Tag Archives: Jerome Powell

Almost Looks Like the Fed Has a 3% Inflation Target

16 Sunday Nov 2025

Posted by in Inflation, Monetary Policy

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Inflation leveled off below 3% in 2024 and has drifted around the 3% level in 2025. The rate of increase in the core PCE (Personal Consumption Deflator) is the inflation measure of most interest to the Federal Reserve as a policy reference, but advances in the core CPI (Consumer Price Index) have settled at about the same level. The core inflation rates exclude food and energy prices due to the volatility of those components, but even with food and energy, inflation in the PCE and the CPI have been running near 3%.

It’s a 2% Target… Or Is It?

The Fed continues to maintain that its “official” inflation target is 2% for the core PCE. However, the central bank is now easing policy despite inflation running a full percentage point faster than the target. The rationale turns on the Fed’s dual mandate to maintain both “price stability” and full employment, goals that are not always compatible.

Currently, the labor market is showing signs of weakness, so the Fed has elected to ease policy by guiding the federal funds rate downward, and by putting a stop to run-off in its balance sheet holdings of securities. The latter ends a brief period of so-called quantitative tightening.

Just a couple of months ago, the central bank announced a new emphasis on targeting 2% inflation in the long run, with notable differences from the “flexible average inflation targeting” (FAIT) that it claimed to have adopted in 2020. In some respects, the Fed appeared to be giving more primacy to the “2%” definition of price stability than to the full employment mandate. Yet the “new approach” still allows plenty of wiggle room and might not differ much from the approach followed prior to FAIT.

No FAITful Error

Here’s how David Beckworth characterizes the way FAIT ultimately played out. He says that in practice the Fed took:

“… an asymmetric approach to the dual mandate: It would implement makeup policy on misses below the inflation target, and it would respond to shortfalls from maximum employment. These asymmetries, while well- intended, created an inflationary bias that caused FAIT to fail the ‘stress test’ of the 2021–22 inflation surge. This failure caused the Fed to effectively abandon FAIT in early 2022 and become a single-mandate central bank focused on price stability.“

Scott Sumner says the Fed never really really practiced FAIT to begin with. It should have been a symmetric policy, but it wasn’t. During 2021-22, the Fed did not attempt to correct for rising inflation. Instead, it focused on the recessionary effects of Covid and the impingements of Covid-era restrictions on employment.

Clearly, Covid was a shock that monetary policy was ill-suited to address without reinforcing inflation. Furthermore, the pandemic inflation was thought by the Fed to be transitory, but easing policy was a critical error. Stimulating demand via monetary accommodation gave inflation more permanence than the Fed apparently expected.

Lost In the Tea Leaves Again

While a strong commitment to price stability is welcome, it’s not clear that is what’s guiding the Fed’s decisions at the moment. Again, the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge has flattened out at around 3%. However, with uncertainty about tariffs and tariff pass throughs in 2026, the weak dollar, and unrelenting Treasury borrowing, easier monetary conditions could well set the stage for persistent inflation above 3%, despite the official 2% target. That might help explain the failure of longer-term interest rates to decline in the wake of the Fed’s latest quarter-point cut in the federal funds target in October.

Suspicious Minds

Speculation that the Fed is allowing its true inflation target to creep upward is hardly new. Back in June, former New York Fed economist Robert Brusca noted the following:

“A Cleveland Fed survey already has the business community thinking that the REAL target for inflation is 2.5%.”

More recently, Mark Sobel of the Official Monetary and Fiscal Institutions Forum stated that the real target, for now, is probably 3%:

“But could the Fed stealthily and unintentionally end up near 3%? Even apart from above-target inflation in recent years, short- and longer-term structural forces are at play that could usher in slightly higher inflation, notwithstanding Fed speeches on the sanctity of the 2% inflation target.“

Chewing On Data

It’s pretty clear that the Fed has become a skittish about the pace of the real economy, lending more weight to the full employment part of its dual mandate. Employment growth slowed over the past year, partly due to government employee buy-outs and separations of illegal immigrants from their employers. The last official employment report was in early September, however, so the nonfarm payroll data is two months out-of-date:

Private payroll growth from ADP over the past two months has not looked especially encouraging:

Tariffs and weakened profit margins have likely had a contractionary effect, and the six-week government shutdown just ended will shave 0.5% or more off fourth quarter GDP growth. Furthermore, while money (M2) growth has accelerated over the past year, it remains fairly restrained.

And the monetary base has been pretty flat for most of 2025:

We’ll see where these aggregates go from here. The extended “restraint” might now be of some concern to the Fed, given recent doubts about employment and economic growth. Still, in October, Fed Chairman Jerome Powell said that another quarter-point cut in the federal funds rate target in December was not a foregone conclusion. That statement seems to have worried equity investors while offering little solace to bond investors.

Aborted Landing

If (and as long as) the Fed gives primacy or greater weight in its policy deliberations to employment than inflation, it might as well have adopted an inflation target of 3% or more. The additional erosion in purchasing power wrought by that leniency is bad enough, but the effect of monetary policy on the real side of the economy is more poorly understood than its effect on nominal variables. The Fed’s shift in priorities is both unreliable on the real side and dangerous in terms of price stability. These concerns are even more salient given the upcoming appointment (in May) of a new Fed Chairman by President Trump, who seems eager for easy money.

