Donald Trump’s latest volley against the Federal Reserve accuses the central bank of fixing interest rates at artificially high levels compared to rates in other developed countries. He repeatedly demands that the Fed make a large cut to its federal funds rate target, in the apparent belief that other rates will immediately fall with it. While a highly imperfect analogy, that’s a bit like saying that long-term parking in New York City would be cheaper if only hourly rates were cut to what’s charged in Omaha, and with only favorable consequences. Don’t tell Mamdani!
Trump believes the Fed’s restrictive monetary policy is preventing the economy from achieving its potential under his policies. He also argues that the Fed’s “high-rate” policy is costing the federal government and taxpayers hundreds of billions in excessive interest on federal debt. High rates can certainly impede growth and raise the cost of debt service. The question is whether there is a policy that can facilitate growth and reduce borrowing costs without risking other objectives, most notably price stability.
Delusions of Control
The financial community understands that the Fed does not directly control rates paid by the Treasury on federal debt. The Fed has its most influence on rates at the short end of the maturity spectrum. Rates on longer-term Treasury notes and bonds are subject to a variety of market forces, including expected inflation, the expected future path of federal deficits, and the perceived direction of the economy, to name a few. The Fed simply cannot dictate investor sentiments and expectations, and the ongoing flood of new Treasury debt complicates matters.
Another fundamental lesson for Trump is that cross-country comparisons of interest rates are meaningless outside the context of differing economic conditions. Market interest rates are driven by things that vary from one country to another, such as expected inflation rates, economic policies, currency values, and the strength of the home economy. Differences in rates are always the result of combinations of circumstances and expectations, which can be highly varied.
A Few Comparisons
A few examples will help reinforce this point. Below, I compare the U.S. to a few other countries in terms of recent short-term central bank rate targets and long-term market interest rates. Then we can ask what conditions explain these divergencies. For reference, the current fed funds rate target range is 4.25 – 4.5%, while 10-year Treasury bonds have traded recently at yields in the same range. Current U.S. inflation is roughly 2.5%.
It’s important to remember that markets attempt to price bonds to compensate buyers for expected future inflation. Currently, the10-year “breakeven” inflation implied by indexed Treasury bonds is about 2.35% (but it is closer to 3% at short durations). That means unindexed Treasury bonds yielding 4.4% offer an expected real yield just above 2%. Accounting for expected inflation often narrows the gap between U.S. interest rates and foreign rates, but not always.
Switzerland: The Swiss National Bank maintains a policy rate of 0%; the rate on 10-year Swiss government bonds has been in the 0.5 – 0.7% range. Why can’t we have Swiss-like interest rates in the U.S.? Is it merely intransigence on the part of the Fed, as Trump would have us believe?
No. Inflation in Switzerland is near zero, so in terms of real yields, the gap between U.S. and Swiss rates is closer to 1.4%, rather than 3.8%. But what of the remaining difference? Swiss government debt, even more than U.S. Treasury debt, attracts investors due to the nation’s “safe-haven” status. Also, U.S. yields are elevated by our ballooning federal debt and uncertainties related to trade policy. Economic growth is also somewhat stronger in the U.S., which tends to elevate yields.
These factors give the Fed reason to be cautious about cutting its target rate. It needs evidence that inflation will continue to trend down, and that policy uncertainties can be resolved without reigniting inflation.
Euro Area: The European Central Bank’s (ECB) refinancing rate is now 2.15%. Meanwhile, the 10-year German Bund is yielding around 2.6%, so both short-term and long-term rates in the Euro area are lower than in the U.S. In this case, the difference relative to U.S. rates is not large, nor is it likely attributable to lower expected inflation. Instead, sluggish growth in the EU helps explain the gap. Federal deficits and the ongoing issuance of new Treasury debt also keep U.S. yields higher. Treasury yields may also reflect a premium for volatility due to heavier reliance on foreign investors and private funds, who tend to be price sensitive.
Japan: The Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) policy rate is currently 0.5%. Yields on Japanese 10-year government bonds have recently traded just below 1.5%. Expected inflation in Japan has been around 2.5% this year, which means that real yields are sharply negative. The BOJ has tightened policy to bring inflation down. The nearly 3% gap between U.S. and Japanese bond yields reflects very weak economic growth in Japan. In addition, despite a very high debt to GDP ratio, the depressed value of the yen discourages investment abroad, helping to sustain heavy domestic holdings of government debt.
Blame and Backfire
Trump might well understand the limits of the Fed’s control over interest rates, but if he does, then this is exclusively a case of scapegoating. Cross-country differences in interest rates represent equilibria that balance an array of complex conditions. These range from disparate rates of inflation, the strength of economic growth, currency values, fiscal imbalances, and the character of the investor base. .
Investor expectations obviously play a huge role in all this. A central bank like the Fed cannot dictate long-term yields, and it can do much more harm than good by attempting to push the market where it does not want to go. That type of aggressiveness can spark changes in expectations that undermine policy objectives. It’s childish and destructive to insist that interest rates can and should be as low in the U.S. as in countries facing much different circumstances.
Seemingly everyone wants to know: where is this tariff inflation you economists speak of? Even my pool guy asked me! We haven’t seen it yet, despite the substantial tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration. The press has been wondering about this for almost two months, and some of the MAGA faithful are celebrating the resounding success of the tariffs in this and other respects. Not so fast, grasshoppers!
There are a couple of aspects to the question of tariff inflation. One has to do with the meaning of inflation itself. Strictly speaking, inflation is a continuing positive rate of increase in the price level. Certain purists say it is a continuous positive rate of increase in the money supply, which I grant is least a step beyond what most people understand as inflation. Rising prices over any duration is a good enough definition for now, but I’ll return to this question below in the context of tariffs.
There is near-unanimity among economists that higher tariffs will increase the prices of imports, import-competing goods, and goods requiring imported materials as inputs. Domestic importers pay the tariffs, so they face pressure on their profit margins unless they can pass the cost onto their customers. But so far, since Donald Trump made his “Liberation Day” tariff announcement, we’ve seen very little price pressure. What explains this stability, and will it last?
Several factors have limited the price response to tariffs thus far:
— Some importers are “eating” the tariffs themselves, at least for now, and they might continue to pay a share of the tariffs with smaller margins.
“… cargo loaded onto ships in Asia on April 4 was not subject to the reciprocal tariffs, while cargo loaded April 5 was. Cargo coming from Asia can take up to 45 days to make it to U.S. ports and then must be transported to distribution centers and then on to customers. It is possible that goods from Asia subjected to high tariffs are only now making their way to customers. These two factors suggest the economic effects of increased tariffs could merely be delayed.“
— Data on prices is reported with a lag. We won’t know the June CPI and PPI until July 15, and the PCE price index (and its core measure, of most importance to the Fed) won’t be reported until July 31, and will be subject to revisions in subsequent months.
— Importers stocked up on inventories before tariffs took effect, and even before Trump took office. Once these are depleted, new supplies will carry a higher cost. That’s likely over the next few months.
— Uncertainty about the magnitude of the new tariffs. Trump has zig-zagged a number of times on the tariff rates he’ll impose on various countries, and real trade agreements have been slow in coming. This makes planning difficult. Nevertheless, inventories are likely to carry a higher replacement cost, but adjusting price creates a danger of putting oneself at a competitive disadvantage and alienating customers. Many businesses would prefer to wait for a clearer read on the situation before committing to a substantial price hike.
— Tariff exemptions have reduced the average tariffs assessed thus far to about 10%, well below the 15% official average. This will reduce the impact on prices and margins, but it is still a huge increase in tariffs and another source of uncertainty that should give importers pause in any effort to recoup tariffs by repricing.
— Importers are storing goods in “bonded warehouse“ to delay the payment of tariffs. This helps importers buy time before committing to pricing decisions.
— Kashkari notes that businesses can find ways to alter trade routes so as to lower the tariffs they pay. For example, he says some goods are being routed to take advantage of the relatively favorable terms of the free trade agreement between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada.
So it’s still too early to have seen much evidence of price pressure from Trump’s tariffs. However, that pressure is likely to become more obvious over the summer months. The expectation that tariffs should have already shown up in prices is just one of several errors of those critical of the Federal Reserve’s patience in easing policy.
Is there a sound reason to expect higher tariffs to produce a continuing inflation? Or instead, should we expect a “one-time” increase in the price level without further complications? Tariffs could generate an ongoing inflation if accompanied by an increase in the rate of money growth, or at least enough money growth to create expectations of higher inflation. Thus, if the Federal Reserve seeks to “accommodate” tariffs by easing monetary policy, that might lead to more widespread inflation. That could be difficult to rein-in, to the extent that higher inflation gets embedded into expectations.
Tariffs are excise taxes, and while they put upward pressure on the prices of imports and import-competing goods, they may have a contractionary effect on economic activity. Tighter budgets might lead to softer prices in other sectors of the economy and moderate the impact of tariffs on the overall price level.
The Fed’s reluctance to ease policy has been reinforced by another development. It’s usually argued that tariffs will strengthen the domestic currency due to the induced reduction in demand for foreign goods (and thus the need for foreign currency). Instead, the dollar has declined more than 9% against the Euro since “Liberation Day”, and the overall U.S. dollar index experienced its steepest first-half decline in 50 years. A lower dollar stimulates exports and depresses imports, but it also can lead to “imported” inflation (in this case, apart from the direct impact of tariffs). Uncertainty regarding tariffs deserves some of the blame for the dollar sell-off, but the fiscal outlook and rising debt levels have also done their part.
The upshot is that Trump’s tariffs are likely to cause a one-time increase in the price level with possibly a mild contractionary effect on the real economy. So it’s a somewhat stagflationary effect. It won’t be disastrous, but the tariffs can be made more inflationary than they “need be”. That’s why Trump is foolish to persist in haranguing the Fed for not rushing to ease policy.
