The Comparative Human Advantage

10 Thursday Aug 2017

Posted by pnuetz in Automation, Technology, Tradeoffs

Tags

Absolute Advantage, Automation, Comparative advantage, Elon Musk, Kardashev Scale, Minimum Wage, Opportunity cost, Scarcity, Specialization, Superabundance, Trade

There are so many talented individuals in this world, people who can do many things well. In fact, they can probably do everything better than most other people in an absolute sense. In other words, they can produce more of everything at a given cost than most others. Yet amazingly, they still find it advantageous to trade with others. How can that be?

It is due to the law of comparative advantage, one of the most important lessons in economics. It’s why we specialize and trade with others for almost all of ours needs and wants, even if we are capable of doing all things better than them. Here’s a simple numerical example… don’t bail out on me (!):

Let’s say that you can produce either 1,000 bushels of barley or 500 bushels of hops in a year, or any combination of the two in those proportions. Each extra bushel of hops you produce involves the sacrifice of two bushels of barley.
Suppose that I can produce only 500 bushels of barley and 400 bushels of hops in a year, or any combination in those proportions. It costs me only 1.25 bushels of barley to produce an extra bushel of hops.
You can produce more hops than I can, but hops are costlier for you at the margin: 2 bushels of barley to get an extra bushel of hops, more than the 1.25 bushels it costs me.
That means you can probably obtain a better combination (for you) of barley and hops by specializing in barley and trading some of it to me for hops. You don’t have to do everything yourself. It’s just not in your self-interest even if you have an absolute advantage over me in everything!

This is not a coincidental outcome. Exploiting opportunities for trade with those who face lower marginal costs effectively increases our real income. In production, we tend to specialize — to do what we do — because we have a comparative advantage. We specialize because our costs are lower at the margin in those activities. And that’s also what motivates trade with others. That’s why nations should trade with others. And, as I mentioned about one week ago here, that’s why we have less to fear from automation than many assume.

Certain tasks will be automated as increasingly productive “robots” (or their equivalents) justify the costs of the resources required to produce and deploy them. This process will be accelerated to the extent that government makes it appear as if robots have a comparative advantage over humans via minimum wage laws and other labor market regulations. As a general rule, employment will be less vulnerable to automation if wages are flexible.

What if one day, as Elon Musk has asserted, robots can do everything better than us? Will humans have anywhere to work? Yes, if human labor is less costly at the margin. Once deployed, a robot in any application has other potential uses, and even a robot has just 24 hours in a day. Diverting a robot into another line of production involves the sacrifice of its original purpose. There will always be uses in which human labor is less costly at the margin, even with lower absolute productivity, than repurposing a robot or the resources needed to produce a new robot. That’s comparative advantage! That will be true for many of the familiar roles we have today, to say nothing of the unimagined new roles for humans that more advanced technology will bring.

Some have convinced themselves that a fully-automated economy will bring an end to scarcity itself. Were that to occur, there would be no tradeoffs except one kind: how you use your time (barring immortality). Superabundance would cause the prices of goods and services to fall to zero; real incomes would approach infinity. In fact, income as a concept would become meaningless. Of course, you will still be free to perform whatever “work” you enjoy, physical or mental, as long as you assign it a greater value than leisure at the margin.

Do I believe that superabundance is realistic? Not at all. To appreciate the contradictions inherent in the last paragraph, think only of the scarcity of talented human performers and their creativity. Perhaps people will actually enjoy watching other humans “perform” work. They always have! If the worker’s time has any other value (and it is scarce to them), what can they collect in return for their “performance”? Adulation and pure enjoyment of their “work”? Some other form of payment? Not everything can be free, even in an age of superabundance.

Scarcity will always exist to one extent or another as long as our wants are insatiable and our time is limited. As technology solves essential problems, we turn our attention to higher-order needs and desires, including various forms of risk reduction. These pursuits are likely to be increasingly resource intensive. For example, interplanetary or interstellar travel will be massively expensive, but they are viewed as desirable pursuits precisely because resources are, and will be, scarce. Discussions of the transition of civilizations across the Kardashev scale, from “Type 0” (today’s Earth) up to “Type III” civilizations, capable of harnessing the energy equivalent of the luminosity of its home galaxy, are fundamentally based on presumed efforts to overcome scarcity. Type III is a long way off, at best. The upshot of ongoing scarcity is that opportunity costs of lines of employment will remain positive for both robots and humans, and humans will often have a comparative advantage.