Indecorously Jaw-Boning an Unhurried Fed

21 Saturday Jun 2025

Posted by in Inflation, Monetary Policy

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President Trump engaged in one of his favorite pastimes on June 18 while the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) was concluding its meeting on the direction of monetary policy. He publicly called Fed Chairman Jerome Powell “stupid” for not having cut rates already, and later said the Fed’s board was “complicit”.

“”I don’t know why the Board doesn’t override this Total and Complete Moron!“

Trump also tagged Powell with one of his trademark appellations: “Too Late”. Yep, that’s how Trump says he refers to Powell.

Later that day, the Fed once again announced that it had decided to leave unchanged its target range for the interest rate on federal funds. Powell described the overall tenor of current Fed policy as mildly restrictive, but FOMC members still “expect” (loosely speaking) two quarter-point cuts in the funds rate by year end.

Of course, Powell and the FOMC really were far too late in recognizing that inflation was more than transitory in 2021-22. Now, with inflation measures tapering but still higher than the Fed’s 2% target, Trump says “Too Late” Powell and the Fed are again behind the curve. Of course, because the central bank is outside the President’s direct control, it makes a convenient scapegoat for whatever might ail the Trump economy, and Trump frets that unnecessarily high rates will cost the U.S. Treasury hundreds of billions in interest on new and refinanced federal debt.

The President has no appreciation for the value of an independent central bank, as opposed to one captive to the fiscal whims of Presidents and Congress. Despite his frequent criticism of inflationary sins of the past, Trump doesn’t understand the dangers of a central bank that could be bullied into inflating away government debt.

The day after the Fed’s meeting, Trump said rates should be cut immediately by a huge 2.5%! As the Donald might say, no one’s ever seen anything like it!

Trump, however, is delusional to think the Fed can engineer reductions in the spectrum of interest rates by aggressively slashing its fed funds target. The Fed does not control long-term interest rates, nor is that part of the Fed’s formal mandate. In fact, an aggressively large reduction in the fed funds rate is likely to backfire, feeding expectations of higher inflation and a selloff in credit markets.

Let me reiterate: the Fed does not control long-term interest rates. Short-term rates are more heavily influenced by the Fed’s rate actions, and by expectations of Fed policy, but the Fed is likewise influenced by those very expectations. In fact, the Fed often follows market rates rather than leading them. In any case, a general truth is that long-term interest rates go where market forces direct them, not where the Fed might try to push them.

Today the Fed is attempting to walk a line between precipitating divergent and potentially negative outcomes. It wants to see clear evidence that inflation is settling down at roughly the 2% target. Also, the Fed is wary that Trump’s tariffs might generate a near-term spike in prices. Under those circumstances, prematurely easing policy could rekindle more permanent inflationary pressures. It seems clear that the Fed currently judges inflation as the dominant risk.

At the same time, the real economy shows mixed signals. Clear signs of a downturn would likely prompt the Fed to cut its fed funds target sooner. After the latest meeting, the Fed announced that it had reduced its own forecast for real GDP growth in 2025 to just 1.4%. Recent employment gains have been moderate, but jobless claims are trending up. The unemployment rate is low, but the labor force has declined over the past few months, which incidentally might be putting upward pressure on wages.

Policy uncertainty was a major theme in the Fed’s June rate decision. Tariffs loom large and would be a threat to continued growth if producers, facing weak demand, were unable to pass the cost of tariffs through to customers, undermining their profit margins. Prospects for passage of the budget reconciliation bill create more uncertainty, providing another rationale to stand pat without cutting the funds rate.

Again, Jerome Powell says that Fed policy is “modestly restrictive” at present. In fact, estimates of the “policy neutral” Fed funds rate are in the vicinity of 2.75%, well below the current target range of 4.25-4.50. However, the money supply (M2) has drifted up over the past year and by May was up 4.4% from a year earlier. That would be consistent with 2% inflation and better than 2% real growth, the latter being higher than the FOMC’s expectation.

Another consideration is that the Fed has nearly ended its quantitative tightening (QT) program, having recently trimmed the passive runoff of maturing securities in its portfolio to just $5 billion per month. This leads to less downward pressure on bank reserves and less upward pressure on the fed funds rate. In other words, policy has already shifted toward greater support for money growth. But out of caution, the Fed wants to defer reductions in the funds rate to avoid undermining the central bank’s inflation-fighting credibility.

Jerome Powell and the FOMC probably could not care less about Trump’s exhortations to reduce interest rates. For one thing, it is beyond the Fed’s power to force down rates that could spur housing and other economic activity. And Trump should be grateful: such a reckless attempt would risk great harm to markets and the economy, not to mention Trump’s economic agenda. Better to wait until near-term inflation risks and policy uncertainty clear up.

Trump can jawbone as aggressively as he wants. He cannot fire Powell, though he keeps saying he “should”. However, no matter what actions the Fed takes, he will almost certainly not reappoint Powell to lead the Fed when Powell’s term expires next May. Sadly, Trump will try to appoint a replacement he can rely upon to do his bidding. Let’s hope the Senate stands in his way to preserve Fed independence.