Matt Yglesias tweeted on X that “the bond market does not appear to believe in DOGE”. He included a chart much like the updated one above to “prove” his point. Tyler Cowen posted a link to the tweet on Marginal Revolution, without comment … Cowen surely must know that any such conclusion is premature, especially based on the movement of Treasury yields over the past month (or more, since the market’s evaluation of the DOGE agenda preceded Trump’s inauguration).
Of course, there is a difference between “believing” in DOGE and being convinced that its efforts should have succeeded in reducing interest rates immediately amidst waves of background noise from budget and tax legislation, court challenges, Federal Reserve missteps (this time cutting rates too soon), and the direction of the economy in general.
In this case, perhaps a better way to define success for DOGE is a meaningfully negative impact on the future supply of Treasury debt. Even that would not guarantee a decline in Treasury rates, so the premise of Yglesias’ tweet is somewhat shaky to begin with. Still, all else equal, we’d expect to see some downward pressure on yields if DOGE succeeds in this sense. But we must go further by recognizing that DOGE savings could well be reallocated to other spending initiatives. Then, the savings would not translate into lower supplies of Treasury debt after all.
Certainly, the DOGE team has made progress in identifying wasteful expenditures, inefficiencies, and poor controls on spending. But even if the $55 billion of estimated savings to date is reliable, DOGE has a long way to go to reach Musk’s stated objective of $2 trillion. There are some juicy targets, but it will be tough to get there in 17 more months, when DOGE is to stand down. Still, it’s not unreasonable to think DOGE might succeed in accomplishing meaningful deficit reduction.
But if bond traders have doubts about DOGE, it’s partly because Donald Trump and Elon Musk themselves keep giving them reasons. In my view, Musk and Trump have made a major misstep in toying with the idea of using prospective DOGE savings to fund “dividend checks” of $5,000 for all Americans. These would be paid by taking 20% of the guesstimated $2 trillion of DOGE savings. Musk’s expression of interest in the idea was followed by a bit of clusterfuckery, as Musk walked back his proposal the next day even as Trump jumped on board. PLEASE Elon, don’t give the Donald any crowd-pleasing ideas! And don’t lose sight of the underlying objective to reduce the burden of government and the public debt.
Now, Trump proposes that 60% of the savings accomplished by DOGE be put toward paying for outlays in future years. Sure, that’s deficit reduction, but it may serve to dull the sense that shrinking the federal government is an imperative. The mechanics of this are unclear, but as a first pass, I’d say the gain from investing DOGE savings for a year in low-risk instruments is unlikely to outweigh the foregone savings in interest costs from paying off debt today! Of course, that also depends on the future direction of interest rates, but it’s not a good bet to make with public funds.
Nor can the bond market be comforted by uncertainty surrounding legislation that would not only extend the Trump tax cuts, but will probably include various spending provisions, both cuts and increases. As of now, the mix of provisions that might accompany a deal among GOP factions is very much up in the air.
There is also trepidation about Trump’s aggressive stance toward the Federal Reserve. He promises to replace Jerome Powell as Fed Chairman, but with God knows whom? And Trump jawbones aggressively for lower rates. The Fed’s ill-advised rate cuts in the fall might have been motivated in part by an attempt to capitulate to the then-President Elect.
Trump’s Executive Order to create a sovereign wealth fund (SWF), which I recently discussed here, is probably not the most welcome news to bond investors. All else equal, placing tax or tariff revenue into such a fund would reduce the potential for deficit reduction, to say nothing of the idiocy of additional borrowing to purchase assets.
Finally, Trump has proposed what might later prove to be massive foreign policy trial balloons. Some of these are bound up with the creation of the SWF. They might generate revenue for the government without borrowing (mineral rights in Ukraine? Or Greenland?), but at this point there’s also a chance they’ll create massive funding needs (Gaza development?). Again, Trump seems to be prodding or testing counterparties to various negotiations… prodding diplomacy. It’s unlikely that anything too drastic will come of it from a fiscal perspective, but it probably doesn’t leave bond traders feeling easy.
At this stage, it’s pretty rash to conclude that the bond market “doesn’t believe in DOGE”. In fact, there is no doubt that DOGE is making some progress in identifying potential fraud and inefficiencies. However, bond traders must weigh a wide range of considerations, and Donald Trump has a tendency to kick up dust. Indeed, the so-called DOGE dividend will undermine confidence in debt reduction and bond prices.
If you want to induce a shortage, a price ceiling is a reliable way to do it. Usury laws are no exception to this rule. Private credit can be supplied plentifully to borrowers only when lenders are able to charge rates commensurate with other uses of their funds. Importantly, the rate charged must include a premium for the perceived risk of nonpayment. That’s critical when extending credit to financially-challenged applicants, who are often deserving but may be less stable or unproven.
No doubt certain lenders will seek to exploit vulnerable borrowers, but those borrowers are made less vulnerable when formal, mainstream sources of credit are available. A legal ceiling on the price of credit short-circuits this mechanism by restricting the supply to low-income borrowers, many of whom rely on credit cards as a source of emergency funds.
A couple of odd bedfellows, Senators Josh Hawley (R-MO) and Bernie Sanders (D-CT), are cosponsoring a bill to impose a cap of 10% on credit card interest rates. Sanders is an economic illiterate, so his involvement is no surprise. Hawley is otherwise a small government conservative, but in this effort he reveals a deep ignorance. Unfortunately, President Trump would be happy to sign their bill into law if it gets through Congress, having made a similar promise last fall during the campaign. Unfortunately, this is a typically populist stance for Trump; as a businessman he should know better.
Many consumers in the low-income segment of the market for credit have thin credit reports, a few delinquencies, or even defaults. Most of these potential borrowers struggle with expenses but generally meet their obligations. But even a few with the best intentions and work ethic will be unable to pay their debts. The segment is risky for lenders.
Card issuers might be able to compensate along a variety of margins. These include high minimum payments, stiff fees for late payments, tight credit limits (on lines, individual purchases, or revolving balances), deep relationship requirements, and limits on rewards. However, the most straightforward option for covering the risk of default is to charge a higher interest rate on revolving balances.
The total return on assets of credit-card issuing banks in 2023 was 3.33%, more than twice the 1.35% earned at non-issuing banks, asreported by the Federal Reserve. But that difference in profitability is well aligned with the incremental risk of unsecured credit card lending. According to BBVA Research:
“… studies confirm that higher interest rates on credit cards are not related to limited market competition but to greater levels of risk relative to other banking activities backed or secured by collateral. … In fact, an investigation into the risk-adjusted returns of credit cards banks versus all commercial banks suggests that over the long term, credit cards banks do not enjoy a significant advantage. … the market is characterized by participants that operate a high-risk business that requires elevated risk premiums.”
So card issuers are not monopolists. They face competition from other banks, often on the basis of non-rate product features, as well as “down-market” lenders who “specialize” in serving high-risk borrowers. These include payday lenders, pawn shop operators, vehicle title lenders, refund anticipation lenders, and informal loan sharks, all of whom tend to demand stringent terms. People turn to these alternatives and other informal sources when they lack better options. Hawley, Sanders, and Trump would unwittingly throw more credit-challenged consumers into this tough corner of the credit market if the proposed legislation becomes law.
Much of this was discussed recently by J.D. Tuccille, who writes that many consumers:
“… find banks, credit card companies, and other mainstream institutions rigid, uninterested in their business, and too closely aligned with snoopy government officials. Often, the costs and requirements imposed by government regulations make doing business with higher-risk, lower-income customers unattractive to mainstream finance.
‘The regulators are causing the opposite of the desired effect by making it so dangerous now to serve a lower-income segment,’ JoAnn Barefoot, a former federal official, including a stint as deputy controller of the currency, told the book’s author. She emphasized red tape that makes serving many potential customers a legal minefield“
Tuccille offers a revealing quote attributed to a bank official from a 2015 article in the Albuquerque Journal:
“‘Banking regulations stemming from the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and the Patriot Act of 2001 have created an almost adversarial credit environment for people whose finances are in cash.‘“
In other words, for some time the government has been doing its damnedest to choke off bank-supplied credit to low-income and risky borrowers, many of whom are deserving. It’s tempting to say this was well-intentioned, but the truth might be more sinister. Onerous regulation of lending practices at mainstream financial institutions, including caps on credit card interest rates, is political gold for politicians hoping to exploit populist sentiment. “Good” politics often hold sway over predictable but unintended consequences, which later can be blamed on the very same financial institutions.
Wow! We’re less than a week from Election Day! I’d hoped to write a few more detailed posts about the platforms and policies of Kamala Harris and Donald Trump, but I was waylaid by Hurricane Milton. It sent us scrambling into prep mode, then we evacuated to the Florida Panhandle. The drive there and back took much longer than expected due to the mass exodus. On our return we found the house was fine, but there was significant damage to an exterior structure and a mess in the yard. We also had to “de-prep” the house, and we’ve been dealing with contractors ever since. It was an exhausting episode, but we feel like we were very lucky.
Now, with less than a week left till the election, I’ll limit myself to a summary of the positions of the candidates in a number of areas, mostly but not all directly related to policy. I assign “grades” in each area and calculate an equally-weighted “GPA” for each candidate. My summaries (and “grades”) are pretty off-the-cuff and not adequate treatments on their own. Some of these areas are more general than others, and I readily admit that a GPA taken from my grade assignments is subject to a bit of double counting. Oh well!
