Tag Archives: Externalities

COVID Externalities: the Costs and Benefits of Intervention

13 Sunday Dec 2020

Posted by in Coronavirus, Public Health, Social Costs

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This post offers a simple representation of the argument against public non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to subdue the COVID-19 pandemic. The chart below features two lines, one representing the presumed life-saving benefits of lockdown measures or NPI stringency, and another representing the costs inflicted by those measures. The values on the axes here are not critical, though measures of stringency exist (e.g., the University of Oxford Stringency Index) and take values from zero to 100.

The benefits of lives saved due to NPI stringency are assigned a value on the vertical axis, as are the costs of lives lost due to deferred health care, isolation, and other stressors caused by stringency. In addition, there are the more straightforward losses caused by suspending economic activity, which should be included in costs.

One can think of the benefits curve as representing gains from forcing individuals, via lockdown measures, to internalize the external costs of risk inflicted on others. However, this curve captures only benefits incremental to those achieved through voluntary action. Thus, NPI benefits include only extra gains from coercing individuals to internalize risks, while losses from NPI stringency are captured by the cost curve.

My contention is that the benefits of stringency diminish and may in fact turn down at some point, and that costs always increase in the level of stringency. In the chart, for what it’s worth, the “optimal” level of stringency would be at a value of 2, where the difference between total benefits and total costs is maximized (and where the benefits of incremental stringency are equal to the marginal costs or losses). However, I am not convinced that the benefits of lockdown measures ever exceed costs, as they do in the chart above. That is, voluntary action may be sufficient. But if the benefits of NPIs do exceed costs, it’s likely to be only at low levels of stringency.

To the extent that people are aware of the pandemic and recognize risk, the external costs of possible infectiousness are already internalized to some degree. Moreover, there is mutual risk in most interactions, and all individuals face risks that are proportional to those to which they expose others: if your contacts are more varied and your interactions are more frequent and intimate, you face correspondingly higher risks yourself. After all, in a pandemic, an individual’s failure to exercise caution may lead to a very hard internalization of costs if an infection strikes them. This mutuality is an element absent from most situations involving externalities. And to the extent that you take voluntary precautions, you and your contacts both benefit. Nevertheless, I concede that there are individuals who face less risk themselves (the young or healthy) but who might behave recklessly, and they might not internalize all risk for which they are responsible. Yes, stringency may have benefits, but that does not mean it has net benefits.

Even if there is some meaningful point at which NPIs are “optimized”, government does not possess the knowledge required to find that point. It lacks detailed knowledge of both costs and benefits of NPIs. This is a manifestation of the “knowledge problem” articulated by Friedrich Hayek, which hampers all efforts at central planning. In contrast, individual actors know their own tolerance for risk, and they surely have some sense of the risks they create in their normal course of affairs. And again, there is a strong degree of proportionality and voluntary internalization of mutual risks.

While relying on voluntary action is economically inefficient relative to an ideal, full-information and perfectly altruistic solution, it is at least based on information that individuals possess: their own risk profile and risk preferences. In contrast, government does not possess information necessary to impose rules in an optimal way, and those rules are rife with unintended consequences and costs inflicted on individuals.

My next post will present empirical evidence of the weakness of lockdown measures in curbing the coronavirus as well as the high costs of those measures. The coronavirus is a serious infection, but it is not terribly deadly or damaging to the longer-term health of the vast majority of people. This, in and of itself, should be sufficient to demonstrate that the array of non-pharmaceutical interventions imposed in the U.S. and abroad were and are not worthwhile. People are capable of assessing risks for themselves. The externality argument, that NPIs are necessary because people do not adequately assess the risk they pose to others, relies on an authority’s ability to assess that risk, and they invariably go overboard on interventions for which they underestimate costs. COVID is not serious enough to justify a surrender of our constitutional rights, and like every concession to government authority, those rights will be difficult to recover.

