Immigration and Merit As Fiscal Propositions

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Immigration into the U.S. can be a powerful force for economic growth. This takes on special importance given low fertility rates in the U.S. and the effective insolvency of our entitlement systems (with dim prospects for reform). But whether a given flow of immigrants will mitigate the negative growth and fiscal effects of unfavorable demographic trends is a conclusion requiring some qualification.

This certainly isn’t a case of “the more, the merrier”. Sharp tradeoffs bear on whether and how immigration can be a part of the solution to our demographic and fiscal woes.

Fiscal Contribution

University of Pennsylvania economist Jesús Fernández-Villaverde asserts that a high volume of immigrants will not solve our fiscal challenges. His reasoning is straightforward: immigrants are concentrated in the lower part of the income distribution, and therefore relatively few provide a surplus contribution to the nation’s fiscal balance. In fact, our large fiscal imbalance is driven by the country’s generous welfare state. With near-open borders, it serves as a magnet for low-income migrants. Thus, a broadly lenient immigration policy will not solve fiscal issues caused by low birth rates. However, Fernandez-Villaverde offers no direct empirical evidence except to say that data from some European countries support his claim.

Daniel Di Martino of the Manhattan Institute recently published a detailed analysis of the fiscal effects of immigration, including the fiscal contributions of both immigrants and two subsequent generations of offspring. He provided an excellent summary in a later tweet:

“… when it comes to immigration, the main question isn’t how many immigrants but which immigrants.”

In particular, highly-educated immigrants engender a surplus fiscal contribution. All else equal, so do immigrants less than 40 years of age. Low-skill immigrants are likely to produce a fiscal deficit, however. Legal immigrants tend to have a positive fiscal effect, while illegal immigrants tend to add to deficits.

This 2017 report from the National Academies of Sciences found similarly mixed results on the fiscal impact of immigrants. Education and age were again important determinants.

Country of Origin

Garret Jones argues that place of origin is a vital indicator of fiscal contribution. Here is a chart he posted at the link (from The Economist):

The chart pertains to immigration into Denmark, so like Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, we’re relying on European data. However, I suspect this generalizes to most other western countries. Of course, the plots above represent averages; individuals from any of the categories shown in the chart might differ substantially. Nevertheless, the average non-western immigrant into Denmark makes a weak or negative fiscal contribution relative to immigrants of western origin. The contrast is especially sharp for immigrants from the category that includes the Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan, and Turkey.

There are a variety of explanations for these disparate results. Westerners emigrating to Denmark probably have a strong advantage in terms of common languages and communication. Average skill levels are probably higher for westerners as well. Cultural differences almost surely make assimilation into society and the workplace more difficult for non-westerners.

A strict ban or quota on immigration from certain countries is probably unwise, however. Given our growth and fiscal objectives, we should seek to attract talented individuals from all over, and humanitarian imperatives suggest acceptance of legitimate refugees from political, religious, racial, or ethnic persecution. That might well mean a greater annual number of legal immigrants into the U.S. But if the question is whether it’s fiscally sound to encourage broad inflows of non-western immigrants, the answer is mostly no.

Vetting

It should go without saying that all potential immigrants must be vetted, and the intensity of the process could be made a function of an individual’s place of origin. Military-age males from hostile countries should receive particular scrutiny so that we can mitigate risks like those described here.

It’s reasonable to demand that those entering the country meet some subset of possible qualifications, some of which might override other criteria. For example, highly productive workers make wonderful immigrants, contribute to economic growth, make a greater fiscal contribution, and are more likely to assimilate successfully. Those are key rationales for a merit-based immigration system. But an overriding consideration might apply to individuals or families fleeing their homeland due to persecution, who have legitimate claims to refugee status regardless of economic potential. It’s also reasonable to extend favorable treatment to individuals having close family members already in the U.S., barring any red flags.

A related concern is birthright citizenship, which is a constitutional right. As long as immigrants clear reasonable hurdles for legal entry, birthright citizenship should stand going forward. The Supreme Court is likely to rule against the Trump Administration’s challenge to birthright citizenship, and it should, though the vast number of illegals who entered the U.S. under Biden certainly creates a birthright burden for U.S. taxpayers. It also sometimes complicates efforts to deport individuals who never should have been allowed to enter.

Merit

Rigid immigration quotas don’t make economic sense. It’s desirable to allow flexibility as labor market conditions evolve. Those capable of work might be ranked by education or skill, and in turn assigned priority based on the strength of domestic opportunities in their areas of experience or expertise. This can accommodate unskilled workers when they are in heavy demand. But merit and labor-market pressures aside, please don’t adopt preferences like the last two sentences shown here (from the White House’s latest national security strategy document).

Legal immigration should not be handled as a residual. Employers will often find that an immigrant is more qualified for a certain job. They should be free to hire that individual assuming the immigrant is vetted. As Robby Soave notes at the tweet linked above, the White House position is economically equivalent to hiring on the basis of DEI preferences.

Needless to say, almost any formula or decision tree can be manipulated unless it is spelled out in detail by law. However, that too might subvert economic and fiscal objectives by imparting too much rigidity to the system.

Crimes and Misdemeanors

Notwithstanding protestations from many economists I admire, who make endless assertions that illegal immigrants have lower crime rates than the domestic population, those arguments are beside the point. There seems little justification for allowing anyone having a record of serious crime to enter the country. It is hard to imagine many circumstances under which exceptions should be considered. Yet we have managed to allow large numbers of proven criminals to enter the U.S. (similar numbers reported here). It goes without saying that we cannot properly vet potential immigrants unless they go through the proper legal process for entering the country. For example, this is what happened in Europe as countries allowed unchecked inflows of migrants (and continue to do so).

Illegal immigrants are obviously in violation of immigration laws, which cannot simply be rewarded. Rather than the traditional fines or jail time for improper entry, so-called “remigration” is an increasingly popular solution. Voluntary deportation is one possibility; should the immigrant refuse, there must be a greater price to pay for the violation of law. Involuntary deportation is more controversial but might be warranted if the alternative is state dependency. Other possibilities include private sponsorship with a price tag high enough to pay what would otherwise become an obligation imposed on taxpayers. Factors that could weigh in favor of an illegal immigrant would be employability, a commitment to learn the English language, and a course of study toward meeting the requirements for citizenship.

Summary

An open borders policy is idealized by some libertarians, but it has severe drawbacks. Among those are potential compromises in national security and a blind eye to the ingress of dangerous criminals. Furthermore, many potential immigrants contribute to fiscal deficits due to their reliance on the welfare state and the generous entitlements available to many U.S. residents. A well-designed immigration system would screen for merit across a number of dimensions, with responsiveness to labor market conditions.

Tariff “Dividend” From An Indigent State

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I’ll try to keep this one short. I was starting a post on another topic when Donald Trump distracted me… again. This time it was the $2,000 per person “tariff dividend” he’s proposed. This would be paid to all low- and middle-income Americans starting in mid-2026. As if the federal government was a profitable enterprise. Obviously that’s the wrong model! This is either sheer stupidity or willful government failure. Sure, the Fed can just print money, so why not? Who knew Trump was a closet modern monetary theorist?

It’s such a bad idea…. Tariffs themselves are bad enough. They are taxes, of course, a truth about which Trump and his central trade planners have denied since the beginning of the escapade. Tariffs hurt consumers and businesses who import inputs. Tariffs retard growth by increasing input costs, disrupting supply chains, and raising the prices of not only imports, but also domestically-produced goods that compete with imports. Surely Trump knows all this and the implications for his political capital: he’s already backtracking on tariffs for certain food items.

The tariff dividend is a transparent attempt to compensate consumers for the harms of taxation. It’s also a transparent attempt to buy or keep votes, much as he’s already sought to buy-off farmers harmed by tariffs. The income limit for the dividend hasn’t been announced, but make no mistake: this represents another form of redistribution.

It’s also striking that the tariffs won’t generate nearly as much revenue as will be required to begin paying the dividend by mid-2026. In fact, it could be short by as much as $300 million! Will the Treasury borrow the rest? More pressure on the bond market and interest rates.

