Do You Chronically Feel Cheated?

24 Tuesday Aug 2021

Tags

Buyer’s Remorse, Classism, Comparative advantage, Consumer Surplus, Excise Taxes, Frank C. Keil, Free Markets, Intervention, Jiewen Zhang, Marxism, Mercantilism, monopoly, Producer Surplus, Reservation Price, Samuel B.G. Johnson, statism, Subsidies, Surplus, Use Value, Zero-Sum Thinking

Economists are rightfully astonished when people act as if they’ve come up losers in almost every transaction they make. It’s often when they’re on the buying end, but here’s the paradox: almost all transactions are voluntary, a major exception being the coerced payment of taxes. There are few private transactions in which free choice is absent. A truly voluntary choice is an absolute proof of gain. In those trades, buyers reveal that they assign less value to choices not made, and foregone choices almost always exist, including the possibility of doing nothing. By their very nature, voluntary transactions are mutually beneficial. So why do people feel cheated so often?

Free To Lose?

Yes, we are free to choose and free to lose! But this isn’t about cases in which a product proves defective or quickly becomes obsolete. Nor is it about making a purchase only to learn of a discount later. Those are ex post events that might have been impossible to foresee. Here, I refer only to the decision made on the day and hour of the purchase, including any assessment of risk.

A recent study confirmed a pervasive “loser’s” mentality in transactions: “Win–win denial: The psychological underpinnings of zero-sum thinking”, by Samuel B.G. Johnson, Jiewen Zhang, and Frank C. Keil. They also found that people judge the seller as the “winner” in most transactions. The authors considered a few explanations for these findings discussed in psychological literature, such as socially-ingrained mercantilist attitudes and a tendency to zero-sum thinking.

Roots of “Never-a-Buyer-Be” Phobia

Mercantilism was borne of zero-sum thinking — a belief in a hard limit to total wealth. Under those circumstances, accumulating gold or other hard assets was seen as preferable to spending on imports of goods from other nations. Imports meant gold had to be shipped out, but exports of goods brought it in.

That uncompromising view led to efforts by government on behalf of domestic industries to stanch imports, and it ultimately led to decline. One nation cannot buy another’s goods indefinitely without corresponding flows of goods in the other direction. Nations gain from trade only by producing things in which they have a comparative advantage and selling them to others. In turn, they must purchase goods from others in which they do NOT have a comparative advantage. It’s cheaper that way! And it’s a win-win prescription for building worldwide wealth.

If You Gotta Have It…

People do have a tendency to regret money spent on things they reluctantly feel they must have. They suffer a kind of advance buyer’s remorse, but it stems from having to part with money, which represents all those other nice things one might have had, covering an infinite range of possibilities. This is the same fallacy inherent in mercantilism. The fact is, we purchase things we must have because they represent greater value than doing without. The phantom satisfaction of opportunities foregone are simply not large enough to keep us from doing the “right” thing in these situations.

The Contest For Surplus

There’s a more basic reason why people feel swindled after having engaged in mutually beneficial trade. The seller collects more revenue than marginal cost, and the buyer pays less than the item’s full “use value”. The latter is the buyer’s reservation price: the most they’d be willing to pay under the circumstances. The seller’s gain (over cost) plus the buyer’s gain (under reservation price) is the total “surplus” earned in the exchange. It’s the surplus that’s up for grabs, and both buyer and seller might view the exchange as a contest over its division. Competitive instincts and thrift being what they are, both sides want a larger share of the spoils!

So there truly is a sort of zero-sum game in play. You can try to bargain to capture more of the surplus, but not every seller will do so, often as a matter of policy or reputation. Or you can spend more time and incur greater personal cost by shopping around. Ultimately, if the offer you face is less than your “reservation price”, you’ll extract an absolute benefit from the exchange. Both you and the seller are better off than without it. You both do it voluntarily, and it’s mutually beneficial. Whatever the division of the surplus, you haven’t really lost anything, even if you have the gnawing feeling you might have been able to find a better bargain and captured more surplus.

Exceptions?

You might think the parties to a stock trade cannot both win. However, buyers and sellers have different reasons for making stock trades, which usually involve other needs and differing expectations. Ex ante, both sides of these trades earn a surplus, unless either the seller or buyer is at the losing end of a previous option trade now forcing them to buy or sell the stock.

There are other cases worthy of debate: buyers in monopolized or captive markets are unlikely to collect much of the surplus. Buyers at an informational disadvantage will gain less surplus as well, and they might incur greater risk to any gain whatsoever. Excise taxes allow government to capture some of the surplus, while government subsidies deliver “fake” surplus to the buyer and seller that comes at the expense of taxpayers. Now I feel cheated!

Beware Marxist Sympathies

Buyers and sellers both benefit by virtue of voluntary exchange. The gains might not be divided equally, but the false perception that buyers always get the “short end of the bargain” is a fundamental misunderstanding about how markets work. It also undermines support for basic freedoms allowing autonomous economic decisions and activity, and it strengthens the hand of statists who would fetter the operation of free markets. Like short-sighted mercantilists, those who would intervene in markets create obstacles to human cooperation and the creation of wealth. In fact, the idea that buyers are always cheated is a classist, Marxist notion. Policies acting upon that bias are rife with unintended consequences: small and large market interventions often strike at property rights, which ultimately inhibits the supply of goods and harms consumers.