Will DOGE Hunt? Bond Market Naturally Defers

21 Friday Feb 2025

Posted by in DOGE, Public debt

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Matt Yglesias tweeted on X that “the bond market does not appear to believe in DOGE”. He included a chart much like the updated one above to “prove” his point. Tyler Cowen posted a link to the tweet on Marginal Revolution, without comment … Cowen surely must know that any such conclusion is premature, especially based on the movement of Treasury yields over the past month (or more, since the market’s evaluation of the DOGE agenda preceded Trump’s inauguration).

Of course, there is a difference between “believing” in DOGE and being convinced that its efforts should have succeeded in reducing interest rates immediately amidst waves of background noise from budget and tax legislation, court challenges, Federal Reserve missteps (this time cutting rates too soon), and the direction of the economy in general.

In this case, perhaps a better way to define success for DOGE is a meaningfully negative impact on the future supply of Treasury debt. Even that would not guarantee a decline in Treasury rates, so the premise of Yglesias’ tweet is somewhat shaky to begin with. Still, all else equal, we’d expect to see some downward pressure on yields if DOGE succeeds in this sense. But we must go further by recognizing that DOGE savings could well be reallocated to other spending initiatives. Then, the savings would not translate into lower supplies of Treasury debt after all.

Certainly, the DOGE team has made progress in identifying wasteful expenditures, inefficiencies, and poor controls on spending. But even if the $55 billion of estimated savings to date is reliable, DOGE has a long way to go to reach Musk’s stated objective of $2 trillion. There are some juicy targets, but it will be tough to get there in 17 more months, when DOGE is to stand down. Still, it’s not unreasonable to think DOGE might succeed in accomplishing meaningful deficit reduction.

But if bond traders have doubts about DOGE, it’s partly because Donald Trump and Elon Musk themselves keep giving them reasons. In my view, Musk and Trump have made a major misstep in toying with the idea of using prospective DOGE savings to fund “dividend checks” of $5,000 for all Americans. These would be paid by taking 20% of the guesstimated $2 trillion of DOGE savings. Musk’s expression of interest in the idea was followed by a bit of clusterfuckery, as Musk walked back his proposal the next day even as Trump jumped on board. PLEASE Elon, don’t give the Donald any crowd-pleasing ideas! And don’t lose sight of the underlying objective to reduce the burden of government and the public debt.

Now, Trump proposes that 60% of the savings accomplished by DOGE be put toward paying for outlays in future years. Sure, that’s deficit reduction, but it may serve to dull the sense that shrinking the federal government is an imperative. The mechanics of this are unclear, but as a first pass, I’d say the gain from investing DOGE savings for a year in low-risk instruments is unlikely to outweigh the foregone savings in interest costs from paying off debt today! Of course, that also depends on the future direction of interest rates, but it’s not a good bet to make with public funds.

Nor can the bond market be comforted by uncertainty surrounding legislation that would not only extend the Trump tax cuts, but will probably include various spending provisions, both cuts and increases. As of now, the mix of provisions that might accompany a deal among GOP factions is very much up in the air.

There is also trepidation about Trump’s aggressive stance toward the Federal Reserve. He promises to replace Jerome Powell as Fed Chairman, but with God knows whom? And Trump jawbones aggressively for lower rates. The Fed’s ill-advised rate cuts in the fall might have been motivated in part by an attempt to capitulate to the then-President Elect.

Trump’s Executive Order to create a sovereign wealth fund (SWF), which I recently discussed here, is probably not the most welcome news to bond investors. All else equal, placing tax or tariff revenue into such a fund would reduce the potential for deficit reduction, to say nothing of the idiocy of additional borrowing to purchase assets.

Finally, Trump has proposed what might later prove to be massive foreign policy trial balloons. Some of these are bound up with the creation of the SWF. They might generate revenue for the government without borrowing (mineral rights in Ukraine? Or Greenland?), but at this point there’s also a chance they’ll create massive funding needs (Gaza development?). Again, Trump seems to be prodding or testing counterparties to various negotiations… prodding diplomacy. It’s unlikely that anything too drastic will come of it from a fiscal perspective, but it probably doesn’t leave bond traders feeling easy.

At this stage, it’s pretty rash to conclude that the bond market “doesn’t believe in DOGE”. In fact, there is no doubt that DOGE is making some progress in identifying potential fraud and inefficiencies. However, bond traders must weigh a wide range of considerations, and Donald Trump has a tendency to kick up dust. Indeed, the so-called DOGE dividend will undermine confidence in debt reduction and bond prices.

The Fed Tiptoes Through Lags and an Endless Fiscal Thicket

04 Wednesday Sep 2024

Posted by in Inflation, Monetary Policy

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The late, great Milton Friedman said monetary policy has “long and variable lags” in its effect on the economy. Easy money might not spark an inflation in goods prices for two years or more, though the typical lag is thought to be more like 15-20 months. Tight money seems to have similar lags in its effects. Debates surround the division and timing of these effects between inflation and real GDP, and too many remain convinced that a reliable tradeoff exists between inflation and unemployment.