Furthermore, the so-called dividend would be inflationary if the Federal Reserve fails to neutralize it. It would amount to another “helicopter drop” of cash, similar to the cash dump from Covid relief payments: money printing under the guise of fiscal policy.

To the extent that tariff revenue flows, it should be used to reduce the federal deficit or to pay down the gigantic government debt already outstanding ($38 trillion today not including the impending cost of funding entitlement programs). Instead, Trump is proudly following in the footsteps of generations of spendthrift politicians.

Keep in mind that the dividend is a promise Trump might not be able to keep. The Supreme Court will soon announce its decision on presidential power to impose tariffs. This decision will bear on the president’s authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) — if and when an actual emergency is at hand, which it clearly is not. More broadly, the decision hinges on whether a “foreign facing” tax falls within the president’s Article II powers under the Constitution.

The proposed tariff dividend undermines the Administration’s argument before the Court that tariffs are primarily regulatory tools, and that any revenue from tariffs is merely incidental. Thank God the dividend would have to be authorized by Congress! I truly hope there are enough sensible legislators on the Hill to beat back this idiocy.

Almost Looks Like the Fed Has a 3% Inflation Target

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Inflation leveled off below 3% in 2024 and has drifted around the 3% level in 2025. The rate of increase in the core PCE (Personal Consumption Deflator) is the inflation measure of most interest to the Federal Reserve as a policy reference, but advances in the core CPI (Consumer Price Index) have settled at about the same level. The core inflation rates exclude food and energy prices due to the volatility of those components, but even with food and energy, inflation in the PCE and the CPI have been running near 3%.

It’s a 2% Target… Or Is It?

The Fed continues to maintain that its “official” inflation target is 2% for the core PCE. However, the central bank is now easing policy despite inflation running a full percentage point faster than the target. The rationale turns on the Fed’s dual mandate to maintain both “price stability” and full employment, goals that are not always compatible.

Currently, the labor market is showing signs of weakness, so the Fed has elected to ease policy by guiding the federal funds rate downward, and by putting a stop to run-off in its balance sheet holdings of securities. The latter ends a brief period of so-called quantitative tightening.

Just a couple of months ago, the central bank announced a new emphasis on targeting 2% inflation in the long run, with notable differences from the “flexible average inflation targeting” (FAIT) that it claimed to have adopted in 2020. In some respects, the Fed appeared to be giving more primacy to the “2%” definition of price stability than to the full employment mandate. Yet the “new approach” still allows plenty of wiggle room and might not differ much from the approach followed prior to FAIT.

No FAITful Error

Here’s how David Beckworth characterizes the way FAIT ultimately played out. He says that in practice the Fed took:

“… an asymmetric approach to the dual mandate: It would implement makeup policy on misses below the inflation target, and it would respond to shortfalls from maximum employment. These asymmetries, while well- intended, created an inflationary bias that caused FAIT to fail the ‘stress test’ of the 2021–22 inflation surge. This failure caused the Fed to effectively abandon FAIT in early 2022 and become a single-mandate central bank focused on price stability.

Scott Sumner says the Fed never really really practiced FAIT to begin with. It should have been a symmetric policy, but it wasn’t. During 2021-22, the Fed did not attempt to correct for rising inflation. Instead, it focused on the recessionary effects of Covid and the impingements of Covid-era restrictions on employment.

Clearly, Covid was a shock that monetary policy was ill-suited to address without reinforcing inflation. Furthermore, the pandemic inflation was thought by the Fed to be transitory, but easing policy was a critical error. Stimulating demand via monetary accommodation gave inflation more permanence than the Fed apparently expected.

Lost In the Tea Leaves Again

While a strong commitment to price stability is welcome, it’s not clear that is what’s guiding the Fed’s decisions at the moment. Again, the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge has flattened out at around 3%. However, with uncertainty about tariffs and tariff pass throughs in 2026, the weak dollar, and unrelenting Treasury borrowing, easier monetary conditions could well set the stage for persistent inflation above 3%, despite the official 2% target. That might help explain the failure of longer-term interest rates to decline in the wake of the Fed’s latest quarter-point cut in the federal funds target in October.

Suspicious Minds

Speculation that the Fed is allowing its true inflation target to creep upward is hardly new. Back in June, former New York Fed economist Robert Brusca noted the following:

A Cleveland Fed survey already has the business community thinking that the REAL target for inflation is 2.5%.”

More recently, Mark Sobel of the Official Monetary and Fiscal Institutions Forum stated that the real target, for now, is probably 3%:

But could the Fed stealthily and unintentionally end up near 3%? Even apart from above-target inflation in recent years, short- and longer-term structural forces are at play that could usher in slightly higher inflation, notwithstanding Fed speeches on the sanctity of the 2% inflation target.

Chewing On Data

It’s pretty clear that the Fed has become a skittish about the pace of the real economy, lending more weight to the full employment part of its dual mandate. Employment growth slowed over the past year, partly due to government employee buy-outs and separations of illegal immigrants from their employers. The last official employment report was in early September, however, so the nonfarm payroll data is two months out-of-date:

Private payroll growth from ADP over the past two months has not looked especially encouraging:

Tariffs and weakened profit margins have likely had a contractionary effect, and the six-week government shutdown just ended will shave 0.5% or more off fourth quarter GDP growth. Furthermore, while money (M2) growth has accelerated over the past year, it remains fairly restrained.

And the monetary base has been pretty flat for most of 2025:

We’ll see where these aggregates go from here. The extended “restraint” might now be of some concern to the Fed, given recent doubts about employment and economic growth. Still, in October, Fed Chairman Jerome Powell said that another quarter-point cut in the federal funds rate target in December was not a foregone conclusion. That statement seems to have worried equity investors while offering little solace to bond investors.

Aborted Landing

If (and as long as) the Fed gives primacy or greater weight in its policy deliberations to employment than inflation, it might as well have adopted an inflation target of 3% or more. The additional erosion in purchasing power wrought by that leniency is bad enough, but the effect of monetary policy on the real side of the economy is more poorly understood than its effect on nominal variables. The Fed’s shift in priorities is both unreliable on the real side and dangerous in terms of price stability. These concerns are even more salient given the upcoming appointment (in May) of a new Fed Chairman by President Trump, who seems eager for easy money.

Government Malpractice Breeds Health Care Havoc

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The impasse at the heart of the seemingly unending government shutdown revolves around health care subsidies.

First, there is disagreement about whether to extend the expanded Obamacare subsidies promulgated during the COVID pandemic. That expansion allowed individuals earning more than four times the federal poverty level (the original limit under the Affordable Care Act (ACA)) to receive tax credits for the purchase of health coverage on the exchange “marketplace”. Republicans find this highly objectionable. Many of them also object that the subsidies help pay for “essential health benefits” under the ACA that include so-called gender-affirming care.

Democrats and the insurance lobby would very much like to reinstate or retain the tax credits. The ten-year cost of extending them is more than $400 billion. Incredibly, it turns out that roughly 40% of individuals taking those tax credits did not file a medical claim in 2024. It was pure cash for insurers at the expense of taxpayers.

Second, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBB), among other things, restricts access to Medicaid by imposing work or job search requirements for overall eligibility. It also formally denies coverage to illegal aliens. This, of course, is opposed by Democrats, who insist that those requirements be rescinded.

Health Care Central Planning

These issues are part of a much larger debate over government dominance of the health care system. Almost every institutional arrangement in health care coverage and delivery is dictated by rules and practices imposed by government, and it would seem they are intentionally designed to escalate costs and compromise the delivery of care. The chart at the top of this post illustrates, in a high-level way, the futility of these efforts.

Medicare and Medicaid dominate government health care spending, as this report from the Peter G. Peterson Foundation shows. However, that strict budgetary view greatly understates the control government now exerts on the health care sector.

Medical Free Market Myth

Michael Cannon recently emphasized the irony of the persistent myth of a U.S. free market in health care:

“… government controls a larger share of health spending in the United States than in 27 out of 38 OECD-member nations, including the United Kingdom (83%) and Canada (73%), each of which has an explicitly socialized health-care system. When it comes to government control of health spending, the United States is closer to communist Cuba (89%) than the average OECD nation (75%).