Sell the Interstates and Poof — Get a Universal Basic Income

11 Tuesday Jul 2017

Posted by pnuetz in Automation, Universal Basic Income

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Artificial Intelligence, Basic Income, James P. Murphy, Jesse Walker, Minimum Wage, Opportunity cost, Private Infrastructure, Private Roads, Public Lands, Rainy Day Funds, Universal Basic Income, Vernon Smith, work incentives

Proposals for a universal basic income (UBI) seem to come up again and again. Many observers uncritically accept the notion that robots and automation will eliminate labor as a factor of production in the not-too-distant future. As a result, they cannot imagine how traditional wage earners, and even many salary earners, will get along in life without the helping hand of government. Those who own capital assets — machines, buildings and land — will have to be taxed to support UBI payments, according to this logic.

Even with artificial intelligence added to the mix, I view robot anxiety as overblown, but it makes for great headlines. The threat is likely no greater than the substitution of capital for labor that’s been ongoing since the start of the industrial revolution, and which ultimately led to the creation of more jobs in occupations that were never before imagined. See below for more on my skepticism for robot dystopia. For now, I’ll stipulate that human obsolescence will happen someday, or that a great many workers will be displaced by automation over an extended period. How will society manage with minimal rewards for labor? The question of distributing goods and services will depend more exclusively on the ownership of capital, or else it will be charity and/or government redistribution.

The UBI, as typically framed, is an example of the latter. However, a UBI needn’t require government to tax and redistribute income on an ongoing basis. Nobel Prize winner Vernon Smith suggests that the government owns salable assets sufficient to fund a permanent UBI. He suggests privatizing the interstate highway system and selling off federal lands in the West. The proceeds could then be invested in a variety of assets to generate growth and income. Every American would receive a dividend check each year, under this plan.

Why a UBI?

Given the stipulation that human labor will become obsolete, the UBI is predicated on the presumption that the ownership of earning capital cannot diffuse through society to the working class in time to provide for them adequately. Working people who save are quite capable of accumulating assets, though government does them no favors via tax policy and manipulation of interest rates. But accumulating assets takes time, and it is fair to say that today’s distribution of capital would not support the current distribution of living standards without opportunities to earn labor income.

Still, a UBI might not be a good reason to auction public assets. That question depends more critically on the implicit return earned by those assets via government ownership relative to the gains from privatization, including the returns to alternative uses of the proceeds from a sale.

Objections to the UBI often center on the generally poor performance of government in managing programs, the danger of entrusting resources to the political process, and the corrosive effect of individual dependency. However, if government can do anything well at all, one might think it could at least cut checks. But even if we lay aside the simple issue of mismanagement, politics is a different matter. Over time, there is every chance that a UBI program will be modified as the political winds shift, that exceptions will be carved out, and that complex rules will be established. And that brings us back to the possibility of mismanagement. Even worse, it creates opportunities for rent seekers to skim funds or benefit indirectly from the program. In the end, these considerations might mean that the UBI will yield a poor return for society on the funds placed into the program, much as returns on major entitlements like Social Security are lousy.

Another area of concern is that policy should not discourage work effort while jobs still exist for humans. After all, working and saving is traditionally the most effective route to accumulating capital. Recipients of a UBI would not face the negative marginal work incentives associated with means-tested transfer payments because the UBI would not (should not) be dependent on income. It would go to the rich and poor alike. A UBI could still have a negative impact on labor supply via an income effect, however, depending on how individuals value incremental leisure versus consumption at a higher level of money income. On the whole, the UBI does not impart terrible incentive effects, but that is hardly a rationale for a UBI, let alone a reason to sell public assets.

Funding the UBI

We usually think of funding a UBI via taxes, and it’s well known that taxes harm productive incentives. If the trend toward automation is a natural response to a high return on capital, taxes on capital will retard the transition and might well inhibit the diffusion of capital ownership into lower economic strata. If your rationale for a UBI is truly related to automation and the obsolescence of labor, then funding a UBI should somehow take advantage of the returns to private capital short of taxing those returns away. This makes Smith’s idea more appealing as a funding mechanism.

