policy, often invoked via executive order. (His failures in race relations and foreign policy are another subject altogether.)

Fascism is not a prescription for rapid economic growth. It is a policy of regression, and it is fundamentally anti-innovation to the extent that government policymakers create compliance burdens and are poor judges of technological evolution. Fascism is a policy of privilege and is regressive, with rewards concentrated within the political class. That’s what Obama has wrought.

Big-Time Regulatory Rewards

26 Tuesday Jul 2016

Posted by Nuetzel in Big Government, Central Planning, Regulation

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Cronyism, Daniel Mitchell, Glenn Reynolds, Guy Rolnik, Harvard Business Review, Industrial Policy, James Bessen, Matt Ridley, Mercatus Center, Regdata, regressivity

Why does regulation of private industry so often inure to the benefit of the regulated at the expense of consumers? In the popular mind, at least, regulating powerful market players restrains “excessive” profits or ensures that their practices meet certain standards. More often than not, however, regulation empowers the strongest market players at the expense of the very competition that would otherwise restrain prices and provide innovative alternatives. The more complex the regulation, the more likely that will be the result. Smaller firms seldom have the wherewithal to deal with complicated regulatory compliance. Moreover, regulatory standards are promulgated by politicians, bureaucrats, and often the most powerful market players themselves. If ever a system was “rigged”, to quote a couple of well-known presidential candidates, it is the regulatory apparatus. Pro-regulation candidates might well have the voters’ best interests at heart, or maybe not, but the losers are usually consumers and the winners are usually the dominant firms in any regulated industry.

The extent to which our wanderings into the regulatory maze have rewarded crony capitalists — rent seekers — is bemoaned by Daniel Mitchell in “A Very Depressing Chart on Creeping Cronyism in the American Economy“. The chart shows that about 40% of the increase in U.S. corporate profits since 1970 was generated by rent-seeking efforts — not by activities that enhance productivity and output. The chart is taken from an article in the Harvard Business Review by James Bessen of Boston University called “Lobbyists Are Behind the Rise in Corporate Profits“. Here are a couple of choice quotes from the article:

“Lobbying and political campaign spending can result in favorable regulatory changes, and several studies find the returns to these investments can be quite large. For example, one study finds that for each dollar spent lobbying for a tax break, firms received returns in excess of $220. …regulations that impose costs might raise profits indirectly, since costs to incumbents are also entry barriers for prospective entrants. For example, one study found that pollution regulations served to reduce entry of new firms into some manufacturing industries.”

“This research supports the view that political rent seeking is responsible for a significant portion of the rise in profits [since 1970]. Firms influence the legislative and regulatory process and they engage in a wide range of activity to profit from regulatory changes, with significant success. …while political rent seeking is nothing new, the outsize effect of political rent seeking on profits and firm values is a recent development, largely occurring since 2000. Over the last 15 years, political campaign spending by firm PACs has increased more than thirtyfold and the Regdata index of regulation has increased by nearly 50% for public firms.“

A good explanation of Bessen’s findings is provided by Guy Rolnik, including an interview with Bessen. Law Professor Glenn Reynolds of the University of Tennessee put his finger on the same issue in an earlier article entitled “Why we still don’t have flying cars“. One can bicker about the relative merits of various regulations, but as Reynolds points out, the expansion of the administrative and regulatory state has led to a massive diversion of resources that is very much a detriment to the intended beneficiaries of regulation:

“… 1970 marks what scholars of administrative law (like me) call the ‘regulatory explosion.’ Although government expanded a lot during the New Deal under FDR, it wasn’t until 1970, under Richard Nixon, that we saw an explosion of new-type regulations that directly burdened people and progress: The Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, National Environmental Policy Act, the founding of Occupation Safety and Health Administration, the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency, etc. — all things that would have made the most hard-boiled New Dealer blanch.

