Tag Archives: All-Cause Mortality

Revisiting Excess Mortality

31 Sunday Jan 2021

Posted by in Coronavirus, Pandemic

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In early December I said that 2020 all-cause mortality in the U.S. would likely be comparable to figures from about 15 years ago. Now, Ben Martin confirms it with the chart below. Over time, declines in U.S. mortality have resulted from progress against disease and fewer violent deaths. COVID led to a jump in 2020, though some of last year’s deaths were attributable to policy responses, as opposed to COVID itself.

Here’s an even longer view of the trend from my post in December (for which 2020 is very incomplete):

As Martin notes sarcastically:

“Surprising, since the US is undergoing a ‘century pandemic‘ – In reality it is an event that’s unique in the last ‘15 years’”

The next chart shows 2020 mortality by month of year relative to the average of the past five years. Clearly, excess deaths have occurred compared to that baseline.

Using the range of deaths by month over the past 20 years (the blue-shaded band in the next chart), the 2020 figures don’t look quite as anomalous.

Finally, Martin shows total excess deaths in 2020 relative to several different baselines. The more recent (and shorter) the baseline time frame, the larger the excess deaths in 2020. Compared to the five-year average, 364,000 excess deaths occurred in 2020. Relative to the past 20 years, however, 150,000 excess deaths occurred last year. While those deaths are tragic, the pandemic looks more benign than when we confine our baseline to the immediate past.

Moreover, a large share of these excess deaths can be attributed to non-COVID causes of death that represent excesses relative to prior years, including drug overdoses, suicide, heart disease, dementia, and other causes. As many as 100,000 of these deaths are directly attributable lockdowns. That means true excess deaths caused by COVID infections were on the order of 50,000 relative to a 20-year baseline.

As infections subside from the fall wave, and as vaccinations continue to ramp up, some policy makers are awakening to the destructive impacts of non-pharmaceutical interventions (lockdown measures). The charts above show that this pandemic was never serious enough to justify those measures, and it’s not clear they can ever be justified in a free society. Yet some officials, including President Biden and Anthony Fauci, still labor under the misapprehension that masks mandates, stay-at-home orders, and restaurant closures can be effective or cost-efficient mitigation strategies.

A Good Historical Backdrop for the Pandemic

07 Monday Dec 2020

Posted by in Pandemic, Public Health

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In this short post I’m trying to do my part to put our pandemic experience in perspective. Lord knows, I was on the low side in my U.S. case-load “guesstimate” last March, as well as the number of deaths induced by COVID. (A number of others, using highly sophisticated models, erred more severely in the opposite direction.) I also failed to anticipate the strength of the later seasonal waves we’ve experienced — I was excessively optimistic as the first wave ebbed. But now, as the fall wave is showing some signs of topping out, what can we say about the pandemic in historical perspective? I came across an interesting chart that sheds some light on the question.

In terms of all-cause mortality, we’ve clearly seen a bump upward this year. Take a look at the chart below. It shows deaths per million (DPM) of population (from all causes). Try clicking on it if it’s hard to read, or turn your phone sideways. See the little blip on the lower right? That’s our pandemic year through August. The blip made 2020, at least through August, look something like a normal year of the early 2000s.

The visible spike early in 2020 was the spring wave, which was concentrated on the east coast. Of course, the fall wave will yield another spike, probably a bit higher than the first. Nevertheless, against the historical backdrop, this chart shows that the magnitude of our current public health crisis is relatively minor.

If you scan to the left from 2020, you can see that DPM this year would have appeared normal around 2005. Remember how bad it was back in aught-five…. all the death? Yeah, me neither. That’s perspective.

The chart also reflects several mild flu seasons over the past few years. Because the flu, like COVID-19, tends to hit the elderly and infirm the hardest, the “soft” DPM numbers over the past few years support the theory that the population included a fair amount of so-called “dry tinder” for COVID as we entered the year.

One other note on the chart: the DPMs are “age-adjusted”, meaning that age groups are weighted for comparisons across countries with differing age distributions (not what we’re doing here). In this case, the DPM values are weighted based on the population in the year 2000.

It’s amazing how so many have bought into the narrative that the current pandemic is historically bad. Yes, our DPMs are high relative to the last decade, but a significant number of those deaths were caused not by COVID, but by our own overreaction to the virus. That’s something else I failed to anticipate in the spring. It’s something we can put behind us now, however, if only we’re willing to put our experience in perspective. Unfortunately, many public officials, along with their public health advisors, continue to promote the deluded view that the virus can only be stopped by stopping our lives, our educations, our earnings, our health, and our sanity.

The Favored Cause of Death

19 Monday Oct 2020

Posted by in Coronavirus, Public Health

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The CDC changed its guidelines on completion of death certificates on April 5th of this year, and only for COVID-19 (C19), just as infections and presumed C19 deaths were ramping up. The substance of the change was to broaden the definition under which death should be attributed to C19. This ran counter to CDC guidelines followed over the previous 17 years, and the change not only makes the C19 death counts suspect: it also makes comparisons of C19 deaths to other causes of death unreliable, since only C19 is subject to the new CDC guidance. That’s true for concurrent and historical comparisons. The distortions are especially bad relative to other respiratory diseases, but also relative to other conditions that are common in mortality data.