Role of Government: Kamala Harris is a statist through and through. No mystery there. Trump is more selective in his statist tendencies. He’ll often favor government action if it’s politically advantageous. However, in general I think he is amenable to a smaller role for the public than the private sector. Harris: F; Trump: C
Regulation: There is no question that Trump stands for badly needed federal regulatory reform. This spans a wide range of areas, and it extends to a light approach to crypto and AI regulation. Trump plans to appoint Elon Musk as his “Secretary of Cost Cutting”. Harris, on the other hand, seems to favor a continuation of the Biden Administration’s heavy regulatory oversight. This encourages a bloated federal bureaucracy, inflicts high compliance costs on the private sector, stifles innovation, and tends to concentrate industrial power. Harris: F; Trump: A
Border Policy: Trump wants to close the borders (complete the wall) and deport illegal immigrants. Both are easier said than done. Except for criminal elements, the latter will be especially controversial. I’d feel better about Trump’s position if it were accompanied by a commitment to expanded legal immigration. We need more legal immigrants, especially the highly skilled. For her part, Harris would offer mass amnesty to illegals. She’d continue an open border policy, though she claims to want certain limits on illegal border crossings going forward. She also claims to favor more funds for border control. However, it is not clear how well this would translate into thorough vetting of illegal entrants, drug interdiction at the border, or sex trafficking. Harris: D; Trump: B-
Antitrust: Accusations of price gouging by American businesses? Harris! Forty three corporations in the S&P 500 under investigation by the DOJ? The Biden-Harris Administration. This reflects an aggressively hostile and manipulative attitude toward the business community. Trump, meanwhile, might wheedle corporations to act on behalf of certain of his agendas, but he is unlikely to take such a broadly punitive approach. Harris: F; Trump: B-
Foreign Policy: Harris is likely to continue the Biden Administration’s conciliatory approach to dealing with America’s adversaries. The other side of that coin is an often tepid commitment to longtime allies like Israel. Trump believes that dealing from a position of strength is imperative, and he’s willing to challenge enemies with an array of economic and political sticks and carrots. He had success during his first term in office promoting peace in the Middle East. A renewed version of the Abraham Accords that strengthened economic ties across the region would do just that. Ideally, he would like to restore the strength of America’s military, about which Harris has less interest. Trump has also shown a willingness to challenge our NATO partners in order to get them to “pay their fair share” toward the alliance’s shared defense. My major qualification here has to do with the candidates’ positions with respect to supporting Ukraine in its war against Putin’s mad aggression. Harris seems more likely than Trump to continue America’s support for Ukraine. Harris: D+; Trump: B-
Trade: Nations who trade with one another tend to be more prosperous and at peace. Unfortunately, neither candidate has much recognition of these facts. Harris is willing to extend the tariffs enforced during the Biden Administration. Trump, however, is under the delusion that tariffs can solve almost anything that ails the country. Of course, tariffs are a destructive tax on American consumers and businesses. Part of this owes to the direct effects of the tax. Part owes to the pricing power tariffs grant to domestic producers. Tariffs harm incentives for efficiency and the competitiveness of American industry. Retaliatory action by foreign governments is a likely response, which magnifies the harm.
To be fair, Trump believes he can use tariffs as a negotiating tool in nearly all international matters, whether economic, political, or military. This might work to achieve some objectives, but at the cost of damaging relations more broadly and undermining the U.S. economy. Trump is an advocate for not just selective, punitive tariffs, but for broad application of tariffs. Someone needs to disabuse him of the notion that tariffs have great revenue-raising potential. They don’t. And Trump is seemingly unaware of another basic fact: the trade deficit is mirrored by foreign investment in the U.S. economy, which spurs domestic economic growth. Quashing imports via tariffs will also quash that source of growth. I’ll add one other qualification below in the section on taxes, but I’m not sure it has a meaningful chance.
Harris: C-; Trump: F
Inflation: This is a tough one to grade. The President has no direct control over inflation. Harris wants to challenge “price gougers”, which has little to do with actual inflation. I expect both candidates to tolerate large deficits in order to fulfill campaign promises and other objectives. That will put pressure on credit markets and is likely to be inflationary if bond investors are surprised by the higher trajectory of permanent government indebtedness, or if the Federal Reserve monetizes increasing amounts of federal debt. Deficits are likely to be larger under Trump than Harris due in large part to differences in their tax plans, but I’m skeptical that Harris will hold spending in check. Trump’s policies are more growth oriented, and these along with his energy policies and deregulatory actions could limit the inflationary consequences of his spending and tax policies. Higher tariffs will not be of much help in funding larger deficits, and in fact they will be inflationary. Harris: C; Trump: C
Federal Reserve Independence: Harris would undoubtedly like to have the Fed partner closely with the Treasury in funding federal spending. Her appointments to the Board would almost certainly lead to a more activist Fed with a willingness to tolerate rapid monetary expansion and inflation. Trump might be even worse. He has signaled disdain for the Fed’s independence, and he would be happy to lean on the Fed to ease his efforts to fulfill promises to special interests. Harris: D; Trump: F
Entitlement Reform: Social Security and Medicare are both insolvent and benefits will be cut in 2035 without reforms. Harris would certainly be willing to tax the benefits of higher-income retirees more heavily, and she would likely be willing to impose FICA and Medicare taxes on incomes above current earning limits. These are not my favorite reform proposals. Trump has been silent on the issue except to promise no cuts in benefits. Harris: C-; Trump: F
Health Care: Harris is an Obamacare supporter and an advocate of expanded Medicaid. She favors policies that would short-circuit consumer discipline for health care spending and hasten the depletion of the already insolvent Medicare and Medicaid trust funds. These include a $2,000 cap on health care spending for Americans on Medicare, having Medicare cover in-home care, and extending tax credits for health insurance premia. She supports funding to address presumed health care disparities faced by black men. She also promises efforts to discipline or supplant pharmacy benefit managers. Trump, for his part, has said little about his plans for health care policy. He is not a fan of Obamacare and he has promised to take on Big Pharma, whatever that might mean. I fear that both candidates would happily place additional controls of the pricing of pharmaceuticals, a sure prescription for curtailed research and development and higher mortality. Harris: F; Trump: D+
Abortion: The Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson essentially relegated abortion law to individual states. That’s consistent with federalist principles, leaving the controversial balancing of abortion vs. the unborn child’s rights up to state voters. Geographic differences of opinion on this question are dramatic, and Dobbs respects those differences. Trump is content with it. Meanwhile, Harris advocates for the establishment of expanded abortion rights at the federal level, including authorization of third trimester abortions by “care providers”. And Harris does not believe there should be religious exemptions for providers who do not wish to offer abortion services. No doubt she also approves of federally funded abortions. Harris: F; Trump: A
Housing: The nation faces an acute housing shortage owing to excessive regulation that limits construction of new or revitalized housing. These excessive rules are primarily imposed at the state and local level. While the federal government has little direct control over many of these decisions, it has abetted this regulatory onslaught in a variety of ways, especially in the environmental arena. Harris is offering stimulus to the demand side through a $25,000 housing tax credit for first-time home buyers. This will succeed in raising the cost of housing. She has also called for heavier subsidies for developers of low-income housing. If past is prologue, this might do more to line the pockets of developers than add meaningfully to the stock of affordable housing. Harris also favors rent controls, a sure prescription for deterioration in the housing stock, and she would prohibit software allowing landlords to determine competitive neighborhood rents. Trump has called for deregulation generally and would not favor rent controls. Harris: F; Trump B
Taxes: Harris has broached several wildly destructive tax proposals. Perhaps the worst of these is to tax unrealized capital gains, and while she promises it would apply only to extremely wealthy taxpayers, it would constitute a wealth tax. Once that line is crossed, the threat of widening the base becomes a very slippery slope. It would also be a strong detriment to domestic capital investment and economic growth. Harris would increase the top marginal personal tax rate and the corporate tax rate, which would discourage investment and undermine real wage growth. She’d also increase estate tax rates. As discussed above, she unwisely calls for a $25,000 tax credit for first-time homebuyers. She also wants to expand the child care tax credit to $6,000 for families with newborns. A proposed $50,000 small business tax credit would allow the federal government to subsidize and encourage risky entrepreneurial activity at taxpayers’ expense. I’m all for small business, but this style of industrial planning is bonkers. She would sunset the Trump (TCJA) tax cuts in 2026.
Finally, Harris has mimicked Trump in calling for no taxes on tips. Treating certain forms of income more favorably than others is a recipe for distortions in economic activity. Employers of tip-earning workers will find ways to shift employees’ income to tips that are mandatory for patrons. It will also skew labor supply decisions toward occupations that would otherwise have less economic value. But Trump managed to find an idea so politically seductive that Harris couldn’t resist.
Trump’s tax plans are a mixed bag of good and bad ideas. They include extending his earlier tax cuts (TCJA) and restoring the SALT deduction. The latter is an alluring campaign tidbit for voters in high-tax states. He would reduce the corporate tax rate, which I strongly favor. Corporate income is double-taxed, which is a detriment to growth as well as a weight on real wages. He would eliminate taxes on overtime income, another example of favoring a particular form of income over others. Wage earners would gain at the expense of salaried employees, so one could expect a transition in the form employees are paid over time. Otherwise, the classification of hours as “overtime” would have to be standardized. One could expect existing employees to work longer hours, but at the expense of new jobs. Finally, Trump says Social Security benefits should not be taxed, another kind of special treatment by form of income. This might encourage early retirement and become an additional drain on the Social Security Trust Fund.
The higher tariffs promised by Trump would collect some revenue. I’d be more supportive of this plank if the tariffs were part of a larger transition from income taxes to consumption taxes. However, Trump would still like to see large differentials between tariffs and taxes imposed on the consumption of domestically-produced goods and services.