Nor does the United States have market prices for health care. Direct government price-setting, price floors, and price ceilings determine prices for more than half of U.S. health spending, including virtually all health-insurance premiums.

ObamaSnare

Government “control” takes a variety of forms, including regulatory intrusions under the aegis of Obamacare. The Affordable Care Act (ACA), as its name implies, was sold as a way to keep health care and health insurance costs affordable. And it was billed as a way to extend individual health care coverage to the previously uninsured population. It failed badly on the first count and met with only limited success on the second.

One leg upon which the ACA stood was kicked away in 2017: the penalty for violating the Act’s individual mandate for health coverage was eliminated by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). The penalty was arguably unconstitutional as a tax on non-commerce, or the non-purchase of insurance on the exchange. However, the Supreme Court had ruled narrowly in favor of the penalty in 2012, claiming that it was within the scope of Congress’ taxing power. Following passage of the TCJA, however, the toothlessness of the mandate caused the risk pool to deteriorate. This was aggravated by the ACA’s insistence on comprehensive coverage, which applies not just to policies sold on the Obamacare exchange, but to almost all private health insurance sold in the U.S.

A well-functioning marketplace would instead have promoted the availability of more moderately-priced coverage options. Ultimately, subsidies were all that prevented a broad exit from the marketplace. But they did nothing to slow the escalation in coverage costs and deteriorating quality of coverage and care:

The result has been a race to the bottom in terms of the quality of insurance coverage for the sick. …individual-market provider networks [have] narrow[ed] significantly… They have eroded coverage through ‘poor coverage for the medications demanded by [the sick]’ … higher deductibles and copayments; mandatory drug substitutions and coverage exclusions for certain drugs; more frequent and tighter preauthorization requirements; highly variable coinsurance requirements; inaccurate provider directories; and exclusions of top specialists, high-quality hospitals, and leading cancer centers from their networks. ….

The healthy suffer, too. … ‘currently healthy consumers cannot be adequately insured against the negative shock of transitioning to one of the poorly covered chronic disease states.’ A coalition of dozens of patient groups has complained that this dynamic ‘completely undermines the goal of the [Affordable Care Act].’

Price Distortions

Cannon emphasizes another persistent myth: that government sets prices at levels that would prevail in a free market. Here is one baffling aspect of the many prices set by government for individual services under the Medicare and Medicaid programs.

One of the more striking indications of widespread mispricing is that Medicare routinely sets different prices for identical items depending solely on who owns the facility.

For example, ambulatory surgical centers are compensated much less for the same services as hospitals. The same is true of compensation for skilled nursing facilities vs. long-term care hospitals, and there appears to be no economic rationale for the differences. Furthermore, it’s an open secret that Medicare sets higher prices for lower-cost providers (and treatment of lower-cost patients). As Cannon notes, this explains the rapid growth of specialty hospitals owned by physicians.

Cannon provides much more detail on Medicare and Medicaid mis-pricing, including the blunting of patients’ price-sensitivity and the shifting of costs to private payers.

Divorcing Risk and Insurance

The price of insurance and insurer reimbursements are also prescribed by government. Cannon’s discussion includes the ACA’s abolition of risk-based insurance pricing, which is an astonishing case of economic malpractice. Depending on one’s health status, “community pricing” acts as either a price ceiling or a price floor. This creates perverse incentives for both the healthy and the unhealthy. Premiums fall short of the cost of caring for the sick.

The federal government attempts to compensate by subsidizing insurers based on the health status of individuals in their risk pool, but that falls short in terms of the quality of coverage for unhealthy individuals. Thus, both the healthy and taxpayers must shoulder an ever-increasing cost burden of insuring the unhealthy.

Circular Scam

As for Medicaid, certain arrangements drive up the cost of the program to taxpayers. For example, last March I wrote about this apparent scam allowing state governments to inflate their Medicaid costs, qualifying for hundreds of billions of federal matching funds:

Here’s the gist of it: increases in state Medicaid reimbursements qualify for a federal match at a rate known as the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAPs). First, increases in Medicaid reimbursements must be funded at the state level. To do this, states tax Medicaid providers, but then the revenue is kicked back to providers in higher reimbursements. The deluge of matching federal dollars follows, and states are free to use those dollars in their general budgets.

Unfortunately, FMAP reform is not directly addressed in the “clean” Continuing Resolution before Congress, though reduced funding levels might lead to reductions in FMAP percentages.

And Another Circular Scam

John Cochrane is largely in agreement with Cannon’s piece, but he focuses first on cross subsidies flowing to “eligible” hospitals dispensing prescription drugs to low-income patients. These hospitals get the drugs from pharmaceutical companies at a steep discount mandated by the so-called 340B program, but the hospitals then bill insurers (or Medicare and Medicaid), a significant markup over their acquisition cost. The Medicaid expansion under the ACA led to an increase in the number of hospitals eligible for the drug discounts.

But that’s not the end of the story. This arrangement creates an obvious incentive for the drug companies to raise their pre-discounted prices. Another unintended outcome cited by Cochrane is that eligible hospitals do not use the proceeds of their mark-ups to offer better care (or care at a lower cost) to low-income consumers. Instead, the funds tend to be directed to investment accounts. The program also creates another incentive for hospital consolidation.

Someone Else’s Money

Unfortunately, the dysfunction in health care goes deeper than Obamacare, Medicare, and Medicaid. The third-party payment system itself has been at the root of cost escalation. It largely relieves consumers of their sovereignty over purchasing decisions, rendering them much less sensitive to variations in price. This can be seen clearly in one of Cannon’s charts, reproduced below:

In addition, the disparate income tax treatment of employer-provided health coverage exacerbates cost escalation. Obviously, employees receiving this deduction can afford higher-quality and more comprehensive coverage. This exemption has acted to drive up the cost of all health care and insurance coverage over the almost nine decades of its existence..

What To Do?

The claim that the U.S. health care system operates within a free market ecosystem is obviously absurd. Together, the Cochrane and Cannon pieces represent something of a gripe session, but it is well deserved. Both authors devote sections to reforms, however. They don’t break new ground in the debate, but the overarching theme of the suggested reforms is to give consumers authority over their health care spending. That means keeping government out of health care in all the myriad ways it now intrudes. It also means that insurers should not have authority to dictate how health care is priced. The key is to allow competition to flourish among health care providers and insurers.

Ending FMAPs and the tax exemption for employer-provided coverage is one thing, but it’s another to contemplate dismantling Medicare, Medicaid, and the many rules and pricing arrangements enforced under Obamacare.

Cochrane takes an accommodating approach to the health care needs of seniors and those in need of a safety net. He calls for Medicare and Medicaid to be replaced with the issuance of vouchers (rather than cash) toward the purchase of affordable private health care plans. Then, health coverage can be provided in a lightly regulated, competitive market without all the distortions and sneaky opportunities for graft embedded in our current entitlements.

Conflicting Rights and Reality

And what of the argument that health care is a human right? That notion is, of course, very popular on the left. The idea subtly shifts a meaningful portion of the responsibility for one’s health onto others, including providers and taxpayers. But smokers, heavy drinkers, reckless drivers, hard drug users, and the avoidably obese should not be led to expect a free ride for risky behaviors.

Of course, it’s not a basic human right to demand, by force of government, involuntary service of health care workers, or that taxpayers give alms, but Cochrane answers with this:

Yes! It is a basic human right that I should be free to offer my money to a willing physician or hospital, in a brutally competitive and innovative market.

“Willing” is a key word, and to that we should add “able”, but those are qualifying conditions that markets help facilitate.

Jane Menton has discussed the notion of a human right to health care, wisely explaining that conditions are not always compatible with fulfilling such a right. Her primary concern is the future supply of medical personnel, and an acute shortage of nurses.

In our current political environment, young people seem to think that claiming something as an entitlement means someone will inevitably show up to do the work.

To codify a right to health care would be an ill-fared call for a nationalized solution. It would be a prescription for still higher costs and lower quality care. As in any other sector, centralized decision-making leads to misallocated resources, higher costs, and inferior outcomes for patients. Our current mess gives a strong hint of the kind of over-regulated dysfunction that nationalization would bring.