Will there be a private investment appetite for highways and western land? Selling these assets would take time, of course, and it is difficult to know what bids they could attract. There is no question that toll roads can be profitable. Robert P. Murphy provides an informative discussion of private roads and takes issue with arguments against privatization, such as the presumptions of monopoly pricing and increased risk to drivers. Actually, privatization holds promise as a way of improving the efficiency of infrastructure use and upkeep. In fact, government mispricing of roads is a primary cause of congestion, and private operators have incentives to maintain and improve road safety and quality. Public land sales in the West are complex to the extent that existing mineral and grazing rights could be subject to dispute, and those sales might be unpopular with other landowners.

Once the assets are sold to investors, who will manage the UBI fund? Whether managed publicly or privately, the best arrangement would be no active trading management. Nevertheless, the appropriate mix of investments would be the subject of endless political debate. Every market downturn would bring new calls for conservatism. The level of distributions would also be a politically contentious issue. Dividend yields and price appreciation are not constant, and so it is necessary to determine a sustainable payout rate as well as if and when adjustments are needed. Furthermore, there must be some allowance to assure fund growth over time so that population growth, whatever the source, will not diminish the per capita payout.

Jesse Walker has a good retrospective on the history of “basic income” proposals and programs over time. He demonstrate that economic windfalls have frequently been the impetus for establishment of “rainy day” programs. Alaska, enabled by oil revenue, is unique in establishing a fund paying dividends to residents:

“From time to time a state will find itself awash in riches from natural resources. Some voices will suggest that the government not spend the new money at once but put some away for a rainy day. Some fraction of those voices will suggest it create a sovereign wealth fund to invest the windfall. And some fraction of that fraction will want the fund to pay dividends.

Now, there are all sorts of potential problems with government-run investment portfolios, as anyone who has followed California’s pension troubles can tell you. If you’re wary about mismanagement, you’ll be wary about states playing the market; they won’t all invest as conservatively as Alaska has.

Still, several states have such funds already—the most recent additions to the list are North Dakota and West Virginia—and the number may well grow. None has followed Juneau’s example and started paying dividends, but it is hardly unimaginable that someone else will eventually adopt an Alaska-style system.”

Human-Machine Collaboration

A world without human labor is unlikely to evolve. Automation, for the foreseeable future, can improve existing processes such as line tasks in manufacturing, order taking in fast food outlets, and even burger flipping. Declines in retail employment can also be viewed in this context, as internet sales have grown as a share of consumer spending. However, innovation itself cannot be automated. In today’s applications, the deployment and ongoing use of robots often requires human collaboration. Like earlier increases in capital intensity, automation today spurs the creation of new kinds of jobs. Operational technology now exists alongside information technology as an employment category.

I have addressed concerns about human obsolescence several times in the past (most recently here, and also here). Government must avoid policies that hasten automation, like drastic hikes in the minimum wage (see here and here). U.S. employment is at historic highs even though the process of automation has been underway in industry for a very long time. Today there are almost 6.4 million job vacancies in the U.S., so plenty of work is available. Again, new technologies certainly destroy some jobs, but they tend to create new jobs that were never before imagined and that often pay more than the jobs lost. Human augmentation will also provide an important means through which workers can add to their value in the future. And beyond the new technical opportunities, there will always be roles available in personal service. The human touch is often desired by consumers, and it might even be desirable on a social-psychological level.

Opportunity Costs

Finally, is a UBI the best use of the proceeds of public asset sales? That’s doubtful unless you truly believe that human labor will be obsolete. It might be far more beneficial to pay down the public debt. Doing so would reduce interest costs and allow taxpayer funds to flow to other programs (or allow tax reductions), and it would give the government greater borrowing capacity going forward. Another attractive alternative is to spend the the proceeds of asset sales on educational opportunities, especially vocational instruction that would enhance worker value in the new world of operational technology. Then again, the public assets in question have been funded by taxpayers over many years. Some would therefore argue that the proceeds of any asset sale should be returned to taxpayers immediately and, to the extent possible, in proportion to past taxes paid. The UBI just might rank last.