Private Social Distancing, Private Reversal

04 Monday May 2020

Posted by in Liberty, Pandemic, Uncategorized

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My original post on the dominance of voluntary social distancing over the mandated variety appears below. That dominance is qualified by the greater difficulty of engaging in certain activities when they are outlawed by government, or when the natural locations of activities are declared off-limits. Nevertheless, as with almost all regulation, people make certain “adjustments” to suit themselves (sometimes involving kickbacks to authorities, because regulation does nothing so well as creating opportunities for graft). Those “adjustments” often lead to much less desirable outcomes than the original, unregulated state. In the case of a pandemic, however, it’s tempting to view such unavoidable actions as a matter of compromise.

I say this now because the voluntary social distancing preceding most government lockdown orders in March (discussed in the post below) is subject to a degree of self-reversal. Apple Mobility Data suggests that something like that was happening throughout much of April, as shown in the chart at the top of this post. Now, in early May, the trend is likely to continue as some of the government lockdown mandates are being lifted, or at least loosened.

An earlier version of the chart above appeared in a Forbes article entitled, “Apple Data Shows Shelter-In-Place Is Ending, Whether Governments Want It To Or Not“. The author, John Koetsier, noted the Apple data are taken from map searches, so they may not be reliable indicators of actual movement. But he also featured some charts from Foursquare, which showed actual visits to various kinds of destinations, and some of theoe demonstrate the upward trend in activity.

In the original post below, I used SafeGraph charts lifted from a paper I described there. The four charts below are available on the SafeGraph website, which offered the services of the friendly little robot in the lower right-hand corner, but I demurred. You’ll probably need to click on the image to read the detail. They show more granular information by industry, brand, region, and restaurant categories. The upward trends are evident in quite a few of the series.

I should qualify my interpretation of the charts above and those in my original post: First, nine states did not have stay-at-home orders, though a few of those had varying restrictions on individuals and on the operation of “non-essential” businesses. The five having no orders of any kind (that I can tell) are lightly-populated, very low-density states, so the vast majority of the U.S. population was subject to some sort of lockdown measure. Second, eight states began to ease or lift orders in the last few days of April, Georgia and Colorado being the largest. Therefore, at the tail end, a small part of the increase in activity could be related to those liberalizations. Then again, it might have happened anyway.

The authoritarian impulse to shut everything down was largely unnecessary, and it did not accomplish much that voluntary distancing hadn’t accomplished already (again, see below). Healthy people need to stop cowering and take action. That includes the non-elderly and those free of underlying health conditions. Sure, take precautions, keep your distance, but get out of your home if you can. Get some sunny Vitamin D.

Committing yourself to the existence of a shut-in is not healthy, not wise, and it might destroy whatever wealth you possess if you are a working person. The data above show that people are recognizing that fact. As much as the Left wishes it were so, government seldom “knows better”. It is least effective when it uses force to suppress voluntary behavior; it is most effective when it follows consensus, and especially when it protects the rights of individuals to make their own choices where no consensus exists.

Last week’s post follows:

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

How much did state and local governments accomplish when they decided to issue stay-at-home orders? Perhaps not much. That’s the implication of data presented by the authors of “Internal and external effects of social distancing in a pandemic” (starts on page 22 in the linked PDF). Social distancing began in the U.S. in a series of voluntary, private actions. Government orders merely followed and, at best, reinforced those actions, but often in ham-handed ways.

The paper has a broader purpose than the finding that social distancing is often a matter of private initiative. I’ll say a bit more about it, but you can probably skip the rest of this paragraph without loss of continuity. The paper explores theoretical relationships between key parameters (including a social distancing construct) and the dynamics of a pandemic over time in a social welfare context. The authors study several alternatives: a baseline in which behavior doesn’t change in any way; a “laissez faire” path in which actions are all voluntary; and a “socially optimal” path imposed by a benevolent and all-knowing central authority (say what???). I’d offer more details, but I’ll await the coming extension promised by the authors to a world in which susceptible populations are heterogenous (e.g., like Covid-19, where children are virtually unaffected, healthy working age adults are roughly as at-risk as they are to the flu, and a population of the elderly and health-compromised individuals for which the virus is much more dangerous than the flu). In general, the paper seems to support a more liberalized approach to dealing with the pandemic, but that’s a matter of interpretation. Tyler Cowen, who deserves a hat-tip, believes that reading is correct “at the margin”.