When Government Externalizes Internalities

02 Sunday Feb 2020

Posted by pnoetx in Government Failure

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Corrective Taxation, Exclusivity, External Benefits, External Costs, Externalizing Internality, Government Failure, Internalizing Externality, Minimum Wage, National Defense, Public goods, Quotas, Regulatory Capture, Social Costs, Social Good, Subsidies, Takings, Wage floor

The headline describes a kind of government failure. In an ideal private transaction, costs and benefits are fully internalized by the buyer and seller. Both reap private gains, or surplus, from mutually beneficial transactions. On the other hand, there are cases in which external costs are inflicted on otherwise unrelated third parties, as when production emits pollutants. Or, there might be external benefits that inure to third parties, as when a homeowner pays to beautify their property and the whole neighborhood gains. These “externalities” are commonly citied as rationale for government interference in private markets. A good government, it is said, would seek to “internalize the externalities”, in one way or another, to prevent too much trade in a good imposing external costs, or too little trade where there are external benefits. Imposing taxes, granting subsidies, intervening with price controls, quotas, or various regulations are all ways in which corrective action might be attempted by public authorities.

The problem is that government often chooses badly, both misidentifying externalities, poorly estimating their magnitude, or in choosing how best to address them. When mistakes of this nature occur, the internal gains from trade are not just compromised or even destroyed. They are often externalized — revoked and redistributed to non-participants. The formerly private and internal gains may be extracted in the form of taxes, ultimately flowing to unconnected third parties. They are externalized internalizes, if I may coin a phrase. In other cases, in order to subsidize favored industries, individuals might be taxed on their income. Yet the favored industry is likely unconnected or external to the taxed individual’s source of income. While the gains that might accrue in the favored industry are internalized there, their source is an externalized internality.

Putting the troubling issue of takings or confiscation aside, these mistaken interventions distort relative prices and production decisions, with false signals propagating into other markets — which again are external effects. This, in turn, distorts the allocation of resources across various uses. These cases are clear-cut examples of externalized internalities.

I will confine this discussion to economic matters. By “internalities“, I mean all things within the economic realm that are private and/or reserved to the individual by natural rights. That includes private property and the individual’s freedom to trade and contract with others.

Wrongly taxing presumed “bads” or wrongly subsidizing presumed “goods” are absolute cases of externalizing internalities. And taxing a “bad” excessively (at more than its true social cost) or subsidizing a “good” excessively (at more than its true social benefit) are cases of externalizing internalities. The political temptation to subsidize might be the greater danger, as it is all too easy for public officials and politicians to identify and sell “deserving” causes, especially if they intimate that others will pay.

For example, subsidized education, which primarily benefits private individuals, is billed to the taxpaying public. It over-allocates resources to education, including students with greater value as human resources in other pursuits. Subsidized energy pays the seller of a power source more than its value to buyers, courtesy of taxpayers, and over allocates resources to those energy sources relative to non-subsidized energy and other goods.

Even if an industry is taxed in exact accordance with its true social cost, there is still the question of how the proceeds of the tax are to be distributed. Ideally, unless the social costs are borne equally by all, the distribution should bear some proportionality to the damages borne by individuals, yet that is seldom considered outside of certain kinds of litigation. The true victims will almost certainly be shorted. Benefits will accrue to many who are free of any burden inflicted by the undesired activity. The corrective action thus fails to properly address the externality, and it bestows an incidental external benefit on wholly unconnected parties.

Likewise, subsidies paid to an industry in exact accordance with its true social benefits require taxes that may burden individuals who do not stand to benefit from the subsidized activity in any way. That is true unless the industry in question produces a pure public good. Indeed, if the taxed individuals had a choice in the matter, they would often use the funds for something they value more highly. Thus, suboptimal distribution of the tax proceeds for funding a less-than-pure “social good” involves the extraction of an internality.

Other forms of government action have similar externalization of internal costs or benefits. With the imposition of a wage floor, or minimum wage, the least-skilled workers are likely to lose their jobs. Consumers are likely to pay higher prices as well. The job losers become more dependent on public aid, which must be funded via taxes on others. The wage floor will also degrade working conditions for those lucky enough to keep their jobs. All of these effects of market intervention demonstrate the public piercing of internal gains from private, voluntary trade. Some of what is excised gets spilt, and some gets siphoned off to external parties. Thus internalities are externalized.

Regulation of private industry often results in regulatory capture, whereby regulators impose rules with compliance costs too high for small competitors and potential entrants to afford. This obviously strengthens the market power of larger incumbents, who may in turn increase prices or skimp on quality. Taxpayers pay the regulators, consumers pay the inflated prices, smaller firms shut down, and resources are under-allocated to the product or service in question. These distortions spill into other markets as well. All these effects are part of the despoilment of internal gains from trade. To the extent that trades are prevented at competitive prices, the external winners are those who capture trades at higher prices, along with the regulators themselves and anyone else standing to benefit from graft as part of the arrangement. And again, the wrongful gains to the winners can be described as externalized internalities.

There are many other examples of government failure that fit the description of externalized internalities. In fact, extracting internalities is the very essence of taxation, though we readily accept its use for expenditures on goods that are of a truly public nature, which by definition confer benefits that are non-exclusive. The classic case, of course, is national defense. The differences in the cases of government failure cited above, however, are that the internalities extracted via taxation or other forms of intervention are externalized for private gain by other parties, no matter how widely distributed and diffuse. This is an extremely pernicious kind of government failure, as it ultimately leads to a cannibalization of private activity via our role as public actors. Beware politicians bearing gifts, and beware them just as much when they demonize private trade.

Who Are the Zero-Sum Winners?

09 Monday Sep 2019

Posted by pnoetx in Big Government, rent seeking

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

Caveat Emptor, Compliance Costs, Consumer Sovereignty, Drug Prohibition, Economic Rents, Energy subsidies, Farm Subsidies, Monopoly Rents, Mutually Beneficial Trade, Public Aid, Public goods, Public Lottery, Public Trough, Regulatory Rents, rent seeking, Social Security, Subsidies, Tax Deductibility, Zero-Sum Economics

Productive effort seldom goes unrewarded, but all too often rewards are directed to nonproductive activities and secured in ways that are outright takings of resources and rights from others. These are zero-sum propositions at best, as the rewards come only at equivalent or greater costs to others. Gains from zero-sum activities are often purely consumptive in nature and tend to foster more destructive behavior. A clear-cut example is outright thievery, but there are many cases in which, by matters of degree, the perpetrators are not even dimly aware that their gains bring harm to others.