The change in the CDC guidelines was noted in a recent report prepared for the Florida House of Representatives. It was brought to my attention by a retweet by Justin Hart linked to this piece on Andrew Bostom’s site. Death certificates are divided into two parts: Part 1 provides four lines in which causes of death are listed in reverse clinical order of events leading to death. Thus, the first line is the final clinical condition precipitating death. Prior clinical events are to be listed below that. The example shown above indicates that an auto accident, listed on the fourth line, initiated the sequence of events. Part 2 of the certificate is available for physicians or examiners to list contributing factors that might have played a role in the death that were not part of the sequence of clinical events leading to death.

The CDC’s change in guidelines for C19, and C19 only, made the criteria for inclusion in Part 1 less specific, and it essentially eliminated the distinction between Parts 1 and 2. The following appears under “Vital Records Criteria”:

“A death certificate that lists COVID-19 disease or SARS-CoV-2 as a cause of death or a significant condition contributing to death.”

How much difference does this make? For one thing, it opens the door to C19-attributed deaths in cases of false-positive PCR tests. When large cohorts are subject to testing — for example, all patients admitted to hospitals — there will always be a significant number of false positives even when test specificity is as high as 98 – 99%.

The elimination of any distinction between Parts 1 and 2 causes other distortions. A review of the Florida report is illustrative. The House staff reviewed almost 14,000 certificates for C19-19 attributed deaths. Over 9% of those did not list C19 among the clinical conditions leading to death. Instead, in those cases, C19 was listed as a contributing factor. Under the CDC’s previous guidelines, those would not have been counted as C19 deaths. The Florida House report is conservative in concluding that the new CDC guidelines inflated C19 deaths by only those 9% of the records examined.

There are reasons to think that the exaggeration was much greater, however. First, the Florida House report noted that nearly 60% of the certificates contained information “recorded in a manner inconsistent with state and national guidance”. In addition, almost another 10% of the fatalities were among patients already in hospice! Do we really believe the deaths of all those patients whose diseases had reached such an advanced stage should be classified as C19 fatalities? And another 1-2% listed non-C19 conditions as the immediate and underlying causes.

Finally, more than 20% of the certificates listed C19 alone as a cause of death despite a range of other contributing conditions or co-morbidities. This in itself may have been prompted by the change in the CDC’s guidelines, as the normal standards often involve a “comorbidity” as the initial reason for hospitalization — in that case a clinical event ordinarily listed in Part 1. The high rate of errors and the fact that roughly two-thirds of the deaths reviewed occurred in the hospital, where patients are all tested and often multiple times, raises the specter that up to 20% more of the C19 deaths were either erroneous and/or misclassified due to false positives.

(An exception may have occurred in New York, where an order issued in March by Governor Andrew Cuomo to return C19-positive residents of nursing homes (including suspected C19 cases) back to those homes, The order was made before the change in CDC guidelines and wasn’t rescinded until later in April. There is reason to believe that some of the C19 deaths among nursing home residents in New York were undercounted.)

All told, in the Florida data we have potential misclassification of deaths of 9% + 9% + 2% + 20% = 40%, or inflation relative to actual C19 deaths of up to 40%/60% = 67%! I strongly doubt it’s that high, but I would not consider a range of 25% – 50% exaggeration to be unreasonable.

We know that reports of C19 deaths lag actual dates of death by anywhere from 1 to 8 weeks, sometimes even more. This is misleading when no effort is made to explain that difference, which I’ve never heard out of a single journalist. We also know that false positive tests inflate C19 deaths. The Florida report gives us a sense of how large that exaggeration might be. In addition, the Florida data show that the CDC guidelines inflate C19 deaths in other ways: as a mere contributing factor, it can now be listed as the cause of death, unlike the treatment of pneumonia as a contributing factor, for instance. The same kind of distortion occurs when patients contract C19 (or have a false positive test) while in hospice.

There is no doubt that C19 led to “excess deaths” relative to all-cause mortality. However, many of these fatalities are misclassified, and it’s likely that a large share were and are lockdown deaths as opposed to C19 deaths. That’s tragic. The CDC has done the country a massive disservice by creating “special rules” for attributing cause-of-death to C19. If reported C19 fatality rates reflected the same rules applied to other conditions, our approach to managing the pandemic surely would have inflicted far less damage to health and economic well being.

Risk Realism, COVID Hysteria

29 Wednesday Jul 2020

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Perhaps life in a prosperous society has sapped our ability and willingness to face risks. This tendency undermines that very prosperity, however. If we ever needed an illustration, the hysteria surrounding COVID-19 surely provides it. Do we really know how to exist in a world with risk anymore? During this episode, the media, public officials, and much of the public have completely lost their bearings with respect to the evaluation of risk, acting as if they are entitled to a zero-risk existence. Of course, COVID-19 is highly transmissible and dangerous for certain segments of the population, but it is rather benign for most people.

