Tag Archives: Justin Hart

Harbingers of COVID Fade, But Not the Pretense for Hysteria

17 Thursday Dec 2020

Posted by in Coronavirus, Pandemic, Vaccinations

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My pre-Thanksgiving optimism about a crest in the fall wave of the coronavirus has been borne out for the Midwest and Mountain states in the U.S. These regions were the epicenter of the fall wave through October and most of November, but new cases in those states have continued to decline. Cases in a number of other states began to climb in November, however, contributing to a continuing rise in total new cases nationally. Some of these states are still in the throes of this wave, with the virus impacting subsets of the population that were relatively unscathed up till now.

My disclaimer: COVID is obviously a nasty virus. I don’t want to get it. However, on the whole, it is not a cataclysm on the order of many pandemics of the past. In fact, excess deaths this year will add just over 10% to projections of total deaths based on a five-year average. That level puts us in line with average annual deaths of about twenty years ago. And many of those excess deaths have been caused by our overreaction to the pandemic, not by the virus itself. As my endocrinologist has said, this is the greatest overreaction in all medical history. Unfortunately, a fading pandemic does not mean we can expect an end to the undue panic, or pretense for panic, on the part of interventionists.

This post will focus largely on trends in newly diagnosed COVID cases. I have been highly critical of our testing regime and COVID case counts because the most prominent diagnostic test (PCR) falsely identifies a large number of uninfected individuals as COVID-positive. However, case numbers are widely tracked and it’s fairly easy to find information across geographies for comparison. Deflate all the numbers by 30% if you want, or by any other factor, but please indulge me because I think the trends are meaningful, even if the absolute level of cases is inflated.

I’ll start with the good news and work my way down to states in which cases are still climbing (all of the following charts are from @Humble_Analysis (PLC)). The first chart is for the Great Plains, where cases peaked a little before Thanksgiving and have continued to fall since then. That peak came about six weeks after it began in earnest and cases have faded over the last four weeks.

Next we have the Mountain states, where again, cases peaked around Thanksgiving, though Idaho saw a rebound after the holiday. You’ll see below that a number of states had a distinct drop in new cases during the week of Thanksgiving. There was somewhat of a pause in testing during that week, so the subsequent rebounds are largely due to a “catch-up” at testing sites, rather than some kind of Thanksgiving-induced spike in infections.

Back to the Mountain region, the peak came an average of about six or seven weeks into the wave, but the duration of the wave appears to have been longer in Montana and Wyoming.

Here are the Southern Plain states, where cases plateaued around Thanksgiving (though cases in Missouri have clearly declined from their peak). In this region, case counts accelerated in October after a slow climb over the summer.

The situation is somewhat similar in the Midwest. where cases have generally plateaued. There were some post-Thanksgiving rebounds in several states, especially Tennessee. The wave began a little later in this region, in mid- to late October, and it is now seven to eight weeks into the wave, on average.

Here are the Mid-Atlantic states, which may be showing signs of a peak, though North Carolina has had the greatest caseload and is still climbing. These states are about seven weeks into the wave, on average.

The Northeast also shows signs of a possible peak and is about seven weeks into the wave, except for Rhode Island, which saw an earlier onset and the most severe wave among these states.

And finally we have the South, which is defined quite broadly in PLC’s construction. It’s a mixed bag, with a few states showing signs of a peak after about seven weeks. However, cases are still climbing in several states, notably California and Florida, among a few others.

Oregon and Washington were skipped, but they appear as the Pacific NW in the following chart, along with aggregations for all the other regions. Maine is Part of the “Rural NE”, which was also skipped. The fall wave can be grouped roughly into two sets of regions: those in which waves began in late September or early October, and those where waves began in early to mid-November. The first group has moved beyond a peak or at least has plateaued. The latter group may be reaching peaks now or one hopes very soon. It seems to take about seven weeks to reach the peak of these regional waves, so a late December peak for the latter group would be consistent.

Justin Hart has a take on the duration of these waves, but he does so in terms of the share of emergency room (ER) visits in which symptoms of COVID-like illness (CLI) are presented. CLI tends to precede case counts slightly. Hart puts the duration of these waves at eight to ten weeks, but that’s a judgement call, and I might put it a bit longer using caseloads as a guide. Still, this color-coded chart from Hart is interesting.

If this sort of cyclical duration holds up, it’s consistent with the view that cases in many of the still “hot” states should be peaking this month.

Aggregate cases for the U.S. appear below. The growth rate of new cases has slowed, and the peak is likely to occur soon. However, because it combines all of the regional waves, the duration of the wave nationwide will appear to be greater than for the individual regions. COVID-attributed deaths are also plotted, but they are reported deaths, not by date of death (DOD) or actual deaths, as I sometimes call them. Deaths by DOD are available only with a lag. As always, some of the reported deaths shown below occurred weeks before their reported date. Actual deaths were still rising as of late November, and are likely still rising. However, another indicator suggests they should be close to a peak.