Sadly, our society has undergone a transition to a state in which everyone collects ongoing streams of zero-sum rewards, which are, by definition, at someone else’s (and often our own) expense. The turbulence caused by this unnecessary and avoidable mix of costs and rewards is all too real for consumers and businesses, but again, they don’t always fully grasp its dysfunctional nature.

The Way To Positive Sums

Of course, there are winners and losers in almost any area of economic life. Even when two individuals engage in mutually beneficial exchange, an otherwise win-win situation, other traders might regret missing out on the deal. Pleasing buyers more effectively than one’s competitors might force those rivals to turn to other pursuits. That’s all for the best from a social point of view, unless they can come up with an even better idea to win back customers. In this way, things can keep getting better and better for everyone, even for the one-time losers who are free to compete in trades to which they are better suited. Winners, then, are defined by their success in creating value for others. These are the productive winners. But again, material success doesn’t always come so honorably.

Bobbing For Booty?

Purely “consumptive” or zero-sum winners might be simple crooks who are able to avoid apprehension, or perhaps they are dishonest business-people who sell goods with hidden defects or inferior workmanship. There are many degrees here: a talented salesperson with shoddy merchandise might compromise on price. A clever product manager might reduce the size of a package slightly without reducing price.

A simple gamble is zero-sum in a purely monetary sense, but both gamblers do it for enjoyment, so there are psychic gains involved. A successful gambler might be a zero-sum winner in a monetary sense, but luck usually runs out on honest players. A cheater qualifies as a zero-sum winner. Conversely, it’s not correct to say that casinos are strictly zero-sum winners, though the odds are always stacked in favor of the house and everyone knows it. Casino patrons enjoy the experience, including other amusements available in casinos, so they are often happy customers despite their losses. They are engaging in mutually beneficial exchange.

Private Affairs Made Public

A short-hand description encompassing much of our zero-sum havoc is “the public trough”. Many zero-sum rewards have arisen out of legislative battles, court cases, and regulatory actions restricting private decision-making and encroaching on private property rights. The unremitting tendency is for expansion of these kinds of actions. Where there are zero-sum winners at the public trough, or an opportunity to expand the trough itself, there are always more covetous seekers of zero-sum winnings, otherwise known as rent seekers. They are reliable promoters of “do-something-ism” relative to the outrage du jour through more legislation, lawsuits, and regulatory filings. The tragic thing about rent seeking is that the process itself consumes resources and undermines private incentives, thereby transforming zero-sum outcomes into wasteful, negative-sum outcomes.

Winners At the Trough

There are many kinds of zero-sum winners at the public trough. The winning and losing often occur separately and asynchronously, connected only by an enabling authority who sets rules and funds winners from proceeds taken from losers. For this reason, it is easy for citizens to lose track of the “zero-sumness” of the many benefits they receive. After all, the government can deliver things for “free”, right? And the connection between one’s obligations, losses, and the gains reaped by others is not always obvious.

All of the following involve some degree of zero-sum activity, and all attract rent seekers:

Public aid in exchange for no contribution to output, funded by zero-sum losing taxpayers.
Subsidies for politically-favored technologies that are otherwise uneconomic, funded by zero-sum losing taxpayers.
Farm subsidies when too much is produced and the output is not highly valued, leading to an overallocation of resources to agricultural activity and rents for farmers funded by zero-sum losing taxpayers.
Complex regulatory and tax rules generate income for compliance advisors such as attorneys, accountants, and consultants. Those are rents, pure and simple, paid for by parties who must comply under penalty of law.
Regulatory advantage conferred upon firms sufficiently large or dominant to afford compliance. That penalizes smaller competitors and undermines their market position. The additional profit large firms may earn as a consequence is a rent, funded by zero-sum losing consumers and weaker competitors.
The award of government contracts is often as much political as it is economic. Such a process is not subject to the market discipline imposed on private contracts, so there is ample opportunity for rents via cost-padding and graft, again funded by zero-sum losing taxpayers.
More generally, government purchases of any kind are subject to weak market discipline, like any buyer spending someone else’s money. Thus, government has a tendency to pay prices not supported by economic value, offering rents to suppliers, funded by zero-sum losing taxpayers.
The tax deduction afforded to employer-provided health care is a targeted subsidy that leads employees to over-insure. More fundamentally, these employees and their employers are zero-sum winners. It also creates profits for health insurers and drives up health care costs. The zero-sum spoils are to the detriment of other taxpayers and participants in the individual insurance market.
Drug prohibition drives up black market profits, creating zero-sum winnings at the expense and safety of users.
Social Security creates zero-sum winnings for those who will not or cannot save. But this is a mixed bag to the extent that some people are unable to save privately: their ability to do so is largely usurped via payroll taxes, both on them and on their employer. The many zero-sum losers would otherwise have no difficulty earning better returns on private investments.

There are many other examples. And almost everyone ends up on one side or the other of many different zero-sum outcomes. Show me a government action and I’ll show you zero-sum winners and losers. This is not to say there are no welfare gains associated with government action. Public aid, for example, is intended as social insurance and surely has some value in mitigating the risks of personal economic calamity. Nonetheless, the overextension and poor incentives of aid programs create a significant zero-sum component. Likewise, government spending on public goods creates social benefits, but government is insufficiently incented to economize, creating a zero-sum win for contractors and losses for taxpayers.

Not Zero Sum

While zero-sum winners collect economic rents, the existence of economic rents does not imply a zero-sum winning. For example, members of the so-called rentier class collect passive investment income. Those investments represent a supply of current resources to other parties hoping to transform them into a greater supply of future resources. That’s productive, and so the gains enjoyed by rentiers are not zero-sum winnings, but payments for the use of transformational capital.