Good Profits and Bad Profits

18 Thursday May 2017

Posted by pnuetz in Health Care, Profit Motive

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

ACA, Affordable Care Act, Big government, Corporatism, Cronyism, Economic Rents, Health Insurance, Opportunity cost, Profit Motive, Regulatory Capture, Reinsurance, rent seeking, Risk corridors, Supra-Normal Profit

Toles-on-Regulatory-Capture

There are two faces of profit. It’s always the fashion on the left to denigrate profits and the profit motive generally, as if it serves no positive social function. This stems partly from a failure to examine the circumstances under which profits are earned: is it through competitive performance, innovation, hard-won customer loyalty, and the skill or even luck to spot an underpriced asset? Such a “good” profit might even exceed what economists call a “normal profit”, or one that just covers the opportunity cost of the owners’ capital. On the other hand, profit can be derived from what economists call “rent seeking”. That’s the dark side, but the unrecognized spirit of rent seeking seems to lurk within many discussions, as if the word profit was exclusively descriptive of evil. The “rent” in rent seeking derives from “economic rent”, which traditionally meant profit in excess of opportunity cost, or a “supra-normal” profit. But it’s impossible to know exactly how much of any given profit is extracted by rent seeking; a high profit in and of itself is not prima facie evidence of rent seeking, even though we might argue the social merits of a firm’s dominant market position.

Rent seeking takes many forms. Collusion between ostensible competitors is one, as is any predatory attempt to monopolize a market, but the term is most often associated with cronyism in government. For example, lobbying efforts might involve favors to individuals in hopes of swaying votes on regulatory matters or lucrative government contracts. Sometimes, a rent seeker wants lighter regulation. At others, a rent seeker might work the political system for more regulation in the knowledge that smaller competitors will be incapable of surviving the heavy compliance costs. Government administrators also have the authority to change fortunes with their rulings, and they are subject to the same temptations as elected officials. In fact, in the aggregate, administrative rule-making and even enforcement might outweigh prospective legislation as attractors of intense rent-seeking.

Rent seeking is big-time and it is small-time. It takes place at all levels of government, from attempts to influence zoning decisions, traffic patterns, contract awards, and even protection from law enforcement. When it’s big time, rent seeking is the very essence of what some call corporatism and more generally fascism: the enlistment of coercive government power for private gain. A pretty reliable rule is that where there’s government, there is rent-seeking behavior.

Otherwise, the profit motive serves a valuable and massive social function: resources are attracted to profitable uses because they signal the desires of potential buyers. In this way, profits assure that resources are drawn into the most-valued uses. The market interactions between new competitors, drawn by the prospect of profits, and willing buyers leads to a self-correction: supra-normal profits get competed away over time. In this way, the spontaneous actions of voluntary market participants lead to a great achievement: all mutually beneficial trades are exhausted. Profit makes this possible in the short-run and it assures that trades evolve optimally with changes in tastes, technology and resource availability. By comparison, government fares poorly when it attempts to plan outcomes in the short- or the long-run. Rent seeking is an attempt to influence and even encourage such planning, and the profits it enables impose costs on society.

Good and Bad Profits In Health Insurance

I’ve written a few posts about health insurance reform recently (see the left margin). Health care is scarce. If relying on government is the preferred alternative to private insurance, don’t count on better access to care: you won’t get it unless you’re connected. Profits earned by health insurance carriers are roundly condemned by the left. It is as if private capital utilized in arranging coverage and carrying the risk on pools of customers deserves zero compensation, that only public capital raised by coercive taxation is morally acceptable for this purpose. But aside from this obvious hogwash, is there a reason to question the insurers’ route to profitability based upon rent seeking?

The health insurers played a role in shaping the Affordable Care Act (ACA, i.e., Obamacare) and certainly had hoped to benefit from several of its provisions, even while sacrificing autonomy over product, price, coverage decisions, and payout ratios. The individual and employer mandates would force low-risk individuals to purchase extensive coverage, and essential benefits requirements would earn incremental margins. Sounds like a nice deal, but those policies were regarded by the ACA’s proponents as necessary for universal coverage, stabilizing risk, and promoting adequate coverage levels. There were other provisions, however, designed to safeguard the profitability of insurers. These included an industry risk adjustment mechanism, temporary reinsurance to help defray the cost of covering high-risk patients, and so-called risk corridors (also temporary).

As it turned out, the ACA was not a great bet for insurers, as their risk pools deteriorated more than many expected. With the expiration of the temporary protections in Obamacare, it became evident that offering policies on the exchanges would not be profitable without large premium hikes. A number of carriers have stopped offering policies on the exchanges.