A leading indicator of actual deaths I’ve discussed in the past now shows a more definitive improvement than it did just after Thanksgiving, as the next chart shows. This is the CLI share discussed above. An even better predictor of COVID deaths by actual DOD is the sum of CLI and the share of ER patients presenting symptoms of influenza-like illness (ILI), but ILI has been fairly low and stable, so it isn’t contributing much to changes in trend at the moment. There has been about a three-week lead between movements in CLI+ILI and COVID deaths by DOD.

(The reason the sum, CLI+ILI, has been a better predictor than CLI alone is because for some individuals, there are similarities in the symptoms of COVID and the flu.)

The chart shows that CLI peaked right around the Thanksgiving holiday (and so did CLI+ILI), but it remained on something of a plateau through the first week of December before declining. Some of the last few days on this chart are subject to revision, but the recent trend is encouraging. Allowing for a three-week lead, this indicates that peak deaths by DOD should occur around mid-December, but we won’t know exactly until early to mid-January. To be conservative, we might say the latter half of December will mark the peak in actual deaths.

The regional COVID waves this summer and fall seem to have run their course within 10 – 12 weeks. Several former hot spots have seen cases drop since Thanksgiving after surges of six to seven weeks. However, there are several other regions with populous states where the fall wave is still close to “mid-cycle”, as it were, showing signs of possible peaks after roughly seven weeks of rising cases. The national CLI share peaked around Thanksgiving, but it did not give up much ground until early December. That suggests that actual deaths (as opposed to reported deaths), at least in some regions, will peak around the time of the winter solstice. Let’s hope it’s sooner.

Successive waves within a region seem to reach particular subsets of the population with relatively few reinfections. The 10 – 12 week cycle discussed above is sufficient to achieve an effective herd immunity within these subsets. But once again, a large share of the vulnerable, and a large share of COVID deaths, are still concentrated in the elderly, high-risk population and in care homes. The vaccine(s) currently being administered to residents of those homes are likely to hasten the decline in COVID deaths beginning sometime in January, perhaps as early as mid-month. By then, however, we should already see a decline underway as this wave of the virus finally burns itself out. As vaccines reach a larger share of the population through the winter and spring, the likelihood of additional severe waves of the virus will diminish.

Lest there be any misunderstanding, the reasons for the contagion’s fade to come have mostly to do with reaching the effective herd immunity threshold within afflicted subsets of the population (sub-herds). Social distancing certainly plays a role as well. Nearly all of that is voluntary, though it has been encouraged by panicked pronouncement by certain public officials and the media. Direct interventions or lockdown measures are in general counter-productive, however, and they create a death toll of their own. Unfortunately, the fading pandemic might not rein-in the curtailment of basic liberties we’ve witnessed this year.

Post-Script: Let’s hope the side effects of the vaccines are not particularly severe in the elderly. That’s a little uncertain, because that sub-population was not tested in very high numbers.

COVID Interventions: Costly, Deadly, and Ineffective

14 Monday Dec 2020

Posted by in Coronavirus, Liberty, Lockdowns, Public Health

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What does it take to shake people out of their statist stupor? Evidently, the sweet “logic” of universal confinement is very appealing to the prescriptive mindset of busybodies everywhere, who anxiously wag their fingers at those whom they view as insufficiently frightened. As difficult as it is for these shrieking, authoritarian curs to fathom, measures like lockdowns, restrictions on business activity, school closures, and mandates on behavior have at best a limited impact on the spread of the coronavirus, and they are enormously costly in terms of economic well-being and many dimensions of public health. Yet the storm of propaganda to the contrary continues. Media outlets routinely run scare stories, dwelling on rising case numbers but ignoring them when they fall; they emphasize inflated measures of pandemic severity; certain researchers and so-called health experts can’t learn the lessons that are plain in the data; and too many public officials feel compelled to assert presumed but unconstitutional powers. At least the World Health Organization has managed to see things clearly, but many don’t want to listen.

I’ll be the first to say I thought the federalist approach to COVID policy was commendable: allow states and local governments to craft policies appropriate to local conditions and political preferences, rather than have the federal government dictate a one-size-fits-all policy. I haven’t wavered in that assessment, but let’s just say I expected more variety. What I failed to appreciate was the extent to which state and local leaders are captive to provincial busybodies, mavens of precautionary excess, and fraudulent claims to scientific wisdom.

Of course, it should be obvious that the “knowledge problem” articulated by Friedrich Hayek is just as dangerous at low-levels of government as it is in a central Leviathan. And it’s not just a knowledge problem, but a political problem: officials become panicked because they fear bad outcomes will spell doom for their careers. Politicians are particularly prone to the hazards of “do-somethingism”, especially if they have willing, status-seeking “experts” to back them up. But as Scott Sumner says:

“When issues strongly impact society, the science no longer ‘speaks for itself’.