Insurance On Insurability

Pre-existing conditions motivate much of the discussion surrounding a presumed right to health care. Individual portability of group health coverage goes partway in addressing coverage for pre-existing conditions. Portability is mandated by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, but like community rating, it shifts costs to others. That is, the cost of covering pre-existing conditions becomes the responsibility of employers in general, group insurers, and ultimately healthy (and younger) workers.

Given time, the debate over a right to health care can be rendered moot via market processes. Cochrane has long supported the concept of health status insurance. Such policies would allow healthy consumers to guarantee their insurability against the risk of future health contingencies. Guaranteed renewability is a limited form of this type of coverage. General availability of health status insurance contracts, offered regardless of current coverage, could allow for a range of future insurability options at affordable prices. Then, pre-existing conditions would cease to be such a huge driver of cross subsidies.

A Tax On Imports Takes a Toll on Exports

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Tariffs have far-reaching effects that strike some as counter-intuitive, but they are real forces nevertheless. Much like any selective excise tax, tariffs reduce the quantity demanded of the taxed good; buyers (importers) pay more, but sellers of the good (foreign exporters) extract less revenue. Suppose those sellers happen to be the primary buyers of what you produce. Because they have less to spend, you also will earn less revenue.

The Lerner Effect

The imposition of tariffs by the U.S. means that foreigners have fewer dollars to spend on exports from the U.S. (as well as fewer dollars to invest in the U.S. assets like Treasury bonds, stocks, and physical capital). That much is true without any change in the exchange rate. However, lower imports also imply a stronger dollar, further eroding the ability of foreigners to purchase U.S. exports.

The implications of the import tariff for U.S. exports may be even more starkly negative. Scott Sumner discusses an economic principle called Lerner Symmetry: a tax on imports can be the exact equivalent of a tax on exports! That’s because two-directional trade flows rely on two-directional flows of income.

Note that this has nothing to do with foreign retaliation against U.S. trade policy, although that will also hurt U.S. exporters. Nor is it a consequence of the very real cost increase that tariffs impose on U.S. export manufacturers who require foreign inputs. That’s a separate issue. Lerner Symmetry is simply part of the mechanics of trade flows in response to a one-sided tariff shock.

Assumptions For Lerner Symmetry

Scott Sumner enumerated certain conditions that must be in place for full Lerner Symmetry. While they might seem strict, the Lerner effect is nevertheless powerful under relaxed assumptions (though somewhat weaker than full Lerner Symmetry).

As Sumner puts it, while full Lerner Symmetry requires perfect competition, nearly all markets are “workably competitive”. In the longer-run, assumptions of price flexibility and full employment are anything but outlandish. Complete non-retaliation is an unrealistic assumption, given the breadth and scale of the Trump tariffs. Some countries will retaliate, but not all, and it is certainly not in their best interests to do so. The assumption of balanced trade is one and the same as the assumption of no capital flows; a departure from these “two” assumptions weakens the symmetry between tariffs and export taxes because a reduction in capital flows takes up some of the slack from lower revenue earned by foreign producers.

Trump Tariff Impacts

So here we are, after large hikes in tariffs and perhaps more on the way. Or perhaps more exceptions will be carved out for favored supplicants in return for concessions of one kind or another. All that is economically and ethically foul.

But how are imports and exports faring? Here I’ll quote the Yale Budget Lab’s (YBL) September 26th report on tariffs, which includes the chart shown at the top of this post:

Consumers face an overall average effective tariff rate of 17.9%, the highest since 1934. After consumption shifts, the average tariff rate will be 16.7%, the highest since 1936.

The post-substitution price increase settles at 1.4%, a $1,900 loss per household.

The “post-substitution” modifier refers to the fact that price increases caused by tariffs would be somewhat larger but for consumers’ attempts to find lower-priced domestic substitutes. Suppose the PCE deflator ends 2025 with a 2.8% annual increase. The YBL’s price estimate implies that absent the Trump tariffs, the PCE would have increased 1.4%. If that seems small to you (and the tariff effect seems large to you), recall that monetary policy has been and remains moderately restrictive, so we might have expected some tapering in the PCE without tariffs.

We also know that the early effects of the tariffs have been dominated by thinner margins earned by businesses on imported goods. Those firms have been swallowing a large portion of the tariff burden, but they will increasingly attempt to pass the added costs into prices.

But back to the main topic … what about exports? Unfortunately, the data is subject to lags and revisions, so it’s too early to say much. However, we know exports won’t decline as much as imports, given the lack of complete Lerner symmetry. YBL predicts a drop in exports of 14%, but that includes retaliatory effects. In August the WTO predicted only about a 4% decline, which would be about half the decline in imports.

Seeking Compensatory Rents

More telling perhaps, and it may or may not be a better indicator of the Lerner effect, is the clamoring for relief by American farmers who face diminished export opportunities. As Tyler Cowen says, “Lerner Symmetry Bites”. Other industries will feel the pinch, but many are likely preoccupied with the more immediate problem of increases in the direct cost of imported materials and components.

The farm lobby is certainly on its toes. The Trump Administration is now asking U.S. taxpayers to subsidize soybean producers to the tune of $15 billion. Those exporting farmers are undoubtedly victimized by tariffs. But so much for deficit reduction! More from Cowen:

Using tariff revenue to subsidize the losses of exporters is a textbook illustration of Lerner Symmetry because the export losses flow directly from the tax on imports! The irony is that President Trump parades the subsidies as a victory while in fact they are simply damage control for a policy he created.

A List of Harms

Tariffs are as distortionary as any other selective excise tax. They restrict choice and penalize domestic consumers and businesses, whose judgement of cost and quality happen to favor goods from abroad. Tariffs create cost and price pressures in some industries that both erode profit margins and reduce real incomes. For consumers, a tariff is a regressive tax, harming the poor disproportionately.

Tariffs also diminish foreign flows of capital to the U.S., slowing the long-term growth of the economy as well as productivity growth and real wages. And the Lerner effect implies that tariffs harm U.S. exporters by reducing the dollars available to foreigners for purchasing goods from the U.S. In these several ways, Americans are made worse off by tariffs.

We now see attempts to cover for the damage done by tariffs by subsidizing the victims. A “tariff dividend” to consumers? Subsidies to exporters harmed by the Lerner effect? In both cases, we would forego the opportunity to pay down the bloated public debt. Thus, the American taxpayer will be penalized as well.

Dubious Scorecards of Violence By Ideology

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There have been many claims about the relative frequency of violent terrorist acts committed by the left and right sides of the political spectrum. Leftists like to focus on fatalities because they believe the data favor them as less violent. Broader measures of violence tell a different story. However, the comparisons are terribly flawed owing to the difficulty of 1) knowing that ideology was definitely the motive in a particular case; and 2) classifying the ideology of a violent actor. Law enforcement statistics are obviously subject to those kinds of classification problems, and so are most studies that purport to measure ideological violence accurately. In short, the comparisons are a mess.

Ideological Homicide

The following are counts of total ideologically-motivated homicides since 1990 according to a 2024 DOJ National Institute of Justice report. Excluding the 9/11/2021 Twin Towers attack, there were 520 total fatalities; 227 were attributed to the far right and 42 to the far left. That report is now available only as an archive on the Wayback Machine. The on-line PDF disappeared just after Charlie Kirk’s murder in September, which seems a little too coincidental. Nevertheless, as we’ll see, the report’s findings were absurd.

Matt Margolis reviews a recent CATO study by Alex Nowrasteh on politically-motivated violence. Here are the totals by year:

Margolis discusses a couple of major (and questionable) decisions made by the author or his sources:

—The Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 (168 deaths) was committed by Timothy McVeigh, an individual of ambiguous “anti-government” political persuasion who supported abortion rights. Those deaths were attributed to the right.