Let’s look at some of the charts the authors present early in the paper. The data on social distancing behavior comes from Safegraph, a vendor of mobility data taken from cell phone location information. This data can be used to construct various proxies for aggregate social activity. The first chart below shows traffic at “points of interest” (POI) in the U.S. from March 8 to April 12, 2020. That’s the blue line. The red line is the percentage of the U.S. population subject to lockdown orders on each date. The authors explain the details in the notes below the chart:

Clearly POI visits were declining sharply before any governments imposed their own orders. The next two charts show similar declines in the percent of mobile devices that leave “home” each day (“home” being the device’s dominant location during nighttime hours) and the duration over which devices were away from “home”, on average.

So all of these measures of social activity began declining well ahead of the government orders. The authors say private social distancing preceded government action in all 50 states. POI traffic was down almost 40% by the time 10% of the U.S. population was subject to government orders, and those early declines accounted for the bulk of the total decline through April 12. The early drops in the two away-from-home measures were 15-20%, again accounting for well over half of the total decline.

The additional declines beyond that time, to the extent they can be discerned, could be either trends that would have continued even in the absence of government orders or reinforcing effects the orders themselves. This does not imply that lockdown orders have no effects on specific activities. Rather, it means that those orders have minor incremental effects on measures of aggregate social activity than the voluntary actions already taken. In other words, the government lockdowns are largely a matter of rearranging the deck chairs, or, that is to say, their distribution.

Many private individuals and institutions acted early in response to information about the virus, motivated by concerns about their own safety and the safety of family and friends. The public sector in the U.S. was not especially effective in providing information, with such politicos as President Donald Trump, Nancy Pelosi, Andrew Cuomo, Bill De Blasio, and the mayor of New Orleans minimizing the dangers into the month of March, and some among them encouraging people to get out and celebrate at public events. Even Anthony Fauci minimized the danger in late February (not to mention the World Health Organization). In fact, “the scientists” were as negligent in their guidance as anyone in the early stages of the pandemic.

When lockdown orders were issued, they were often arbitrary and nonsensical. Grocery stores, liquor stores, and Wal Mart were allowed to remain open, but department stores and gun shops were not. Beaches and parks were ordered closed, though there is little if any chance of infection outdoors. Lawn care services, another outdoor activity, were classified as non-essential in some jurisdictions and therefore prohibited. And certain personal services seem to be available to public officials, but not to private citizens. The lists of things one can and can’t buy truly defies logic.

In March, John W. Whitehead wrote:

“We’re talking about lockdown powers (at both the federal and state level): the ability to suspend the Constitution, indefinitely detain American citizens, bypass the courts, quarantine whole communities or segments of the population, override the First Amendment by outlawing religious gatherings and assemblies of more than a few people, shut down entire industries and manipulate the economy, muzzle dissidents, ‘stop and seize any plane, train or automobile to stymie the spread of contagious disease,’…”

That is fearsome indeed, and individuals can accomplish distancing without it. If you are extremely risk averse, you can distance yourself or take other precautions to remain protected. You can either take action to isolate yourself or you can decide to be in proximity to others. The more risk averse among us will internalize most of the cost of voluntary social distancing. The less risk averse will avoid that cost but face greater exposure to the virus. Of course, this raises questions of public support for vulnerable segments of the population for whom risk aversion will be quite rational. That would certainly be a more enlightened form of intervention than lockdowns, though support should be offered only to those highly at-risk individuals who can’t support themselves.

Christopher Phelan writes of three rationales for the lockdowns: buying time for development of a vaccine or treatments; reducing the number of infected individuals; and to avoid overwhelming the health care system. Phelan thinks all three are of questionable validity at this point. A vaccine might never arrive, and Phelan is pessimistic about treatments (I have more hope in that regard). Ultimately a large share of the population will be infected, lockdowns or not. And of course the health care system is not overwhelmed at this point. Yes, those caring for Covid patients are under a great stress, but the health care system as a whole, and patients with other maladies, are currently suffering from massive under-utilization.