Economic profits are those exceeding the owner’s opportunity cost, and they too are called rents. They should not necessarily be classified as zero-sum gains, however. Only sometimes. Successful innovators and first movers often earn economic profits as a reward for their efforts, as do alert entrepreneurs deploying their resources where they are most demanded. This “positive-sumness” applies to monopolists with a hot product just as surely as it applies to a firm facing nascent competition. But economic profits gained through political connections, outright graft, and government-enabled monopoly are zero-sum, enabled by non-market, authoritarian forces. Members of the political class tend to share in these zero-sum gains, and there are many losers.

Zero-Sum Psyche

Unfortunately, zero-sum thinking is deeply ingrained in the human psyche, despite our transition to a higher plane of social cooperation via markets. Even in those markets, certain outcomes might seem zero-sum in the moment. Witness the widespread denigration of the profit motive, which produces efficient outcomes in the long-run. As noted above, over time, the biggest winners tend to be those capable of creating the most value.

If you ask school children today how to get rich, many will say “win the lottery” without hesitation. I know, I know, government-sponsored lotteries are a relatively new phenomenon, and some of the lottery proceeds may benefit schools or other public programs, but the idea that a game of chance is so indelibly ingrained in the minds of children is a manifestation of the psychology of zero-sum success.

The Tangled Mess

So we have the zero-sum winners: successful gamblers, thieves, and rent seekers. The latter root deeply for gains made possible by government intervention in private affairs, actions that always leave room for enduring rents. They always lobby fiercely for new public interventions that might confer private advantages. And then we have the hapless public, stumbling through a series of zero-sum gains and losses made possible by the Leviathan they know and obey. They should look in the mirror, because every law and every program they have allowed their political leaders to hatch, reliably sold as good and just, creates more zero-sum activity to the detriment of long-term economic welfare. Roll it back!

A “Right to Health Care” Is Code for “Freebie“

07 Tuesday May 2019

Posted by pnoetx in Health Care, Rights

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Don Boudreaux, Free Health Care, Medicaid, Medicare, Negative Rights, Positive Rights, Right To Health Care, Subsidies, Trevor Burrus

The existence of a right to health care is often taken for granted without a moment’s reflection on its absurd implications. Does your right to health care exist regardless of how you comport yourself? Do you smoke or drink heavily? How much treatment for diseased lungs and livers will be owed to you? Do you take physical risks? By how much are the world’s ERs and orthopedists in thrall to you? There are always people who can benefit from additional care, so providers must then come face-to-face with truly daunting obligations. Are caregivers to be in bondage? Can they take vacations? After all, delivery of care is their duty to all health-care rights-holders. If you are entitled to health care as a basic right, does that relieve you of any responsibility to purchase insurance coverage? Or does that become everyone else’s responsibility?

These are just a few of the decisions that have to made to determine the boundaries of a “right” to health care. The answers are dependent on politics and, surrounding many details, bureaucratic rule-making. It is an odd thing for a so-called “right” to be subject to the shifting vagaries of politics and the day-to-day decisions of bureaucrats.

There is an important distinction between two different kinds of rights, however. The least controversial rights place obligations on others only insofar as they must tolerate free exercise by the rights-holder. So it is with free speech, religion, and private property, which only compel others to inaction. For that reason, they are sometimes called “negative rights”, a rather unfortunate appellation. Trevor Burrus draws contrasts between negative rights and those which obligate others to take action. The latter are called “positive rights”, which is equally unfortunate and dubious.

The problem is that no one has an indisputable right obligating others to take action on their behalf. One may feel it is their moral imperative to aid others under some circumstances, as under a physician’s oath, but ultimately, in a free society, such acts are voluntary. Neither should these actions be matters of state compulsion. Instead, they are ordinarily self-imposed as professional duty or Samaritanship. The point is that a positive right to health care cannot exist without the consent of someone else: those second parties (providers) or third parties (payers) upon whom the exercise of the right depends.

Don Boudreaux states things simply: asserting a right to healthcare is really a demand that health care be “free” at the point of service, despite its resource costs. Inspired by this misguided notion, vote-seeking politicians have given us a history of efforts to subsidize health care via Medicaid, Medicare and tax deductibility. But as Boudreaux explains, this has driven up health care costs, often undermining the ability to access the very care meant to have been available in greater abundance. Boudreaux’s key insight is the application of real-world scarcity to the problem of inventing “rights” that require the positive action and resources of others.

A hot topic in the current health care debate involves coverage of individuals with pre-existing conditions and the subsidies necessary to ensure that they get care. Do they have a right to that care? Perhaps a “positive right”, but maybe not: as a society, we might choose to ensure their care, but if that is a political decision lacking the full consent of all potential payers, the delivery of care is really just an act of majoritarian compassion, not an absolute right.

The most fundamental of human rights, so-called negative rights, require only tolerance from others. In a free society, so-called positive rights do not exist without the voluntary consent of those who must shoulder the burdens necessary to allow the exercise of those rights. The burdens might involve tasks or payments on the rights-holders behalf. Human rights should never be conceived as creating enforceable, involuntary debts for second or third parties to be repaid with action. Without full consent, government creates such obligations only by force and the taking of resources. Health care should be viewed as a real right only to the extent that caregivers and payers agree to provide the needed resources voluntarily. That doesn’t mean we lack an ethical obligation to care for the sick, only that sick individuals may not demand free, unrestricted care.