Harris: F; Trump C+
Climate Policy: This topic has undergone a steep decline in relative importance to voters. Harris favors more drastic climate interventions than Trump, including steep renewable subsidies, EV mandates, and a panoply of other initiatives, many of which would carry over from the Biden Administration. Harris: F; Trump: B
Energy: Low-cost energy encourages economic growth. Just ask the Germans! Consistent with the climate change narrative, Harris wishes to discourage the use of fossil fuels, their domestic production, and even their export. She has been very dodgy with respect to restrictions on fracking. Her apparent stance on energy policy would be an obvious detriment to growth and price stability (or I should say a continuing detriment). Trump wishes to encourage fossil fuel production. Harris: F; Trump: A
Constitutional Integrity: Harris has supported the idea of packing the Supreme Court, which would lead to an escalating competition to appoint more and more justices with every shift in political power. She’s also disparaged the Electoral College, without which many states would never have agreed to join the Union. Under the questionable pretense of “protecting voting rights”, she has opposed steps to improve election integrity, such voter ID laws. And operatives within her party have done everything possible to register non-citizens as voters. Harris: F; Trump: A
First Amendment Rights: Harris has called for regulation and oversight of social media content and moderation. A more descriptive word for this is censorship. Trump is generally a free speech advocate. Harris: F; Trump A-
Second Amendment Rights: Harris would like to ban so-called “assault weapons” and high-capacity magazines, and she backs universal background checks for gun purchases. Trump has not called for any new restrictions on gun rights. Harris: F; Trump: A
DEI: Harris is strongly supportive of diversity and equity initiatives, which have undermined social cohesion and the economy. That necessarily makes her an enemy of merit-based rewards. Trump has no such confusion. Harris: F; Trump: A
Hysteria: The Harris campaign has embraced a strategy of demonizing Donald Trump. Of course, that’s not a new approach among Democrats, who have fabricated bizarre stories about Trump escapades in Russia, Trump as a pawn of Vladimir Putin, and Russian manipulation of the 2016 Trump campaign. Congressional democrats spent nearly all of Trump’s first term in office trying to find grounds for impeachment. Concurrently, there were a number of other crazy and false stories about Trump. The current variation on “Orange Man Bad” is that Trump is a fascist and a Nazi, and that all of his supporters are Nazis. And that Trump will use the military against his domestic political opponents, the so-called “enemy within”. And that Trump will send half the country’s populace to labor camps. The nonsense never ends, but could anything more powerfully ignite the passions of violent extremists than this sort of hateful rhetoric? Would it not be surprising if at least a few leftists weren’t interested in assassinating “Hitler” himself. This is hysteria, and one has to wonder if that is not, in fact, the intent.
Can any of these people actually define the term fascist? Most fundamentally, a fascist desires the use of government coercion for private gain (of wealth or power) for oneself and/or one’s circle of allies. By that definition, we could probably categorize a great many American politicians as fascists, including Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Donald Trump, and a majority of both houses of Congress. That only demonstrates that corporatism is fundamental to fascist politics. Less-informed definitions of fascism conflate it with everything from racism (certainly can play a part) and homophobia (certainly can play a part) to mere capitalism. But take a look at the demographics of Trump’s supporters and you can see that most of these definitions are inapt.
Is the Trump campaign suffering from any form of hysteria? It’s shown great talent at poking fun at the left. Of course, Trump’s reactions to illegal immigration, crime, and third-trimester abortions are construed by leftists to be hysterical. I mean, why would anyone get upset about those kinds of things?
Harris: F; Trump: A
“Grade Point Average”
I’m sure I forgot an area or two I should have covered. Anyway, the following are four-point “GPAs” calculated over 20 categories. I’m deducting a quarter point for a “minus” grade and adding a quarter point for a “plus” grade. Here’s what I get:
The late, great Milton Friedman said monetary policy has “long and variable lags” in its effect on the economy. Easy money might not spark an inflation in goods prices for two years or more, though the typical lag is thought to be more like 15-20 months. Tight money seems to have similar lags in its effects. Debates surround the division and timing of these effects between inflation and real GDP, and too many remain convinced that a reliable tradeoff exists between inflation and unemployment.
With that preface, where do we stand today? The Fed executed a veritable helicopter drop of cash during the pandemic, in concert with support payments by the Treasury, with predictable inflationary results. It was also, in part, an accommodation to supply-side pressures. Then the tightening of policy began in the spring of 2022. How will the timing and strength of these shifting policies ultimately play out, as well as the impact of expectations regarding future policy moves?
Help On the Way?
Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell and the Fed’s Open Market Committee (FOMC) are now poised to ease policy after three-plus years of a tighter policy stance. The FOMC is widely expected to cut its short-term interest rate target by a quarter point at the next FOMC on September 17-18. There is an outside chance that the Fed will cut the target by a half point, depending on the strength of new data to be released over the next couple of weeks. In particular, this Friday’s employment report looms large.
What sometimes goes unacknowledged is that the Fed will be following market rates downward, not leading them. The chart below shows the steep drop in the one-year Treasury yield over the past couple of months. Other rates have declined as well. Granted, longer rates are determined in large part by expectations of future short-term rates over which the Fed has more control.
And yet the softening of market rates may well be a signal of weaker economic activity. There is certainly concern among investors that a failure by the Fed to ease policy might jeopardize the much hoped-for “soft landing”. The lagged effects of the Fed’s tighter policy stance may drag on, with damage to the real economy and the labor market. Indeed, some assert that a recession remains a strong possibility (and see here), and the manufacturing sector has been in a state of contraction for five months.
On the other hand, the Fed has fallen short of its 2% inflation goal. The core PCE deflator, the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge, was up 2.6% for the year ending in July. Some observers fear that easing policy prematurely will lead to a new acceleration of inflation.
Powell Gives the Nod
Nevertheless, markets were relieved when Jerome Powell, in his recent speech in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, indicated his determination that a shift in policy was appropriate. From Bloomberg:
“Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell said ‘the time has come’ for the central bank to start cutting interest rates.
“Powell’s comments cemented expectations for a rate cut at the central bank’s next gathering in September. The Fed chief said the cooling of the labor market is ‘unmistakable,’ adding, ‘We do not seek or welcome further cooling in labor market conditions.’ Powell also said his confidence has grown that inflation is on a ‘sustainable path’ back to the Fed’s goal of 2%.“
The “sustainable path back to … 2%” might imply a view inside Fed that policy will remain somewhat restrictive even after a quarter or half-point rate cut in September. Or perhaps the “sustainable path” has to do with the aforementioned lags, which might continue to be operative regardless of any immediate change in policy. The feasibility of a “soft landing” depends on whether policy is indeed still restrictive or on how benign those lagged effects turn out to be. But if we take the lags seriously, an easing of policy wouldn’t have real economic force for perhaps 15 months. Still, the market puts great hope in the salutary effects of a move by the Fed to ease policy.
Big Balance Sheet
It can be argued that the Fed already took a step toward easing policy in May when it reduced the rate at which it was allowing runoff in its portfolio of Treasury and mortgage-backed securities. Prior to that, it had been redeeming $95 billion of maturing securities a month. The new runoff amount is $60 billion per month. Unless neutralized in other ways, the runoff has a contractionary effect on bank reserves and the money supply. It is known as “quantitative tightening” (QT). but then the May announcement was a de facto easing in the degree of QT.
Thus far, the total reduction in the Fed’s portfolio has amounted to only $1.7 trillion from the original high-water mark of $8.9 trillion. Here is a chart showing the recent evolution in the size of the Fed’s securities holdings.
The Fed’s current balance sheet of $7.2 trillion is gigantic by historical standards. It’s reasonable to ask why the Fed considers what we have now to be a more “normalized” portfolio, and whether its size (and correspondingly, the money supply) represents potential “dry tinder” for future inflation. It remains to be seen whether the Fed will further pare the rate of portfolio runoff in the months ahead.
Money growth had been running negative for roughly a year and a half, but it edged closer to zero in late 2023 before accelerating to a slow, positive rate a few months into 2024. The timing didn’t exactly correspond to the Fed’s slowing of portfolio runoff. Nevertheless, the Fed’s strong preference is to supply the banking system with “ample reserves”, and reserves drive money growth. Thus, the Fed’s reaction to conditions in the market for reserves was a factor allowing money growth to accelerate.
A Cut Too Soon?
A rate cut later this month will make reserves still more ample and support additional money growth. And again, this will be an effort to mediate the negative impact of earlier policy tightness, but the effect of this move on the economy will be subject to similar lags.
A danger is that the Fed might be easing too soon, so that inflation will fail to taper to the 2% goal and possibly accelerate again. And perhaps policy was not quite as tight as it needed to be to achieve the 2% goal. Now, new supply bottlenecks are cropping up, including a near shutdown of shipping through the Suez Canal and a potential strike by east coast dockworkers.
Fiscal Incontinence
An even greater threat now, and in the years ahead, is the massive pressure placed on the economy and the Fed by excessive federal spending and Treasury borrowing. The growth of federal debt over the 12 months ending in July was almost 10%. Total federal debt stands at about $35 trillion. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections, federal debt held by the public will be almost $28 trillion by the end of 2024 (the rest the public debt is held by the Fed or federal agencies). The CBO also projects that the federal budget deficit will average almost $1.7 trillion annually through 2027 before rising to $2.6 trillion by 2034. That would bring federal debt held by the public to more than $48 trillion.
Inflation is receding ever so slowly for now, but it’s unclear that investors will remain comfortable that growth in the public debt can be paid down by future surpluses. If not, the only way its real value can be reduced is through higher prices. Most observers believe such an inflation requires that the Fed monetize federal debt (buy it from the public with printed money). Tighter credit markets will increase pressure on the Fed to do so, but the growing debt burden is likely to exert upward pressure on the prices of goods with or without accommodation by the Fed.
Hard, Soft, Or Aborted Landing?