If you wish to be socially distant, you are free to do so on your very own. Individuals are quite capable of voluntary risk mitigation without authoritarian fiat, as the charts above show. While private actors might not internalize all of the external costs of their activities, government is seldom capable of making the appropriate corrections. Coercion to enforce the kinds of crazy rules that have been imposed during this pandemic is the kind of abuse of power the nation’s founders intended to prevent. Reversing those orders can be difficult, and the precedent itself becomes a threat to future liberty. Nevertheless, we see mounting efforts to resist by those who are harmed by these orders, and by those who recognize the short-sighted nature of the orders. Private incentives for risk reduction, and private evaluation of the benefits of social and economic activity, offer superior governance to the draconian realities of lockdowns.

Social Distancing Largely a Private Matter

26 Sunday Apr 2020

Posted by in Liberty, Pandemic, Uncategorized

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How much did state and local governments accomplish when they decided to issue stay-at-home orders? Perhaps not much. That’s the implication of data presented by the authors of “Internal and external effects of social distancing in a pandemic” (starts on page 22 in the linked PDF). Social distancing began in the U.S. in a series of voluntary, private actions. Government orders merely followed and, at best, reinforced those actions, but often in ham-handed ways.

The paper has a broader purpose than the finding that social distancing is often a matter of private initiative. I’ll say a bit more about it, but you can probably skip the rest of this paragraph without loss of continuity. The paper explores theoretical relationships between key parameters (including a social distancing construct) and the dynamics of a pandemic over time in a social welfare context. The authors study several alternatives: a baseline in which behavior doesn’t change in any way; a “laissez faire” path in which actions are all voluntary; and a “socially optimal” path imposed by a benevolent and all-knowing central authority (say what???). I’d offer more details, but I’ll await the coming extension promised by the authors to a world in which susceptible populations are heterogenous (e.g., like Covid-19, where children are virtually unaffected, healthy working age adults are roughly as at-risk as they are to the flu, and a population of the elderly and health-compromised individuals for which the virus is much more dangerous than the flu). In general, the paper seems to support a more liberalized approach to dealing with the pandemic, but that’s a matter of interpretation. Tyler Cowen, who deserves a hat-tip, believes that reading is correct “at the margin”.

Let’s look at some of the charts the authors present early in the paper. The data on social distancing behavior comes from Safegraph, a vendor of mobility data taken from cell phone location information. This data can be used to construct various proxies for aggregate social activity. The first chart below shows traffic at “points of interest” (POI) in the U.S. from March 8 to April 12, 2020. That’s the blue line. The red line is the percentage of the U.S. population subject to lockdown orders on each date. The authors explain the details in the notes below the chart:

Clearly POI visits were declining sharply before any governments imposed their own orders. The next two charts show similar declines in the percent of mobile devices that leave “home” each day (“home” being the device’s dominant location during nighttime hours) and the duration over which devices were away from “home”, on average.

So all of these measures of social activity began declining well ahead of the government orders. The authors say private social distancing preceded government action in all 50 states. POI traffic was down almost 40% by the time 10% of the U.S. population was subject to government orders, and those early declines accounted for the bulk of the total decline through April 12. The early drops in the two away-from-home measures were 15-20%, again accounting for well over half of the total decline.

The additional declines beyond that time, to the extent they can be discerned, could be either trends that would have continued even in the absence of government orders or reinforcing effects the orders themselves. This does not imply that lockdown orders have no effects on specific activities. Rather, it means that those orders have minor incremental effects on measures of aggregate social activity than the voluntary actions already taken. In other words, the government lockdowns are largely a matter of rearranging the deck chairs, or, that is to say, their distribution.

Many private individuals and institutions acted early in response to information about the virus, motivated by concerns about their own safety and the safety of family and friends. The public sector in the U.S. was not especially effective in providing information, with such politicos as President Donald Trump, Nancy Pelosi, Andrew Cuomo, Bill De Blasio, and the mayor of New Orleans minimizing the dangers into the month of March, and some among them encouraging people to get out and celebrate at public events. Even Anthony Fauci minimized the danger in late February (not to mention the World Health Organization). In fact, “the scientists” were as negligent in their guidance as anyone in the early stages of the pandemic.