The Insidious Guaranteed Income

26 Sunday Feb 2017

Posted by pnoetx in Welfare State

≈ 3 Comments

Tags

Artificial Intelligence, Automation, Bryan Caplan, Cash vs. In-Kind Aid, Don Boudreaux, Earned Income Tax Credit, Forced Charity, Guaranteed Income, Incentive Effects, Mises Wire, Nathan Keeble, Permanent Income Hypothesis, Subsidies, Tax Cliff, UBI, Universal Basic Income

Praise for the concept of a “universal basic income” (UBI) is increasingly common among people who should know better. The UBI’s appeal is based on: 1) improvement in work incentives for those currently on public aid; 2) the permanent and universal cushion it promises against loss of livelihood; 3) the presumed benefits to those whose work requires a lengthy period of development to attain economic viability; and 4) the fact that everyone gets a prize, so it is “fair”. There are advocates who believe #2 is the primary reason a UBI is needed because they fear a mass loss of employment in the age of artificial intelligence and automation. I’ll offer some skepticism regarding that prospect in a forthcoming post.

And what are the drawbacks of a UBI? As an economic matter, it is outrageously expensive in both budgetary terms and, more subtly but no less importantly, in terms of its perverse effects on the allocation of resources. However, there are more fundamental reasons to oppose the UBI on libertarian grounds.

Advocates of a UBI often use $10,000 per adult per year as a working baseline. That yields a cost of a guaranteed income for every adult in the U.S. on the order of $2.1 trillion. We now spend about $0.7 trillion a year on public aid programs, excluding administrative costs (the cost is $1.1 trillion all-in). The incremental cost of a UBI as a wholesale replacement for all other aid programs would therefore be about $1.4 trillion. That’s roughly a 40% increase in federal outlays…. Good luck funding that! And there’s a strong chance that some of the existing aid programs would be retained. The impact could be blunted by excluding individuals above certain income thresholds, or via taxes applied to the UBI in higher tax brackets. However, a significant dent in the cost would require denying the full benefit to a large segment of the middle class, making the program into something other than a UBI.

Nathan Keeble at Mises Wire discusses some of the implications of a UBI for incentives and resource allocation. A traditional criticism of means-tested welfare programs is that benefits decline as market income increases, so market income is effectively taxed at a high marginal rate. (This is not a feature of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).) Thus, low-income individuals face negative incentives to earn market income. This is the so-called “welfare cliff”. A UBI doesn’t have this shortcoming, but it would create serious incentive problems in other ways. A $1.4 trillion hit on taxpayers will distort work, saving and investment incentives in ways that would make the welfare cliff look minor by comparison. The incidence of these taxes would fall heavily on the most productive segments of society. It would also have very negative implications for the employment prospects of individuals in the lowest economic strata.

Keeble describes another way in which a UBI is destructive. It is a subsidy granted irrespective of the value created by work effort. Should an individual have a strong preference for leisure as opposed to work, a UBI subsidy exerts a strong income effect in accommodating that choice. Or, should an individual have a strong preference for performing varieties of work for which they are not well-suited, and despite having a relatively low market value for them, the income effect of a UBI subsidy will tend to accommodate that choice as well. In other words, a UBI will subsidize non-economic activity:

“The struggling entrepreneurs and artists mentioned earlier are struggling for a reason. For whatever reason, the market has deemed the goods they are providing to be insufficiently valuable. Their work simply isn’t productive according to those who would potentially consume the goods or services in question. In a functioning marketplace, producers of goods the consumers don’t want would quickly have to abandon such endeavors and focus their efforts into productive areas of the economy. The universal basic income, however, allows them to continue their less-valued endeavors with the money of those who have actually produced value, which gets to the ultimate problem of all government welfare programs.“

I concede, however, that unconditional cash transfers can be beneficial as a way of delivering aid to impoverished communities. This application, however, involves a subsidy that is less than universal, as it targets cash at the poor, or poor segments of society. The UBI experiments described in this article involve private charity in delivering aid to poor communities in underdeveloped countries, not government sponsored foreign aid or redistribution. Yes, cash is more effective than in-kind aid such as food or subsidized housing, a proposition that economists have always tended to support as a rule. The cash certainly provides relief, and it may well be used as seed money for productive enterprises, especially if the aid is viewed as temporary rather than permanent. But that is not in the spirit of a true UBI.

More fundamentally, a UBI is objectionable from a libertarian perspective because it involves a confiscation of resources. In “Why Libertarians Should Oppose the Universal Basic Income“, Bryan Caplan makes the point succinctly:

“Forced charity is unjust. Individuals have a moral right to decide if and when they want to help others….

Forcing people to help others who can’t help themselves… is at least defensible. Forcing people to help everyone is not. And for all its faults, at least the status quo makes some effort to target people who can’t help themselves. The whole idea of the Universal Basic Income, in contrast, is to give money to everyone whether they need it or not.”

Later, Caplan says:

…libertarianism isn’t about the freedom to be coercively supported by strangers. It’s about the freedom to be left alone by strangers.“

Both Keeble and Caplan would argue that the status quo, with its hodge-podge of welfare programs offering tempting but rotten incentives to recipients, is preferable to the massive distortions that would be created by a UBI. The mechanics of such an intrusion are costly enough, but as Don Boudreaux has warned, the UBI would put government in a fairly dominant position as a provider:

“… such an income-guarantee by government will further fuel the argument that government is a uniquely important and foundational source of our rights and our prosperity – and, therefore, government is uniquely entitled to regulate our behavior.“

Health Care Devolution and Monopoly

02 Thursday Jun 2016

Posted by pnoetx in Health Care, monopoly, Obamacare

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Accountable Care Organizations, Adverse Risk Pools, Affordable Care Act, Bend the Cost Curve, Bronze Plan, Death Spiral, ER Utlization, Health Care Monopolization, Insurer Attrition, Insurer Consolidation, Non-Profit Monopoly, Obamacare, Provider Consolidation, Risk corridors, Subsidies, United Health Care

Risk Pool

Obamacare and its boosters are trying to come to grips with several new blows. Last month, United Health Care (UHC) announced that it would not participate in the Obamacare exchanges in the 2017 plan year. The announcement offers confirmation that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is plagued by adverse selection on the exchanges it authorized, and the spiral will only get worse. This is emphasized in “Five Things ACA Supporters Don’t Want You To Know“: other carriers are struggling and will be forced to accept UHC’s adverse risk pool; premiums must increase; more carriers will bail out; and quality of coverage will continue to decline because the ACA effectively punishes more comprehensive coverage.