Perspective On C19 Risks

Just for starters, the table at the top of this post (admittedly not particularly well organized) shows calculations of odds from the CDC. These odds might well overstate the risks of both C19 and the flu, as they probably don’t account well for the huge number of asymptomatic cases of both viruses.

Another glimpse of reality is offered by a recent Swiss study showing the C19 infection mortality rate (IFR) by age, shown below. You can find a number of other charts on-line that show the same pattern: If you’re less than 50 years old, your risk of death from C19 is quite slim. Even those 50-64 years of age don’t face a substantial mortality risk, though it’s obviously higher for individuals having co-morbidities. These IFRs are lower than all-cause mortality for younger cohorts, but higher for older cohorts.

And here are a few other facts to put the risks of C19 in perspective:

  • The current pandemic is relatively benign: thus far, the U.S. has suffered a total of about 145,000 deaths, or 440 per million of population;
  • the Asian Flu of 1957-58 took 116,000, according to the CDC, or 674 per million;
  • the Spanish Flu of 1917-18 took 675,000 U.S lives, or 6,553 per million.

It should be obvious that these risks, while new and elevated for some, are not of such outrageous magnitude that they can’t be managed without bringing life to a grinding halt. That’s especially true when so-called safety measures entail substantial health risks of their own, as I have emphasized elsewhere (and here).

The Schools

Nothing illustrates our inability to assess risks better than the debate over reopening schools. This article in Wired is well-balanced on the safety issue. It emphasizes that there is little risk to teachers, students, or their families from opening schools if reasonable safety measures are taken.

Children of pre-school and elementary school age do not contract the virus readily, do not transmit the virus readily, and do not readily succumb to its effects. This German study on elementary schools demonstrates the safety of reopening. It is similar to the experience of other EU countries that have reopened schools. This article reinforces that point, but it emphasizes measures to limit any flare-ups that might arise. And while it singles out Israel as an example of poor execution, it fails to offer any evidence on the severity of infections.

Furthermore, we should not overlook the destructive effects of denying in-classroom learning to children. They simply don’t learn as well on-line, especially students who struggle. There are also the devastating social-psychological effects of the isolation experienced by many elementary school children during extended school closures. This is of a piece with the significant risks of lockdowns to well being. Perhaps not well known is that schooling is positively correlated with life expectancy: this study found that a one-year reduction in years of schooling is associated with a reduction in life expectancy of 0.6 years!

It’s true that children older than 10 might pose somewhat greater risks for C19 contagion, but those risks are manageable via hygiene, distancing, and other mitigations including hydroxychloraquine or other prophylaxes against infection for teachers who desire it. Capacity limitations might well require a temporary mix of online and in-school learning, but at least part-time attendance at brick-and-mortar schools should remain the centerpiece.

As Tyler Cowen points out, teenagers are less likely to remain isolated from others during school closures, so their behavior might be more difficult to manage. It’s quite possible they could be more heavily exposed outside of school, hanging out with friends, than in the classroom. This illustrates how our readiness to demure from absolute risk often ignores the pertinent question of relative risk.

Judging by reactions on social media, people are so frightened out of their wits that they cannot put these manageable risks in perspective. But here is a statement from the American Academy of Pediatrics. And here is a statement from the American Association of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine. They speak for themselves.

Excessive Precautionary Putzery

Our reaction to C19 amounts to a misapplication of the precautionary principle (PP), which states, quite reasonably, that precautionary measures must be invoked when faced with a risk that is not well understood. Risk must be managed! But what are those precautions and on what basis should benefits we forego via mitigation be balanced against quantifiable risks. That was one theme of my post “Precaution Forbids Your Rewards” several years back. Ralph B. Alexander discusses the PP, noting that the construct is vulnerable to political manipulation. It is, unfortunately, a wonderful devise for opportunistic interest groups and interventionist politicians. See something you don’t like? Identify a risk you can use to frighten the public. Use any anecdotal evidence you can scrape together. Start a movement and put a stop to it!

That really doesn’t help us deal with risk in a productive way. Do we understand that well being generally is enhanced by our willingness to incur and manage risks? As David Zaruk, aka, the Risk Monger, says, “our reliance of the precautionary principle has ruined our ability to manage risk.”:

“Two decades of the precautionary principle as the key policy tool for managing uncertainties has neutered risk management capacities by offering, as the only approach, the systematic removal of any exposure to any hazard. As the risk-averse precautionary mindset cements itself, more and more of us have become passive docilians waiting to be nannied. We no longer trust and are no longer trusted with risk-benefit choices as we are channelled down over-engineered preventative paths. While it is important to reduce exposure to risks, our excessively-protective risk managers have, in their zeal, removed our capacity to manage risks ourselves. Precaution over information, safety over autonomy, dictation over accountability.”

To quote Mollie Hemingway, in the case of the coronavirus, Americans are “reacting like a bunch of hysterics“.