When lockdown orders were issued, they were often arbitrary and nonsensical. Grocery stores, liquor stores, and Wal Mart were allowed to remain open, but department stores and gun shops were not. Beaches and parks were ordered closed, though there is little if any chance of infection outdoors. Lawn care services, another outdoor activity, were classified as non-essential in some jurisdictions and therefore prohibited. And certain personal services seem to be available to public officials, but not to private citizens. The lists of things one can and can’t buy truly defies logic.

In March, John W. Whitehead wrote:

“We’re talking about lockdown powers (at both the federal and state level): the ability to suspend the Constitution, indefinitely detain American citizens, bypass the courts, quarantine whole communities or segments of the population, override the First Amendment by outlawing religious gatherings and assemblies of more than a few people, shut down entire industries and manipulate the economy, muzzle dissidents, ‘stop and seize any plane, train or automobile to stymie the spread of contagious disease,’…”

That is fearsome indeed, and individuals can accomplish distancing without it. If you are extremely risk averse, you can distance yourself or take other precautions to remain protected. You can either take action to isolate yourself or you can decide to be in proximity to others. The more risk averse among us will internalize most of the cost of voluntary social distancing. The less risk averse will avoid that cost but face greater exposure to the virus. Of course, this raises questions of public support for vulnerable segments of the population for whom risk aversion will be quite rational. That would certainly be a more enlightened form of intervention than lockdowns, though support should be offered only to those highly at-risk individuals who can’t support themselves.

Christopher Phelan writes of three rationales for the lockdowns: buying time for development of a vaccine or treatments; reducing the number of infected individuals; and to avoid overwhelming the health care system. Phelan thinks all three are of questionable validity at this point. A vaccine might never arrive, and Phelan is pessimistic about treatments (I have more hope in that regard). Ultimately a large share of the population will be infected, lockdowns or not. And of course the health care system is not overwhelmed at this point. Yes, those caring for Covid patients are under a great stress, but the health care system as a whole, and patients with other maladies, are currently suffering from massive under-utilization.

If you wish to be socially distant, you are free to do so on your very own. Individuals are quite capable of voluntary risk mitigation without authoritarian fiat, as the charts above show. While private actors might not internalize all of the external costs of their activities, government is seldom capable of making the appropriate corrections. Coercion to enforce the kinds of crazy rules that have been imposed during this pandemic is the kind of abuse of power the nation’s founders intended to prevent. Reversing those orders can be difficult, and the precedent itself becomes a threat to future liberty. Nevertheless, we see mounting efforts to resist by those who are harmed by these orders, and by those who recognize the short-sighted nature of the orders. Private incentives for risk reduction, and private evaluation of the benefits of social and economic activity, offer superior governance to the draconian realities of lockdowns.

Relieving the U.S. Public Toilet Shortage: User Fees

12 Wednesday Dec 2018

Posted by in Price Mechanism, Social Costs

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The musical comedy Urinetown opened in 2001 and ran for 965 performances, not a bad run by Broadway standards. The show, which is still performed in theaters around the country, is a melodramatic farce: a town tries to deal with a water shortage by mandating that all townspeople use pay toilets controlled by a malevolent private utility. Despite the play’s premise, pay toilets are a solution to the very real problem of finding decent facilities, or any facility, in which to relieve oneself in public places. Anyone who has ever strolled the streets of a city has encountered this problem from time-to-time. But in the U.S., where local budgets are typically strapped, the choice is often between scarce and decrepit free toilets or no toilets at all. Otherwise, those seeking relief must rely on the kindness business owners or pass laws allowing non-patrons to commandeer businesses’ bathrooms at will. Toilets with user fees, however, are an alternative that should get more emphasis.

In part, the theme of Urinetown reflects a longstanding notion among anti-capitalists that pay toilets are a disgustingly unfair solution to these urgent needs. One can imagine the logic: everyone has a need and a right to make waste, so we should all have access to sparkling public toilets for free! There is also the presumed misogyny of charging at stalls but not urinals (which are cheaper to maintain, after all), but overcoming that problem should not present a great technical hurdle. And surely pay toilets could be made to accept EBT cards, or locally-issued pee-for-free cards for the homeless.