Those insurers would have bailed sooner if not for subsidies they’ve been receiving from the federal government on individuals with incomes up to various multiples of the poverty line. However, the funding of a portion of those subsidies was ruled unconstitutional in federal appeals court in May. A deposition from a senior IRS official indicates that the Obama Administration was warned in early 2014 that it had no authority to make the payments, advice that it summarily dismissed. That’s on top of new lawsuits by insurers who say they were shorted by a wide margin on “risk corridor” payments owed to them by the federal government under Obamacare. The risk corridors, which supposedly cover a portion of aggregate losses on health exchange business, will expire after this year, just one the reasons to expect large premium hikes for next year.

As insurers drop out of the Obamacare exchanges, consumers will be forced to deal with a less competitive landscape. About half of the so-called coops on the exchanges had failed by the end of last year. A consequence of this attrition is that the range of coverage available to consumers will shrink:

“One BlueCross BlueShield subsidiary in Virginia has already filed plans to get out of the bronze plan, according to Inside Health Policy, and other insurers will follow suit if BCBS succeeds. That will destabilize the markets further, as one analyst told Leslie Small at Fierce Health Payer, because most of the younger and healthier participants in these risk pools have chosen bronze plans – and would likely bail out rather than pay higher premiums for insurance that they hardly ever use.“

Obamacare also fosters monopolization in the delivery of medical care. A pernicious effect is that local health-care markets are increasingly dominated by a single so-called “non-profit” hospital organization:

“Researchers at Johns Hopkins and Washington and Lee Universities report that seven of America’s 10 most profitable hospitals are officially not for profit. … That status entitles them to huge state and federal tax breaks — whose value has doubled in recent years — for ‘charity care and community benefit.’ … A for-profit outlet will pay taxes and returns to investors. Nonprofits wind up paying huge sums to executives — and plowing cash into gaining more market share.“

Non-profit status does not preclude monopolistic behavior. These institutions possess:

“… enormous leverage when setting prices and negotiating reimbursement from private insurers — whose hands are tied because they need those hospitals to be part of their network to attract paying customers. … As Dr. Marty Makary of Johns Hopkins wrote in The Wall Street Journal back in 2014: ‘When you’re the only game in town, you call the shots.’“

It’s no coincidence that Obamacare rewards consolidation of health care providers through so-called Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). That’s helped to drive the disappearance of independent physician practices in recent years. Those physicians are Increasingly employed by hospitals at which they can meet standardized quality measures more easily. The medical establishment maintains that ACOs will “bend the cost curve”… someday. But in the meantime, it’s not happening: the quality measures don’t provide good measures of health outcomes, and they inhibit innovation.

“For one thing, outcomes themselves are not easy to measure. An 80-year-old goes to the doctor with back pain. What is the best outcome? No pain? That’s probably impossible to achieve with even the highest quality care. Less pain? Maybe. But what does that mean and how do you measure it from patient to patient?

Then there is the matter of adjusting those scores for the severity of the disease and the social and economic status of the patient. This matters because low-income patients often struggle to manage their follow-up care or may be unable to afford medications. Such ‘risk adjustment’ is even harder to do with older adults with multiple chronic conditions.“

Even worse, while Obamacare seeks to broaden the market for health care to include those for whom good health coverage is otherwise out of reach, there is evidence that it is not truly improving access to health care. First, the kinds of policies that have been mandated provide relatively “thin” coverage, with high deductibles and copayment rates. Even when subsidized on the exchanges, many of the insured find actual health care payments to be prohibitive. Little wonder that emergency room utilization (where care must be provided regardless of ability to pay) has climbed under Obamacare, contrary to the early assertions of proponents. Second, many of the newly insured are covered by Medicaid, but low physician reimbursement rates have diminished the number of physicians willing to serve that market. Finally, while Obamacare increases the demand for provider services, it does not bring forth its own supply. A provider shortage is expected to continue to grow more severe over the next ten years.

The dual markets for health coverage and health care itself are becoming less competitive under Obamacare. The central planning inherent in the law effectively tossed the most potent forces available for reducing health care costs and expanding coverage: market competition and innovation. Higher prices represent only one avenue for the release of pressures created by mandates; shortfalls in access and the quality of care are others. While the medical establishment and regulators insist that safeguards are in place, it’s a safe bet that monopoly and central planning will have their usual dire effects.

Would You Tax Coastal Development?

14 Monday Dec 2015

Posted by pnoetx in Central Planning, Global Warming

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Carbon forcing, central planning, Climate Alarmism, Climate Change, Coastal development, Coastal tax, Federal Flood Insurance, FEMA, Glacier Melts, Glenn Reynolds, Pigouvian subsidies, Pigouvian Taxes, Robin Hanson, Sea Ice Extent, Strait of Gibraltar, Subsidies, Taxing development

If sea levels are truly rising due to climate change, then public policy should stop encouraging new development in coastal areas. Stipulating that this threat is real for the moment, serious and damaging encroachment of the seas might be 50 years away or more. By that time, many of today’s coastal buildings will be gone, or at least candidates for replacement, under realistic assumptions about the average lives of structures. A relatively low-cost approach to the threat of rising seas would be to stop building along the most vulnerable coasts right now and move new development inland. Yet no one wants to do that, least of all coastal property owners. But there is little discussion of this alternative even among the true believers of a coming global warming apocalypse. Why not?