—The 2020 riots following George Floyd’s death resulted in 19 deaths. Of course, Antifa (which we’re confidently told doesn’t exist) and Black Lives Matter (BLM) were heavily involved, so this was clearly leftist violence. Those deaths aren’t counted,

These two adjustments alone would swing the attribution of deaths to a majority of leftist killers. Margolis then credits Amber Duke for identifying several additional misclassifications that occurred between 2015 and 9/10/2025 (the day prior to Kirk’s murder), during which there were 57 “politically-inspired” killers. She documents nine cases (26 fatalities and a number of serious injuries) of questionable political attribution. Several of these cases involved motives that are arguably nonpolitical, including severe psychological disorders, and at least one killer could have been motivated by a desire to promote a leftist politician (Tim Walz). I would probably accept a couple of these incidents as right-adjacent if not right-wing motivated, but the point is that ambiguities frequently compromise these ideological classifications.

Duke notes the head-scratching exclusion of a couple of incidents attributable to leftist passions: the BLM-affiliated Waukesha killer who plowed into a Christmas parade in his truck, killing six; a killing perpetrated by multiple BLM protestors; and a bomber at an IVF clinic that killed one person. Again, in the nine cases identified by Duke, the perps were either questionably classified ideologically or not classified at all. Correcting all of these errors swings the tally to 20 left-wing and 19 right-wing killers from 2015-9/10/2025.

Oddly, Duke takes no issue with the non-classification of the Pulse Nightclub shooting in 2016 (treated separately as Islamic terror). The killer was said to have had “issues” with gays, but apparently he was gay! And there were reports that he was motivated by opposition to U.S. foreign policy, which usually codes as left.

The ADL Weighs In

Duke also directs us to a critique by Ryan James Girdusky of some agitprop produced by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). Of course, the ADL has a left-wing bias that comes through loud and clear in this report. As Duke summarizes,

“… they lump white nationalist inter-gang killings, domestic violence, and other non-ideologically motivated murders into its ‘right-wing political violence’ category.

And here is David Harsanyi:

The [ADL] list includes murders that occurred during attempted prison escapes, sex crimes, robberies, and family squabbles, none of which have anything to do with furthering the tenets of white supremacy or any cause. In one of the incidents, the police have yet to find a motive for the homicide.

In case you still harbor any doubt about the ADL’s bias, their report actually excludes six deaths connected with the Zizians, a murderous trans cult. They also ascribe no political motive for Luigi Mangioni’s assassination of United Health Care CEO Brian Thompson because:

… hostility towards the healthcare system or health insurance companies is not in itself an ideology and because a good portion of the anger on Mangione’s part may have stemmed from purely personal reasons .…”

The list, however, includes “right-wing” murders that occurred during attempted prison escapes, sex crimes, robberies, and family squabbles, none of which had anything to do with furthering the tenets of white supremacy or any cause. In one of these incidents, the police have yet to find a motive for the homicide.

Harsanyi offers further criticism of the FBI’s classifications and the Global Terrorism Database. Of the latter, he notes:

It counted the Las Vegas mass shooter who murdered 59 people in 2017 as a right-wing ‘anti-government extremist.’ In truth, we have no clue what the shooter’s motivations were, unless the GTD has inside information from the FBI. Of the 32 other incidents the organization labeled right-wing terrorism that year, 12 were merely ‘suspected’ of being on the Right (mostly because they had white skin).

More Systemic Misclassification

The CATO and ADL reports, as well as government statistics, are uniform in treating violence by Islamic extremists as a category apart from violence on the left and right. The Islamist category dominates the data on terrorist homicides due to 9/11 (87% of terrorist fatalities since 1975; excluding 9/11, Islamist attacks account for 23%). Separate treatment is based on alleged religious motives behind these acts. However, Islamic causes have garnered increasing support from the Left in the years since 9/11 and the War in Iraq. That became more palpable during the Obama years. It has culminated in a surge of aggressive anti-Zionism and support for not just a Palestinian state, but one extending from the river to the sea, which is code for genocide in Israel. Apparently, Hamas’ murderous raid into Israel on 10/7/2023 was a major touch point for this activism.

At present, there isn’t much ambiguity surrounding the leftist-Islamic alignment, despite what should seem like obvious points of tension. These include Islamic subjugation of women and harsh treatment of homosexuals. But in the West, leftists identify with the presumed victimhood status of Islamic populations. Certain cases of violence by Islamic actors in the U.S. can reasonably be counted now as leftist terror attacks. However, the reports aren’t tallied that way, which helps to foster the impression that the right instigates a larger share of violent and homicidal attacks.

Also problematic: “anti-government” actors have almost always been classified as right-wing. This is highly misleading. Both left-and right-wing anti-government violence tend to vary with which side is in power.

Non-Lethal But Could Be Lethal

Despite its severe shortcomings, the CATO report at least gives lip service to non-lethal violence … or what, for the grace of God, might have turned out to be non-lethal. This encompasses foiled efforts to harm, injuries of all sorts, arson, smashed windows, stolen merchandise, other property damage, and even threats to individuals or institutions, which tend to inflict emotional distress and other costs. Too much commentary hints at praise for the left’s “restraint” in perpetrating non-lethal violence! Protests accompanied by riots are described as “mostly peaceful”.

There is no question about the recent surge in left-wing violence, especially in 2025. Over the past few years, there have been several assassination attempts against high-profile individuals on the right, including Donald Trump and Charlie Kirk. Trans activists have perpetrated other killings. There have been multiple attacks on ICE agents and other law enforcement officers. We’ve witnessed persecution, intimidation, and attacks against Jews on college campuses and elsewhere. Riots have erupted in Portland, LA, New York, Atlanta, and other cities. The trend is not new, but the levels of unrest have been disquieting.

They Say, “Don’t Overreact”

Another factor is prosecutorial leniency. Violent leftist actions tend to be concentrated in urban areas where prosecutors are likely to share the actors’ ideology and give them a pass. This does nothing to discourage destructive behavior. As a civil libertarian, however, Nowrasteh warns in his CATO report:

The big fear from politically motivated terrorism is that the pursuit of justice will overreach, result in new laws and policies that overreact to the small threat, and end up killing far more people while diminishing all our freedoms.

I too have strong libertarian leanings, but the balance of risks should favor action to protect individuals and their property from threats of violent action, maintain public order, while not prejudging the intent of disturbances as “peaceful”.

Views on Violence

Official statistics and other reports on political violence by the left and right are unreliable. They tend to overstate right-wing inspired violence and understate left-wing inspired violence. The recent swing toward leftist acts of terror has been difficult to hide, however.

I’ll close by noting that the mainstream right and left seem to have considerably different attitudes toward politically-motivated violence. In my observation, when some fringe right-wing maniac, white supremacist, or militia group perpetrates violence (or so much as stages a public demonstration), the mainstream right tends to react with revulsion. When fringe leftists do the same, the mainstream left tends to rationalize and even support the uglies.

The Network Contagion Research Institute (NCRI) has noted the rise of “assassination culture”. Surveys show that violence against political opposition has more support from the left than the right. Social media has become a breeding ground upon which these sentiments can turn into action. From the last link:

NCRI’s analysis, based on troves of social media data, reveals how fringe internet culture has helped build what the group calls ‘permission structures’ for violence. These are social environments—online or offline—where violent acts are no longer condemned but tacitly accepted, if not outright encouraged.

This is what Christopher Rufo calls the “left-wing terror memeplex”, and it’s often less tacit than right out loud! It’s almost enough to make a sham of the explicit exceptions to protected speech defined by the First Amendment.

Employee Speech and Its Consequences

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I just can’t express any sympathy for those fired from their jobs for publicly endorsing or “celebrating” the assassination of Charlie Kirk. Regardless of how you felt about Charlie Kirk’s words, he was a nonviolent public figure who did everything he could to engage peacefully with those who disagreed with his views. Praising his assassination is morally repugnant.

The fairness and even the legality of these dismissals has been called into question, however. As Eugene Volokh notes, the First Amendment offers protection “against criminal punishment, civil liability” for all speech unless it “is intended to and likely to cause imminent illegal conduct”. It does not protect the speaker from other consequences, however, such as continued employment or social ostracism. It goes without saying that this applies to both sides of any debate.