With that preface, where do we stand today? The Fed executed a veritable helicopter drop of cash during the pandemic, in concert with support payments by the Treasury, with predictable inflationary results. It was also, in part, an accommodation to supply-side pressures. Then the tightening of policy began in the spring of 2022. How will the timing and strength of these shifting policies ultimately play out, as well as the impact of expectations regarding future policy moves?

Help On the Way?

Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell and the Fed’s Open Market Committee (FOMC) are now poised to ease policy after three-plus years of a tighter policy stance. The FOMC is widely expected to cut its short-term interest rate target by a quarter point at the next FOMC on September 17-18. There is an outside chance that the Fed will cut the target by a half point, depending on the strength of new data to be released over the next couple of weeks. In particular, this Friday’s employment report looms large.

What sometimes goes unacknowledged is that the Fed will be following market rates downward, not leading them. The chart below shows the steep drop in the one-year Treasury yield over the past couple of months. Other rates have declined as well. Granted, longer rates are determined in large part by expectations of future short-term rates over which the Fed has more control.

And yet the softening of market rates may well be a signal of weaker economic activity. There is certainly concern among investors that a failure by the Fed to ease policy might jeopardize the much hoped-for “soft landing”. The lagged effects of the Fed’s tighter policy stance may drag on, with damage to the real economy and the labor market. Indeed, some assert that a recession remains a strong possibility (and see here), and the manufacturing sector has been in a state of contraction for five months.

On the other hand, the Fed has fallen short of its 2% inflation goal. The core PCE deflator, the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge, was up 2.6% for the year ending in July. Some observers fear that easing policy prematurely will lead to a new acceleration of inflation.

Powell Gives the Nod

Nevertheless, markets were relieved when Jerome Powell, in his recent speech in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, indicated his determination that a shift in policy was appropriate. From Bloomberg:

“Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell said ‘the time has come’ for the central bank to start cutting interest rates.

“Powell’s comments cemented expectations for a rate cut at the central bank’s next gathering in September. The Fed chief said the cooling of the labor market is ‘unmistakable,’ adding, ‘We do not seek or welcome further cooling in labor market conditions.’ Powell also said his confidence has grown that inflation is on a ‘sustainable path’ back to the Fed’s goal of 2%.“

The “sustainable path back to … 2%” might imply a view inside Fed that policy will remain somewhat restrictive even after a quarter or half-point rate cut in September. Or perhaps the “sustainable path” has to do with the aforementioned lags, which might continue to be operative regardless of any immediate change in policy. The feasibility of a “soft landing” depends on whether policy is indeed still restrictive or on how benign those lagged effects turn out to be. But if we take the lags seriously, an easing of policy wouldn’t have real economic force for perhaps 15 months. Still, the market puts great hope in the salutary effects of a move by the Fed to ease policy.

Big Balance Sheet

It can be argued that the Fed already took a step toward easing policy in May when it reduced the rate at which it was allowing runoff in its portfolio of Treasury and mortgage-backed securities. Prior to that, it had been redeeming $95 billion of maturing securities a month. The new runoff amount is $60 billion per month. Unless neutralized in other ways, the runoff has a contractionary effect on bank reserves and the money supply. It is known as “quantitative tightening” (QT). but then the May announcement was a de facto easing in the degree of QT.

Thus far, the total reduction in the Fed’s portfolio has amounted to only $1.7 trillion from the original high-water mark of $8.9 trillion. Here is a chart showing the recent evolution in the size of the Fed’s securities holdings.

The Fed’s current balance sheet of $7.2 trillion is gigantic by historical standards. It’s reasonable to ask why the Fed considers what we have now to be a more “normalized” portfolio, and whether its size (and correspondingly, the money supply) represents potential “dry tinder” for future inflation. It remains to be seen whether the Fed will further pare the rate of portfolio runoff in the months ahead.

Money growth had been running negative for roughly a year and a half, but it edged closer to zero in late 2023 before accelerating to a slow, positive rate a few months into 2024. The timing didn’t exactly correspond to the Fed’s slowing of portfolio runoff. Nevertheless, the Fed’s strong preference is to supply the banking system with “ample reserves”, and reserves drive money growth. Thus, the Fed’s reaction to conditions in the market for reserves was a factor allowing money growth to accelerate.

A Cut Too Soon?

A rate cut later this month will make reserves still more ample and support additional money growth. And again, this will be an effort to mediate the negative impact of earlier policy tightness, but the effect of this move on the economy will be subject to similar lags.

A danger is that the Fed might be easing too soon, so that inflation will fail to taper to the 2% goal and possibly accelerate again. And perhaps policy was not quite as tight as it needed to be to achieve the 2% goal. Now, new supply bottlenecks are cropping up, including a near shutdown of shipping through the Suez Canal and a potential strike by east coast dockworkers.

Fiscal Incontinence

An even greater threat now, and in the years ahead, is the massive pressure placed on the economy and the Fed by excessive federal spending and Treasury borrowing. The growth of federal debt over the 12 months ending in July was almost 10%. Total federal debt stands at about $35 trillion. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections, federal debt held by the public will be almost $28 trillion by the end of 2024 (the rest the public debt is held by the Fed or federal agencies). The CBO also projects that the federal budget deficit will average almost $1.7 trillion annually through 2027 before rising to $2.6 trillion by 2034. That would bring federal debt held by the public to more than $48 trillion.