This and related questions have been asked recently by several writers, including Glenn Reynolds and economist Robin Hanson. There are alternatives to discouraging new construction along coasts. Other expensive abatement projects can be pursued, now and later, such as sea walls or even adding land mass excavated from the sea floor or inland. In fact, the prospect of damming the Strait of Gibraltar to protect Mediterranean coastlines has been discussed. The expense of such an unprecedented public works project is what prompted Hanson’s post. To the extent that such remedial projects are not funded privately, they represent social costs arising from coastal development.

The federal government still subsidizes flood insurance on many coastal properties, though efforts to phase-out this FEMA program have been underway for a few years. However, governments seem only too willing to undertake the investment in public infrastructure and ongoing maintenance made necessary by new coastal development. And like other development projects, tax abatements and other subsidies are still granted for coastal development. Why do these policies escape notice from coastal green elites? Public outlays with private beneficiaries along threatened coasts are an immediate drain on resources, relieving private developers and property buyers of shoreline risk.

Reynolds (perhaps tongue-in-cheek) and Hanson suggest that new development should be taxed in coastal areas. That, and ending subsidies for development along coasts, is an economically and ecologically defensible alternative to the public expense of ubiquitous sea walls. However, a coastal tax might not be in the immediate interests of elites who claim that mankind faces an insurmountable global warming problem. Better to put off these sorts of remedial measures, especially while you can tax and regulate fossil fuels, and maybe live on the coast!

The position of the warmist community is that carbon emitters must cease and desist, in the hope that the seas will stop rising. They are willing to destroy entire industries (fossil fuels) in pursuit of their goals, but are unlikely to achieve them without inflicting drastic economic harm. If greens are so amenable to central control of economic activity and individual behavior (so long as they are at the controls), it would be prudent to take precautions now that will help to minimize the damage later. Discouraging coastal development with taxes and denial of subsidies is the sort of classic intervention that any Pigouvian planner should love. There is even evidence that sea levels have been much higher at times in the past. An earnest central planner might say that coastal development should always be discouraged to mitigate the risk of destruction.

I am skeptical of alarmist claims, including those related to rising sea levels. In fact, the connection between carbon emissions, global temperatures and sea levels is not well established, and whether sea levels are rising due to human activity is a matter of some dispute. Furthermore, global sea ice extent is not declining dramatically, if at all, and the storied glacier melts have been greatly exaggerated. Climate activists pursue their agenda despite the gross inaccuracy of past carbon-forcing forecasts, the gaping uncertainty surrounding model predictions going forward, and the crushing expense of the measures they advocate. The expense, however, is not one that activists expect to compromise their own standard of living. They either assume that it will be borne by others or that their draconian prescriptions will usher in an era of “sustainability”, powered by new, renewable energy sources. Not many of these alarmists would boast that their policies can quickly reverse the sea level rises they’ve told us to fear, but they dare not suggest taxes on coastal development until they see more convincing evidence. At least that much is sensible, if ironic!

Universal Pre-K Dumb-Down

30 Friday Oct 2015

Posted by pnoetx in Education, Welfare State

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Bernie Sanders, Child Development, Cradle to Grave Socialism, Ezra Klein, Federal funding, Fertility Decisions, Head Start, Hillary Clinton, Negative Incentives, Pre-Kindergarten Education, Pre-School For All, Socialization, Subsidies, Tennessee Pre-K Study, Universal Pre-K, Vox, Welfare State

Can the middle class be sold on federal pre-kindergarten dependency? Is pre-K always beneficial to children? All children? One of many issues agitating the “government-must-do-something” crowd is universal pre-kindergarten. It’s a favorite topic of the Socialist-Democrat Bernie Sanders and, more recently, it became a campaign promise from the Democrat-Socialist Hillary Clinton. It’s typical of the freebies these two presidential candidates are compelled to promise their base. While federal funding of universal pre-K is often billed as way to assist low-income working families, the subsidies proposed are not well-targeted: Clinton’s proposal calls for pre-K subsidies for middle-class families as well. A “Pre-School For All” proposal by President Obama in 2013 required $75 billion in funding. These kinds of broad-based transfer payments aren’t cheap.

In addition to the expense, it’s not clear that pre-K schooling is beneficial to all children. In Vox, Ezra Klein describes a recent study on the efficacy of a pre-K program in Tennessee (hat tip: John Crawford). The selection of children for the pre-K and control groups was randomized by virtue of a “lottery” for admission in regions experiencing excess demand. Here is Klein’s description of the results:

“At the end of pre-K, the results look pretty much as you would expect: Teachers rates [sic] the children who went through pre-K as ‘being better prepared for kindergarten work, as having better behaviors related to learning in the classroom and as having more positive peer relations.’

The problem is those results dissipate by the end of kindergarten — by then, the group that attended pre-K is no better off than the group that didn’t — and then begin to reverse by the end of first grade. By the end of second grade, the children who attended the pre-K program are scoring lower on both behavioral and academic measures than the children who didn’t.“

Klein cites two other “high-quality” studies (one by Head Start) that are consistent with the findings in Tennessee. He also notes some weaknesses of earlier studies suggesting that pre-K provides developmental benefits.

Some prominent advocates of pre-K insist that there are long-term benefits that the recent studies fail to capture. If so, it is hard to square that belief with such negative results after three years. I suspect that there are significant developmental rewards for children who spend their days with family members or even family friends, and I am skeptical that improved socialization can be gained from full-time attendance at a public facility. Perhaps some children benefit, but clearly not all.

None of this is to suggest that low-income parents would not benefit economically from additional subsidies for early education. To the extent that the parents are able to earn more income, the entire household will benefit and perhaps even society will benefit. But this is a social safety net issue at its base, not a broad-based social need. Ideally, one’s prospects for income should have a strong bearing on fertility decisions. Individual families should not expect others to bear the costs. And as for the safety net, let’s face it, great parts of it would be unnecessary in the absence of the negative work and family incentives inherent in many transfer programs. Neutralizing the costs of raising children compounds the bad incentives.