Well, the science is not quite as clear as the “follow-the-science” crowd would have you believe. And unfortunately, public officials have little interest in sober assessments of the unintended effects of lockdown policy.

In my last post, I presented a simple framework for thinking about the benefits and costs of lockdown measures, or non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs). I also emphasized the knowledge problem: even if there is some point at which NPI stringencies are “optimized”, government does not possess the knowledge to find that point. It lacks detailed information on both the costs and benefits of NPIs, but individual actors know their own tolerance for risk, and they surely have some sense of the risks they pose to others in their normal course of affairs. While voluntary precautions might be imperfect, they accomplish much of what interventionists hope will be gained via coercion. But, in an effort to “sell” NPIs to constituents and assert their authority, officials vastly over-estimate benefits of NPIs and under-estimate the costs.

NPI Stringency and COVID Outcomes

Let’s take a look at a measure of the strength of NPIs by state — the University of Oxford Stringency Index — and compare those to CDC all-cause excess deaths in each state. If it’s hard to read, try clicking on the image or turn your phone sideways. This plot covers outcomes through mid-November:

The chart doesn’t suggest any benefit to the imposition of greater restrictions, or more stringent NPIs. In fact, the truth is that people will do most of the work on their own based on perceptions of risk. That’s partly because government restrictions add little risk mitigation to what can be accomplished by voluntary social distancing and other precautions.

Here’s a similar chart with cross-country comparisons, though the data here ended in early October (I apologize for the fuzzy image):

But what about reverse causality? Maybe the imposition of stringency was a response to more severe contagions. Now that the virus has swept most of the U.S and Europe in three distinct waves, and given the variety and timing of NPIs that have been tried, it’s harder to make that argument. States like South Dakota have done fairly well with low stringency, while states like New Jersey with high stringency have fared poorly. The charts above provide multiple pair-wise examples and counter-examples of states or countries having faced hard waves with different results.

But let’s look at a few specific situations.

The countries shown above have converged somewhat over the past month: Sweden’s daily deaths have risen while the others have declined to greater or lesser degrees, but the implications for mask usage are unaltered.

And of course we have this gem, predicated on the mental gymnastics lockdown enthusiasts are fond of performing:

But seriously, it’s been a typical pattern: cases rise to a point at which officials muster the political will to impose restrictions, often well after the “exponential” phase of the wave or even the peak has passed. For the sake of argument, if we were to stipulate that lockdowns save lives, it would take time for these measures to mitigate new infections, time for some of the infected individuals to become symptomatic, and more time for diagnosis. For the lockdown arguments to be persuasive, the implementation of NPIs would have to precede the point at which the growth of cases begins to decline by a few weeks. That’s something we’ve seldom observed, but officials always seem to take credit for the inevitable decline in cases.

More informed lockdown proponents have been hanging their hats on this paper in Nature by Seth Flaxman, et al, published in July. As Philippe LeMoine has shown, however, Flaxman and his coauthors essentially assumed their result. After a fairly exhaustive analysis, Lemoine, a man who understands sophisticated mathematics, offers these damning comments:

“Their paper is a prime example of propaganda masquerading as science that weaponizes complicated mathematics to promote questionable policies. Complicated mathematics always impresses people because they don’t understand it and it makes the analysis look scientific, but often it’s used to launder totally implausible assumptions, which anyone could recognize as such if they were stated in plain language. I think it’s exactly what happened with Flaxman et al.’s paper, which has been used as a cudgel to defend lockdowns, even though it has no practical relevance whatsoever.”

The Economic Costs of Stringency

So the benefits of stringent lockdowns in terms of averting sickness and death from COVID are speculative at best. What about the costs of lockdowns? We can start with their negative impact on economic activity:

That’s a pretty bad reflection on NPI stringency. In the U.S, a 10% decline in GDP in 2020 amounts to about $2.1 trillion in lost goods and services. That’s just for starters. The many destroyed businesses and livelihoods carry an ongoing cost that could take years to fade, as this graphic on permanent business closures shows:

If you’re wondering about the distributional effects of lockdowns, here’s more bad news:

It’s possible to do many high-paying jobs from home. Not so for blue-collar workers. And distributional effects by size of enterprise are also heavily-skewed in favor of big companies. Within the retail industry, big-box stores are often designated as “essential”, while small shops and restaurants are not. The restaurant industry has been destroyed in many areas, inflicting a huge blow to owners and workers. This despite evidence from contact tracing showing that restaurants and bars account for a very small share of transmission. To add insult to injury, many restaurants invested heavily in safety measures and equipment to facilitate new, safer ways of doing business, only to be double-crossed by officials like Andrew Cuomo and Eric Garcetti, who later shut them down.