But job dismissals for expressing controversial opinions should not extend beyond issues likely to threaten the mission of the employing organization, including reputation and the well being of clients and other employees. Even more importantly, prosecution under so-called “hate speech” laws (a flawed construct) should not extend outside the bounds of the First Amendment, and should not be prosecuted selectively on political grounds.

One prominent action with which I’m not comfortable is the “indefinite” cancellation of Jimmy Kimmel, who (like others on the Left) thought it would be clever to make the absurd claim, during his late-night monologue, that Kirk’s assassin was one of the MAGA tribe. Kimmel did not “celebrate” the murder per se, but his statement was enough to get his show pulled, for now. The cancellation was lauded by the Right as a response to the market. That’s plausible: Kimmel’s pronouncement might have damaged ABC’s brand, though it didn’t have far to drop. The Trump Administration seems to have employed some strong-arm tactics in this episode, however, which is awful. In any case, I’d rather keep Kimmel out there making a fool of himself.

Of course, private employers can generally employ whom they want and can often cite agreed-upon codes of conduct as justification for dismissals, if necessary. Who wants an employee announcing to the world that he or she endorses the murder of someone with whom they happen to disagree on public policy or expressions of faith? Or who wants an employee openly stating such a monstrous opinion in the workplace? It’s simply bad business to risk offense to customers, sowing discord in the workplace, or affiliating in any way with an individual willing to demonstrate such depraved values.

Things are a little different for public employees. In his post, Volokh outlined general legal conditions under which a public employee can be disciplined. These are (the full list is a quote):

  1. the speech is said by the employee as part of the employee’s job duties, Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006), or
  2. the speech is not on a matter of public concern, Connick v. Myers (1983), or
  3. the damage caused by the speech to the efficiency of the government agency’s operation outweighs the value of the speech to the employee and the public, Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. (1968).

As Volokh says, strictly speaking, these conditions do not establish categorical grounds for dismissing a public employee for praising violence. He cites case law to support that position. But the third condition listed is critical in many cases. On that point, he notes that the case in question involved a private conversation with the speaker’s co-worker/boyfriend. So that case hardly seems dispositive.

Volokh goes on to say that #3 above, or really the Pickering case, establishes a kind of heckler’s veto for public employers. That is, it:

… often allows government to fire employees because their speech sufficiently offends coworkers or members of the public. …

“This conclusion by lower courts applying Pickering might, I think, stem from the judgment that employees are hired to do a particular job cost-effectively for the government: If their speech so offends others (especially clients or coworkers) that keeping the employees on means more cost for the government than benefit, the government needn’t continue to pay them for what has proved to be a bad bargain.

Whether it involves someone in the public or the private sector, concerns about endorsing the murder of an ideological opponent are particularly acute when issued by those in jobs requiring a high level of trust. That covers a broad swath of workers, but especially those in health care, education, and law enforcement. Can you trust a nurse, a surgeon, or any other caregiver who would endorse murder as a proper response to political or ideological differences? Are you willing to allow your child to be instructed by such an individual at any level? For that matter, would you trust a news anchor who spouted that kind of rhetoric?

It’s certainly doesn’t present as “normal” to espouse or praise murder and other violent acts, regardless of ideological passion. In fact, most people would fairly question the stability of anyone cheerleading for murder and the risk they might present to society. Words are cheap, but it might well signal an elevated propensity for acts of violent retaliation for perceived wrongs.

The question of trust really permeates our interactions with the whole of society, so the kind of behavior we’ve witnessed from this quarter is threatening. Will my waitress, overhearing a conversation, befoul or poison the food she serves me? Will my ride share driver deliver me to a torture chamber? Will a neighborhood contact attempt to exact some kind of retribution? It’s not quite there yet, but the encroachment is real. This should be more salient to anyone with an accessible social media profile who wishes to express an honest opinion, particularly on a college campus.

A brief word about some of the Charlie Kirk quotes that have made the rounds. They are often excerpted and divorced from the full context of the argument he was attempting to make. Julie Borowsky on X provides some direct, full quotes of Kirk on several important topics. I happen to think he made valid (if not fully developed) points about the value of the Second Amendment, the divisiveness of DEI, overuse of the word “empathy”, and the downsides of Civil Rights Act. At the same time, I am certain I’d disagree with other positions Kirk held, like his support for tariffs. Still, they were all debating points on policy (or matters of faith), and they did not qualify as “hate speech”, which is a subjective notion and highly resistant to consensus. In any case, his comments could never have justified the insane reaction of Kirk’s assassin or those who cheered his murder.

Tariff Challenges at the High Court

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The world doesn’t ordinarily revolve around tariffs, but so much has happened to make tariffs into an economic and political linchpin of the moment. Donald Trump put them in the spotlight, of course, and while he’s still seeing roses, things won’t turn out entirely the way he hopes. At the tariff levels he’s instituted, this shouldn’t be too surprising.

While tariff revenue is helping to shave the federal budget deficit, the tax falls largely on the backs of American consumers and businesses with all the attending distortions that entails. Sadly, the extra revenue also seems to have offered a handy excuse to put spending cuts on the back burner. Tariffs and tariff uncertainty have businesses attempting to compromise between reduced margins and price hikes. Thinning margins due to tariffs have played a role in the weak employment numbers we’ve seen over the past few months. And tariffs, at least until now, have quite rightly reinforced the Federal Reserve’s cautious stance toward easing policy. However, the weak labor market has likely convinced the Fed to cut its short-term interest rate target, despite inflation stubbornly remaining well above the Fed’s 2% objective. That upward price pressure will remain.

Now, the legal battle over Trump’s tariff authority is about to reach a climax. That’s what I’ll focus on here. The Supreme Court has agreed to fast track the challenge to the President’s discretion to impose retaliatory tariffs unilaterally. There are two cases at hand: V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, and Learning Resources, Inc., et al. v. Donald Trump et al. In both cases, small business plaintiffs contend that Trump’s invocation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is unwarranted, and that “most” of the tariff actions taken by Trump have usurped Congress’ power of the purse under Article I of the Constitution. Here’s Ilya Somin, who is a Volokh Conspiracy regular and one of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs:

“… IEEPA doesn’t even mention tariffs and has never previously been used to impose them, that there is no ‘unusual and extraordinary threat’ of the kind required to invoke IEEPA, the major questions doctrine, the constitutional nondelegation doctrine, and more.

This isn’t the first time a U.S. president has imposed tariffs unilaterally, but it is easily the most drastic such action. Historically, nearly all tariffs were levied by acts of Congress. Prior to Trump II, perhaps the broadest tariff imposed by a President was Richard Nixon’s brief 10% surcharge on all imports, but that was lifted quickly. Presidents Johnson and Obama imposed some selective tariffs. All of these episodes seem piddling compared to Trump’s tariffs, which are both sweeping and in many cases painfully selective.

Eric Boehm notes that when it comes to major constitutional questions, the Court has taken the position that

… executive power should be construed narrowly, not broadly …. Rather than tying itself into knots to affirm nearly unlimited executive powers over commerce, the Supreme Court should tell the Trump administration to get permission from Congress before imposing new tariffs.

I believe that will be the general shape of the outcome here. Maybe there’s a way for the Court to allow the tariffs to stand until Congress decides to “man up”, acting one way or the other. SCOTUS would probably like to do just that! Or maybe the Court could stay the lower court’s injunction until the case is heard by the Court in full on the regular docket, or until Congress acts.

There’s a decent chance, however, that Trump’s tariffs will be struck down, leaving it up to tariff supporters in Congress to lay down statutory rules rather than put up with the impulsive craziness we’ve witnessed thus far. If the Court lets the tariffs stand, it leaves the door open for new tests on the limits of executive discretion. Here is Greg Ip at the link:

There would also be no end to uncertainty. ‘Unlike most other tariff authorities, these tariffs are not enshrined in statute, there’s no process to change them, and they can change very rapidly, in a day, without much notice, as we’ve seen,’ said Greta Peisch, a trade attorney at Wiley Rein and former general counsel for the U.S. trade representative.