Like so many other statist misadventures, the populist appeal of universal pre-K is a desire for a freebie at the expense of others. The politicians Sanders, Clinton and Obama understand that, and they recognize it as another pillar of support for the great federal highway of cradle-to-grave serfdom.

Obamacare Gets a Whole New Grube

13 Thursday Nov 2014

Posted by pnoetx in Uncategorized

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

ACA, Individual Mandate, Jonathan Gruber, King vs. Burwell, Obamacare, Ron Fournier, Sacred Cow Chips, state exchanges, Subsidies, Supreme Court

Is anyone unaware at this point that Obamacare (the ACA) was built on a foundation of lies? The “tax vs. penalty” controversy was squirrelly, as the administration shifted positions in defending the individual mandate before the Supreme Court in 2012. Surprisingly, that court decision went in favor of the ACA despite the obvious flip-flop. Of course, we heard Obama say, “if you like your plan, you can keep your plan,” and “if you like your doctor, you can keep your doctor,” both of which were patently false statements. Now, we have the curious case of Jonathan Gruber, the celebrated MIT economist and a chief architect of the ACA. A citizen journalist (“real” journalists were asleep at the switch) uncovered a series of video clips of Gruber in which he strongly asserts that there was willful deceit involved in the crafting and selling of the health care law. Some Gruber:

“This bill was written in a tortured way to make sure CBO did not score the mandate as taxes. If CBO [Congressional Budget Office] scored the mandate as taxes, the bill dies. Okay, so it’s written to do that. In terms of risk rated subsidies, if you had a law which said that healthy people are going to pay in – you made explicit healthy people pay in and sick people get money, it would not have passed… Lack of transparency is a huge political advantage. And basically, call it the stupidity of the American voter or whatever, but basically that was really really critical for the thing to pass….”

Ron Fournier, at the first link above, writes:

“Liberals should be the angriest. Not only were they personally deceived, but the administration’s dishonest approach to health care reform has helped make Obamacare unpopular while undermining the public’s faith in an activist government. A double blow to progressives. …Gruber’s remarks are evidence that the administration intentionally deceived the American public on the costs of the programs. …And so even I have to admit, as a supporter, that Obamacare was built and sold on a foundation of lies.”

Even worse for those clinging to hope that the ACA will survive intact, in July, a year-old video came to light in which Gruber confirmed that the Obamacare subsidies were intended as an inducement to states to provide their own insurance exchanges, rather than relying on the federal exchange. This is now the subject of another case before the Supreme Court, King vs. Burwell. Sacred Cow Chips featured a post on Gruber’s statement in July, when he attempted to pass-off the remarks as mistaken, a “speak-o” as he put it, but he said the same thing on at least three separate occasions. In so doing, Gruber helped to make the case that subsidies were not intended for individuals purchasing insurance through the federal exchange.

There has been a spate of recent contentions that Obamacare is “working” after all. Lest any hypocrite take solace that the lies and deceit were worthwhile after all, the positive news is scant. Of course, the number of uninsured has declined to some extent, but almost entirely via Medicaid enrollment, for which access to providers is often problematic. Premia have increased for many previously insured under individual policies. Overall measures of premia are distorted by subsidies and the so-called “risk corridors,” basically bailout funds kicked back to health insurers to keep them profitable. There are a host of other problems. You can read about some of them here.

Big Casino Bets Have Bad Economic Odds

18 Monday Aug 2014

Posted by pnoetx in Uncategorized

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Casino Gambling, David Frum, Glenn Reynolds, Legalized Gambling, Problem Gamblers, Riverboat Casinos, Subsidies

I generally don’t gamble, but I believe that gambling should be legal, and not just at casinos on rivers and lagoons. Those high-profile casino developments involve a lot of concentrated economic and political power in the service of providing a willing counter-party for bettors, always at odds that garner a tidy profit for the casino. That power is associated with some dark realities, as local governments stumble over each other to provide incentives (ahem!!) for these developments. Unfortunately, other than a limited number of jobs for locals and the ephemeral thrills derived by bettors, the ongoing operations of casinos do not provide much benefit to their local economies, and are very likely a drag on local growth. This is the subject of “A Good Way To Wreck a Local Economy: Build Casinos,” by David Frum in The Atlantic. Here is one of Frum’s nuggets:

“The impact of casinos on neighboring property values is “unambiguously negative,” according to the economists at the National Association of Realtors. Casinos don’t encourage non-gaming businesses to open nearby, because the people who most often visit casinos do not wander out to visit other shops and businesses. A casino is not like a movie theater or a sports stadium, offering a time-limited amusement. It is designed to be an all-absorbing environment that does not release its customers until they have exhausted their money.”

Glenn Reynolds, on his Instapundit blog, says:

“A casino is basically a sign that the local political class has wrecked things already enough that they need a new approach to squeeze sufficient graft out of the wreckage. That’s especially true now that casinos are common enough that they mostly draw from the (already economically suffering) local region.”

I think Reynolds’ is referring to casinos that are subsidized by local governments with some degree of protection from local competition (which is afforded to some extent by laws that require casinos to “float”).

Frum makes much of the negative personal and social consequences of problem gambling. In light of his assertions, how could I support more general legalization? First, an end to subsidies for big casino developments would be an important step. Second, legal betting would expand personal liberty, which should be a sufficient justification. Legal or not, there will always be problem gamblers, but that’s not a good reason to curtail the rights of those capable of restraint. In addition, more general legalization would help keep local gambling dollars circulating locally, rather than sucked out of the local economy via casino profits or internet gambling. Another answer lies in what I suspect would be a less elastic supply of willing counterparty dollars, in a competitive environment (assuming an absence of subsidies to large gaming providers), to satisfy the presumed expansion of betting demand.