Yes, we all make waste. However, most of us are so modest and fastidious that we quite literally “internalize the externality” we’d otherwise impose on others were we to seek relief in the street or behind trees in the park. We hold it and sometimes incur high costs in search of a restroom. Those are costs many of us would willingly pay to avoid.

As Alex Tabarrok says in “Legalize Pay Toilets“, outrage over pay toilets, very much like the kind expressed in Urinetown, is what led to outright bans on pay toilets in America during the 1970s (also see Sophie House’s discussion of the need for pay toilets at Citylab). According to Tabarrok, “In 1970 there were some 50,000 pay toilets in America and by 1980 there were almost none.” Many travelers know, however, that pay toilets are fairly commonplace in Europe.

In the wake of pay-toilet bans in America, and without the flow of revenue, those one-time pay toilets were not well-maintained nor replaced. In that sense, hostility to the concept of pay toilets is responsible for the paucity and abysmal condition of most public restrooms today. Public restrooms are often plagued by a tragedy of the commons. And when you do see a “free” public restroom in relatively good condition (in an airport, on a turnpike, or elsewhere), it is usually because its costs are cross-subsidized by payments for other goods and services offered in those facilities. It’s not as if you don’t pay for the bathrooms.

There is no question of a willingness to pay, but legal obstacles to pay toilets remain. Pay toilets are still very uncommon. New York City actually decriminalized public urination a few years ago, an odd way to deal with the shortage of restrooms. Some cities, such as Philadelphia, have initiated efforts to bring back pay toilets, but they have made little headway. Just last year, the toilet paper producer Charmin ran a successful publicity campaign in New York City by testing a mobile toilet-sharing service (à la Uber ride-sharing) called Charmin Van-GO. The company described the test as a big success in terms of publicity, but apparently the service has not been offered on a continuing basis.

The economic problem posed by full bladders and bowels on the public square can be solved with relative efficiency using the price mechanism: pay toilets. The flow of revenue can defray the costs of restrooms and their maintenance, easing the strain on public budgets and covering the cost of keeping them clean. Pay toilets can be provided publicly or built and operated by private providers. Pricing the use of toilets, whether offered publicly or privately, helps focus resources at the point of need. Free public toilets, in contrast, are scarce and typically unsanitary. Funding public restrooms through taxation, rather than user fees, involves a loss of efficiency because taxpayers are often distinct from actual users. Forcing purveyors of food and drink (or anything of value) to offer bathroom access to “free riders” creates another obvious source of inefficiency. Allowing the use of EBT cards at pay toilets, while overcoming certain objections, would also involve inefficiencies, but at least they’d be limited to subsidies for a small proportion of the bathroom-going public. Given the alternatives under the status quo, our cities would be far more pleasant if they were flush with pay toilets.

The Socially Seductive Tax Deduction

20 Monday Nov 2017

Posted by in Taxes

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deductions desert

The rat’s nest that is the federal income tax code is a testament to the counter-productive nature of central economic planning. Not only does the tax code force citizens to waste time and other resources on compliance activities. It also encourages us to direct resources into uses that would not be worthwhile in the absence of tax incentives, uses that are not worthwhile in a societal context.

A general rationale for many provisions of the tax code is that they serve some “worthwhile” public purpose. A special tax provision is created to subsidize activities contributing to that purpose. Since that reduces the flow of revenue, tax rates must increase as an offset. However, high tax rates are damaging to economic health in and of themselves. They blunt incentives and drive wedges between the values and rewards that guide all economic decisions.