We’ve already seen strong hints that the Administration would like to force businesses to eat the cost of the tariffs rather than pass them along to consumers in higher prices. There hasn’t been any formal action of this kind by the Administration, at least not yet. Still, one can hardly blame businesses who might perceive an implicit threat if they fail to comply. That kind of bullying represents an a massive abuse of power. The Court could do everyone a big favor by clarifying that the authority to impose tariffs rests with Congress.

Trump’s New Corporatist Plunder Will Cost U.S.

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Since his inauguration, Donald Trump has been busy finding ways for the government to extort payments and ownership shares from private companies. This has taken a variety of forms. Tad DeHaven summarizes the major pieces of booty extracted thus far in the following bullet points (skipping the quote marks here):

  • June 13: Trump issues an executive order allowing the Nippon Steel-US Steel deal contingent on giving the government a “golden share” that enables the president to exert extensive control over US Steel’s operations.
  • July 10: The Department of Defense (DoD) unveils a multi-part package with convertible preferred stock, warrants, and loan guarantees, making it the top shareholder of rare earth metals producer MP Materials.
  • July 23: The White House claims an agreement with Japan to reduce the president’s so-called reciprocal tariff rate on Japanese imports comes with a $550 billion Japanese “investment fund” that Trump will control.
  • July 31: Trump claims an agreement with South Korea to reduce the so-called reciprocal tariff on South Korean imports comes with a $350 billion South Korean-financed investment in projects “owned and controlled by the United States” that he will select.
  • August 11: The White House confirms an “unprecedented” deal with Nvidia and AMD that allows them to sell particular chips to China in exchange for 15 percent of the sales.
  • August 12: In a Fox Business interview, Bessent points to the alleged investments from Japan, South Korea, and the EU “to some extent” and says, “Other countries, in essence, are providing us with a sovereign wealth fund.”
  • August 22: Fifteen days after calling for Intel CEO Lip-Bu Tan to resign, Trump announces that the US will take a 10 percent equity stake in Intel using the CHIPS Act and DoD funds, becoming Intel’s largest single shareholder.

Each of these “deals” has a slightly different back story, but national security is a common theme. And Trump says they’ll all make America great again. They are touted as a way for American taxpayers to benefit from the investment he claims his policies are attracting to the U.S. However, all of these are ill-advised for several reasons, some of which are common to all. That includes the extortionary nature of each and every one of them.

Short Background On “Deals”

The June 13 deal (Nippon/US Steel), the July 10 deal (MP Materials), and the August 22 deal (Intel) all involve U.S. government equity stakes in private companies. The August 11 deal (NVIDIA/AMD) diverts a stream of private revenue to the government. The July 23 and July 31 deals (Japan and South Korea) both involve “investment funds” that Trump will control to one extent or another.

The August 12 entry adds “expected” EU investments with some qualification, but that bullet quotes Treasury Secretary Bessent referring to these investments as part of a sovereign wealth fund (SWF). Secretary of Commerce Lutnick now denies that an SWF will exist. My objections might be tempered slightly (but only slightly) by an SWF because it would probably need to place constraints on an Administation’s control. That might give you a hint as to why Lutnick is now downplaying the creation of an SWF.

I object to the Nippon/US Steel “deal” in part (and only in part) because it was extortion on its face. There is no valid anti-trust argument against the deal (US Steel is the nation’s third largest steelmaker and is broke), and the national security concerns that were voiced (Japan! for one thing) were completely bogus. Even worse, the “Golden Share” would give the federal government authority, if it chose to exercise it, over a variety of the company’s decisions.

The Intel “deal” is another highly questionable transaction. Intel was to receive $11 billion under the CHIPS Act, a fine example of corporate welfare, as Veronique de Rugy once described the law. However, Intel was to receive its grants only if it stood up four fabrication facilities. But it did not. Now, instead of demanding reimbursement of amounts already paid, the government offered to pay the remainder in exchange for a 9.9% stake in the company. And there is no apparent requirement that Intel meet the original committment! This could turn out a bust!

The MP Materials transaction with the Department of Defense has also been rationalized on national security grounds. This excuse comes a little closer to passing the smell test, but the equity stake is objectionable for other reasons (to follow).

The Nvidia/AMD deal has been justified as compensation for allowing the companies to sell chips to China, which is competing with the U.S. to lead the world in AI development. This is another form of selective treatment, here applied to an export license. The chips in question do not have the same advanced specifications as those sold by the companies in the U.S., but let’s not let that get in the way of a revenue opportunity.

While nothing about TikTok appears on the list above, I fear that a resolution of its operational status in the U.S. presents another opportunity for extortion by the Trump Administration. I’m sure there will be many other cases.

Root Cause: Protectionism

The so-called investment funds described in the timeline above are nearly all the result of trade terms negotiated by a dominant and belligerent trading partner: the U.S. My objections to tariffs are one thing, but here we are extorting investment pledges for reductions in the taxes we’ll impose on our own citizens! Additionally, the belief that these investments will somehow prevent a general withdrawal of foreign investment in the U.S. is misguided. In fact, a smaller trade deficit dictates less foreign investment. The difference here is that the government will wrest ownership control over a greater share of less foreign investment.

Trump the Socialist?

Needless to say, I don’t favor government ownership of the means of production. That’s socialism, but do matters of national security offer a rationale for public ownership? For example, rare earth minerals are important to national defense. Therefore, it’s said that we must ensure a domestic supply of those minerals. I’m not convinced that’s true, but in any case, fat defense contracts should create fat profit opportunities in mining rare earths (enter MP Materials). None of that means public ownership is necessary or a good idea.

All of these federal investments are construed, to one extent or another, as matters of national security, but that argument for market intervention is much too malleable. Must we ensure a domestic supply of semiconductors for national security reasons? And public ownership? Is the same true of steel? Is the same true of our “manufacturing security”? It can go on and on. The next thing you know, someone will argue that grocery stores should be owned by the government in the name of “food security”! Oh, wait…

Trump the Central Planner

Government ownership takes the notion of industrial planning a huge step beyond the usual conception of that term. Ordinarily, when government takes the role of encouraging or discouraging activity in particular industries or technologies, it attempts to select winners and losers. The very idea presumes that the market is not allocating resources in an optimal way, as if the government is in any position to gainsay the decisions of private market participants who have skin in the game. This is a foolhardy position with predictably negative consequences. (For some examples, see the first, second, and fourth articles linked here by Don Boudreaux.) The fundamental flaw in central planning always comes down to the inability of planners to collect, process, and act on the information that the market handles with marvelous efficiency.

When government invests taxpayer funds in exchange for ownership positions in private concerns, the potential levers of control are multiplied. One danger is that political guidance will replace normal market incentives. And as de Rugy points out, the government’s potential role as a regulator creates a clear conflict of interest. In a strong sense, a government ownership stake is worse for private owners than a mere dilution of their interests. It looms as a possible taking, as private owners and managers surrender to creeping government extortion.

Financial Malfeasance

In addition to the objections above, I maintain that these investments represent poor stewardship of public funds. The U.S. public debt currently stands at $37 trillion with an entitlement disaster still to come. In fact, according to one estimate, the federal government’s total unfunded obligations amount to additional $121 trillion! Putting aside the extortion we’re witnessing, any spare dollar should be put toward retiring debt, rather than allowing its upward progression.

As I’ve noted before, paying off a dollar of debt entails a risk-free “return” in the form of interest cost avoidance, let’s say 3.5% for the sake of argument. If instead the dollar is “invested” in risk assets by the government, the interest cost is still incurred. To earn a net return as high as the that foregone from interest avoidance, the government must consistently earn at least 7% on its invested dollar. But of course that return is not risk-free!

A continuing failure to pay down the public debt will ultimately poison the debt market’s assessment of the government’s will to stay within its long-run budget constraint. That would ultimately manifest in an inflation, shrinking the real value of the public debt even as it undermines the living standards of many Americans.

One final thought: Though few MAGA enthusiasts would admit it even if they understood, we’re witnessing a bridging of two ends of the idealogical “horseshoe”. Right-wing populism and protectionism meet the left-wing ideal of central planning and public ownership. There is a name for this particular form of corporatist state, and it is fascism.