Public Health Costs of Stringency

Lives are lost due to lockdowns, but here’s a little exercise for the sake of argument: The life value implied by individual willingness-to-pay for risk reduction comes in at less than $4 million. Even if the supposed 300,000 COVID deaths had all been saved by lockdowns, that would have amounted to a value of $1.2 trillion, about half of the GDP loss indicated above. Of course, it would be outrageously generous to concede that lives saved by NPI’s have approached 300,000, so lockdowns fall far short at the very outset of any cost-benefit comparison, even if we value individual lives at far more than $4 million.

As AJ Kay says, the social and human costs go far beyond economic losses:

I cited specific examples of losses in many of these categories in an earlier post. But for the moment, instead of focusing on causes of death, take a look at this table provided by Justin Hart showing a measure of non-COVID excess deaths by age group in the far right-hand column:

The numbers here are derived by averaging deaths by age group over the previous five years and subtracting COVID deaths in each group. I believe Hart’s numbers go through November. Of greatest interest here is the fact that younger age groups, having far less risk of death from COVID than older age groups, have suffered large numbers of excess deaths NOT attributed to COVID. As Hart notes later in his thread:

These deaths are a tragic consequence of lockdowns.

Educational Costs of Stringency

Many schools have been closed to in-person instruction during the pandemic, leading to severe disruptions to the education f children. This report from the Fairfax County, VA School District is indicative, and it is extremely disheartening. The report includes the following table:

Note the deterioration for disabled students, English learners, and the economically disadvantaged. The surfeit of failing grades is especially damaging to groups already struggling in school relative to their peers, such as blacks and Hispanics. Not only has the disruption to in-person instruction been disastrous to many students and their futures; it has also yielded little benefit in mitigating the contagion. A recent study in The Lancet confirms once again that transmission is low in educational settings. Also see here and here for more evidence on that point.

Conclusion

It’s clear that the “follow-the-science” mantra as a rationale for stringent NPIs was always a fraud, as was the knee-jerk response from those who conflated lockdowns with “leadership”. Such was the wrongheaded and ultimately deadly pressure to “do something”. We can be thankful that pressure was resisted at the federal level by President Trump. The extraordinary damage inflicted by ongoing NPIs was quite foreseeable, but there is one more very ominous implication. I’ll allow J.D. Tucille to sum that up with some of the pointed quotes he provides:

“‘The first global pandemic of the digital age has accelerated the international adoption of surveillance and public security technologies, normalising new forms of widespread, overt state surveillance,’ warned Kelsey Munro and Danielle Cave of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Cyber Policy Centre last month.

‘Numerous governments have used the COVID-pandemic to repress expression in violation of their obligations under human rights law,’ United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression David Kaye noted in July.

‘For authoritarian-minded leaders, the coronavirus crisis is offering a convenient pretext to silence critics and consolidate power,’ Human Rights Watch warned back in April.

There’s widespread agreement, then, that government officials around the world are exploiting the pandemic to expand their power and to suppress opposition. That’s the case not only among the usual suspects where authorities don’t pretend to take elections and civil liberties seriously, but also in countries that are traditionally considered ‘free.’ … It’s wildly optimistic to expect that newly acquired surveillance tools and enforcement powers will simply evaporate once COVID-19 is sent on its way. The post-pandemic new normal is almost certain to be more authoritarian than what went before.”

COVID and Hospital Capacity

15 Sunday Nov 2020

Posted by in Health Care, Pandemic

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The fall wave of the coronavirus has brought with it an increase in COVID hospitalizations. It’s a serious situation for the infected and for those who care for them. But while hospital utilization is rising and is reaching tight conditions in some areas, claims that it is already a widespread national problem are without merit.

National and State Hospital Utilization

The table below shows national and state statistics comparing beds used during November 1-9 to the three-year average from 2017 – 19, from Justin Hart. There are some real flaws in the comparison: one is that full-year averages are not readily comparable to particular times of the year, with or without COVID. Nevertheless, the comparison does serve to show that current overall bed usage is not “crazy high” in most states, as it were. The increase in utilization shown in the table is highest in IA, MT, NV, PA, VT, and WI, and there are a few other states with sizable increases.

Another limitation is that the utilization rates in the far right column do not appear to be calculated on the basis of “staffed” beds, but total beds. The U.S. bed utilization rate would be 74% in terms of staffed beds.

Average historical hospital occupancy rates from Statista look like this:

Again, these don’t seem to be calculated on the basis of staffed beds, but current occupancies are probably higher now based on either staffed beds or total beds.

As of November 11th, a table available at HealthData.gov indicates that staffed bed utilization in the U.S. is at nearly 74%, with ICU utilization also at 74%. As the table above shows, states vary tremendously in their hospital bed utilization, a point to which I’ll return below.