The competing tax plans under debate in the House and Senate would eliminate or pare back deductions to varying degrees, enabling a reduction in tax rates. I applaud steps in that direction, though a consequence of doing so piecemeal is to invite later tinkering of the sort that got us into this mess in the first place. Both the House and Senate bills are piecemeal. Here is a run-down of some of the deductions that are under review in the GOP plans:

State and Local Tax (SALT) Deductions: this deduction prevents the imposition of federal “taxes on taxes”, which is a worthwhile consideration. However, SALT also gives lower levels of government a “discount” on tax burdens they impose on their citizens, thereby forcing that burden to be shared by members of other jurisdictions. According to the Tax Foundation:

“The deduction favors high-income, high-tax states like California and New York, which together receive nearly one-third of the deduction’s total value nationwide. Six states—California, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Texas, and Pennsylvania—claim more than half of the value of the deduction.“

Defenders of this deduction note peremptorily that it is used by taxpayers in all fifty states, as if that should come as a surprise. Well of course it is! And those who are taxed most heavily benefit the most from this deduction, and those benefits are most concentrated in high-tax states. The House GOP bill would limit the SALT deduction to $10,000, while the Senate version would eliminate it entirely.

Mortgage Interest (MI) Deduction: Long ago, the idea took hold that ownership of a home was of greater inherent value than mere occupancy. It’s obviously true that owners have greater rights than renters over use of a property. Those benefits are internalized, and owner-occupants might well be more inclined than renters to take pride in, care for, and improve a property. That suggests a social or external benefit from home ownership, one that at least benefits others in the vicinity of a given property.

The MI deduction creates an incentive for debt-financed home ownership, but only for the minority of taxpayers who can benefit from itemizing deductions. It therefore tends to subsidize the housing choices of those at higher levels of income and those with larger homes. It has contributed little, if anything, to the homeownership rate. Here are Edward Glaeser and Jesse Shapiro describing the findings of their NBER Working Paper:

“Externalities from living around homeowners are far too small to justify the deduction. … the home mortgage interest deduction is a particularly poor instrument for encouraging homeownership since it is targeted at the wealthy, who are almost always homeowners. The irrelevance of the deduction is supported by the time series which shows that the ownership subsidy moves with inflation and has changed significantly between 1960 and today, but the homeownership rate has been essentially constant.“

This deduction has fostered a massive over-investment in housing relative to other assets and forms of consumption. The House tax bill would allow a deduction on interest payments for up to $500,000 of mortgage debt, but this limit would apply only to new mortgages. The Senate bill would not alter the deduction in any way. These steps are severely limited in their reform ambitions.

Medical Expense Deduction: To take this deduction, you must 1) be an itemizer; and 2) have eligible medical expenses exceeding 10% of adjusted gross income (AGI). Then, you can deduct only the excess above 10%. A relatively small percentage of taxpayers actually take this deduction, mostly wealthy, older individuals or couples. It can be argued that the deduction encourages overuse of medical resources in some cases, but there are certainly others in which it provides relief from the hardship of an illness requiring expensive care. On the other hand, the deduction might serve to discourage the purchase of supplemental Medicare coverage by individuals who can afford it but are willing to bet that they won’t need it. Part of that bet is covered by the deduction.

The House bill would repeal this deduction in its entirety. The Senate bill would leave it untouched.

Student Loan Interest Deduction: Currently, up to $2,500 of student loan interest can be deducted “above the line” by non-itemizers, but only if their AGI is within certain limits. Higher education is often claimed to have social (external) benefits. To some extent, the student loan interest deduction helps bring the cost of an eduction to within reach of a broader swath of the citizenry. These considerations provide the rationale for public subsidies for funding tuition and other costs with debt. The tax deduction is only one of many forms of education subsidies. Another is provided by the below-market rates at which students are able to borrow from the federal government.

The social benefits of higher education are strongly associated with the value it adds for the individual. It can be argued that as a society, we may have pushed college education well beyond that point. A large number of indebted students decide, too late, that continued enrollment has little value, so they drop out and often default on their federally-subsidized debt. Moreover, these loan subsidies stimulate the demand for college education, which leads to a certain amount of escalation in tuition and fees. These ill effects make elimination of this deduction a tempting way to broaden the income-tax base, enabling a reduction in tax rates.

The House bill eliminates the deduction for student loan interest, but the Senate bill leaves it intact.