Some economists are convinced that the Fed has successfully engineered a “soft landing”. I might have to eat some crow…. I felt that a “hard landing” was inevitable from the start of this tightening phase. Even now I would not discount the possibility of a recession late this year or in early 2025. And perhaps we’ll get no “landing” at all. The Fed’s expected policy shift together with the fiscal outlook could presage not just a failure to get inflation down to the Fed’s 2% target, but a subsequent resurgence in price inflation.
The Fed’s “higher for longer” path for short-term interest rates lingers on, and so does inflation in excess of the Fed’s 2% target. No one should be surprised that rate cuts aren’t yet on the table, but the markets freaked out a little with the release of the February CPI numbers last week, which were higher than expected. For now, it only means the Fed will remain patient with the degree of monetary restraint already achieved.
Dashed Hopes
As I’ve said before, there was little reason for the market to have expected the Fed to cut rates aggressively this year. Just a couple of months ago, the market expected as many as six quarter-point cuts in the Fed’s target for the federal funds rate. The only rationale for that reaction would have been faster disinflation or the possibility of an economic “hard landing”. A downturn is not out of the question, especially if the Fed feels compelled to raise its rate target again in an effort to stem a resurgence in inflation. Maybe some traders felt the Fed would act politically, cutting rates aggressively as the presidential election approaches. Not yet anyway, and it seems highly unlikely.
There is no assurance that the Fed can succeed in engineering a “soft landing”, i.e., disinflation to its 2% goal without a recession. No one can claim any certainty on that point — it’s too early to call, though the odds have improved somewhat. As Scott Sumner succinctly puts it, a soft landing basically depends on whether the Fed can disinflate gradually enough.
It’s a Demand-Side Inflation
I’d like to focus a little more on Sumner’s perspective on Fed policy because it has important implications for the outlook. Sumner is a so-called market monetarist and a leading proponent of nominal GDP level targeting by the Fed. He takes issue with those ascribing the worst of the pandemic inflation to supply shocks. There’s no question that disruptions occurred on the supply side, but the Fed did more than accommodate those shocks in attempting to minimize their impact on real output and jobs. In fact, it can fairly be said that a Fed / Treasury collaboration managed to execute the biggest “helicopter drop” of money in the history of the world, by far!
That “helicopter drop” consisted of pandemic relief payments, a fiscal maneuver amounting to a gigantic monetary expansion and stimulus to demand. The profligacy has continued on the fiscal side since then, with annual deficits well in excess of $1 trillion and no end in sight. This reflects government demand against which the Fed can’t easily act to countervail, making the job of achieving a soft landing that much more difficult.
The Treasury, however, is finding a more limited appetite among investors for the flood of bonds it must regularly sell to fund the deficit. Recent increases in long-term Treasury rates reflect these large funding needs as well as the “higher-for-longer” outlook for short-term rates, inflation expectations, and of course better perceived investment alternatives.
The Nominal GDP Proof
There should be no controversy that inflation is a demand-side problem. As Summer says, supply shocks tend to reverse themselves over time, and that was largely the case as the pandemic wore on in 2021. Furthermore, advances in both real and nominal GDP have continued since then. The difference between the two is inflation, which again, has remained above the Fed’s target.
So let’s see… output and prices both growing? That combination of gains demonstrates that demand has been the primary driver of inflation for three-plus years. Restrictive monetary policy is the right prescription for taming excessive demand growth and inflation.
Here’s Sumner from early March (emphasis his), where he references flexible average inflation targeting (FAIT), a policy the Fed claims to be following, and nominal GDP level targeting (NGDPLT):
“Over the past 4 years, the PCE price index is up 16.7%. Under FAIT it should have risen by 8.2% (i.e., 2%/year). Thus we’ve had roughly 8.5% excess inflation (a bit less due to compounding.)
Aggregate demand (NGDP) is up by 27.6%. Under FAIT targeting (which is similar to NGDPLT) it should have been up by about 17% (i.e., 4%/year). So we’ve had a bit less than 10.6% extra demand growth. That explains all of the extra inflation.”
Is Money “Tight”?
The Fed got around to tightening policy in the spring of 2022, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that policy ever advanced to the “tight” stage. Sumner has been vocal in asserting that the Fed’s policy hasn’t looked especially restrictive. Money growth feeds demand and ultimately translates into nominal GDP growth (aggregate demand). The latter is growing too rapidly to bring inflation into line with the 2% target. But wait! Money growth has been moderately negative since the Fed began tightening. How does that square with Sumner’s view?
In fact, the M2 money supply is still approximately 35% greater than at the start of the pandemic. There’s still a lot of M2 sloshing around out there, and the Fed’s portfolio of securities acquired during the pandemic via “quantitative easing” remains quite large ($7.5 trillion). Does this sound like tight money?
Again, Sumner would say that with nominal GDP ripping ahead at 5.7%, the Fed can’t be credibly targeting 2% inflation given an allowance for real GDP growth at trend of around 1.8% (or even somewhat greater than that). It’s an even bigger stretch if M2 velocity (V — turnover) continues to rebound with higher interest rates.
Wage growth also exceeds a level consistent with the Fed’s target. The chart below shows the gap between price inflation and wage inflation that left real wages well below pre-pandemic levels. Since early 2023, wages have made up part of that decline, but stubborn wage inflation can impede progress against price inflation.
Just Tight Enough?
Despite Sumner’s doubts, there are arguments to be made that Fed policy qualifies as restrictive. Even moderate declines in liquidity can come as a shock to markets grown accustomed to torrents from the money supply firehose. And to the extent that inflation expectations have declined, real interest rates may be higher now than they were in early November. In any case, it’s clear the market was disappointed in the higher-than-expected CPI, and traders were not greatly assuaged by the moderate report on the PPI that followed.
However, the Fed pays closest attention to another price index: the core deflator for personal consumption expenditures (PCE). Inflation by this measure is trending much closer to the Fed’s target (see the second chart below). Still, from the viewpoint of traders, many of whom, not long ago, expected six rate cuts this year, the reality of “higher for longer” is a huge disappointment.
Danger Lurks
As I noted, many believe the odds of a soft landing have improved. However, the now-apparent “stickiness” of inflation and the knowledge that the Fed will standby or possibly hike rates again has rekindled fears that the economy could turn south before the Fed elects to cut its short-term interest rate target. That might surprise Sumner in the absence of more tightening, as his arguments are partly rooted in the continuing strength of aggregate demand and nominal GDP growth.
There’s a fair degree of consensus that the labor market remains strong, which underscores Sumner’s doubts as to the actual tenor of monetary policy. The March employment numbers were deceptive, however. The gain in civilian employment was just shy of 500,000, but that gain was entirely in part-time employment. Full-time employment actually declined slightly. In fact, the same is true over the prior 12 months. And over that period, the number of multiple jobholders increased by more than total employment. Increasing reliance on part-time work and multiple jobs is a sign of stress on household budgets and that firms may be reluctant to commit to full-time hires. From the establishment survey, the gain in nonfarm employment was dominated once again by government and health care. These numbers hardly support the notion that the economy is on solid footing.
There are other signs of stress: credit card delinquencies hit an all-time high in February. High interest rates are taking a toll on households and business borrowers. Retail sales were stronger than expected in March, but excess savings accumulated during the pandemic were nearly depleted as of February, so it’s not clear how long the spending can last. And while the index of leading indicators inched up in February, it was the first gain in two years and the index has shown year/over-year declines over that entire two-year period.
Conclusion
It feels a little hollow for me to list a series of economic red flags, having done so a few times over the past year or so. The risks of a hard landing are there, to be sure. The behavior of the core PCE deflator over the next few months will have much more influence on the Fed policy, as would any dramatic changes in the real economy. The “data dependence” of policy is almost a cliche at this point. The Fed will stand pat for now, and I doubt the Fed will raise its rate target without a dramatic upside surprise on the core deflator. Likewise, any downward rate moves won’t be forthcoming without more softening in the core deflator toward 2% or definitive signs of a recession. So rate cuts aren’t likely for some months to come.
When Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell said “higher for longer” last year, it wasn’t about the Grateful Dead concerts he’s attended over the years. No, he meant the Fed might need to raise its short-term interest rate target and/or keep it elevated for an extended period to squeeze inflation out of the economy. As late as December, Powell said that additional rate hikes remain on the table. But short of that, the Fed might keep its current target rate steady until inflation is solidly in-line with its 2% objective. The obvious risk is that tight monetary policy might tip the economy into recession. The market, for its part, is pricing in several rate cuts this year.
Thus far, the release of key economic data for December 2023 has not settled the debate as to whether disinflation has truly paused short of the Fed’s goal. There were inauspicious signs from the labor market in December as well. These data releases don’t rule out a “soft landing”, but they indicate that recession risks are still with us in 2024. The Fed will face a dilemma if the economy weakens but inflation fails to abate, either due to residual stickiness or new supply shocks. The latter are unfolding even now with the shut down of Red Sea shipping.
Bad Employment Report
On the surface, the employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) was strong relative to expectations, and the media reported it on that superficial level: nonfarm payrolls increased by 216,000 jobs, about 45,000 more than expected; unemployment was unchanged from November at 3.7%.
Unfortunately, the report contained several ominous signs:
1) Employment from the BLS Household Survey declined by 683,000 in December and is essentially flat since July. This discrepancy should be rather unsettling to anyone waving off the possibility of a recession.
2) The number of full-time workers decreased by 1.53 million in December, and the number of part-time workers increased by 762,000 as the holidays approached. Retail employment was not particularly strong however, and the big loss of full-time work stands in contrast to the “strong-report” narrative.
3) The number of multiple jobholders hit a record and increased by 556,000 over the past year. This might indicate trouble for some workers making ends meet.