It should be no surprise that health insurance profitability has been anything but impressive over the past three years. The average industry return on equity was just 5.6% during that time frame, and it was a slightly better 6.2% in 2016, about 60% of the market-wide average. It’s difficult to conclude that insurers benefitted greatly from rent seeking activity with regard to the ACA’s passage, but perhaps that activity had a sufficient influence on policy to stabilize what otherwise might have been disastrous performance.

The critics of insurance profits are primarily interested in scapegoating as a means to promote a single-payer health care system. While some are aware of the favors granted to the industry in the design of the ACA, most are oblivious to the actual results. Even worse, they wish to throw-out the good with the bad.

The left is almost universally ignorant of the social function served by the profit motive. Profits stimulate supply, competition and innovation in virtually every area of economic life. To complain about profits in general is to wish for a primitive existence. Unfortunately, the potential for government to change the rules of the market makes it a ripe target for rent-seeking, and it creates a fog through which few discern the good from the bad.

Busting the K-12 Monopoly

12 Monday Dec 2016

Posted by pnuetz in Education, School Choice

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Betsy DeVos, Cafe Hayek, Don Boudreaux, Donald Trump, Education Funding, GI Bill, Opportunity cost, Public School Monopoly, Racial Segregation, School Choice, School Vouchers, Teachers Unions

Public school teachers are highly sensitive to any suggestion that their schools should “compete” for students, but it’s difficult to rationalize restrictions on competition faced by any institution that trades with consumers. Education is certainly not a natural monopoly. But in the U.S., K-12 public schools are granted an effective service monopoly over large segments of their local markets. Their monopoly status is a legacy and usually taken for granted, but that does not make the arrangement a natural state of affairs, or a healthy one.

The idea that education is a “public good”, or nonexclusive in the benefits it confers, is true only in a weak sense. Yes, there are external benefits from the education of children, but those are secondary to the personal benefits reaped by the children themselves as they go through life. And even strong public spillover benefits do not imply that government should provision the education itself, free of competition. Economic theory justifying intervention in markets implies only that the public sector should attempt to augment supply; direct production by the public sector is unnecessary and often unwise. Competition among schools will bring forth more of the private and public benefits than a monopoly.

But the public schools are free, and that doesn’t sound like a monopoly, right? Well, no, they aren’t free! Not to taxpayers, of course, but also, not to families with children who are denied the right to fully internalize the true opportunity cost of the resources claimed by public schools. The option to move to a school district with better academic performance is unavailable to many families. What would those families decide given a greater degree of empowerment to consider alternatives?

About 18 months ago, the topic of the K-12 monopoly was the subject of a favorite post on Sacred Cow Chips called: “Public Monopolists Say “Don’t Be Choosy“. It called attention to a thought exercise featured by economist Don Boudreaux on Cafe Hayek. Consumers are very choosy about their food, and they should be. Why shouldn’t they be just as choosy about another essential: the school for their children? Because the government won’t let them! Boudreaux lists factors that would make consumer grocery distribution just like the structure of K-12 education. That includes property taxes to pay for “public” grocery stores and the allotments of food they distribute, assignment of each family to a single public grocery store, but freedom to shop at “private” grocery stores at additional expense. He then asks how the food distribution system would perform. Here’s Boudreaux:

“Being largely protected from consumer choice, almost all public supermarkets would be worse than private ones. In poor counties the quality of public supermarkets would be downright abysmal. ….

Responding to these failures, thoughtful souls would call for ‘supermarket choice’ fueled by vouchers or tax credits. Those calls would be vigorously opposed by public-supermarket administrators and workers.

Opponents of supermarket choice would accuse its proponents of demonizing supermarket workers (who, after all, have no control over their customers’ poor eating habits at home). Advocates of choice would also be accused of trying to deny ordinary families the food needed for survival. Such choice, it would be alleged, would drain precious resources from public supermarkets whose poor performance testifies to their overwhelming need for more public funds.

As for the handful of radicals who call for total separation of supermarket and state—well, they would be criticized by almost everyone as antisocial devils indifferent to the starvation that would haunt the land if the provision of groceries were governed exclusively by private market forces.

In the face of calls for supermarket choice, supermarket-workers unions would use their significant resources for lobbying—in favor of public-supermarkets’ monopoly power and against any suggestion that market forces are appropriate for delivering something as essential as groceries.“

That’s exactly the behavior we see from the teacher’s unions, from which sanctimony flows liberally as to “public service”. Remember that the classic monopolist actively engages in denying choice and restraining trade through private actions, public relations and various other political means. But why would any sane observer have concluded that these “protected markets” would lead to successful outcomes?