Inflation is receding ever so slowly for now, but it’s unclear that investors will remain comfortable that growth in the public debt can be paid down by future surpluses. If not, the only way its real value can be reduced is through higher prices. Most observers believe such an inflation requires that the Fed monetize federal debt (buy it from the public with printed money). Tighter credit markets will increase pressure on the Fed to do so, but the growing debt burden is likely to exert upward pressure on the prices of goods with or without accommodation by the Fed.

Hard, Soft, Or Aborted Landing?

Some economists are convinced that the Fed has successfully engineered a “soft landing”. I might have to eat some crow…. I felt that a “hard landing” was inevitable from the start of this tightening phase. Even now I would not discount the possibility of a recession late this year or in early 2025. And perhaps we’ll get no “landing” at all. The Fed’s expected policy shift together with the fiscal outlook could presage not just a failure to get inflation down to the Fed’s 2% target, but a subsequent resurgence in price inflation.

Stubborn Inflation and the Fed’s Approach Trajectory

15 Monday Jan 2024

Posted by in Economic Outlook, Monetary Policy

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When Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell said “higher for longer” last year, it wasn’t about the Grateful Dead concerts he’s attended over the years. No, he meant the Fed might need to raise its short-term interest rate target and/or keep it elevated for an extended period to squeeze inflation out of the economy. As late as December, Powell said that additional rate hikes remain on the table. But short of that, the Fed might keep its current target rate steady until inflation is solidly in-line with its 2% objective. The obvious risk is that tight monetary policy might tip the economy into recession. The market, for its part, is pricing in several rate cuts this year.

Thus far, the release of key economic data for December 2023 has not settled the debate as to whether disinflation has truly paused short of the Fed’s goal. There were inauspicious signs from the labor market in December as well. These data releases don’t rule out a “soft landing”, but they indicate that recession risks are still with us in 2024. The Fed will face a dilemma if the economy weakens but inflation fails to abate, either due to residual stickiness or new supply shocks. The latter are unfolding even now with the shut down of Red Sea shipping.

Bad Employment Report

On the surface, the employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) was strong relative to expectations, and the media reported it on that superficial level: nonfarm payrolls increased by 216,000 jobs, about 45,000 more than expected; unemployment was unchanged from November at 3.7%.

Unfortunately, the report contained several ominous signs:

1) Employment from the BLS Household Survey declined by 683,000 in December and is essentially flat since July. This discrepancy should be rather unsettling to anyone waving off the possibility of a recession.

2) The number of full-time workers decreased by 1.53 million in December, and the number of part-time workers increased by 762,000 as the holidays approached. Retail employment was not particularly strong however, and the big loss of full-time work stands in contrast to the “strong-report” narrative.

3) The number of multiple jobholders hit a record and increased by 556,000 over the past year. This might indicate trouble for some workers making ends meet.

5) The civilian labor force declined by 676,000. What accounts for the change in status among these former workers or job seekers?

6) From the BLS Establishment Survey, government hiring accounted for 24% of the nonfarm jobs filled in December. Social Services accounted for 10% of the new hiring and health care for 18%, both of which are heavily dependent on government.

7) Nonfarm payrolls were revised downward by a total of 71,000 for October and November. We’ve seen downward revisions for 10 of the past 11 months.

8) In total, initial monthly job reports in 2023 overstated the full-year gain in nonfarm employment after available revisions by 439,000.

Those are big qualifiers on the “stronger than expected” jobs report. Furthermore, I tend to discount new government jobs as a real engine of production possibilities, so the report didn’t offer much assurance about the economy’s momentum. In addition, there are estimates that the payroll gain was due to better weather than the seasonal adjustment factors indicate.

Fictional Payroll Gains?

Still other issues cast doubt on the BLS payroll numbers. First, they are based on a survey of employers that is not complete by the time of each month’s initial report. Second, the survey is heavily skewed toward employees of government and large corporations; the sample of small employers is light by comparison. Third, seasonal adjustments often swamp the unadjusted changes in payrolls.

Finally, the BLS uses a statistical model of business births/deaths to adjust the figures. This is intended to correct for a lag in survey coverage as new businesses are formed and others close. The net effect on the payroll estimate can be positive or negative. Unfortunately, it’s difficult for even the BLS to tell how much the birth/death model affects the headline nonfarm jobs figure in any particular month. Therefore, it’s tough to put much faith in the monthly reports, but we watch them anyway.

Stubborn Inflation

The Consumer Price Index (CPI) for December increased 0.3% over November and 3.4% year-over-year, slightly more than expectations of 0.2% and 3.2%, respectively. The “core” CPI (excluding food and energy prices) rose 3.9% year-over-year, more than the 3.8% expected. The core rate declined on a one-month and year-over-year basis, however, as did the median item in the CPI.

All CPI measures in the chart declined during 2023, though the core and median lagged the headline CPI (green line), which “flattened” somewhat during the last half of the year. So there appears to be some stickiness hindering disinflation in the CPI at this point, but the apparent “stickiness” has been confined to lagging declines in housing costs (also see here).