5) The civilian labor force declined by 676,000. What accounts for the change in status among these former workers or job seekers?
6) From the BLS Establishment Survey, government hiring accounted for 24% of the nonfarm jobs filled in December. Social Services accounted for 10% of the new hiring and health care for 18%, both of which are heavily dependent on government.
7) Nonfarm payrolls were revised downward by a total of 71,000 for October and November. We’ve seen downward revisions for 10 of the past 11 months.
8) In total, initial monthly job reports in 2023 overstated the full-year gain in nonfarm employment after available revisions by 439,000.
Those are big qualifiers on the “stronger than expected” jobs report. Furthermore, I tend to discount new government jobs as a real engine of production possibilities, so the report didn’t offer much assurance about the economy’s momentum. In addition, there are estimates that the payroll gain was due to better weather than the seasonal adjustment factors indicate.
Fictional Payroll Gains?
Still other issues cast doubt on the BLS payroll numbers. First, they are based on a survey of employers that is not complete by the time of each month’s initial report. Second, the survey is heavily skewed toward employees of government and large corporations; the sample of small employers is light by comparison. Third, seasonal adjustments often swamp the unadjusted changes in payrolls.
Finally, the BLS uses a statistical model of business births/deaths to adjust the figures. This is intended to correct for a lag in survey coverage as new businesses are formed and others close. The net effect on the payroll estimate can be positive or negative. Unfortunately, it’s difficult for even the BLS to tell how much the birth/death model affects the headline nonfarm jobs figure in any particular month. Therefore, it’s tough to put much faith in the monthly reports, but we watch them anyway.
Stubborn Inflation
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) for December increased 0.3% over November and 3.4% year-over-year, slightly more than expectations of 0.2% and 3.2%, respectively. The “core” CPI (excluding food and energy prices) rose 3.9% year-over-year, more than the 3.8% expected. The core rate declined on a one-month and year-over-year basis, however, as did the median item in the CPI.
All CPI measures in the chart declined during 2023, though the core and median lagged the headline CPI (green line), which “flattened” somewhat during the last half of the year. So there appears to be some stickiness hindering disinflation in the CPI at this point, but the apparent “stickiness” has been confined to lagging declines in housing costs (also see here).
The Producer Price Index (PPI) reported a day later was thought to be benign. Like the CPI, disinflation in the core PPI has tapered:
In this context, it should be noted that declines in the Fed’s preferred inflation gauge, the PCE deflator, have also undergone something of a pause, and the PCE weights housing costs much less heavily than the CPI.
The CPI and PPI reports don’t offer any reason for the Fed to reduce its target federal funds rate over the next couple of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings. There are two more sets of monthly inflation reports before the meeting in late March, so things could change. But again, the Fed has given ample guidance that it might have to leave its target rate at the current level for an extended period.
The Market View
Markets had priced-in six cuts in the Fed funds rate target in 2024 prior to the CPI report, but traders began to discount that possibility in its immediate aftermath. However, members of the FOMC expected an average of three cuts in 2024, with more to come in 2025, whether or not that’s consistent with “higher for longer”. Inflation is hovering somewhat above the Fed’s goal, but getting the rest of the job done might be tough, and indeed, might imply “longer” if not “higher”.
But why did the market ever hold the expectation of six cuts this year? Traders must have anticipated an economic contraction, which would kick the Fed into rapid response mode. The employment report offered no assurance that such a “hard landing” will be avoided. A few more negative signals on the real economy without further progress on prices would provide quite a test of the Fed’s inflation-fighting resolve.
Policy activists have long maintained that manipulating government policy can stabilize the economy. In other words, big spending initiatives, tax cuts, and money growth can lift the economy out of recessions, or budget cuts and monetary contraction can prevent overheating and inflation. However, this activist mirage burned away under the light of experience. It’s not that fiscal and monetary policy are powerless. It’s a matter of practical limitations that often cause these tools to be either impotent or destabilizing to the economy, rather than smoothing fluctuations in the business cycle.
The macroeconomics classes seem like yesterday: Keynesian professors lauded the promise of wise government stabilization efforts: policymakers could, at least in principle, counter economic shocks, particularly on the demand side. That optimistic narrative didn’t end after my grad school days. I endured many client meetings sponsored by macro forecasters touting the fine-tuning of fiscal and monetary policy actions. Some of those economists were working with (and collecting revenue from) government policymakers, who are always eager to validate their pretensions as planners (and saviors). However, seldom if ever do forecasters conduct ex post reviews of their model-spun policy scenarios. In fairness, that might be hard to do because all sorts of things change from initial conditions, but it definitely would not be in their interests to emphasize the record.
In this post I attempt to explain why you should be skeptical of government stabilization efforts. It’s sort of a lengthy post, so I’ve listed section headings below in case readers wish to scroll to points of most interest. Pick and choose, if necessary, though some context might get lost in the process.
Expectations Change the World
Fiscal Extravagance
Multipliers In the Real World
Delays
Crowding Out
Other Peoples’ Money
Tax Policy
Monetary Policy
Boom and Bust
Inflation Targeting
Via Rate Targeting
Policy Coordination
Who Calls the Tune?
Stable Policy, Stable Economy
Expectations Change the World
There were always some realists in the economics community. In May we saw the passing of one such individual: Robert Lucas was a giant intellect within the economics community, and one from whom I had the pleasure of taking a class as a graduate student. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1995 for his applications of rational expectations theory and completely transforming macro research. As Tyler Cowen notes, Keynesians were often hostile to Lucas’ ideas. I remember a smug classmate, in class, telling the esteemed Lucas that an important assumption was “fatuous”. Lucas fired back, “You bastard!”, but proceeded to explain the underlying logic. Cowen uses the word “charming” to describe the way Lucas disarmed his critics, but he could react strongly to rude ignorance.
Lucas gained professional fame in the 1970s for identifying a significant vulnerability of activist macro policy. David Henderson explains the famous “Lucas Critique” in the Wall Street Journal:
“… because these models were from periods when people had one set of expectations, the models would be useless for later periods when expectations had changed. While this might sound disheartening for policy makers, there was a silver lining. It meant, as Lucas’s colleague Thomas Sargent pointed out, that if a government could credibly commit to cutting inflation, it could do so without a large increase in unemployment. Why? Because people would quickly adjust their expectations to match the promised lower inflation rate. To be sure, the key is government credibility, often in short supply.”
Non-credibility is a major pitfall of activist macro stabilization policies that renders them unreliable and frequently counterproductive. And there are a number of elements that go toward establishing non-credibility. We’ll distinguish here between fiscal and monetary policy, focusing on the fiscal side in the next several sections.
Fiscal Extravagance
We’ve seen federal spending and budget deficits balloon in recent years. Chronic and growing budget deficits make it difficult to deliver meaningful stimulus, both practically and politically.
The next chart is from the most recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report. It shows the growing contribution of interest payments to deficit spending. Ever-larger deficits mean ever-larger amounts of debt on which interest is owed, putting an ever-greater squeeze on government finances going forward. This is particularly onerous when interest rates rise, as they have over the past few years. Both new debt is issued and existing debt is rolled over at higher cost.
Relief payments made a large contribution to the deficits during the pandemic, but more recent legislation (like the deceitfully-named Inflation Reduction Act) piled-on billions of new subsidies for private investments of questionable value, not to mention outright handouts. These expenditures had nothing to do with economic stabilization and no prayer of reducing inflation. Pissing away money and resources only hastens the debt and interest-cost squeeze that is ultimately unsustainable without massive inflation.
Hardly anyone with future political ambitions wants to address the growing entitlements deficit … but it will catch up with them. Social Security and Medicare are projected to exhaust their respective trust funds in the early- to mid-2030s, which will lead to mandatory benefit cuts in the absence of reform.
If it still isn’t obvious, the real problem driving the budget imbalance is spending, not revenue, as the next CBO chart demonstrates. The “emergency” pandemic measures helped precipitate our current stabilization dilemma. David Beckworth tweets that the relief measures “spurred a rapid recovery”, though I’d hasten to add that a wave of private and public rejection of extreme precautions in some regions helped as well. And after all, the pandemic downturn was exaggerated by misdirected policies including closures and lockdowns that constrained both the demand and supply sides. Beckworth acknowledges the relief measures “propelled inflation”, but the pandemic also seemed to leave us on a permanently higher spending path. Again, see the first chart below.
The second chart below shows that non-discretionary spending (largely entitlements) and interest outlays are how we got on that path. The only avenue for countercyclical spending is discretionary expenditures, which constitute an ever-smaller share of the overall budget.
We’ve had chronic deficits for years, but we’ve shifted to a much larger and continuing imbalance. With more deficits come higher interest costs, especially when interest rates follow a typical upward cyclical pattern. This creates a potentially explosive situation that is best avoided via fiscal restraint.
Putting other doubts about fiscal efficacy aside, it’s all but impossible to stimulate real economic activity when you’ve already tapped yourself out and overshot in the midst of a post-pandemic economic expansion.
Multipliers In the Real World
So-called spending multipliers are deeply beloved by Keynesians and pork-barrel spenders. These multipliers tell us that every dollar of extra spending ultimately raises income by some multiple of that dollar. This assumes that a portion of every dollar spent by government is re-spent by the recipient, and a portion of that is re-spent again by another recipient. But spending multipliers are never what they’re cracked up to be for a variety of reasons. (I covered these in“Multipliers Are For Politicians”, and also see this post.) There are leakages out of the re-spending process (income taxes, saving, imports), which trim the ultimate impact of new spending on income. When supply constraints bind on economic activity, fiscal stimulus will be of limited power in real terms.