DOGE Hunts On, Despite Obstacles

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I’ve noted a number of policy moves by Donald Trump that I find aggravating (scroll my home page), but I still applaud his administration’s agenda to downsize government, promote operational efficiency, and deregulate the private economy. It’s just too bad that Trump demonstrates a penchant for expanding government authority in significant ways, which makes it harder to celebrate successes of the former variety. Beyond that, there have been huge obstacles to rationalizing the administrative state. We’ve seen progress in some areas, but the budgetary impact has been disappointing.

Grinding On

The Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) was to play a large role in the effort to reduce fraud and inefficiency at the federal level. On the surface, it’s easy to surmise that DOGE has failed in its mission to root out government waste. After seven months, DOGE touts that it has saved taxpayers $205 billion thus far. That is well short of the original $2 trillion objective (subsequently talked down by Elon Musk), but it was expected to take 18 months to reach that goal. Still, the momentum has slowed considerably.

Moreover, the $205 billion figure does not represent recurring budgetary savings. Some of it is one-time proceeds from property sales or grant cancellations. Some of it ($30 billion) seems to represent savings in regulatory compliance costs to Americans, but that’s not clear as the DOGE website is lightly documented, to put it charitably. A recent analysis reached the conclusion that DOGE had exaggerated the savings it has claimed for taxpayers, which seems plausible.

But DOGE is still plugging away, reviewing federal contracts, programs, regulations, payments, grants, workforce deployment, and accounting systems. The work is desperately needed given the fraud that’s been exposed among the agency workforce, which seemed to escalate following the advent of massive Covid benefit payments during the pandemic. Some details of an investigation by the Senate DOGE Caucus, discussed at this link, are truly astonishing. Employees at multiple state and federal agencies have been collecting food stamps, survivor benefits, and even unemployment benefits while employed by government. Apparently, this was made possible by the lack of list de-duplication by the federal agencies that dole out these benefits. This might be a pretty good explanation for the lawsuits filed by federal employee unions attempting to prevent DOGE from accessing agency records. Congratulations to Senator Joni Ernst, Chairman of the Caucus, for her leadership in exposing this graft.

False Aspersions

Shortly after DOGE was constituted, most of its employees were assigned to individual agencies to identify opportunities to reduce waste and promote efficiency. This has led to confusion about the extent to which DOGE should take credit for certain savings maneuvers. However, contrary to some allegations, no DOGE employees have been “embedded” as career civil servants.

Since almost the start of Trump’s second term, DOGE has been blamed for workforce reductions that some deemed reckless and arbitrary. There were indeed some early mistakes, most notably at HHS, but a number of those key workers were rehired. Many of the force reductions were instigated by individual agencies themselves, and many of those were voluntary separations with generous severance packages.

As to the “arbitrary” nature of the force reductions, one former DOGE staffer described the difficulty of making sensible cuts at the Veterans Administration under agency rules:

Then came a reality check about RIF rules, which turned out to be brutally deterministic:

  • Tenure matters most—new hires were cut first
  • Veterans’ preference comes next; vets are protected over non-vets
  • Length of service trumps performance—seniority beats skill
  • Performance ratings break any remaining ties

“These reduction-in-force rules–which stem from the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944–surprised me and many others. Unlike private industry layoffs that target middle management bloat and low performers, the government cuts its newest people first, regardless of performance. Anyone promoted within the last two years was also considered probationary—first in line to go.

It would be hard to be less arbitrary than these rules. Other agencies are subject to similar strictures on reductions in force. No wonder the Administration relied heavily on a buyout offer (“deferred resignation”) with broad eligibility in its attempt to downsize government. Furthermore, the elimination of positions was largely targeted functions that were wasteful of taxpayer resources, such as promoting DEI objectives and administering grants to NGOs driven by ideological motives.

Of course, the buyouts come with a cost to taxpayers. In fact, one report asserted that DOGE’s efforts themselves cost taxpayers $135 billion or more. Of course, buyouts carry a one-time cost. However, that figure also includes a questionable estimate of lost productivity caused by turmoil at federal agencies. I’m just a little skeptical when it comes to claims about the productivity of the federal workforce.

Obstacles

DOGE has had to grapple with other severe limitations, as Dan Mitchell has commented. These are primarily rooted in the spending authority of Congress. Only one rescission bill reflecting DOGE cuts, totaling just $9 billion, has made it to Trump’s desk. Another “untouchable” for DOGE is interest on the federal debt, which has become a huge portion of the federal budget.

Furthermore, DOGE is guilty of one self-imposed obstacle: the main driver of ongoing deficits is entitlement spending, While the Big Beautiful Bill included Medicaid reforms, the Trump Administration and Congress have shown little interest in shoring up Social Security and Medicare, both of which are technically insolvent. While DOGE would seem to have limited authority over entitlements, as opposed to the discretionary budget, some charge that DOGE made a critical error in failing to address entitlement fraud. According to Veronique de Rugy:

It is insane not to have started there. Given DOGE’s comparative advantage in data analytics and [information technology], this is where it can have the greatest impact… Cracking down on this waste isn’t just about saving money; it’s about restoring integrity to safety-net programs and protecting taxpayers. And if fixing this problem is not quintessential ‘efficiency,’ what is?

On the Bright Side

Michael Reitz offered a different perspective. He cited the difficulty of reforming an entrenched bureaucracy. He also noted the following, however, as a kind of hidden success of DOGE and Elon Musk:

But others I spoke with thought Musk’s four months in government were both substantive and symbolic. He changed the conversation about waste and grift. Musk made cuts cool again, especially for Republican politicians who have forgotten fiscal restraint. He highlighted the need to follow the data and oppose bureaucrats who impede reform by controlling the flow of information.

Of course, DOGE has been instrumental in identifying absurdly wasteful federal contracts, even if they are “small change” relative to the size of the federal budget. This includes grants to NGOs that appear to have functioned primarily as partisan slush funds. DOGE has also helped identify deregulatory actions to eliminate duplicative or contradictory agency rules on industry, reducing costly economic burdens on the private sector. The DOGE website claims (preliminarily) that it has deleted 1.9 million words of regulation, but doesn’t provide a total number of rules eliminated.

An important part of DOGE’s mission was to modernize technology, software, and accounting systems at federal agencies. This included centralization of these systems with improved tracking of payments and a written justification for each payment. These efforts were met with hostility from some quarters, including lawsuits to limit or prevent DOGE personnel from accessing agency data. Nevertheless, DOGE has pushed ahead with the initiative. This is a laudable attempt to not only modernize systems, but to encourage transparency, accountability, and efficiency.

In a related development, this week DOGE was blamed by a whistleblower for uploading a file from Social Security containing sensitive information to an unsecured cloud environment. However, a spokesperson for the Social Security Administration stated that the data was secure and that the SSA had no indication that it had been breached. We shall see.

AI Scrutiny

Now, DOGE is recommending the use of an AI tool to cut federal regulations. According to Newsweek:

The ‘DOGE AI Deregulation Decision Tool,’ developed by engineers brought into government under Elon Musk’s DOGE initiative, is programmed to scan about 200,000 existing federal rules and flag those that are either outdated or not legally required.

Critics are concerned about accuracy and legal complexities, but the regulations flagged by the AI tool will be reviewed by attorneys and other agency personnel, and there will be an opportunity for public comment. The process could make deregulatory progress well beyond what would be possible under purely human review. DOGE believes that up to 100,000 rules could be eliminated, saving trillions of dollars in compliance costs. If successful, this might well turn out to be DOGE’s signal accomplishment.

Conclusion

I’m disappointed at the flagging momentum of DOGE’s quest to eliminate inefficiencies in the executive branch. I’m also frustrated by the limited progress in translating DOGE’s work into ongoing deficit reduction. In addition, it was a mistake to leave aside any scrutiny of improper entitlement payments. Nevertheless, DOGE has has some significant wins and the effort continues. Also, it must be acknowledged that DOGE has faced tremendous obstacles. For too long, government itself has metastasized along with bureaucratic inefficiencies and graft. That is the rotten fruit of the symbiosis between rent seeking behavior and a bloated public sector. We should applaud the spirit motivating DOGE and encourage greater progress.