COVID patients were using just over 9% of of all staffed beds and just over 19% of ICU beds as of November 11th. One caveat on the reported COVID shares you’ll see for dates going forward: the CDC changed its guidelines on counting COVID hospitalizations as of November 12th. It is now a COVID patient’s entire hospital stay, rather than only when a patient is in isolation with COVID. That might be a better metric if we can trust the accuracy of COVID tests (and I don’t), but either way, the change will cause a jump in the COVID share of occupied beds.

Interpreting Hospital Utilization

Many issues impinge on the interpretation of hospital utilization rates:

First, cases and utilization rates are increasing, which is worrisome, but the question is whether they have already reached crisis levels or will very soon. The data doesn’t suggest that is the case in the aggregate, but there certainly there are hospitals bumping up against capacity constraints in some parts of the country.

Second, occupancies are increasing due to COVID patients as well as patients suffering from lockdown-related problems such as self-harm, psychiatric problems, drug abuse, and conditions worsened by earlier deferrals of care. We can expect more of that in coming weeks.

Third, lockdowns create other hospital capacity issues related to staffing. Health care workers with school-aged children face the daunting task of caring for their kids and maintaining hours on jobs for which they are critically needed.

Fourth, there are capacity issues related to PPE and medical equipment that are not addressed by the statistics above. Different uses must compete for these resources within any hospital, so the share of COVID admissions has a strong bearing on how the care of other kinds of patients must be managed.

Fifth, some of the alarm is purely case-driven: all admissions are tested for COVID, and non-COVID admissions often become COVID admissions after false-positive PCR tests, or simply due to the presence of mild COVID with a more serious condition or injury. However, severe COVID cases have an outsized impact on utilization of staff because their care is relatively labor-intensive.

Sixth, there are reports that the average length of COVID patient stays has decreased markedly since the spring (it is hard to find nationwide figures), but it is also increasingly difficult to find facilities for post-acute care required for some patients on discharge. Nevertheless, if improved treatment reduces average length of stay, it helps hospitals deal with the surge.

Finally, thus far, the influenza season has been remarkably light, as the following chart from the CDC shows. It is still early in the season, but the near-complete absence of flu patients is helping hospitals manage their resources.

St. Louis Hotspot

The St. Louis metro area has been proclaimed a COVID “hotspot” by the local media and government officials, which certainly doesn’t make St. Louis unique in terms of conditions or alarmism. I’m curious about the data there, however, since it’s my hometown. Here is hospital occupancy on the Missouri side of the St. Louis region:

It seems this chart is based on total beds, not staffed beds, However, one of the interesting aspects of this chart is the variation in capacity over time, with several significant jumps in the series. This has to do with data coverage and some variation in daily reporting. Almost all of these data dashboards are relatively new, so their coverage has been increasing, but generally in fits and starts. Reporting is spotty on a day-to-day basis, so there are jagged patterns. And of course, capacity can vary from day-to-day and week-to-week — there is some flexibility in the number of beds that can be made available.

The share of St. Louis area beds in use was 61% as of November 11th (preliminary). COVID patients accounted for 12% of hospital beds. ICU utilization in the St. Louis region was a preliminary 67% as of Nov. 11, with COVID patients using 29% of ICU capacity (which is quite high). Again, these figures probably aren’t calculated on the basis of “staffed” beds, so actual hospital-bed and ICU-bed utilization rates could be several percentage points higher. More importantly, it does not appear that utilization in the St. Louis area has trended up over the past month.

At the moment, the St. Louis region appears to have more spare hospital capacity than the nation, but COVID patients are using a larger share of all beds and ICU beds in St. Louis than nationwide. So this is a mixed bag. And again, capacity is not spread evenly across hospitals, and it’s clear that hospitals are under pressure to manage capacity more actively. In fact, hospitals only have so many options as the share of COVID admissions increases: divert or discharge COVID and non-COVID patients, defer elective procedures, discharge COVID and non-COVID patients earlier, allow beds to be more thinly staffed and/or add temporary beds wherever possible.

Closing Thoughts

Anyone with severe symptoms of COVID-19 probably should be hospitalized. The beds must be available, or else at-home care will become more commonplace, as it was for non-COVID maladies earlier in the pandemic. A continued escalation in severe COVID cases would require more drastic steps to make hospital resources available. That said, we do not yet have a widespread capacity crisis, although that’s small consolation to areas now under stress. And a few of the states with the highest utilization rates now have been rather stable in terms of hospitalizations — they already had high average utilization rates, which is potentially dangerous.

COVID is a seasonal disease, and it’s no surprise that it’s raging now in areas that did not experience large outbreaks in the spring and summer. And those areas that had earlier outbreaks have not had a serious surge this fall, at least not yet. My expectation and hope is that the midwestern and northern states now seeing high case counts will soon reach a level of prevalence at which new infections will begin to subside. And we’re likely to see a far lower infection fatality rate than experienced in the Northeast last spring.

COVID Trends and Flu Cases

05 Thursday Nov 2020

Posted by in Pandemic

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Writing about COVID as a respite from election madness is very cold comfort, but here goes….