If stimulus is truly expected to be counter-cyclical and transitory, as is generally claimed, then much of each dollar of extra government spending will be saved rather than spent. This is the lesson of the permanent income hypothesis. It means greater leakages from the re-spending stream and a lower multiplier. We saw this with the bulge in personal savings in the aftermath of pandemic relief payments.
Another side of this coin, however, is that cutting checks might be the government’s single-most efficient activity in execution, but it can create massive incentive problems. Some recipients are happy to forego labor market participation as long as the government keeps sending them checks, but at least they spend some of the income.
Delays
Another unappreciated and destabilizing downside of fiscal stimulus is that it often comes too late, just when the economy doesn’t need stimulus. That’s because a variety of delays are inherent in many spending initiatives: legislative, regulatory, legal challenges, planning and design, distribution to various spending authorities, and final disbursement. As I noted here:
“Even government infrastructure projects, heralded as great enhancers of American productivity, are often subject to lengthy delays and cost overruns due to regulatory and environmental rules. Is there any such thing as a federal ‘shovel-ready’ infrastructure project?”
Crowding Out
The supply of savings is limited, but when government borrows to fund deficits, it directly competes with private industry for those savings. Thus, funds that might otherwise pay for new plant, equipment, and even R&D are diverted to uses that should qualify as government consumption rather than long-term investment. Government competition for funds “crowds-out” private activity and impedes growth in the economy’s productive capacity. Thus, the effort to stimulate economic activity is self-defeating in some respects.
Other Peoples’ Money
Government doesn’t respond to price signals the way self-interested private actors do. This indifference leads to mis-allocated resources and waste. It extends to the creation of opportunities for graft and corruption, typically involving diversion of resources into uses that are of questionable productivity (corn ethanol, solar and wind subsidies).
Consider one other type of policy action perceived as counter-cyclical: federal bailouts of failing financial institutions or other troubled businesses. These rescues prop up unproductive enterprises rather than allowing waste to be flushed from the system, which should be viewed as a beneficial aspect of recession. The upshot is that too many efforts at economic stabilization are misdirected, wasteful, ill-timed, and pro-cyclical in impact.
Tax Policy
Like stabilization efforts on the spending side, tax changes may be badly timed. Tax legislation is often complex and can take time for consumers and businesses to adjust. In terms of traditional multiplier analysis, the initial impact of a tax change on spending is smaller than for expenditures, so tax multipliers are smaller. And to the extent that a tax change is perceived as temporary, it is made less effective. Thus, while changes in tax policy can have powerful real effects, they suffer from some of the same practical shortcomings for stabilization as changes in spending.
However, stimulative tax cuts, if well crafted, can boost disposable incomes and improve investment and work incentives. As temporary measures, that might mean an acceleration of certain kinds of activity. Tax increases reduce disposable incomes and may blunt incentives, or prompt delays in planned activities. Thus, tax policy may bear on the demand side as well as the timing of shifts in the economy’s productive potential or supply side.
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is subject to problems of its own. Again, I refer to practical issues that are seemingly impossible for policy activists to overcome. Monetary policy is conducted by the nation’s central bank, the Federal Reserve (aka, the Fed). It is theoretically independent of the federal government, but the Fed operates under a dual mandate established by Congress to maintain price stability and full employment. Therein lies a basic problem: trying to achieve two goals that are often in conflict with a single policy tool.
Make no mistake: variations in money supply growth can have powerful effects. Nevertheless, they are difficult to calibrate due to “long and variable lags” as well as changes in money “velocity” (or turnover) often prompted by interest rate movements. Excessively loose money can lead to economic excesses and an overshooting of capacity constraints, malinvestment, and inflation. Swinging to a tight policy stance in order to correct excesses often leads to “hard landings”, or recession.
Boom and Bust
The Fed fumbled its way into engineering the Great Depression via excessively tight monetary policy. “Stop and go” policies in the 1970s led to recurring economic instability. Loose policy contributed to the housing bubble in the 2000s, and subsequent maladjustments led to a mortgage crisis (also see here). Don’t look now, but the inflationary consequences of the Fed’s profligacy during the pandemic prompted it to raise short-term interest rates in the spring of 2022. It then acted with unprecedented speed in raising rates over the past year. While raising rates is not always synonymous with tightening monetary conditions, money growth has slowed sharply. These changes might well lead to recession. Thus, the Fed seems given to a pathology of policy shifts that lead to unintentional booms and busts.
Inflation Targeting
The Fed claims to follow a so-called flexible inflation targeting policy. In reality, it has reacted asymmetrically to departures from its inflation targets. It took way too long for the Fed to react to the post-pandemic surge in inflation, dithering for months over whether the surge was “transitory”. It wasn’t, but the Fed was reluctant to raise its target rates in response to supply disruptions. At the same time, the Fed’s own policy actions contributed massively to demand-side price pressures. Also neglected is the reality that higher inflation expectations propel inflation on the demand side, even when it originates on the supply side.
Via Rate Targeting
At a more nuts and bolts level, today the Fed’s operating approach is to control money growth by setting target levels for several key short-term interest rates (eschewing a more direct approach to the problem). This relies on price controls (short-term interest rates being the price of liquidity) rather than allowing market participants to determine the rates at which available liquidity is allocated. Thus, in the short run, the Fed puts itself into the position of supplying whatever liquidity is demanded at the rates it targets. The Fed makes periodic adjustments to these rate targets in an effort to loosen or tighten money, but it can be misdirected in a world of high debt ratios in which rates themselves drive the growth of government borrowing. For example, if higher rates are intended to reduce money growth and inflation, but also force greater debt issuance by the Treasury, the approach might backfire.
Policy Coordination
While nominally independent, the Fed knows that a particular monetary policy stance is more likely to achieve its objectives if fiscal policy is not working at cross purposes. For example, tight monetary policy is more likely to succeed in slowing inflation if the federal government avoids adding to budget deficits. Bond investors know that explosive increases in federal debt are unlikely to be repaid out of future surpluses, so some other mechanism must come into play to achieve real long-term balance in the valuation of debt with debt payments. Only inflation can bring the real value of outstanding Treasury debt into line. Continuing to pile on new debt simply makes the Fed’s mandate for price stability harder to achieve.
Who Calls the Tune?
The Fed has often succumbed to pressure to monetize federal deficits in order to keep interest rates from rising. This obviously undermines perceptions of Fed independence. A willingness to purchase large amounts of Treasury bills and bonds from the public while fiscal deficits run rampant gives every appearance that the Fed simply serves as the Treasury’s printing press, monetizing government deficits. A central bank that is a slave to the spending proclivities of politicians cannot make credible inflation commitments, and cannot effectively conduct counter-cyclical policy.
Stable Policy, Stable Economy
Activist policies for economic stabilization are often perversely destabilizing for a variety of reasons. Good timing requires good forecasts, but economic forecasting is notoriously difficult. The magnitude and timing of fiscal initiatives are usually wrong, and this is compounded by wasteful planning, allocative dysfunction, and a general absence of restraint among political leaders as well as the federal bureaucracy..
Predicting the effects of monetary policy is equally difficult and, more often than not, leads to episodes of over- and under-adjustment. In addition, the wrong targets, the wrong operating approach, and occasional displays of subservience to fiscal pressure undermine successful stabilization. All of these issues lead to doubts about the credibility of policy commitments. Stated intentions are looked upon with doubt, increasing uncertainty and setting in motion behaviors that lead to undesirable economic consequences.
The best policies are those that can be relied upon by private actors, both as a matter of fulfilling expectations and avoiding destabilization. Federal budget policy should promote stability, but that’s not achievable institutions unable to constrain growth in spending and deficits. Budget balance would promote stability and should be the norm over business cycles, or perhaps over periods as long as typical 10-year budget horizons. Stimulus and restraint on the fiscal side should be limited to the effects of so-called automatic stabilizers, such as tax rates and unemployment compensation. On the monetary side, the Fed would do more to stabilize the economy by adopting formal rules, whether a constant rate of money growth or symmetric targeting of nominal GDP.
It’s as if people view the debt limit controversy as a political nuisance rather than the stopgap enforcement mechanism for fiscal sanity that it’s intended to be. That’s a lesson in how far we’ve gone toward an unhealthy acceptance of permanent federal deficits. Oh, most people seem to realize the the government’s spending is prodigious and beyond our capacity to collect taxes, but many don’t grasp the recklessness of the ongoing blowout. Federal deficits are expected to average $1.6 trillion per year over the next decade, versus less than $0.9 trillion and $1.25 trillion over the two previous decades, respectively. That $1.25 trillion includes the massive (and excessive) transfers that took place during the pandemic, which is why we’ve bumped up against the debt limit earlier than had been expected. The trend isn’t abating, despite the fact that the pandemic is behind us. And keep in mind that the Congressional Budget Office has been too optimistic for the past 20 years or so. Take a look at federal debt relative to GDP:
Unpleasant Arithmetic
With federal debt growing faster than GDP, the burden of servicing the debt mounts. This creates a strain in the coordination of fiscal and monetary policy, as described by David Andolfatto, who last year reviewed the implications of “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic” for current policy. His title was taken from a seminal paper written by Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace in 1981. Andolfatto says that:
“… attempting to monetize a smaller fraction of outstanding Treasury securities has the effect of increasing the rate of inflation. A tighter monetary policy ends up increasing the interest expense of debt issuance. And if the fiscal authority is unwilling to curtail the rate of debt issuance, the added interest expense must be monetized—at least if outright default is to be avoided.
Andolfatto wrote that last spring, before the Federal Reserve began its ongoing campaign to tighten monetary policy by raising short-term interest rates. But he went on to say:
“Deficit and debt levels are elevated relative to their historical norms, and the current administration seems poised to embark on an ambitious public spending program. … In the event that inflation rises and then remains intolerably above target, the Federal Reserve is expected to raise its policy rate. … if the fiscal authority is determined to pursue its deficit policy into the indefinite future, raising the policy rate may only keep a lid on inflation temporarily and possibly only at the expense of a recession. In the longer run, an aggressive interest rate policy may contribute to inflationary pressure—at least until the fiscal regime changes.”