It’s no secret that public schools in the U.S. face severe challenges. They are highly uneven in their results. A recent report in U.S. News said the following:

“Since World War II, inflation-adjusted spending per student in American public schools has increased by 663 percent. Where did all of that money go? One place it went was to hire more personnel. Between 1950 and 2009, American public schools experienced a 96 percent increase in student population. During that time, public schools increased their staff by 386 percent – four times the increase in students. The number of teachers increased by 252 percent, over 2.5 times the increase in students. The number of administrators and other staff increased by over seven times the increase in students.“

Federal efforts to improve K-12 education have been remarkably fruitless. Despite the massive increases in staffing over the past 50 years at all levels, graduation rates are still miserable in minority districts; schools are more segregated today than 50 years ago; huge gaps exist between the achievement of students in high and low-income districts; and math scores on standardized tests rank near the bottom of OECD countries, (science and reading scores are closer to the average).

The usual rejoinder from the public school establishment is that still greater funding is needed. Always more…. But families are exercising their right to opt-out. The number of home-schooled children is likely to exceed two million by 2020. There are now programs in 32 states facilitating choice through vouchers, tax credits, tax deductions, and education savings accounts. The body of research surrounding the effects of school choice is overwhelmingly positive: choice has improved academic outcomes in both private schools and the public schools that are forced to compete, it has a positive fiscal impact, and it reduces racial segregation. The constant drumbeat of additional funding requests looks unnecessary and wasteful in view of the options.

As for federal dollars, one suggestion is to pare back sharply the number of bureaucrats at the education department, putting the savings toward a program that would emulate the hugely successful GI Bill, under which beneficiaries chose how to spend the money.

Donald Trump’s nominee for education secretary is school choice advocate Betsy DeVos. Obviously, the new administration will not view the public school monopoly as untouchable. But let’s get one thing straight: no one is trying to “ruin” public schools. The objective is to fix something that’s been broken for a long time and, in so doing, to improve educational outcomes across all segments of society. The medicine delivered thus far, including top-down planning and profligate spending, has been expensive and ineffective, and even counterproductive in some respects. A few bad schools will fail under a competitive regime, but they already do. Bad schools have no sacred right to survive. Most struggling schools will improve, leveraging innovative techniques as well as their natural advantages, which often include proximity to a base of prospective students. It’s time to tackle the education problem by vesting consumers with sovereignty in the choice of schools.

The State and The Invisible Future Lost

14 Sunday Dec 2014

Posted by pnuetz in Uncategorized

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Capital investment, Don Boudreaux, Innovation, Opportunity cost, Prohibition, regulation, Taxes, Technology

Lost opportunities can have far reaching consequences. Our society routinely destroys economic opportunities as a matter of policy. This includes immediate discouragement of economic activity via tax disincentives and regulatory obstacles as well as lost capital investment and innovation. And it includes actions that grant protected status for monopolists, a steady by-product of the regulatory state. Don Boudreaux at Cafe Hayek posts a letter from a reader and his own thoughts on these points. From the letter:

“California has 3,754 wineries and they provide good wines for customers, jobs for employees, profits for owners, and fun places to visit. Imagine if Prohibition had never ended or if regulations were such that a mere five wineries produced all the wine for the entire country. Who would have known what we would have been missing?”

The damage of such policies goes on and on, and the negative effects compound with the passage of time. But those effects are seldom visible when policies are made. We never observe the bounty of the counterfactual when a new plant or shop isn’t built, a new shift isn’t added, a new company isn’t formed, a price increase isn’t discouraged by competition, or when inventions and discoveries aren’t made. From Boudreaux:

“The unseen includes also, and more importantly, the greater and better and completely different goods and services, the newer and safer and less-resource-intensive ways of production, and the more full prospects for human flourishing and the heightened hopes and the improved and expanded life-style options that human creativity – unleashed by free markets and governed by open competition and private property rights – makes possible.”

Technology and the advance of knowledge is a process that builds upon itself. The achievements of recent decades were impossible for us to have imagined beforehand, but much more might have been possible. Looking forward, the opportunities lost to today’s stultifying policies will become more staggering as the decades pass, losses much greater than we can imagine today.