COVID deaths in the U.S. still haven’t shown the kind of upward trend this fall that many had feared. It could happen, but it hasn’t yet. In the chart above, new cases are shown in brown (along with the rolling seven-day average), while deaths (on the right axis) are shown in blue. It’s been over six weeks since new case counts began to rise, but deaths have risen for about two weeks, and it’s been gradual relative to the first two waves. Either the average lag between diagnosis and death is much longer than earlier in the year, or the current “casedemic” is much less deadly, or perhaps both. It could change. And granted, this is national data; states in the midwest have had the strongest trends in cases, especially the upper midwest, as well as stronger trends in hospitalizations and deaths. Most of those areas had milder experiences with the virus in the spring and summer.

Lagged Reporting

What’s tricky about this is that both case reports and death reports in the chart above are significantly lagged. A COVID test might not take place until several days after infection (if at all), and sometimes not until hospitalization or death. Then the test result might not be known for several days. However, the greater availability of tests and faster turnaround time have almost certainly shortened that lag.

Deaths are reported with an even a greater delay, though you wouldn’t know it from listening to the media or some of the organizations that track these statistics, such as Johns Hopkins University and the COVID Tracking Project. Thus far, they only tell you what’s reported on a given day. This article from Rational Ground does a good job of explaining the issue and the distortion it causes in discerning trends.

Deaths by actual date-of-death

I’ve reported on the issue of lagged COVID deaths myself. The following graph from Justin Hart is a clear presentation of the reporting delays.

Reported deaths for the most recent week (10/24) are shown in dark blue, and those deaths were spread over a number of prior weeks. Actual deaths in a given week are represented by a “stack” of deaths reported later, in subsequent weeks. One word of caution: actual deaths in the most recent weeks are “provisional”, and more will be added in subsequent reporting weeks. Hence the steep drop off for the 10/17 and 10/24 reporting weeks.

Going back three or four weeks, it’s clear that actual deaths continued to decline into October. Unfortunately, that doesn’t tell us much about the recent trend or whether actual deaths have started to rise given the increase in new cases. I have seen a new weekly update with the deaths by actual date of death, but it is not “stacked” by reporting week. However, it does show a slight increase in the week of 10/10, the first weekly increase since the end of June. So perhaps we’ll see an uptick more in-line with the earlier lags between diagnosis and death, but that’s far from certain.

Another important point is that the number of deaths each week, and each day, are not as high as reported by the media and the popular tracking sites. How often have you heard “more than 1,000 people a day are dying”. That’s high even for weekly averages of reported deaths. As of three weeks ago, actual daily deaths were running at about 560. That’s still very high, but based on seroprevalence estimates (the actual number of infections from the presence of antibodies), the infection fatality keeps dropping toward levels that are comparable to the flu at ages less than 65.

Where is the flu?

Speaking of the flu, this chart from the World Health Organization is revealing: the flu appears to have virtually disappeared in 2020:

It’s still very early in the northern flu season, but the case count was very light this summer in the Southern Hemisphere. There are several possible explanations. One favored by the “lockdown crowd” is that mitigation efforts, including masks and social distancing, have curtailed the flu bug. Not just curtailed … quashed! If that’s true, it’s more than a little odd because the same measures have been so unsuccessful in curtailing COVID, which is transmitted the same way! Also, these measures vary widely around the globe, which weakens the explanation.

There are other, more likely explanations: perhaps the flu is being undercounted because COVID is being overcounted. False positive COVID tests might override the reporting of a few flu cases, but not all diagnoses are made via testing. Other respiratory diseases can be mistaken for the flu and vice versus, and they are now more likely to be diagnosed as COVID absent a test — and as the joke goes, the flu is now illegal! And another partial explanation: it is rare to be infected with two viruses at once. Thus, COVID is said to be “crowding out” the flu.

Waiting for data

There is other good news about transmission, treatment, and immunity, but I’ll devote another post to that, and I’ll wait for more data. For now, the “third wave” appears to be geographically distinct from the first two, as was the second wave from the first. This suggests a sort of herd immunity in areas that were hit more severely in earlier waves. But the best news is that COVID deaths, thus far this fall, are not showing much if any upward movement, and estimates of infection fatality rates continue to fall.

The Favored Cause of Death

19 Monday Oct 2020

Posted by in Coronavirus, Public Health

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The CDC changed its guidelines on completion of death certificates on April 5th of this year, and only for COVID-19 (C19), just as infections and presumed C19 deaths were ramping up. The substance of the change was to broaden the definition under which death should be attributed to C19. This ran counter to CDC guidelines followed over the previous 17 years, and the change not only makes the C19 death counts suspect: it also makes comparisons of C19 deaths to other causes of death unreliable, since only C19 is subject to the new CDC guidance. That’s true for concurrent and historical comparisons. The distortions are especially bad relative to other respiratory diseases, but also relative to other conditions that are common in mortality data.