So it is with a spendthrift government: escalating debt and interest expense must ultimately be dealt with via higher taxes or inflation, despite the best intentions of a monetary authority.
Fiscal Wrasslin’
Some people think the debt limit debate is all a big fake. Maybe … there are spendthrifts on both sides of the aisle. Still, the current debt limit impasse could serve a useful purpose if fiscal conservatives succeed in efforts to restrain spending. There is, however, an exaggerated uproar over the possibility of default, meaning a failure to make scheduled payments on Treasury securities. The capital markets aren’t especially worried because an outright default is very unlikely. Establishment Republicans may well resort to their usual cowardice and accept compromise without holding out for better controls on spending. Already, in a politically defensive gesture, House Speaker Kevin McCarthy has said the GOP wishes to strengthen certain entitlement programs. Let’s hope he really means restoring solvency to the Social Security and Medicare Trust Funds via fundamental reforms. And if the GOP rules out cuts to any program, let’s hope they don’t rule out cuts in the growth of these programs, or privatization. For their part, of course, Democrats would like to eliminate the debt ceiling entirely.
One of the demands made by Republicans is a transformation of the federal tax system. They would like to eliminate the income tax and substitute a tax on consumption. Economists have long favored the latter because it would eliminate incentives that penalize saving, which undermine economic growth. Unfortunately, this is almost dead in the water as a political matter, but the GOP further sabotaged their own proposal in their zeal to abolish the IRS. Their consumption tax would be implemented as a national sales tax applied at the point of sale, complete with a new Treasury agency to administer the tax. They’d have done better to propose a value added tax (VAT) or a tax on a simple base of income less saving (and other allowances).
Gimmicks and Measures
We’ve seen proposals for various accounting tricks to allow the government to avoid a technical default and buy time for an agreement to be reached on the debt limit. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen already has implemented “extraordinary measures” to stay under the debt limit until June, she estimates. The Treasury is drawing down cash, skipping additional investments in government retirement accounts (which can be made up later without any postponement of benefits), plus a few other creative accounting maneuvers.
Payment prioritization, whereby the Treasury makes payments on debt and critical programs such as Social Security and Medicare, but defers a variety of other payments, has also been considered. Those deferrals could include amounts owed to contractors or even government salaries. However, a deferral of payments owed to anyone represents a de facto default. Thus, payment prioritization is not a popular idea, but if push comes to shove, it might be viewed as the lesser of two evils. Missing payments on government bonds could precipitate a financial crisis, but no one believes it will come to that.
Two other ideas for avoiding a breach of the debt ceiling are rather audacious. One involves raising new cash via the sale of premium bonds by the Treasury, as described here by Josh Barro (and here by Matt Levine). The other idea is to mint a large denomination ($1 trillion) platinum, “commemorative” coin, which the Treasury would deposit at the Federal Reserve, enabling it to conduct business as usual until the debt limit impasse is resolved. I’ll briefly describe each of these ideas in more detail below.
Premium Bonds
Premium bonds would offer a solution to the debt limit controversy because the debt ceiling is defined in terms of the par value of Treasury debt outstanding, as opposed to the amount actually raised from selling bonds at auction. For example, a note that promises to pay $100 in one year has a par value of $100. If it also promises to pay $100 in interest, it will sell at a steep premium. Thus, the Treasury collects, say, $185 at auction, and it could use the proceeds to pay off $100 of maturing debt and fund $85 of federal spending. That would almost certainly require a “market test” by the Treasury on a limited scale, and the very idea might reveal any distaste the market might have for obviating the debt limit in this fashion. But distaste is probably too mild a word.
An extreme example of this idea is for the Treasury to sell perpetuities, which have a zero par value but pay interest forever, or at least until redeemed beyond some minimum (but lengthy) term. John Cochrane has made this suggestion, though mainly just “for fun”. The British government sold perpetuities called consols for many years. Such bonds would completely circumvent the debt limit, at least without legislation to redefine the limit, which really is long overdue.
The $1 Trillion Coin
Minting a trillion dollar coin is another thing entirely. Barro has a separate discussion of this option, as does Cochrane. The idea was originally proposed and rejected during an earlier debt-limit controversy in 2011. Keep in mind, in what follows, that the Fed does not follow Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
Skeptics might be tempted to conclude that the “coin trick” is a ploy to engineer a huge increase the money supply to fund government expansion, but that’s not really the gist of this proposal. Instead, the Treasury would deposit the coin in its account at the Fed. The Fed would hold the coin and give the Treasury access to a like amount of cash. To raise that cash, the Fed would sell to the public $1 trillion out of its massive holdings of government securities. The Treasury would use that cash to meet its obligations without exceeding the debt ceiling. As Barro says, the Fed would essentially substitute sales of government bonds from its portfolio for bonds the Treasury is prohibited from selling under the debt limit. The effect on the supply of money is basically zero, and it is non-inflationary unless the approach has an unsettling impact on markets and inflation expectations (which of course is a distinct possibility).
When the debt ceiling is finally increased by Congress, the process is reversed. The Treasury can borrow again and redeem its coin from the Fed for $1 trillion, then “melt it down”, as Barro says. The Fed would repurchase from the public the government securities it had sold, adding them back to its portfolio (if that is consistent with its objectives at that time). Everything is a wash with respect to the “coin trick”, as long as the Treasury ultimately gets a higher debt limit.
Lust For the Coin
In fairness to skeptics, it’s easy to understand why the “coin trick” described above might be confused with another coin minting idea that arose from the collectivist vanguard during the pandemic. Representative Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) proposed minting coins to fund monthly relief payments of $1,000 – $2,000 for every American via electronic benefit cards. She was assisted in crafting this proposal by Rohan Grey, a prominent advocate of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), the misguided idea that government can simply print money to pay for the resources it demands without inflationary consequences.
Tlaib’s plan would have required the Federal Reserve to accept the minted coins as deposits into the Treasury’s checking account. But then, rather than neutralizing the impact on the money supply by selling government bonds, the coin itself would be treated as base money. Cash balances would simply be made available in the Treasury’s checking account with the Fed. That’s money printing, pure and simple, but it’s not at all the mechanism under discussion with respect to short-term circumvention of the debt limit.
Fed Independence
The “coin trick” as a debt limit work-around is probably an impossibility, as Barro and others point out. First, the Fed would have to accept the coin as a deposit, and it is under no legal obligation to do so. Second, it obligates the Fed to closely coordinate monetary policy with the Treasury, effectively undermining its independence and its ability to pursue its legal mandates of high employment and low inflation. Depending on how badly markets react, it might even present the Fed with conflicting objectives.
Believe me, you might not like the Fed, but we certainly don’t want a Fed that is subservient to the Treasury… maintaining financial and economic stability in the presence of an irresponsible fiscal authority is bad enough without seating that authority at the table. As Barro says of the “coin trick”:
“These actions would politicize the Fed and undermine its independence. In order to stabilize expectations about inflation, the Fed would have to communicate very clearly about its intentions to coordinate its fiscal actions with Treasury — that is, it would have to tell the world that it’s going to act as Treasury’s surrogate in selling bonds when Treasury can’t. …
These actions would interfere with the Fed’s normal monetary operations. … the Fed is currently already reducing its holdings of bonds as part of its strategy to fight inflation. If economic conditions change (fairly likely, in the event of a near-default situation) that might change the Fed’s desired balance sheet strategy.”
On With The Show
Discussions about the debt limit continue between the White House and both parties in Congress. Kevin McCarthy met with President Biden today (2/1), but apparently nothing significant came it. Fiscal conservatives wonder whether McCarthy and other members of the GOP lack seriousness when it comes to fiscal restraint. But spending growth must slow to achieve deficit reduction, non-inflationary growth, and financial stability.
Meanwhile, even conservative media pundits seem to focus only on the negative politics of deficit reduction, ceding the advantage to Democrats and other fiscal expansionists. For those pundits, the economic reality pales in significance. That is a mistake. Market participants are increasingly skeptical that the federal government will ever pay down its debts out of future surpluses. This will undermine the real value of government debt, other nominal assets, incomes and buying power. That’s the inflation tax in action.
Unbridled growth of the government’s claims on resources at the expense of the private sector destroys the economy’s productive potential, to say nothing of growth. The same goes for government’s insatiable urge to regulate private activities and to direct patterns of private resource use. Unfortunately, so many policy areas are in need of reform that imposition of top-down controls on spending seems attractive as a stopgap. Concessions on the debt limit should only be granted in exchange for meaningful change: limits on spending growth, regulatory reforms, and tax simplification (perhaps replacing the income tax with a consumption tax) should all be priorities.
In the meantime, let’s avoid trillion dollar coins. As a debt limit work-around, premium bonds are more practical without requiring any compromise to the Fed’s independence. Other accounting gimmicks will be used to avoid missing payments, of course, but the fact that premium bonds and platinum coins are under discussion highlights the need to redefine the debt limit. When the eventual time of default draws near, fiscal conservatives must be prepared to stand up to their opponents’ convenient accusations of “brinksmanship”. The allegation is insincere and merely a cover for government expansionism.
In advanced civilizations the period loosely called Alexandrian is usually associated with flexible morals, perfunctory religion, populist standards and cosmopolitan tastes, feminism, exotic cults, and the rapid turnover of high and low fads---in short, a falling away (which is all that decadence means) from the strictness of traditional rules, embodied in character and inforced from within. -- Jacques Barzun
Sacred Cow Chips 