The Producer Price Index (PPI) reported a day later was thought to be benign. Like the CPI, disinflation in the core PPI has tapered:

In this context, it should be noted that declines in the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge, the PCE deflator, have also undergone something of a pause, and the PCE weights housing costs much less heavily than the CPI.

The CPI and PPI reports don’t offer any reason for the Fed to reduce its target federal funds rate over the next couple of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings. There are two more sets of monthly inflation reports before the meeting in late March, so things could change. But again, the Fed has given ample guidance that it might have to leave its target rate at the current level for an extended period.

The Market View

Markets had priced-in six cuts in the Fed funds rate target in 2024 prior to the CPI report, but traders began to discount that possibility in its immediate aftermath. However, members of the FOMC expected an average of three cuts in 2024, with more to come in 2025, whether or not that’s consistent with “higher for longer”. Inflation is hovering somewhat above the Fed’s goal, but getting the rest of the job done might be tough, and indeed, might imply “longer” if not “higher”.

But why did the market ever hold the expectation of six cuts this year? Traders must have anticipated an economic contraction, which would kick the Fed into rapid response mode. The employment report offered no assurance that such a “hard landing” will be avoided. A few more negative signals on the real economy without further progress on prices would provide quite a test of the Fed’s inflation-fighting resolve.

The Perils of Powell: Inflation, Illiquid Banks, Lonnng Lags

01 Saturday Apr 2023

Posted by in Inflation, Monetary Policy

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To the great chagrin of some market watchers, the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) increased its target for the federal funds rate in March by 0.25 points, to range of 4.75 – 5%. This was pretty much in line with plans the FOMC made plain in the fall. The “surprise” was that this increase took place against a backdrop of liquidity shortfalls in the banking system, which also had taken many by surprise. Perhaps a further surprise was that after a few days of reflection, the market didn’t seem to mind the rate hike all that much.

Switchman Sleeping

There’s plenty of blame to go around for bank liquidity problems. Certain banks and their regulators (including the Fed) somehow failed to anticipate that carrying large, unhedged positions in low-rate, long-term bonds might at some point alarm large depositors as interest rates rose. Those banks found themselves way short of funds needed to satisfy justifiably skittish account holders. A couple of banks were closed, but the FDIC agreed to insure all of their depositors. As the lender of last resort, the Fed provided banks with “credit facilities” to ease the liquidity crunch. In a matter of days, the fresh credit expanded the Fed’s balance sheet, offsetting months of “quantitative tightening” that had taken place since last June.

Of course, the Fed is no stranger to dozing at the switch. Historically, the central bank has failed to anticipate changes wrought by its own policy actions. Today’s inflation is a prime example. That kind of difficulty is to be expected given the “long and variable lags” in the effects of monetary policy on the economy. It makes activist policy all the more hazardous, leading to the kinds of “boom and bust” cycles described in Austrian business cycle theory.

Persistent Inflation

When the Fed went forward with the 25 basis point hike in the funds rate target in March, it was greeted with dismay by those still hopeful for a “soft landing”. In the Fed’s defense, one could say the continued effort to tighten policy is an attempt to make up for past sins, namely the Fed’s monetary profligacy during the pandemic.

The Fed’s rationale for this latest rate hike was that inflation remains persistent. Here are four CPI measures from the Cleveland Fed, which show some recent tapering of price pressures. Perhaps “flattening” would be a better description, at least for the median CPI:

Those are 12-month changes, and just in case you’ve heard that month-to-month changes have tapered more sharply, that really wasn’t the case in January and February:

Jason Furman noted in a series of tweets that the prices of services are driving recent inflation, while goods prices have been flat:

A compelling argument is that the shelter component of the CPI is overstating services inflation, and it’s weighted at more than one-third of the overall index. CPI shelter costs are known as “owner’s equivalent rent” (OER), which is based on a survey question of homeowners as to the rents they think they could command, and it is subject to a fairly long lag. Actual rent inflation has slowed sharply since last summer, so the shelter component is likely to relieve pressure on CPI inflation (and the Fed) in coming months. Nevertheless, Furman points out that CPI inflation over the past 3 -4 months was up even when housing is excluded. Substituting a private “new rent” measure of housing costs for OER would bring measured inflation in services closer the Fed’s comfort zone, however.

The Fed’s preferred measure of inflation, the deflator for personal consumption expenditures (PCE), uses a much lower weight on housing costs, though it might also overstate inflation within that component. Here’s another chart from the Cleveland Fed:

Inflation in the Core PCE deflator, which excludes food and energy prices, looks as if it’s “flattened” as well. This persistence is worrisome because inflation is difficult to stop once it becomes embedded in expectations. That’s exactly what the Fed says it’s trying to prevent.

Rate Targets and Money Growth

Targeting the federal funds rate (FFR) is the Fed’s primary operational method of conducting monetary policy. The FFR is the rate at which banks borrow from one another overnight to meet short-term needs for reserves. In order to achieve price stability, the Fed would do better to focus directly on controlling the money supply. Nevertheless, it has successfully engineered a decline in the money supply beginning last April, and recently the money supply posted year-over-year negative growth.