The change in the CDC guidelines was noted in a recent report prepared for the Florida House of Representatives. It was brought to my attention by a retweet by Justin Hart linked to this piece on Andrew Bostom’s site. Death certificates are divided into two parts: Part 1 provides four lines in which causes of death are listed in reverse clinical order of events leading to death. Thus, the first line is the final clinical condition precipitating death. Prior clinical events are to be listed below that. The example shown above indicates that an auto accident, listed on the fourth line, initiated the sequence of events. Part 2 of the certificate is available for physicians or examiners to list contributing factors that might have played a role in the death that were not part of the sequence of clinical events leading to death.

The CDC’s change in guidelines for C19, and C19 only, made the criteria for inclusion in Part 1 less specific, and it essentially eliminated the distinction between Parts 1 and 2. The following appears under “Vital Records Criteria”:

“A death certificate that lists COVID-19 disease or SARS-CoV-2 as a cause of death or a significant condition contributing to death.”

How much difference does this make? For one thing, it opens the door to C19-attributed deaths in cases of false-positive PCR tests. When large cohorts are subject to testing — for example, all patients admitted to hospitals — there will always be a significant number of false positives even when test specificity is as high as 98 – 99%.

The elimination of any distinction between Parts 1 and 2 causes other distortions. A review of the Florida report is illustrative. The House staff reviewed almost 14,000 certificates for C19-19 attributed deaths. Over 9% of those did not list C19 among the clinical conditions leading to death. Instead, in those cases, C19 was listed as a contributing factor. Under the CDC’s previous guidelines, those would not have been counted as C19 deaths. The Florida House report is conservative in concluding that the new CDC guidelines inflated C19 deaths by only those 9% of the records examined.

There are reasons to think that the exaggeration was much greater, however. First, the Florida House report noted that nearly 60% of the certificates contained information “recorded in a manner inconsistent with state and national guidance”. In addition, almost another 10% of the fatalities were among patients already in hospice! Do we really believe the deaths of all those patients whose diseases had reached such an advanced stage should be classified as C19 fatalities? And another 1-2% listed non-C19 conditions as the immediate and underlying causes.

Finally, more than 20% of the certificates listed C19 alone as a cause of death despite a range of other contributing conditions or co-morbidities. This in itself may have been prompted by the change in the CDC’s guidelines, as the normal standards often involve a “comorbidity” as the initial reason for hospitalization — in that case a clinical event ordinarily listed in Part 1. The high rate of errors and the fact that roughly two-thirds of the deaths reviewed occurred in the hospital, where patients are all tested and often multiple times, raises the specter that up to 20% more of the C19 deaths were either erroneous and/or misclassified due to false positives.

(An exception may have occurred in New York, where an order issued in March by Governor Andrew Cuomo to return C19-positive residents of nursing homes (including suspected C19 cases) back to those homes, The order was made before the change in CDC guidelines and wasn’t rescinded until later in April. There is reason to believe that some of the C19 deaths among nursing home residents in New York were undercounted.)

All told, in the Florida data we have potential misclassification of deaths of 9% + 9% + 2% + 20% = 40%, or inflation relative to actual C19 deaths of up to 40%/60% = 67%! I strongly doubt it’s that high, but I would not consider a range of 25% – 50% exaggeration to be unreasonable.

We know that reports of C19 deaths lag actual dates of death by anywhere from 1 to 8 weeks, sometimes even more. This is misleading when no effort is made to explain that difference, which I’ve never heard out of a single journalist. We also know that false positive tests inflate C19 deaths. The Florida report gives us a sense of how large that exaggeration might be. In addition, the Florida data show that the CDC guidelines inflate C19 deaths in other ways: as a mere contributing factor, it can now be listed as the cause of death, unlike the treatment of pneumonia as a contributing factor, for instance. The same kind of distortion occurs when patients contract C19 (or have a false positive test) while in hospice.

There is no doubt that C19 led to “excess deaths” relative to all-cause mortality. However, many of these fatalities are misclassified, and it’s likely that a large share were and are lockdown deaths as opposed to C19 deaths. That’s tragic. The CDC has done the country a massive disservice by creating “special rules” for attributing cause-of-death to C19. If reported C19 fatality rates reflected the same rules applied to other conditions, our approach to managing the pandemic surely would have inflicted far less damage to health and economic well being.

COVID Seasonality and Latitudes

23 Sunday Aug 2020

Posted by in Pandemic

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The coronavirus (C19), or SARS-CoV-2, has a strong seasonal component that appears to closely match that of earlier SARS viruses as well as seasonal influenza. This includes the two distinct caseloads we’ve experienced in the U.S. 1) in the late winter/early spring; and 2) the smaller bump we witnessed this summer in some southern states and tropics. 