Within a decade or so, Washington was transformed from a sleepy backwater (mocked by John F. Kennedy for its ‘Southern efficiency and Northern charm’) to a city full of fancy restaurants and expensive houses, a trend that has only continued in the decades since. The explosion of regulations led to an explosion of people to lobby the regulators, and lobbyists need nice restaurants and fancy houses.“

Matt Ridley hits on a related point in “Industrial Strategy Can Be Regressive“, meaning that government planning and industrial regulation have perverse effects on prices and economic growth that hit the poor the hardest. Ridley, who is British, discusses regressivity in the context of his country’s policy environment, but the lessons are general:

“The history of industrial strategies is littered with attempts to pick winners that ended up picking losers. Worse, it is government intervention, not laissez faire, that has done most to increase inequality and to entrench wealth and privilege. For example, the planning system restricts the supply of land for housebuilding, raising property prices to the enormous benefit of the haves (yes, that includes me) at the expense of the have-nots. …

Why are salaries so high in financial services? Because there are huge barriers to entry erected by government, which hands incumbent firms enormous quasi-monopoly advantages and thereby shelters them from upstart competition. Why are cancer treatments so expensive? Because governments give monopolies called patents to the big firms that invent them. Why are lawyers so rich? Because there is a government-licensed cartel restricting the supply of them.“

Ridley’s spirited article gives emphasis to the fact that the government cannot plan the economy any more than it can plan the way our tastes and preferences will evolve and respond to price incentives; it cannot plan production any more than it can anticipate changes in resource availability; it cannot dictate technologies wisely any more than it can predict the innumerable innovations brought forth by private initiative and market needs; it almost never can regulate any better than the market can regulate itself! But government is quite capable of distorting prices, imposing artificial rules, picking suboptimal technologies, consuming resources, and rewarding cronies. One should never underestimate the potential for regulation, and government generally, to screw things up!

Mortgage Mania at the Fed

09 Thursday Oct 2014

Posted by Nuetzel in Uncategorized

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Fannie Mae, Federal Reserve, Freddie Mac, Industrial Policy, Monetary Stimulus, Mortgage Interest Deduction, Mortgage Securities, Quantitative Easing, Richmond Fed, Wall Street Journal

The Federal Reserve has no business distorting incentives by dabbling with billions in markets for private debt. Kudos to two officials at the Richmond Fed for making this point forcefully in the Wall Street Journal** today.

Normally, the Fed conducts monetary policy by buying or selling Treasury debt, which is thought to be neutral with respect to relative private interest rates. In other words, the Fed’s impact on the Treasury market, whatever that might be, does not encourage investment in housing at the expense of factory investment or vice versa. Since 2009, however, the Fed has attempted to support the housing and mortgage markets via massive purchases of mortgage securities originally issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This has the effect of reducing mortgage interest rates relative to rates on other kinds of private debt. It also constitutes a form of bailout for mortgage investors, who tend to receive favorable bids from the Fed for these assets. Free money! And more free money is dolled out by the Fed when it pays banks interest on the new reserve balances these transactions ultimately create.

One might object that the struggling mortgage market needed the Fed’s support in the wake of the housing crash. I do not accept that view because the mortgage and housing markets needed to unwind their excesses and monetary stimulus did not require mortgage purchases. But this also begs the question: what gave rise to the crisis? Over-investment in housing and a home price bubble fueled by tax-deductible interest, easy Fed monetary policy, regulatory capital standards that favored mortgage lending, prospective bailouts in case of failure, and loose bank credit standards. Those should all sound familiar. Now, the Fed believes it’s necessary to re-inflate the mortgage market via continuing asset purchases.

The Fed’s policies can be criticized on other grounds, but interfering in private debt markets should be avoided. It is an example of industrial policy that is clearly not even part of the Fed’s so-called mandate, and it ultimately means a continuing massive misallocation of resources into housing at the expense of other forms of investment.

** The article at the link should be ungated. If not, try Googling “wsj Fed’s Mortgage Favoritism.”