That doesn’t mean money growth has been “optimized” in any sense, but a slowdown in money growth was way overdue after the pandemic money creation binge. You might not like the way the Fed executed the reversal or its operating policy in general, and neither do I, but it did restrain money growth. In that sense, I applaud the Fed for exercising its independence, standing up to the Treasury rather than continuing to monetize yawning federal deficits. That’s encouraging, but at some point the Fed will reverse course and ease policy. We’ll probably hope in vain that the Fed can avoid sending us once again along the path of boom and bust cycles.

In effect, the FFR target is a price control with a dynamic element: the master fiddles with the target whenever economic conditions are deemed to suggest a change. This “controlled” rate has a strong influence on other short-term interest rates. The farther out one goes on the maturity spectrum, however, the weaker is the association between changes in the funds rate and other interest rates. The Fed doesn’t truly “control” those rates of most importance to consumers, corporate borrowers, government borrowers, and investors. It definitely influences those rates, but credit risk, business opportunities, and long-term expectations are often dominant.

The FOMC’s latest rate increase suggests its members don’t expect an immediate downturn in economic activity or a definitive near-term drop in inflation. The Committee may, however, be willing to pause for a period of several meeting cycles (every six weeks) to see whether the “long and variable lags” in the transmission of tighter monetary policy might begin to kick-in. As always, the FOMC’s next step will be “data dependent”, as Chairman Powell likes to say. In the meantime, the economic response to earlier tightening moves is likely to strengthen. Lenders are responding to the earlier rate hikes and reduced lending margins by curtailing credit and attempting to rebuild their own liquidity.

Is It Supply Or Demand?

There’s an ongoing debate about whether monetary policy is appropriate for fighting this episode of inflation. It’s true that monetary policy is ill-suited to addressing supply disruptions, though it can help to stem expectations that might cause supply-side price pressures to feed upon themselves (and prevent them from becoming demand-side pressures). However, profligate fiscal and monetary policy did much to create the current inflation, which is pressure on the demand-side. On that point, David Beckworth leaves little doubt as to where he stands:

“The real world is nominal. And nominal PCE was about $1.6 trillion above trend thru February. Unless one believes in immaculate above-trend spending, this huge surge could 𝙣𝙤𝙩 have happened without support from fiscal and monetary policy.”

In reality, this inflationary episode was borne of a mix of demand and supply-side pressures, and policy either caused or accommodated all of it. Nevertheless, it’s interesting to consider efforts to decompose these forces. This NBER paper attributed about 2/3 of inflation from December 2019 – June 2022 to the demand-side. Given the ongoing tenor of fiscal policy and the typical policy lags, it’s likely that the effects of fiscal and monetary stimulus have persisted well beyond that point. Here is a page from the San Francisco Fed’s site that gives an edge to supply-side factors, as reflected in this breakdown of the Fed’s favorite inflation gauge:

Of course, all of these decompositions are based on assumptions and are, at best, model-based. Nevertheless, to the extent that we still face supply constraints, they would impose limits to the Fed’s ability to manage inflation downward without a “hard landing”.

There’s also no doubt that supply side policies would reduce the kinds of price pressures we’re now experiencing. Regulation and restrictive energy policies under the Biden Administration have eroded productive capacity. These policies could be reversed if political leaders were serious about improving the nation’s economic health.

The Dark Runway Ahead

Will we have a recession? And when? There are no definite signs of an approaching downturn in the real economy just yet. Inventories of goods did account for more than half of the fourth quarter gain in GDP, which may now be discouraging production. There are layoffs in some critical industries such as tech, but we’ll have to see whether there is new evidence of overall weakness in next Friday’s employment report. Real wages have been a little down to flat over the past year, while consumer debt is climbing and real retail sales have trended slightly downward since last spring. Many firms will experience higher debt servicing costs going forward. So it’s not clear that the onset of recession is close at hand, but the odds are good that we’ll see a downturn as the year wears on, especially with credit increasingly scarce in the wake of the liquidity pinch at banks. But no one knows for sure, including the Fed.

The Employment Situation: Where’s the Recession?

14 Wednesday Dec 2022

Posted by in Economic Outlook

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It’s always hard to foresee dramatic turns in the economy and their timing. One day, way back in grad school, a professor of mine went on about how the Great Depression seemed to surprise people at the time. He felt they should have known it was coming, and he emphasized that housing had been in a downturn starting around 1926. Well, hindsight’s 20/20, and I’m not sure how timely and accurate economic reporting was at the time, but today it’s not any easier to call recessions in advance.

An Array of Weak Signals

We’ve seen a downturn in housing this year, and for that and several other reasons many forecasters are predicting a recession in 2023. Consumers are depleting their savings and running up debt, and in November consumer confidence dropped for a fourth month in a row. In October, the Index of Leading Economic Indicators declined for an eighth straight month. A slump in business confidence has been underway for 12 months. Businesses are accumulating debt at much higher interest rates, and the earnings outlook (excluding energy) is bleak.

Buttressing that negative outlook is the inverted yield curve, which has been reliable (though not infallible) as a recession signal in the past. We now have a gap between the one-year Treasury yield and the 10-year Treasury yield of well over 100 basis points, which is as high as it’s been since 1981. That looks rather ominous.