COVID Seasonal Patterns and Latitude

The Ethical Skeptic on Twitter recently featured the chart below. It shows the new case count of C19 in the U.S. in the upper panel, and the 2003 SARS virus in the lower panel. Both viruses had an initial phase at higher latitudes and a summer rebound at lower latitudes.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I particularly like the following visualizations from Justin Hart demonstrating the pandemic’s pattern at different latitudes (shown in the leftmost column). The first table shows total cases by week of 2020. The second shows deaths per 100,000 of population by week. Again, notice that lower latitudes have had a crest in the contagion this summer, while higher latitudes suffered the worst of their contagion in the spring. Based on deaths in the second table, the infections at lower latitudes have been less severe.

Viral Patterns in the South

Many expected the pandemic to abate this summer, including me, as it is well known that viruses don’t thrive in higher temperatures and humidity levels, and in more direct sunlight. So it is a puzzle that southern latitudes experienced a surge in the virus during the warmest months of the year. True, the cases were less severe on average, and sunlight and humidity likely played a role in that, along with the marked reduction in the age distribution of cases. However, the SARS pandemic of 2003 followed the same pattern, and the summer surge of C19 at southern latitudes was quite typical of viruses historically.

A classic study of the seasonality of viruses was published in 1981 by Robert Edgar Hope-Simpson. The next chart summarized his findings on influenza, seasonality, and latitude based on four groups of latitudes. Northern and southern latitudes above 30° are shown in the top and bottom panels, respectively. Both show wintertime contagions with few infections during the summer months. Tropical regions are different, however. The second and third panels of the chart show flu infections at latitudes less than 30°. Influenza seems to lurk at relatively low levels through most of the year in the tropics, but the respective patterns above and below the equator look almost like very muted versions of activity further to the north and south. However, some researchers describe the tropical pattern as bimodal, meaning that there are two peaks over the course of a year.   

So the “puzzle” of the summer surge at low latitudes appears to be more of an empirical regularity. But what gives rise to this pattern in the tropics, given that direct sunlight, temperature, and humidity subdue viral activity?

There are several possible explanations. One is that the summer rainy season in the tropics leads to less sunlight as well as changes in behavior: more time spent indoors and even less exposure to sunlight. In fact, today, in tropical areas where air conditioning is more widespread, it doesn’t have to be rainy to bring people indoors, just hot. Unfortunately, air conditioning dries the air and creates a more hospitable environment for viruses. Moreover, low latitudes are populated by a larger share of dark-skinned peoples, who generally are more deficient in vitamin D. That might magnify the virulence associated with the flight indoors brought on by hot and or rainy weather.   

Mutations and Seasonal Patterns

What makes the seasonal patterns noted above so reliable in the face of successful immune responses by recovered individuals? And shouldn’t herd immunity end these seasonal repetitions? The problem is the flu is highly prone to viral mutation, having segments of genes that are highly interchangeable (prompting so-called “antigenic drift“). That’s why flu vaccines are usually different each year: they are customized to prompt an immune response to the latest strains of the virus. Still, the power of these new viral strains are sufficient to propagate the kinds of annual flu cycles documented by Hope-Simpson.

With C19, we know there have been up to 100 mutations, mostly quite minor. Two major strains have been dominant. The first was more common in Southeast Asia near the beginning of the pandemic. It was less virulent and deadly than the strain that hit much of Europe and the U.S. Of course, in July the media misrepresented this strain as “new”, when in fact it had become the most dominant strain back in March and April.

What Lies Ahead

By now, it’s possible that the herd immunity threshold has been surpassed in many areas, which means that a surge this coming fall or winter would be limited to a smaller subset of still-susceptible individuals. The key question is whether C19 will be prone to mutations that pose new danger. If so, it’s possible that the fall and winter will bring an upsurge in cases in northern latitudes both among those still susceptible to existing strains, and to the larger population without immune defenses against new strains.

Fortunately, less dangerous variants are more more likely to be in the interest of the virus’ survival. And thus far, despite the number of minor mutations, it appears that C19 is relatively stable as viruses go. This article quotes Dr. Heidi J. Zapata, an infectious disease specialist and immunologist at Yale, who says that C19:

“… has shown to be a bit slow when it comes to accumulating mutations … Coronaviruses are interesting in that they carry a protein that ‘proofreads’ [their] genetic code, thus making mutations less likely compared to viruses that do not carry these proofreading proteins.”

The flu, however, does not have such a proofreading enzyme, so there is little to check its prodigious tendency to mutate. Ironically, C19’s greater reliability in producing faithful copies of itself should help ensure more durable immunity among those already having acquired defenses against C19.

This means that C19 might not have a strong seasonal resurgence in the fall and winter. Exceptions could include: 1) the remaining susceptible population, should they be exposed to a sufficient viral load; 2) regions that have not yet reached the herd immunity threshold; and 3) the advent of a dangerous new mutation, though existing T-cell immunity may effectively cross-react to defend against such a mutation in many individuals.