Conclusion: There are plenty of shortcomings in both the House and Senate versions of tax reform. Three liberalizing goals of reform are tax simplification, elimination of provisions that benefit special interests, and of course lower rates. Most of the complexities in the tax code benefit special interests in one way or another. The deductions discussed above fall into that category and necessitate higher tax rates on personal income. That in turn makes the deductions more valuable to those who claim them. In terms of the liberalizing goals of reform, the House tax bill is wider ranging than the Senate version, though the Senate bill’s complete elimination of the SALT deduction is better.

Subsidies Are For Suckled Statists

07 Sunday Dec 2014

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ethanol-corn-money

Who told Congress the following? “We oppose ALL subsidies, whether existing or proposed, including programs that benefit us, which are principally those that are embedded in our economy, such as mandates.”

And this? “[We don’t] view these as ‘benefits’ even if they are in industries we’re in. They are wasteful and market distorting, and allow other firms to run businesses that aren’t making money any other way.”

This principled stand against one major type of crony capitalism was taken by none other than Koch Industries. According to this Free Beacon article:

“The company owned by billionaire philanthropists Charles and David Koch, as well as groups frequently associated with the fraternal libertarians, are pushing Congress to let 55 tax breaks expire, including several that provide billions in tax relief for corporations such as Koch Industries.”

They are similarly opposed to regulatory cronyism that restrains competition and the sort of public largess favoring lucrative contract awards for large corporate entities. These are the same Koch brothers typically demonized by the Left (but not always), as if their political contributions were an effort to garner public subsidies. Clearly that is not the case. Moreover, Left-leaning billionaires such as Tom Steyer, Michael Bloomberg and George Soros are far more prolific political contributors than the Koch brothers. And what do these corporatists want for their money? Surely not a smaller government; they’d like a big fat administrative state from which their many corporate interests can suckle.

Some kinds of subsidies are transparently wasteful, such as tax breaks for already-profitable businesses or bailouts to firms that have made bad decisions, or to firms in dying industries. More fundamentally, all public subsidies circumvent the unforgiving cost-benefit calculus imposed by the market, misdirecting resources via signals distorted by the visible fists of government. This often allows activity to continue that would otherwise be judged wasteful or unsustainable, or excessive investment of resources into particular activities. Self-interested politicians and public officials, however, often justify these subsidies by asserting the existence of external benefits unrecognized by market valuations. Too often, these assertions rely on value judgements. Regardless, the supposed benefits are never easily measured. Our experience with pervasive cronyism and waste in government should always lead us to insist on a skeptical evaluation of proposed subsidies. Rent-seeking behavior is usually at the root of such initiatives.

Aside

Can the Carbon Tax

22 Thursday May 2014

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carbon tax footprint

Economists often fall victim to the naive view that government technocrats can measure the external costs or benefits of an activity accurately. Having performed the necessary calculations, the idea is that optimal taxes or subsidies can be promulgated through the political process and applied to an activity in order to correct or “internalize” these kinds of social effluents. In their focus on private market failure, many economists fail to appreciate the extent to which governments usually “fail” in these and many other efforts. At best, one might hope that such intrusions are directionally correct, but even that is fraught with risk.

A particularly good example involves the presumed social costs of carbon emissions. Carbon tax proposals are very much in vogue, but they are not without controversy. The well-meaning assertions of climate alarmists rely on rather fatuous claims about anthropomorphic warming and an overly broad and unwise application of the precautionary principle. There is a vocal minority of climate researchers who do not believe we have sufficient knowledge about climate sensitivities to make judgements about the true social costs and even some likely benefits of a warmer climate, should that be an ultimate consequence. Moreover, accurately measuring the presumed costs is out of the question. Meanwhile, carbon taxes impose costly burdens in the here and now that are difficult to justify.

This response to Irwin Selzer on carbon taxes is worth reading (with a link to Selzer’s article).

Here is a review and further links regarding the disastrous Australian carbon tax.

And here is Robert Murphy on carbon taxes, in which he discusses some prominent estimates of costs and benefits which show the sometimes enormous danger of setting non-optimal carbon taxes (granting the conceit that an optimal tax is positive).

FYI, the unfortunate Julia in the cartoon above refers to Julia Gillard, the former PM of Australia who pushed for the country’s ill-fated carbon tax.