The Fed’s Mission

Perhaps most importantly, the Federal Reserve has succeeded in reducing the money supply. That shift to tightening policy really only began in the late spring, however, and as Milton Friedman emphasized, the impact of money supply growth on the real economy is subject to “long and variable lags”. That could mean an economic slowdown or recession any time from now into 2024, but many analysts believe it will begin in the first half of 2023.

Denialists

Yet a few observers claim things are rosy, not least of all those within the Biden Administration. They insist the economy is in fine shape, pointing to the continuing strength in some of the employment numbers. Those gains have also been a preoccupation of the media, but employment statistics aren’t especially good predictors of changes in economic growth. Job growth and unemployment are lagging indicators, so we shouldn’t expect to see obvious signals of recession from employment data, at least until a downturn is underway. Even the Fed’s official economic forecast still calls for something of a “soft landing”, but Chairman Jerome Powell is wary of placing much confidence in particular outcomes, and with good reason.

The Employment Situation

There are unusual patterns in recent employment data that might portend a weaker economy, but first, the statistics most widely followed are changes in non-farm employment (from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Survey of Business Establishments) and the unemployment rate (from the BLS Household Survey). The chart below shows monthly changes in nonfarm payrolls over the past year. There was a still-healthy gain in payrolls in November, but the pace of job growth slowed over the last twelve months as we came off the post-pandemic rebound.

One factor partly offsetting recent gains in non-farm employment is a decrease in the average workweek. Average weekly hours declined slightly in November and it was down 0.4 hours from a year earlier.

There are sectors of the economy that have shown recent weakness in payroll jobs. There was a decline in goods-producing employment in November, and layoffs are underway in the tech sector, a first for some of the big tech firms. Job reductions have also been announced at a few prominent financial firms.

The next chart shows that the unemployment rate has remained near post-pandemic lows since early this year. An ongoing factor helping to keep it low, however, is that labor force participation is still running below pre-pandemic levels (despite rebounding well off pandemic lows during 2021). You aren’t counted as unemployed if you don’t participate in the labor force by seeking work.

One negative sign here is an uptick over the past two months in the share of job losers among the unemployed (as opposed to quitters or new entrants). That’s a pattern that would become more pronounced when and if a recession takes hold.

Keep in mind that these statistics are derived from surveys and extrapolated to the universe of households or non-farm employees. The Household Survey samples 60,000 households, whereas the Establishment Survey samples 131,000 employers, accounting for 670,000 employees. So the Household Survey is much smaller. Nevertheless, sample sizes of these magnitudes should be highly reliable, even for most subcategories.

Contradictory BLS Surveys

There are a few other possible signs of a weakening labor market in recent employment data. One such development is a gap between new job numbers from the Establishment Survey (non-farm payrolls) and the Household Survey (total employment). The following table (taken from the December 2nd BLS Report for households) is from a series of tweets by Elise Gould:

Total employment from the Household Survey has actually declined by almost 470,000 the past two months, while non-farm payrolls have increased by a total of over 500,000. Turning points in employment from the Household Survey tend to lead non-farm payrolls, so this could foretell a softening. While the Household Survey is smaller than the Establishment Survey, it is broader in some respects, covering several categories of workers who aren’t counted on non-farm payrolls, including agricultural workers and the self-employed. The latter are a more significant part of the employed population given the rise in the so-called gig economy. Self-employed workers (unincorporated) have declined by more than 170,000 over the past two months. However, it’s not clear that these workers would be affected earlier than others around turning points.

A separate employment report by ADP Research noted a sharp slowdown in private sector hiring in November, with the most weakness in construction and interest rate sensitive industries. The report also noted that fewer workers are leaving jobs voluntarily.

Is the Labor Market Tight Or Loose?

Nominal wages are rising at an accelerating pace, which might make it more difficult for the Fed to rein-in inflation. However, wages are still rising less than prices — as of October, real hourly earnings had declined 1.9% over the past year. November will mark 20 straight months of declines in the real wage. The drop in real weekly earnings is even steeper, given a slight decline in the average workweek. If we’re looking for a silver lining, inflation and declines in real earnings mean that employers have gained additional incentive to hire. Perhaps that can be offered as one reason for persistent strength in the payroll numbers.

There are still more than 10 million job openings across the country, but only 6 million workers are unemployed. Again, many would-be job candidates are sitting things out. (Perhaps they are mostly terrible candidates, given their apparent disinterest in work.) Some observers assume this means that the labor market is extremely tight, yet real wages are declining, as if there were an excess supply of workers! The answer to this “puzzle” is that many vacancies are ultimately filled by candidates who were already employed. Also, there is a large number of underemployed workers. Thus, the available pool of candidates is much larger than the number available due to unemployment. It’s not outlandish to think that there is actually an excess supply of labor at the moment, rather than excess demand, but that doesn’t bode well for real wage gains going forward.

Conclusion

Despite an ostensibly strong labor market, there are reasons to think that strength is waning, even without appeal to other economic and financial indicators. The BLS household survey showed recent declines in employment, as did the ADP survey, and we’ve seen an increase in the share of job losers among the unemployed. High-profile layoff announcements should also give pause. The recessionary outlook is reinforced by a number of other indicators, but most of all, the Federal Reserve’s tightening of the money supply is bound to have a stronger impact on the economy in 2023, and the Fed is not finished tightening yet.